From Leninism to Freedom

The Challenges of Democratization

Democracy and the Market:

I]DITIID BY A Marriage of Inconvenience
Margaret Latus Nugent
leff Weintraub

It already seerns clear that the 1980s will prove in retrospect to have been
a landmark decade in the history of democracy, worthy perhaps to be
compared to the "age of the democratic revolution" which closed the
eighteenth century.r They brought to a climax the remarkable wave of
democratic openings and transitions that began in the 1970s with the
political transformations of Greece, Spain, and Portugal; witnessed the fall
or gradual abdication of military regimes across latin America; produced
democratic pressures or even breakthroughs in countries as disparate as
the Philippines, Mexico, and South Korea; and culminated in the.annus
nriraltilis of 1989, with the general collapse of the neo-Stalinist order in
Eastern (or Central and Eastern) Europe, marking the effective bankruptcy
of the grand Leninist project which has absorbed so much of the political
energy and idealism of the twentieth century.
Nor has the current age of democratic revolution necessarily run its
course. If the disintegration of the Soviet Union is followed by the
consoliclation of political liberty in Russia, the Ukraine, and other
fragments of the former Soviet empire; if South Africa, implausibly,
manages a successful passage to a multi-racial democratic regime; if there
is serious movement toward detrrocracy in China -- then the 1990s may
alnrost overshadow the 1980s.
The hopeful side of this scerrario is the continued existence of pressttres
for democracy and the prospect of new and intportant democratic open-
irrgs. Its sobering side is the fact that the long-term success of current
efforts toward denrocratizatiorr is far from guaranteed. The weakening or
Westview Press collapse of an autlroritariarr reginre is trot necessarily the same thing as the
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48 leff Weintraub
slrccessful institutionalization of denrocracy -- olle need only considcr the
consequences of 1,917, or even of 1789. One of the hard lessons of history,
as Edward Friedman enrphasizes in his contribution to this volume, is that
transitions from despotism to denrocracy are rarely quick or smooth and
are often painful, even when they eventually succeed. A few fortunate
countries may hope to repeat the extraordinary success story of post-
Franco Spain; but in most cases -- and this certainly applies to almost all
of the post-Leninist world -- what we are witnessing is only the beginrring
of a difficult and dangerous drama whose last act cannot be taken for
granted.
This is, in sl'rort, an historical moment when denrocracy presents itself
with special urgency as both a theoretical problem and a practical
challerrge. It is therefore appropriate to try to evaluate carefully the
tlreoretical resources available to address the issues involvecl, and tr:
consider how they calr best be brought to bear on current developnrents.
And, on the other hand, this remarkable moment provicles an auspicious
occasioll to reconsider some of the central issues regarding the relation-
ships among denrocracy, the market, and the state which have been on the
theoretical and practical agenda of the modern West, and then of rnuch of
the rest of the world, since the early nineteenth century -- the unsettled
questiorrs of the political sociology of modernity, to put it Gernranically.
Tlre present clrapter will atternpt to contribute to this clotrble enterprise.
It will sketch sonle elenrents of an orienting tlreoretical franrework wlrich
can provide a guide for approaching, and integrating, certain key issues
regarding the problem of democratization. In the process, it will try to
corlvey two larger nlessages tlrat go beyond the specific topics acldressed
here.
The first is the need for a considerable degree of refinement, and of
what nriglrt becallecl "conrplcxification," in the Iheoretical paracligrns usecl
to address issues of den'rocracy and denrocratization. Current discussions,
as I will try to illustrate, often tend to pose both theoretical and practical
alternatives irr overly easy and simplistic ways that can be unhelpful at
best, nrisleading at worst.
The second is the need to do justice both to the essential continuity of
sonre of the fundamental issues and to tlre lristorical particularity of tlre
ways that they currently present themselves. The challenges facing those
societies now enrerging from under the nrbble of the Leninist project are
in certain respects unique and unprececlented. -l'lre atternpt has never
before been made to move simultaneously from a state-socialist comntand
economy to a market economy arrd from post-totalitarian despotism to a
democratic regime. But, at the sanre time, many of the most inrportant
underlying issues are not entirely new; they have, in fact, been a source
of continuous perplexity since the onset of what Karl Polanyi callecl the
Great Transformation in the West.z On tl.re one hand, despite the exas-
--J
Denrocracy and the Market 49
perated serrtiment of "no more experiments!" often founcl iIl Eastern
Europe, those societies are unavoidably engaged in a great leap into the
unknown. On the other hand, there is an important sense in which the
post-Leninist world, having passed through a gigantic world-historical
detour, is now re-encountering the central dilemmas of the great trans-
formation (though not, of course, in precisely the same form).
T-|rc Prescnt Monrcttt
Let me begin by noting some key features of the intellectual and
ideological landscape within which contemporary discourse about
democracy takes place, both in the context of academic debate and in the
realm of political action. Three elements, taken together, seem to be
decisive in defining what is distinctive about the present moment.
The first of these elements is, of course, the unprecedented world-wide
power and prestige of the democratic idea. It is worth reminding
ourselves how exceptional, even surprising, this situation is. Irr particular,
this is probably the first moment in the twentieth century when the ideal
clf "democracy" (in some sense that does not actually mean revolutionary
dictatorship) has had something like ideological hegemony among
intellectuals and political activists in both Europe and the western
hemisphere -- and, to a striking though uneven extent, in much of the rest
of the world as well. Of course, hegemony does not mean unauimity. But
for tlre moment, at least, almost all the maior principled alternatives to
democracy thrown up by the twentieth century -- Leninisnr, Stalinism,
fascism, authoritarian corporatism -- are discredited or in disarray.
(lslamic "fundamentalism," in its different varieties, constitutes the most
dramatic exception to this pattern.) How long this situation will last is an
open question. But, whatever the outcomes of current efforts toward
dernocratization, the strength and pervasiveness of democratic ttsltiration
is one of the grand facts of our time'
The second of these grand facts is that this flowering of dernocratic
aspiratior-r coincides with - and, indeed, is very often linked to -- a wave
of increased enthusiasm, or at least respect, for the magic of the market.
This is, again, not at all a localized phenomenon. h'r Latin America as well
as Eastern Europe, if one speaks of "economic reform" this will irnnredi-
ately be understood to mean marketization, iust as "political reform" will
be taken to refer to democratization--something that would hardly have
been true a decade ago.
A third grand fact - which to some extent brings the previous two
together - is the degree to which, in the last decade of the twerrtieth
century, tl.re societies of Western Europe and North America represent
overwhelu-ringly, for much of the world, the model of successful nrodern-
ity - particularly since the collapse of the maior nlternaliue nrodel of
50 let'f Wcittraub
industrial society in Eastern Europe. Over half a century ago Lincoln
Steffens captured a very different mood when he said, after a visit to the
Soviet Union, that he had seen the future and it worked. For most
contemporary Eastern Europeans -- and not for them alone -- it is Western
society that "works." The contrast with the West played a major role in
corrvincing them that their own societies did not work, and tl-re Western
model now is a central point of reference guiding their attempts at social
reconstruction. The market economy and democracy are two central
elements of the package that this model represents.
Modernity and Complexity
I emphasized earlier the need for considerable tlreoretical "conrplexifi-
cation" in nrarry current approaches to the pr<lblenrs of cleruocratiz-atiort.
One reason this theoretical complexification is necessary is that the
'solution' to the dilemmas of modernity worked out (more or less success-
fully) in the West over the last few centuries is itself much more complex
and paradoxical than is often appreciated when it is drawn on to provide
a model for the post-Leninist world. Put briefly: The key to the Western
'success' (when it ftns been successful) has not involved unleashing a single
system of social relationships (e.g., capitalism or democracy) whose
prirrciples lrave subsurned all others, or which necessarily generates or
"determines" all the others.' Rather, it has involved fincling ways to
manage and coordinate the ongoing interplay of an ensentble of systems
wlriclr are potentially complementary, but which are analytically distinct
ancl potentially in tension, because their central organizing principles are
quite different.a
This pattern is exemplified dramatically in the relationship between
deurccraql arrd the nmrket ecotrcnty. I will argue for the irreclucible com-
plexity of this relationship, try to elucidate the reasons for this conrplexity,
and explore some of its implications for the problems of democratization.
To summarize: The essential verdict, in light of historical experience from
'i,789 to 1989, is that democracy and the nrarket economy are potentially
conrpatible and even (for the foreseeable future) inescapably conrplernertt-
ary, but a/so in necessary and pernratreut telrsiorr. This is a possible and
necessary n.rarriage, but an inl'rerently difficult one. We might go so far
as to call it a marriage of inconvenience.
Some Preliminary Clarifications
Before proceeding, I should offer some indication of what I mean in
speaking of "dernocracy'' and the "market economy." Tlrese are two
Democracy and lhe Market 5'l
coDrplex and contested notions, for which rapid definitions will be of only
limited help; but some initial clarification may be useful.
By "deniocracy" I mean self-government -- or, to put it more technical-
ly, a system of ongoing collective self-determination. This implies that, to
a significant degree, (1) consequential collective outcomes are subject to
discussion and conscious decision; (2) the decision-making process is, in
one way or another, ultimately controlled by the people affected by those
outconles; (3) those people are treated as being, in principle, fundanrental-
ly equal in political rights. As an essential definition, I adn'rit I find it
liard-to impiove on Abraharn Lincoln's formulation: "government of the
people, by the people, for the people." Of course, any actual,democratic
sysLem will achieve this objective only to a greater or lesser degree.
Centuries of historical experience have suggested a set of basic
institutiorral requirentents for a denrocratic regime, which cau be touched
on lrere only selectively and schematically. In a community of any size
and complexity, dernocratic government must include a representative
system in which power-holders are ultimately accountable to popular
eiectiorr. Representative government, in turn, requires a party system in
which parties compete for a mandate and governing parties can lose.
Furthermore, a democratic system can work only if individuals are
effectively guaranteed certain rights under law, not least those which
allow them to speak and organize freely. such a situation requires the
existerrce of a form of state based on the rule of law, in which the legal
system is admirristered by an independent judiciary who can secure the
rights of individuals against the abuses of power-holders, or even agailrst
the transient will of democratic majorities.5 It requires, that is, what the
Cermans call a Rechlsstonl. A Rechtsstaat is not necessarily a democratic
reginre; but a democratic regime is necessarily, among other.things, a
Richlsslnat (to settle by fiat, for the moment, a subject of centtlries of
debate).
Representative government need not necessarily be democratic, since
it may involve the extension of political rights to only a small fraction of
the population. only a representative regime with an inclusive electorate
is properly termed a democracy. Even where there is forrnally a
clcirociatii electorate, a sizable portiorr of it may be effectively trnatrle to
exercise political power, whether because of economic depetrdence,
inability to organize, intimidation, or other reasons. The result will be one
of those oligirchic pseudo-representative regimes all too fanriliar from
Latin American history -- which tend to collapse in the everrt of serious
social conflicts. Finally, the elected government must itself be capable of
exercising effective power; where actual power is monopolized by other
actors -- e.g., an uncontrolled army -- den'rocracy is, again, nominal rather
tlran genuine.
52 Jet'f Wcintraub
There is a good deal more to be said about the nature and requiretTrents
of democracy - and some of it will be said later in this chapter -- but the
foregoing should be enough to establish the basic contours of the concept.
Witn the market economy I will be even more brusque. A market is a
system of relationships based on the exchange of commodities for gain.
A market ecorlomy is an economic system in which the nrarket is the
predontinant mechanism coordinating production and distribution (in no
socio-economic system has it ever been the exclusiue mechatrisnr). This
entails, not only that most social production be exchanged as comnlodities
on the market, but also that the means of production antl labor be
effectively treated as commodities. The commoditization of labor means
irr practice that large-scale, coordinated production is carried out primarily
by means of wage labor.
'Ihe significance of the wage-labor relationslrip is that the itrclivicltral
productive enterprise is a command system, with inequality of power
between workers on the one hand and capitalists and/or marlagers on the
other. It is possible in principle to imagine an economy in which overall
coorclination was achieved by the market but specific enterprises were not
based on wage labor -- in which they were organized, for example, as
democratic cooperatives. One would then have a market econollly, but
not a capitalist one. However, it is hard to see such arrangenlellts as the
wave of the forseeable future; and, at all events, as lolrg as cliffereut
enterprises are coordinated by the nrarket, this change would not affect
most of the dynamics of the market system on which my discussion will
focus.
It is irnportant to emphasize that capitalist economies can be organized
in a variety of ways and -- even more important -- can be articulated in
very different ways with other social institutions. swederr, tlre United
States, a1d Ctratenrala are all societies with capitalist ecorttltnios; but it
wotrlcl be hard to nraintain seriously that identifying the three as
"capitalist societies" told us everything important we wanted to know
about them.
A Marriage of Inconvenience
One of the central questions posed for Western social thought by the
interplay of the French and industrial revolutions (one which is agair-r
becoming a burnirrg issue in the post-Leninist world) may sound
surprising to sottte readers at this mornent: Is democracy conlpatible with
the capitalist market economy? lt is easy to forget how genuinely
uncertain the answer appeared before 1945. The answer provided by
history seems to be "yes," but it is inrportant to consider the weight and
cogerlcy of the qualifications. A variety of figures -- ranging frorn Karl
Detnocracy aril the Markt 53
Marx and Karl Polanyi to Augusto Pinocl'ret -- have answered "no" for
quite intellectually reipectable reasons; and it is worth bearing in mind
tirat European history from the nineteenth century through the 1940s
I
provided a good deal of evidence to render this verdict plausible'
I
' The termi of the question, however, have been decisively changed by
I
two crucial developments since world war II. The first is the consolida-
tion of stable repreientative regimes based on a mass franchise throughout
western Errrope -- an astonishing achievement in light of previous_history,
which people are now inclined to take too much for 8ranted.. This
suggests that denrocracy and the market economy can cohabit. And the
seJond is the accumulation of evidence that no one has come up with an
adequate, let alone superior, alternative to capitalism-as a-Yay of orga-
nizing a modern economy -- certainly not one which holds out more
a,trpiiiour prospects for democracy. Man's vision of socialism and the
"ac[ually existing socialism" of Leninism and Stalinism differ in quite
clrastic ways. But, for both, the transcendence of the market is at the heart
of socialism; and it is precisely the idea that this goal is practicable and
desirable that l'ras ceased to be credible.
Much of the theoretical debate and political conflict of the last two
centuries has been colored by the widespread belief - which took a
varietv of forms - that a fundamental alternative to the market economy
existei and could be readily put into practice. The general collapse of
faith that such an alternative is available is thus a world-historical event
of the first magnitude. It eliminates any easy way out of confronting the
dilemmas invoived in the relationship between democracy and the market
economy.
These dilemmas are real, however, and continue to exist. It has always
been clear tl.rat we can have capitalism without democracy. But the
contrary now seenrs unlikely (and is certainly undemonstrated). -At this
point iir history, any serious consideration of democracy must take it as
i prernise that, if democracy is to exist, it will have to be in co-existence
with some version of the capitalist market economy (and, over the long
run, probably or.rly in co-existence with a fairly healthy market economy).
But ii is unwarranted to leap to the conclusion, often expressed in the easy
use of the phrase "denrocratic capitalism," that the relationship between
a capitalist socio-economic system and a democratic regime is straight-
forward and urrproblematic. In fact, they remain two quite different
systems, with a permanent potential for disharmony; and this is not
acciclental, since (among other reasons) their organizing principles are in
profound tetrsiou.
To state this contrast somewhat ideal-typically: In the market, collective
outconres emerge from the relatively spontaneous operation of inrpersonal
forces, the systemic "discipline" of the "invisible hand." Ancl this
inrpersonal constraint is not an irrcidental feature of the market system,
54 lct'f Weitiraub
but is inseparable from what is potentially aaluable about the Inarket. Itr
tlre individual capitalist enterprise (as in the administrative dimension of
the modern state), coordination is enforced by authority from above, and
increasingly by what Alfred Chandler calls the "visible hand"o of bureau-
cratically administered formal organization. But the central premise of
democracy is that collective outcomes are subject, in some important
degree, t_o tl-re conscious consideration and collective decision of the people
affected.'
The two systems may be compatible in practice -- even, urtder the right
conditions, mutually supportive - but they remain analytically distinct;
each runs according. to a different inner logic and generates a different
theoretical problenil'' The laissezJaire utopia of the fully self-regulating
market is no nrore'equivalent to democracy than is the "mono-organi-
zatiorral" -utopia (to use Rigby's apt phrase) of post-Stalinist state
socialisrn.d Thus, attempts to collapse democracy theoretically into the
market (often the import of analyses deriving from utilitarian liberalism,
which currently go under the name of "rational choice") are fundamental-
ly n'riscor.rceived and misleading.
Nor is this distinction important only at the level of formal abstraction.
It has inrportant practical implications, which are likely to manifest them-
selves with particular urgency precisely when the attempt is made to
nrove simultaneously toward bollr democracy and the market econonly.
The heart of the tension between them is obvious but profouncl (Polanyi's
account remains the most penetrating): (1) The essence, and the rttarvel,
of the rnarket is that it is a (more or less) spontaneously self-regulating
system of interdependence, which is coordinated^by the inrpersonal cort-
strnhrt it exercises over the actors in the system.' It is not the case that
any irrterfererrce with the "magic of the market" is necessarily destab-
ilizirrg; brrt it is tlre case tlrat there is a linrit to how tnttt:lt blockage attci
interference lhe market system can withstamd before starting to short-
circuit and malfunction. On the other hand, (2) the dynanrics of the
nrarket system (which Schumpeter, who loved capitalism, called a "contin-
uous gale of creative destruction"lo) are inherently disruptive both to the
interests of particular groups and to the more general fabric of cultural
continuity, so that they provide continual inducements for interference in
the fornr of collective action and state intervention. And denrocratic
enlpowerment (where it is genuine and not merely formal) gives an ever-
wider range of social groups the means (as well as the right) to act polit-
ically so as defend themselves against the unhanrpered operation of the
nrarket and to try to influence collective outcomes to their own advantage.
'Iherefore, the two systems can coexist only if democracy is willirrg to
be (to a degree yet to be determined) "selfJimiting" with respect to the
:rtrtononrc'rtrs dynanrics of the market. Arrd this will recprirc., anrong otlter
things, a cultural framework which includes at least a miniural acceptarnce
Denrocracy and the Market 55
of nrarket-oriented values and activities, and also a basic acceptance of the
need to defer to the market's impersonal discipline- In the long run,
maintaining this coexistence probably also requires some minimum rate
of economii growth, as well as the buffering effects of various non-market
phenomena: policies which are able to contain or offset the market's most
iocially disruptive effects without short-circuiting the system; eloug!
urrderiying soiial solidarity to keep conflicts from getting out of-hand; and
-Otherwise,
so on. what results is economic decline at best, and, at worst,
escalating crisis and social conflict and, eventually, some fornr of political
authoritaiianism (or worse) when the going gets rough.
This sort of deference is necessary to maintain the health of the market.
But, from the point of view of democracy, this deference cannot amount
to abdication. Democracy may be able to coexist with the market, but it
cannot be expected to surrender entirely to the logic of a fully self-
regulating market. This is not only utopian from.a,practical point of view;
it woul<t also r.reat giving up any possibility of democratic control over
the course of social Iife, whictl would make it suicidal rather than self-
lirnitirrg. Democracy also requires a differat, and partly conflicting, set of
practices, assumptions, and values from those of the market, since it is
brganized around processes of collective decision-making, collective action,
an"d collective selfdetermination. In so far as democracy is genuine rather
tharr purely nominal, individuals and groups have the po_tential power to
call iolleciive outcomes into question, and will therefore have to be
corrvinced (more or less) of the t'ainress of collective outcomes through a
process of discussion and negotiation. As Friedrich Hayek brings out with
particular clarity and forthrightness, these processes and concerns are
incompatible in principle wiih the central logic of the market system.rl
This is a tension that can be managed but not eliminated'
For most of the last several centuries, as I noted earlier, it has been
widely believed that there is a way out of these dilenrmas based on
abolishing, transcending, or sharply restricting the market economy. This
belief haJyielded two key positions: (1) Democracy can be made possible,
and rendeied genuine, by eliminating the market economy and replacing
it with socialism. (This is the standpoint of various forms of denrocratic
socialism, including Polanyi's -- and, with some special features, of Marx's
socialisrn.) (2) onJof the ailaantaga of eliminating democracy is precisely
that it makes possible the abolition (or drastic curtailment) of the market
economy in fivor of some form of command arrangement. (This is the
stanclpoint of Leninism and Stalinism, and also of the "magic anti-capital-
ism" of fascism, as well as various less extreme tendencies' In the
twerrtietl.r century, the supposedly "left-wing" and "right-wirrg" strands
here have often come tog*her in some forms of "dependency theory" and
contenrporary "anti-inrperialism.")
56 lct'f Weintraub
l-Iowever, the essential foundation for all these positions is the premise
that there exists a superior, and readily available, alternative to the market
econony. Therefore, the intellectual collapse of this premise has been
devastating in its impact. There are some who see the results leading to
the demise, not only of Leninism, but of socialism more generally. This
outcome seems to me unlikely; but it is certainly true tlrat, for the for-
seeable future, no credible socialism can conceive itself in terms of the
abolition of the market.
There is, of course, a third possible response to the tension between
democracy and the market: the Chilean or South Korean route of
combining a capitalist socio-economic system with an authoritarian
regime. f'he Chilean example is a particularly pure case of using the
terroristic power of a despotic regime to break the population's resistance
to the self-regulating market. While the economic corrsetluences of
despotic regimes are generally disastrous, it is clear that in certain cases
the authoritarian/market strategy has yielded genuine results in tern-rs of
economic development. But the successes of this model are hardly
cheering for those committed to democracli they have been more likely
to encourage, for example, those Chinese "reformers" who hope to escape
economic stagnation while avoiding any concessions to democracy.l2
But in recent years this model has also lost some of its aura of prestige
and inevitability. The case for this strategy relies too muclr on assuntp-
tions about the iuherent impossibility of stable democratic regirtres which
now appear to be overdrawn. And it is clear that this strategy eventually
generates important socio-political contradictions of its own, including, if
it is economically successful, increasing demands for democracy, as Peter
Tournanoff argues in a later chapter.
In short, we can have capitalism without democracy but not, it appears,
clemocracy witlrout capitalism; and a recognition of this fact nrust frlrn'r the
starting-point for any serious thinking about den.rocracy and clernocratiza-
tion in our era. Bul, at the same time, the combination of democracy with
capitalism requires living with a permanent tension. The relationship
seems to be at once inextricably interdependent and inescapably contradic-
tory, and it will be necessary to recognize its irreducible ambivalence.
Political Society, Civil Society, and the State
Thus far the discussion has focused primarily on the recluiremer.rts of
the market economy. But what are the requirements of democracy, and
how are they affected by the impact of the market econonry?
One rrecessary step toward elucidating this relationship is a complexifi-
cation in the theory of democracy itself. In this respect, I would propose
a refornrulation and refinement of one of the most significant concepl.ual
l_
Denncracrl and the Markct 57
distinctior.rs in modern social and political analysis, one which has become
ubiquitous in receut discussions, including those in this volume: the
distinction between civil society and the state. The concept of "civil
society" has a long and checkered history in Western thought, in the
course of which it has been given a range of different and even contradic-
tory meanings.l3 With the sudden and sweeping increase in the popu-
larity of this notion during the last decade or so--in both scholarly and
political circles -- it has become increasingly hazy and ambiguous. (The
nrain comnton denominator is that alnrost everyone now agrees that,
whatever it is, "civil society" is a Good l'hing - as opposed to, say, Marx,
who wanted to abolish it.)
This is not the place to survey the different usages or enter into the
relevant controversies. Let me simply say that the valid intuition behind
the fascination with "civil society" is the recognition that denrocracy is not
simply a matter of how the state is organized, but has to do above all with
the reltttiotrship between state and society. One basic recluirement of
democracy is that members of the society have the capacity to organize in
order to exert control over the state, and this in furn requires the existence
of a sphere of activities and institutions indePendent of the colrtrol of state
power. However, the usual dichotomous distinction between state and
civil society, in which "civil society" often tends to serye as a more or less
unclifferentiated residual category, is both inadequate and misleacling for
addressing the relevant issues.
Lessotr s from Tocqueaille
One element in building up a more effective theory of democracy
should be a conceptual framework that distinguishes analytically between
the stntc (in the sense of the more or less centralized apparatus of
clorlination and administration), civil society (the moclern sp|ere of
individualistic relations centered above all on the market arrd private life),
and political society (the sphere of collective action, conflict, and coopera-
tion whicl-r mediates between the two), so as to be able to trace their
interplay and interpenetration in a systematic and historically specific
way.l4 In making this suggestion, I draw in particular on my under-
standing of Tocqueville's political sociology, which he intended to be a
sociology of liberty -- that is, one whose central problem was the
possibility and social conditions of liberty in the modern world' Tocque-
ville's decisive contribution lies in his insistence that genuine clemocratic
self-government must rest on more than legal mechanisms and fornral
political institutions, though these are of course indispensable' It requires,
in addition, the existence and vitality of a wider political conrr.rlunity
supported by a political culture of .citizenship -- which, as we will see, is
a rather special and delicate thiug.''
58 leff Weiilraub
One point of terminological clarification before proceeding: We can
avoid some common confusions by reminding ourselves of the ways that
Tocqueville uses some of the key terms involved, beginning with
"democracy" itself. Although Tocqueville's terminology is not absolutely
consistent here, he generally uses "democracy" to mean, not a particular
kind of political regime, but rather a certain kind of social order -- that is,
one based on fundamental equality and individualism. The term he
generally uses to denote a regime based on self-government and collective
decision-making is politiail liberty. A system of political liberty rnay be
based on a restricted franchise, like England's in the eighteenth and
nineteenth century; or it n'right come to incorporate (more or less) the
whole adult population. In the latter case, political liberty becomes demo-
cratic ar-rd can be called, as a shorthand, democratic liberty. But a
"democratic" social order is also con.rpatible with a distinctively clemocrat-
ic dupotism (of which the former People's Democracies would be good
examples). Following common usage, I will ofter-r speak of democracy
where Tocqueville would say democratic liberty, but it is worth keeping
Tocclueville's corrceptual vocabulary in mind.
Tocclueville's starting point is the decay of those fomrs of organic
community and independent authority which, in a more traditional
society, serve to limit and counterbalance state power. The kind of
"aristocratic" liberty that they strpported, rooted in tradition ancl a spirit
of resistarrce, is not viable uncler nrodern conditions. The lxtlilicol liberty
possible in a democratic age is different in form and requires a new theory
("a new science of politics").
Tocqueville is often misinterpreted as either a nostalgic conservative
aristocrat or a liberal exponent of a purely "negative" liberty. In fact,
Tocqueville's "new science of politics" centers on a theory of political
conrnrunity deve.loped witlrin the framework of what I call the republican
vir'tue traditiorr,'' a tlreory which focuses on the iltteraction between
political institutions and political culture. What I mean by the republican
virtue tradition is that broad current of modern Western social thought
orierrted above all to the idea of citizarship.
Now, citizenship is not a word to be used lightly. The defining mark
of den.rocratic citizenship, in any strong sense of the term, is the capacity
of individuals to enter, directly or indirectly, into a process of collect.ive
decisiorr-making and collective self-determination, involving the conscious
consideration and resolution of public issues. This process may be
mediated through a variety of institutional mechanisms. But its effective
operation requires a certain degree of active and responsible participation
in a decision-making conrmunity based on fundamental equality and
maintained by fundan-rental solidarity and the exercise of what used to be
called repubfican virtue.tz The prictice of citizenship thus recltrires a
distinctive ethos, and involves a distinctive set of skills and orientations,
Danocracy and lhe Markct 59
different from those pertaining to, for example, the market or bureaucratic
administration.
As I indicated above, the key to Tocqueville's position is that he does
not draw his crucial distinction between the state and civil society but
instead distinguishes -- at times implicitly, sometimes explicitly -- among
tlre state, civil society, and plitical society.'o Political society is the whole
realm of activities oriented toward voluntary concerted action, conscious
solidarity, and the discussion and collective resolution of public issues.
As an analytical category it cuts across the more obvious division between
governmental and non-governmental, excluding much administration and
including -- to give some well-known examples -- local self-government,
voluntary associations, trial by jury, some aspects of religion, and so on.
The heart of Tocqueville's approach is precisely that he analyzes
political society as a system, as a distinctive sphere of social life with its
own special dynamics and requirements. For example, the self-governing
townslrip analyzed in Democracy in America is only one of a range of
democratic "secondary" or "intermediate" powers basecl on the active par-
ticipation of citizens as equals in collective decision-making (as opposed
to the "secondary" powers of aristocratic society, which rest on tradition
and dependent ties). The guiding insight here is that political liberty is
about the exercise of puuer -- meaning not simply power over others but,
nrore funclarnentally, the capacity to get things done -- and that political
power is constituted by the ability to act in concert. The moral isolation
of individuals, on the contrary, makes them not autonomous, but weak
and powerless.
Such "secondary" powers serve two, mutually reinforcing, functions in
a system of democratic liberty: (1) They serve as centers of resistance
against, and as bocially workable alternatiaes to, centralized or arbitrary
power. And (2) tlre experience of participating in the exercise of political
liberty is a crucial element in the formation and "practical political educa-
tion" of citizens - that is, it contributes to the process throtrgh which
individuals (and groups) develop the values, skills, and commitmeuts (i.e.,
the "mores") which render them willing and able to make political liberty
work. And these "secondary powers" can do this, of course, only if they
form elements in a larger natiorral polity in which political libelty is
institutiorralized and exercised.
Wl-rat defines a democratic political society is tltis active interplay of
power and culture, and not any fixed or invariant set of institutions or
organizations. In some societies, for exanrple, we can see the labor
movenrent as a crucial element in political society (to use an exan'rple
about which Tocqueville might have been ambivalent) -- arrd in otl'rer
contexts it may simply consist of some narrowly defensive organizations
in civil society. The political significance of voluntary associatiorts (even,
frequently, those without explicitly "political" aims) is that they serve as
60
Jet'f Wcintraub
a series of poirrts of medinliotr between civil society and political society,
and contribute to the political education of citizens.re Parties can also
play this role, of course -- but not necessarily. And Tocqueville famously
saw religion as, in a sense, the most important political institution in
America -- rrof because it had any direct influence over government, but
because of the (rather subtle) role it played in forming the political culture
of citizenship.
The mores of citizenship -- or, as Tocqueville also puts it, the spirit of
the citizen -- require a delicate, and in some ways difficult, balance of two
complementary elements. On the one hand, the citizen must be active and
assertive (as well as competent) in insisting on his participation in the
collective exercise of political power, both to advance his own interests
and beliefs and to resist arbitrary or illegitilnate power; orr the other hand,
the spirit of the citizen requires a willingness and capacity for self-
discipline and self-restraint which grows out of a sense of responsibility
for the collective results of his actions. And this combination of activism
and responsibility rests, in turn, on a sense of fundamental solidarity with
other citizens, and of commitment to the political community and to the
regime of political liberty itself.
By contrast, the spirit of the subject combines habitual political passivity
with, from tirne to time, periodic outbtrrsts of riot or clisorder in nrornents
of outrag,e or of the weakening of arrtlrority. Wlrat marks both siclcs of the
spirit of the subject, Tocqueville emphasizes, is the absence of alry sense
of responsibility for the management of social affairs -- wltich are someone
else's concern. Of course, rulers would like subjects to be responsible and
self-disciplined as well as passively obedient (this attitude has certainly
not passed from the historical scene). But it is futile (certainly in a derno-
cratic age) to expect people to develop a sense of responsibility unless they
are also accustonred to having power -- not just fornrally, but in terms of
the experience of actually participating in its exercise. The reader will
recall Acton's famous aphorism that absolute power corrupts absolutely;
Tocqueville would certainly agree, but he would add that the absence of
political power - of the active exercise of political power -- can a/so be
corrupting.
Tocqueville's analysis of political liberty is of course mirrored by a
penetrating, though hostile, analysis of the modern centralized state. 'Ihe
centralized bureaucratic state is potentially quite threatening to political
society, Tocqueville emphasizes, not only in terms of direct repression, but
also because the pervasiveness of centralized administration chokes off the enetgies
I of political life at their source and smothers political society. If
participation in political liberty is part of a process of political education
which helps generate the spirit of the citizen, then we can say that tl-re
experience of subordination to bureaucratic despotism furthers a kind of
political mis-education which strengthens the spirit of the subject. Thus,
Danocracy anil the Market 6"1
everr if a despotic regin're is overthrown, its legacy will help to insure that,
after an interlude of instability, it will be replaced by another despotic
regime.
But the threat posed by the state is otrly one side of Tocqueville's
analysis. Tocqueville argues tlrat civil society can also pose a tltreat to
political society. This is because the central tendency of modern civil
society - if left to itself - is precisely to isolate individuals, to disrupt ties
of comnrunity, and to encourage a single-minded focus on purely private
concerns -- above all, on making money. That is, the nrores of the market
are not the mores of citizenship. If these atomizing tendencies of civil
society are not counterbalanced by an active political society based on
democratic citizenship -- as they were, he believed, in the America of the
1830s - then they will help produce a society incapable of political
con'ununity and self-determination, in wl'rich the despotism of a cen-
tralized bureaucratic state will be irresistible. In an important sense, it
will also be indispensable, since society will have lost the capacity to run
itself. Historically, a despotic centralized state and a privatized civil
society actually reinforce each other in various ways; the danger, from the
point of view of political liberty, is that political society will be squeezed
out between them.
Tocqueville's picture of the relationship between state and society in the
nroclerrr world is thtrs dominated by two polar alternatives: Irr the first,
society is both active and cohesive, capable of self-organization and of
both resisting and controlling state power. In the second, society is an
inert and passive mass of isolated individuals (or small intimate circles)
dominated by a centralized state that surmounts it like a foreign body.
And both these situations are, to a certain extent, self-reinforcing.
Tocquevillc and Transitions from Lcninism
It is clear that these themes have a strong and immediate resonance
with the key issues thrown up by the experience of Leninist state-socialist
regimes. In particular, one might well say that a whole gerreration of
Eastern European critical intellectuals (beginning in Poland ancl Flungary)
went -- quite unconsciously -- through a process of painfully rediscovering
Tocqueville's problematic. However, they did so under the fornrula --
I which I have been arguing is in some ways quite nrisleading -- of "civil
society against the state." Since this line of thought helped stimulate the
revival of concern with "civil society" in the West over tlre last few
I
decades, and was then re-imported into the political and intellectual
debates of other state-socialist societies (among others), it is now of far
more than merely Eastern European relevance.
While orre aspect of (say) the Hegelian approach is tl're failure to foctts
sufficiently on the distinction between tlrc state and political society, in
62 let'f Weintraub
many current usages certain key issues are obscured by collapsing cioil
society and political society. Let me give one concrete example of the
distinction: In both Hungary and Poland the state increasingly lost its
grip on society during the last decades of the post-Stalinist regime. But
the l"Iungarian pattern centered on the gradual building up of ciuil society,
based on the growth of the "second economy" and the leaching-away of
social energies into privatization (as Elem6r Hankiss once put it, wlrat was
emergirrg was not sirnply a "secotrd ecorromy" but a "seCorrcl society"2o).
This was partly the result of a deliberate Kadarist strategy of finding an
Eastern European mode of coexistence between the state and civil society,
based on the effective suppression of political society - but it was a
strategy that went awry. Poland, however, saw the dramatic eruption
(tlrough not, in the short run, the successful institutionalization) of political
society, based on conscious collective action, social self-organization, and
(of course) active solidarity. The dynamics, as well as the long-term
effects, of these two processes are very different.zl It is therefore in-rport-
ant to have a conceptual vocabulary which brings out sharply, rather than
blurring, the key analytical distinctions. And this recluires markirrg off
political society as a distinctive and coherent (though complex) object of
inalvsis.2
Tocqueville's sociology of political liberty can Ilterefore offer us
especially valuable guiclance in approaching sorne of the challenges ancl
dilemn'ras of post-Leninist democratization, both because of the conceptual
resources it provides and because of the orienting moral courmitment that
informs them. Let me sum up some particularly crucial lessous that are
highlighted by Tocqueville's perspective.
While "anti-politics" -- to quote a resonant East European phrase --
represented a significant and often honorable fornr of resistatrce to the
despotisrn of the party-state, the cclnstruction of a dernocratic altemative
requires something else: a "counter-politics" of gerruitre citizel'rship. As
we have seen, "politics" and the political realm should not simply be
identified with the state. As Tocqueville observes inTlrc OId Regi rrre, when
the absolutist state had reached its apogee, political life reached its nadir.
And observers of state-socialist regimes have noted over and over that the
attempt at total state control of society, which supposedly "politicizes"
everything, actually leads in the long run to massive de-politicization and
privatization, in tl're sense of a profound cynicism and disillusionment
about public life and an emotional retreat to tl're world of intimate
relations and personal ties. This was, in nlany cases, a healthy reaction to
a rnendacious and ritualized pseudo-public life, but it is not a healtl'ry
basis for a democratic polity. What is now required is precisely the re-
politicization of social life - but in a democratic rather than a totalitarian
way. In this respect, civil society (in the strict sense) carl serve either as
I
Democracy anil the Market 63
a cornpler-rrent or as an alternative to the vitality of political society. In
order to consolidate a democratic order, both have to be rebuilt.
It is thus important to be reminded of the crucial sigr-rificance of the
political culture of citizenship for the maintenance of political liberty. This
realization drives honre the dangers inherent in some current strategies of
all-out marketization that disregard or even undermine the distinctive, and
in some respects, countervailing, requirements of reconstructing political
society. As Anclrew Arato notes in his chapter for this volurne, now tl.rat
the governments of post-Leninist societies are in place and have to grapple
with the overwhelming problems of social reconstruction, there is a
dangerous temptation to believe that politics should be the business of
political elites and trained technocrats, and that between elections ordinary
people should go back to private life. This temptation is particularly
strong because of the enormous social pain that n-rarketization will
necessarily cause; the response is to conclude that it will be best for the
masses to be demobilized while the bitter medicine is administered.
However, this is likely to be a false realism. If the pain contir-rues, short-
run passivity and political withdrawal -- something which has already
become noticeable in several East-Central European countries -- could turn
rapidly into support for demagogic and anti-democratic movements able
to mobilize a politics of helpless rage. On the other hand, if one wants to
appeal to a sense of social responsibility and cooperation, one is more
likely to get it from a population who think of themselves as active
citizens. And they are more likely to think of themselves in this way if it
accords with their actual experience.
This point suggests a final, indispensable lesson. lt is not airy idealism
but hard realisrn to say that democracy rests in the end on virtue, on the
capacities and commitments of its citizens. And, as Tocqueville insists, the
spirit of the citizen necessary to maintain democracy must embody a
conrrnitnrent whicl'r goes beyorrd narrow self-interest or the purely
instrumental use of political institutions. Underlying the conflicts and disa-
greements of political life, there must be some fundamental civic
commitment, some aspiration for denrocratic liberty for its owtr sake, some
sense of common membership and shared responsibility which cannot be
reduced to the moral logic of the market. As Tocqueville's Inentor
Montesquieu puts it in The Spirit of the Inws, in a fornrulation which
strikes me as especially topical in connection with current efforts at
democratization: "ln [democracies] alone the government is entrusted to
each citizen. Now, a government is like everything else: to preserve it we
must love it."23 This admonition is especially conrpelling at a moment
when political liberty must not simply be maintained but be created, and
created in circun.rstances of dislocation and economic crisis that will put
civic commitments and capacities to the most denranding test.
64 leff Weittraub
Democracy as a Permanent Challenge
To those engaged in the difficult struggle for democratization in the rest
of the world, Western societies are likely to stand out as spectacular
success stories. And there is good reason for this. The argument that
democracy in the West has been simply a sham, whether advanced from
the standpoint of Marxism or elite theory or deconstnlctiotr, is wrolrg and
pernicious. Democracy has been, to a greater or lesser extent, a gettuitte
achievement of a number of (mostly but not exclusively Western) societies;
and this degree of success is not part of the "superstructure" of modern
society, but part of what defines modernity itself. But it would be equally
misleading to assume that "democracy" in the West is an accor.nplished
fact, which can simply be taken over as a model (by other societies) and
comfortably enjoyed (by those of us here). Rather, it should be seen as au
ongoing project which is still only partly accomplished ancl permanently
precarious. In that respect, Western societies and post-Leninist societies
are now - for all their differences -- in the same boat.
Notes
l. I lrrrrrow tlris plrrasr'fronr R.R. Palrncr,'I-lrc Aga of llrc Dcnwcntlic llcuolttlittrr:
A lrolitical Ilistory of Europe and Anrcrica,1760-1800,2 vols. (l,rinccton: I'rincctorr
Univcrsity Prcss, 1959, 1964).
2. Karl Polanyi, Thc Creat Transt'onnation: The Political arul Econonic Origins of
Our Time (Boston, Beacon Press, 1957; originally published in 1944).
3.Thus, few phrascs have becn more mislcading tlran "capitalist mciety"
when it is taken to mcan, not that a capitalist socio-economic system is a crucial
defining characteristic of "modern society," but that it is lfte dcfinirrg fcature.
4. This is not sirnply an argument about the "structural differentiation" of
modern socie ties -- at least, as that idea is often conceived. The term "differentia-
tion" is often used to convey the image of "subsystems" that are scparated but
harmoniously coordinated or mutually indifferent. I want to stress the potcntial
for lensbn between certain of these systems.
5. For a more extcnded discussion of the rule of law and its importance, see
Alice Erh-Soon Tay's clrapter in this volume.
(r. Affred D. Chandle.r, Jr., Thc Visible Flanil: The Managcrial Rnolution in
American Business (Cambridge: Harvard Univcrsity Press, 1977).
7. Thc conce,ptual discussion in tlris section is extractcd in part frorn tlre
argumerrt of my forthcoming book, Freedom and Conmrunity: The lTelntblicarr Virlue
Tradition and the Sociology of Liberty (University of California J'ress), where thc
ideas are developcd more fully.
8. T.H. Rigby, "Stalinism arrd the Mono-Organizational Socicty," in Robert
Tuckcr, ed., Stalinistrr: Essays ir Hislorical lntcrltrctaliorr (Ncw York: Norton, 1977).
Democracy and the Markel 55
9. Thrrs, onc of Smith's most prominent and sophisticatcd currcnt disciplcs,
thc l-lrrngarian ccotromist Janos Kornai, spcaks of tl're cxistcncc of a "hard budgct
constraint,' on individual firms as the dccisive reason for thc supcriority of
capitalist over state'-socialist economies. Janos Kornai, The Economics of Shortage,
2 vols. (Amstcrdam: North Holland, 1980).
10. foscph Schumpetcr, Capitalism, Socialism, and Donrcracy (Ncw York:
Harpcr Torchbooks, 1942).
11. T'hcv: argumcnts arc dcvcloped irr a numbcr of his works, but scc
particularfy The Constitution of Libcrty (ch icago: univcrsity of Chicago Prcss, 1960)
and Law, Legislation, and Liberty,3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
'1973, 1976, 1980). For Hayck, liberty is tied to the "spontaneous orde/'of the
market, which is incompatible in principle with attempts at conscious control over
collective outcomes. The health of the market thus requires rather drastic
restrictions on the scope of democratic decision-making. In the second volume
trf tlre latter work (Tfte Mirage of Social lustice), Hayek argues that it is not only
illegitimate but, shictly speaking, meaningless to question the "fairncss" or "un-
fairness" of market outcomcs, as long as everyone has played by the rulcs.
12. As Kjeld Erik Brddsgaard r.rotes in his contribution to this volume, this
attempt
,,to
combine political authoritarianism with economic libcralism" is rather
laughably called "socialism with Chinese charactcristics-"
1 3, Sornc of the basic references are provided by Eugene Kamcnka and Kjeld
Erik Brddsgaard in their chapters.
14. For a more comprehensive treatmcnt of thc logic of modcrn societies, I
think it is important to distinguish civil xrciety analytically, not otrly from the
rnore "public- rcalln of political zuciety, but also from ilre morc "private" or
"personal" realm of the family and other intimate relationships. (For more
details, see my paper on 'The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinc-
tion,,, noted bclow.) But I also think the conceptual rheme advancecl here is at
least a useful first step in the direction of analytical complexification.
15. My discussion here is drawn, again, from my larger argumentin Freedom
and Connriurrily. The organizing conceptual framework is laid out primarily in
chs. I-ll. The direct examination of Tocqueville is primarily in ch. VII. Elcmcnts
of my argument herc are also to be found in two unpublished p_apers (which
have, however, circulated in the public domain): "Tocqueville's Conccption of
Political Society" (Unpublislred paper, U. of California at San Diego, 1986) and
"The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction" (Paper presented at
the 1990 annual mcetirrg of the American Political Sciencc Association).
.i6. What I have tcrnred thc rcpublican virtue tradition ovcrlaps to some
degrce with what other scholars have' studicd undcr tlre rubrics of "classical
republicanism" and "civic humanism." But I camc on it from a diffcrent dircction
and have construed it somewlrat differerrtly (in ways I cannot elaborate fully
lrcrc), so it rvill be clearcr for nrc to stick to rny own terminology'
17. In Tocqueville's tcrmirrology, usually "public spirit," "public virtucs," or
the ,,spirit of citizenslrip." Thcse are pervasive tlremcs in both Detrocracy irr
Anrcrica (originally publishcd in 1835 & 1840) and Tfre old Regime and the French
Rcaolution (originally publishcd in 1856).
18. Sce, e.g., Alcxis clc Toctlue'villc,Tha OId Reginrc and the lrurch lltnoluliotr
(Gardcn City, Doublcd ay, 1955), 223'
 66 lct'f Wcintraub

19. Many of tlrc kinds of groups tlrat T<lc<yucvillc calls "volutrtary associa-
tiorrs" would now bc tcrmcd "social movt-'tnt-'trts."
20. Elcm6r Hankiss, "Tlrc 'Second Socicty': ls Therc an Altcnrativc Social
Model Emerging in Contcmporary I-lungary?" Social Research 55:l (Surnnrcr 1988).
21. This point is takcn up, arrd applicd to the Polish casc, by Z.A. Pclczynski
in "Solidarity and The Rcbirth of Civil Society' in Poland" (included in John
Keane, ed., Cioil Socicty aril the Stale, Cuilford, Vcrso, 1988); scc, in particular,
rrotc 14. It is now clcar that the Hungarian'solutiotr'was lc'ss statrlc, and tlrc
cruption of political socicty in Poland lcss transitory, tltan many pcuplc oncc
bclieved.
22. For two useful efforts to utilize conccptions of "political socicty" similar
to the onc bcing advanccd here, in very diffcrent contcxts, scc Crzt'gorz Ekicrt,
Consolidatins Democratic
"Democratisation Proccsses in East Central Europe: A Thcoretical Rcconccpt- Breakthroughs ifi Leninist States
ualization" (British lournal of Political Science 21:.3 119911,285-313) and Carlos
Forment, "Thc Formation of Political Society in Spanish America: 'Ilrc Mcxican Edward Friedman
Case, 17fi)-1830" (Unpublishcd dissertation, Harvard Univcrsity, 1990). (ln
ncitlrer case, of course, is the author's conccptual framework prcciscly the same
as my own.) Alfrcd Stcpan has independcntly dcvclopcd his own tripartitc
distinction arlrong state, civil society, and political socicty (irrtroduccc'l in
Rethirkirrg Military Polilics: Brazil and the Southtrn Corre IPrincctorr: I)rinccton When the Berlin Wall fell and democracy danced on the rubble of
University Prcss, 19BBl). To avoid confusion, it is worth noting tlrat his forrnula- crumbling tyranny, ecstasy was tempered by the knowledge that a break-
tion and mirre are different in kcy rcspects, arrd highlight sorncwhat differeint through in the confining bonds of despotism does not automatically
conccrns. Stcpan's rxrtion of "political vrcitty" is muro narrowly conccivcd tlran guarantee a successflll consolidation of democracy. When the walls of
thc orrt' to lvhiclr I warrt to call attt'rtti<tn. Wlrat Stcpan tt'rrtls lo rnt'an by tyranrry ttrr.rrble, forces surface fronl beneath the smelly heap whose
"political socicty" is prirnarily tlrc world of professiorral political clitcs -- wlrat resultant foul wirrds are trot friendly to freeclom. Wise voices warn that
Colombians call thc "pafs polftico," or tlrc Frcnch and Italiarrs call tlrc "political a nasty fate rnay still await the celebrants who have triumphed over tlre
class" -- and the institutions tlrrough which tlrey opcratc. This is an extrernely inhuman Leninist party-state. They decry "a nationalism that readily
important elcrnent of a democratic political socicty, in tlre scnse discusscd in this slides into an exclusive, aggressive, xenophobic chauvinism. . .drawing on
chapter, but only one elcmcnt.
the most backward and reactionary interpretations of religion."l Emerg-
23. Montcsquie'u, Thc Syirit of thc Larus, tr. Thomas Nrrgcnt (Ncw York, ing from the garbage of Leninisn.r, a "social Pandora's box. . .a Hobbesian
Flafirer, 1949; originally publisltcd in 1748), Bcxrk IV, Ch. 5, 34 (trarrslation slightly
amendcd).
bellum omnium co,rtra onurcs of ethnic, corporatist, nationalist, etc., inter-
ests,"2 can spread "sonre of the most sordid aspects of traditional
culture,"r motivating "a populace so igllorant that the nrairr alteruative
to communism itself seenrs to be. .vicious bigotry."a These latent,
divisive responses to the brutally divisive rule of Leninism include the
delegitimation of the prior nationalism of Leninist anti-in.rperialism ancl,
consequently,_a need for a new national identity, even for the clonrirrant
ethnic group.' This nationalist rreed may complicate the building of a
democracy, may make the denrocratization of a Lerrinist system more
conrplex than the democratization of many other kinds of dictatorships.

The Difficult Political Geography of Democratization

Ilow then slrotrlci a polity craft a denrocracy so that it will become

institutionalized such that the gains from consolidating political freedon'r

o/

I IT
 UI Corierrls

12 Denrocratization in the MulLinational State of Yugoslavia,

Bsrbara lelaaiclr 197

Contents 13 Econonric Decentralization and Denrocratization

in the USSR, Peter Tounnnoff 271

14 Civil Society and Deurocratization in China,

List of Tables and Figures vrt Kjcld Erik Br{dsgaard 237
Foranrord, Thomas E. Hachey lx
15 1'he Prospects for Transiticlns from Letrinistn
to Denrocracy, Su Slnozhi md Margnret Lnlus Nugent 259
1 Introcluction,
Margaret Latus Nugent
About llrc, Conlribulors 275
2 To Leninisrn and Back. Sclcclcd Bibliography 287
Marslall I. Goldrnn and Merle Coldmon Index 285

3 Historical Foundations for Democracy in Russia?

Robert F. Byrne-s 29

4 Denrocracy and the Market: A Marriage of Inconvenience,

It'lf Waintraub 47

5 Consolidating Democratic Breakthroughs in Leninist States,

Edward Fridman 67

6 Implementing a Market-Oriented Economy,

Elizabeth Clayton 85

7 The Role of Law in Democratic and Economic Refornr

in Leninist States, Alice Erh-Soon Tay 99

8 Civil Society and Freedom in the Post-Communist World,

Eugene Kamenka t11

9 Civil Society in the Emerging Democracies:

Poland and Ilungary, Andrau Arato 127

10 Transforming East Gernrany: A New Cerman Question,

Stephett F. Szabo 153

I1 Transition to Democracy in Czechoslovakia, I{ungary,

arrd Poland: A Preliminary Analysis,
Andrzei Korbonski 165