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LudwigWittgenstein
OnCertainty(UberGewissheit)
ed.G.E.M.AnscombeandG.H.vonWright
TranslatedbyDenisPaulandG.E.M.Anscombe
BasilBlackwell,Oxford19691975
Preface
WhatwepublishherebelongstothelastyearandahalfofWittgenstein'slife.
Inthemiddleof1949hevisitedtheUnitedStatesattheinvitationofNorman
Malcolm,stayingatMalcolm'shouseinIthaca.Malcolmactedasagoadtohis
interestinMoore's'defenceofcommonsense',thatistosayhisclaimtoknowa
numberofpropositionsforsure,suchas"Hereisonehand,andhereis
another",and"Theearthexistedforalongtimebeforemybirth",and"Ihave
neverbeenfarfromtheearth'ssurface".ThefirstofthesecomesinMoore's
'ProofoftheExternalWorld'.Thetwoothersareinhis'DefenceofCommon
Sense'WittgensteinhadlongbeeninterestedintheseandhadsaidtoMoore
thatthiswashisbestarticle.Moorehadagreed.Thisbookcontainsthewhole
ofwhatWittgensteinwroteonthistopicfromthattimeuntilhisdeath.Itisall
firstdraftmaterial,whichhedidnotlivetoexcerptandpolish.
Thematerialfallsintofourpartswehaveshownthedivisionsat#65,#192,
#299.Whatwebelievetobethefirstpartwaswrittenontwentyloosesheetsof
linedfoolscap,undated.TheseWittgensteinleftinhisroomin
G.E.M.Anscombe'shouseinOxford,wherehelived(apartfromavisitto
Norwayintheautumn)fromApril1950toFebruary1951.I(G.E.M.A.)am
undertheimpressionthathehadwrittentheminVienna,wherehestayedfrom
thepreviousChristmasuntilMarchbutIcannotnowrecallthebasisofthis
impression.Therestisinsmallnotebooks,containingdatestowardstheend,
indeed,thedateofwritingisalwaysgiven.Thelastentryistwodaysbeforehis
deathonApril29th1951.Wehaveleftthedatesexactlyastheyappearinthe
manuscripts.Thenumberingofthesinglesections,however,isbytheEditors.
Itseemedappropriatetopublishthisworkbyitself.Itisnotaselection
Wittgensteinmarkeditoffinhisnotebooksasaseparatetopic,whichhe
apparentlytookupatfourseparateperiodsduringthiseighteenmonths.It
constitutesasinglesustainedtreatmentofthetopic.
G.E.M.Anscombe
G.H.vonWright

1.Ifyoudoknowthathereisonehand,we'llgrantyoualltherest.
Whenonesaysthatsuchandsuchapropositioncan'tbeproved,ofcoursethat
doesnotmeanthatitcan'tbederivedfromotherpropositionsanyproposition
canbederivedfromotherones.Buttheymaybenomorecertainthanitis
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itself.(OnthisacuriousremarkbyH.Newman.)
2.Fromitsseemingtomeortoeveryonetobeso,itdoesn'tfollowthatitis
so.
Whatwecanaskiswhetheritcanmakesensetodoubtit.
3.Ife.g.someonesays"Idon'tknowifthere'sahandhere"hemightbetold
"Lookcloser".Thispossibilityofsatisfyingoneselfispartofthelanguage
game.Isoneofitsessentialfeatures.
4."IknowthatIamahumanbeing."Inordertoseehowunclearthesenseof
thispropositionis,consideritsnegation.Atmostitmightbetakentomean"I
knowIhavetheorgansofahuman".(E.g.abrainwhich,afterall,noonehas
everyetseen.)Butwhataboutsuchapropositionas"IknowIhaveabrain"?
CanIdoubtit?Groundsfordoubtarelacking!Everythingspeaksinitsfavour,
nothingagainstit.Neverthelessitisimaginablethatmyskullshouldturnout
emptywhenitwasoperatedon.
5.WhetherapropositioncanturnoutfalseafteralldependsonwhatImake
countasdeterminantsforthatproposition.
6.Now,canoneenumeratewhatoneknows(likeMoore)?Straightofflikethat,
Ibelievenot.Forotherwisetheexpression"Iknow"getsmisused.And
throughthismisuseaqueerandextremelyimportantmentalstateseemstobe
revealed.
7.MylifeshowsthatIknoworamcertainthatthereisachairoverthere,ora
door,andsoon.Itellafriende.g."Takethatchairoverthere","Shutthe
door",etc.etc.
8.Thedifferencebetweentheconceptof'knowing'andtheconceptof'being
certain'isn'tofanygreatimportanceatall,exceptwhere"Iknow"ismeantto
mean:Ican'tbewrong.Inalawcourt,forexample,"Iamcertain"could
replace"Iknow"ineverypieceoftestimony.Wemightevenimagineitsbeing
forbiddentosay"Iknow"there.[Apassagein"WilhelmMeister",where"You
know"or"Youknew"isusedinthesense"Youwerecertain",thefactsbeing
differentfromwhatheknew.]
9.NowdoI,inthecourseofmylife,makesureIknowthathereisahandmy
ownhand,thatis?
10.Iknowthatasickmanislyinghere?Nonsense!Iamsittingathisbedside,I
amlookingattentivelyintohisface.SoIdon'tknow,then,thatthereisasick
manlyinghere?Neitherthequestionnortheassertionmakessense.Anymore
thantheassertion"Iamhere",whichImightyetuseatanymoment,ifsuitable
occasionpresenteditself.Thenis"2x2=4"nonsenseinthesameway,andnot
apropositionofarithmetic,apartfromparticularoccasions?"2x2=4"isatrue
propositionofarithmeticnot"onparticularoccasions"nor"always"butthe
spokenorwrittensentence"2x2=4"inChinesemighthaveadifferentmeaning
orbeoutandoutnonsense,andfromthisisseenthatitisonlyinusethatthe
propositionhasitssense.And"Iknowthatthere'sasickmanlyinghere",used
inanunsuitablesituation,seemsnottobenonsensebutratherseemsmatterof
course,onlybecauseonecanfairlyeasilyimagineasituationtofitit,andone
thinksthatthewords"Iknowthat..."arealwaysinplacewherethereisno
doubt,andhenceevenwheretheexpressionofdoubtwouldunintelligible.
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11.Wejustdonotseehowveryspecializedtheuseof"Iknow"is.
12.For"Iknow"seemstodescribeastateofaffairswhichguaranteeswhatis
known,guaranteesitasafact.Onealwaysforgetstheexpression"IthoughtI
knew".
13.Foritisnotasthoughtheproposition"Itisso"couldbeinferredfrom
someoneelse'sutterance:"Iknowitisso".Norfromtheutterancetogetherwith
itsnotbeingalie.Butcan'tIinfer"Itisso"frommyownutterance"Iknow
etc."?Yesandalso"Thereisahandthere"followsfromtheproposition"He
knowsthatthere'sahandthere".Butfromhisutterance"Iknow..."itdoesnot
followthathedoesknowit.
14.Thathedoesknowremainstobeshown.
15.Itneedstobeshownthatnomistakewaspossible.Givingtheassurance"I
know"doesn'tsuffice.ForitisafterallonlyanassurancethatIcan'tbemaking
amistake,anditneedstobeobjectivelyestablishedthatIamnotmakinga
mistakeaboutthat.
16."IfIknowsomething,thenIalsoknowthatIknowit,etc."amountsto:"I
knowthat"means"Iamincapableofbeingwrongaboutthat."ButwhetherI
amsomustadmitofbeingestablishedobjectively.
17.SupposenowIsay"I'mincapableofbeingwrongaboutthis:thatisabook"
whileIpointtoanobject.Whatwouldamistakeherebelike?AndhaveIany
clearideaofit?
18."Iknow"oftenmeans:Ihavethepropergroundsformystatement.Soifthe
otherpersonisacquaintedwiththelanguagegame,hewouldadmitthatIknow.
Theother,ifheisacquaintedwiththelanguagegame,mustbeabletoimagine
howonemayknowsomethingofthekind.
19.Thestatement"Iknowthathereisahand"maythenbecontinued:"forit's
myhandthatI'mlookingat."ThenareasonablemanwillnotdoubtthatIknow.
Norwilltheidealistratherhewillsaythathewasnotdealingwiththe
practicaldoubtwhichisbeingdismissed,butthereisafurtherdoubtbehindthat
one.Thatthisisanillusionhastobeshowninadifferentway.
20."Doubtingtheexistenceoftheexternalworld"doesnotmeanforexample
doubtingtheexistenceofaplanet,whichlaterobservationsprovedtoexist.Or
doesMoorewanttosaythatknowingthathereishishandisdifferentinkind
fromknowingtheexistenceoftheplanetSaturn?Otherwiseitwouldbe
possibletopointoutthediscoveryoftheplanetSaturntothedoubtersandsay
thatitsexistencehasbeenproved,andhencetheexistenceoftheexternalworld
aswell.
21.Moore'sviewreallycomesdowntothis:theconcept'know'isanalogousto
theconcepts'believe','surmise','doubt','beconvinced'inthatthestatement"I
know..."can'tbeamistake.Andifthatisso,thentherecanbeaninference
fromsuchanutterancetothetruthofanassertion.Andheretheform"Ithought
Iknew"isbeingoverlooked.Butifthislatterisinadmissible,thenamistake
intheassertionmustbelogicallyimpossibletoo.Andanyonewhois
acquaintedwiththelanguagegamemustrealizethisanassurancefroma
reliablemanthatheknowscannotcontributeanything.
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22.Itwouldsurelyberemarkableifwehadtobelievethereliablepersonwho
says"Ican'tbewrong"orwhosays"Iamnotwrong".
23.IfIdon'tknowwhethersomeonehastwohands(say,whethertheyhave
beenamputatedornot)Ishallbelievehisassurancethathehastwohands,ifhe
istrustworthy.Andifhesaysheknowsit,thatcanonlysignifytomethathe
hasbeenabletomakesure,andhencethathisarmsaree.g.notstillconcealed
bycoveringsandbandages,etc.etc.Mybelievingthetrustworthymanstems
frommyadmittingthatitispossibleforhimtomakesure.Butsomeonewho
saysthatperhapstherearenophysicalobjectsmakesnosuchadmission.
24.Theidealist'squestionwouldbesomethinglike:"WhatrighthaveInotto
doubttheexistenceofmyhands?"(Andtothattheanswercan'tbe:Iknowthat
theyexist.)Butsomeonewhoaskssuchaquestionisoverlookingthefactthata
doubtaboutexistenceonlyworksinalanguagegame.Hence,thatweshould
firsthavetoask:whatwouldsuchadoubtbelike?,anddon'tunderstandthis
straightoff.
25.Onemaybewrongevenabout"therebeingahandhere".Onlyinparticular
circumstancesisitimpossible."Eveninacalculationonecanbewrongonly
incertaincircumstancesonecan't."
26.Butcanitbeseenfromarulewhatcircumstanceslogicallyexcludea
mistakeintheemploymentofrulesofcalculation?
Whatuseisaruletoushere?Mightn'twe(inturn)gowronginapplyingit?
27.If,however,onewantedtogivesomethinglikearulehere,thenitwould
containtheexpression"innormalcircumstances".Andwerecognizenormal
circumstancesbutcannotpreciselydescribethem.Atmost,wecandescribea
rangeofabnormalones.
28.Whatis'learningarule'?This.
Whatis'makingamistakeinapplyingit'?This.Andwhatispointedtohereis
somethingindeterminate.
29.Practiceintheuseoftherulealsoshowswhatisamistakeinits
employment.
30.Whensomeonehasmadesureofsomething,hesays:"Yes,thecalculation
isright",buthedidnotinferthatfromhisconditionofcertainty.Onedoesnot
inferhowthingsarefromone'sowncertainty.
Certaintyisasitwereatoneofvoiceinwhichonedeclareshowthingsare,but
onedoesnotinferfromthetoneofvoicethatoneisjustified.
31.Thepropositionswhichonecomesbacktoagainandagainasifbewitched
theseIshouldliketoexpungefromphilosophicallanguage.
32.It'snotamatterofMoore'sknowingthatthere'sahandthere,butratherwe
shouldnotunderstandhimifheweretosay"OfcourseImaybewrongabout
this."Weshouldask"Whatisitliketomakesuchamistakeasthat?"e.g.
what'sitliketodiscoverthatitwasamistake?
33.Thusweexpungethesentencesthatdon'tgetusanyfurther.
34.Ifsomeoneistaughttocalculate,ishealsotaughtthathecanrelyona
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calculationofhisteacher's?Buttheseexplanationsmustafterallsometime
cometoanend.Willhealsobetaughtthathecantrusthissensessinceheis
indeedtoldinmanycasesthatinsuchandsuchaspecialcaseyoucannottrust
them?
Ruleandexception.
35.Butcan'titbeimaginedthatthereshouldbenophysicalobjects?Idon't
know.Andyet"Therearephysicalobjects"isnonsense.Isitsupposedtobean
empiricalproposition?
Andisthisanempiricalproposition:"Thereseemtobephysicalobjects"?
36."Aisaphysicalobject"isapieceofinstructionwhichwegiveonlyto
someonewhodoesn'tyetunderstandeitherwhat"A"means,orwhat"physical
object"means.Thusitisinstructionabouttheuseofwords,and"physical
object"isalogicalconcept.(Likecolour,quantity,...)Andthatiswhynosuch
propositionas:"Therearephysicalobjects"canbeformulated.
Yetweencountersuchunsuccessfulshotsateveryturn.
37.Butisitadequatetoanswertothescepticismoftheidealist,orthe
assurancesoftherealist,tosaythat"Therearephysicalobjects"isnonsense?
Forthemafterallitisnotnonsense.Itwould,however,beananswertosay:
thisassertion,oritsoppositeisamisfiringattempttoexpresswhatcan'tbe
expressedlikethat.Andthatitdoesmisfirecanbeshownbutthatisn'ttheend
ofthematter.Weneedtorealizethatwhatpresentsitselftousasthefirst
expressionofadifficulty,orofitssolution,mayasyetnotbecorrectly
expressedatall.Justasonewhohasajustcensureofapicturetomakewill
oftenatfirstofferthecensurewhereitdoesnotbelong,andaninvestigationis
neededinordertofindtherightpointofattackforthecritic.
38.Knowledgeinmathematics:Hereonehastokeeponremindingoneselfof
theunimportanceofthe'innerprocess'or'state'andask"Whyshoulditbe
important?Whatdoesitmattertome?"Whatisinterestingishowweuse
mathematicalpropositions.
39.Thisishowcalculationisdone,insuchcircumstancesacalculationis
treatedasabsolutelyreliable,ascertainlycorrect.
40.Upon"Iknowthatthereismyhand"theremayfollowthequestion"How
doyouknow?"andtheanswertothatpresupposesthatthiscanbeknownin
thatway.So,insteadof"Iknowthathereismyhand",onemightsay"Hereis
myhand",andthenaddhowoneknows.
41."IknowwhereIamfeelingpain","IknowthatIfeelithere"isaswrongas
"IknowthatIaminpain".But"Iknowwhereyoutouchedmyarm"isright.
42.Onecansay"Hebelievesit,butitisn'tso",butnot"Heknowsit,butitisn't
so".Doesthisstemfromthedifferencebetweenthementalstatesofbeliefand
knowledge?No.Onemayforexamplecall"mentalstate"whatisexpressed
bytoneofvoiceinspeaking,bygesturesetc.Itwouldthusbepossibletospeak
ofamentalstateofconviction,andthatmaybethesamewhetheritis
knowledgeorfalsebelief.Tothinkthatdifferentstatesmustcorrespondtothe
words"believe"and"know"wouldbeasifonebelievedthatdifferentpeople
hadtocorrespondtotheword"I"andthename"Ludwig",becausetheconcepts
aredifferent.
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43.Whatsortofpropositionisthis:"Wecannothavemiscalculatedin
12x12=144"?Itmustsurelybeapropositionoflogic.Butnow,isitnotthe
same,ordoesn'titcometothesame,asthestatement12x12=144?
44.Ifyoudemandarulefromwhichitfollowsthattherecan'thavebeena
miscalculationhere,theansweristhatwedidnotlearnthisthrougharule,but
bylearningtocalculate.
45.Wegottoknowthenatureofcalculatingbylearningtocalculate.
46.Butthencan'titbedescribedhowwesatisfyourselvesofthereliabilityofa
calculation?Oyes!Yetnoruleemergeswhenwedoso.Butthemost
importantthingis:Theruleisnotneeded.Nothingislacking.Wedocalculate
accordingtoarule,andthatisenough.
47.Thisishowonecalculates.Calculatingisthis.Whatwelearnatschool,for
example.Forgetthistranscendentcertainty,whichisconnectedwithyour
conceptofspirit.
48.However,outofahostofcalculationscertainonesmightbedesignatedas
reliableonceforall,othersasnotyetfixed.Andnow,isthisalogical
distinction?
49.Butremember:evenwhenthecalculationissomethingfixedforme,thisis
onlyadecisionforapracticalpurpose.
50.Whendoesonesay,Iknowthat...x...=....?Whenonehascheckedthe
calculation.
51.Whatsortofpropositionis:"Whatcouldamistakeherebelike?"Itwould
havetobealogicalproposition.Butisitalogicthatisnotused,becausewhat
ittellsusisnottaughtbymeansofpropositions.Itisalogicalpropositionfor
itdoesdescribetheconceptual(linguistic)situation.
52.Thissituationisthusnotthesameforapropositionlike"Atthisdistance
fromthesunthereisaplanet"and"Hereisahand"(namelymyownhand).
Thesecondcan'tbecalledahypothesis.Butthereisn'tasharpboundaryline
betweenthem.
53.SoonemightgrantthatMoorewasright,ifheisinterpretedlikethis:a
propositionsayingthathereisaphysicalobjectmayhavethesamelogical
statusasonesayingthathereisaredpatch.
54.Foritisnottruethatamistakemerelygetsmoreandmoreimprobableas
wepassfromtheplanettomyownhand.No:atsomepointithasceasedtobe
conceivable.
Thisisalreadysuggestedbythefollowing:ifitwerenotso,itwouldalsobe
conceivablethatweshouldbewrongineverystatementaboutphysicalobjects
thatanyweevermakearemistaken.
55.Soisthehypothesispossible,thatallthethingsaroundusdon'texist?
Wouldthatnotbelikethehypothesisofourhavingmiscalculatedinallour
calculations?
56.Whenonesays:"Perhapsthisplanetdoesn'texistandthelightphenomenon
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arisesinsomeotherway",thenafteralloneneedsanexampleofanobject
whichdoesexist.Thisdoesn'texist,asforexampledoes...
Orarewetosaythatcertaintyismerelyaconstructedpointtowhichsome
thingsapproximatemore,somelessclosely?No.Doubtgraduallylosesits
sense.Thislanguagegamejustislikethat.
Andeverythingdescriptiveofalanguagegameispartoflogic.
57.Nowmightnot"Iknow,Iamnotjustsurmising,thathereismyhand"be
conceivedasapropositionofgrammar?Hencenottemporally.
Butinthatcaseisn'titlikethisone:"Iknow,Iamnotjustsurmising,thatIam
seeingred"?
Andisn'ttheconsequence"Sotherearephysicalobjects"like:"Sothereare
colours"?
58.If"Iknowetc"isconceivedasagrammaticalproposition,ofcoursethe"I"
cannotbeimportant.Anditproperlymeans"Thereisnosuchthingasadoubt
inthiscase"or"Theexpression'Idonotknow'makesnosenseinthiscase".
Andofcourseitfollowsfromthisthat"Iknow"makesnosenseeither.
59."Iknow"isherealogicalinsight.Onlyrealismcan'tbeprovedbymeansof
it.
60.Itiswrongtosaythatthe'hypothesis'thatthisisabitofpaperwouldbe
confirmedordisconfirmedbylaterexperience,andthat,in"Iknowthatthisisa
bitofpaper",the"Iknow"eitherrelatestosuchanhypothesisortoalogical
determination.
61....Ameaningofawordisakindofemploymentofit.
Foritiswhatwelearnwhenthewordisincorporatedintoourlanguage.
62.Thatiswhythereexistsacorrespondencebetweentheconcepts'rule'and
'meaning'.
63.Ifweimaginethefactsotherwisethanastheyare,certainlanguagegames
losesomeoftheirimportance,whileothersbecomeimportant.Andinthisway
thereisanalterationagradualoneintheuseofthevocabularyofa
language.
64.Comparethemeaningofawordwiththe'function'ofanofficial.And
'differentmeanings'with'differentfunctions'.
65.Whenlanguagegameschange,thenthereisachangeinconcepts,andwith
theconceptsthemeaningsofwordschange.
_____________________
66.Imakeassertionsaboutreality,assertionswhichhavedifferentdegreesof
assurance.Howdoesthedegreeofassurancecomeout?Whatconsequences
hasit?
Wemaybedealing,forexample,withthecertaintyofmemory,oragainof
perception.Imaybesureofsomething,butstillknowwhattestmightconvince
meoferror.Iame.g.quitesureofthedateofabattle,butifIshouldfinda
differentdateinarecognizedworkofhistory,Ishouldaltermyopinion,and
thiswouldnotmeanIlostallfaithinjudging.
67.Couldweimagineamanwhokeepsonmakingmistakeswhereweregarda
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mistakeasruledout,andinfactneverencounterone?
E.g.hesayshelivesinsuchandsuchaplace,issoandsoold,comesfromsuch
andsuchacity,andhespeakswiththesamecertainty(givingallthetokensof
it)asIdo,butheiswrong.
Butwhatishisrelationtothiserror?WhatamItosuppose?
68.Thequestionis:whatisthelogiciantosayhere?
69.Ishouldliketosay:"IfIamwrongaboutthis,Ihavenoguaranteethat
anythingIsayistrue."Butotherswon'tsaythataboutme,norwillIsayit
aboutotherpeople.
70.FormonthsIhavelivedataddressA,Ihavereadthenameofthestreetand
thenumberofthehousecountlesstimes,havereceivedcountlesslettershere
andgivencountlesspeopletheaddress.IfIamwrongaboutit,themistakeis
hardlylessthatifIwere(wrongly)tobelieveIwaswritingChineseandnot
German.
71.Ifmyfriendweretoimagineonedaythathehadbeenlivingforalongtime
pastinsuchandsuchaplace,etc.etc.,Ishouldnotcallthisamistake,butrather
amentaldisturbance,perhapsatransientone.
72.Noteveryfalsebeliefofthissortisamistake.
73.Butwhatisthedifferencebetweenmistakeandmentaldisturbance?Or
whatisthedifferencebetweenmytreatingitasamistakeandmytreatingitas
mentaldisturbance?
74.Canwesay:amistakedoesn'tonlyhaveacause,italsohasaground?I.e.,
roughly:whensomeonemakesamistake,thiscanbefittedintowhatheknows
aright.
75.Wouldthisbecorrect:IfImerelybelievedwronglythatthereisatablehere
infrontofme,thismightstillbeamistakebutifIbelievewronglythatIhave
seenthistable,oronelikeit,everydayforseveralmonthspast,andhave
regularlyusedit,thatisn'tamistake?
76.Naturally,myaimmustbetogivethestatementsthatonewouldliketo
makehere,butcannotmakesignificantly.
77.PerhapsIshalldoamultiplicationtwicetomakesure,orperhapsget
someoneelsetoworkitover.ButshallIworkitoveragaintwentytimes,orget
twentypeopletogooverit?Andisthatsomesortofnegligence?Wouldthe
certaintyreallybegreaterforbeingcheckedtwentytimes?
78.AndcanIgiveareasonwhyitisn't?
79.ThatIamamanandnotawomancanbeverified,butifIweretosayIwas
awoman,andthentriedtoexplaintheerrorbysayingIhadn'tcheckedthe
statement,theexplanationwouldnotbeaccepted.
80.Thetruthofmystatementsisthetestofmyunderstandingofthese
statements.
81.Thatistosay:ifImakecertainfalsestatements,itbecomesuncertain
whetherIunderstandthem.
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82.Whatcountsasanadequatetestofastatementbelongstologic.Itbelongs
tothedescriptionofthelanguagegame.
83.Thetruthofcertainempiricalpropositionsbelongstoourframeof
reference.
84.Mooresaysheknowsthattheearthexistedlongbeforehisbirth.Andput
likethatitseemstobeapersonalstatementabouthim,evenifitisinadditiona
statementaboutthephysicalworld.Nowitisphilosophicallyuninteresting
whetherMooreknowsthisorthat,butitisinterestingthat,andhow,itcanbe
known.IfMoorehadinformedusthatheknewthedistanceseparatingcertain
stars,wemightconcludefromthatthathehadmadesomespecial
investigations,andweshallwanttoknowwhatthesewere.ButMoorechooses
preciselyacaseinwhichweallseemtoknowthesameashe,andwithout
beingabletosayhow.Ibelievee.g.thatIknowasmuchaboutthismatter(the
existenceoftheearth)asMooredoes,andifheknowsthatitisashesays,then
Iknowittoo.Foritisn't,either,asifhehadarrivedatthispropositionby
pursuingsomelineofthoughtwhich,whileitisopentome,Ihavenotinfact
pursued.
85.Andwhatgoesintosomeone'sknowingthis?Knowledgeofhistory,say?
Hemustknowwhatitmeanstosay:theearthhasalreadyexistedforsuchand
suchalengthoftime.Fornotanyintelligentadultmustknowthat.Weseemen
buildinganddemolishinghouses,andareledtoask:"Howlonghasthishouse
beenhere?"Buthowdoesonecomeontheideaofaskingthisabouta
mountain,forexample?Andhaveallmenthenotionoftheearthasabody,
whichmaycomeintobeingandpassaway?Whyshouldn'tIthinkoftheearth
asflat,butextendingwithoutendineverydirection(includingdepth)?Butin
thatcaseonemightstillsay"Iknowthatthismountainexistedlongbeforemy
birth."ButsupposeImetamanwhodidn'tbelievethat?
86.SupposeIreplacedMoore's"Iknow"by"Iamoftheunshakeable
conviction"?
87.Can'tanassertoricsentence,whichwascapableoffunctioningasan
hypothesis,alsobeusedasafoundationforresearchandaction?I.e.can'tit
simplybeisolatedfromdoubt,thoughnotaccordingtoanyexplicitrule?It
simplygetsassumedasatruism,nevercalledinquestion,perhapsnoteven
everformulated.
88.Itmaybeforexamplethatallenquiryonourpartissetsoastoexempt
certainpropositionsfromdoubt,iftheywereeverformulated.Theylieapart
fromtheroutetravelledbyenquiry.
89.Onewouldliketosay:"Everythingspeaksfor,andnothingagainstthe
earth'shavingexistedlongbefore..."
YetmightInotbelievethecontraryafterall?Butthequestionis:Whatwould
thepracticaleffectsofthisbeliefbe?Perhapssomeonesays:"That'snotthe
point.Abeliefiswhatitiswhetherithasanypracticaleffectsornot."One
thinks:Itisthesameadjustmentofthehumanmindanyway.
90."Iknow"hasaprimitivemeaningsimilartoandrelatedto"Isee"("wissen",
"videre").And"Iknewhewasintheroom,buthewasn'tintheroom"islike"I
sawhimintheroom,buthewasn'tthere"."Iknow"issupposedtoexpressa
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relation,notbetweenmeandthesenseofaproposition(like"Ibelieve")but
betweenmeandafact.Sothatthefactistakenintomyconsciousness.(Hereis
thereasonwhyonewantstosaythatnothingthatgoesonintheouterworldis
reallyknown,butonlywhathappensinthedomainofwhatarecalledsense
data.)Thiswouldgiveusapictureofknowingastheperceptionofanouter
eventthroughvisualrayswhichprojectitasitisintotheeyeandthe
consciousness.Onlythenthequestionatonceariseswhetheronecanbecertain
ofthisprojection.Andthispicturedoesindeedshowhowourimagination
presentsknowledge,butnotwhatliesatthebottomofthispresentation.
91.IfMooresaysheknowstheearthexistedetc.,mostofuswillgranthimthat
ithasexistedallthattime,andalsobelievehimwhenhesaysheisconvinced
ofit.Buthashealsogottherightgroundforthisconviction?Forifnot,then
afterallhedoesn'tknow(Russell).
92.However,wecanask:Maysomeonehavetellinggroundsforbelievingthat
theearthhasonlyexistedforashorttime,saysincehisownbirth?Supposehe
hadalwaysbeentoldthat,wouldhehaveanygoodreasontodoubtit?Men
havebelievedthattheycouldmaketherainwhyshouldnotakingbebrought
upinthebeliefthattheworldbeganwithhim?AndifMooreandthiskingwere
tomeetanddiscuss,couldMoorereallyprovehisbelieftobetherightone?I
donotsaythatMoorecouldnotconvertthekingtohisview,butitwouldbea
conversionofaspecialkindthekingwouldbebroughttolookattheworldina
differentway.
Rememberthatoneissometimesconvincedofthecorrectnessofaviewbyits
simplicityorsymmetry,i.e.,thesearewhatinduceonetogoovertothispointof
view.Onethensimplysayssomethinglike:"That'showitmustbe."
93.ThepropositionspresentingwhatMoore'knows'areallofsuchakindthatit
isdifficulttoimaginewhyanyoneshouldbelievethecontrary.E.g.the
propositionthatMoorehasspenthiswholelifeincloseproximitytotheearth.
OncemoreIcanspeakofmyselfhereinsteadofspeakingofMoore.What
couldinducemetobelievetheopposite?Eitheramemory,orhavingbeentold.
EverythingthatIhaveseenorheardgivesmetheconvictionthatnomanhas
everbeenfarfromtheearth.Nothinginmypictureoftheworldspeaksin
favouroftheopposite.
94.ButIdidnotgetmypictureoftheworldbysatisfyingmyselfofits
correctnessnordoIhaveitbecauseIamsatisfiedofitscorrectness.No:itis
theinheritedbackgroundagainstwhichIdistinguishbetweentrueandfalse.
95.Thepropositionsdescribingthisworldpicturemightbepartofakindof
mythology.Andtheirroleislikethatofrulesofagameandthegamecanbe
learnedpurelypractically,withoutlearninganyexplicitrules.
96.Itmightbeimaginedthatsomepropositions,oftheformofempirical
propositions,werehardenedandfunctionedaschannelsforsuchempirical
propositionsaswerenothardenedbutfluidandthatthisrelationalteredwith
time,inthatfluidpropositionshardened,andhardonesbecamefluid.
97.Themythologymaychangebackintoastateofflux,theriverbedof
thoughtsmayshift.ButIdistinguishbetweenthemovementofthewaterson
theriverbedandtheshiftofthebeditselfthoughthereisnotasharpdivision
oftheonefromtheother.
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98.Butifsomeoneweretosay"Sologictooisanempiricalscience"hewould
bewrong.Yetthisisright:thesamepropositionmaygettreatedatonetimeas
somethingtotestbyexperience,atanotherasaruleoftesting.
99.Andthebankofthatriverconsistspartlyofhardrock,subjecttono
alterationoronlytoanimperceptibleone,partlyofsand,whichnowinone
placenowinanothergetswashedaway,ordeposited.
100.ThetruthswhichMooresaysheknows,aresuchas,roughlyspeaking,all
ofusknow,ifheknowsthem.
101.Suchapropositionmightbee.g."Mybodyhasneverdisappearedand
reappearedagainafteraninterval."
102.MightInotbelievethatonce,withoutknowingit,perhapsisastateof
unconsciousness,Iwastakenfarawayfromtheearththatotherpeopleeven
knowthis,butdonotmentionittome?Butthiswouldnotfitintotherestof
myconvictionsatall.NotthatIcoulddescribethesystemoftheseconvictions.
Yetmyconvictionsdoformasystem,astructure.
103.AndnowifIweretosay"Itismyunshakeableconvictionthatetc.",this
meansinthepresentcasetoothatIhavenotconsciouslyarrivedatthe
convictionbyfollowingaparticularlineofthought,butthatitisanchoredinall
myquestionsandanswers,soanchoredthatIcannottouchit.
104.Iamforexamplealsoconvincedthatthesunisnotaholeinthevaultof
heaven.
105.Alltesting,allconfirmationanddisconfirmationofahypothesistakes
placealreadywithinasystem.Andthissystemisnotamoreorlessarbitrary
anddoubtfulpointofdepartureforallourarguments:no,itbelongstothe
essenceofwhatwecallanargument.Thesystemisnotsomuchthepointof
departure,astheelementinwhichargumentshavetheirlife.
106.Supposesomeadulthadtoldachildthathehadbeenonthemoon.The
childtellsmethestory,andIsayitwasonlyajoke,themanhadn'tbeenonthe
moonnoonehaseverbeenonthemoonthemoonisalongwayoffanditis
impossibletoclimbupthereorflythere.Ifnowthechildinsists,saying
perhapsthereisawayofgettingtherewhichIdon'tknow,etc.whatreplycould
Imaketohim?WhatreplycouldImaketotheadultsofatribewhobelievethat
peoplesometimesgotothemoon(perhapsthatishowtheyinterprettheir
dreams),andwhoindeedgrantthattherearenoordinarymeansofclimbingup
toitorflyingthere?Butachildwillnotordinarilysticktosuchabeliefand
willsoonbeconvincedbywhatwetellhimseriously.
107.Isn'tthisaltogetherlikethewayonecaninstructachildtobelieveina
God,orthatnoneexists,anditwillaccordinglybeabletoproduceapparently
tellinggroundsfortheoneortheother?
108."Butistherethennoobjectivetruth?Isn'tittrue,orfalse,thatsomeone
hasbeenonthemoon?"Ifwearethinkingwithinoursystem,thenitiscertain
thatnoonehaseverbeenonthemoon.Notmerelyisnothingofthesortever
seriouslyreportedtousbyreasonablepeople,butourwholesystemofphysics
forbidsustobelieveit.Forthisdemandsanswerstothequestions"Howdidhe
overcometheforceofgravity?""Howcouldhelivewithoutanatmosphere?"
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andathousandotherswhichcouldnotbeanswered.Butsupposethatinsteadof
alltheseanswerswemetthereply:"Wedon'tknowhowonegetstothemoon,
butthosewhogetthereknowatoncethattheyarethereandevenyoucan't
explaineverything."Weshouldfeelourselvesintellectuallyverydistantfrom
someonewhosaidthis.
109."Anempiricalpropositioncanbetested"(wesay).Buthow?andthrough
what?
110.Whatcountsasitstest?"Butisthisanadequatetest?And,ifso,mustit
notberecognizableassuchinlogic?"Asifgivinggroundsdidnotcometoan
endsometime.Buttheendisnotanungroundedpresupposition:itisan
ungroundedwayofacting.
111."IknowthatIhaveneverbeenonthemoon."Thatsoundsdifferentinthe
circumstanceswhichactuallyhold,tothewayitwouldsoundifagoodmany
menhadbeenonthemoon,andsomeperhapswithoutknowingit.Inthiscase
onecouldgivegroundsforthisknowledge.Istherenotarelationshiphere
similartothatbetweenthegeneralruleofmultiplyingandparticular
multiplicationsthathavebeencarriedout?
Iwanttosay:mynothavingbeenonthemoonisassureathingformeasany
groundsIcouldgiveforit.
112.Andisn'tthatwhatMoorewantstosay,whenhesaysheknowsallthese
things?Butishisknowingitreallywhatisinquestion,andnotratherthat
someofthesepropositionsmustbesolidforus?
113.Whensomeoneistryingtoteachusmathematics,hewillnotbeginby
assuringusthatheknowsthata+b=b+a.
114.Ifyouarenotcertainofanyfact,youcannotbecertainofthemeaningof
yourwordseither.
115.Ifyoutriedtodoubteverythingyouwouldnotgetasfarasdoubting
anything.Thegameofdoubtingitselfpresupposescertainty.
116.Insteadof"Iknow...",couldn'tMoorehavesaid:"Itstandsfastforme
that..."?Andfurther:"Itstandsfastformeandmanyothers..."
117.WhyisitnotpossibleformetodoubtthatIhaveneverbeenonthemoon?
AndhowcouldItrytodoubtit?
Firstandforemost,thesuppositionthatperhapsIhavebeentherewouldstrike
measidle.Nothingwouldfollowfromit,nothingbeexplainedbyit.Itwould
nottieinwithanythinginmylife.
WhenIsay"Nothingspeaksfor,everythingagainstit,"thispresupposesa
principleofspeakingforandagainst.Thatis,Imustbeabletosaywhatwould
speakforit.
118.Nowwoulditbecorrecttosay:Sofarnoonehasopenedmyskullinorder
toseewhetherthereisabraininsidebuteverythingspeaksfor,andnothing
against,itsbeingwhattheywouldfindthere?
119.Butcanitalsobesaid:Everythingspeaksfor,andnothingagainstthe
table'sstillbeingtherewhennooneseesit?Forwhatdoesspeakofit?
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120.Butifanyoneweretodoubtit,howwouldhisdoubtcomeoutinpractice?
Andcouldn'twepeacefullyleavehimtodoubtit,sinceitmakesnodifference
atall?
121.Canonesay:"Wherethereisnodoubtthereisnoknowledgeeither"?
122.Doesn'toneneedgroundsfordoubt?
123.WhereverIlook,Ifindnogroundfordoubtingthat...
124.Iwanttosay:Weusejudgmentsasprinciplesofjudgment.
125.Ifablindmanweretoaskme"Haveyougottwohands?"Ishouldnot
makesurebylooking.IfIweretohaveanydoubtofit,thenIdon'tknowwhyI
shouldtrustmyeyes.Forwhyshouldn'tItestmyeyesbylookingtofindout
whetherIseemytwohands?Whatistobetestedbywhat?(Whodecideswhat
standsfast?)
Andwhatdoesitmeantosaythatsuchandsuchstandsfast?
126.IamnotmorecertainofthemeaningofmywordsthatIamofcertain
judgments.CanIdoubtthatthiscolouriscalled"blue"?
(My)doubtsformasystem.
127.ForhowdoIknowthatsomeoneisindoubt?HowdoIknowthatheuses
thewords"Idoubtit"asIdo?
128.FromachildupIlearnttojudgelikethis.Thisisjudging.
129.ThisishowIlearnedtojudgethisIgottoknowasjudgment.
130.Butisn'titexperiencethatteachesustojudgelikethis,thatistosay,thatit
iscorrecttojudgelikethis?Buthowdoesexperienceteachus,then?Wemay
deriveitfromexperience,butexperiencedoesnotdirectustoderiveanything
fromexperience.Ifitisthegroundforourjudginglikethis,andnotjustthe
cause,stillwedonothaveagroundforseeingthisinturnasaground.
131.No,experienceisnotthegroundforourgameofjudging.Norisits
outstandingsuccess.
132.Menhavejudgedthatakingcanmakerainwesaythiscontradictsall
experience.Todaytheyjudgethataeroplanesandtheradioetc.aremeansfor
theclosercontactofpeoplesandthespreadofculture.
133.UnderordinarycircumstancesIdonotsatisfymyselfthatIhavetwohands
byseeinghowitlooks.Whynot?Hasexperienceshownittobeunnecessary?
Or(again):Haveweinsomewaylearntauniversallawofinduction,anddowe
trustitheretoo?Butwhyshouldwehavelearntoneuniversallawfirst,and
notthespecialonestraightaway?
134.Afterputtingabookinadrawer,Iassumeitisthere,unless..."Experience
alwaysprovesmeright.Thereisnowellattestedcaseofabook's(simply)
disappearing."Ithasoftenhappenedthatabookhasneverturnedupagain,
althoughwethoughtweknewforcertainwhereitwas.Butexperiencedoes
reallyteachthatabook,say,doesnotvanishaway.(E.g.graduallyevaporates.)
Butisitthisexperiencewithbooksetc.thatleadsustoassumethatsuchabook
hasnotvanishedaway?Well,supposeweweretofindthatunderparticular
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novelcircumstancesbooksdidvanishaway.Shouldn'twealterour
assumption?Canonegivethelietotheeffectofexperienceonoursystemof
assumption?
135.Butdowenotsimplyfollowtheprinciplethatwhathasalwayshappened
willhappenagain(orsomethinglikeit)?Whatdoesitmeantofollowthis
principle?Dowereallyintroduceitintoourreasoning?Orisitmerelythe
naturallawwhichourinferringapparentlyfollows?Thislatteritmaybe.Itis
notaniteminourconsiderations.
136.WhenMooresaysheknowssuchandsuch,heisreallyenumeratingalot
ofempiricalpropositionswhichweaffirmwithoutspecialtestingpropositions,
thatis,whichhaveapeculiarlogicalroleinthesystemofourempirical
propositions.
137.Evenifthemosttrustworthyofmenassuresmethatheknowsthingsare
thusandso,thisbyitselfcannotsatisfymethathedoesknow.Onlythathe
believesheknows.ThatiswhyMoore'sassurancethatheknows...doesnot
interestus.Thepropositions,however,whichMooreretailsasexamplesofsuch
knowntruthsareindeedinteresting.Notbecauseanyoneknowstheirtruth,or
believesheknowsthem,butbecausetheyallhaveasimilarroleinthesystem
ofourempiricaljudgments.
138.Wedon't,forexample,arriveatanyofthemasaresultofinvestigation.
Therearee.g.historicalinvestigationsandinvestigationsintotheshapeand
alsotheageoftheearth,butnotintowhethertheearthhasexistedduringthe
lasthundredyears.Ofcoursemanyofushaveinformationaboutthisperiod
fromourparentsandgrandparentsbutmaynt'theybewrong?"Nonsense!"
onewillsay."Howshouldallthesepeoplebewrong?"Butisthatan
argument?Isitnotsimplytherejectionofanidea?Andperhapsthe
determinationofaconcept?ForifIspeakofapossiblemistakehere,this
changestheroleof"mistake"and"truth"inourlives.
139.Notonlyrules,butalsoexamplesareneededforestablishingapractice.
Ourrulesleaveloopholesopen,andthepracticehastospeakforitself.
140.Wedonotlearnthepracticeofmakingempiricaljudgmentsbylearning
rules:wearetaughtjudgmentsandtheirconnexionwithotherjudgments.A
totalityofjudgmentsismadeplausibletous.
141.Whenwefirstbegintobelieveanything,whatwebelieveisnotasingle
proposition,itisawholesystemofpropositions.(Lightdawnsgraduallyover
thewhole.)
142.Itisnotsingleaxiomsthatstrikemeasobvious,itisasysteminwhich
consequencesandpremisesgiveoneanothermutualsupport.
143.Iamtold,forexample,thatsomeoneclimbedthismountainmanyyears
ago.DoIalwaysenquireintothereliabilityofthetellerofthisstory,and
whetherthemountaindidexistyearsago?Achildlearnstherearereliableand
unreliableinformantsmuchlaterthanitlearnsfactswhicharetoldit.Itdoesn't
learnatallthatthatmountainhasexistedforalongtime:thatis,thequestion
whetheritissodoesn'tariseatall.Itswallowsthisconsequencedown,soto
speak,togetherwithwhatitlearns.
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144.Thechildlearnstobelieveahostofthings.I.e.itlearnstoactaccordingto
thesebeliefs.Bitbybitthereformsasystemofwhatisbelieved,andinthat
systemsomethingsstandunshakeablyfastandsomearemoreorlessliableto
shift.Whatstandsfastdoesso,notbecauseitisintrinsicallyobviousor
convincingitisratherheldfastbywhatliesaroundit.
145.Onewantstosay"Allmyexperiencesshowthatitisso".Buthowdothey
dothat?Forthatpropositiontowhichtheypointitselfbelongstoaparticular
interpretationofthem.
"ThatIregardthispropositionascertainlytruealsocharacterizesmy
interpretationofexperience."
146.Weformthepictureoftheearthasaballfloatingfreeinspaceandnot
alteringessentiallyinahundredyears.Isaid"Weformthepictureetc."andthis
picturenowhelpsusinthejudgmentofvarioussituations.
Imayindeedcalculatethedimensionsofabridge,sometimescalculatethat
herethingsaremoreinfavourofabridgethanaferry,etc.etc.,butsomewhere
Imustbeginwithanassumptionoradecision.
147.Thepictureoftheearthasaballisagoodpicture,itprovesitself
everywhere,itisalsoasimplepictureinshort,weworkwithitwithout
doubtingit.
148.WhydoInotsatisfymyselfthatIhavetwofeetwhenIwanttogetup
fromachair?Thereisnowhy.Isimplydon't.ThisishowIact.
149.MyjudgmentsthemselvescharacterizethewayIjudge,characterizethe
natureofjudgment.
150.Howdoessomeonejudgewhichishisrightandwhichhislefthand?How
doIknowthatmyjudgmentwillagreewithsomeoneelse's?HowdoIknow
thatthiscolourisblue?IfIdon'ttrustmyselfhere,whyshouldItrustanyone
else'sjudgment?Isthereawhy?MustInotbegintotrustsomewhere?Thatis
tosay:somewhereImustbeginwithnotdoubtingandthatisnot,sotospeak,
hastybutexcusable:itispartofjudging.
151.Ishouldliketosay:Mooredoesnotknowwhatheassertsheknows,butit
standsfastforhim,asalsoformeregardingitasabsolutelysolidispartofour
methodofdoubtandenquiry.
152.Idonotexplicitlylearnthepropositionsthatstandfastforme.Ican
discoverthemsubsequentlyliketheaxisaroundwhichabodyrotates.Thisaxis
isnotfixedinthesensethatanythingholdsitfast,butthemovementaroundit
determinesitsimmobility.
153.Nooneevertaughtmethatmyhandsdon'tdisappearwhenIamnot
payingattentiontothem.NorcanIbesaidtopresupposethetruthofthis
propositioninmyassertionsetc.,(asiftheyrestedonit)whileitonlygetssense
fromtherestofourprocedureofasserting.
154.Therearecasessuchthat,ifsomeonegivessignsofdoubtwherewedonot
doubt,wecannotconfidentlyunderstandhissignsassignsofdoubt.
I.e.:ifwearetounderstandhissignsofdoubtassuch,hemaygivethemonly
inparticularcasesandmaynotgivetheminothers.
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155.Incertaincircumstanceamancannotmakeamistake.("Can"ishereused
logically,andthepropositiondoesnotmeanthatamancannotsayanything
falseinthosecircumstances.)IfMooreweretopronouncetheoppositeofthose
propositionswhichhedeclarescertain,weshouldnotjustnotsharehisopinion:
weshouldregardhimasdemented.
156.Inordertomakeamistake,amanmustalreadyjudgeinconformitywith
mankind.
157.Supposeamancouldnotrememberwhetherhehadalwayshadfive
fingersortwohands?Shouldweunderstandhim?Couldwebesureof
understandinghim?
158.CanIbemakingamistake,forexample,inthinkingthatthewordsof
whichthissentenceiscomposedareEnglishwordswhosemeaningIknow?
159.Aschildrenwelearnfactse.g.,thateveryhumanbeinghasabrain,and
wetakethemontrust.Ibelievethatthereisanisland,Australia,ofsuchand
suchashape,andsoonandsoonIbelievethatIhadgreatgrandparents,that
thepeoplewhogavethemselvesoutasmyparentsreallyweremyparents,etc.
Thisbeliefmayneverhavebeenexpressedeventhethoughtthatitwasso,
neverthought.
160.Thechildlearnsbybelievingtheadult.Doubtcomesafterbelief.
161.Ilearnedanenormousamountandaccepteditonhumanauthority,and
thenIfoundsomethingsconfirmedordisconfirmedbymyownexperience.
162.IngeneralItakeastruewhatisfoundintextbooks,ofgeographyfor
example.Why?Isay:Allthesefactshavebeenconfirmedahundredtimes
over.ButhowdoIknowthat?Whatismyevidenceforit?Ihaveaworld
picture.Isittrueorfalse?Aboveallitisthesubstratumofallmyenquiringand
asserting.Thepropositionsdescribingitarenotallequallysubjecttotesting.
163.Doesanyoneevertestwhetherthistableremainsinexistencewhennoone
ispayingattentiontoit?
WecheckthestoryofNapoleon,butnotwhetherallthereportsabouthimare
basedonsensedeception,forgeryandthelike.Forwheneverwetestanything,
wearealreadypresupposingsomethingthatisnottested.NowamItosaythat
theexperimentwhichperhapsImakeinordertotestthetruthofaproposition
presupposesthetruthofthepropositionthattheapparatusIbelieveIseeis
reallythere(andthelike)?
164.Doesn'ttestingcometoanend?
165.Onechildmightsaytoanother:"Iknowthattheearthisalreadyhundred
ofyearsold"andthatwouldmean:Ihavelearntit.
166.Thedifficultyistorealizethegroundlessnessofourbelieving.
167.Itisclearthatourempiricalpropositionsdonotallhavethesamestatus,
sinceonecanlaydownsuchapropositionandturnitfromanempirical
propositionintoanormofdescription.
Thinkofchemicalinvestigations.Lavoisiermakesexperimentswithsubstances
inhislaboratoryandnowheconcludesthatthisandthattakesplacewhenthere
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isburning.Hedoesnotsaythatitmighthappenotherwiseanothertime.Hehas
gotholdofadefiniteworldpicturenotofcourseonethatheinvented:he
learneditasachild.Isayworldpictureandnothypothesis,becauseitisthe
matterofcoursefoundationforhisresearchandassuchalsodoes
unmentioned.
168.Butnow,whatpartisplayedbythepresuppositionthatasubstanceA
alwaysreactstoasubstanceBinthesameway,giventhesamecircumstances?
Oristhatpartofthedefinitionofasubstance?
169.Onemightthinkthattherewerepropositionsdeclaringthatchemistryis
possible.Andthesewouldbepropositionsofanaturalscience.Forwhatshould
theybesupportedby,ifnotbyexperience?
170.Ibelievewhatpeopletransmittomeinacertainmanner.InthiswayI
believegeographical,chemical,historicalfactsetc.ThatishowIlearnthe
sciences.Ofcourselearningisbasedonbelieving.
IfyouhavelearntthatMontBlancis4000metreshigh,ifyouhavelookeditup
onthemap,yousayyouknowit.
Andcanitnowbesaid:weaccordcredenceinthiswaybecauseithasprovedto
pay?
171.AprinciplegroundforMooretoassumethatheneverwasonthemoonis
thatnooneeverwasonthemoonorcouldcomethereandthiswebelieveon
groundsofwhatwelearn.
172.Perhapssomeonesays"Theremustbesomebasicprincipleonwhichwe
accordcredence",butwhatcansuchaprincipleaccomplish?Isitmorethana
naturallawof'takingfortrue'?
173.IsitmaybeinmypowerwhatIbelieve?orwhatIunshakeablybelieve?
Ibelievethatthereisachairoverthere.Can'tIbewrong?But,canIbelieve
thatIamwrong?OrcanIsomuchasbringitunderconsideration?And
mightn'tIalsoholdfasttomybeliefwhateverIlearnedlateron?!Butismy
beliefthengrounded?
174.Iactwithcompletecertainty.Butthiscertaintyismyown.
175."Iknowit"Isaytosomeoneelseandherethereisajustification.But
thereisnoneformybelief.
176.Insteadof"Iknowit"onemaysayinsomecases"That'showitisrely
uponit."Insomecases,however"Ilearnedityearsandyearsago"and
sometimes:"Iamsureitisso."
177.WhatIknow,Ibelieve.
178.ThewrongusemadebyMooreoftheproposition"Iknow..."liesinhis
regardingitasanutteranceaslittlesubjecttodoubtas"Iaminpain".Andsince
from"Iknowitisso"therefollows"Itisso",thenthelattercan'tbedoubted
either.
179.Itwouldbecorrecttosay:"Ibelieve..."hassubjectivetruthbut"I
know..."not.
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180.Oragain"Ibelieve..."isan'expression',butnot"Iknow...".
181.SupposeMoorehadsaid"Iswear..."insteadof"Iknow...".
182.Themoreprimitiveideaisthattheearthneverhadabeginning.Nochild
hasreasontoaskhimselfhowlongtheearthhasexisted,becauseallchange
takesplaceonit.Ifwhatiscalledtheearthreallycameintoexistenceatsome
timewhichishardenoughtopicturethenonenaturallyassumesthe
beginningashavingbeenaninconceivablylongtimeago.
183."ItiscertainthatafterthebattleofAusterlitzNapoleon...Well,inthatcase
it'ssurelyalsocertainthattheearthexistedthen."
184."Itiscertainthatwedidn'tarriveonthisplanetfromanotheronea
hundredyearsago."Well,it'sascertainassuchthingsare.
185.Itwouldstrikemeasridiculoustowanttodoubttheexistenceof
Napoleonbutifsomeonedoubtedtheexistenceoftheearth150yearsago,
perhapsIshouldbemorewillingtolisten,fornowheisdoubtingourwhole
systemofevidence.Itdoesnotstrikemeasifthissystemweremorecertain
thanacertaintywithinit.
186."ImightsupposethatNapoleonneverexistedandisafable,butnotthat
theearthdidnotexist150yearsago."
187."Doyouknowthattheearthexistedthen?""OfcourseIknowthat.Ihave
itfromsomeonewhocertainlyknowsallaboutit."
188.Itstrikesmeasifsomeonewhodoubtstheexistenceoftheearthatthat
timeisimpugningthenatureofallhistoricalevidence.AndIcannotsayofthis
latterthatitisdefinitelycorrect.
189.Atsomepointonehastopassfromexplanationtomeredescription.
190.Whatwecallhistoricalevidencepointstotheexistenceoftheearthalong
timebeforemybirththeoppositehypothesishasnothingonitsside.
191.Well,ifeverythingspeaksforanhypothesisandnothingagainstitisit
thencertainlytrue?Onemaydesignateitassuch.Butdoesitcertainlyagree
withreality,withthefacts?Withthisquestionyouarealreadygoingroundin
acircle.
192.Tobesurethereisjustificationbutjustificationcomestoanend.
_____________________
193.Whatdoesthismean:thetruthofapropositionisacertain?
194.Withtheword"certain"weexpresscompleteconviction,thetotalabsence
ofdoubt,andtherebyweseektoconvinceotherpeople.Thatissubjective
certainty.
Butwhenissomethingobjectivelycertain?Whenamistakeisnotpossible.But
whatkindofpossibilityisthat?Mustn'tmistakebelogicallyexcluded?
195.IfIbelievethatIamsittinginmyroomwhenIamnot,thenIshallnotbe
saidtohavemadeamistake.Butwhatistheessentialdifferencebetweenthis
caseandamistake?
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196.Sureevidenceiswhatweacceptassure,itisevidencethatwegobyin
actingsurely,actingwithoutanydoubt.
Whatwecall"amistake"playsaquitespecialpartinourlanguagegames,and
sotoodoeswhatweregardascertainevidence.
197.Itwouldbenonsensetosaythatweregardsomethingassureevidence
becauseitiscertainlytrue.
198.Rather,wemustfirstdeterminetheroleofdecidingfororagainsta
proposition.
199.Thereasonwhytheuseoftheexpression"trueorfalse"hassomething
misleadingaboutitisthatitislikesaying"ittallieswiththefactsoritdoesn't",
andtheverythingthatisinquestioniswhat"tallying"ishere.
200.Really"Thepropositioniseithertrueorfalse"onlymeansthatitmustbe
possibletodecidefororagainstit.Butthisdoesnotsaywhatthegroundfor
suchadecisionislike.
201.Supposesomeoneweretoask:"Isitreallyrightforustorelyonthe
evidenceofourmemory(oroursenses)aswedo?"
202.Moore'scertainpropositionsalmostdeclarethatwehavearighttorely
uponthisevidence.
203.[Everythingthatweregardasevidenceindicatesthattheearthalready
existedlongbeforemybirth.Thecontraryhypothesishasnothingtoconfirmit
atall.
Ifeverythingspeaksforanhypothesisandnothingagainstit,isitobjectively
certain?Onecancallitthat.Butdoesitnecessarilyagreewiththeworldof
facts?Attheverybestitshowsuswhat"agreement"means.Wefinditdifficult
toimagineittobefalse,butalsodifficulttomakeuseof.]{crossedoutinMS}
Whatdoesthisagreementconsistin,ifnotinthefactthatwhatisevidencein
theselanguagegamesspeaksforourproposition?(TractatusLogico
Philosophicus)
204.Givinggrounds,however,justifyingtheevidence,comestoanendbut
theendisnotcertainpropositions'strikingusimmediatelyastrue,i.e.itisnota
kindofseeingonourpartitisouracting,whichliesatthebottomofthe
languagegame.
205.Ifthetrueiswhatisgrounded,thenthegroundisnottrue,notyetfalse.
206.Ifsomeoneaskedus"butisthattrue?"wemightsay"yes"tohimandif
hedemandedgroundswemightsay"Ican'tgiveyouanygrounds,butifyou
learnmoreyoutoowillthinkthesame."
Ifthisdidn'tcomeabout,thatwouldmeanthathecouldn'tforexamplelearn
history.
207."Strangecoincidence,thateverymanwhoseskullhasbeenopenedhada
brain!"
208.IhaveatelephoneconversationwithNewYork.Myfriendtellsmethat
hisyoungtreeshavebudsofsuchandsuchakind.Iamnowconvincedthathis
treeis...AmIalsoconvincedthattheearthexists?
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209.Theexistenceoftheearthisratherpartofthewholepicturewhichforms
thestartingpointofbeliefforme.
210.DoesmytelephonecalltoNewYorkstrengthenmyconvictionthatthe
earthexists?
Muchseemstobefixed,anditisremovedfromthetraffic.Itisalsosotospeak
shuntedontoanunusedsiding.
211.Nowitgivesourwayoflookingatthings,andourresearches,theirform.
Perhapsitwasoncedisputed.Butperhaps,forunthinkableages,ithasbelonged
tothescaffoldingofourthoughts.(Everyhumanbeinghasparents.)
212.Incertaincircumstances,forexample,weregardacalculationas
sufficientlychecked.Whatgivesusarighttodoso?Experience?Maythatnot
havedeceivedus?Somewherewemustbefinishedwithjustification,andthen
thereremainsthepropositionthatthisishowwecalculate.
213.Our'empiricalpropositions'donotformahomogeneousmass.
214.Whatpreventsmefromsupposingthatthistableeithervanishesoralters
itsshapeandcolourwhenononeisobservingit,andthenwhensomeonelooks
atitagainchangesbacktoitsoldcondition?"Butwhoisgoingtosuppose
suchathing?"onewouldfeellikesaying.
215.Hereweseethattheideaof'agreementwithreality'doesnothaveany
clearapplication.
216.Theproposition"Itiswritten".
217.Ifsomeonesupposedthatallourcalculationswereuncertainandthatwe
couldrelyonnoneofthem(justifyinghimselfbysayingthatmistakesare
alwayspossible)perhapswewouldsayhewascrazy.Butcanwesayheisin
error?Doeshenotjustreactdifferently?Werelyoncalculations,hedoesn'twe
aresure,heisn't.
218.CanIbelieveforonemomentthatIhaveeverbeeninthestratosphere?
No.SodoIknowthecontrary,likeMoore?
219.Therecannotbeanydoubtaboutitformeasareasonableperson.That's
it.
220.Thereasonablemandoesnothavecertaindoubts.
221.CanIbeindoubtatwill?
222.IcannotpossiblydoubtthatIwasneverinthestratosphere.Doesthat
makemeknowit?Doesitmakeittrue?
223.Formightn'tIbecrazyandnotdoubtingwhatIabsolutelyoughttodoubt?
224."Iknowthatitneverhappened,forifithadhappenedIcouldnotpossibly
haveforgottenit."
But,supposingitdidhappen,thenitjustwouldhavebeenthecasethatyouhad
forgottenit.Andhowdoyouknowthatyoucouldnotpossiblyhaveforgotten
it?Isn'tthatjustfromearlierexperience?
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225.WhatIholdfasttoisnotonepropositionbutanestofpropositions.
226.CanIgivethesuppositionthatIhaveeverbeenonthemoonanyserious
considerationatall?
227."Isthatsomethingthatonecanforget?!"
228."Insuchcircumstances,peopledonotsay'Perhapswe'veallforgotten',
andthelike,butrathertheyassumethat..."
229.Ourtalkgetsitsmeaningfromtherestofourproceedings.
230.Weareaskingourselves:whatdowedowithastatement"Iknow..."?For
itisnotaquestionofmentalprocessesormentalstates.
Andthatishowonemustdecidewhethersomethingisknowledgeornot.
231.Ifsomeonedoubtedwhethertheearthhadexistedahundredyearsago,I
shouldnotunderstand,forthisreason:Iwouldnotknowwhatsuchaperson
wouldstillallowtobecountedasevidenceandwhatnot.
232."Wecoulddoubteverysingleoneofthesefacts,butwecouldnotdoubt
themall."
Wouldn'titbemorecorrecttosay:"wedonotdoubtthemall".
Ournotdoubtingthemallissimplyourmannerofjudging,andthereforeof
acting.
233.Ifachildaskedmewhethertheearthwasalreadytherebeforemybirth,I
shouldanswerhimthattheearthdidnotbeginonlywithmybirth,butthatit
existedlong,longbefore.AndIshouldhavethefeelingofsayingsomething
funny.Ratherasifachildhadaskedifsuchandsuchamountainwerehigher
thanatallhousethatithadseen.InansweringthequestionIshouldhavetobe
impartingapictureoftheworldtothepersonwhoaskedit.
IfIdoanswerthequestionwithcertainty,whatgivesmethiscertainty?
234.IbelievethatIhaveforebears,andthateveryhumanbeinghasthem.I
believethattherearevariouscities,and,quitegenerally,inthemainfactsof
geographyandhistory.Ibelievethattheearthisabodyonwhosesurfacewe
moveandthatitnomoresuddenlydisappearsorthelikethananyothersolid
body:thistable,thishouse,thistree,etc.IfIwantedtodoubttheexistenceof
theearthlongbeforemybirth,Ishouldhavetodoubtallsortsofthingsthat
standfastforme.
235.Andthatsomethingstandsfastformeisnotgroundedinmystupidityor
credulity.
236.Ifsomeonesaid"Theearthhasnotlongbeen..."whatwouldhebe
impugning?DoIknow?
Woulditnothavetobewhatiscalledascientificbelief?Mightitnotbea
mysticalone?Isthereanyabsolutenecessityforhimtobecontradicting
historicalfacts?orevengeographicalones?
237.IfIsay"anhouragothistabledidn'texist",Iprobablymeanthatitwas
onlymadelateron.
IfIsay"thismountaindidn'texistthen",Ipresumablymeanthatitwasonly
formedlateronperhapsbyavolcano.
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IfIsay"thismountaindidn'texistanhourago",thatissuchastrangestatement
thatitisnotclearwhatImean.WhetherforexampleImeansomethinguntrue
butscientific.Perhapsyouthinkthatthestatementthatthemountaindidn'texist
thenisquiteclear,howeveroneconceivesthecontext.Butsupposesomeone
said"Thismountaindidn'texistaminuteago,butanexactlysimilaronedid
instead."Onlytheaccustomedcontextallowswhatismeanttocomethrough
clearly.
238.Imightthereforeinterrogatesomeonewhosaidthattheearthdidnotexist
beforehisbirth,inordertofindoutwhichofmyconvictionshewasatodds
with.Andthenitmightbethathewascontradictingmyfundamentalattitudes,
andifthatwerehowitwas,Ishouldhavetoputupwithit.
Similarlyifhesaidhehadatsometimebeenonthemoon.
239.IbelievethateveryhumanbeinghastwohumanparentsbutCatholics
believethatJesusonlyhadahumanmother.Andotherpeoplemightbelieve
thattherearehumanbeingswithnoparents,andgivenocredencetoallthe
contraryevidence.Catholicsbelieveaswellthatincertaincircumstancesa
wafercompletelychangesitsnature,andatthesametimethatallevidence
provesthecontrary.AndsoifMooresaid"Iknowthatthisiswineandnot
blood",Catholicswouldcontradicthim.
240.Whatisthebeliefthatallhumanbeingshaveparentsbasedon?On
experience.AndhowcanIbasethissurebeliefonmyexperience?Well,Ibase
itnotonlyonthefactthatIhaveknowntheparentsofcertainpeoplebuton
everythingthatIhavelearntaboutthesexuallifeofhumanbeingsandtheir
anatomyandphysiology:alsoonwhatIhaveheardandseenofanimals.But
thenisthatreallyaproof?
241.Isn'tthisanhypothesis,which,asIbelieve,isagainandagaincompletely
confirmed?
242.Mustn'twesayateveryturn:"Ibelievethiswithcertainty"?
243.Onesays"Iknow"whenoneisreadytogivecompellinggrounds."I
know"relatestoapossibilityofdemonstratingthetruth.Whethersomeone
knowssomethingcancometolight,assumingthatheisconvincedofit.
Butifwhathebelievesisofsuchakindthatthegroundsthathecangiveareno
surerthanhisassertion,thenhecannotsaythatheknowswhathebelieves.
244.Ifsomeonesays"Ihaveabody",hecanbeasked"Whoisspeakinghere
withthismouth?"
245.Towhomdoesanyonesaythatheknowssomething?Tohimself,orto
someoneelse.Ifhesaysittohimself,howisitdistinguishedfromtheassertion
thatheissurethatthingsarelikethat?ThereisnosubjectivesurenessthatI
knowsomething.Thecertaintyissubjective,butnottheknowledge.SoifIsay
"IknowthatIhavetwohands",andthatisnotsupposedtoexpressjustmy
subjectivecertainty,ImustbeabletosatisfymyselfthatIamright.ButIcan't
dothat,formyhavingtwohandsisnotlesscertainbeforeIhavelookedat
themthanafterwards.ButIcouldsay:"ThatIhavetwohandsisanirreversible
belief."ThatwouldexpressthefactthatIamnotreadytoletanythingcountas
adisproofofthisproposition.
246."HereIhavearrivedatafoundationofallmybeliefs.""ThispositionI
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willhold!"Butisn'tthat,precisely,onlybecauseIamcompletelyconvincedof
it?Whatis'beingcompletelyconvinced'like?
247.WhatwoulditbeliketodoubtnowwhetherIhavetwohands?Whycan'tI
imagineitatall?WhatwouldIbelieveifIdidn'tbelievethat?SofarIhaveno
systematallwithinwhichthisdoubtmightexist.
248.Ihavearrivedattherockbottomofmyconvictions.
Andonemightalmostsaythatthesefoundationwallsarecarriedbythewhole
house.
249.Onegivesoneselfafalsepictureofdoubt.
250.Myhavingtwohandsis,innormalcircumstances,ascertainasanything
thatIcouldproduceinevidenceforit.
ThatiswhyIamnotinapositiontotakethesightofmyhandasevidencefor
it.
251.Doesn'tthismean:Ishallproceedaccordingtothisbeliefunconditionally,
andnotletanythingconfuseme?
252.Butitisn'tjustthatIbelieveinthiswaythatIhavetwohands,butthat
everyreasonablepersondoes.
253.Atthefoundationofwellfoundedbeliefliesbeliefthatisnotfounded.
254.Any'reasonable'personbehaveslikethis.
255.Doubtinghascertaincharacteristicmanifestations,buttheyareonly
characteristicofitinparticularcircumstances.Ifsomeonesaidthathedoubted
theexistenceofhishands,keptlookingatthemfromallsides,triedtomake
sureitwasn't'alldonebymirrors',etc.,weshouldnotbesurewhetherweought
tocallthisdoubting.Wemightdescribehiswayofbehavingaslikethe
behaviourofdoubt,butthisgamewouldbenotbeours.
256.Ontheotherhandalanguagegamedoeschangewithtime.
257.IfsomeonesaidtomethathedoubtedwhetherhehadabodyIshouldtake
himtobeahalfwit.ButIshouldn'tknowwhatitwouldmeantotryto
convincehimthathehadone.AndifIhadsaidsomething,andthathad
removedhisdoubt,Ishouldnotknowhoworwhy.
258.Idonotknowhowthesentence"Ihaveabody"istobeused.
Thatdoesn'tunconditionallyapplytothepropositionthatIhavealwaysbeenon
ornearthesurfaceoftheearth.
259.Someonewhodoubtedwhethertheearthhadexistedfor100yearsmight
haveascientific,orontheotherhandphilosophical,doubt.
260.Iwouldliketoreservetheexpression"Iknow"forthecasesinwhichitis
usedinnormallinguisticexchange.
261.Icannotatpresentimagineareasonabledoubtastotheexistenceofthe
earthduringthelast100years.
262.Icanimagineamanwhohadgrownupinquitespecialcircumstancesand
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beentaughtthattheearthcameintobeing50yearsago,andthereforebelieved
this.Wemightinstructhim:theearthhaslong...etc.Weshouldbetryingto
givehimourpictureoftheworld.
Thiswouldhappenthroughakindofpersuasion.
263.Theschoolboybelieveshisteachersandhisschoolbooks.
264.IcouldimagineMoorebeingcapturedbyawildtribe,andtheirexpressing
thesuspicionthathehascomefromsomewherebetweentheearthandthe
moon.Mooretellsthemthatheknowsetc.buthecan'tgivethemthegrounds
forhiscertainty,becausetheyhavefantasticideasofhumanabilitytoflyand
knownothingaboutphysics.Thiswouldbeanoccasionformakingthat
statement.
265.Butwhatdoesitsay,beyond"Ihaveneverbeentosuchandsuchaplace,
andhavecompellinggroundstobelievethat"?
266.Andhereonewouldstillhavetosaywhatarecompellinggrounds.
267."Idon'tmerelyhavethevisualimpressionofatree:Iknowthatitisa
tree".
268."Iknowthatthisisahand."Andwhatisahand?"Well,this,for
example".
269.AmImorecertainthatIhaveneverbeenonthemoonthanthatIhave
neverbeeninBulgaria?WhyamIsosure?Well,IknowthatIhaveneverbeen
anywhereintheneighbourhoodforexampleIhaveneverbeenintheBalkans.
270."Ihavecompellinggroundsformycertitude."Thesegroundsmakethe
certitudeobjective.
271.WhatisatellinggroundforsomethingisnotanythingIdecide.
272.Iknow=Iamfamiliarwithitasacertainty.
273.Butwhendoesonesayofsomethingthatitiscertain?
FortherecanbedisputewhethersomethingiscertainImean,whensomething
isobjectivelycertain.
Therearecountlessgeneralempiricalpropositionsthatcountascertainforus.
274.Onesuchisthatifsomeone'sarmiscutoffitwillnotgrowagain.
Another,ifsomeone'sheadiscutoffheisdeadandwillneverliveagain.
Experiencecanbesaidtoteachusthesepropositions.However,itdoesnot
teachustheminisolation:rather,itteachesusahostofinterdependent
propositions.IftheywereisolatedImightperhapsdoubtthem,forIhaveno
experiencerelatingtothem.
275.Ifexperienceisthegroundofourcertainty,thennaturallyitispast
experience.
Anditisn'tforexamplejustmyexperience,butother'speople's,thatIget
knowledgefrom.
Nowonemightsaythatitisexperienceagainthatleadsustogivecredenceto
others.Butwhatexperiencemakesmebelievethattheanatomyandphysiology
booksdon'tcontainwhatisfalse?Thoughitistruethatthistrustisbackedup
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bymyownexperience.
276.Webelieve,sotospeak,thatthisgreatbuildingexists,andthenwesee,
nowhere,nowthere,oneoranothersmallcornerofit.
277."Ican'thelpbelieving..."
278."Iamcomfortablethatthatishowthingsare."
279.Itisquitesurethatmotorcarsdon'tgrowoutoftheearth.Wefeelthatif
someonecouldbelievethecontraryhecouldbelieveeverythingthatwesayis
untrue,andcouldquestioneverythingthatweholdtobesure.
Buthowdoesthisonebeliefhangtogetherwithalltherest?Weshouldliketo
saythatsomeonewhocouldbelievethatdoesnotacceptourwholesystemof
verification.
Thissystemissomethingthatahumanbeingacquiresbymeansofobservation
andinstruction.Iintentionallydonotsay"learns".
280.Afterhehasseenthisandthisandheardthatandthat,heisnotina
positiontodoubtwhether...
281.I,L.W.,believe,amsure,thatmyfriendhasn'tsawdustinhisbodyorin
hishead,eventhoughIhavenodirectevidenceofmysensestothecontrary.I
amsure,byreasonofwhathasbeensaidtome,ofwhatIhaveread,andofmy
experience.Tohavedoubtsaboutitwouldseemtomemadnessofcourse,this
isalsoinagreementwithotherpeoplebutIagreewiththem.
282.IcannotsaythatIhavegoodgroundsfortheopinionthatcatsdonotgrow
ontreesorthatIhadafatherandamother.
Ifsomeonehasdoubtsaboutithowisthatsupposedtohavecomeabout?By
hisnever,fromthebeginning,havingbelievedthathehadparents?Butthen,is
thatconceivable,unlesshehasbeentaughtit?
283.Forhowcanachildimmediatelydoubtwhatitistaught?Thatcouldmean
onlythathewasincapableoflearningcertainlanguagegames.
284.Peoplehavekilledanimalssincetheearliesttimes,usedthefur,bones
etc.etc.forvariouspurposestheyhavecounteddefinitelyonfindingsimilar
partsinanysimilarbeast.
Theyhavealwayslearntfromexperienceandwecanseefromtheiractions
thattheybelievecertainthingsdefinitely,whethertheyexpressthisbeliefor
not.BythisInaturallydonotwanttosaythatmenshouldbehavelikethis,but
onlythattheydobehavelikethis.
285.Ifsomeoneislookingforsomethingandperhapsrootsaroundinacertain
place,heshowsthathebelievesthatwhatheislookingforisthere.
286.Whatwebelievedependsonwhatwelearn.Weallbelievethatitisn't
possibletogettothemoonbuttheremightbepeoplewhobelievethatthatis
possibleandthatitsometimeshappens.Wesay:thesepeopledonotknowalot
thatweknow.And,letthembeneversosureoftheirbelieftheyarewrong
andweknowit.
Ifwecompareoursystemofknowledgewiththeirsthentheirsisevidentlythe
pooreronebyfar.
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23.9.50
287.Thesquirreldoesnotinferbyinductionthatitisgoingtoneedstoresnext
winteraswell.Andnomoredoweneedalawofinductiontojustifyour
actionsorourpredictions.
288.Iknow,notjustthattheearthexistedlongbeforemybirth,butalsothatit
isalargebody,thatthishasbeenestablished,thatIandtherestofmankind
haveforebears,thattherearebooksaboutallthis,thatsuchbooksdon'tlie,etc.
etc.etc.AndIknowallthis?Ibelieveit.Thisbodyofknowledgehasbeen
handedontomeandIhavenogroundsfordoubtingit,but,onthecontrary,all
sortsofconfirmation.
Andwhyshouldn'tIsaythatIknowallthis?Isn'tthatwhatonedoessay?
ButnotonlyIknow,orbelieve,allthat,buttheothersdotoo.Orrather,I
believethattheybelieveit.
289.Iamfirmlyconvincedthatothersbelieve,believetheyknow,thatallthat
isinfactso.
290.Imyselfwroteinmybookthatchildrenlearntounderstandawordinsuch
andsuchaway.DoIknowthat,ordoIbelieveit?WhyinsuchacasedoI
writenot"Ibelieveetc."butsimplytheindicativesentence?
291.Weknowthattheearthisround.Wehavedefinitivelyascertainedthatitis
round.
Weshallsticktothisopinion,unlessourwholewayofseeingnaturechanges.
"Howdoyouknowthat?"Ibelieveit.
292.Furtherexperimentscannotgivethelietoourearlierones,atmostthey
maychangeourwholewayoflookingatthings.
293.Similarlywiththesentence"waterboilsat100C".
294.Thisishowweacquireconviction,thisiscalled"beingrightlyconvinced".
295.Sohasn'tone,inthissense,aproofoftheproposition?Butthatthesame
thinghashappenedagainisnotaproofofitthoughwedosaythatitgivesusa
righttoassumeit.
296.Thisiswhatwecallan"empiricalfoundation"forourassumptions.
297.Forwelearn,notjustthatsuchandsuchexperimentshadthoseandthose
results,butalsotheconclusionwhichisdrawn.Andofcoursethereisnothing
wronginourdoingso.Forthisinferredpropositionisaninstrumentfora
definitiveuse.
298.'Wearequitesureofit'doesnotmeanjustthateverysinglepersonis
certainofit,butthatwebelongtoacommunitywhichisboundtogetherby
scienceandeducation.
299.Wearesatisfiedthattheearthisround.[InEnglish]
______________________
10.3.51
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300.Notallcorrectionsofourviewsareonthesamelevel.
301.Supposingitwasn'ttruethattheearthhadalreadyexistedlongbeforeI
wasbornhowshouldweimaginethemistakebeingdiscovered?
302.It'snogoodsaying"Perhapswearewrong"when,ifnoevidenceis
trustworthy,trustisexcludedinthecaseofthepresentevidence.
303.If,forexample,wehavealwaysbeenmiscalculating,andtwelvetimes
twelveisn'tahundredandfortyfour,whyshouldwetrustanyother
calculation?Andofcoursethatiswronglyput.
304.ButnoramImakingamistakeabouttwelvetimestwelvebeingahundred
andfortyfour.ImaysaylaterthatIwasconfusedjustnow,butnotthatIwas
makingamistake.
305.Hereoncemorethereisneededastepliketheonetakeninrelativity
theory.
306."Idon'tknowifthisisahand."Butdoyouknowwhattheword"hand"
means?Anddon'tsay"Iknowthatitmeansnowforme".Andisn'titan
empiricalfactthatthiswordisusedlikethis?
307.AndherethestrangethingisthatwhenIamquitecertainofhowthe
wordsareused,havenodoubtaboutit,Icanstillgivenogroundsformyway
ofgoingon.IfItriedIcouldgiveathousand,butnoneascertainasthevery
thingtheyweresupposedtobegroundsfor.
308.'Knowledge'and'certainty'belongtodifferentcategories.Theyarenot
two'mentalstates'like,say'surmising'and'beingsure'.(HereIassumethatitis
meaningfulformetosay"Iknowwhat(e.g.)theword'doubt'means"andthat
thissentenceindicatesthattheword"doubt"hasalogicalrole.)Whatinterests
usnowisnotbeingsurebutknowledge.Thatis,weareinterestedinthefact
thataboutcertainempiricalpropositionsnodoubtcanexistifmaking
judgmentsistobepossibleatall.Oragain:Iaminclinedtobelievethatnot
everythingthathastheformofanempiricalpropositionisone.
309.Isitthatruleandempiricalpropositionmergeintooneanother?
310.Apupilandateacher.Thepupilwillnotletanythingbeexplainedtohim,
forhecontinuallyinterruptswithdoubts,forinstanceastotheexistenceof
things,themeaningofwords,etc.Theteachersays"Stopinterruptingmeand
doasItellyou.Sofaryourdoubtsdon'tmakesenseatall."
311.Orimaginethattheboyquestionedthetruthofhistory(andeverythingthat
connectsupwithit)andevenwhethertheearthexistedatallahundredyears
before.
312.Hereitstrikesmeasifthisdoubtwerehollow.Butinthatcaseisn'tbelief
inhistoryhollowtoo?No:thereissomuchthatthisconnectsupwith.
313.Soisthatwhatmakesusbelieveaproposition?Wellthegrammarof
"believe"justdoeshangtogetherwiththegrammarofthepropositionbelieved.
314.Imaginethattheschoolboyreallydidask"andisthereatablethereeven
whenIturnaround,andevenwhennooneistheretoseeit?"Istheteacherto
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reassurehimandsay"ofcoursethereis!"?
Perhapstheteacherwillgetabitimpatient,butthinkthattheboywillgrowout
ofaskingsuchquestions.
315.Thatistosay,theteacherwillfeelthatthisisnotreallyalegitimate
questionatall.
Anditwouldbejustthesameifthepupilcastdoubtontheuniformityof
nature,thatistosayonthejustificationofinductivearguments.Theteacher
wouldfeelthatthiswasonlyholdingthemup,thatthiswaythepupilwould
onlygetstuckandmakenoprogress.Andhewouldberight.Itwouldbeasif
someonewerelookingforsomeobjectinaroomheopensadraweranddoesn't
seeittherethenheclosesitagain,waits,andopensitoncemoretoseeif
perhapsitisn'ttherenow,andkeepsonlikethat.Hehasnotlearnedtolookfor
things.Andinthesamewaythispupilhasnotlearnedhowtoaskquestions.He
hasnotlearnedthegamethatwearetryingtoteachhim.
316.Andisn'titthesameasifthepupilweretoholduphishistorylessonwith
doubtsastowhethertheearthreally...?
317.Thisdoubtisn'toneofthedoubtsinourgame.(Butnotasifwechosethis
game!)
12.3.51
318.'Thequestiondoesn'tariseatall.'Itsanswerwouldcharacterizeamethod.
Butthereisnosharpboundarybetweenmethodologicalpropositionsand
propositionswithinamethod.
319.Butwouldn'tonehavetosaythen,thatthereisnosharpboundarybetween
propositionsoflogicandempiricalpropositions?Thelackofsharpnessisthat
oftheboundarybetweenruleandempiricalproposition.
320.Hereonemust,Ibelieve,rememberthattheconcept'proposition'itselfis
notasharpone.
321.Isn'twhatIamsaying:anyempiricalpropositioncanbetransformedintoa
postulateandthenbecomesanormofdescription.ButIamsuspiciousevenof
this.Thesentenceistoogeneral.Onealmostwantstosay"anyempirical
propositioncan,theoretically,betransformed...",butwhatdoes"theoretically"
meanhere?ItsoundsalltoreminiscentoftheTractatus.
322.Whatifthepupilrefusedtobelievethatthismountainhadbeenthere
beyondhumanmemory?
Weshouldsaythathehadnogroundsforthissuspicion.
323.Sorationalsuspicionmusthavegrounds?
Wemightalsosay:"thereasonablemanbelievesthis".
324.Thusweshouldnotcallanybodyreasonablewhobelievedsomethingin
despiteofscientificevidence.
325.Whenwesaythatweknowthatsuchandsuch...,wemeanthatany
reasonablepersoninourpositionwouldalsoknowit,thatitwouldbeapieceof
unreasontodoubtit.ThusMoorewantstosaynotmerelythatheknowsthathe
etc.etc.,butalsothatanyoneendowedwithreasoninhispositionwouldknow
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itjustthesame.
326.Butwhosayswhatitisreasonabletobelieveinthissituation?
327.Soitmightbesaid:"Thereasonablemanbelieves:thattheearthhasbeen
theresincelongbeforehisbirth,thathislifehasbeenspentonthesurfaceof
theearth,ornearit,thathehasnever,forexample,beenonthemoon,thathe
hasanervoussystemandvariousinnardslikeallotherpeople,etc.,etc."
328."IknowitasIknowthatmynameisL.W."
329.'Ifhecallsthatindoubtwhatever"doubt"meansherehewillnever
learnthisgame'.
330.Soherethesentence"Iknow..."expressesthereadinesstobelievecertain
things.
13.3.
331.Ifweeverdoactwithcertaintyonthestrengthofbelief,shouldwe
wonderthatthereismuchwecannotdoubt?
332.Imaginethatsomeoneweretosay,withoutwantingtophilosophize,"I
don'tknowifIhaveeverbeenonthemoonIdon'tremembereverhavingbeen
there".(Whywouldthispersonbesoradicallydifferentfromus?)
Inthefirstplacehowwouldheknowthathewasonthemoon?Howdoeshe
imagineit?Compare:"IdonotknowifIwaseverinthevillageofX."But
neithercouldIsaythatifXwereinTurkey,forIknowthatIwasneverin
Turkey.
333.Iasksomeone"HaveyoueverbeeninChina?"Hereplies"Idon'tknow".
Hereonewouldsurelysay"Youdon'tknow?Haveyouanyreasontobelieve
youmighthavebeenthereatsometime?Wereyouforexampleevernearthe
Chineseborder?Orwereyourparentsthereatthetimewhenyouweregoingto
beborn?"NormallyEuropeansdoknowwhethertheyhavebeeninChinaor
not.
334.Thatistosay:onlyinsuchandsuchcircumstancesdoesareasonable
persondoubtthat.
335.Theprocedureinacourtoflawrestsonthefactthatcircumstancesgive
statementsacertainprobability.Thestatementthat,forexample,someone
cameintotheworldwithoutparentswouldn'teverbetakenintoconsideration
there.
336.Butwhatmenconsiderreasonableorunreasonablealters.Atcertain
periodsmenfindreasonablewhatatotherperiodstheyfoundunreasonable.
Andviceversa.
Butistherenoobjectivecharacterhere?
Veryintelligentandwelleducatedpeoplebelieveinthestoryofcreationinthe
Bible,whileothersholditasprovenfalse,andthegroundsofthelatterarewell
knowntotheformer.
337.Onecannotmakeexperimentsiftherearenotsomethingsthatonedoes
notdoubt.Butthatdoesnotmeanthatonetakescertainpresuppositionson
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trust.WhenIwritealetterandpostit,ItakeitforgrantedthatitwillarriveI
expectthis.
IfImakeanexperimentIdonotdoubttheexistenceoftheapparatusbeforemy
eyes.Ihaveplentyofdoubts,butnotthat.IfIdoacalculationIbelieve,
withoutanydoubts,thatthefiguresonthepaperaren'tswitchingoftheirown
accord,andIalsotrustmymemorythewholetime,andtrustitwithoutany
reservation.Thecertaintyhereisthesameasthatofmyneverhavingbeenon
themoon.
338.Butimaginepeoplewhowereneverquitecertainofthesethings,butsaid
thattheywereveryprobablyso,andthatitdidnotpaytodoubtthem.Sucha
person,then,wouldsayinmysituation:"ItisextremelyunlikelythatIhave
everbeenonthemoon",etc.,etc.Howwouldthelifeofthesepeoplediffer
fromours?Fortherearepeoplewhosaythatitismerelyextremelyprobable
thatwateroverafirewillboilandnotfreeze,andthatthereforestrictly
speakingwhatweconsiderimpossibleisonlyimprobable.Whatdifference
doesthismakeintheirlives?Isn'titjustthattheytalkrathermoreaboutcertain
thingsthattherestofus?
339.Imaginesomeonewhoissupposedtofetchafriendfromtherailway
stationanddoesn'tsimplylookthetrainupinthetimetableandgotothe
stationattherighttime,butsays:"Ihavenobeliefthatthetrainwillreally
arrive,butIwillgotothestationallthesame."Hedoeseverythingthatthe
normalpersondoes,butaccompaniesitwithdoubtsorwithselfannoyance,etc.
340.Weknow,withthesamecertaintywithwhichwebelieveany
mathematicalproposition,howthelettersAandBarepronounced,whatthe
colourofhumanbloodiscalled,thatotherhumanbeingshavebloodandcallit
"blood".
341.Thatistosay,thequestionsthatweraiseandourdoubtsdependonthe
factthatsomepropositionsareexemptfromdoubt,areasitwerelikehingeson
whichthoseturn.
342.Thatistosay,itbelongstothelogicofourscientificinvestigationsthat
certainthingsareindeednotdoubted.
343.Butitisn'tthatthesituationislikethis:Wejustcan'tinvestigate
everything,andforthatreasonweareforcedtorestcontentwithassumption.If
Iwantthedoortoturn,thehingesmuststayput.
344.Mylifeconsistsinmybeingcontenttoacceptmanythings.
345.IfIasksomeone"whatcolourdoyouseeatthemoment?",inorder,that
is,tolearnwhatcolouristhereatthemoment,Icannotatthesametime
questionwhetherthepersonIaskunderstandsEnglish,whetherhewantsto
takemein,whethermyownmemoryisnotleavingmeinthelurchastothe
namesofcolours,andsoon.
346.WhenIamtryingtomatesomeoneinchess,Icannothavedoubtsabout
thepiecesperhapschangingplacesofthemselvesandmymemory
simultaneouslyplayingtricksonmesothatIdon'tnotice.
15.3.51
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347."Iknowthatthat'satree."WhydoesitstrikemeasifIdidnotunderstand
thesentence?thoughitisafterallanextremelysimplesentenceofthemost
ordinarykind?ItisasifIcouldnotfocusmymindonanymeaning.Simply
becauseIdon'tlookforthefocuswherethemeaningis.AssoonasIthinkofan
everydayuseofthesentenceinsteadofaphilosophicalone,itsmeaning
becomesclearandordinary.
348.Justasthewords"Iamhere"haveameaningonlyincertaincontexts,and
notwhenIsaythemtosomeonewhoissittinginfrontofmeandseesme
clearly,andnotbecausetheyaresuperfluous,butbecausetheirmeaningisnot
determinedbythesituation,yetstandsinneedofsuchdetermination.
349."Iknowthatthat'satree"thismaymeanallsortsofthings:Ilookata
plantthatItakeforayoungbeechandthatsomeoneelsethinksisablack
currant.Hesays"that'sashrub"Isayitisatree.Weseesomethinginthe
mistwhichoneofustakesforaman,andtheothersays"Iknowthatthat'sa
tree".Someonewantstotestmyeyesetc.etc.etc.etc.Eachtimethe'that'
whichIdeclaretobeatreeisofadifferentkind.
Butwhatwhenweexpressourselvesmoreprecisely?Forexample:"Iknowthat
thatthingthereisatree,Icanseeitquiteclearly."LetusevensupposeIhad
madethisremarkinthecontextofaconversation(sothatitwasrelevantwhenI
madeit)andnow,outofallcontext,Irepeatitwhilelookingatthetree,andI
add"ImeanthesewordsasIdidfiveminutesago".IfIadded,forexample,that
Ihadbeenthinkingofmybadeyesagainanditwasakindofsigh,thenthere
wouldbenothingpuzzlingabouttheremark.
Forhowasentenceismeantcanbeexpressedbyanexpansionofitandmay
thereforebemadepartofit.
350."Iknowthatthat'satree"issomethingaphilosophermightsayto
demonstratetohimselfortosomeoneelsethatheknowssomethingthatisnota
mathematicalorlogicaltruth.Similarly,someonewhowasentertainingtheidea
thathewasnouseanymoremightkeeprepeatingtohimself"Icanstilldothis
andthisandthis."Ifsuchthoughtsoftenpossessedhimonewouldnotbe
surprisedifhe,apparentlyoutofallcontext,spokesuchasentenceoutloud.
(ButhereIhavealreadysketchedabackground,asurrounding,forthisremark,
thatistosaygivenitacontext.)Butifsomeone,inquiteheterogeneous
circumstances,calledoutwiththemostconvincingmimicry:"Downwith
him!",onemightsayofthesewords(andtheirtone)thattheywereapattern
thatdoesindeedhavefamiliarapplications,butthatinthiscaseitwasnoteven
clearwhatlanguagethemaninquestionwasspeaking.Imightmakewithmy
handthemovementIshouldmakeifIwereholdingahandsawandsawing
throughaplankbutwouldonehaveanyrighttocallthismovementsawing,
outofallcontext?(Itmightbesomethingquitedifferent!)
351.Isn'tthequestion"havethesewordsameaning?"similarto"Isthatatool?"
askedasoneproduces,say,ahammer?Isay"Yes,it'sahammer."Butwhatif
thethingthatanyofuswouldtakeforahammerweresomewhereelsea
missile,forexample,oraconductor'sbaton?Nowmaketheapplication
yourself.
352.Ifsomeonesays,"Iknowthatthat'satree"Imayanswer:"Yes,thatisa
sentence.AnEnglishsentence.Andwhatisitsupposedtobedoing?"Suppose
hereplies:"IjustwantedtoremindmyselfthatIknowthinglikethat"?
353.Butsupposehesaid"Iwanttomakealogicalobservation"?Ifaforester
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goesintoawoodwithhismenandsays"Thistreehasgottobecutdown,and
thisoneandthisone"whatifhethenobserves"Iknowthatthat'satree"?
ButmightnotIsayoftheforester"Heknowsthatthat'satreehedoesn't
examineit,ororderhismentoexamineit"?
354.Doubtingandnondoubtingbehavior.Thereisthefirstonlyifthereisthe
second.
355.Amaddoctor(perhaps)mightaskme"Doyouknowwhatthatis?"andI
mightreply"Iknowthatit'sachairIrecognizeit,it'salwaysbeeninmy
room".Hesaysthis,possibly,totestnotmyeyesbutmyabilitytorecognize
things,toknowtheirnamesandtheirfunctions.Whatisinquestionhereisa
kindofknowingone'swayabout.Nowitwouldbewrongformetosay"I
believethatit'sachair"becausethatwouldexpressmyreadinessformy
statementtobetested.While"Iknowthatit..."impliesbewildermentifwhatI
saidwasnotconfirmed.
356.My"mentalstate",the"knowing",givesmenoguaranteeofwhatwill
happen.Butitconsistsinthis,thatIshouldnotunderstandwhereadoubtcould
getafootholdnorwhereafurthertestwaspossible.
357.Onemightsay:"'Iknow'expressescomfortablecertainty,notthecertainty
thatisstillstruggling."
358.NowIwouldliketoregardthiscertainty,notassomethingakinto
hastinessorsuperficiality,butasaformoflife.(Thatisverybadlyexpressed
andprobablybadlythoughtaswell.)
359.ButthatmeansIwanttoconceiveitassomethingthatliesbeyondbeing
justifiedorunjustifiedasitwere,assomethinganimal.
360.Iknowthatthisismyfoot.Icouldnotacceptanyexperienceasproofto
thecontrary.Thatmaybeanexclamationbutwhatfollowsfromit?Atleast
thatIshallactwithacertaintythatknowsnodoubt,inaccordancewithmy
belief.
361.ButImightalsosay:IthasbeenrevealedtomebyGodthatitisso.God
hastaughtmethatthisismyfoot.Andthereforeifanythinghappenedthat
seemedtoconflictwiththisknowledgeIshouldhavetoregardthatas
deception.
362.Butdoesn'titcomeoutherethatknowledgeisrelatedtoaadecision?
363.Andhereitisdifficulttofindthetransitionfromtheexclamationone
wouldliketomake,toitsconsequencesinwhatonedoes.
364.Onemightalsoputthisquestion:"Ifyouknowthatthatisyourfoot,do
youalsoknow,ordoyouonlybelieve,thatnofutureexperiencewillseemto
contradictyourknowledge?"(Thatis,thatnothingwillseemtoyouyourselfto
doso.)
365.Ifsomeonereplied:"Ialsoknowthatitwillneverseemtomeasif
anythingcontradictedthatknowledge",whatcouldwegatherfromthat,
exceptthathehimselfhadnodoubtthatitwouldneverhappen?
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366.Supposeitwereforbiddentosay"Iknow"andonlyallowedtosay"I
believeIknow"?
367.Isn'titthepurposeofconstruingawordlike"know"analogouslyto
"believe"thatthenopprobriumattachestothestatement"Iknow"iftheperson
whomakesitiswrong?
Asaresultamistakebecomessomethingforbidden.
368.Ifsomeonesaysthathewillrecognizenoexperienceasproofofthe
opposite,thatisafteralladecision.Itispossiblethathewillactagainstit.
16.3.51
369.IfIwantedtodoubtwhetherthiswasmyhand,howcouldIavoid
doubtingwhethertheword"hand"hasanymeaning?SothatissomethingI
seemtoknowafterall.
370.Butmorecorrectly:ThefactthatIusetheword"hand"andalltheother
wordsinmysentencewithoutasecondthought,indeedthatIshouldstand
beforetheabyssifIwantedsomuchastotrydoubtingtheirmeaningsshows
thatabsenceofdoubtbelongstotheessenceofthelanguagegame,thatthe
question"HowdoIknow..."dragsoutthelanguagegame,orelsedoesaway
withit.
371.Doesn't"Iknowthatthat'sahand",inMoore'ssense,meanthesame,or
moreorlessthesame,as:Icanmakestatementslike"Ihaveapaininthis
hand"or'thishandisweakerthantheother"or"Ioncebrokethishand",and
countlessothers,inlanguagegameswhereadoubtastotheexistenceofthis
handdoesnotcomein?
372.Onlyincertaincasesisitpossibletomakeaninvestigation"isthatreallya
hand?"(or"myhand").For"Idoubtwhetherthatisreallymy(ora)hand"
makesnosensewithoutsomemoreprecisedetermination.Onecannottellfrom
thesewordsalonewhetheranydoubtatallismeantnorwhatkindofdoubt.
373.Whyisitsupposedtobepossibletohavegroundsforbelievingsomething
ifitisn'tpossibletobecertain?
374.Weteachachild"thatisyourhand",not"thatisperhaps(or"probably")
yourhand".Thatishowachildlearnstheinnumerablelanguagegamesthatare
concernedwithhishand.Aninvestigationorquestion,'whetherthisisreallya
hand'neveroccurstohim.Nor,ontheotherhand,doeshelearnthatheknows
thatthisisahand.
375.Hereonemustrealizethatcompleteabsenceofdoubtatsomepoint,even
wherewewouldsaythat'legitimate'doubtcanexist,neednotfalsifya
languagegame.Forthereisalsosomethinglikeanotherarithmetic.
Ibelievethatthisadmissionmustunderlieanyunderstandingoflogic.
17.3.
376.ImayclaimwithpassionthatIknowthatthis(forexample)ismyfoot.
377.Butthispassionisafterallsomethingveryrare,andthereisnotraceofit
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whenItalkofthisfootintheordinaryway.
378.Knowledgeisintheendbasedonacknowledgement.
379.Isaywithpassion"Iknowthatthisisafoot"butwhatdoesitmean?
380.Imightgoon:"Nothingintheworldwillconvincemeoftheopposite!"
Formethisfactisatthebottomofallknowledge.Ishallgiveupotherthings
butnotthis.
381.This"Nothingintheworld"isobviouslyanattitudewhichonehasn'tgot
towardseverythingonebelievesoriscertainof.
382.Thatisnottosaythatnothingintheworldwillinfactbeabletoconvince
meofanythingelse.
383.Theargument"Imaybedreaming"issenselessforthisreason:ifIam
dreaming,thisremarkisbeingdreamedaswellandindeeditisalsobeing
dreamedthatthesewordshaveanymeaning.
384.Nowwhatkindofsentenceis"Nothingintheworld..."?
385.Ithastheformofaprediction,butofcourseitisnotonethatisbasedon
experience.
386.Anyonewhosays,withMoore,thatheknowsthatsoandso...givesthe
degreeofcertaintythatsomethinghasforhim.Anditisimportantthatthis
degreehasamaximumvalue.
387.Someonemightaskme:"Howcertainareyouthatthatisatreeoverthere
thatyouhavemoneyinyourpocketthatthatisyourfoot?"Andtheanswerin
onecasemightbe"notcertain",inanother"asgoodascertain",inthethird"I
can'tdoubtit".Andtheseanswerswouldmakesenseevenwithoutanygrounds.
Ishouldnotneedforexample,tosay:"Ican'tbecertainwhetherthatisatree
becausemyeyesaren'tsharpenough."Iwanttosay:itmadesenseforMooreto
say"Iknowthatthatisatree",ifhemeantsomethingquiteparticularbyit.
[Ibelieveitmightinterestaphilosopher,onewhocanthinkhimself,toreadmy
notes.ForevenifIhavehitthemarkonlyrarely,hewouldrecognizewhat
targetsIhadbeenceaselesslyaimingat.]
388.Everyoneofusoftenusessuchasentence,andthereisnoquestionbut
thatitmakessense.Butdoesthatmeanityieldsanyphilosophicalconclusion?
Isitmoreofaproofoftheexistenceofexternalthings,thatIknowthatthisisa
hand,thanthatIdon'tknowwhetherthatisgoldorbrass?
18.3.
389.Moorewantedtogiveanexampletoshowthatonereallycanknow
propositionsaboutphysicalobjects.Iftherewereadisputewhetheronecould
haveapaininsuchandsuchapartofthebody,thensomeonewhojustthenhad
apaininthatspotmightsay:"Iassureyou,Ihaveapaintherenow."Butit
wouldsoundoddifMoorehadsaid:"Iassureyou,Iknowthat'satree."A
personalexperiencesimplyhasnointerestforushere.
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390.Allthatisimportantisthatitmakessensetosaythatoneknowssucha
thingandconsequentlytheassurancethatonedoesknowitcan'taccomplish
anythinghere.
391.Imaginealanguagegame"WhenIcallyou,comeinthroughthedoor."In
anyordinarycase,adoubtwhethertherereallyisadoortherewillbe
impossible.
392.WhatIneedtoshowisthatadoubtisnotnecessaryevenwhenitis
possible.Thatthepossibilityofthelanguagegamedoesn'tdependon
everythingbeingdoubtedthatcanbedoubted.(Thisisconnectedwiththerole
ofcontradictioninmathematics.)
393.Thesentence"Iknowthatthat'satree"ifitweresaidoutsideitslanguage
game,mightalsobeaquotation(fromanEnglishgrammarbookperhaps).
"ButsupposeImeanitwhileIamsayingit?"Theoldmisunderstandingabout
theconcept'mean'.
394."ThisisoneofthethingsthatIcannotdoubt."
395."Iknowallthat."AndthatwillcomeoutinthewayIactandinthewayI
speakaboutthethingsinquestion.
396.Inthelanguagegame(2),canhesaythatheknowsthatthosearebuilding
stones?"No,buthedoesknowit."
[[PhilosophicalInvestigationsI,2:...andwritewithconfidence"Inthe
beginningwasthedeed."Goethe,FaustI.]]
397.Haven'tIgonewrongandisn'tMooreperfectlyright?Haven'tImadethe
elementarymistakeofconfusingone'sthoughtswithone'sknowledge?Of
courseIdonotthinktomyself"Theearthalreadyexistedforsometimebefore
mybirth",butdoIknowitanytheless?Don'tIshowthatIknowitbyalways
drawingitsconsequences?
398.Anddon'tIknowthatthereisnostairwayinthishousegoingsixfloors
deepintotheearth,eventhoughIhaveneverthoughtaboutit?
399.Butdoesn'tmydrawingtheconsequencesonlyshowthatIacceptthis
hypothesis?
19.3
400.HereIaminclinedtofightwindmills,becauseIcannotyetsaythethingI
reallywanttosay.
401.Iwanttosay:propositionsoftheformofempiricalpropositions,andnot
onlypropositionsoflogic,formthefoundationofalloperatingwiththoughts
(withlanguage).Thisobservationisnotoftheform"Iknow..."."Iknow..."
stateswhatIknow,andthatisnotoflogicalinterest.
402.Inthisremarktheexpression"propositionsoftheformofempirical
propositions"isitselfthoroughlybadthestatementsinquestionarestatements
aboutmaterialobjects.Andtheydonotserveasfoundationsinthesamewayas
hypotheseswhich,iftheyturnouttobefalse,arereplacedbyothers.
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403.Tosayofman,inMoore'ssense,thatheknowssomethingthatwhathe
saysisthereforeunconditionallythetruth,seemswrongtome.Itisthetruth
onlyinasmuchasitisanunmovingfoundationofhislanguagegames.
404.Iwanttosay:it'snotthatonsomepointsmenknowthetruthwithperfect
certainty.No:perfectcertaintyisonlyamatteroftheirattitude.
405.Butofcoursethereisstillamistakeevenhere.
406.WhatIamaimingatisalsofoundinthedifferencebetweenthecasual
observation"Iknowthatthat'sa...",asitmightbeusedinordinarylife,andthe
sameutterancewhenaphilosophermakesit.
407.ForwhenMooresays"Iknowthatthat's..."Iwanttoreply"youdon't
knowanything!"andyetIwouldnotsaythattoanyonewhowasspeaking
withoutphilosophicalintention.Thatis,Ifeel(rightly?)thatthesetwomeanto
saysomethingdifferent.
408.Forifsomeonesaysheknowssuchandsuch,andthisispartofhis
philosophythenhisphilosophyisfalseifhehasslippedupinthisstatement.
409.IfIsay"Iknowthatthat'safoot"whatamIreallysaying?Isn'tthewhole
pointthatIamcertainoftheconsequencesthatifsomeoneelsehadbeenin
doubtImightsaytohim"youseeItoldyouso"?Wouldmyknowledgestill
beworthanythingifitletmedownasaclueinaction?Andcan'titletme
down?
20.3.
410.Ourknowledgeformsanenormoussystem.Andonlywithinthissystem
hasaparticularbitthevaluewegiveit.
411.IfIsay"weassumethattheearthhasexistedformanyyearspast"(or
somethingsimilar),thenofcourseitsoundsstrangethatweshouldassumesuch
athing.Butintheentiresystemofourlanguagegamesitbelongstothe
foundations.Theassumption,onemightsay,formsthebasisofaction,and
therefore,naturally,ofthought.
412.Anyonewhoisunabletoimagineacaseinwhichonemightsay"Iknow
thatthisismyhand"(andsuchcasesarecertainlyrare)mightsaythatthese
wordswerenonsense.True,hemightalsosay"OfcourseIknowhowcouldI
notknow?"butthenhewouldpossiblybetakingthesentence"thisismy
hand"asanexplanationofthewords"myhand".
413.Forsupposeyouwereguidingablindman'shand,andasyouwereguiding
italongyoursyousaid"thisismyhand"ifhethensaid"areyousure?"or"do
youknowitis?",itwouldtakeveryspecialcircumstancesforthattomake
sense.
414.Butontheotherhand:howdoIknowthatitismyhand?DoIevenhere
knowexactlywhatitmeanstosayitismyhand?WhenIsay"howdoI
know?"IdonotmeanthatIhavetheleastdoubtofit.Whatwehavehereisa
foundationforallmyaction.Butitseemstomethatitiswronglyexpressedby
thewords"Iknow".
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415.Andinfact,isn'ttheuseoftheword"know"asapreeminently
philosophicalwordaltogetherwrong?If"know"hasthisinterest,whynot
"beingcertain"?Apparentlybecauseitwouldbetoosubjective.Butisn't
"know"justassubjective?Isn'tonemisledsimplybythegrammatical
peculiaritythat"p"followsfrom"Iknowp"?
"IbelieveIknow"wouldnotneedtoexpressalesserdegreeofcertainty.
True,butoneisn'ttryingtoexpresseventhegreatestsubjectivecertainty,but
ratherthatcertainpropositionsseemtounderlieallquestionsandallthinking.
416.Andhaveweanexampleofthisin,say,thepropositionthatIhavebeen
livinginthisroomforweekspast,thatmymemorydoesnotdeceivemeinthis?
"certainbeyondallreasonabledoubt"
21.3
417."IknowthatforthelastmonthIhavehadabatheveryday."WhatamI
remembering?Eachdayandthebatheachmorning?No.IknowthatIbathed
eachdayandIdonotderivethatfromsomeotherimmediatedatum.SimilarlyI
say"Ifeltapaininmyarm"withoutthislocalitycomingintomyconsciousness
inanyotherway(suchasbymeansofanimage).
418.Ismyunderstandingonlyblindnesstomyownlackofunderstanding?It
oftenseemssotome.
419.IfIsay"IhaveneverbeeninAsiaMinor",wheredoIgetthisknowledge
from?Ihavenotworkeditout,noonetoldmemymemorytellsme.SoI
can'tbewrongaboutit?IsthereatruthherewhichIknow?Icannotdepart
fromthisjudgmentwithouttopplingallotherjudgmentswithit.
420.Evenapropositionlikethisone,thatIamnowlivinginEngland,hasthese
twosides:itisnotamistakebutontheotherhand,whatdoIknowof
England?Can'tmyjudgmentgoalltopieces?
Woulditnotbepossiblethatpeoplecametomyroomandalldeclaredthe
opposite?evengaveme'proofs'ofit,sothatIsuddenlystoodtherelikea
madmanaloneamongpeoplewhowereallnormal,oranormalpersonalone
amongmadmen?MightInotthensufferdoubtsaboutwhatatpresentseemsat
thefurthestremovefromdoubt?
421.IaminEngland.Everythingaroundmetellsmesowhereverand
howeverIletmythoughtsturn,theyconfirmthisformeatonce.ButmightI
notbeshakenifthingssuchasIdon'tdreamofatpresentweretohappen?
422.SoIamtryingtosaysomethingthatsoundslikepragmatism.
HereIambeingthwartedbyakindofWeltanschauung.
423.Thenwhydon'tIsimplysaywithMoore"IknowthatIaminEngland?"
Sayingthisismeaningfulinparticularcircumstances,whichIcanimagine.But
whenIutterthesentenceoutsidethesecircumstances,asanexampletoshow
thatIcanknowtruthsofthiskindwithcertainty,thenitatoncestrikesmeas
fishy.Oughtitto?
424.Isay"Iknowp"eithertoassurepeoplethatI,too,knowthetruthp,or
simplyasanemphasisof|p.Onesaystoo,"Idon'tbelieveit,Iknowit".And
onemightalsoputitlikethis(forexample):"Thatisatree.Andthat'snotjust
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surmise."
Butwhataboutthis:"IfIweretotellsomeonethatthatwasatree,thatwouldn't
bejustsurmise."Isn'tthiswhatMoorewastryingtosay?
425.ItwouldnotbesurmiseandImighttellittosomeoneelsewithcomplete
certainty,assomethingthereisnodoubtabout.Butdoesthatmeanthatitis
unconditionallythetruth?MaynotthethingthatIrecognizewithcomplete
certaintyasthetreethatIhaveseenheremywholelifelongmaythisnotbe
disclosedassomethingdifferent?Mayitnotconfoundme?
Andneverthelessitwasright,inthecircumstancesthatgivethissentence
meaning,tosay"Iknow(Idonotmerelysurmise)thatthat'satree."Tosaythat
instricttruthIonlybelieveit,wouldbewrong.Itwouldbecompletely
misleadingtosay:"IbelievemynameisL.W."Andthistooisright:Icannot
bemakingamistakeaboutit.ButthatdoesnotmeanthatIaminfallibleabout
it.
21.3.51
426.Buthowcanweshowsomeonethatweknowtruths,notonlyaboutsense
databutalsoaboutthings?Forafterallitcan'tbeenoughforsomeonetoassure
usthatheknowsthis.
Well,whatmustourstartingpointbeifwearetoshowthis?
22.3
427.Weneedtoshowthatevenifheneverusesthewords"Iknow...",his
conductexhibitsthethingweareconcernedwith.
428.Forsupposeapersonofnormalbehaviorassuredusthatheonlybelieved
hisnamewassuchandsuch,hebelievedherecognizedthepeopleheregularly
livedwith,hebelievedthathehadhandsandfeetwhenhedidn'tactuallysee
them,andsoon.Canweshowhimitisnotsofromthethingshedoes(and
says)?
23.3.51
429.WhatreasonhaveI,now,whenIcannotseemytoes,toassumethatIhave
fivetoesoneachfoot?
Isitrighttosaythatmyreasonisthatpreviousexperiencehasalwaystaught
meso?AmImorecertainofpreviousexperiencethanthatIhavetentoes?
Thatpreviousexperiencemayverywellbethecauseofmypresentcertitude
butisititsground?
430.ImeetsomeonefromMarsandheasksme"Howmanytoeshavehuman
beingsgot?"Isay"Ten.I'llshowyou",andtakemyshoesoff.Supposehe
wassurprisedthatIknewwithsuchcertainty,althoughIhadn'tlookedatmy
toesoughtItosay:"Wehumansknowhowmanytoeswehavewhetherwe
canseethemornot"?
26.3.51
431."Iknowthatthisroomisonthesecondfloor,thatbehindthedoorashort
landingleadstothestairs,andsoon."OnecouldimaginecaseswhereIshould
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comeoutwiththis,buttheywouldbeextremelyrare.ButontheotherhandI
showthisknowledgedayin,dayoutbymyactionsandalsoinwhatIsay.
Nowwhatdoessomeoneelsegatherfromtheseactionsandwordsofmine?
Won'titbejustthatIamsureofmyground?FromthefactthatIhavebeen
livinghereformanyweeksandhavegoneupanddownthestairseverydayhe
willgatherthatIknowwheremyroomissituated.Ishallgivehimthe
assurance"Iknow"whenhedoesnotalreadyknowthingswhichwouldhave
compelledtheconclusionthatIknew.
432.Theutterance"Iknow..."canonlyhaveitsmeaninginconnectionwiththe
otherevidenceofmy'knowing'.
433.SoifIsaytosomeone"Iknowthatthat'satree",itisalsoasifItoldhim
"thatisatreeyoucanabsolutelyrelyonitthereisnodoubtaboutit".Anda
philosophercouldonlyusethestatementtoshowthatthisformofspeechis
actuallyused.Butifhisuseofitisnottobemerelyanobservationabout
Englishgrammar,hemustgivethecircumstancesinwhichthisexpression
functions.
434.Nowdoesexperienceteachusthatinsuchandsuchcircumstancespeople
knowthisandthat?Certainly,experienceshowsusthatnormallyaftersoand
somanydaysamancanfindhiswayaboutahousehehasbeenlivingin.Or
even:experienceteachesusthataftersuchandsuchaperiodoftrainingaman's
judgmentistobetrusted.Hemust,experiencetellsus,havelearntforsolong
inordertobeabletomakeacorrectprediction.But.
27.3
435.Oneisoftenbewitchedbyaword.Forexample,bytheword"know".
436.IsGodboundbyourknowledge?Arealotofourstatementsincapableof
falsehood?Forthatiswhatwewanttosay.
437.Iaminclinedtosay:"Thatcannotbefalse."Thatisinteresting.Butwhat
consequenceshasit?
438.ItwouldnotbeenoughtoassuresomeonethatIknowwhatisgoingonat
acertainplacewithoutgivinghimgroundsthatsatisfyhimthatIamina
positiontoknow.
439.Eventhestatement"Iknowthatbehindthisdoorthereisalandingandthe
stairwaydowntothegroundfloor"onlysoundssoconvincingbecause
everyonetakesitforgrantedthatIknowit.
440.Thereissomethinguniversalherenotjustsomethingpersonal.
441.Inacourtoflawthemereassurance"Iknow..."onthepartofawitness
wouldconvincenoone.Itmustbeshownthathewasinapositiontoknow.
Eventheassurance"Iknowthatthat'sahand",saidwhilesomeonelookedat
hisownhand,wouldnotbecredibleunlessweknewthecircumstancesin
whichitwassaid.Andifwedoknowthem,itseemstobeanassurancethatthe
personspeakingisnormalinthisrespect.
442.FormayitnothappenthatIimaginemyselftoknowsomething?
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443.Supposethatinacertainlanguagetherewerenowordcorrespondingto
our"know".Thepeoplesimplymakeassertions.("Thatisatree",etc.)
Naturallyitcanoccurforthemtomakemistakes.Andsotheyattachasignto
thesentencewhichindicateshowprobabletheytakeamistaketobeorshould
Isay,howprobableamistakeisinthiscase?Thislattercanalsobeindicated
bymentioningcertaincircumstances.Forexample"ThenAsaidtoB'...'Iwas
standingquiteclosetothemandmyhearingisgood",or"Awasatsuchand
suchaplaceyesterday.Isawhimfromalongwayoff.Myeyesarenotvery
good",or"Thereisatreeoverthere:IcanseeitclearlyandIhaveseenit
innumerabletimesbefore".
444."Thetrainleavesattwoo'clock.Checkitoncemoretomakecertain"or
"Thetrainleavesattwoo'clock.Ihavejustlookeditupinanewtimetable."
Onemayalsoadd"Iamreliableinsuchmatters".Theusefulnessofsuch
additionsisobvious.
445.ButifIsay"Ihavetwohands",whatcanIaddtoindicatereliability?At
themostthatthecircumstancesaretheordinaryones.
446.ButwhyamIsocertainthatthisismyhand?Doesn'tthewholelanguage
gamerestonthiskindofcertainty?
Or:isn'tthis'certainty'(already)presupposedinthelanguagegame?Namelyby
virtueofthefactthatoneisnotplayingthegame,orisplayingitwrong,ifone
doesnotrecognizeobjectswithcertainty.
28.3
447.Comparewiththis12x12=144.Heretoowedon'tsay"perhaps".For,inso
farasthispropositionrestsonournotmiscountingormiscalculatingandonour
sensesnotdeceivingusaswecalculate,bothpropositions,thearithmeticalone
andthephysicalone,areonthesamelevel.
Iwanttosay:Thephysicalgameisjustascertainasthearithmetical.Butthis
canbemisunderstood.Myremarkisalogicalandnotapsychologicalone.
448.Iwanttosay:Ifonedoesn'tmarvelatthefactthatthepropositionsof
arithmetic(e.g.themultiplicationtables)are'absolutelycertain',thenwhy
shouldonebeastonishedthattheproposition"Thisismyhand"issoequally?
449.Somethingmustbetaughtusasafoundation.
450.Iwanttosay:ourlearninghastheform"thatisaviolet","thatisatable".
Admittedly,thechildmightheartheword"violet"forthefirsttimeinthe
sentence"perhapsthatisaviolet",butthenhecouldask"whatisaviolet?"
Nowthismightofcoursebeansweredbyshowinghimapicture.Buthow
woulditbeifonesaid"thatisa..."onlywhenshowinghimapicture,but
otherwisesaidnothingbut"perhapsthatisa..."Whatpracticalconsequences
isthatsupposedtohave?
Adoubtthatdoubtedeverythingwouldnotbeadoubt.
451.MyobjectionagainstMoore,thatthemeaningoftheisolatedsentence
"Thatisatree"isundetermined,sinceitisnotdeterminedwhatthe"that"is
thatissaidtobeatreedoesn'twork,foronecanmakethemeaningmore
definitebysaying,forexample:"Theobjectovertherethatlookslikeatreeis
notanartificialimitationofatreebutarealone."
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452.Itwouldnotbereasonabletodoubtifthatwasarealtreeoronly...
Myfindingitbeyonddoubtisnotwhatcounts.Ifadoubtwouldbe
unreasonable,thatcannotbeseenfromwhatIhold.Therewouldthereforehave
tobearulethatdeclaresdoubttobeunreasonablehere.Butthereisn'tsucha
rule,either.
453.Idoindeedsay:"Herenoreasonablepersonwoulddoubt."Couldwe
imaginelearnedjudgesbeingaskedwhetheradoubtwasreasonableor
unreasonable?
454.Therearecaseswheredoubtisunreasonable,butotherswhereitseems
logicallyimpossible.Andthereseemstobenoclearboundarybetweenthem.
29.3
455.Everylanguagegameisbasedonwords'andobjects'beingrecognized
again.Welearnwiththesameinexorabilitythatisachairasthat2x2=4.
456.If,therefore,Idoubtoramuncertainaboutthisbeingmyhand(in
whateversense),whynotinthatcaseaboutthemeaningofthesewordsas
well?
457.DoIwanttosay,then,thatcertaintyresidesinthenatureofthelanguage
game?
458.Onedoubtsonspecificgrounds.Thequestionisthis:howisdoubt
introducedintothelanguagegame?
459.Iftheshopkeeperwantedtoinvestigateeachofhisappleswithoutany
reason,forthesakeofbeingcertainabouteverything,whydoesn'thehaveto
investigatetheinvestigation?Andcanonetalkofbeliefhere(Imeanbeliefas
in'religiousbelief',notsurmise)?Allpsychologicaltermsmerelydistractus
fromthethingthatreallymatters.
460.Igotothedoctor,showhimmyhandandsay"Thisisahand,not...I've
injuredit,etc.,etc."AmIonlygivinghimapieceofsuperfluousinformation?
Forexample,mightn'tonesay:supposingthewords"Thisisahand"werea
pieceofinformationhowcouldyoubankonhisunderstandingthis
information?Indeed,ifitisopentodoubt'whetherthatisahand',whyisn'tit
alsoopentodoubtwhetherIamahumanbeingwhoisinformingthedoctorof
this?Butontheotherhandonecanimaginecaseseveniftheyareveryrare
oneswherethisdeclarationisnotsuperfluous,orisonlysuperfluousbutnot
absurd.
461.SupposethatIwerethedoctorandapatientcametome,showedmehis
handandsaid:"Thisthingthatlookslikeahandisn'tjustasuperbimitationit
reallyisahand"andwentontotalkabouthisinjuryshouldIreallytakethis
asapieceofinformation,eventhoughasuperfluousone?Shouldn'tIbemore
likelytoconsideritnonsense,whichadmittedlydidhavetheformofapieceof
information?For,Ishouldsay,ifthisinformationreallyweremeaningful,how
canhebecertainofwhathesays?Thebackgroundislackingforittobe
information.
30/3
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462.Whydoesn'tMooreproduceasoneofthethingsthatheknows,for
example,thatissuchandsuchapartofEnglandthereisavillagecalledso
andso?Inotherwords:whydoesn'thementionafactthatisknowntohimand
nottoeveryoneofus?
31/3
463.Thisiscertainlytrue,thattheinformation"Thatisatree",whennoone
coulddoubtit,mightbeakindofjokeandassuchhavemeaning.Ajokeofthis
kindwasinfactmadeoncebyRenan.
3/4/51
464.Mydifficultycanalsobeshownlikethis:Iamsittingtalkingtoafriend.
SuddenlyIsay:"Iknewallalongthatyouweresoandso."Isthatreallyjusta
superfluous,thoughtrue,remark?
Ifeelasifthesewordswerelike"Goodmorning"saidtosomeoneinthemiddle
ofaconversation.
465.Howwoulditbeifwehadthewords"Theyknownowadaysthatthereare
over...speciesofinsects"insteadof"Iknowthatthat'satree"?Ifsomeonewere
suddenlytoutterthefirstsentenceoutofallcontextonemightthink:hehas
beenthinkingofsomethingelseintheinterimandisnowsayingoutloudsome
sentenceinhistrainofthought.Oragain:heisinatranceandisspeaking
withoutunderstandingwhatheissaying.
466.ThusitseemstomethatIhaveknownsomethingthewholetime,andyet
thereisnomeaninginsayingso,inutteringthistruth.
467.Iamsittingwithaphilosopherinthegardenhesaysagainandagain"I
knowthatthat'satree",pointingtoatreethatisnearus.Someoneelsearrives
andhearsthis,andItellhim:"Thisfellowisn'tinsane.Weareonlydoing
philosophy."
4/4
468.Someonesaysirrelevantly"That'satree".Hemightsaythissentence
becauseheremembershavinghearditinasimilarsituationorhewassuddenly
struckbythetree'sbeautyandthesentencewasanexclamationorhewas
pronouncingthesentencetohimselfasagrammaticalexampleetc.,etc.And
nowIaskhim"Howdidyoumeanthat?"andhereplies"Itwasapieceof
informationdirectedatyou."Shouldn'tIbeatlibertytoassumethathedoesn't
knowwhatheissaying,ifheisinsaneenoughtowanttogivemethis
information?
469.Inthemiddleofaconversation,someonesaystomeoutoftheblue:"I
wishyouluck."IamastonishedbutlaterIrealizethatthesewordsconnectup
withhisthoughtsaboutme.Andnowtheydonotstrikemeasmeaninglessany
more.
470.WhyistherenodoubtthatIamcalledL.W.?Itdoesnotseematalllike
somethingthatonecouldestablishatoncebeyonddoubt.Onewouldnotthink
thatitisoneoftheindubitabletruths.
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5/4
[Herethereisstillabiggapinmythinking.AndIdoubtwhetheritwillbe
fillednow.]
471.Itissodifficulttofindthebeginning.Or,better:itisdifficulttobeginat
thebeginning.Andnottrytogofurtherback.
472.Whenachildlearnslanguageitlearnsatthesametimewhatistobe
investigatedandwhatnot.Whenitlearnsthatthereisacupboardintheroom,it
isn'ttaughttodoubtwhetherwhatitseeslateronisstillacupboardoronlya
kindofstageset.
473.Justasinwritingwelearnaparticularbasicformoflettersandthenvaryit
later,sowelearnfirstthestabilityofthingsasthenorm,whichisthensubject
toalterations.
474.Thisgamesprovesitsworth.Thatmaybethecauseofitsbeingplayed,
butitisnottheground.
475.Iwanttoregardmanhereasananimalasaprimitivebeingtowhichone
grantsinstinctbutnotratiocination.Asacreatureinaprimitivestate.Anylogic
goodenoughforaprimitivemeansofcommunicationneedsnoapologyfrom
us.Languagedidnotemergefromsomekindofratiocination[Raisonnement].
6/4
476.Childrendonotlearnthatbooksexist,thatarmchairsexist,etc.,etc.they
learntofetchbooks,sitinarmchairs,etc.,etc.
Later,questionsabouttheexistenceofthingsdoofcoursearise,"Istheresucha
thingasaunicorn?"andsoon.Butsuchaquestionispossibleonlybecauseasa
rulenocorrespondingquestionpresentsitself.Forhowdoesoneknowhowto
setaboutsatisfyingoneselfoftheexistenceofunicorns?Howdidonelearnthe
methodfordeterminingwhethersomethingexistsornot?
477."Soonemustknowthattheobjectswhosenamesoneteachesachildbyan
ostensivedefinitionexist."Whymustoneknowtheydo?Isn'titenoughthat
experiencedoesn'tlatershowtheopposite?
Forwhyshouldthelanguagegamerestonsomekindofknowledge?
7/4
478.Doesachildbelievethatmilkexists?Ordoesitknowthatmilkexists?
Doesacatknowthatamouseexists?
479.Arewetosaythattheknowledgethattherearephysicalobjectscomes
veryearlyorverylate?
8/4
480.Achildthatislearningtousetheword"tree".Onestandswithitinfront
ofatreeandsays"Lovelytree!"Clearlynodoubtastothetree'sexistence
comesintothelanguagegame.Butcanthechildbesaidtoknow:'thatatree
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exists'?Admittedlyit'struethat'knowingsomething'doesn'tinvolvethinking
aboutitbutmustn'tanyonewhoknowssomethingbecapableofdoubt?And
doubtingmeansthinking.
481.WhenonehearsMooresay"Iknowthatthat'satree",onesuddenly
understandsthosewhothinkthatthathasbynomeansbeensettled.
Thematterstrikesoneallatonceasbeingunclearandblurred.ItisasifMoore
hadputitinthewronglight.
ItisasifIweretoseeapainting(sayapaintedstageset)andrecognizewhatit
representsfromalongwayoffatonceandwithouttheslightestdoubt.Butnow
Istepnearer:andthenIseealotofpatchesofdifferentcolours,whichareall
highlyambiguousanddonotprovideanycertaintywhatever.
482.Itisasif"Iknow"didnottolerateametaphysicalemphasis.
483.Thecorrectuseoftheexpression"Iknow".Someonewithbadsightasks
me:"doyoubelievethatthethingwecanseethereisatree?"Ireply"Iknowit
isIcanseeitclearlyandamfamiliarwithit."A:"Isn'tN.N.athome?"I:"I
believeheis."A:"Washeathomeyesterday?"I"YesterdayhewasI
knowhewasIspoketohim."A:"Doyouknoworonlybelievethatthispart
ofthehouseisbuiltonlaterthantherest?"I:"IknowitisIgotitfromsoand
so."
484.Inthesecases,then,onesays"Iknow"andmentionshowoneknows,orat
leastonecandoso.
485.Wecanalsoimagineacasewheresomeonegoesthroughalistof
propositionsandashedoessokeepsasking"DoIknowthatordoIonly
believeit?"Hewantstocheckthecertaintyofeachindividualproposition.It
mightbeaquestionofmakingastatementasawitnessbeforeacourt.
9/4
486."DoyouknowordoyouonlybelievethatyournameisL.W.?"Isthata
meaningfulquestion?
Doyouknowordoyouonlybelievethatwhatyouarewritingdownnoware
Germanwords?Doyouonlybelievethat"believe"hasthismeaning?What
meaning?
487.WhatistheproofthatIknowsomething?MostcertainlynotmysayingI
knowit.
488.Andso,whenwritersenumerateallthethingstheyknow,thatproves
nothingwhatever.
Sothepossibilityofknowledgeaboutphysicalobjectscannotbeprovedbythe
protestationsofthosewhobelievethattheyhavesuchknowledge.
489.Forwhatreplydoesonemaketosomeonewhosays"Ibelieveitmerely
strikesyouasifyouknewit"?
490.WhenIask"DoIknowordoIonlybelievethatIamcalled...?"itisno
usetolookwithinmyself.
ButIcouldsay:notonlydoIneverhavetheslightestdoubtthatIamcalled
that,butthereisnojudgementIcouldbecertainofifIstarteddoubtingabout
that.
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10/4
491."DoIknowordoIonlybelievethatIamcalledL.W.?"Ofcourse,ifthe
questionwere"AmIcertainordoIonlysurmise...?",thenmyanswercouldbe
reliedon.
492."DoIknowordoIonlybelieve...?"mightalsobeexpressedlikethis:
Whatifitseemedtoturnoutthatwhatuntilnowhasseemedimmunetodoubt
wasafalseassumption?WouldIreactasIdowhenabeliefhasprovedtobe
false?orwoulditseemtoknockfromundermyfeetthegroundonwhichI
standinmakinganyjudgementsatall?ButofcourseIdonotintendthisasa
prophecy.
WouldIsimplysay"Ishouldneverhavethoughtit!"orwouldI(haveto)
refusetorevisemyjudgementbecausesucha'revision'wouldamountto
annihilationofallyardsticks?
493.Soisthisit:Imustrecognizecertainauthoritiesinordertomake
judgementsatall?
494."Icannotdoubtthispropositionwithoutgivingupalljudgement."
Butwhatsortofpropositionisthat?(ItisreminiscentofwhatFregesaidabout
thelawofidentity.)Itiscertainlynoempiricalproposition.Itdoesnotbelong
topsychology.Ithasratherthecharacterofarule.
495.Onemightsimplysay"O,rubbish!"tosomeonewhowantedtomake
objectionstothepropositionsthatarebeyonddoubt.Thatis,notreplytohim
butadmonishhim.
496.Thisisasimilarcasetothatofshowingthatithasnomeaningtosaythata
gamehasalwaysbeenplayedwrong.
497.Ifsomeonewantedtoarousedoubtsinmeandspokelikethis:hereyour
memoryisdeceivingyou,thereyou'vebeentakenin,thereagainyouhavenot
beenthoroughenoughinsatisfyingyourself,etc.,andifIdidnotallowmyself
tobeshakenbutkepttomycertaintythenmydoingsocannotbewrong,even
ifonlybecausethisisjustwhatdefinesagame.
11/4
498.ThequeerthingisthateventhoughIfinditquitecorrectforsomeoneto
say"Rubbish!"andsobrushasidetheattempttoconfusehimwithdoubtsat
bedrock,nevertheless,Iholdittobeincorrectifheseekstodefendhimself
(using,e.g.,thewords"Iknow").
499.Imightalsoputitlikethis:the'lawofinduction'cannomorebegrounded
thancertainparticularpropositionsconcerningthematerialofexperience.
500.Butitwouldalsostrikemeasnonsensetosay"Iknowthatthelawof
inductionistrue".
Imaginesuchastatementmadeinacourtoflaw!Itwouldbemorecorrectto
say"Ibelieveinthelawof..."where'believe'hasnothingtodowithsurmising.
501.AmInotgettingcloserandclosertosayingthatintheendlogiccannotbe
described?Youmustlookatthepracticeoflanguage,thenyouwillseeit.
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502.Couldonesay"Iknowthepositionofmyhandswithmyeyesclosed",if
thepositionIgavealwaysormostlycontradictedtheevidenceofotherpeople?
503.Ilookatanobjectandsay"Thatisatree",or"Iknowthatthat'satree".
NowifIgoneareranditturnsoutthatitisn't,Imaysay"Itwasn'tatreeatall"
oralternativelyIsay"Itwasatreebutnowitisn'tanylonger".Butifallthe
otherscontradictedme,andsaiditneverhadbeenatree,andifalltheother
evidencesspokeagainstmewhatgoodwoulditdotometosticktomy"I
know"?
504.WhetherIknowsomethingdependsonwhethertheevidencebacksmeup
orcontradictsme.Fortosayoneknowsonehasapainmeansnothing.
505.ItisalwaysbyfavourofNaturethatoneknowssomething.
506."Ifmymemorydeceivesmehereitcandeceivemeeverywhere."
IfIdon'tknowthat,howdoIknowifmywordsmeanwhatIbelievethey
mean?
507."Ifthisdeceivesme,whatdoes'deceive'meananymore?"
508.WhatcanIrelyon?
509.Ireallywanttosaythatalanguagegameisonlypossibleifonetrusts
something(Ididnotsay"cantrustsomething").
510.IfIsay"OfcourseIknowthatthat'satowel"Iammakinganutterance.I
havenothoughtofaverification.Formeitisanimmediateutterance.
Idon'tthinkofpastorfuture.(Andofcourseit'sthesameforMoore,too.)
Itisjustlikedirectlytakingholdofsomething,asItakeholdofmytowel
withouthavingdoubts.
511.Andyetthisdirecttakingholdcorrespondstoasureness,nottoa
knowing.
Butdon'tItakeholdofathing'snamelikethat,too?
12/4
512.Isn'tthequestionthis:"Whatifyouhadtochangeyouropinionevenon
thesemostfundamentalthings?"Andtothattheanswerseemstometobe:
"Youdon'thavetochangeit.Thatisjustwhattheirbeing'fundamental'is."
513.Whatifsomethingreallyunheardofhappened?IfI,say,sawhouses
graduallyturningintosteamwithoutanyobviouscause,itthecattleinthefields
stoodontheirheadsandlaughedandspokecomprehensiblewordsiftrees
graduallychangedintomenandmenintotrees.Now,wasIrightwhenIsaid
beforeallthesethingshappened"Iknowthatthat'sahouse"etc.,orsimply
"that'sahouse"etc.?
514.Thisstatementappearedtomefundamentalifitisfalse,whatare'true'
and'false'anymore?!
515.IfmynameisnotL.W.,howcanIrelyonwhatismeantby"true"and
"false"?
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516.Ifsomethinghappened(suchassomeonetellingmesomething)calculated
tomakemedoubtfulofmyownname,therewouldcertainlyalsobesomething
thatmadethegroundsofthesedoubtsthemselvesseemdoubtful,andIcould
thereforedecidetoretainmyoldbelief.
517.Butmightitnotbepossibleforsomethingtohappenthatthrewme
entirelyofftherails?Evidencethatmadethemostcertainthingunacceptableto
me?Oratanyratemademethrowovermymostfundamentaljudgements?
(Whetherrightlyorwronglyisbesidethepoint.)
518.CouldIimagineobservingthisinanotherperson?
519.Admittedly,ifyouareobeyingtheorder"Bringmeabook",youmayhave
tocheckwhetherthethingyouseeovertherereallyisabook,butthenyoudo
atleastknowwhatpeoplemeanbya"book"andifyoudon'tyoucanlookit
up,butthenyoumustknowwhatsomeotherwordmeans.Andthefactthata
wordmeanssuchandsuch,isusedinsuchandsuchaway,isinturnan
empiricalfact,likethefactthatwhatyouseeoverthereisabook.
Therefore,inorderforyoutobeabletocarryoutanordertheremustbesome
empiricalfactaboutwhichyouarenotindoubt.Doubtitselfrestsonlyonwhat
isbeyonddoubt.
Butsincealanguagegameissomethingthatconsistsintherecurrent
proceduresofthegameintime,itseemsimpossibletosayinanyindividual
casethatsuchandsuchmustbebeyonddoubtifthereistobealanguagegame
thoughitisrightenoughtosaythatasarulesomeempiricaljudgmentor
othermustbebeyonddoubt.
13/4
520.Moorehaseveryrighttosayheknowsthere'satreethereinfrontofhim.
Naturallyhemaybewrong.(Foritisnotthesameaswiththeutterance"I
believethereisatreethere".)Butwhetherheisrightorwronginthiscaseisof
nophilosophicalimportance.IfMooreisattackingthosewhosaythatone
cannotreallyknowsuchathing,hecan'tdoitbyassuringthemthatheknows
thisandthat.Foroneneednotbelievehim.Ifhisopponentshadassertedthat
onecouldnotbelievethisandthat,thenhecouldhavereplied:"Ibelieveit".
14/4
521.Moore'smistakeliesinthiscounteringtheassertionthatonecannot
knowthat,bysaying"Idoknowit".
522.Wesay:ifachildhasmasteredlanguageandhenceitsapplicationit
mustknowthemeaningofwords.Itmust,forexample,beabletoattachthe
nameofitscolourtowhite,black,redorblueobjectwithouttheoccurrenceof
anydoubt.
523.Andindeednoonemissesdoubtherenooneissurprisedthatwedonot
merelysurmisethemeaningofourwords.
15/4
524.Isitessentialforourlanguagegames('orderingandobeying'forexample)
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thatnodoubtappearsatcertainpoints,orisitenoughifthereisthefeelingof
beingsure,admittedlywithaslightbreathofdoubt?
Thatis,isitenoughifIdonot,asIdonow,callsomething'black','green','red',
straightoff,withoutanydoubtatallinterposingitselfbutdoinsteadsay"Iam
surethatisred",asonemaysay"Iamsurethathewillcometoday"(inother
wordswiththe'feelingofbeingsure')?
Theaccompanyingfeelingisofcourseamatterofindifferencetous,and
equallywehavenoneedtobotheraboutthewords"Iamsurethat"either.
Whatisimportantiswhethertheygowithadifferenceinthepracticeofthe
language.
Onemightaskwhetherapersonwhospokelikethiswouldalwayssay"Iam
sure"onoccasionswhere(forexample)thereissurenessinthereportswemake
(inanexperiment,forexample,welookthroughatubeandreportthecolour
weseethroughit).Ifhedoes,ourimmediateinclinationwillbetocheckwhat
hesays.Butifheprovestobeperfectlyreliable,onewillsaythathiswayof
talkingismerelyabitperverse,anddoesnotaffecttheissue.Onemightfor
examplesupposethathehasreadscepticalphilosophers,becomeconvinced
thatonecanknownothing,andthatiswhyhehasadoptedthiswayof
speaking.Onceweareusedtoit,itdoesnotinfectpractice.
525.What,then,doesthecaselooklikewheresomeonereallyhasgota
differentrelationshiptothenamesofcolours,forexample,fromus?Where,
thatis,therepersistsaslightdoubtorapossibilityofdoubtintheiruse.
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526.IfsomeoneweretolookatanEnglishpillarboxandsay"Iamsurethat
it'sred",weshouldhavetosupposethathewascolourblind,orbelievehehad
nomasteryofEnglishandknewthecorrectnameforthecolourinsomeother
language.
Ifneitherwasthecaseweshouldnotquiteunderstandhim.
527.AnEnglishmanwhocallsthiscolour"red"isnot'sureitiscalled"red"in
English'.
Achildwhohasmasteredtheuseofthewordisnot'surethatinhislanguage
thiscolouriscalled...'.Norcanonesayofhimthatwhenheislearningtospeak
helearnsthatthecolouriscalledthatinEnglishnotyet:heknowsthiswhen
hehaslearnttheuseoftheword.
528.Andinspiteofthis:ifsomeoneaskedmewhatthecolourwascalledin
GermanandItellhim,andnowheasksme"areyousure?"thenIshallreply
"IknowitisGermanismymothertongue".
529.Andonechild,forexample,willsay,ofanotherorofhimself,thathe
alreadyknowswhatsuchandsuchiscalled.
530.Imaytellsomeone"thiscolouriscalled'red'inEnglish"(whenfor
exampleIamteachinghimEnglish).InthiscaseIshouldnotsay"Iknowthat
thiscolour..."IwouldperhapssaythatifIhadjustnowlearnedit,orby
contrastwithanothercolourwhoseEnglishnameIamnotacquaintedwith.
531.Butnow,isn'titcorrecttodescribemypresentstateasfollows:Iknow
whatthiscolouriscalledinEnglish?Andifthatiscorrect,whythenshouldI
notdescribemystatewiththecorrespondingwords"Iknowetc."?
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532.SowhenMooresatinfrontofatreeandsaid"Iknowthatthat'satree",he
wassimplystatingthetruthaboutthisstateatthetime.
[Idophilosophynowlikeanoldwomanwhoisalwaysmislayingsomething
andhavingtolookforitagain:nowherspectacles,nowherkeys.]
533.Well,ifitwascorrecttodescribehisstateoutofcontext,thenitwasjust
ascorrecttoutterthewords"that'satree"outofcontext.
534.Butisitwrongtosay:"Achildthathasmasteredalanguagegamemust
knowcertainthings"?
Ifinsteadofthatonesaid"mustbeabletodocertainthings",thatwouldbea
pleonasm,yetthisisjustwhatIwanttocounterthefirstsentencewith.But:
"achildacquiresaknowledgeofnaturalhistory".Thatpresupposesthatitcan
askwhatsuchandsuchaplantiscalled.
535.Thechildknowswhatsomethingiscalledifhecanreplycorrectlytothe
question"whatisthatcalled?"
536.Naturally,thechildwhoisjustlearningtospeakhasnotyetgotthe
conceptiscalledatall.
537.Canonesayofsomeonewhohasn'tthisconceptthatheknowswhatsuch
andsuchiscalled?
538.Thechild,Ishouldliketosay,learnstoreactinsuchandsuchawayand
insoreactingitdoesn'tsofarknowanything.Knowingonlybeginsatalater
lever.
539.Doesitgoforknowingasitdoesforcollecting?
540.AdogmightlearntoruntoNatthecall"N",andtoMatthecall"M",
butwouldthatmeanheknowswhatthesepeoplearecalled?
541."Heonlyknowswhatthispersoniscallednotyetwhatthatpersonis
called".Thatissomethingonecannot,strictlyspeaking,sayofsomeonewho
simplyhasnotyetgottheconceptofpeople'shavingnames.
542."Ican'tdescribethisflowerifIdon'tknowthatthiscolouriscalled'red'."
543.Achildcanusethenamesofpeoplelongbeforehecansayinanyform
whatever:"Iknowthisone'snameIdon'tknowthatone'syet."
544.OfcourseImaytruthfullysay"Iknowwhatthiscolouriscalledin
English",atthesametimeasIpoint(forexample)tothecolouroffreshblood.
But
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545.'Achildknowswhichcolourismeantbytheword"blue".'Whatheknows
hereisnotallthatsimple.
546.Ishouldsay"Iknowwhatthiscolouriscalled"ife.g.whatisinquestion
isshadesofcolourwhosenamenoteverybodyknows.
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547.Onecan'tyetsaytoachildwhoisjustbeginningtospeakandcanusethe
words"red"and"blue":"Comeon,youknowwhatthiscolouriscalled!"
548.Achildmustlearntheuseofcolourwordsbeforeitcanaskforthename
ofacolour.
549.ItwouldbewrongtosaythatIcanonlysay"Iknowthatthereisachair
there"whenthereisachairthere.Ofcourseitisn'ttrueunlessthereis,butI
havearighttosaythisifIamsurethereisachairthere,evenifIamwrong.
[Pretensionsareamortgagewhichburdensaphilosopher'scapacitytothink.]
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550.Ifsomeonebelievessomething,weneedn'talwaysbeabletoanswerthe
question'whyhebelievesit'butifheknowssomething,thenthequestion"how
doesheknow?"mustbecapableofbeinganswered.
551.Andifonedoesanswerthisquestion,onemustdosoaccordingto
generallyacceptedaxioms.Thisishowsomethingofthissortmaybeknown.
552.DoIknowthatIamnowsittinginachair?Don'tIknowit?!Inthe
presentcircumstancesnooneisgoingtosaythatIknowthisbutnomorewill
hesay,forexample,thatIamconscious.Norwillonenormallysaythatofthe
passersbyinthestreet.
Butnow,evenifonedoesn'tsayit,doesthatmakeituntrue??
553.Itisqueer:ifIsay,withoutanyspecialoccasion,"Iknow"forexample,
"IknowthatIamnowsittinginachair",thisstatementseemstomeunjustified
andpresumptuous.ButifImakethesamestatementwherethereissomeneed
forit,then,althoughIamnotajotmorecertainofitstruth,itseemstometobe
perfectlyjustifiedandeveryday.
554.Initslanguagegameitisnotpresumptuous.There,ithasnohigher
positionthan,simply,thehumanlanguagegame.Forthereithasitsrestricted
application.
ButassoonasIsaythissentenceoutsideitscontext,itappearsinafalselight.
ForthenitisasifIwantedtoinsistthattherearethingsthatIknow.God
himselfcan'tsayanythingtomeaboutthem.
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555.Wesayweknowthatwaterboilswhenitisputoverafire.Howdowe
know?Experiencehastaughtus.Isay"IknowthatIhadbreakfeastthis
morning"experiencehasn'ttaughtmethat.Onealsosays"Iknowthatheisin
pain".Thelanguagegameisdifferenteverytime,wearesureeverytime,and
peoplewillagreewithusthatweareinapositiontoknoweverytime.Andthat
iswhythepropositionsofphysicsarefoundintextbooksforeveryone.
Ifsomeonesaysheknowsomething,itmustbesomethingthat,bygeneral
consent,heisinapositiontoknow.
556.Onedoesn'tsay:heisinapositiontobelievethat.
Butonedoessay:"Itisreasonabletoassumethatinthissituation"(or"to
believethat").
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557.Acourtmartialmaywellhavetodecidewhetheritwasreasonablein
suchandsuchasituationtohaveassumedthisorthatwithconfidence(even
thoughtwrongly).
558.Wesayweknowthatwaterboilsanddoesnotfreezeundersuchandsuch
circumstances.Isitconceivablethatwearewrong?Wouldn'tamistaketopple
alljudgmentwithit?More:whatcouldstandifthatweretofall?Might
someonediscoversomethingthatmadeussay"Itwasamistake"?
Whatevermayhappeninthefuture,howeverwatermaybehaveinthefuture,
weknowthatuptonowithasbehavedthusininnumerableinstances.
Thisfactisfusedintothefoundationsofourlanguagegame.
559.Youmustbearinmindthatthelanguagegameissotosaysomething
unpredictable.Imean:itisnotbasedongrounds.Itisnotreasonable(or
unreasonable).
Itistherelikeourlife.
560.Andtheconceptofknowingiscoupledwiththatofthelanguagegame.
561."Iknow"and"Youcanrelyonit".Butonecannotalwayssubstitutethe
latterfortheformer.
562.Atanyrateitisimportanttoimaginealanguageinwhichourconcept
'knowledge'doesnotexist.
563.Onesays"Iknowthatheisinpain"althoughonecanproduceno
convincinggroundsforthis.Isthisthesameas"Iamsurethathe..."?No,"I
amsure"tellsyoumysubjectivecertainty."Iknow"meansthatIwhoknowit,
andthepersonwhodoesn'tareseparatedbyadifferenceinunderstanding.
(Perhapsbasedonadifferenceindegreeofexperience.)
IfIsay"Iknow"inmathematics,thejustificationforthisisaproof.
Ifinthesetwocasesinsteadof"Iknow",onesays"youcanrelyonit"thenthe
substantiationisofadifferentkindineachcase.
Andsubstantiationcomestoanend.
564.Alanguagegame:bringingbuildingstones,reportingthenumberof
availablestones.Thenumberissometimesestimated,sometimesestablishedby
counting.Thenthequestionarises"Doyoubelievethereareasmanystonesas
that?",andtheanswer"IknowthereareI'vejustcountedthem".Butherethe
"Iknow"couldbedropped.If,however,thereareseveralwaysoffinding
somethingoutforsure,likecounting,weighing,measuringthestack,thenthe
statement"Iknow"cantaketheplaceofmentioninghowIknow.
565.Butherethereisn'tyetanyquestionofany"knowledge"thatthisiscalled
"aslab",this"apillar",etc.
566.Nordoesachildwholearnsmylanguagegame(PINo.2)learntosay"I
knowthatthisiscalled'aslab'".
Nowofcoursethereisalanguagegameinwhichthechildusesthatsentence.
Thispresupposesthatthechildisalreadycapableofusingthenameassoonas
heisgivenit.(Asifsomeoneweretotellme"thiscolouriscalled...")Thus,if
thechildhaslearntalanguagegamewithbuildingstones,onecansay
somethinglike"andthisstoneiscalled...",andinthiswaytheoriginal
languagegamehasbeenexpanded.
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567.Andnow,ismyknowledgethatIamcalledL.W.ofthesamekindas
knowledgethatwaterboilsat100C?Ofcourse,thisquestioniswronglyput.
568.Ifoneofmynameswereusedonlyveryrarely,thenitmighthappenthatI
didnotknowit.ItgoeswithoutsayingthatIknowmyname,onlybecause,like
anyoneelse,Iuseitoverandoveragain.
569.AninnerexperiencecannotshowmethatIknowsomething.
Hence,ifinspiteofthatIsay,"Iknowthatmynameis...",andyetitis
obviouslynotanempiricalproposition,
570."Iknowthisismynameamongusanygrownupknowswhathisname
is."
571."Mynameis...youcanrelyonthat.Ifitturnsouttobewrongyouneed
neverbelievemeinthefuture."
572.Don'tIseemtoknowthatIcan'tbewrongaboutsuchathingasmyown
name?
Thiscomesoutinthewords:"Ifthatiswrong,thenIamcrazy".Verywell,but
thosearewordsbutwhatinfluencehasitontheapplicationoflanguage?
573.Isitthroughtheimpossibilityofanything'sconvincingmeofthecontrary?
574.Thequestionis,whatkindofpropositionis:"IknowIcan'tbemistaken
aboutthat",oragain"Ican'tbemistakenaboutthat"?
This"Iknow"seemstoprescindfromallgrounds:Isimplyknowit.Butifthere
canbeanyquestionatallofbeingmistakenhere,thenitmustbepossibleto
testwhetherIknowit.
575.Thusthepurposeofthephrase"Iknow"mightbetoindicatewhereIcan
bereliedonbutwherethat'swhatit'sdoing,theusefulnessofthissignmust
emergefromexperience.
576.Onemightsay"HowdoIknowthatI'mnotmistakenaboutmyname?"
andifthereplywas"BecauseIhaveuseditsooften",onemightgoontoask
"HowdoIknowthatIamnotmistakenaboutthat?"Andherethe"HowdoI
know"cannotanylongerhaveanysignificance.
577."Myknowledgeofmynameisabsolutelydefinite."
Iwouldrefusetoentertainanyargumentthattriedtoshowtheopposite!
Andwhatdoes"Iwouldrefuse"mean?Isittheexpressionofanintention?
578.Butmightn'tahigherauthorityassuremethatIdon'tknowthetruth?So
thatIhadtosay"Teachme!"?Butthenmyeyeswouldhavetobeopened.
579.Itispartofthelanguagegamewithpeople'snamesthateveryoneknows
hisnamewiththegreatestcertainty.
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580.ItmightsurelyhappenthatwheneverIsaid"Iknow"itturnedouttobe
wrong.(Showingup.)
581.ButperhapsImightneverthelessbeunabletohelpmyself,sothatIkept
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ondeclaring"Iknow...".Butaskyourself:howdidthechildlearnthe
expression?
582."Iknowthat"maymeanIamquitefamiliarwithitoragain:itis
certainlyso.
583."Iknowthatthenameofthisin...is..."Howdoyouknow?"Ihave
learnt...".
CouldIsubstitute"In...thenameofthisis..."for"Iknowetc"inthisexample?
584.Woulditbepossibletomakeuseoftheverb"know"onlyinthequestion
"Howdoyouknow?"followingasimpleassertion?Insteadof"Ialready
knowthat"onesays"Iamfamiliarwiththat"andthisfollowsonlyuponbeing
toldthefact.Butwhatdoesonesayinsteadof"Iknowwhatthatis"?
585.Butdoesn't"Iknowthatthat'satree"saysomethingdifferentfrom"thatis
atree"?
586.Insteadof"Iknowwhatthatis"onemightsay"Icansaywhatthatis".
Andifoneadoptedthisformofexpressionwhatwouldthenbecomeof"Iknow
thatthatisa..."?
587.Backtothequestionwhether"Iknowthatthat'sa..."saysanything
differentfrom"thatisa...".Inthefirstsentenceapersonismentioned,inthe
second,not.Butthatdoesnotshowthattheyhavedifferentmeanings.Atall
eventsoneoftenreplacesthefirstformbythesecond,andthenoftengivesthe
latteraspecialintonation.Foronespeaksdifferentlywhenonemakesan
uncontradictedassertionfromwhenonemaintainsanassertioninfaceof
contradiction.
588.Butdon'tIusethewords"Iknowthat..."tosaythatIaminacertainstate,
whereasthemereassertion"thatisa..."doesnotsaythis?Andyetoneoften
doesreplytosuchanassertionbyasking"howdoyouknow?""Butsurely,
onlybecausethefactthatIassertthisgivestounderstandthatIthinkIknow
it."Thispointcouldbemadeinthefollowingway:inazootheremightbea
notice"thisisazebra"butnever"Iknowthatthisisazebra".
"Iknow"hasmeaningonlywhenitisutteredbyaperson.But,giventhat,itisa
matterofindifferencewhetherwhatisutteredis"Iknow..."or"Thatis...".
589.Forhowdoesamanlearntorecognizehisownstateofknowing
something?
590.Atmostonemightspeakofrecognizingastate,wherewhatissaidis"I
knowwhatthatis".Hereonecansatisfyoneselfthatonereallyisinpossession
ofthisknowledge.
591."Iknowwhatkindoftreethatis.Itisachestnut."
"Iknowwhatkindoftreethatis.Iknowit'sachestnut."
Thefirststatementsoundsmorenaturalthanthesecond.Onewillonlysay"I
know"asecondtimeifonewantsespeciallytoemphasizecertaintyperhapsto
anticipatebeingcontradicted.Thefirst"Iknow"meansroughly:Icansay.
Butinanothercaseonemightbeginwiththeobservation"that'sa...",andthen,
whenthisiscontradicted,counterbysaying:"Iknowwhatsortoftreeitis",
andbythismeanslayemphasisonbeingsure.
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592."Icantellyouwhatkindofa...thatis,andnodoubtaboutit."
593.Evenwhenonecanreplace"Iknow"by"Itis..."stillonecannotreplace
thenegationoftheonebythenegationoftheother.
With"Idon'tknow..."anewelemententersourlanguagegames.
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594.Mynameis"L.W."Andifsomeoneweretodisputeit,Ishould
straightawaymakeconnexionswithinnumerablethingswhichmakeitcertain.
595."ButIcanstillimaginesomeonemakingalltheseconnexions,andnoneof
themcorrespondingwithreality.Whyshouldn'tIbeinasimilarcase?"
IfIimaginesuchapersonIalsoimagineareality,aworldthatsurroundshim
andIimaginehimasthinking(andspeaking)incontradictiontothisworld.
596.IfsomeonetellsmehisnameisN.N.,itismeaningfulformetoaskhim
"Canyoubemistaken?"Thatisanallowablequestioninthelanguagegame.
Andtheanswertoit,yesorno,makessense.Nowofcoursethisanswerisnot
infallibleeither,i.e.,theremightbeatimewhenitprovedtobewrong,butthat
doesnotdeprivethequestion"Canyoube..."andtheanswer"No"oftheir
meaning.
597.Thereplytothequestion"Canyoubemistaken?"givesthestatementa
definiteweight.Theanswermayalsobe:"Idon'tthinkso."
598.Butcouldn'tonereplytothequestion"Canyou..."bysaying:"Iwill
describethecasetoyouandthenyoucanjudgeforyourselfwhetherIcanbe
mistaken"?
Forexample,ifitwereaquestionofsomeone'sownname,thefactmightbe
thathehadneverusedthisname,butrememberedhehadreaditonsome
document,butontheotherhandtheanswermightbe:"I'vehadthisnamemy
wholelifelong,I'vebeencalleditbyeverybody."Ifthatisnotequivalenttothe
answer"Ican'tbemistaken",thenthelatterhasnomeaningwhatever.Andyet
quiteobviouslyitpointstoaveryimportantdistinction.
599.Forexampleonecoulddescribethecertaintyofthepropositionthatwater
boilsatcirca100C.Thatisn'te.g.apropositionIhaveonceheard(likethisor
that,whichIcouldmention).Imadetheexperimentmyselfatschool.The
propositionisaveryelementaryoneinourtextbooks,whicharetobetrusted
inmatterslikethisbecause...Nowonecanoffercounterexamplestoallthis,
whichshowthathumanbeingshaveheldthisandthattobecertainwhichlater,
accordingtoouropinion,provedfalse.Buttheargumentisworthless.[Mayit
notalsohappenthatwebelievewerecognizeamistakeofearliertimesand
latercometotheconclusionthatthefirstopinionwastherightone?etc.]To
say:intheendwecanonlyadducesuchgroundsasweholdtobegrounds,isto
saynothingatall.
Ibelievethatatthebottomofthisisamisunderstandingofthenatureofour
languagegames.
600.WhatkindofgroundshaveIfortrustingtextbooksofexperimental
physics?
Ihavenogroundsfornottrustingthem.AndItrustthem.Iknowhowsuch
booksareproducedorrather,IbelieveIknow.Ihavesomeevidence,butit
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doesnotgoveryfarandisofaveryscatterednature.Ihaveheard,seenand
readvariousthings.
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601.Thereisalwaysthedangerofwantingtofindanexpression'smeaningby
contemplatingtheexpressionitself,andtheframeofmindinwhichoneusesit,
insteadofalwaysthinkingofthepractice.Thatiswhyonerepeatsthe
expressiontooneselfsooften,becauseitisasifonemustseewhatoneis
lookingforintheexpressionandinthefeelingitgivesone.
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602.ShouldIsay"Ibelieveinphysics",or"Iknowthatphysicsistrue"?
603.Iamtaughtthatundersuchcircumstancesthishappens.Ithasbeen
discoveredbymakingtheexperimentafewtimes.Notthatthatwouldprove
anythingtous,ifitweren'tthatthisexperiencewassurroundedbyotherswhich
combinewithittoformasystem.Thus,peopledidnotmakeexperimentsjust
aboutfallingbodiesbutalsoaboutairresistenceandallsortsofotherthings.
ButintheendIrelyontheseexperiences,oronthereportsofthem,Ifeelno
scruplesaboutorderingmyownactivitiesinaccordancewiththem.Buthasn't
thistrustalsoproveditself?SofarasIcanjudgeyes.
604.Inacourtoflawthestatementofaphysicistthatwaterboilsatabout100C
wouldbeacceptedunconditionallyastruth.
IfImistrustedthisstatementwhatcouldIdotoundermineit?Setup
experimentsmyself?Whatwouldtheyprove?
605.Butwhatifthephysicist'sstatementweresuperstitionanditwerejustas
absurdtogobyitinreachingaverdictastorelyonordealbyfire?
606.Thattomymindsomeoneelsehasbeenwrongisnogroundforassuming
thatIamwrongnow.Butisn'titagroundforassumingthatImightbewrong?
Itisnogroundforanyunsurenessinmyjudgement,ormyactions.
607.Ajudgemightevensay"Thatisthetruthsofarasahumanbeingcan
knowit."Butwhatwouldthisrider[Zusatz]achieve?("beyondallreasonable
doubt").
608.Isitwrongformetobeguidedinmyactionsbythepropositionsof
physics?AmItosayIhavenogoodgroundfordoingso?Isn'tpreciselythis
whatwecalla'goodground'?
609.Supposingwemetpeoplewhodidnotregardthatasatellingreason.Now,
howdoweimaginethis?Insteadofthephysicist,theyconsultanoracle.(And
forthatweconsiderthemprimitive.)Isitwrongforthemtoconsultanoracle
andbeguidedbyit?Ifwecallthis"wrong"aren'tweusingourlanguage
gameasabasefromwhichtocombattheirs?
610.Andarewerightorwrongtocombatit?Ofcoursethereareallsortsof
sloganswhichwillbeusedtosupportourproceedings.
611.Wheretwoprinciplesreallydomeetwhichcannotbereconciledwithone
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another,theneachmandeclarestheotherafoolandheretic.
612.IsaidIwould'combat'theotherman,butwouldn'tIgivehimreasons?
Certainlybuthowfardotheygo?Attheendofreasonscomespersuasion.
(Thinkwhathappenswhenmissionariesconvertnatives.)
613.IfInowsay"Iknowthatthewaterinthekettleinthegasflamewillnot
freezebutboil",Iseemtobeasjustifiedinthis"Iknow"asIaminany.'IfI
knowanythingIknowthis'.OrdoIknowwithstillgreatercertaintythatthe
personoppositemeismyoldfriendsoandso?Andhowdoesthatcompare
withthepropositionthatIamseeingwithtwoeyesandshallseethemifIlook
intheglass?Idon'tknowconfidentlywhatIamtoanswerhere.Butstill
thereisadifferencebetweencases.Ifthewateroverthegasfreezes,ofcourseI
shallbeasastonishedascanbe,butIshallassumesomefactorIdon'tknowof,
andperhapsleavethemattertophysiciststojudge.Butwhatcouldmakeme
doubtwhetherthispersonhereisN.N.,whomIhaveknownforyears?Herea
doubtwouldseemtodrageverythingwithitandplungeitintochaos.
614.Thatistosay:IfIwerecontradictedonallsidesandtoldthatthisperson's
namewasnotwhatIhadalwaysknownitwas(andIuse"know"here
intentionally),theninthatcasethefoundationofalljudgingwouldbetaken
awayfromme.
615.Nowdoesthatmean:"Icanonlymakejudgementsatallbecausethings
behavethusandthus(asitwere,behavekindly)"?
616.Why,woulditbeunthinkablethatIshouldstayinthesaddlehowever
muchthefactsbucked?
617.CertaineventswouldmeintoapositioninwhichIcouldnotgoonwith
theoldlanguagegameanyfurther.InwhichIwastornawayfromthesureness
ofthegame.
Indeed,doesn'titseemobviousthatthepossibilityofalanguagegameis
conditionedbycertainfacts?
618.Inthatcaseitwouldseemasifthelanguagegamemust'show'thefacts
thatmakeitpossible.(Butthat'snothowitis.)
Thencanonesaythatonlyacertainregularityinoccurrencesmakesinduction
possible?The'possible'wouldofcoursehavetobe'logicallypossible'.
619.AmItosay:evenifanirregularityinnaturaleventsdidsuddenlyoccur,
thatwouldn'thavetothrowmeoutofthesaddle,Imightmakeinferencesthen
justasbefore,butwhetheronewouldcallthat"induction"isanotherquestion.
620.Inparticularcircumstancesonesays"youcanrelyonthis"andthis
assurancemaybejustifiedorunjustifiedineverydaylanguage,anditmayalso
countasjustifiedevenwhenwhatwasforetolddoesnotoccur.Alanguage
gameexistsinwhichthisassuranceisemployed.
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621.IfanatomywereunderdiscussionIshouldsay:"Iknowthattwelvepairs
ofnervesleadfromthebrain."Ihaveneverseenthesenerves,andevena
specialistwillonlyhaveobservedtheminafewspecimens.Thisjustishow
theword"know"iscorrectlyusedhere.
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622.Butnowitisalsocorrecttouse"Iknow"inthecontextswhichMoore
mentioned,atleastinparticularcircumstances.(Indeed,Idonotknowwhat"I
knowthatIamahumanbeing"means.Buteventhatmightbegivenasense.)
ForeachoneofthesesentencesIcanimaginecircumstancesthatturnitintoa
moveinoneofourlanguagegames,andbythatitloseseverythingthatis
philosophicallyastonishing.
623.WhatisoddisthatinsuchacaseIalwaysfeellikesaying(althoughitis
wrong):"Iknowthatsofarasonecanknowsuchathing."Thatisincorrect,
butsomethingrightishiddenbehindit.
624."Canyoubemistakenaboutthiscolour'sbeingcalled'green'inEnglish?"
Myanswertothiscanonlybe"No".IfIweretosay"Yes,forthereisalways
thepossibilityofdelusion",thatwouldmeannothingatall.
Foristhatrider[Nachsatz]somethingunknowntotheother?Andhowisit
knowntome?
625.Butdoesthatmeanthatitisunthinkablethattheword"green"shouldhave
beenproducedherebyaslipofthetongueoramomentaryconfusion?Don'twe
knowofsuchcases?Onecanalsosaytosomeone"Mightn'tyouperhapshave
madeaslip?"Thatamountsto:"Thinkaboutitagain."
Buttheserulesofcautiononlymakesenseiftheycometoanendsomewhere.
Adoubtwithoutanendisnotevenadoubt.
626.Nordoesitmeananythingtosay:"TheEnglishnameofthiscolouris
certainly'green',unless,ofcourse,Iammakingaslipofthetongueoram
confusedinsomeway."
627.Wouldn'tonehavetoinsertthisclauseintoalllanguagegames?(Which
showsitssenselessness.)
628.Whenwesay"Certainpropositionsmustbeexcludedfromdoubt",it
soundsasifIoughttoputthesepropositionsforexample,thatIamcalled
L.W.intoalogicbook.Forifitbelongstothedescriptionofalanguage
game,itbelongstologic.ButthatIamcalledL.W.doesnotbelongtoanysuch
description.Thelanguagegamethatoperateswithpeople'snamescancertainly
existevenifIammistakenaboutmyname,butitdoespresupposethatitis
nonsensicaltosaythatthemajorityofpeoplearemistakenabouttheirnames.
629.Ontheotherhand,however,itisrighttosayofmyself"Icannotbe
mistakenaboutmyname",andwrongifIsay"perhapsIammistaken".Butthat
doesn'tmeanthatitismeaninglessforotherstodoubtwhatIdeclaretobe
certain.
630.Itissimplythenormalcase,tobeincapableofmistakeaboutthe
designationofcertainthingsinone'smothertongue.
631."Ican'tbemakingamistakeaboutit"simplycharacterizesonekindof
assertion.
632.Certainanduncertainmemory.Ifcertainmemorywerenotingeneral
morereliablethanuncertainmemory,i.e.,ifitwerenotconfirmedbyfurther
verificationmoreoftenthanuncertainmemorywas,thentheexpressionof
certaintyanduncertaintywouldnothaveitspresentfunctioninlanguage.
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633."Ican'tbemakingamistake"butwhatifIdidmakeamistakethen,after
all?Forisn'tthatpossible?Butdoesthatmaketheexpression"Ican'tbeetc."
nonsense?Orwoulditbebettertosayinstead"Icanhardlybemistaken"?No
forthatmeanssomethingelse.
634."Ican'tbemakingamistakeandiftheworstcomestotheworstIshall
makemypropositionintoanorm."
635."Ican'tbemakingamistakeIwaswithhimtoday."
636."Ican'tbemakingamistakebutifafterallsomethingshouldappearto
speakagainstmypropositionIshallsticktoit,despitethisappearance."
637."Ican'tetc."showsmyassertionitsplaceinthegame.Butitrelates
essentiallytome,nottothegameingeneral.
IfIamwronginmyassertionthatdoesn'tdetractfromtheusefulnessofthe
languagegame.
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638."Ican'tbemakingamistake"isanordinarysentence,whichservestogive
thecertaintyvalueofastatement.Andonlyinitseverydayuseitisjustified.
639.ButwhatthedeviluseisitifaseveryoneadmitsImaybewrongabout
it,andthereforeaboutthepropositionitwassupposedtosupporttoo?
640.OrshallIsay:thesentenceexcludesacertainkindoffailure?
641."HetoldmeaboutittodayIcan'tbemakingamistakeaboutthat."But
whatifitdoesturnouttobewrong?!Mustn'tonemakeadistinctionbetween
thewaysinwhichsomething'turnsoutwrong'?Howcanitbeshownthatmy
statementwaswrong?Hereevidenceisfacingevidence,anditmustbedecided
whichistogiveway.
642.Butsupposesomeoneproducedthescruple:whatifIsuddenlyasitwere
wokeupandsaid"Justthink,I'vebeenimaginingIwascalledL.W.!"well,
whosaysthatIdon'twakeuponceagainandcallthisanextraordinaryfancy,
andsoon?
643.Admittedlyonecanimagineacaseandcasesdoexistwhereafterthe
'awakening'oneneverhasanymoredoubtwhichwasimaginationandwhich
wasreality.Butsuchacase,oritspossibility,doesn'tdiscredittheproposition
"Ican'tbewrong".
644.Forotherwise,wouldn'tallassertionbediscreditedinthisway?
645.Ican'tbemakingamistake,butsomeday,rightlyorwrongly,Imay
thinkIrealizethatIwasnotcompetenttojudge.
646.Admittedly,ifthatalwaysoroftenhappeneditwouldcompletelyalterthe
characterofthelanguagegame.
647.Thereisadifferencebetweenamistakeforwhich,asitwere,aplaceis
preparedinthegame,andacompleteirregularitythathappensasanexception.
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648.ImayalsoconvincesomeoneelsethatI'can'tbemakingamistake'.
Isaytosomeone"Soandsowaswithmethismorningandtoldmesuchand
such".Ifthisisastonishinghemayaskme:"Youcan'tbemistakenaboutit?"
Thatmaymean:"Didthatreallyhappenthismorning?"orontheotherhand:
"Areyousureyouunderstoodhimproperly?"ItiseasytoseewhatdetailsI
shouldaddtoshowthatIwasnotwrongaboutthetime,andsimilarlytoshow
thatIhadn'tmisunderstoodthestory.ButallthatcannotshowthatIhaven't
dreamedthewholething,orimaginedittomyselfinadreamyway.Norcanit
showthatIhaven'tperhapsmadesomeslipofthetonguethroughout.(Thatsort
ofthingdoeshappen.)
649.(IoncesaidtosomeoneinEnglishthattheshapeofacertainbranch
wastypicalofthebranchofanelm,whichmycompaniondenied.Thenwe
camepastsomeashes,andIsaid"There,yousee,herearethebranchesIwas
speakingabout."Towhichhereplied"Butthat'sanash"andIsaid"Ialways
meantashwhenIsaidelm".)
650.Thissurelymeans:thepossibilityofamistakecanbeeliminatedincertain
(numerous)cases.Andonedoeseliminatemistakesincalculationinthisway.
Forwhenacalculationhasbeencheckedoverandoveragainonecannotthen
say"Itsrightnessisstillonlyveryprobableforanerrormayalwaysstillhave
slippedin".Forsupposeitdidseemforonceasifanerrorhadbeendiscovered
whyshouldn'twesuspectanerrorhere?
651.Icannotbemakingamistakeabout12x12being144.Andnowonecannot
contrastmathematicalcertaintywiththerelativeuncertaintyofempirical
propositions.Forthemathematicalpropositionhasbeenobtainedbyaseriesof
actionsthatareinnowaydifferentfromtheactionsoftherestofourlives,and
areinthesamedegreeliabletoforgetfulness,oversightandillusion.
652.NowcanIprophesythatmenwillneverthrowoverthepresent
arithmeticalpropositions,neversaythatnowatlasttheyknowhowthematter
stands?Yetwouldthatjustifyadoubtonourpart?
653.Iftheproposition12x12=144isexemptfromdoubt,thensotoomustnon
mathematicalpropositionsbe.
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654.Butagainstthisthereareplentyofobjections.Inthefirstplacethereis
thefactthat"12x12etc."isamathematicalproposition,andfromthisonemay
inferthatonlymathematicalpropositionsareinthissituation.Andifthis
inferenceisnotjustified,thenthereoughttobeapropositionthatisjustas
certain,anddealswiththeprocessofthiscalculation,butisn'titself
mathematical.Iamthinkingofsuchapropositionas:"Themultiplication
'12x12',whencarriedoutbypeoplewhoknowhowtocalculate,willinthe
greatmajorityofcasesgivetheresult'144'."Nobodywillcontestthis
proposition,andnaturallyitisnotamathematicalone.Buthasitgotthe
certaintyofthemathematicalproposition?
655.Themathematicalpropositionhas,asitwereofficially,beengiventhe
stampofincontestability.I.e.:"Disputeaboutotherthingsthisisimmovable
itisahingeonwhichyourdisputecanturn."
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656.AndonecannotsaythatofthepropositionsthatIamcalledL.W.Norof
thepropositionthatsuchandsuchpeoplehavecalculatedsuchandsucha
problemcorrectly.
657.Thepropositionsofmathematicsmightbesaidtobefossilized.The
proposition"Iamcalled...."isnot.Butittooisregardedasincontrovertibleby
thosewho,likemyself,haveoverwhelmingevidenceforit.Andthisnotoutof
thoughtlessness.For,theevidence'sbeingoverwhelmingconsistspreciselyin
thefactthatwedonotneedtogivewaybeforeanycontraryevidence.Andso
wehavehereabuttresssimilartotheonethatmakesthepropositionsof
mathematicsincontrovertible.
658.Thequestion"Butmightn'tyoubeinthegripofadelusionnowand
perhapslaterfindthisout?"mightalsoberaisedasanobjectiontoany
propositionofthemultiplicationtables.
659."IcannotbemakingamistakeaboutthefactthatIhavejusthadlunch."
ForifIsaytosomeone"Ihavejusteaten"hemaybelievethatIamlyingor
havemomentarilylostmywitsbuthewon'tbelievethatIammakingamistake.
Indeed,theassumptionthatImightbemakingamistakehasnomeaninghere.
Butthatisn'ttrue.Imight,forexample,havedroppedoffimmediatelyafterthe
mealwithoutknowingitandhavesleptforanhour,andnowbelieveIhavejust
eaten.
Butstill,Idistinguishherebetweendifferentkindsofmistake.
660.Imightask:"HowcouldIbemakingamistakeaboutmynamebeing
L.W.?"AndIcansay:Ican'tseehowitwouldbepossible.
661.HowmightIbemistakeninmyassumptionthatIwasneveronthemoon?
662.IfIweretosay"IhaveneverbeenonthemoonbutImaybemistaken",
thatwouldbeidiotic.
ForeventhethoughtthatImighthavetransportedthere,byunknownmeans,in
mysleep,wouldnotgivemeanyrighttospeakofapossiblemistakehere.I
playthegamewrongifIdo.
663.Ihavearighttosay"Ican'tbemakingamistakeaboutthis"evenifIam
inerror.
664.Itmakesadifference:whetheroneislearninginschoolwhatisrightand
wronginmathematics,orwhetherImyselfsaythatIcannotbemakinga
mistakeinaproposition.
665.InthelattercaseIamaddingsomethingspecialtowhatisgenerallylaid
down.
666.Buthowisitforexamplewithanatomy(oralargepartofit)?Isn'twhatit
describes,too,exemptfromalldoubt?
667.EvenifIcametoacountrywheretheybelievedthatpeopleweretakento
themoonindreams,Icouldn'tsaytothem:"Ihaveneverbeentothemoon.
OfcourseImaybemistaken".Andtotheirquestion"Mayn'tyoubemistaken?"
Ishouldhavetoanswer:No.
668.WhatpracticalconsequenceshasitifIgiveapieceofinformationandadd
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thatIcan'tbemakingamistakeaboutit?
(Imightalsoaddinstead:"Icannomorebewrongaboutthisthanaboutmy
name'sbeingL.W.")
Theotherpersonmightdoubtmystatementnonetheless.Butifhetrustsmehe
willnotonlyacceptmyinformation,hewillalsodrawdefiniteconclusions
frommyconviction,astohowIshallbehave.
669.Thesentence"Ican'tbemakingamistake"iscertainlyusedinpractice.
Butwemayquestionwhetheritisthentobetakeninaperfectlyrigoroussense,
orisratherakindofexaggerationwhichperhapsisusedonlywithaviewto
persuasion.
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670.Wemightspeakoffundamentalprinciplesofhumanenquiry.
671.Iflyfromheretoapartoftheworldwherethepeoplehaveonlyindefinite
information,ornoneatall,aboutthepossibilityofflying.ItellthemIhavejust
flowntherefrom...TheyaskmeifImightbemistaken.Theyhaveobviously
afalseimpressionofhowthethinghappens.(IfIwerepackedupinaboxit
wouldbepossibleformetobemistakenaboutthewayIhadtravelled.)IfI
simplytellthemthatIcan'tbemistaken,thatwon'tperhapsconvincethembut
itwillifIdescribetheactualproceduretothem.Thentheywillcertainlynot
bringthepossibilityofamistakeintothequestion.Butforallthatevenifthey
trustmetheymightbelieveIhadbeendreamingorthatmagichadmademe
imagineit.
672."IfIdon'ttrustthisevidencewhyshouldItrustanyevidence?"
673.IsitnotdifficulttodistinguishbetweenthecasesinwhichIcannotand
thoseinwhichIcanhardlybemistaken?Isitalwayscleartowhichkindacase
belongs?Ibelievenot.
674.Thereare,however,certaintypesofcaseinwhichIrightlysayIcannotbe
makingamistake,andMoorehasgivenafewexamplesofsuchcases.
Icanenumeratevarioustypicalcases,butnotgiveanycommoncharacteristic.
(N.N.cannotbemistakenabouthisflownfromAmericatoEnglandafewdays
ago.Onlyifheismadcanhetakeanythingelsetobepossible.)
675.IfsomeonebelievesthathehasflownfromAmericatoEnglandinthelast
fewdays,then,Ibelieve,hecannotbemakingamistake.
Andjustthesameifsomeonesaysthatheisatthismomentsittingatatable
andwriting.
676."ButevenifinsuchcasesIcan'tbemistaken,isn'titpossiblethatIam
drugged?"IfIamandifthedrughastakenawaymyconsciousness,thenIam
notnowreallytalkingandthinking.IcannotseriouslysupposethatIamatthis
momentdreaming.Someonewho,dreaming,says"Iamdreaming",evenifhe
speaksaudiblyindoingso,isnomorerightthanifhesaidinhisdream"itis
raining",whileitwasinfactraining.Evenifhisdreamwereactuallyconnected
withthenoiseoftherain.

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