ADDITION HILLS MANDALUYONG CIVIC & SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, INC.,Petitioner,v.

MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES & HOLDINGS, INC., WILFREDO I. IMPERIAL, in his capacity

as Director, NCR, and HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,Respondents.

FACTS:
MEGAWORLD was the registered owner of a parcel of land located along Lee Street, Barangay Addition
Hills, Mandaluyong City. It conceptualized the construction of a residential condominium complex on the
said parcel of land called the Wack-Wack Heights Condominium consisting of a cluster of six (6) fourstorey buildings and one (1) seventeen (17) storey tower. MEGAWORLD thereafter secured the necessary
clearances, licenses and permits for the condominium project
Thereafter, construction of the condominium project began, but on June 30, 1995, the plaintiff-appellee
AHMCSO filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, to annul the Building Permit,
CLV, ECC and Development Permit granted to MEGAWORLD; to prohibit the issuance to
MEGAWORLD of Certificate of Registration and License to Sell Condominium Units; and to
permanently enjoin local and national building officials from issuing licenses and permits to
MEGAWORLD.
MEGAWORLD filed a Motion to Dismiss the case for lack of cause of action and that jurisdiction over
the case was with the public respondent HLURB and not with the regular courts.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court decision. Hence, the
petitioner filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
HELD: Yes. CA Decision Affirmed.
Political Law- doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; doctrine of primary jurisdiction
The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale
for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed.
In the case of Republic v. Lacap, the SC held that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he
should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted
to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction;
that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
What is apparent, however, is that petitioner unjustifiably failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before seeking recourse with the
trial court. Under the rules of the HLURB which were then in effect.

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER, vs.SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C.

AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N.

SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON,

CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential
subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver
the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a
criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a
prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the
criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs. Case Facts
San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties) is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business.
During this time, BF Homes was under receivership. The receiver is Atty. Florencio Orendain.
San Miguel purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes) 130 residential
lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Paraaque, containing a total area of 44,345 square meters for
the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00.
Some of the parcels of land for which San Miguel paid the full price were not delivered. BF Homes
refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands.
San Miguel filed a complaint-affidavit charging BF Homes in violation of PD 957 due to nondelivery of
titles.
At the same time, San Miguel sued BF Homes for specific performance in HLURB, compelling BF
Homes to release the 20 TCTs.
BF Homes contentions: o San Miguel Properties claim was not legally demandable because Atty.
Orendain did not have the authority to sell the lots due to his having been replaced as BF Homes
rehabilitation receiver by the SEC o the deeds of sale conveying the lots were irregular for being undated
and unnotarized o the claim should have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under
receivership o in receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed corporation
in order to enable the receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from judicial and extra-judicial
interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company o the lots involved were under
custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Pias of
the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.
San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Pias, citing the pendency
of BF Homes receivership case in the SEC.
BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend
SEC terminated BF Homes receivership
San Miguel filed a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to the termination of
receivership
The OCP Las Pias dismissed San Miguel Properties criminal complaint for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 957 on the following grounds: o no action could be filed by or against a receiver without
leave from the SEC that had appointed him o that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB o that there existed a

prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action o no prior resort to administrative
jurisdiction had been made o there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents
San Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
San Miguel appealed the OCPs resolution to the DOJ.
DOJ denied the appeal.
San Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
San Miguel elevated DOJs resolutions to the CA but was dismissed by the CA
San Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Issue: WON there is prejudicial question?
Held: Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a
prejudicial question. BF Homes posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the
HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation
of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct. A prejudicial question is
understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is
determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the
crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.22 The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.23 The essential elements of a prejudicial question
are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The concept of a
prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties
submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the
prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a
prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific
performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB,
whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. The action for specific performance in the
HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the
delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes
directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former
must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not
entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF
Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal
liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating
the need to proceed with the criminal case. A prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt
or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case

Smart v. Aldecoa, G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications business. On March 9, 2000,

petitioner entered into a contract of lease with Florentino Sebastian in which the latter agreed to lease to
the former a piece of vacant lot, measuring around 300 square meters, located in Barangay Vira, Roxas,
Isabela (leased property).Petitioner, through its contractor, Allarilla Construction, immediately
constructed and installed a cellular base station on the leased property. Inside the cellular base station is a
communications tower, rising as high as150 feet, with antennas and transmitters; as well as a power house
open on three sides containing a 25KVA diesel power generator. Around and close to the cellular base
station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and establishments, including the properties of respondents Arsenio
Aldecoa, Jose B. Torre, Conrado U. Pua, Gregorio V. Mansano, Jerry Corpuz, and Estelita Acosta.

Respondents filed before the RTC on May 23, 2000 a Complaint against petitioner for abatement of
nuisance and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioner then sought the dismissal of respondents Complaint; the denial of respondents prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; the award of
moral, nominal, and exemplary damages in the amounts which the court deem just and reasonable; and
the award of attorneys fees in the sum of P500,000.00 and litigation expenses as may be proven at the
trial.

On September 11, 2000, petitioner filed its Pre-Trial Brief. On even date, petitioner filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment that reads:
Petitioner SMART Communications Inc., thru counsel, respectfully manifests that:
1. There is no need for a full-blown trial as the causes of action and issues have already been
identified in all the pleadings submitted to this Honorable court by both respondents and
petitioner
2. There is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact or cause in the action.
3. There is no extreme urgency to issue a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction as stated in an
affidavit executed by SMART Senior Supervisor Andres V. Romero in an affidavit hereto
attached as Annex "A"

4. Petitioner seeks immediate declaratory relief from respondents contrived allegations as set
forth in their complaint;
Respondents filed their Pre-Trial Brief on September 21, 2000. Respondents likewise filed on September
21, 2000 their Opposition to petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment, maintaining that there were
several genuine issues relating to the cause of action and material facts of their Complaint. They asserted
that there was a need for a full blown trial to prove the allegations in their Complaint, as well as the
defenses put up by petitioner.

In its Order dated September 28, 2000, the RTC indefinitely postponed the pre-trial until it has resolved
petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment. In the same Order, the RTC directed the counsels of both
parties to submit their memoranda, including supporting affidavits and other documents within 30 days.

On January 16, 2001, the RTC issued its Order granting petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismissing respondents Complaint. The RTC ruled as follows:
What is of prime importance is the fact that contrary to the respondents speculation, the radio frequency
radiation as found out by the Department of Health is much lower compared to that of TV and radio
broadcast. The respondents counter to this claim is that the Department of Health was misled. This is a
mere conclusion of the respondents.
The respondents in opposing the Smarts construction of their cellsite is anchored on the supposition that
the operation of said cellsite tower would pose a great hazard to the health of the alleged cluster of
residents nearby and the perceived danger that the said tower might also collapse in case of a strong
typhoon that fell the Mobiline Cellsite tower of Mobiline (sic). The structured built of the Smarts Cellsite
tower is similar to that of the Mobiline.
Now, as to the Courts assessment of the circumstances obtaining, we find the claim of the respondents to
be highly speculative, if not an isolated one. Elsewhere, we find several cellsite towers scattered (sic)
allover, both of the Smart, Globe, and others, nay even in thickly populated areas like in Metro Manila
and also in key cities nationwide, yet they have not been outlawed or declared nuisance as the
respondents now want this Court to heed. To the thinking of the Court, the respondents are harping
imagined perils to their health for reason only known to them perhaps especially were we to consider that
the Brgy. Captain of Vira earlier gave its imprimatur to this project. Noteworthy is the fact that the alleged
cluster of residential houses that abut the cellsite tower in question might be endangered thereby, the
respondents are but a few of those residents. If indeed, all those residents in Vira were adversely affected
for the perceived hazards posed by the tower in question, they should also have been joined in as
respondents in a class suit. The sinister motive is perhaps obvious.
All the foregoing reasons impel this Court to grant the petitioners motion for the dismissal of the
complaint, the perceived dangers being highly speculative without any bases in fact. Allegations in the
complaint being more imaginary than real, do not constitute factual bases to require further proceeding or

a trial. As to the claim that there is no certification or clearance from the DENR for the petitioner to lay in
wait before the construction, suffice it to say that no action as yet has been taken by said office to stop the
ongoing operation of said cellsite now in operation. There has been no hue and cry from among the
greater majority of the people of Roxas, Isabela, against it. Al contrario, it is most welcome to them as
this is another landmark towards the progress of this town.
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration arguing that: (1) the basis for the judgment of the appellate
court that the cellular base station was a nuisance had been extinguished as the generator subject of the
Complaint was already removed; and (2) there had been substantial compliance in securing all required
permits for the cellular base station.

Issues:
The Court of Appeals erred in declaring Petitioners entire base station a nuisance considering that it was
only a small part of the base station, a generator that initially powered the base station, that was
reportedly producing unacceptable levels of noise.
The Court of Appeals erred in not considering that the supervening event of shut down and pull out of the
generator in the base station, the source of the perceived nuisance, made the complaint for abatement of
nuisance academic.

Held:
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as:
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything
else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

The term "nuisance" is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered
with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort.
The Court, in AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabelle Properties Corporation, settled that a simple suit for
abatement of nuisance, being incapable of pecuniary estimation, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC. Although respondents also prayed for judgment for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
and litigation expenses, such claims are merely incidental to or as a consequence of, their principal relief.
Nonetheless, while jurisdiction over respondents Complaint for abatement of nuisance lies with the
courts, the respective judgments of the RTC and the Court of Appeals cannot be upheld.
At the outset, the RTC erred in granting petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment and ordering the
dismissal of respondents Complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000.
Summary judgments are governed by Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of which state:
SEC. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the
time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or
admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that,
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphases supplied.)
In Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, the Court discussed extensively when a summary judgment is proper:
For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there must be no
genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the
motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of
the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material
fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails,
the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment.
A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an
issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim.
The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents,
affidavits or counter affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or
undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary judgment called
for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a
summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on record must be viewed in light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences as
can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.
Courts must be critical of the papers presented by the moving party and not of the papers/documents in
opposition thereto. Conclusory assertions are insufficient to raise an issue of material fact. A party cannot
create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculations or compilation of differences. He may
not create an issue of fact through bald assertions, unsupported contentions and conclusory statements. He
must do more than rely upon allegations but must come forward with specific facts in support of a claim.
Where the factual context makes his claim implausible, he must come forward with more persuasive
evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted.)
Judging by the aforequoted standards, summary judgment cannot be rendered in this case as there are
clearly factual issues disputed or contested by the parties.
Likewise constituting real or genuine issues for trial, which arose from subsequent events, are the
following: whether the generator subject of respondents Complaint had been removed; whether said
generator had been replaced by another that produces as much or even more noise and fumes; and
whether the generator is a nuisance that can be abated separately from the rest of the cellular base station.
The courts have made it clear that in every case the question is one of reasonableness. What is a
reasonable use of ones property and whether a particular use is an unreasonable invasion of anothers use
and enjoyment of his property so as to constitute a nuisance cannot be determined by exact rules, but must
necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case, such as locality and the character of the
surroundings, the nature, utility and social value of the use, the extent and nature of the harm involved,
the nature, utility and social value of the use or enjoyment invaded, and the like.
A reading of the RTC Order dated January 16, 2001 readily shows that the trial court did not take into
account any of the foregoing considerations or tests before summarily dismissing Civil Case No. Br. 23632-2000. The reasoning of the RTC that similar cellular base stations are scattered in heavily populated
areas nationwide and are not declared nuisances is unacceptable. As to whether or not this specific
cellular base station of petitioner is a nuisance to respondents is largely dependent on the particular
factual circumstances involved in the instant case, which is exactly why a trial for threshing out disputed
or contested factual issues is indispensable. Evidently, it was the RTC which engaged in speculations and
unsubstantiated conclusions.
For the same reasons cited above, without presentation by the parties of evidence on the contested or
disputed facts, there was no factual basis for declaring petitioner's cellular base station a nuisance and
ordering petitioner to cease and desist from operating the same.
Given the equally important interests of the parties in this case, i.e., on one hand, respondents' health,
safety, and property, and on the other, petitioner's business interest and the public's need for accessible
and better cellular mobile telephone services, the wise and prudent course to take is to remand the case to
the RTC for trial and give the parties the opportunity to prove their respective factual claims.

Remedial law; Doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is
such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is
supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be
enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for
its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. The
objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question
or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
Exceptions to the rule on primary jurisdiction. There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where
the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the
amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where
the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies

has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong
public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. However, none of the foregoing
circumstances is applicable in the present case. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a
court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. All the proceedings of the court in violation of
the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and void.
Administrative law; The Commission on Audit (COA) has primary jursidiction over money claims against
the government. It is the COA and not the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioners
money claim against respondent local government unit. Such jurisdiction may not be waived by the
parties failure to argue the issue nor active participation in the proceedings. Respondents collection suit
being directed against a local government unit, such money claim should have been first brought to the
COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the
COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of
its notice of appeal and before the CA.
G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262 : November 27, 2013
THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN,Petitioner,v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP.,Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On January 12, 1998, the Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development
Corp. (respondent) entered into a contract for the design and -construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and
Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. The total project cost isP38,900,000: P 18,700,000 for the design and
construction of passenger terminal, andP20,200,000 for the design and construction of the jetty port
facility.In the course of construction, petitioner issued variation/change orders for additional works. The
scope of work under these change orders were agreed upon by petitioner and respondent.
On January 5, 2001, petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with respondent for the construction of
Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan. The contract price for
Phase II isP2,475,345.54.
On October 22, 2001, respondent made a demand for the total amount ofP22,419,112.96 covering unpaid
accomplishments on works undertaken, tax refunds, price escalation, labor costs, overhead costs, and
interest.
On July 13, 2006, respondent sued petitioner in the Regional Trial Court to collect the aforesaid
amounts.On August 17, 2006, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment.
After trial, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of plaintiff Jody King Construction And

Development Corporation and against defendant Province of Aklan.

Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. On November 24, 2009, the trial court issued a writ of
execution ordering Sheriff IV Antonio E. Gamboa, Jr. to demand from petitioner the immediate payment
ofP67,027,378.34 and tender the same to the respondent. Consequently, Sheriff Gamboa served notices of
garnishment on Land Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the
Philippines at their branches in Kalibo, Aklan for the satisfaction of the judgment debt from the funds
deposited under the account of petitioner. Said banks, however, refused to give due course to the court
order, citing the relevant provisions of statutes, circulars and jurisprudence on the determination of
government monetary liabilities, their enforcement and satisfaction.
Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order (TRO)
and preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution dated November 24, 2009, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 111754.
On December 7, 2009, the trial court denied petitioners notice of appeal filed on December 1, 2009.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the December 7, 2009 Order was likewise denied.On May 20,
2010, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the aforesaid orders denying
due course to its notice of appeal.
By Decision dated October 18, 2010, the CAs First Division dismissed the petition as it found no grave
abuse of discretion in the lower courts issuance of the writ of execution. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was likewise denied by the CA. The CA stressed that even assuming as true the
alleged errors committed by the trial court, these were insufficient for a ruling that grave abuse of
discretion had been committed. On the matter of execution of the trial courts decision, the appellate court
said that it was rendered moot by respondents filing of a petition before the Commission on Audit (COA).
On August 31, 2011, the CAs Sixteenth Division rendered its Decision dismissing the petition. The CA
said that petitioner failed to provide valid justification for its failure to file a timely motion for
reconsideration; counsels explanation that he believed in good faith that the August 14, 2009 Decision of
the trial court was received on September 25, 2009 because it was handed to him by his personnel only on
that day is not a justifiable excuse that would warrant the relaxation of the rule on reglementary period of
appeal. The CA also held that petitioner is estopped from invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as
it only raised the issue of COAs primary jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was denied and a writ of
execution was issued against it.
Petitioner is not estopped in questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 273,
Marikina City over the subject matter of the case.
The petition for certiorari filed before the CA due to the RTCs denial of petitioners Notice of Appeal was
in accord with jurisprudence.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable to this case?
2. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of execution was proper?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.
POLITICAL LAW: doctrine of primary jurisdiction

COA has primary jurisdiction over private respondents money claims. Petitioner is not estopped from
raising the issue of jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may
well be within their proper jurisdiction.It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a
case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question
or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by petitioner, a
local government unit.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327,as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,it is the
COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities.
Section 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general
accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the
examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and
settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an
accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort
due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said
jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and
other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed,
including non-governmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations through
the government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government
has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.
Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987 Constitutionand existing laws, the COA
promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit. Rule II, Section 1
specifically enumerated those matters falling under COAs exclusive jurisdiction, which include "money
claims due from or owing to any government agency." Rule VIII, Section 1 further provides:
Section 1. Original Jurisdiction - The Commission Proper shall have original jurisdiction over:
a) money claim against the Government;
b) request for concurrence in the hiring of legal retainers by government agency;
c) write off of unliquidated cash advances and dormant accounts receivable in amounts exceeding one
million pesos (P1,000,000.00);

d) request for relief from accountability for loses due to acts of man, i.e. theft, robbery, arson, etc, in
amounts in excess of Five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00).
POLITICAL LAW: money claims against local government units are under the jurisdiction of the
COA
In Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas,we ruled that it is the COA and not the RTC
which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioners money claim against respondent local government
unit. Such jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties failure to argue the issue nor active participation
in the proceedings. Thus:
This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly held sway for although petitioners
collection suit forP487,662.80 was within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the circumstances surrounding
petitioners claim brought it clearly within the ambit of the COAs jurisdiction.
First, petitioner was seeking the enforcement of a claim for a certain amount of money against a local
government unit. This brought the case within the COAs domain to pass upon money claims against the
government or any subdivision thereof under Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines:
The authority and powers of the Commission on Audit shall extend to and comprehend all matters
relating to the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to
the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.
The scope of the COAs authority to take cognizance of claims is circumscribed, however, by an unbroken
line of cases holding statutes of similar import to mean only liquidated claims, or those determined or
readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers.
Petitioners claim was for a fixed amount and although respondent took issue with the accuracy of
petitioners summation of its accountabilities, the amount thereof was readily determinable from the
receipts, invoices and other documents. Thus, the claim was well within the COAs jurisdiction under the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Second, petitioners money claim was founded on a series of purchases for the medical supplies of
respondents public hospitals. Both parties agreed that these transactions were governed by the Local
Government Code provisions on supply and property management and their implementing rules and
regulations promulgated by the COA pursuant to Section 383 of said Code. Petitioners claim therefore
involved compliance with applicable auditing laws and rules on procurement. Such matters are not within
the usual area of knowledge, experience and expertise of most judges but within the special competence
of COA auditors and accountants. Thus, it was but proper, out of fidelity to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, for the RTC to dismiss petitioners complaint.
Respondents collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money claim should
have been first brought to the COA.Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the
filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal and before the CA.
POLITICAL LAW: exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as:

(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts
of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is
involved; and,
(l) in quo warranto proceedings.However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the
present case.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions
rendered thereby are null and void.
POLITICAL LAW: writ of execution that violates primary jurisdiction is void
Writ of Execution issued in violation of COAs primary jurisdiction is void

Since a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case is no judgment at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation.All acts
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect and the void judgment can never be
final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void.
Clearly, the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
execution of its judgment against petitioner and garnishment of the latters funds.
In its Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner argued that it is the COA and not the RTC
which has original jurisdiction over money claim against government agencies and subdivisions.The CA,
in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, simply stated that the issue had become moot by
respondent's filing of the proper petition with the COA. However, respondent's belated compliance with
the formal requirements of presenting its money claim before the COA did not cure the serious errors
committed by the RTC in implementing its void decision. The RTC's orders implementing its judgment
rendered without jurisdiction must be set aside because a void judgment can never be validly executed.
Finally, the RTC should have exercised utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in issuing the writ of
execution and notices of garnishment against petitioner. The RTC had no authority to direct the immediate
withdrawal of any portion of the garnished funds from petitioner's depositary banks.Such act violated the
express directives of this Court under Administrative Circular No. 10-2000,which was issued "precisely
in order to prevent the circumvention of Presidential Decree No. 1445, as well as of the rules and
procedures of the COA."