Rule of Reasonable Construction

Every statute has a purpose, an objective. If the literal meaning collides

with the reason of enactment of the statute then the intention of the law
should be taken up so that the actual meaning of the statute can be
properly understood. This rule mainly stresses upon the intention of the
legislature to bring up the statue and the sensible and not the prima facie
meaning of the statute. This helps us clear the errors caused due to faulty
draftsmanship. However this rule also has its own limitations. The intent of
the statute is in itself a surmise and the rule is usually avoided to
complete the quest for interpretation unless the intent in itself can be
interpreted properly.
In R v Allen[1] The defendant was charged with the offence of bigamy
under s.57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The statute states
'whosoever being married shall marry any other person during the lifetime
of the former husband or wife is guilty of an offence'. Under a literal
interpretation of this section the offence would be impossible to commit
since civil law will not recognise a second marriage any attempt to marry
in such circumstances would not be recognised as a valid marriage.
The court applied the rule of reasonable construction and held that the
word 'marry' should be interpreted as 'to go through a marriage
ceremony'. The defendant's conviction was upheld.
Citation:[1] (1872) LR 1 CCR 367
In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar[2] in construing section 6 of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958, the Supreme Court laid down that the crucial date on which the age of
the offender had to be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the
sentence is pronounced by the trial court An accused who on the date of offence was below
21 years of age but on the date on which the judgment pronounced, if he was above 21
years, he is not entitled to the benefit of the statute. This conclusion reached having regard
to the object of the Act. The object of the Statute is to prevent the turning of the youthful
offenders into criminals by their association with the hardened criminals of mature age within
the walls of the prison. An accused below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of the Act by
sending him under the supervision of the probation officer instead of jail.
Citation: [2] AIR 1963 SC 1088: (1963) Supp 2 SCR 745
In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U P.,[3] Sales
Tax was fixed at two per cent, of the turnover in the case of cooked food under section 3A
of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The appellant firm engaged in the business of biscuit

manufacture and sale. Whether biscuits though intended for human consumption, can be
construed as cooked food and liable to be taxed as per the notification issued under the
said provision. Held that if an expression is capable of a wider meaning, the question
whether the wider or narrower meaning should be accepted depends on the context of the
statute. Here biscuit was not covered within the words cooked food. However, where the
precise words used are plain and unambiguous the court is bound to construe them in their
ordinary sense and not to limit plain words in an Act of Parliament by consideration of policy
which has to decided not by court but by Parliament itself.

Citation: [3] AIR 1981 SC 1656