Rule 72

Sec. 1
1. Republic v. CA, G.R. No.163604, May 6, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth
Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and
APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc,
Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner, the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of
September 29, 1999,[1] granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners Report[2] and
accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier,
presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the
Family Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absent spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial courts order
by filing a Notice of Appeal.[3]
By Order of November 22, 1999s,[4] the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed
and served as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
present case being a special proceeding, disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order of disapproval having been
denied by Order of January 13, 2000,[5] it filed a Petition for Certiorari[6] before the Court of
Appeals, it contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the
Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on
appeal.
By Decision of May 5, 2004,[7] the Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition on
procedural and substantive grounds in this wise:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its
petition a certified true copy of the assailed Order dated January 13, 2000 [denying its Motion for
Reconsideration of the November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of Appeal]. Moreover, the
petition questioned the [trial courts] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared Clemente Jomoc
presumptively dead, likewise for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in the records. On this score alone, the petition
should have been dismissed outright in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the substantive issue of
the validity/nullity of the assailed order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a
person is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and the party
appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect
its appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days from notice

or decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal
(Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, a civil action is one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong while a
special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R.
No. 124320, March 2, 1999).
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of
a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial
court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement
or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of
right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal
was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special proceeding, OSG should
have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on
appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. The
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the
enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.
By Resolution of December 15, 2004,[8] this Court, noting that copy of the September 27, 2004
Resolution[9] requiring respondent to file her comment on the petition was returned unserved with
postmasters notation Party refused, Resolved to consider that copy deemed served upon her.
The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special Proceedings, Part II of the Revised
Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, read:
RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the
following:
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
(h) Habeas corpus;
(i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;
(l) Constitution of family home;
(m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (Underscoring
supplied)
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant
of the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court
in disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. (a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple
or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall
be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxx
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of
Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her
desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a summary
proceeding, following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE
FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia:
xxx
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in
an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary
proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal
for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the
filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.
That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:

Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise
known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,
39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or
parts thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
seals the case in petitioners favor.
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before the appellate court.
Petitioners failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial courts order
denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily
fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before
it by petitioner, what the appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the
rule.
As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order granting the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the appellate courts observation that petitioner was also
assailing it, petitioners 8-page petition[10] filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having
assailed the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the
foregoing discussion.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
2. Natcher v. CA, G.R. No. 133000, Oct. 2, 2001
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133000
October 2, 2001
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL
ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA,
RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any
of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision 1 of public
respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside
and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of
defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059
and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
"So ordered."

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with
an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani,
Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's
estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of
TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children
received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.1wphi1.nt
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of ConsolidationSubdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children,
share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving
only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988.
Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where
the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the
second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443.
Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No.
1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55,
herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the
employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear
that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.
Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such
fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married
to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir
of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in
advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against
Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996
holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is
prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property
was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of
property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by
law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded
as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter
alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its
jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate
of a deceased person. XXX
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the
court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"

Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule
45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the
facts of the case."
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in
this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a
special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to
establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal
pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is
granted generally upon an application or motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and
prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity,
and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is
instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced
without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary
actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent
proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by
petition or motion upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement
of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to
have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor
of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under
the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate
court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del
Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the
estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo

determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property
owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings
provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying
an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is
subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an
advance inheritance."12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo13 andMendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it
is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the
six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general
jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle
that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs,or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent
to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment
as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited
the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court.17 (emphasis supplied)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may
be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by
the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With
the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and
only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.19
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that
the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these wellentrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of
advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's
estate.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
3. Hagans v. Wislizenus, G.R. No. 16680, Sept. 13, 1920
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 16680
September 13, 1920
BROADWELL HAGANS, petitioner,
vs.
ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, Judge of First Instance of Cebu, ET AL., respondents.

Block, Johnston & Greenbaum for petitioner.

The respondent judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for the other respondents.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in
the petition are admitted by a demurrer. The only question presented is, whether or not a judge of the
Court of First Instance, in "special proceedings," is authorized under the law to appoint assessors for
the purpose of fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for his services and expenses in
the care, management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the provision of Act No. 190 permit him
to appoint assessors in "special proceedings," The petitioner contends that no authority in law exists
for the appointment of assessors in such proceedings.
The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of assessors are the following; (a) Section
57-62 of Act No. 190; (b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190; (c) section 44 (a) of Act No. 267; (d)
section 2477 of Act No. 2711; and (e) section 2 of Act No. 2369.
Said section 44 (a) of Act No. 267 and section 2477 of Act No. 2711 apply to the city of Manila only.
Act No. 2369 provides for the appointment of assessors in criminal cases only. Sections 57-62 of Act
No. 190 provide for the appointment of assessors in the court of justice of the peace. Therefore, the
only provisions of law which could, by any possibility, permit the appointment of assessors in "special
proceedings" are sections 153-161 of Act No. 190.
Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to
sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . .
."
Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action"? If it is, then, the court is expressly authorized
by said section 154 to appoint assessors. But we find, upon an examination of section 1 of Act No.
190, which gives us an interpretation of the words used in said Act, that a distinction is made between
an "action" and a "special proceeding." Said section 1 provides that an "action" means an ordinary suit
in a court of justice, while "every other remedy furnished by law is a 'special proceeding."
In view of the interpretation given to the words "action" and "special proceeding" by the Legislature
itself, we are driven to the conclusion that there is a distinction between an "action" and a "special
proceeding," and that when the Legislature used the word "action" it did not mean "special
proceeding."
There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding. "An action is a formal
demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It
is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. (People vs. County
Judge, 13 How. Pr. [N. Y.], 398.) The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. (Porter vs. Purdy, 29 N. Y.,
106, 110; Chapin vs. Thompson, 20 Cal., 681.) Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings
are required, unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings is generally
granted upon an application or motion. Illustrations of special proceedings, in contradistinction to
actions, may be given: Proceedings for the appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors; contest
of wills; to perpetuate testimony; to change the name of persons; application for admission to the bar,
etc., etc. (Bliss on Code Pleading, 3d ed., sec. 1.)
From all of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that in proceedings like the present the judge
of the Court of First Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the demurrer is
hereby overruled and the prayer of the petition is hereby granted, and it is hereby ordered and decreed
that the order of the respondent judge appointing the assessors described in the petition be and the
same is hereby annulled and set aside; and, without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
Araullo, Malcolm, Avancea, Moir and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Sec. 2
1. Hilado v. CA, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009

SECOND DIVISION
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ G.R. No. 164108
SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST
FARMERS HOLDING Present:
CORPORATION,
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and
BRION, JJ.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE Promulgated:
AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, May 8, 2009
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was
survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his
only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.[1] At the time of his death, there were two pending civil
cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as
one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of
Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding
Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.[2]
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes.
Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, net of liabilities.
[3] On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.

[4] In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and
Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.[5] In the List of Liabilities
attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned
two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.[6] Private respondent stated
that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 959137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.[7] Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private
respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.[8]

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela,[9] praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the
intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality
of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC
acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC
set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents
estate.[10] Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on
the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had
been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground
that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in
the intestate proceedings.[11] After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in
general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto,
the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision[12] dismissing the petition and
declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene
in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the
appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact
that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were
still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them
the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the
rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather
various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.[13]
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they
prayed that they be henceforth furnished copies of all processes and orders issued by the intestate
court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.[14] Second, they
prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit
a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax
appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the
same.[15] Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the
collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.[16]
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on
intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x While the
language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate
proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor must be
actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.[17]
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons
fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil
Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under
Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The
definition of intervention under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now
before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that
petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the
disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of
those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus
to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any interested persons or any persons
interested in the estate to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings.
Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right
of any person interested to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for
administration; (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition
for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and to any other persons believed to have
interest in the estate; (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a person interested in the estate to petition
for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of
any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein; (5) Section 10 of
Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the
Administrators account to persons interested; (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to
give notice to the persons interested before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or
encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows any person
interested in the estate to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied,
then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to
be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the
administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.[19] However, it appears that the claims

against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom,
Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of
claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.[20] These actions, being as
they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the
other civil case[21] was already pending review before this Court at the time of Benedictos death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where
they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of
petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until
such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,[22] and it does provide us
with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed
an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned
that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had
sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia,
administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention,
manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of
the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had
been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the
pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the
heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close
the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it
was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the
property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property
of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified
in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever
is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching
consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking
cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction
over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close
interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in
excess of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the
closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action
for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of
administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general
jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the
Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property
from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the
executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the
action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply
because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any
step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which
declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the
estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and
should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules
would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be
closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x[23] (Emphasis
supplied) [Citations omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-inintervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such
pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of this
court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to
protect the same, but not for a decision on their action.[24]
Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests
nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also
any person interested or persons interested in the estate various specified capacities to protect their
respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for
quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in
their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent
that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person
interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings,
but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners,

they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided
for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and
there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this
standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection
with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is
no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the
developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a
running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be
compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property
of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances
their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission that
if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court,
then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be
furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a
precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a
claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate
proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of
cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with
respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of
developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,[25] the Court heard a petition
for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed
access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them.
Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that the records of every court of justice shall
be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person x x x. The Court
ruled that petitioners were interested persons entitled to access the court records in the intestate
proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor prompt
compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the
assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the
submission by the Administratrix of an annual accountingappears legitimate, for, as

the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al.,
they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact
"interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x[26]

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an
eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon
them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and
disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the
records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how
relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and
the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the
estate are preserved.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or
all interested parties the petitioners as interested parties will be entitled to such notice. The instances
when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to
the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec.
7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal
estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the
hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the
administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed
by the petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline
for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof,
set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other

parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said
reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while
Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one
(1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are
reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against
the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay
in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are
protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent
claims against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper
remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the
provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt
that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the
interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the
debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such
purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we
have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special
Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons
interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as
provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under
the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
2. Sheker v. Sheker, G.R. No. 157912, Dec. 13, 2007
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 157912

Present:

- versus -

ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,

VICTORIA S. MEDINAAdministratrix,
Respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
December 13, 2007

x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order[1] of the
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order
dated April 9, 2003.
The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order
for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner
filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate,
and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by
petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money
claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against
non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim
was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim
based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per
Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification
against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be
dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?
(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its
failure to contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?
[2]
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the
payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory
manner.
The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with
this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.[3]

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules
governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished.[4] This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in
ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would
not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that
rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of
the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory
pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for
money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are
applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the
present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's
contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a
certification against non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an
initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of

the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims
against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their
respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.[5]
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to
be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In
Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material
but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed.
A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters
in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main
object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.
[7] (Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's
estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for
a mere contingent claim. Hence,herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory
pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that the trial court has
jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a
lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of
separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section
2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a
reasonable time.[9] After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for
settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the
estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de
Macatangay[10] is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a
pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should
expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely,
minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by

mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service
will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort
to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to
catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to
prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving
notice from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other
paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming
the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the
disposition of such pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective
rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then
gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other
modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made
as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion
must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself
begins with the clause whenever practicable.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to
other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal
service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing
is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied
by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to
begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise
consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved
therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation
of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service,
exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:
As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and
filing of pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable.
The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not
be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of
Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted,
clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed
considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why
service was not done personally might have been superfluous. In
any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of may, signifying
permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion
whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that
procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13
may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while
petitioner Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from
Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v.

Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally might have been
superfluous.
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of
procedure has been allowed where, among other cases, the injustice to the adverse
party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for
respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court
should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed
not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of
Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done
personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under
Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for
the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid.[13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims
was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez,[14] thus:
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is
mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the
affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of
the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[15] (Emphasis
supplied)
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a
written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court ofIligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take
appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Rule 73
Sec. 1
1. Maloles II v. Philips, G.R. Nos. 129505 & 133359, Jan. 31, 2000
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000]
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 133359. January 31, 2000]
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V.
GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA
PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, respondents.
Scmis
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth and the Special Eighth
Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement
of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering that they involve the
same parties and some of the issues raised are the same.
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for
probate of his will[1] in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his
will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his
properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were
in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the
will[2] was annexed to the petition for probate.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order
granting the petition and allowing the will. The order reads:
On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition on
12 September 1995, at 8:30 oclock in the morning, copies of which were served to
Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips (Officers
Return, dated 04 September 1995 attached to the records). When the case was called
for hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was
ever filed and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his evidence in
support of the petition.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand
and was directly examined by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and
answers to give this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the petitioner
when he executed the subject will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that
petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and
undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will and Testament on
his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced by any
other person in signing it. Mis sc
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced that petitioner in
his lifetime, executed his Last Will and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4",
"A-5") at his residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park,
Makati City; said Last Will and Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3)

witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16",
"A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14", "A-17", &
"A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and
all of the witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and duly notarized before
Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual execution of the
Last Will and Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").
Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with
address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been
named as sole legatee and devisee of petitioners properties, real and personal,
approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips
was designated as executor and to serve as such without a bond.
From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has substantially
established the material allegations contained in his petition. The Last Will and
Testament having been executed and attested as required by law; that testator at the
time of the execution of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to
make a Will; nor was it executed under duress or under the influence of fear or
threats; that it was in writing and executed in the language known and understood by
the testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and subscribed by three (3) credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of another; that the testator and all the
attesting witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament freely and voluntarily and that
the testator has intended that the instrument should be his Will at the time of affixing
his signature thereto.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the petition for the
allowance of the Last Will and Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED
and ALLOWED.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the
only child of Alicia de Santos (testators sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole fullblooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the
testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance
of letters of administration in his name. Mis spped
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated executrix of the
will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private
respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a
memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to
allow his intervention.[3]
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other hand, private
respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 61,
refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.
Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order, dated
June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santoss estate.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set aside the
appointment of private respondent as special administrator. He reiterated that he was the sole and full
blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61
of the same court was still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testators
estate; that private respondent was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and that
petitioner should be given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 61,
on the ground that "[it] is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ."

It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on August 26, 1996
petitioners motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a
decision[4] promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of petitioners motion for
intervention.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the records of Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending case involving the Estate of
Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The order reads: Spped
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court, transferring
this case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is related with a case before
this Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there is no
related case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS
pending before this Branch.
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule
76 of the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as
SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996 and has
become final.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein Petitioner
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after this Court, during the
hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the subject matter
involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew
her motion and filed this case (No. 4343).
Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before Case
No. M-4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26
August 1996 likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate case to be
filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be included in this case filed
under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must be
approved by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,[5] Judge Abad Santos appeared firm in his position
that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M4343)," considering that the probate proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered
the transfer of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later recalled his decision and took
cognizance of the case "to expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he
stated:
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to
continue hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the probate
proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise its
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the testator had
been partitioned and distributed as per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch
(Regional Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if only to
expedite the proceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City is but one court. Jo spped
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office of the
Court Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita
De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles, Intervenor.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners motion for intervention. Private
respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision[6]
setting aside the trial courts order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any right or interest to
intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61 has lost
jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order
allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos
2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65) acquired
jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private)
respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has
a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed
by the respondent.
4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing her
petition for issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial Court - Makati,
Branch 65 knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving the same testate
estate of the decedent is still pending with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch
61. Spped jo
First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate
upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases of Santiesteban v.
Santiesteban[7] and Tagle v. Manalo,[8] he argues that the proceedings must continue until the estate
is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of
the Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon
private respondents petition for issuance of letters testamentary.
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to
ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.[9]
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so that, after
approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of
the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts
cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory
nature of wills.[10]
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by
the testator himself. It provides:
Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction
for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court for the allowance of wills after the testators death shall govern. Miso
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be
necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of
the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any executor, devisee, or
legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time
after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance
of his will.
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been explained by the
Code Commission thus:
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of the
testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few
cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for

the courts to determine the mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than
after his death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore,
if a will does not comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the same may be
corrected at once. The probate during the testators life, therefore, will lessen the
number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the
testator, the only questions that may remain for the courts to decide after the testators
death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible,
of course, that even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he
may be acting under duress or undue influence, but these are rare cases.
After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not
necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he
make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die
before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding
after the testators death would be in order.[11]
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for
Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the
Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTCMakati that -Nex old
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate
proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise
said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate
proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues
up to such time that the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and
distributed.
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely
that the partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the latters
death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the issuance
of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose
in the probate court.[12]
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, 1 which
states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held:[13]
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the
clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule
indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could
not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is
another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed was

fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered
or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or
authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power
is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the
court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this
does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that
the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may
thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The
appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the
parties. Mani kx
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of
over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional
trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches comprising each court in one
judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other.[14]
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the
will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. As held in the leading case of
Bacalso v. Ramolote:[15]
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth
Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is
only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the
judges. And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not
attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may
be held or proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this
reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of
Justice, the administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different
branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work
by the different branches of the same court. The apportionment and distribution of
cases does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches
and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and the
trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M4343.
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the
testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to
intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent
Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and
nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case
of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and
disposes of all his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is
annulled. His interest in the decedents estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.
Maniks
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the
first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as
the records show, not supported by evidence.
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the
will, and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the private
respondents opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the truth

worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency to act
as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of
the probable value and character of the property of the estate. The true value can be
determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate.[16]
Rule 79, 1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for
administration. - Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why
letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or
any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency
of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of
administration with the will annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest
is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.[17]
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the
testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced
heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of
it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. Manikan
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.[18]
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the
testators will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is
a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is
incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:[19]
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is
natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can
be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this
right may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court
appoint other persons to administer the estate.[20] None of these circumstances is present in this case.
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping when she filed the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings
(Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights
asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the same facts, and a
judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the
testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the
proceedings were terminated. Oldmis o
On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private respondent, as
executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing authority from the Court to
administer the estate and put into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings

commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies
and devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions,
nor was the latter filed during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum
shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
2. Lim v. CA, G.R. No. 124715, Jan. 24, 2005
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124715. January 24, 2000]
RUFINA LUY LIM petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION,
SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING
CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the
estate of a deceased person?
Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari, the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set
aside the orders dated 04 July 1995[2], 12 September 1995[3] and 15 September 1995[4] of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court.
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject
of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor
Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner".
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing,
Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations formed, organized and existing
under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system.
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly
represented by her nephew George Luy, filed on 17 March 1995, a joint petition[5] for the
administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of
Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion[6] for the lifting of lis pendens and motion[7] for exclusion of
certain properties from the estate of the decedent.
In an order[8] dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a
probate court, granted the private respondents twin motions, in this wise:
"Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift, expunge
or delete the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 116716,
116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is hereby further ordered that the properties
covered by the same titles as well as those properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 236236 and 263236 are excluded from these
proceedings.
SO ORDERED."
Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition[9] which contained the following
averments:
"3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following
business entities, to wit:
Business Entity Address:
XXXX
Alliance Marketing ,Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca
BF Homes,

Paraaque,
Metro Manila.
XXXX
Speed Distributing Inc. 910 Barrio Niog,
Aguinaldo Highway,
Bacoor, Cavite.
XXXX
Auto Truck TBA Corp. 2251 Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City.
XXXX
Active Distributors, Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF
Homes, Paraaque,
Metro Manila.
XXXX
Action Company 100 20th Avenue
Murphy, Quezon City
or
92-D Mc-Arthur Highway
Valenzuela Bulacan.
"3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business with the
public as corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were however, personally
owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and officers
appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the above business entities
were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for purposes
of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
"4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the following
banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation and in other banks whose identities are yet to be determined.
"5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of the above
entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage with petitioner,
to wit:
Corporation Title Location
XXXX
k. Auto Truck TCT No. 617726 Sto. Domingo
TBA Corporation Cainta, Rizal
q. Alliance Marketing TCT No. 27896 Prance,
Metro Manila
Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax Declarations
are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".
XXXX
"7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late Pastor Y. Lim,
are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him during the existence of his
marriage with petitioner.
"8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim which
petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will submit to this Honorable
Court the identities thereof and the necessary documents covering the same as soon
as possible."
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioners motion issued an order[10], thus:
"Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens in

case said annotation had already been deleted and/or cancelled said TCT Nos.
116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 51282.
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123, 236256
and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant petition.
SO ORDERED."
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special administrator[11] and
Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after
which letters of administration were accordingly issued.
In an order[12] dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private respondents motion
for exclusion, in this wise:
"The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the
corporations are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim, Otherwise
(sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of the corporate veil, a matter that is
clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and not the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA
483, the crucial issue decided by the regular court was whether the corporation
involved therein was the mere extension of the decedent. After finding in the
affirmative, the Court ruled that the assets of the corporation are also assets of the
estate.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the SECs
exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is simply a suit to settle
the intestate estate of a deceased person who, during his lifetime, acquired several
properties and put up corporations as his instrumentalities.
SO ORDERED."
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by petitioner, issued an
order[13] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under enumerated
are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to produce and submit to the
special administrators , through this Honorable Court within (5) five days from
receipt of this order their respective records of the savings/current accounts/time
deposits and other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations abovementioned, showing all the transactions made or done concerning savings /current
accounts from January 1994 up to their receipt of this court order.
XXX XXX XXX
SO ORDERED."
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari[14], with an urgent prayer for a restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals questioning the orders of the
Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents, rendered the
assailed decision[15], the decretal portion of which declares:
"Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is
hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent court on July 4,1995 and
September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The impugned order issued by
respondent on September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as petitioner corporations"
bank accounts and records are concerned.
SO ORDERED."
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina Luy Lim now
comes before us with a lone assignment of error[16]:
"The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower court
which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private
respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with the
respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or

to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of
Court and thereby preventing the petitioner, from performing her duty as special
administrator of the estate as expressly provided in the said Rules."
Petitioners contentions tread on perilous grounds.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued by the probate court
which were subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction over probate
proceedings is indeed in order.
The provisions of Republic Act 7691[17], which introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
are pertinent:
"Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the
estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in
Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000);
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional
remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property,
estate or amount of the demand does not exceed One Hundred
Thousand Pesos(P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such
personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged, Provided,
that interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys, litigation
expenses and costs shall be included in the determination of the
filing fees, Provided further, that where there are several claims or
causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in
the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
xxx xxx xxx"
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends
upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent.
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on the principle that a
probate court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory.
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend its probing arms in the
determination of the question of title in probate proceedings.
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,[18] held:
"X X X As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining

whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination
is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
to resolve title."
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS[19]:
"X X X The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator
is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the courts
determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties."
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE[20] citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE[21], We made an
exposition on the probate courts limited jurisdiction:
"It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that
the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so."
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO[22], We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr. Justice Andres
Narvasa[23]:
"Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting
as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal
interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not
thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of whether or
not a particular matter should be resolved by the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land
registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one,
involving a mode of practice which may be waived. x x x
x x x. These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title
is not in the decedents name but in others, a situation on which this Court has already
had occasion to rule x x x."(emphasis Ours)
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the Torrens system and
registered in the name of private respondent corporations should be included in the inventory of the
estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the probate court of
whether these properties should be included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not conclusive
and subject to a final determination in a separate action brought for the purpose of adjudging once and
for all the issue of title.
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in the name of private
respondent corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID[24] is of great
essence and finds applicability, thus:
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support
her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their
favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set
aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include,
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons. x x x"

"x x x. In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property

covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title
should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action,
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title. x x x"
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented by
petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties.
Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, " The Property Registration Decree", proscribes collateral
attack on Torrens Title, hence:
"xxx xxx xxx
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
- A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property subject of the
controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system, We categorically stated:
"x x x Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of
title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied
the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question
from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such
third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. x x x"
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are in
the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which under the
law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any
cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor
of private respondents should stand undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents motion for exclusion. While
it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited
jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain
properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the
question of title over properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and
reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the
peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system in the name of
private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the
probate court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the
impugned orders.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of the
presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents. Certainly, the probate court
through such brazen act transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on
this matter.
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent corporations are properly
part of the decedents estate but also the private respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such
flimsy contention, petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and
wholly-owned the five corporations, which are the private respondents in the instant case.[25]
Petitioner thus attached as Annexes "F"[26] and "G"[27] of the petition for review affidavits executed
by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among others, contained averments that the incorporators of
Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual participation in the organization and
incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added that the persons whose names appeared on
the articles of incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as incorporators thereof, are mere dummies

since they have not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock of the corporation and have
been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective signatures thereon.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons
composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be
held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.
[28]
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate
from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is
an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons
comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL
BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS[29], We enunciated:
"x x x When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or
as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes,
the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery
or crime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from the
members or stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its consideration
merely as an aggregation of individuals. x x x"
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud which
exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one
corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.[30]
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but
the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public
convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the
notion of legal entity should come to naught.[31]
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction
is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not
only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2)
Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the
violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of
plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the
injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the
corporate veil".[32]
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital
stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities.[33]
Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-doing must be
clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.[34]
Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in a limited
capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that would
have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner
on the affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the
aforementioned documents possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it
is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants
were not at all presented during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently,
for this Court to uphold the admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to
apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.
Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LEONIDAS[35] finds
pertinence:
"Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared
by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants

statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing
them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
the affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon."
As to the order[36] of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals correctly
observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The
probate court had no authority to demand the production of bank accounts in the name of the private
respondent corporations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified and set aside the orders issued
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12
September 1995 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
3. Republic v. Villarama Jr. G.R. No. 117733, Sept. 5, 1997
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117733. September 5, 1997]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City; ROBERTO SWIFT; RODRIGO DOMINGO;
and SPECIAL MASTERS or Other Persons Acting in Their Stead, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to reverse the 2
November 1994 Order [1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City (hereafter, probate
court), in Special Proceedings No. 10279 entitled In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Ferdinand
E. Marcos/Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration. The assailed order lifted the temporary
restraining order issued on 25 October 1994, and denied petitioner's (1) petition for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and (2) motion to cite Mr. Robert Swift, Atty. Rodrigo Domingo, and
other persons in contempt of court.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines is the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 10279. The
petition, filed on 16 October 1992, alleged that during his exile the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
executed his last will and testament [2] in Hawaii, United States of America, with his wife Imelda
Trinidad R. Marcos and son Ferdinand R. Marcos II as executors. Petitioner justified its action in
filing the petition by claiming neglect on the part of the testators heirs to initiate testate proceedings
and the need to protect the interest of the Philippine government in assessing and collecting the taxes
due the estate. It moved that Mrs. Marcos and Ferdinand II be declared incompetent as executors and
prayed that letters of administration be issued in favor of petitioners nominee.
Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos II filed an Opposition/ Comment on the petition. [3]

On 7 June 1993, petitioner sent a notice [4] of Commencement of Probate Proceedings in

Philippine Court to the United States (U.S.) District Court of Hawaii, where a class action [5]
docketed as MDL No. 840 was previously filed against former President Marcos. [6] The action
sought damages against the latter for human rights violations he allegedly committed during his
authoritarian rule.
After establishing the jurisdictional facts and concluding its presentation of evidence in the
probate court, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Appointment of Special Administrator/s [7]
citing the following grounds in support thereof:
(1) The probate court has failed to appoint an administrator of the estate since the filing of the petition.
(2) The US District Court of Hawaii awarded in favor of the claimants the amount of US$1.2 Billion
as exemplary damages against the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos.
(3) In its order of 19 November 1991 the said court granted a preliminary injunction against the estate
to prevent any transfer, encumbrance, conversion, or disposition of the funds and assets of the estate.
(4) On the premise that no probate proceeding was pending anywhere, said Court modified on 16
November 1992 its preliminary injunction to include certain Swiss Banks.
(5) In July 1994, the plaintiffs in MDL No. 840 filed with the Hawaii District Court a motion to
further modify the preliminary injunction to identify the Republic of the Philippines as agent,
representative, aide, and abettor of the defendant Estate, notice of which was received by the Office of
the Solicitor General on 25 July 1994.
(6) There was a need to preserve the estate, considering that it was the subject of protracted litigation
both here and abroad. Petitioner nominated Commissioner of Internal Revenue Liwayway VinzonsChato as administrator of the estate.
Ferdinand R. Marcos II opposed the motion claiming that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
was not a suitable person to act as administrator of the estate.
In its Order [8] of 9 September 1994, the probate court, per public respondent Judge Villarama,
granted the motion and appointed Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato as Special Administrator
of the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos. Citing Section 1 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the order also
declared that upon the filing of the petition for probate of the will, the probate court acquired
jurisdiction over the estate to the exclusion of all other courts; and that the U.S. District Court of
Hawaii cannot assert its jurisdiction over the assets of the estate and exclude the jurisdiction already
vested in [the probate court]. He directed that a copy of the order be furnished the U.S. District Court
of Hawaii through the Department of Foreign Affairs.
On 24 October 1994, petitioner filed in the probate court a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. [9] It
alleged that in the class action the U.S. District Court of Hawaii issued sometime in October 1994 a
Reference Order [10] appointing special masters for the purpose of obtaining depositions in the
Philippines on the following matters: (1) whether the victims identified in the claim forms suffered
torture, summary execution, or disappearance; and (2) the extent of damages sustained. The Reference
Order prescribed the procedure, including the availment of local court reporters and interpreters as
might be required. Petitioner asserted that the Reference Order impinged on the exclusive jurisdiction
of the probate court and disregarded the claim of the Philippine government against the Marcos estate.
It also contended that the claim against the estate should be filed before the probate court and that the
Philippine government should be accorded first preference in the priority list of the estates creditors.
On 25 October 1994, respondent Judge Villarama issued a temporary restraining order [11]
against the special masters and persons acting in their stead, and set for hearing the petition for the
preliminary injunction. The sheriffs return [12] indicated that service of the order was attempted
upon the resident manager of New World Hotel, Makati City, where Mr. Swift and the other special

masters were billeted. However, the sheriff was referred to the guest services manager, who refused to
accept a copy of the order.
Before the hearing on the preliminary injunction could take place, petitioner filed an urgent exparte motion [13] to cite herein private respondents, Mr. Robert Swift, Atty. Rodrigo Domingo, and
other concerned persons in contempt of court based on media reports that they vowed to continue the
taking of depositions notwithstanding the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Petitioner also
questioned the legal practice in the Philippines of Mr. Swift, an American counsel who had no special
work permit and license to practice.
On 28 October 1994, respondent Judge Villarama issued an order [14] directing private
respondents to comment on petitioner's motion and to show cause why they should not be cited for
contempt. The sheriffs return [15] confirmed that the order was served upon Mr. Swift through the
senior guest services officer of the New World Hotel, Makati City, and personally upon Atty. Domingo
at his office.
In the meantime, the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc.,
(MABINI) filed in SP Proc. No. 10279 a petition for leave to intervene as amicus curiae and pro se ex
abundanti cautela. [16] It noted the hostile, if not indifferent, attitude the Philippine government
continued to display towards its citizens whose human rights were violated; and just when the victims
had been vindicated by the ruling of the U.S. Court District of Hawaii, it was the Philippine
government which would serve as an obstruction to their attainment of justice by suppressing their
freedom to express the ordeal they had suffered. MABINI underscored that the taking of the
depositions was a compassionate remedy granted to the Filipino victims, who were spared the burden
of testifying in a foreign court.
Likewise, the Samahan ng Mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at Para sa Amnestiya
(SELDA), a human rights non-government organization, filed its special appearance with motion to
dissolve the temporary restraining order and to deny writ of preliminary injunction. [17]
In his Opposition [18] Atty. Domingo asserted that the real motive of petitioner was to prevent
the human rights victims from recovering what was due them and that it forgot or conveniently chose
not to remember that in February 1987, it asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to
allow the human rights suits against Marcos to proceed to trial. He also contended that the motion for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was grossly insufficient both in form and substance, since
it was not verified and was deficient and baseless.; and that petitioners reliance on Section 1, Rule 73
of the Rules of Court is misplaced. The words exclusive jurisdiction found therein should be limited to
proceedings concerning the probate of the will and settlement of the estate of the decedent and should
not include other litigation for or against the estate. He argued that MDL No. 840 is an action for
recovery of damages arising out of the late President's tortuous violation of international law. The
action is totally unrelated to the probate proceedings. He reasoned that the probate court is of limited
jurisdiction and that it can only exercise jurisdiction over the property of the estate in the Philippines.
Moreover, the probate court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the special masters, since they were
never properly summoned.
Anent petitioners motion to cite them in contempt of court, Atty. Domingo alleged that said
motion, which was litigious in nature, was a useless scrap of paper for lack of the three-day notice for
hearing. Besides, the temporary restraining order could not be directed to him because he was neither
a special master nor a representative thereof. He was a lawyer for the human rights claimants.
In his pleading [19] Mr. Swift joined Atty. Domingo in the latters opposition and further alleged
that the petition for preliminary injunction became moot and academic, as the special masters
voluntarily left the country on 26 October 1994, without having been served a copy of the temporary
restraining order. He also raised the settled principle of comity, which required the probate court to

avoid interference in the conduct of judicial proceedings in a foreign country; warned that petitioner
was courting danger in encouraging the probate court to collaterally attack the jurisdiction of the U.S.
District Court of Hawaii in violation of said principle; and claimed that the temporary restraining
order could not be directed to him, since he was neither a special master nor a representative thereof
but a counsel of the human rights victims.
On 2 November 1994, public respondent Judge Villarama issued the assailed Order [20] lifting
the 25 October 1995 Temporary Restraining Order and denying the motion for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction on the ground that petitioner has failed to show by convincing proof the
existence of a clear and positive right which should be protected. The said order also denied, on equity
considerations, the motion to cite private respondents in contempt of court.
Petitioner no longer sought a reconsideration of the Order for the following reasons: (a) such
motion would serve no useful purpose because it would raise the same points stated in the rejected
motions; (b) the error committed by respondent Judge was grave and patent as to make the questioned
order void; (c) the relief sought in this petition is extremely urgent because the Special Masters or the
persons acting in their stead were taking the depositions in furtherance and in implementation of the
foreign courts directive; and (d) the issue raised is purely a question of law. [21]
Instead, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in failing to consider that the issuance and implementation of the reference
order of the Hawaii court violated the sovereignty of the Philippines and impinged on the exclusive
jurisdiction of the probate court.
In support thereof, petitioner invokes Section 1 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, which provides
in part as follows:
SEC. 1. Where estate of deceased person settled. xxx The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of the decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
It raises a contradiction in public respondent Judge Villaramas actuation in that in his Order of 9
September 1994 he declared that the U.S. District Court of Hawaii could not assert its jurisdiction
over the assets of the estate and exclude the jurisdiction vested in the probate court. Said respondent
was aware that the purpose of the reference order was to determine the amount of compensatory
damages to be charged against the estate; however, he chose to ignore that it is the probate court which
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the estate. He cannot, therefore, claim that petitioner failed to
prove a clear and positive right which should be protected.
Anent the issue of contempt, petitioner argues that the following documentary evidence
presented before the probate court proved that Messrs. Swift and Domingo and other concerned
persons defied the probate court's temporary restraining order: (1) Special Master Order No. 4 issued
by the Supervising Special Master, which confirmed notice of the probate court's temporary
restraining order; and (2) letters [22] of Mr. Swift to Mr. James Linn, American counsel of Mrs.
Marcos (a) indicating that the plaintiffs in MDL No. 840 would proceed with the taking of the
depositions on 27 October 1994 at the office of Atty. Domingo and the New World Hotel, (b) giving
notice that he would take the depositions of some class members on 28 October 1994, and (c)
notifying the continuation of his taking of the depositions on 29 October 1994. These notwithstanding,
respondent Judge denied petitioner's motion to cite Messrs. Swift and Domingo and other concerned
persons in contempt of court due to equity considerations. The denial was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

In his comment filed on his behalf and as counsel for the other private respondents, Atty.
Domingo argues that the petition is moot and academic and without merit. The act primarily sought to
be restrained, which was the taking of the depositions, was accomplished as of 27 November 1994;
and the transcripts had been submitted to the U.S. District Court of Hawaii. Furthermore, the probate
court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate matters which had no reference or bearing to the probate, such
as MDL No. 840. Besides, there was no law which prohibited the taking of depositions in the
Philippines for evidentiary use in a pending case abroad. The estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos even
financed the taking of the depositions.Lastly, Atty. Domingo reiterated that he could not be cited for
contempt for not having been served a copy of the temporary restraining order.
Mrs. Marcos subsequently filed a motion for leave to intervene and to admit its petition in
intervention, citing that petitioner failed to defend the interest of the estate of her late husband. She
claims that the proceeding undertaken by the special masters by virtue of the reference order was a
continuation of the trial of MDL No. 840, considering that (1) a reference is the trial and determination
of questions arising in litigation by a person appointed for that purpose by the court wherein the case
is pending; [23] (2) a special master is an officer of the appointing court; and (3) the applicable law
pertaining to a reference and a master is Section 53 of the U.S. Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts. Public respondent Judge then erred in considering the proceeding as one for
deposition as a mode of discovery. Accordingly, in denying the petition for injunction he abdicated the
jurisdiction of the probate court in favor of the U.S. District Court of Hawaii; he even made a turnabout since earlier, in his 9 September 1994 Order, he ruled that the Hawaii Court could not assert
jurisdiction over the Marcos assets.
In a Comment submitted on 5 September 1995 in compliance with our resolution, petitioner
offered no objection to the intervention of Mrs. Marcos.
On 4 December 1995, we required the parties to submit their respective memoranda on why this
petition should not be dismissed for having become moot and academic considering that the taking of
the depositions by the special masters appointed pursuant to the Reference Order issued by the District
Court of Hawaii had been completed on 27 November 1994.
Petitioner filed its Memorandum urging us to decide this case on the merits even if the act to be
enjoined had already been consummated in view of the transcendental importance of the issues
involved: sovereignty of the Philippines and the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court of the
Philippines. There is a compelling need to seek an incisive ruling from the highest tribunal of the land
to uphold the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court and to protect this nations sovereignty from
foreign transgressions and preserve the same as supreme and inviolable. To buttress its plea, it cites
Salonga v. Cruz Pano [24] where we resolved the case on its merits even if the issue raised had
become moot and academic.
Private respondents in their memorandum, reiterate that the petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction lacked the verification required under Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
They likewise submit that aside from the undisputed fact that the act sought to be enjoined had already
been completed, the judgment in MDL No. 840 became final on 27 January 1995 and that the estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos was adjudged to pay close to US$2 billion in damages.
We dismiss the petition not only on the ground of mootness which, generally, would justify
dismissal. [25] We dismiss it also for lack of merit.
It is settled that where the ground invoked in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is abuse of discretion --as in this case -- the abuse must be grave as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; or, it
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [26] This remedy then is
extraordinary, and its use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases. [27]

The pleadings of the parties in this case and the record of SP. Proc. No. 10279 fail to show that
respondent Judge Villarama had, as charged by petitioner, committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction against the special masters.
In the first place, the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction was not verified. Section 4 of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is very explicit in its requirement that a preliminary injunction may be
granted only when the complaint is verified. Absence of verification makes an application or petition
for preliminary injunction patently insufficient both in form and substance. [28]
In the second place, even if we disregard the requirement of verification or consider the adverse
parties in estoppel from raising the issue when they allowed the petitioner to present evidence on the
petition, we find that respondent Judge Villarama committed no error in holding that petitioner failed
to prove that it had a clear and positive right to be protected.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction:
(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the nonperformance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending
to render the judgment ineffectual.
Under this rule, a clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown.
Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue
to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise
to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. [29]
We fail to comprehend what clear and positive right petitioner has which may be violated by the
issuance and implementation of the Reference Order by the District Court of Hawaii. Petitioner seeks
to establish such a right by claiming that since the probate court was the first to take cognizance of the
settlement of the Marcos estate then pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, it
exercises jurisdiction thereon to the exclusion of all other courts; and that, accordingly, the District
Court of Hawaii cannot assert jurisdiction over the assets of said estate. The argument is like a loose
cannon ball way off its target.
For one, petitioner is unable to distinguish between the exclusive right on jurisdiction of the
probate court and the right contemplated by the law on injunction. For another, Section 1 of Rule 73
refers to courts in the Philippines and simply means that once a special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of a decedent is filed in one of such courts, that court has exclusive jurisdiction over said
estate and no other special proceedings involving the same subject matter may be filed before any
other court. Since foreign courts are not contemplated in Section 1, in no way then can it be validly
maintained that the District Court of Hawaii has encroached upon, or impinged on, the jurisdiction of
the probate court by the issuance of the Reference Order. The Reference Order cannot be construed as
concerning or affecting the Marcos estate within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. The
duties of the special masters as defined in the Reference Order were to prepare written findings for
submission to the jury regarding (a) whether the victims identified in the claim forms suffered torture,
summary execution or disappearance, and (b) the extent of the damages sustained. No extravagant
imagination can lead us to a conclusion that such duties do not involve any issue cognizable by the
probate court.

Neither is there merit to the claim that the issuance and implementation of the Reference Order
violated the sovereignty of the Philippines.
It is noteworthy that petitioner was aware of the pendency of MDL No. 840 of the District Court
of Hawaii. In fact, it did not oppose the action; on the contrary, it urged the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth District to allow the trial of the human rights litigation against the former strongman.
Petitioner even exhorted the human rights victims to pursue the justice which has eluded them for
many years. In its Amicus Curiae Brief [30] filed before the U.S. District Court of Hawaii, petitioner
declared:
The government of the Republic of the Philippines support of their claims. Because the international
law principles are clear and agreed upon by all nations, this judicial action does not have the capacity
of disrupting foreign relations between the concerned countries. The Government of the Republic of
the Philippines can state without hesitation or reservation that its foreign relations with the United
States will not be adversely affected if these human rights claims against Ferdinand Marcos are heard
in U.S. courts; and, in fact, relations may well be improved if Filipino citizens see that justice is
available in U.S. courts. The Philippine Government has previously expressed its deep concern to the
U.S. Government about the need for a just solution to the present suits against ex-President Marcos.
See Opinion No. 34, s. 1986, Ministry of Justice, Republic of the Philippines, dated April 23, 1986,
attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Philippine Government now respectfully requests this Honorable
Court to allow the present suits to proceed to trial.
As regards the denial of the motion to cite Messrs. Swift and Domingo in contempt of court, we
rule that the same was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It must be recalled that they were not
served a copy of the temporary restraining order which they allegedly defied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Order of 2 November 1992 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban JJ., concur.
4. Musa v. Moson, G.R. 95574, Aug. 16, 1991
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 95574 August 16, 1991
HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA and BASSER MUSA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a
District, Cotabato City and HADJI JAHARA ABDURAHIM, respondents.
Randolph C. Parcasio for petitioners.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p
Questions of jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, and of venue, in an intestate proceeding are
herein raised.
Involved is the intestate estate of the late Jamiri Musa, a Muslim, who passed away on 31 December
1987. He had six (6) wives, three (3) of whom he later divorced, and twenty three (23) children. He
had extensive real and personal properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao, Davao del Sur

and Davao Oriental. Petitioners, Hadji WAHIDA Musa and Hadji SALMA Musa, are among those he
divorced, while private respondent Hadji Jalai a ABDURAHIM is one of the three (3) surviving
widows, RIZAL Musa and BASSER Musa are two (2) of his sons.
On 7 July 1989, Respondent ABDURAHIM filed a "Joint Petition for the Administration and
Settlement of the Inestate Estate of the Late Jamiri Musa and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership,"
before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Sharia's District, with station at Cotabato City (SDC Spec.
Proceedings No. 89-19) (the Intestate Case). That Court embraces the province of Maguindanao
within its jurisdiction but not the provinces of Davao del Sur and Oriental.
The Petition averred that the decedent Jamiri Musa a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, left
various properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao (184 hectares), Davao del Sur (61
hectares), and Davao Oriental (207 hectares). Aside from the settlement of the vast estate, also prayed
for was the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets of the decedent and ABDURAHIM and the
segregation and turn-over to the latter of her one-half (1/2) share.
Appearing as oppositors were: Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA, the divorced wives, who also claim
to be widows of the deceased: RIZAL, Putih Musa, and Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA with the
decedent; and BASSER, another son. They alleged that venues was improperly said and that the
properties of the decedent located outside Aguinaldo were beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a
District. Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
Finding the Joint Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Respondent Judge issued the Order of
Publication on 1 July 1989 and initially set the case for hearing on 18 September 1989.
All interested parties were duly represented during the hearing on said date where petitioners, through
counsel, manifested their desire to have the case amicably settled, Respondent Judo "in the interest of
peace and harmony among the heirs of the deceased Jamiri Musa," appointed the following as Special
Administrators: ABDURAHIM, for all properties situated in Maguindanao; RIZAL. for all properties
situated in Davao Oriental; and BASSER. for all properties situated in Davao del Sul.
However, on 4 October 1989, ABDURAHIM, in her manifestation and Motion to Cite for Contempt,"
accused BASSER, among others, of having allegedly fired upon the house of her son in-law in
Maguindanao on 21 September 1989.
Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an "Opposition to Petition for Administration and Liquidation of
Conjugal Partnership" was filed by Petitioners, alleging that ABDURAHIM was never legally married
to the decedent and, as such, there was "nothing to support her claim" of having had a conjugal
partnership with the latter; and that venue was improperly laid. Petitioners also asked that RIZAL be
issued Letters of Administration instead.
In her Reply, filed on 25 October 1989, ABDURAHIM averred that, her marriage to the decedent was
admitted by the latter in various Deeds of Sale he had signed, which were presented as documentary
evidence. Since there was no amicable settlement reached, hearings on the Joint Petition were
conducted, commencing on 27 December 1989.
On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge, issued an Order appointing ABDURAHIM as Regular
Administratrix upon the finding that she was legally married to the decedent. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration.
In the interim, Respondent Judge issued an Amended Order, dated 4 June 1990, incorporating the
testimonies of the two (2) other witnesses presented by Petitioners, which were omitted in the Order,
dated 16 May 1990. Otherwise, the appointment of ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix was
maintained.
On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Motion to Dismiss," raising
once again, mainly the questions of venue and of jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the real
properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental.
Respondent Judge denied both Motions and upheld the Court's jurisdiction in his Order, dated 22
August 1990. Hence, the elevation of the instant Petition for Prohibition before this Court seeking to
enjoin respondent Judge Corocoy D. Moson, presiding over the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a
District, from further taking action on the "Joint Petition ."

Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have dismissed the Intestate Case for lack
of jurisdiction and for improper venue. Private respondent maintains the contrary.
We rule against Petitioners.
Pres. Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,
explicitly provides that exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters of settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims, belong to Shari'a District Courts. Thus:
Art. 143. Original Jurisdiction.The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims,
probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors
regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property. (Chapter 1, Title I, Book IV, par. (b),
(Emphasis supplied).
Since the disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim is, in fact,
involved herein, the Joint Petition was correctly filed before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a
District.
In invoking improper venue, however, petitioners call attention to the Rules of Court mandating that:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73). (Emphasis supplied).
It is then claimed that since the residence of the decedent at the time of his death was actually in
Davao City, not Maguindanao, as averred by ABDUHARIM, the proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction
of the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, and that venue is more properly laid in Davao City
before the Regional Trial Court since there are no Shari'a District Courts therein.
At this juncture, it should be recalled that the residence of the deceased in an estate proceeding is not
an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. The law of jurisdiction confers
upon Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased (In the matter of the intestate estate of Kaw
Singco, 74 Phil. 239 [1943]).
To all appearances, the decedent was a resident of both Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, and Davao City. In
fact, in various Deeds of Sale presented as evidence by the parties, the decedent alternately stated his
place of residence as either Linao, Upi,Maguindanao which is the residence of ABDURAHIM, or
Davao City, where Petitioners reside. As this Court held in Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954),
"a man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence." Venue, therefore, ordinarily could be at either place of the decedent's
residence, i.e., Maguindanao or Davao City, but for the provisions of the Muslim Code vesting
exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters of disposition and settlement of estates of deceased Muslims,
in Shari'a District Courts (supra).
But petitioners also contend that the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, presided over by
respondent Judge, has no territorial jurisdiction over properties of the decedent situated in the
provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental, citing as statutory authority therefor the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, which provides:
Art. 138. Shari'a judicial districts.Five special judicial districts, each to have one Shari'a District
Court presided over by one judge, are constituted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

(e) The Fifth Shari'a District, the Provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and
the City of Cotabato.
Indeed, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental are not comprised within the Fifth Shari'a District. In fact,
those provinces are outside the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao created by Republic Act No.
6734, its Organic Act. But as stated in that law, "the Shari'a District Court and the Shari'a Circuit
Courts created under existing laws shall continue to function as provided therein." (Art. IX, Sec. 13).
Additionally, the same Organic Act explicitly provides;
(4) Except in cases of successional rights, the regular courts shall acquire jurisdiction over
controversies involving real property outside the area of autonomy. (Art. IX, Section 17[4]).
(Emphasis supplied)
Since the subject intestate proceeding concerns successional rights, coupled with the fact that the
decedent was also a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, owning real estate property located in that
province, venue has been properly laid with the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, winch is
vested with territorial jurisdiction over Maguindanao, notwithstanding the location in different
provinces of the other real proper- ties of the decedent.
A contrary ruling would only result in multiplicity of suits, to the detriment of the expeditious
settlement of estate proceedings (See Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, 30 June 1988,163 SCRA 237 [1988]).
Besides, the judgment that may be rendered by the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, may be
executed in other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated.
When an action covers various parcels of land situated in different provinces, venue may be laid in the
Court of First Instance of any of said provinces, and the judgment rendered therein may be executed in
other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated (National Bank v. Barreto, 52 Phil. 818
[1929]; Monte Piedad v. Rodrigo, 56 Phil. 310 [1931]; El Hogar Filipino v. Seva ,57 Phil. 573 [L1932]; Bank of P.I. v. Green, 57 Phil. 712 [1932]).
The Rules of Court likewise provide that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Courts(Rule 73, sec. 1).
There should be no impediment to the application of said Rules as they apply suppletorily to the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws, there being nothing inconsistent with the provisions of the latter statute
(Article 187 of said Code).
And while Rule 73 provides that "the jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place
of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record," we have taken cognizance of this Petition for Prohibition considering that the
jurisdiction of a Shari'a District Court, a relatively new Court in our judicial system, has been
challenged.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Prohibition is DENIED, and the case hereby REMANDED to the
Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, for continuation of the intestate proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
5. Fule v. CA, G.R. No. L-40502, Nov. 29, 1976
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be
reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba,
presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same
time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973,
Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the
order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no
notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the
estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular
administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment
of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa
B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of
Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed
on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the
jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment
was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G.
Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix
and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G.
Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31,
1973, in theBayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of
Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original
petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he
was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence
was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as
legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir
in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly
renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4)
that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental
petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer
jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the
beginning because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for
letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in
the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take
possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure
cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B.
Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of
the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up
the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia
only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2,
1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition
of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over
the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly
laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased
Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule
as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that
she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the
deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special
administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been
determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting
outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor
Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper
venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and
the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar
ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the
Rules of Court, 1subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of
the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already
been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers
and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates
of title in her name without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear.
Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been
resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the
appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G.
Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the
decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be
appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the
foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special
administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her
motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B.
Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise
prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the
power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets
of the estate.

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of
November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues
raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d)
appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special
administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three
questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the
statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding
amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor
vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the
court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with
the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2
Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the
time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate
of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City.
Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of
his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of
Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for
certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that
court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying
their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to
the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge
Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of
jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the
matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B.
Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same
intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and
appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia
qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of
Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment
of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her
willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become
final, it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until
Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of
Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition
for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and
Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and
calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective
briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order
granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the
payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with
temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge
Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the
reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters
of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor
should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should
allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence,
and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who
seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the
intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the
state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to
grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a
matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons.
Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject
matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural
matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority
of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began."
That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in
which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the
power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court
attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss
of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction
over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential
to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain
words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all
probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of

numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the
venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased
in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this
reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the
term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather thandomicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.10 No particular length of time of residence
is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration
before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on
April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of
Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no
domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba,
Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary,
Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule
herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia
G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also
by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three
months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971
turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring
part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and
certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado
G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that
the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court
of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper

venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper
venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court
of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative
remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing
the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another
issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse.
Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased
until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13
Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the allowance or
disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment
and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. 14Nevertheless, the
discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no
authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and
legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the
choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of a special
administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the
consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the
estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion
of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such
reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than
any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than
the naked ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G.
Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation
whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of
any successional rights.19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the
appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20
the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who
is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to
be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a
Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of
Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate
of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of
Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse.
23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this
Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the

instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of
justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special
administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of
Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the
records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her
as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby
upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Muoz Palma, J., took no part.
6. Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189121
July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON,
Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las
Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo),
filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The petition was
opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia
was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes
Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Las Pias City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To
prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it
was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth

P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value,
Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedents estate
should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to
Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was
properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the decedent
Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision10
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the
Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband
and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las
Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the
decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the
following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON
WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIAQUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING
MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT
SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province
in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. 14 Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and
that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos Death
Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While
the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents residence at the time of his
death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985,
Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to
the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable
petitioners position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children.
It disproves rather than supports petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose from an
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias
marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place,
thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms,
allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to
therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced
by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of
her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity
thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of
action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the
death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia
and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the
Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in
Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish
the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be
found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in
the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown any
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to
the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30)
days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person
as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must
be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the
decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled
to share in the estate as distributees.28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in
the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the
estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the
law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in
the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as
an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
7. San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 &134029, Feb. 6, 2007
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133743
February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029
February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and
January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc.
No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was
the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to
Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was
residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents
surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at
P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed
that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
dismissal 10of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two
motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12
thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of
his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid
down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of
the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on
the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14,
24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also
ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and
did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the

Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos
legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the
records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil
v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly
dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of
E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view sweeping statement
of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our
state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that
the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce
having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x
have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased
and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute
the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35
Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for
letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can
only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it
was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph
2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence,
she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at
the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say,
there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of
fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in
another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5,
1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent
by the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards 49 stating
that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa
was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien

spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule
in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the
properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards
of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court
of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
marriedto private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Codecannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country
if the ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper
party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of
one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise,
Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the
Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article
26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends
of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to
render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to
apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are

apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law
in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was
the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find
that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir,
or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct,
and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint
labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 InSaguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Coownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership
of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x
xx
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or
the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponents defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to
dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
8. Jao v. CA, G.R. No. 128314, May 29, 2002
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128314
May 29, 2002
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who
died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and
other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that
he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually
dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real
properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased
parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. 2 He argued that the
deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their

deaths. The decedents actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to
run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in
Rodolfos residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining
medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously executed
by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voters affidavits, statements of assets and
liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their
permanent residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.1wphi1.nt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfos house in
Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death
certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.4
Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea,
and affixed his own signature on the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents residence on
the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as
reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same
way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to Pericos residence at Legaspi
Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive
evidence of the decedents residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise.5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position. 6 Both failed to
comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived.7
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.8 After the parties submitted the
names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special
administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and 1989,
respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence of the decedents.
Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant,
Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own
representation by taking an inconsistent position other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit movants
motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.10
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo having been
shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge
is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed resolution
dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE
DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY
INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.
III

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT

THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS RESIDENCE RATHER THAN
THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN
ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO A
DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF
RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE
ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF PETITIONER
AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF THE
DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN
ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST
PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF
THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES
CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE
THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING
TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.13
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where
the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before
their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration
granted in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that
the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent residence
or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors
must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b)
physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.15 While it
appears that the decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical
convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent
residence.1wphi1.nt
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres
Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in
Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to

purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a
house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that
Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be
said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon
City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioners Quezon
City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondents assertion that their elderly parents
stayed in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that they were both residents of Quezon
City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mothers
death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized
his deceased mothers residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in
Ignacios death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly considered
and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate courts observation that
since the death certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over
their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents
death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residence at the time of death, over the
numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by
petitioner pertained not toresidence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to
permanent residence or domicile. InGarcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed.
In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.17
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been living with
petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be
substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that,
contrary to petitioners assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents physical presence
in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents stay therein was more than
temporary. In the absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts factual findings stemmed
from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held to be conclusive
and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2,18 on
ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings. He
argues that while venue in the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the
purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule
73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent
residence or domicile because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and where
most of the decedents properties are located.

Petitioners argument fails to persuade.

It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in the place where he
permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a persons properties can be found mostly in the
place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different from
that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No
generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individuals choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary
civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court
of Appeals,20 we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one
and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that
venue for the settlement of the decedents intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
9. Palaganas v. Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, Jan. 26, 2011
SECOND DIVISION
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 169144
PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL
OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH
PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS,
Petitioners, Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* JJ.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS,
Respondent. Promulgated:
January 26, 2011
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner
although it has not been probated in its place of execution.

The Facts and the Case

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United
States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in
California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she
had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for
his appointment as special administrator of her estate.[1] On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners
Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of
Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the
Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming
Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed
under duress and without the testators full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto,
they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.

Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate
occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave
to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit
their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed
by a court in the Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:[2] (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based
executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA),[3] arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot
be probated for the first time in thePhilippines.

On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,[4] affirming the assailed order of the RTC,[5] holding
that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernestos submission of
the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The
CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and
allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The
present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and
allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision,
Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.
The Issue Presented
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be
probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country
where it was executed.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be
probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here. This, they claim,
ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that
local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been
admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its

laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in
that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the
valid execution of a will.

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same
have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be
given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who
is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.[6]

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the
decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may
take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the
executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any
time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the
petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to
the court, the name of the person having custody of it.Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of
the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.[7] The rules do not
require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.

In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California,
petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will
before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a

foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a
competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to
petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply
to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign
probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to
go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since
our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved
and allowed by the proper court.[8]

Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the court
can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will and that, in the meantime, it was
designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of
the due execution of the will, i.e. the testators state of mind at the time of the execution and
compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws ofCalifornia. This explains the trial
courts directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas will and the certified
copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CAG.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.

SO ORDERED.
Sec. 2
1. Agtarap v. Agtarap, G.R. Nos. 177099 & 177192, June 8, 2011
SECOND DIVISION

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 177099

- versus SEBASTIAN
AGTARAP,
JOSEPHAGTARAP,
TERESA
AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and
ABELARDO DAGORO,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 177192

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH

AGTARAP,
TERESA
AGTARAP, Promulgated:
WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO
June 8, 2011
DAGORO,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of petitioners Sebastian G. Agtarap
(Sebastian)[1] and Eduardo G. Agtarap (Eduardo),[2] assailing the Decision dated November 21,
2006[3] and the Resolution dated March 27, 2007[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 73916.
The antecedent facts and proceedings
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City, a
verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap
(Joaquin). It was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 94-4055.
The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without
any known debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with
Lucia Garcia (Lucia),[5] and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924.
Joaquin and Lucia had three childrenJesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three
children, namely, Gloria,[6] Joseph, and Teresa[7]). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926.
They also had three childrenEduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At
the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City, covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of
Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been appropriating for himself
P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the
appointment of a regular administrator. In addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming
and declaring the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled to participate in the
estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto the named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in
accordance with law; and (c) entitling the distributees the right to receive and enter into possession
those parts of the estate individually awarded to them.

On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for initial hearing and
directing Eduardo to cause its publication.
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting the allegations in
the petition, and conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots
belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucias death in April 1924,
they became the pro indivisoowners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built
with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house
were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manongs Restaurant) was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the appointment of Eduardo as
administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his
interest in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed that the
best interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or regular administrator.
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular
administrator of Joaquins estate. Consequently, it issued him letters of administration.
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in intervention, alleging that
Mercedes is survived not only by her daughter Cecile, but also by him as her husband. He also averred
that there is a need to appoint a special administrator to the estate, but claimed that Eduardo is not the
person best qualified for the task.
After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit their respective
proposed projects of partition, the RTC, on October 23, 2000, issued an Order of Partition,[8] with
the following disposition
In the light of the filing by the heirs of their respective proposed projects of
partition and the payment of inheritance taxes due the estate as early as 1965, and
there being no claim in Court against the estate of the deceased, the estate of
JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now consequently ripe for distribution among the heirs
minus the surviving spouse Caridad Garcia who died on August 25, 1999.
Considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during the
existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No.
(38255) which showed on its face that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia,

which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other than their negative
allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second
marriage and the compulsory heirs thereunder.
The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just accounting of
his administration from his date of assumption up to the year ending December 31,
1996 per Financial and Accounting Report dated June 2, 1997 which was approved
by the Court.The accounting report included the income earned and received for the
period and the expenses incurred in the administration, sustenance and allowance of
the widow. In accordance with said Financial and Accounting Report which was duly
approved by this Court in its Resolution dated July 28, 1998 the deceased JOAQUIN
AGTARAP left real properties consisting of the following:
I LAND:
Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located at #3030 Agtarap St., Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 38254 and 38255 and registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, Metro Manila, described as follows:
TCT NO. LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M. ZONAL VALUE AMOUNT
38254 745-B-1 1,335 sq. m. P5,000.00 P6,675,000.00
38255 745-B-2 1,331 sq. m. P5,000.00 P6,655,000.00
TOTAL-------------------------------------------------------------P13,330,000.00
II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:
BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) ------------------------------ P350,000.00
BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) ----------------------------- 320,000.00
Building Improvements -------------------------------------- 97,500.00
Restaurant ------------------------------------------------------ 80,000.00
TOTAL --------------------------------------------------------- P847,500.00
TOTAL NET WORTH ----------------------------------------- P14,177,500.00
WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a
total value of P14,177,500.00, together with whatever interest from bank deposits
and all other incomes or increments thereof accruing after the Accounting Report of
December 31, 1996, after deducting therefrom the compensation of the administrator
and other expenses allowed by the Court, are hereby ordered distributed as follows:
TOTAL ESTATE P14,177,500.00
CARIDAD AGTARAP of the estate as her conjugal share P7,088,750.00, the other
half of P7,088,750.00 to be divided among the compulsory heirs as follows:
1) JOSE (deceased) - P1,181,548.30
2) MILAGROS (deceased) - P1,181,548.30
3) MERCEDES (deceased) - P1,181,548.30
4) SEBASTIAN - P1,181,548.30
5) EDUARDO - P1,181,548.30
6) CARIDAD - P1,181,548.30

The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the amount of P1,181,548.30

and who died in 1996 will go to Teresa Agtarap and Joseph Agtarap, Walter de
Santos and half brothers Eduardo and Sebastian Agtarap in equal proportions.
TERESA AGTARAP - P236,291.66
JOSEPH AGTARAP - P236,291.66
WALTER DE SANTOS - P236,291.66
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - P236,291.66
EDUARDO AGTARAP - P236,291.66
Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows:
COMPULSORY HEIRS:
1) GLORIA (deceased) represented by Walter de Santos
- P295,364.57
2) JOSEPH AGTARAP - P295,364.57
3) TERESA AGTARAP - P295,364.57
4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP - P295,364.57
Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit P295,364.57.
Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of the first marriage
stand to receive the total amount of:
HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:
1) JOSEPH AGTARAP - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap
P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
2) TERESA AGTARAP - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap
P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
3) WALTER DE SANTOS - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap
P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:
a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999
P7,088,750.00 - as conjugal share
P1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir
Total of P8,270,208.30
b) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
c) EDUARDO AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros

d) MERCEDES - as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as the

surviving spouse of a compulsory heir
P1,181,458.38
REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP:
1)
2)

SEBASTIAN AGTARAP
EDUARDO AGTARAP
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap)

In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to inherit:

SEBASTIAN P4,135,104.10 share from Caridad Garcia
P1,181,458.30 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
P5,522,854.06
EDUARDO P4,135,104.10 share from Caridad Garcia
P1,181,458.30 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
P5,522,854.06
SO ORDERED.[9]
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective motions for
reconsideration.
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution[10]

denying the motions for

reconsideration of Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting that of Joseph and Teresa. It also declared that
the real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed
the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs.
However, before the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed
to the CA.
On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated August 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED and
pursuant thereto, the subject properties (Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT No. 38254] and Lot
No. 745-B-2 [TCT No. 38255]) and the estate of the late Joaquin Agtarap are hereby
partitioned as follows:
The two (2) properties, together with their improvements, embraced by TCT
No. 38254 and TCT No. 38255, respectively, are first to be distributed among the
following:

Lucia Mendietta - of the property. But since she is deceased, her share shall
be inherited by Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros
and Jose in equal shares.
Joaquin Agtarap - of the property and of the other half of the property which
pertains to Lucia Mendiettas share.
Jesus Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since he is already deceased
(and died without issue), his inheritance
shall, in turn, be acquired by Joaquin
Agtarap.
Milagros Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since she died in 1996
without issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall
be inherited by Gloria (represented by her
husband Walter de Santos and her
daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and
Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of
Milagros brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8
each shall be inherited by Mercedes
(represented by her husband Abelardo
Dagoro and her daughter Cecile),
Sebastian Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since he died in 1967, his
inheritance shall be acquired by his wife
Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented
by her husband Walter de Santos and her
daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and
Teresa in equal shares.
Then, Joaquin Agtaraps estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4) of the subject
properties and its improvements, shall be distributed as follows:
Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1999, her share shall
be inherited by her children namely
Mercedes Agtarap (represented by her
husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
daughter Cecilia), Sebastian Agtarap and
Eduardo Agtarap in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1996 without
issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be
inherited by Gloria (represented by her
husband Walter de Santos and her
daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and
Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of
Milagros brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8
each shall be inherited by Mercedes
(represented by her husband Abelardo

Dagoro and her daughter Cecile),

Sebastian and Eduardo, all surnamed
Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance
shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and
children Gloria (represented by her
husband Walter de Santos and her
daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and
Teresa Agtarap in equal shares.
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1984, her
inheritance shall be acquired by her
husband Abelardo Dagoro and her
daughter Cecile in equal shares.
Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both motions. Hence, these petitions
ascribing to the appellate court the following errors:
G.R. No. 177192
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the aforementioned
important facts[12] which alter its Decision;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the necessity of hearing the
issue of legitimacy of respondents as heirs;
3. The Court of Appeals erred in allowing violation of the law and in not
applying the doctrines of collateral attack, estoppel, and res judicata.[13]
G.R. No. 177099
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP
AND ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING HER INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF
JOAQUIN AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF HER LAST
WILL AND TESTAMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
PRECEDENCE
OF
TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS
OVER
INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

DECISION APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED
RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THELOWER COURT
HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254
AND TCT (NO.) 38255 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF
PASAY BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN
AGTARAP MARRIED TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA NOTWITHSTANDING
THEIR REGISTRATION UNDER THEIR EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
AS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP, CASADO
CONCARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE
PROBATE COURT HAS NO POWER TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF
THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH
SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR A
TORRENS
TITLE
UNDER
THE
LAW IS
ENDOWED
WITH
INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE MANNER
INDICATED IN THE LAW ITSELF.[14]

As regards his first and second assignments of error, Sebastian contends that Joseph and
Teresa failed to establish by competent evidence that they are the legitimate heirs of their father Jose,
and thus of their grandfather Joaquin.He draws attention to the certificate of title (TCT No. 8026) they
submitted, stating that the wife of their father Jose is Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their
mother is Priscilla. He avers that the marriage contracts proffered by Joseph and Teresa do not qualify
as the best evidence of Joses marriage with Priscilla, inasmuch as they were not authenticated and
formally offered in evidence. Sebastian also asseverates that he actually questioned the legitimacy of
Joseph and Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in his motion to exclude them as heirs, and in his reply to their
opposition to the said motion. He further claims that the failure of Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de
Santos to oppose his motion to exclude them as heirs had the effect of admitting the allegations
therein. He points out that his motion was denied by the RTC without a hearing.
With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains that the certificates of title of real
estate properties subject of the controversy are in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad
Garcia, and as such are conclusive proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they are not subject to
collateral attack, but should be threshed out in a separate proceeding for that purpose. He likewise
argues that estoppel applies against the children of the first marriage, since none of them registered
any objection to the issuance of the TCTs in the name of Caridad and Joaquin only. He avers that the
estate must have already been settled in light of the payment of the estate and inheritance tax by
Milagros, Joseph, and Teresa, resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in Milagros name and of TCT
No. 8026 in the names of Milagros and Jose. He also alleges that res judicata is applicable as the court

order directing the deletion of the name of Lucia, and replacing it with the name of Caridad, in the
TCTs had long become final and executory.
In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error, Eduardo alleges that the CA
erroneously settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus,
Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in contravention of the principle of settling only one estate in
one proceeding. He particularly questions the distribution of the estate of Milagros in the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate of the
will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from Joaquins
estate. He states that this violated the rule on precedence of testate over intestate proceedings.
Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that the CA gravely erred when it
affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to
Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap
casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia. According to him, the RTC, acting as an intestate court with
limited jurisdiction, was not vested with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership,
which properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.

The Courts Ruling

As to Sebastians and Eduardos common issue on the ownership of the subject real properties, we hold
that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during
the proceedings.[15] The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and
limited jurisdiction.[16] As held in several cases,[17] a probate court or one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the
said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in
the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses
no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort
to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to
the final determination of ownership in a separate action.[18] Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.[19] Verily, its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.[20]
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are
all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the
ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is
but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.

It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for judicial settlement
of Joaquins estate, he alleged that the subject properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad since the
TCTs state that the lots were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia. He
also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first
marriage with Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to present
proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were derived from a mother title, TCT No.
5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN
AGTARAP, el primero casado con Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia Garcia Mendietta
(FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia Muscat, and
the second married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta).[21] When TCT No. 5239 was divided between
Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral
Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368, consisting of 8,872
square meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577 (32184)[22] issued on April 23, 1937,
also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April 24, 1924, and
subsequently, on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is worthy to note that TCT No. 5577
(32184) contained an annotation, which reads
Ap-4966 NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de titulo, tal como aparece,
tanchando las palabras con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a y poniendo en su lugar, entre
lineas y en tinta encarnada, las palabras en segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia, en
complimiento de un orden de fecha 28 de abril de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de
la Costa, juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente cadastal
No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 1368; copia de cual orden has sido presentada con
el No. 4966 del Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No. 32184.
Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.[23]
Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa, presiding judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced by en
segundas nuptias con Caridad Garcia, referring to the second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad. It cannot
be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of Caridads name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon
her demise, already left, as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal share in TCT No. 32184. Lucias share in
the property covered by the said TCT was carried over to the properties covered by the certificates of

title derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255. And as found by both the RTC
and the CA, Lucia was survived by her compulsory heirs Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the
death of the husband or the wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse,
and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are conjugal
as it had to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In fact, should
Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should
be consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucias spouse.[24] Accordingly,
the CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to the properties covered by TCT Nos.
38254 and 38255 subject of this case, to her compulsory heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the claim of
Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively show that the owners of the
properties covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name of
Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves scant consideration. This cannot be
said to be a collateral attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of title is not
necessarily conclusive of a holders true ownership of property.[25] A certificate of title under the
Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument for the deprivation of
ownership.[26] Thus, the fact that the properties were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses
coverture.[27] The phrase married to Caridad Garcia in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil
status of Joaquin as the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the realties are their
conjugal properties.[28]
Neither can Sebastians claim that Joaquins estate could have already been settled in 1965 after the
payment of the inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the
estate of a deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. -- When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been
paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts,

to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of the debts of the
estate, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. The
records of these cases do not show that these were complied with in 1965.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa, suffice it to say that
both the RTC and the CA found them to be the legitimate children of Jose. The RTC found that
Sebastian did not present clear and convincing evidence to support his averments in his motion to
exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of
Joseph and Teresa being the children of Jose was never questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and the
latter two even admitted this in their petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts in the August 21,
1995 hearing.[29] Furthermore, the CA affirmed this finding of fact in its November 21, 2006
Decision.[30]
Also, Sebastians insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to the estate of
Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the RTC found that Gloria
Agtarap de Santos died on May 4, 1995, and was later substituted in the proceedings below by her
husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha de
Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for
leave of court to intervene, alleging that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the father
of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention. The RTC later granted the motion, thereby
admitting his answer on October 18, 1995.[31] The CA also noted that, during the hearing of the
motion to intervene on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not interpose any objection when
the intervention was submitted to the RTC for resolution.[32]
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling reason to hold that
both courts erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully
participated in the estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent evidence

to refute his and Eduardos admissions that Joseph and Teresa were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful
heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro.
Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the
right to participate in the estate in representation of the Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria and
Mercedes, respectively.[33]
This Court also differs from Eduardos asseveration that the CA erred in settling, together with
Joaquins estate, the respective estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria. A perusal of the
November 21, 2006 CA Decision would readily show that the disposition of the properties related
only to the settlement of the estate of Joaquin. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as
cited above, the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of
Joaquin, as well as their respective shares after the payment of the obligations of the estate, as
enumerated in the said provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria in the
distribution of the shares was merely a necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquins estate,
they being his legal heirs.
However, we agree with Eduardos position that the CA erred in distributing Joaquins estate pertinent
to the share allotted in favor of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding was
instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros before the RTC, Branch 108,
Pasay City.[34] While there has been no showing that the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of
her share from Joaquins estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been probated and approved, prudence
dictates that this Court refrain from distributing Milagros share in Joaquins estate.
It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15, 2010, per his Certificate of Death. [35]
He is survived by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap (Teresita) and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap
(Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November 21, 2006 Decision and the March 27,
2007 Resolution of the CA should be affirmed with modifications such that the share of Milagros shall
not yet be distributed until after the final determination of the probate of her purported will, and that
Sebastian shall be represented by his compulsory heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for lack of merit, while the petition in
G.R. No. 177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the Decision dated November 21, 2006 and
the Resolution dated March 27, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the following

MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded in favor of Milagros Agtarap shall not be distributed until
the final determination of the probate of her will, and that petitioner Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of
his demise on January 15, 2010, shall be represented by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his children
Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.
These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, for further
proceedings in the settlement of the estate of Joaquin Agtarap. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
2. Alipio v. CA, G.R. No. 134100, Sept. 29, 2000
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 134100. September 29, 2000]

PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his
Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the
collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be
filed in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent Romeo Jaring[1] was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco,
Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19,
1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and
Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was
P485,600.00, payable in two installments of P300,000.00 and P185,600.00, with the second
installment falling due on June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the contract.
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the sublessees only satisfied a
portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to
comply with their obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and
Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5,
Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract should the
defendants fail to pay the balance.

Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placido
Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.[2] She based her action on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964
Rules of Court which then provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules." This provision has been
amended so that now Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time
of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner was herself a party
to the sublease contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel
spouses and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.[3] The
Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason, they were declared in default.
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial, ordering petitioner and the
Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the
amount of P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in denying her
motion to dismiss. In its decision[4] rendered on July 10, 1997, the appellate court dismissed her
appeal. It held:
The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be dismissed when the
defendant dies before final judgment in the regional trial court, does not apply where there are other
defendants against whom the action should be maintained. This is the teaching ofClimaco v. Siy Uy,
wherein the Supreme Court held:
Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a cause of action against the
persons named as defendants therein. It was, however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages,
that is, a sum of money, and the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon
the death of the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court.
xxxxxxxxx
However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co was also named defendant in
the complaint. Obviously, therefore, the order appealed from is erroneous insofar as it dismissed the
case against Co. (Underlining added)
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were signatories to the contract of
sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the
parties to the contract has totally extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial Insurance, Inc. v.
David:
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled jurisprudence, when the obligation is a
solidary one, the creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum.
Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death, her liability is
independent of and separate from her husband's; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be
error to hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her husband should be made in the
decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97).[5]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4, 1998. [6] Hence this
petition based on the following assignment of errors:

A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING

CLIMACO v. SIY UY, 19 SCRA 858, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS NOT SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST
REMAINING DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIM FOR
PAYMENT AGAINST HER AND HER HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD BE
PROSECUTED AS A MONEY CLAIM.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING
IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. v. DAVID, 133 SCRA 317, WHICH IS NOT
APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE SPOUSES IN THIS CASE DID NOT BIND
THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT
JARING.[7]
The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent
in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal
partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the
decedent.
First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months before private
respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside
of the ambit of Rule 3, 21 which deals with dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the
defendant during the pendency of the case and the subsequent procedure to be undertaken by the
plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.As already
noted, Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to
continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein will then
be enforced in the manner especially provided in the Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of
a deceased person. The issue to be resolved is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file
this case against petitioner.
Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed the sublease contract
binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and
also that of the Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art.
161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and
those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.[8]
When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved[9] and
debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with
Rule 73, 2 which states:
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the
debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.If both spouses have
died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
As held in Calma v. Taedo,[10] after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the
collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought against the
surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and
settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the
powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed
by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings.[11] Indeed, the surviving
spouse is not even a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property

belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership property is
void.[12]
The ruling in Calma v. Taedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of Ventura v. Militante.[13] In
that case, the surviving wife was sued in an amended complaint for a sum of money based on an
obligation allegedly contracted by her and her late husband. The defendant, who had earlier moved to
dismiss the case, opposed the admission of the amended complaint on the ground that the death of her
husband terminated their conjugal partnership and that the plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable
against the partnership, should be made in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. The trial
court nevertheless admitted the complaint and ruled, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, that since
the defendant was also a party to the obligation, the death of her husband did not preclude the plaintiff
from filing an ordinary collection suit against her. On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of either spouse. .
. . Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness
chargeable against said conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper
action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses, there is no liquidation
of the conjugal partnership. This does not mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And
private respondent cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
Court, he may apply in court for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the
deceased . . . if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for administration or
request that administration be granted to some other person.[14]
The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling, namely, Climaco v. Siy
Uy[15] and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David,[16] are based on different sets of facts. In Climaco,
the defendants, Carlos Siy Uy and Manuel Co, were sued for damages for malicious prosecution.
Thus, apart from the fact the claim was not against any conjugal partnership, it was one which does
not survive the death of defendant Uy, which merely resulted in the dismissal of the case as to him but
not as to the remaining defendant Manuel Co.
With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and severally executed an
indemnity agreement which became the basis of a collection suit filed against the wife after her
husband had died. For this reason, the Court ruled that since the spouses' liability was solidary, the
surviving spouse could be independently sued in an ordinary action for the enforcement of the entire
obligation.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of gains, an
obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it
is the partnership which is primarily bound for its repayment.[17] Thus, when the spouses are sued
for the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity
as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors such that the concept of
joint or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary to be true,
the nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be discussed later, is not solidary but rather
merely joint, making Imperial still inapplicable to this case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the present suit against
petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of petitioner's husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either for
the issuance of letters of administration[18] or for the allowance of will,[19] depending on whether
petitioner's husband died intestate or testate. Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by
lumping his claim against the Alipios with those against the Manuels considering that, aside from
petitioner's lack of authority to represent their conjugal estate, the inventory of the Alipios' conjugal

property is necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power
exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's estate and not
to any other court.
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the
unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount of P50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount
is to be paid by them jointly or solidarily. In connection with this, Art. 1207 of the Civil Code
provides:
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the same obligation
does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is
bound to render, entire compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so estates, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary does not appear, an
obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are
debtors, each debt being considered distinct from one another.[20]
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that when there are two or
more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be sure,
should the lessees or sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the lease
period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for
the use of the property. The basis of their solidary liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but
the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors.[21] In the case at bar, there is no allegation that the
sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term of the sublease. Indeed, the
unpaid balance sought to be collected by private respondent in his collection suit became due on June
30, 1989, long before the sublease expired on September 12, 1990.
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when there are more than two
lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. On the other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract
involved in this case reads:[22]
2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period of three (3) years and two
(2) months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P485,600.00)
PESOS, including all the improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon as well
all fishing equipment, paraphernalia and accessories. The said amount shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor
by the Sub-Lessees in the following manner, to wit:
A. Three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract; and
B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (P185,6000.00) Pesos to be paid on June 30,
1989.
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and
Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of
P50,600.00 should be divided into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and Remedios Manuel are
ordered to pay the amount of P25,300.00, the attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and the costs
of the suit. The complaint against petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a claim by
private respondent in the proceedings for the settlement of estate of Placido Alipio for the collection of
the share of the Alipio spouses in the unpaid balance of the rent in the amount ofP25,300.00.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
3. Cortes v. CA, G.R. No. 117417, Sept. 21, 2000

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117417. September 21, 2000]

MILAGROS A. CORTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO A. RESELVA,

respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal of the decision dated September 9,
1994 of the Court of Appeals[1] in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 33826;
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and the assailed order of
October 18, 1993, issued by the respondent court in Special Proceeding No. 90-54955 is hereby SET
ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID. With costs against the private respondent."[2]
and the reinstatement of the order of the probate court, thus:
"WHEREFORE, Menandro Reselva and all those acting for or through him, is/are ordered to vacate
forthwith the house and lot of the estate situated in 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, and to deliver
to the executrix Milagros R. Cortes the possession thereof as well as the owner's duplicate certificate
of the title thereof."[3]
The following facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are undisputed:
"Herein petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent (petitioner in this petition) Milagros R.
Cortes, and Florante Reselva are brothers and sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T.
Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva, who died on April 11, 1989 and May 13, 1987, respectively.
During their lifetime, they acquired a property particularly a house and lot consisting of 100 square
meters, more or less, with address at 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila. As can be gleaned from the
records, Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter executed a holographic
will which was probated in this case on July 31, 1991, with Milagros R. Cortes, as the appointed
Executrix. After having been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she filed a motion before
respondent probate court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of the property, be ordered
to vacate the property at No. 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila and turn over to said Executrix the
possession thereof (Annex 'D'). This is the motion which the respondent court granted in the assailed
order of October 18, 1993."[4]
In the Appellate Court, the Regional Trial Court's order was set aside for having been issued
beyond the latter's limited jurisdiction as a probate court.[5]
The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which
are claimed to belong to outside parties.[6] Stated otherwise, "claims for title to, or right of
possession of, personal or real property, made by the heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the
deceased, or made by third persons, cannot be entertained by the (probate) court."[7]
In the present case, however, private respondent Menandro A. Reselva, who refused to vacate the
house and lot being eyed as part of the estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be considered an

"outside party" for he is one of the three compulsory heirs of the former. As such, he is very much
involved in the settlement of Teodoro's estate.[8] By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule,
"when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court
the question of title to property."[9] Here, the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership. More so, when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate
action would be most expensive and inexpedient.[10]
In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict with that of, the decedent
since the former's theory merely advances co-ownership with the latter.[11] In the same way, when
the controversy is whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or exclusively to
the decedent, the same is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to
liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be
distributed among the heirs.[12]
More importantly, the case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of
Court, thus:
"RULE 73
"SEC. 2. Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When the marriage is dissolved by the death of
the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and
the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either."
Hence, in the 1991 case of Vita vs. Montanano we ruled:
"(I)t is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper disposition of the estate of
Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if both spouses have died, the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.In the present
case, therefore, the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated
in the testate proceedings of the latter."[13]
Consequently, this case before us should be returned to the probate court for the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of Teodoro and Lucrecia Reselva prior to the settlement of the estate of Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, without reinstating the assailed order of the trial court, the questioned decision of
the Court of Appeals dated September 9, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33826 is hereby SET ASIDE and
the case REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sec. 3
1. Dillena v. CA, G.R. No. 77660, July 28, 1988
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 77660 July 28, 1988
ELADIO DILLENA petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA CARREON, respondents.
Mario A. Batongbacal for petitioner.
Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates for respondent Aurora Carreon.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated NOVEMBER 14, 1986 of the
respondent Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 08404) filed
by herein petitioner Eladio Dillena to nullify the orders dated August 10, 1984, September 13, 1984
and October 28, 1985 of the RTC, Branch 84, Quezon City, sitting as a probate court in Sp. Proc. No.
Q-19378. The said orders annulled the sale of fishponds under administration, executed by private
respondent Aurora Carreon, as administratrix of the estate under administration in favor of petitioner,
for the reason that said sale was made without authority from and/or approval of the probate court.
The facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Spouses Dolores Sebastian and Rufino Carreon died on March 7, 1974 and August 21, 1974, in
Quezon City and Manila, respectively, leaving an adopted daughter Aurora Carreon, private
respondent herein. On October 21, 1974, Fausta Carreon Herrera, sister of the deceased Rufino
Carreon instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the
Deceased Spouses Rufino B. Carreon and Dolores Sebastian Petition for Letters of Administration"
before the then CFI, Branch XXXI, Quezon City. On November 7, 1974, the said court appointed
Fausta Carreon Herrera as Special Administratrix only for the purpose of receiving and collecting all
sums of money due and payable to the estate, in addition to the powers and duties provided for under
Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
On October 3, 1975, private respondent executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
deceased spouses, adjudicating to herself all the real properties of the said spouses.
On October 14, 1975, private respondent filed a motion to revoke the letters of administration issued
to Fausta Carreon Herrera. Accordingly, the lower court, on March 31, 1976, granted the motion and
allowed private respondent to administer the properties of the estate. Thereafter, private respondent
acted as administratrix of the estate although it was only on June 27, 1980 that the appointment of
private respondent was formalized and she was granted letters of administration on July 1, 1980.
Meanwhile, on November 8, 1978, private respondent, while being the administratrix of the estate,
executed an extrajudicial adjudication of the three (3) fishpond properties of the deceased spouses in
Hagonoy, Bulacan. By virtue of said extrajudicial adjudication, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
140243, 140244 and 140245 in the names of the deceased spouses were cancelled and in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in the name of private respondent.
On November 13, 1978, private respondent sold in favor of petitioner the three fishponds in question
without the knowledge and approval of the probate court. Prior to the sale, petitioner had been leasing
these fishponds for several years. As a result of the sale, transfer certificates of title over the said
properties were issued in favor of petitioner.
Aside from the aforesaid sale, petitioner previously sold real properties of the estate to Luisa S.
Rodriguez on July 19, 1977 and to the Starlight Industrial Co., Inc. on December 7, 1977. Both sales
were likewise made without the approval of the probate court. The said court, having learned of the
aforesaid transfers of the real properties without its approval, issued an order dated September 22,
1981 requiring the three vendees to appear on October 23, 1981 and to explain why the deeds of sale,
as well as the transfer certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof, should not be cancelled for
having been executed without court approval.
The aforesaid vendees were duly furnished with copies of the order dated September 22, 1981. Only
Starlight Industries, Co., Inc. appeared on October 23, 1981. Again, the vendees were required to
submit their respective explanations and the hearing on the incident was re-set to November 11, 1981.
Petitioner was again duly served with a copy of said order.
At the scheduled hearing, Starlight Industries Co., Inc. submitted an explanation, thus, the sale in its
favor was approved and confirmed by the probate court. However, vendees Luisa S. Rodriguez and
petitioner Eladio Dillena neither appeared at the scheduled hearing nor submitted their explanations as
to why the sales in their favor should not be cancelled for having been executed without court
approval.

On August 10, 1984, acting on the claim of Atty. Eugenio Balatbat for attorney's fees on account of his
legal services rendered to private respondent and to the estate, the probate court approved the payment
of said fees to be paid out of the properties of the estate. The same was ordered annotated as a lien on
the transfer certificates of title of the real properties of the estate, including those properties
transferred by private respondent without court approval.
On September 13, 1984, the lower court, on motion of Atty. Balatbat for a definitive ruling as to the
validity of the sale made by administratrix-private respondent to Luisa S. Rodriguez and petitioner,
declared that the transfers in favor of the aforesaid vendees are null and void and without force and
effect for having been made without court authority and approval. Petitioner was served with a copy
of the said order on December 13, 1984.
On July 25, 1985, or after seven (7) months from the time the order of September 13, 1984 was
received by petitioner, the latter filed a petition before the probate court in the same Sp. Proc No. Q19378 by way of special appearance alleging that said court, in view of its limited jurisdiction as a
probate court, has no power to annul the sale of the fishponds in question; that the orders annulling the
sale are void because he is not a party to Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378; that the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the res, which are located in Bulacan province.
After hearing the petition and the opposition therein, the lower court, on October 28, 1985, denied the
petition and ordered petitioner to return physical possession of the fishponds to private respondent.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the aforesaid order which was denied.
On February 20, 1986, a petition for certiorari was instituted by petitioner before the respondent Court
of Appeals and as earlier mentioned, the said court, on November 14, 1986, dismissed the petition.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on March 2, 1987; hence, this petition.
In the present petition, petitioner sets forth as issues the following: 1) that the Court of Appeals in
upholding the order of the trial court, deprived him of his property without due process of law because
he was not a proper party in the court a quo; 2) that the Court of Appeals violated the rule that the
jurisdiction of a court, when acting in the settlement of the estate, is limited and cannot encroach upon
questions of ownership; and 3) that the nullification and revocation of the transfer certificates of title
were brought about by the dictate of the probate court to annotate an attorney's lien thereon, an order
which is discordant with law and jurisprudence.
After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We find the instant Petition devoid of
merit.
Anent the first issue, petitioner postulates that he was deprived of the questioned fishponds without
due process; and that not being an original party before the probate court, he was not summoned
thereto.
We are not persuaded. The probate court in its order dated September 22, 1981 issued in the exercise
of its probate jurisdiction (Sec. 3, Rule 730, required petitioner to appear before it on October 23, 1
981 to explain why the deed of sale in favor of petitioner, as well as the transfer certificates of title
issued as a consequence thereof should not be cancelled for having been executed without authority
from and approval of the court. Petitioner, despite receipt of the aforesaid order, failed to appear on the
scheduled date. However, the probate court still gave him fifteen (15) days to submit the required
explanation and the case was re-set to November 11, 1981. But then again, petitioner, despite receipt
of the second notice requiring his appearance, chose not to appear and totally ignored the order of the
probate court to submit the explanation. One who was given full opportunity to present his evidence
and who failed to do so cannot complain that he was denied due process when the court rendered its
decision (Ganadin vs. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613).
As found out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner was afforded every opportunity to present his
explanation but he repeatedly failed to appear on the two scheduled hearings for the purpose. As said
in Municipality of Daet vs. Hidalgo Enterprises, 138 SCRA 265, and re-echoed in Divine Word High
School vs. NLRC, 143 SCRA 346, there is no denial of due process where petitioner was afforded an
opportunity to present his case.
Moreover, petitioner, on July 25, 1985, filed a petition before the probate court, by way of special
appearance, precisely questioning the power of the said court to declare null and void the sale of the

fishponds involved herein. As has been stated, the lower court after hearing the petition and the
opposition thereto denied the same.
Clearly, petitioner was given full opportunity to present his case. Thus, We give no credence to
petitioner's assertion that he was denied due process of law.
On the second issue, petitioner asseverates that the probate court, in view of its limited jurisdiction,
cannot declare as null and void, the sale of the questioned properties.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the questioned properties (fishponds) were included in the
inventory of properties of the estate submitted by then administratrix Fausta Carreon Herrera on
November 14, 1974. Private respondent was appointed as administratrix of the estate on March 31,
1976 in lieu of Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 13, 1978, the questioned deed of sale of the
fishponds was executed between petitioner and private respondent without notice to and approval of
the probate court. Even after the said sale, administratrix Aurora Carreon still included the three
fishponds as among the real properties of the estate in her inventory submitted on August 13, 1981. In
fact, as stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioner, at the time of the sale of the fishponds in question,
knew that the same were part of the estate under administration. Said the Court of Appeals:
Moreover, Dillena himself had knowledge that the fishponds are included in the inventory of
properties in the estate of the deceased spouses and that they are under special proceedings, hence, no
singular act of Aurora Carreon could bind these fishponds more so as Dillena had been leasing these
fishponds for years. (Court of Appeals Decision, p. 7).
The evidence shows that when the questioned properties were sold without court approval by private
respondent to petitioner, the same were under administration. The subject properties therefore are
under the jurisdiction of the probate court which according to our settled jurisprudence has the
authority to approve any disposition regarding properties under administration.
An administratrix of an estate already subject of a special proceeding pending before the probate court
cannot enjoy blanket authority to dispose of real properties as she pleases. More emphatic is the
declaration We made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes (123 SCRA 767) wherein We stated that when the
estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the
administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (149 SCRA 174), We held that the sale of
an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, needs court
approval, thus:
Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging
to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this
authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court.
This pronouncement finds support in the previous case of Dolores Vda. de Gil vs. Agustin Cancio (14
SCRA 797) wherein We emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the
sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication.
Consequently, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed out in a separate action.
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate court before it can
be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. As early as
1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano (42 Phil. 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an
administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the probate court is null and void
and title does not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the
property under administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without
authority from the said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the
sale (Sections 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for as
long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner's contention that the
probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power pertaining to
the said court. Sales of properties under administration which do not comply with the requisites under
sections 4 and 7 of Rule 89 are null and void (Bonaga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755).

On the third issue, petitioner questions the order of the probate court allowing the annotation of an
attorney's lien on the transfer certificate of title of the estate subject of the special proceedings. Again,
the issue raised does not deserve any consideration because it is already settled that the application to
fix attorney's fees may be made before and passed upon by the probate court in the same proceedings
where attorney's services were rendered (Palanca vs. Pecson, et al., 94 Phil. 419).
Finally, it may not be amiss to point out that the order dated September 13, 1984 of the probate court
nullifying the deed of sale between petitioner and private respondent was received by the former on
December 17, 1984. However, petitioner did not appeal from said order to the appellate court. Instead,
on July 25, 1985 or about seven (7) months thereafter, petitioner filed a petition before the probate
court questioning the power of the said court to nullify the deed of sale which petition was likewise
denied on October 25, 1985.
In view thereof, the order dated September 13, 1984, nullifying the deed of sale had long become final
and executory for failure of petitioner to appeal therefrom within the reglementary period. On this
score alone, the petition for certiorari which was belatedly filed by petitioner before the Court of
Appeals on February 20, 1986 should have been dismissed outright because the remedy of certiorari
does not lie where appeal has been lost. certiorari cannot take the place of an appeal (Santos, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 378; De la Cruz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 134 SCRA 417;
Santiago vs. Castro, 128 SCRA 545).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Sec. 4
1. Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 180863, Sept. 8, 2009
THIRD DIVISION

ANGELITA VALDEZ,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 180863

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

September 8, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12,
2007 dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdezs petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971,
petitioner gave birth to the spouses only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued
constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972,
Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to return but, finally, in
May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents home in Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three
years passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st. He and
petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a document to that
effect.[1] That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didnt hear any news of
Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.[2]
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985.[3]
Subsequently, however, Virgilios application for naturalization filed with the United States
Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioners marriage to Sofio was subsisting.[4]
Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the
declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision[5] on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of
merit. The RTC held that Angelita was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband
Sofio Polborosa was already dead. It said that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present spouse
is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that she has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. This
belief, the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.

The RTC found that, by petitioners own admission, she did not try to find her husband
anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioners daughter testified
that her mother prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also said there is a strong
possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been only 61 years old by then, and
people who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in health and spirits, and, even
assuming as true petitioners testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no
evidence that he continues to drink and smoke until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[6] She argued that it is the Civil Code that
applies in this case and not the Family Code since petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated on
January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that she had
acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the Family
Code should not be applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and
390 on declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was not expressly
repealed by the Family Code. To apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights
petitioner had acquired under the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10, 2007.[7]

Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and Motion
for Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,[8] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended
that the Court set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio
presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of well-founded belief under Article 41 of
the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner could not be expected to
comply with this requirement because it was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes
in 1985. The OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner already
acquired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed
death of Sofio under the Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofios death, the OSG
posits, could not be affected by the obligations created under the Family Code.[9]

Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41 of
the Family Code.[10] Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly
repealed by the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code provides that its provisions
shall not be retroactively applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.[11]
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state
that we are denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal
to this Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on
one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on the
other hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct
application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.[12]
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to
prove a well-founded belief that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family
Code, to wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse.

It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on
January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil
Code.

The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according
to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

Article 390 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not
the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those
of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.

The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable
the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that
the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to
be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.[13]

Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings
independent of the settlement of the absentees estate.

In re Szatraw[14] is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish

national in 1937. They lived together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the
husband, on the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with their child and never
returned. After inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her husband went to Shanghai, China.
However, friends who came from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen there. In 1948,
petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing that since
the latter had been absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any news from him and
about her child, she believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw,
because it does not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and
because he had acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The
rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to
presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from
in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and
made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard
by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action
or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be
made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to
be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent
husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or
for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the
petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but
merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard
from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the
petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is
unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is
presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve
the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A
judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a
prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot
be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter
must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right
or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights
and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final
judgment, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established, by a
final decree, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon
the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res
judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially
provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because
he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another
proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in seven

years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary
period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable
and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.[15]

In Lukban v. Republic,[16] petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with

Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes
after a violent quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent search, inquiries from his
parents and friends, and search in his last known address, proved futile. Believing her husband was
already dead since he had been absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956
for a declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has no legal
impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the antecedents in Gue v.
Republic[17] are similar to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946, Angelina Gues husband left Manila where
they were residing and went to Shanghai, China. From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not
written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts. Despite her efforts and
diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11 years, she asked the court for a declaration of the
presumption of death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial
declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not
authorized by law.[18]
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is
established by law[19] and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is
presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence,[20] Sofio is to be presumed dead
starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to
petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil
Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded belief is not
required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family

Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in
1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit wellfounded belief will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at
the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives
that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofios
death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law.
However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was
celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.