PRELIMINARIES
Jesus Delfin filed to the COMELEC a petition to
ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION
ABAKADA GURO V ERMITA
METHOD AND INTERPRETATION
“ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, LEGAL
REALISM, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION”
ROBERT CLINTON (1987)
“CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM: QUASI-
NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL TRUTHS”
TIMOTHY ZICK (2003)
ART XVII: REMAKING THE
CONSTITUTION
“MALOLOS: THE CRISES OF THE
REPUBLIC”
TEODORO AGONCILLO (1997)
“FROM MCKINLEY’S INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE NEW CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS
ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEM”
VICENTE MENDOZA
(SEE LEGAL HISTORY REVIEWER)
MABANAG V LOPEZ VITO
GONZALES V COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
; November 9, 1967
TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
; October 16, 1971
PLANAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; January 22, 1973 Atty.
amend the Constitution through a people’s initiative. In
his petition, he wanted to amend Sec 4 and 7 of Article
JAVELLANA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 6, Sec 4 of Article 7 and Sec 8 of Article 10 in order to lift
; March 31, 1973 the term limits of all elective government officials. He
asks the COMELEC to assist them in gathering the
sufficient number of signatures by setting up signature
SANIDAD V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS stations all over the country, as required by COMELEC
; October 12, 1976 Resolution No. 2300. The COMELEC took cognizance of
their petition and set the case up for hearing. Senator
MITRA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Raul Roco then filed a motion to dismiss before the
COMELEC, stating that it was not the initiatory petition
; April 4, 1981 properly cognizable before the COMELEC. Sen. Miriam
Defensor Santiago, on the other hand, filed a special civil
LAWYERS’ LEAGUE FOR A BETTER action for prohibition, saying that RA 6735 is deficient
PHILIPPINES V AQUINO insofar as the initiative for amending the Constitution is
concerned. She further alleges that what the petitioners
EN BANC; May 22, 1986 are willing to propose are not amendments, but
revisions. Thereafter, LABAN, DIK and MABINI filed their
FACTS/ISSUES motions for intervention, arguing on the same points.
- Petitioners questioned legitimacy of Aquino
government. ISSUES
- Her gov’t was said to be illegal since it was not
established pursuant to 1973 Consti. 1. WON the court can take action of this case despite
- Proclamation No. 3- “…Aquino gov’t is installed through there being a pending case before the COMELEC
direct exercise of power of the Filipino people, in 2. WON RA 6735 is an adequate enabling law for
defiance of the provisions of 1973 Consti.” people’s initiative
- April 10- Court already voted to dismiss. 3. WON the COMELEC resolution no. 2300 is valid
- April 17- Atty. Lozano withdrew petitions and said that 4. WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or in
they would pursue it by extra-judicial methods. grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin
petition
HELD
Petitions have no merit. HELD
(1) Petitioners have no personality and no cause of 1. Yes. Comelec’s failure to act on roco’s motion to
action. dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition
(2) Legitimacy of gov’t is NOT justiciable, and is a rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under sec 2
political question where people are the only judge. rule 65 of rules of court
(3) People have already accepted such gov’t, which is in - Case may be treated as a special civil action for
effective control of the country, making it a de jure certiorari since delfin didn’t come up with the minimum
gov’t. number of signatures
(4) Community of nations has also accepted it. - Court may brush aside technicalities in cases of
(5) Eleven members of SC have sworn to uphold law transcendental importance.
under her gov’t. 2. No. The law is inadequate.
- First, in Sec 2 of the Act (Statement and Policy), it
IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ seems that the word Constitution was a delayed
afterthought. The word Constitution was neither
;October 24, 1986 germane nor relevant to the said section. It only proves
that it is silent to amendments in the constitution.
DE LEON V ESGUERRA - Second, in the Act does not provide for the contents of
; August 31, 1987 a petition for initiative on the constitution.
- Third, there is no separate subtitle for initiative for the
Constitution.
SANTIAGO V COMMISSION ON - Therefore, it seems that the main thrust of the act is on
ELECTIONS initiative and referendum of national and local laws. It
DAVIDE; March 19, 1997 failed to provide for details in implementation of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
FACTS
- Comelec cannot be delegated power, since the law is
incomplete as it fails to provides a sufficient policy and
standard for the delegated power.
3. No. It only follows that since the RA 6735 is
incomplete, it does not have the power to prescribe rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
4. Yes. There was insufficient number of signatures. Also,
comelec acquires jurisdiction upon filing of the petition.
The delfin petition was only in its initiatory pleading.
Decision Petition granted
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO [concur and dissent]
RA 6735 is not defective. The intent of the framers was
to provide for a law for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. (he cited the sponsorship remarks of Roco)
VITUG
The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition, since
it did not have the required number of signatures.
FRANCISCO [concur and dissent]
looking at the definition of terms in the said RA, the law
clearly intends to include amendments to the
Constitution.
PANGANIBAN
RA 6735 is not perfect but taken together with the
Constitution and COMELEC Res. No. 2300, it is sufficient
to implement Constitutional initiatives.
RESOLUTION
; investment account with their bank on Feb 4 2000.
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
PUNO;
FACTS
- Nature: Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
complaints against him until his term is over
- May 11, 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President; Arroyo
was VP; some 10 million Filipinos voted for Estrada and
both Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a 6-year term.
- Oct. 4, 2000 ~ Estrada's "sharp decent from power"
began; Chavit Singson, Estrada's long time friend,
publicly accused Estrada, Estrada's family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
- Oct. 5, 2000~ Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. delivered a
speech entitled "I ACCUSE" wherein he accused Estrada
of receiving 220 million pesos worth of jueteng money
from Gov. Singson from November 1998 till August 200
and obtained another 70 million peson on excise tax still
from Gov. Singson
- The privilege speech was referred by Sen. Drilon to the
Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice for
joint investigation
- The House of Reps also decided to investigate the
expose of Gov. Singson.
- Reps. Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach Estrada.
- Oct. 11, 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a
pastoral statement asking Estrada to step down from the
presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern
- Oct. 13, 2000~ CBCP also cried out for Estrada's
resignation
- Oct. 17, 2000~ Former Pres. Aquino joined the calls for
resignation and former Pres. Ramos joined the chorus as
well.
- But before that, on Oct 12, Arroyo already resigned as
DSWD Secretary and also asked for Estrada's resignation
but Estrada really held on to his office and refused to
resign. (According to J. Puno: "The heat is on.")
- November ended with a "big-bang" because on
November 13, House Speaker Manuel Villar transmitted
the Articles of Impeachment (which was based on the
grounds of bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of
public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution)
signed by 115 representatives to the Senate.
- Nov. 20, 2000~ Senate finally opened the
impeachment trial. 21 senators took their oath as judges
with SC Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr, presiding.
- Dec. 7, 2000~ The impeachment trial started.
- Dramatic point of the December hearings was the
testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, the SVP of Equitable-PCI
BANK. Ocampo testified that she was one foot away
from Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose
Velarde" on documents involving a 500 million pesos
- Impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of
Christmas and when January came, more bombshells
were exploded.
> Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrada
jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr.
Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.
> Jan. 16, 2001~ with a vote of 11-10, the Senator
judges ruled against opening the 2nd envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner
held 3.3 billion pesos in a secret bank account under
the name "Jose Velarde."
> In short, this resulted to what we know as "EDSA II"
- January 19, 2001~ withdrawal of support from the
Armed Forces, PNP and mass resignations ensued
- Jan 20, 2001~ Estrada surrendered. At 12 nn, CJ Davide
administered the oath to Arroyo as the President of the
Philippines.
> Estrada left Malacañang and issued a press
statement saying that he now leaves Malacañang
Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation.
> He also wrote a letter saying that the VP shall be the
acting president and said letter was transmitted to
former Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. Pres. Pimentel.
- Jan 21, 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties
of the Presidency. The SC issued a resolution, which
confirmed the authority given by the 12 members of the
Court then present to the Chief Justice to administer the
oath of office to GMA.
- Jan. 24, 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estrada's letter,
House of Reps. passed House Resolution No. 175
experiencing full support to GMA's administration and
also HR no. 176
- Feb 7, 2001~ Despite receipt of Estrada's letter
claiming inability, Senate passed Resolution No. 82
confirming GMA's nomination of Teofisto Guingona as VP
and the Senate's support of the new gov't. and also in
the same date, Senate passed Res. No. 83 recognizing
that the impeachment court is functus offictio.
- Feb. 8, 2001~ Senate passed Res. No. 84 certifying
vacancy in the Senate.
- Feb 15, 2001- CJ Davide and J. Panganiban inhibited
themselves from participating in this case as per
Saguisag's motion. They of course debunked his charge
"that they have compromised their weight on one side"
but nonetheless recused themselves.
ISSUES
1. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy
2. WON the petitioner resigned as president
3. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act
as president
4. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (and
assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the
immunity)
5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
HELD
1. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of
WON the change in the presidency was done in the
manner prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. (In this
part, the ponente differentiated EDSA I from EDSA II
saying that EDSA I was a revolution, change of
presidency was done extra-constitutionally whereas
EDSA II was not a revolution, the change was done to an
element of the government only and it was done intra-
constitutionally because GMA swore to uphold or protect
the 1987 Constitution. Read it if u want a better
understanding. Also, the Court is interpreting ART II
sec 1, ART VII Sec 8 and ART VII Sec 11 in this case
so look at those provisions too.)
2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined
from the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue. (In relation to this, see
Art. VII, Section 8)
3. The Court held that the question WON it may review
and revise the decision of both Houses of Congress
recognizing GMA as the de jure President of the
Philippines is a political one. (Congress has laid Estrada's
claim of inability to rest because of its recognition of
GMA as president. The issue is a political question and
the Court cannot review Congress' decision without
violating the principle of separation of powers.)
4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys
immunity only during his tenure. (Reasoning in the In Re:
Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune
from suit or from being brought to court during his
period of his incumbency and tenure but not beyond.)
5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof
that the judges have been unduly influenced by the
barrage of publicity.
Deicison The petitions of Joseph E. Estrada challenging
the respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as the de jure
14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
GONZALES V NARVASA
GONZAGA-REYES; August 14, 2000
FACTS
- Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform or
PCCR was created by then President Joseph Estrada on
Nov 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 in
order to “study and recommend proposed amendments
and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the
manner of implementing the same.”
> The PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or
before June 30, 1999. On Feb 19, 1999, the President
issued Executive Order No. 70 which extended the
time frame of the PCCR’s work until Dec 31 1999.
> The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the
President on Dec 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the
President on the same day.
- Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as citizen and
taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus,
assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR
on two grounds:
> it is a public office which only the legislature can
create by way of law
> by creating the PCCR, the President is intervening in
a process from which he is totally excluded by the
Constitution, i.e. the amendment of the fundamental
charter.
- In this regard, Gonzales:
> seeks to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as
such
> seeks to enjoin Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora from
enforcing their advice and recommendations
> seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from
passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants
> prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to
furnish petitioner with information on certain matters.
ISSUES
1. WON the case has become moot and academic
2. WON petitioner has standing as a citizen
3. WON petitioner has standing as a taxpayer
4. WON the President has power to create positions (70)
in the Office of the President and appoint presidential
consultants (20), advisers (22) and assistants (28)
5. WON the Court may issue a writ of mandamus
ordering Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora to provide petitioner
with names of executive officials holding multiple
positions in government, copies of their appointments,
and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by
the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacañang.
HELD
1. Ratio An act is considered moot when it no longer
presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead. It is beyond
the scope of judicial power to give advisory opinion.
Obiter The case has already become moot and
academic as the PCCR has already ceased to exist. Relief
prayed for by Gonzales (prohibition) is impossible to
grant and is an inappropriate remedy as body sought to
be enjoined no longer exists. Any ruling regarding the
PCCR would only be in the nature of an advisory opinion.
2. Ratio A citizen has standing only if he can establish
that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable action.
Obiter The interest of a person assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show that the law is invalid,
but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way.1
3. Ratio A taxpayer has standing to raise a
constitutional issue when it is established that public
funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of
the law or the Constitution, the action of which is
properly brought only when there is an exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power.
Obiter Under Sec 7 of EO No 43 which created the
PCCR, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its
operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of
the Office of the President.” The appropriations were
authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact,
there was no appropriation at all since appropriation has
1
in Kilosbayan v Morato citing Valmonte v Phil Charity Sweepstakes Office
been defined ‘as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money
may be paid out of the Treasury.’ The funds for the PCCR
was taken from the funds intended for the Office of the
President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power
to transfer funds pursuant to Sec 25 (5) Art VI of
Constitution.
4. Appointment is not synonymous with creation.
- Petitioner does not have the personality to raise this
issue as he has not proven that he has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the
appointment, and he has not alleged the necessary facts
to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a
taxpayer’s interest.
5. As enshrined in Sec 7 of the Bill of Rights, “the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.”
- The right to information is a public right, and the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere
fact that petitioner is a citizen and therefore part of the
general public which possesses the right.
- “matters of public concern” is a term which
“embrace(s) a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the
final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case
to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.”
Decision Petition is dismissed, with the exception that
respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with
information requested.
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
(ART I, II, IV, V)
STATE DEFINED
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V
CAMPOS RUEDA
FERNANDO; October 29, 1971
FACTS
- Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos
Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella
Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P
161,974.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes
for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the
Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having
been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the
time of her death in 1955.
- Rueda’s request for exemption was denied on the
ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
- Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision
denying the claim for tax exemption. However,
respondent denied this request on the grounds that
there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was
moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country.
- Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign
country,' used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government
of that foreign power which, although not an
international person in the sense of international law,
does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible
personal properties of our citizens not residing therein,
or whose law allows a similar exemption from such
taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should
have been recognized by our Government in order to
entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the
last proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so
much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of
an international personality, must be satisfied for a
"foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code
HELD
- Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeal’s
Ruling.
- If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is
required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a
politically organized sovereign community independent
of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally
supreme within its territory, acting through a
government functioning under a regime of law.
- it is thus a sovereign person with the people composing
it viewed as an organized corporate society under a
government with the legal competence to exact
obedience to its commands.
- The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying
a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by
means of its government its sovereign will over the
individuals within it and maintaining its separate
international personality.
- State is a territorial society divided into government
and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a
supremacy over all other institutions. Moreover,
similarly would point to the power entrusted to its
government to maintain within its territory the
conditions of a legal order and to enter into international
relations. With the latter requisite satisfied,
international law does not exact independence as a
condition of statehood.
- Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara: There can be
no doubt that California as a state in the American Union
was lacking in the alleged requisite of international
personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign
country within the meaning of Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
- This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a
tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an
international personality in the traditional sense, did fall
under this exempt category.
SOVEREIGNTY AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican
state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates form them.
ART V SUFFRAGE
Sec 1: Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at
least 18 years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote, for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage
Sec 2: The Congress shall provide a system for securing
the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system
for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the
disabled and illiterates to vote without the assistance of
other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote
under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on
Elections may promulgate to protect secrecy of the
ballot.
TANADA V ANGARA
PANGANIBAN; May 2, 1997
FACTS
- Petition for Certiorari
- DTI secretary Rizalino Navarro signed the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations. (Final Act). By signing it, he
agreed on behalf of the Philippines
o To submit the WTO agreement to
competent authorities for their approval
o Adopt the ministerial declarations and
decisions
(Basically, the final act aims to liberalize and expand
world trade and strengthen the interrelationship
between trade and economic policies affecting growth
and development.)
- The president then sent to the senate a letter which
submits the Uruguay Round Final Act for their
concurrence
- Another letter was sent by the president. This time, he
submits the Uruguay Final Round Act, the Agreement
Establishing the WTO, the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services to the Senate for its concurrence.
- The Senate adopted Resolution number 97, which
expresses their concurrence in the ratification of the
president of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
- The President signed the Instrument of Ratification of
the Agreement Establishing the WTO and the
agreements and associated legal instruments of that
agreement.
- The final act signed by Secretary Navarro, on the other
hand, embodies not only the WTO agreement but also
the ministerial declarations and decisions and the
understanding on commitments in financial services.
- Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the treaty.
They also claim that since the Senate only concurred
with the WTO agreement and not on all the contents of
the Final act, they impliedly rejected the Final act.
ISSUES
1. WON the case is justiciable.
2. WON the parity provisions and national treatment
clauses in the WTO agreement violates Sec. 19
Article 2, Sec. 10 and 12 Article 12 of the
Constitution (“economic nationalism” clauses).
3. WON the WTO agreement unduly limits, restricts
and impairs legislative power of the Congress.
4. WON the WTO agreement intrudes on the power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedures.
5. WON the concurring of the senate only in the WTO
agreement and not in the final act implies rejection
of the final act.
HELD
- Petition dismissed.
1. Yes.
- The judiciary has the duty and power to strike down
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government including Congress
2. No
- The declaration of principles are not intended to
be self-executing, rather, they are just aid and
guides by the judiciary in judicial review, and by
the legislature in enacting laws. These broad
principles need legislative enactments to implement
them.
- The economic nationalism provisions should be read
with other constitutional mandates, especially Sec 1 and
13 of Article 12.
- The WTO protects the weak economies. There are
specific provisos in the agreement with respect to tariffs,
domestic subsidies and protection from unfair
competition which are intended to help developing
economies.
- The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign
control of the national economy.
- The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced
bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it
contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino
companies should be pampered with total prescription of
foreign competition.
- Constitutions are designed to meet not only the
vagaries of contemporary events. They should be
interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances.
3. No
- Sovereignty is not absolute because it is subject
to restrictions and voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines.
- The Constitution did not envision a hermit type
isolation of the country.
- By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict
the absoluteness of sovereignty
- There are certain restrictions to the Constitution
- Limitations imposed by the very nature of
membership in the family of nations.
- Limitations imposed by treaty stipulations
- When the Philippines join the UN, it consented to
restrict its soverign rights under the concept of auto-
limitation. (Reagan vs Commission of Internal Revenue)
- The underlying concept in the partial surrender of
sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other
contracting states granting the same privilege and
immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens.
4. No.
- The burden of proof is not transferred in cases of
patent infringement. It is still on the patent owner to
introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged
identical product.
- The new rule should not really present any problem in
changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the
subject, RA 165 (Patent Law), provides a similar
presumption in cases of infringement of patent design.
- Conclusion in the third issue also applies.
5. No.
- The final act need not be ratified. It is not the treaty
itself. Rather, it is just a summary of the proceedings.
The final act only required that the senate concur with
the WTO agreement, which they did.
- The Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring to
as shown by the member’s deliberations.
REAGAN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
FERNANDO; December 27, 1969
FACTS
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
Petitioner: William Reagan –civilian employee of an
American corporation providing technical assistance to
the United States Air Force in the Philippines
Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
July 7, 1959 –Reagan was assigned at the Clark Field Air
Base
April 22, 1960 –He imported a tax-free Cadillac with
accessories valued at $6,443.83
July 11, 1960 –petitioner asked Base Commander for
permit to sell the car which was granted provided that
he sell it to a member of the US Armed Forces or a US
citizen employed in the Philippine military bases. On the
same date, he sold his car for $6,600.00 to Willie
Johnson, Jr. of the US Marine Corps.
- As a result of the transaction, respondent, after
deducting the landed cost of the car as well as
petitioner’s personal exemption, fixed his net taxable
income arising from the sale at P17,912.34 rendering
him liable for P2,979.00 income tax. After paying the
sum, petitioner sought a refund claiming that he was
exempt, but pending action on his request, he filed the
case with the Court of Tax Appeals which denied his
petition.
- Petitioner asserts that he is exempt from paying the
income tax. He contends that in legal contemplation the
sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore
beyond its jurisdiction to tax.
- Petitioner relies on a statement of Justice Tuason in Co
Po v. Collector of Internal Revenue: “While in army bases
or installations within the Philippines those goods were
in contemplation of law on foreign soil.” The court
resolved this by pointing out that the statement was
merely obiter dictum in that case and therefore, cannot
be invoked in this case.
ISSUE
WON the Clark Field Air Base is Philippine territory
HELD
Yes. Bases under lease to the American armed
forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement
of 1947 remain part of Philippine territory.
- The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its
authority may be exercised over its entire domain.
Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not
thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
- Concept of auto-limitation: Any state may, by its
consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. It is not precluded from allowing
another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If
it does so, it by no means follows that such areas
become impressed with an alien character. They retain
their status as native soil. They are still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does
not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the
American armed forces by virtue of the military bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign
territory.
- Therefore, the Philippines’ jurisdictional rights
over the bases, certainly not excluding the power
to tax, have been preserved. As to certain tax
matters, an appropriate exemption was provided
for.
- Judgment (7 concur, 2 concur in the result, 1 did
not take part)
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying
the refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax
paid by petitioner is affirmed.
REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN
CORONA; July 15, 2003
FACTS
- Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
- Dec 17 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government or PCGG, filed a
petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, entitled
Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. - Marcos,
represented by his Estate/heirs and Imelda R. Marcos,
pursuant to RA 13792.
- PCGG was created by virtue of
Executive Order No. 1 issued on February 28,
1986 by then President Corazon Aquino, and
was charged with the task of assisting the
President in the “recovery of all ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover or sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them during is administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using
their powers, authority, influence, connections
or relationship.”
- In said case, petitioner Republic, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought:
2
An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor.
 a. the declaration of the aggregate amount of - Petitioner asserts in the main that the Sandiganbayan
- Oct 18 1996 petitioner filed a motion for summary committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the
US$356 million (estimated to be US$658 million
judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. decision on the ground that the original copies of the
inclusive of interest as of the time of decision)
Respondents filed their opposition. authenticated Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions
deposited in escrow3 in the Philippine National
- Nov 20 1997 Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion and their “authenticated translations” have not been
Bank (PNB), as ill-gotten wealth.
for summary judgment and/or judgment on the submitted to the Court, when in fact the Sandiganbayan
*The ff account groups, using various foreign
pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the quoted extensively a portion of the Swiss decisions in
foundations in certain Swiss banks, previously
compromise agreement “(took) precedence over the denying a previous motion dated July 29 1999. Petitioner
held the funds:
motion for summary judgment” adds that nowhere in the respondents’ motions for
1. Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation
- May 26 1998 Mrs. Marcos filed manifestation claiming reconsideration and supplemental motion for
accounts
she was not a party to the motion for approval of the reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and
2. Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-
Compromise Agreement and that the owned 90% of the admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged.
Valamo-Spinus-
funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos - Respondents, of course, assert that the petition should
Avertina-Foundation accounts
estate. be denied.
3. Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation
accounts
The Fund Transfer Analysis of Respondents’ Legitimate Income
4. Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation
- Aug 10 1995 petitioner Republic filed with the District - the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or
accounts
Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland an additional request for US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20
5. Maler Foundation accounts
the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow years from 1965 to 1984.
account in PNB. This was granted. - This amount includes Ferdinand Marcos’ salary as
b.
the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million
- Marcoses appealed, Swiss Federal Supreme Court Senate President in 1965, (P15,935) and as President
in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos
affirmed ruling of District Attorney of Zurich, and funds from 1966 to 1985 (1966-1976 at P60,000/year; 1977-
couple’s salaries, other lawful income as well as
were remitted to the Philippines in escrow in 1998. 1985 at P100,000/year), Imelda Marcos’ salary as
income from legitimately acquired property.
Minister of Human Settlements from 1976 to 1986
These treasury notes are frozen at the Bangko
The Petition for Summary Judgment (P75,000/year), income from legal practice
Sentral ng Pilipinas by virtue of freeze order
- Mar 10 2000 petitioner filed another motion for (P11,109,836), plus other sources.
issued by PCGG.
summary judgment “pertaining to the forfeiture of the - Ferdinand Marcos made it appear that he had an
- Oct 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R Marcos, Ma.
US$356 million, based on ff grounds: extremely profitable legal practice before he became
Imelda M Manotoc, Irene M Araneta and Ferdinand R
a. essential facts which warrant the forfeiture of President, and that he was still receiving payments
Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.
the funds are admitted by respondents in their almost 20 years after
pleadings and other submissions made in the
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements
course of the proceeding - Computations establish the total net worth of spouses
- Before case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement
b. respondents’ admission made during pre-trial Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 to 1984, in the
and the Supplemental Agreements dated Dec 28, 1993
that they do not have any interest or ownership amount of US$957,487.75. (assuming income from legal
were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG
over the funds tenders no genuine issue or practice is valid)
Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement
controversy as to any material fact in the - The five group accounts have a total balance of
of the assets of the Marcos family
present action US$356 million.
- The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements
- Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition, which was later
sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and
adopted by co-respondents Marcos children. ISSUES
distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the
- Mar 24 2000 hearing on motion for summary judgment 1. WON petitioner Republic’s action for certiorari is
Marcos family under the conditions contained therein.
was conducted proper.
- It was stated in one of the “whereas clauses” the fact
- Sep 19 2000 Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s 2. WON respondents raised any genuine issue of fact
that petitioner Republic “obtained a judgment from the
motion for summary judgment, stating that there is no which would either justify or negate summary judgment.
Swiss Federal Tribunal on Dec 21 1990 that the US$356
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, 3. WON petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for
million belongs in principle to the Republic of the
and declared the funds, which were deemed unlawfully forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA
Philippines provided certain conditions are met….” The
acquired as ill-gotten wealth, forfeited in favor of the 1379.
decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed
State.
the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Cosandey
- Mrs. Marcos filed motion for reconsideration on Sep 26 HELD
granting legal assistance to Republic. Cosandey declared
2000; Marcos children followed. 1. Ratio Where the case is undeniably ingrained with
the various deposits in the name of the foundations to
- In Jan 31 2002 resolution, Sandiganbayan reversed its immense public interest, public policy and deep
be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen
Sep 19 2000 decision, stating that “the evidence offered historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed
to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled
for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the notwithstanding the existence and availability of the
to restitution.
money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos remedy of appeal.
- Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion to
spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to Obiter Almost two decades have passed since the
approve the General/Supplemental Agreements.
the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds”, and thus government initiated its search for and reversion of ill-
3
denied petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on
Money or a deed or other instrument deposited with a third person for a delivery to a given party upon the Hence, the present petition. the merits is long overdue.
fulfillment of some condition. While in the keeping of the third party, the money or instrument is said to be “in
escrow”. (Random House Webster’s Legal Dictionary, Random House, New York, 1996)
2. Ratio Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact
which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are
not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not
defeat a motion for summary judgment
Obiter Court held that respondent Marcoses failed to
raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings.
Summary judgment should take place as a matter of
right.
- a genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue
which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or
patently lacking in substance.
- Respondents failed to specifically deny each and every
allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the
manner required by the rules (Sec 10 Rule 8 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure). Their answers include “they have no
sufficient knowledge” or “they could not recall because it
happened a long time ago” or “the funds were lawfully
acquired” without stating the basis of such assertions.
- Question: Whether the kind of denial in respondents’
answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the
rules. No. The Court holds that if an allegation directly
and specifically charges a party with having done,
performed or committed a particular act which the latter
did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and
express denial must be made.
- The allegations for forfeiture on the existence of the
Swiss bank deposits, not having been specifically denied
by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted
pursuant to Sec 11 Rule 8 of 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure.
a. Propriety of Summary Judgment
- Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly
no genuine issue as to any material fact in the
action. The Court is justified in dispensing with the
trial and rendering summary judgment if it is
demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or
admissions that the issues are not genuine but
sham or fictitious.
- motion for summary judgment is
premised on the assumption that the issues
presented need not be tried either because
these are patently devoid of substance or
that there is no genuine issue as to any
pertinent fact.
- It is a procedural device for the prompt
disposition of actions in which the pleadings
raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue
as to any material fact.
b. Whether petitioner Republic had bound itself to
go to trial and had legally waived right it had to
move for summary judgment.
- Court rules that petitioner could validly move for
summary judgment any time after the respondents’
answer was filed or, for that matter, at any
subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that
petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any
way prevent it from moving for summary judgment.
c. Whether by the time motion for summary
judgment was filed on Mar 10 2000, estoppel by
laches had already set in against petitioner.
- Doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when
government sues as a sovereign or asserts
governmental rights. Nor can estoppel validate an
act that contravenes law or public policy.
- estoppel by laches is the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained
length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, warranting a presumption that
the person has abandoned his right or
declined to assert it.
- in invoking doctrine of estoppel by
laches, respondents must show not only
unjustified inaction but also that some unfair
injury to them might result unless the action
is barred.
3. Ratio The prima facie presumption raised by the law
that a property is unlawfully acquired when the amount
or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official
salary and other lawful income of the public officer who
owns it stands as proved unless defendant shows, and
proves, that these were lawfully acquired and that there
are other legitimate sources of income.
Obiter burden of proof was on respondents to dispute
presumption and show by clear and convincing evidence
that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that
they had other legitimate sources of income. A
presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed,
and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal
presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.
- the Court not only took into consideration that
respondents themselves made admissions in their
pleadings and testimonies, but that petitioner was able
to present sworn statements of witnesses who had
personal knowledge of the Marcoses’ participation in the
illegal acquisition of funds.
RESOLUTION
CORONA; November 18, 2003
- SC: Respondents in their motions for reconsideration do
not raise any new matters for the Court to resolve.
Is summary judgment in forfeiture proceedings a
violation of due process?
- Respondents: RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect,
hence they are entitled to constitutional safeguards
enjoyed by accused.
- SC: Due process of law has two aspects: substantive
and procedural. There must be a compliance with both
substantive and procedural requirements in order that a
particular act may not be impugned as violative of the
due process clause.
- substantive due process refers to intrinsic
validity of a law that interferes with the
rights of a person to his property
- there is no showing that RA 1379 is
unfair, unreasonable or unjust.
Respondents were not deprived of
their property through forfeiture for
arbitrary reasons.
- procedural due process means
compliance with procedures or steps, even
periods, prescribed by the statute, in
conformity with the standard of fair play
and without arbitrariness on the part of
those who are called upon to administer it.
- forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem,
thus civil in nature, contrary to respondents’
contention that they are penal in character.
The proceedings under RA 1379 do not
terminate in the imposition of penalty but
merely in the forfeiture in favor of the State
of properties illegally acquired.
- Civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired
property under RA 1379 may be proven by
preponderance of evidence. The Government
is required only to state the known lawful
income of respondents for the prima facie
presumption of illegal provenance to attach.
Petitioner Republic having established this
presumption, burden of proof shifted to
respondents to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the Swiss deposits were
lawfully acquired and that they had other
legitimate sources of income. Respondents
failed on this part.
- essence of due process is found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit one’s evidence in support of his
defense
- Respondents were repeatedly accorded
full opportunity to present their case,
defenses and pleadings. They obstinately
refused to do so and have tried to
confuse the issues and the Court and to
delay the disposition of the case
- “the people and the State are entitled to
favorable judgment, free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, the
salutary objective being to restore the
ownership of the Swiss deposits to the
rightful owner – that is, the Republic of the
Philippines – in the shortest possible time.”
Motions for reconsiderations denied with finality.
DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM
 CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT
HOLMES; February 23, 1909
FACTS
- Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet,
contests dismissal of application of registration of their
ancestral land through writ of error.
- Carino’s ancestors maintained fences for cattle,
cultivated some parts, and pastured parts for cattle for
more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris
(April 11, 1899). This land is also used for inheritance in
accordance to Igorot custom.
- Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-
1897, no document of title was issued by Spanish
Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under
mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but it
only established possessory title.
- Procedure
- Court -– application of land registration granted
(March 4, 1904 )
- CFI of Benguet – appeal on behalf of Government of
the Philippines and US having taken possession of
property for military and public purposes; application
dismissed
- Philippine SC – affirmed decision of CFI Benguet
- Federal SC – writ of error reviewing judgment of
Philippine SC
- Respondents argue:
- Given that
- Spain assumed and asserted that they
had title to all the land in the Philippines
except to permit private lands to be acquired
- No prescription against the Spanish
Crown
- Decree of June 25, 1880 required
registration within a limited time to make
the title good
- And US succeeded the title of Spain
(through Treaty of Paris)
- Plaintiff’s land not registered and he had
lost all rights and a mere trespasser
- Also, Benguet never brought under
civil or military government of the Spanish
Crown, so it is not certain whether
registration granted was under Spanish
laws
- Plaintiff argues:
- Argument seems to amount to denial of
native titles throughout an important Island of
Luzon
ISSUE
WON Carino owns the land
HELD
Ratio Prescription, mentioned in the royal cedula of
1754 states: “Where such possessors shall not be able to
produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall
show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription.”
- Decree of June 25, 1880 states: possession for certain
times shall be deemed owners; cultivated land 20 years,
uncultivated 30 years. Plaintiff’s father was owner of
land by the very terms of this decree.
- By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and
rights acquired there by the United States are to be
administered “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.”
Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing
cases to this court (Federal SC), and appeal the
exception, confined to equity in the main.
- Every presumption is and ought to be against the
government in a case like present.
- The reason for taking over the Philippines was different
(compared to occupation of white race against Native
Americans). Our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the
natives not to exploit their country for private gain.
- The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law.
Decision REVERSED
- Applicant should be granted what he seeks and should
not be deprived of what by the practice and belief of
those among whom he lived, was his property, through a
refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of
Spain.
KRIVENKO V REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MANILA
MORAN; November 15, 1947
FACTS
- Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
- December, 1941-Krivenko, alien, bought a residential
lot from the Magdalena Estate. Inc
- The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war.
- May, 1945-Krivenko sought to accomplish said
registration but the Register of Deeds of Manila (RDM)
denied on the ground that he is an alien and cannot
acquire land in this jurisdiction.
- Krivenko filed as suit in the CFI of Manila by means of a
consulta.
- CFI affirmed RDM's refusal hence this appeal.
- After the briefs have been presented, Krivenko filed a
motion to withdraw the appeal.
- The case was already voted upon and the majority
decision was being prepared.
- Rule 52, section 4 of the Rules of Court: Court's
discretion to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs
have been presented.
- The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever
and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it.
- While the motion was pending, a new circular of the
Department of Justice (Circular No. 128) dated August
12, 1947 was issued, instructing all register of deeds to
accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to
aliens.
- RDM naturally obeyed the circular.
ISSUE
Jurisdiction:
WON the Court should grant the motion withdrawing an
appeal with the issuance of the said circular of the DOJ
Primary Issue:
WON an alien under our Constitution may acquire
residential land.
HELD
The Court denied the motion withdrawing the appeal.
Granting a withdrawal of appeal is discretionary upon
the Court after the briefs have been presented.
- It cannot grant appellant's motion withdrawing his
appeal only because the constitutional issue should be
avoided.
- Also, the withdrawal was denied because under the
circumstances, particularly (1) the circular of the Dept.
of Justice issued while this case was pending before the
Court and ordering all registers of deed to accept for
registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens,
together with the circumstance that (2) probably a
similar question may never come up again before the
Court, the effect of the withdrawal would be offensive to
the opinion reached by a majority of the members of the
Court after long and exhaustive deliberations on the
constitutional question.
- To allow the withdrawal under such circumstances is
equivalent to tolerating an offense to the constitution,
offense that may be permanent.
- The Court held that NO, aliens may not acquire private
or public agricultural lands, including residential lands.
(The votes were: 8-3)
- The case was decided under section 5 of Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution which is more comprehensive and
more absolute in the sense that it PROHIBITS THE
TRANSFER TO ALIENS OF ANY PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL
LAND INCLUDING RESIDENTIAL LAND WHATEVER ITS
ORIGIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN.
- This provision closes the only remaining avenue
through which agricultural resources may leak into
aliens' hands.
- This provision should be read in connection with
section 1 of Article XIII "natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated" and with respect to public agricultural lands,
their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.
- This provision secures the policy of nationalization in
Sec. 1 of Art. XIII.
- It would be futile to prohibit the alienation of public
lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so
alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands
in the hands of the Filipino citizens.
- Ratio The Court shall rule that it cannot grant a motion
withdrawing an appeal if such a withdrawal would result
to a permanent offense to the Constitution.
- The Court shall rule that under the provisions of the
Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the
ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines
and as a consequence, all acquisitions made in
contravention of the prohibitions since the Constitution
became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.
LEE HONG HOK V DAVID
FERNANDO; December 27, 1972
FACTS
- Pedro, Simeon, Rosita and Leoncio LEE HONG HOK,
petitioners
- Aniano DAVID, the Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, the Director of Lands and Court of
Appeals
- APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
- Petitioners wanted to declare null and void David’s
Torrens Title (OCT No. 510) because they alleged to own
the disputed lot (226 m2 Lot 2892, which is a portion of
Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre) through accretion.
- Jun 18, 1958 – Director of Lands issued David a sales
patent of the lot
- Aug 26, 1959 – Undersecretary of Agricultural and
Natural Resources issued David a Miscellaneous Sales
Patent No. V-1209
- Oct 21, 1959 – Naga City Register of Deeds issued
David OCT No. 510
ISSUES
1. WON Lot 2892 came into being not by reclamation
but by accretion, therefore a private – not public -
domain (this court says it does not warrant any further
consideration)
2. WON authoritative doctrines do not preclude a party
other than the government to dispute the validity of a
grant (this court says it does)
3. WON the indefeasible character of a public land
patent after one year should not be recognized (this
court says it should be).
HELD
1. Imperium is the government authority possessed by
the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept
of sovereignty, and dominium is the state’s capacity to
own or acquire property. Dominium enables the state to
provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other
natural resources, including their disposition, except as
limited by the Constitution. The present Constitution
adopts the modified concept of jure regalia, in which all
lands – in Spain and its earlier decrees – were held by
the Crown, and the present Constitution holds that it is
the state which possesses ownership (Cariño v Insular
Government). In Valenton v Murciano (1904), all lands
held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored
to us (the Spanish state) according as they belong to us,
in order that after reserving before all what to us or to
our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem
necessary for public squares, ways, pastures and
commons in those places which are peopled, taking into
consideration not only their present condition, but also
their future and their probable increase, and after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for
tillage and pasturage, confirming in them in what they
now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest
of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us
to dispose of as we may wish.
In Montano v Insular Government, unappropriated
public lands constituting the public domain the sole
power is vested in Congress.
The land in question is not private property; the Director
of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources have always sustained the public character
thereof by virtue of reclamation (and not by accretion
which the petitioners claim).
Therefore, the only remedy for the appellants is an
action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud
committed by respondents.
There was no fraud; everything was done in the open –
notices were published, sale and awarding of land to
David were public official acts of a Government officer.
The disputed lot is a result of reclamation,
therefore a public land.
2. Only the government, represented by the Director of
Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void
certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent.
Plaintiffs are private parties and not government
officials, and therefore cannot institute for the
nullification of David’s Torrens Title, since they are not
the registered owners of the land and they had not been
declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga
Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.
Maninang v Consolacion states that “[t]he fact that the
grant was made by the government is undisputed.
Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not
is a question which the government may raise, but until
it is raised by the government and set aside, the
defendant (in this case, the respondents) cannot
question it. The legality of the grant is a question
between the grantee and the government.”
Only the government can question the validity of
the title which it gave.
3. Since the filing of the sales application of David and
during all the proceedings in connection with said
application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent
in his favor, the appellants did not put up any
opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to
them because after the registration and issuance of the
certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a
public land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of RA 496
subject to all the safeguards provided therein.
After registration and issuance of the certificate and
duplicate certificate of title based on a public land
patent, the land is automatically covered by RA 496 ---
RA 496 § 48 says that any question concerning the
validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should
be raised within one year from the date of the issuance
of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based
thereon becomes indefeasible.
In Aquino v Director of Lands (1919), “[t]he
proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under
the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are
the same in that both are against the whole world, both
take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the
decree of registration issued is conclusive and
final.
In Cabacug v Lao, “a holder of a land acquired under a
free patent is more favorably situated than that of an
owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent
have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition
the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor
the right to repurchase within a period of five years.”
David’s application was a renewal of his deceased wife’s
application, wherein his deceased wife occupied Lot
2892 since 1938.
The decision of Court of Appeals of January 31,
1961 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are
affirmed
GONZALES V MARCOS
FERNANDO; July 31, 1975
FACTS
- Gonzales assailed the validity of EO 30 as an
impermissible encroachment by the President on the
legislative prerogative
- EO 30 has the creation of a trust for the benefit of the
Filipino people under the name and style of the Cultural
Center of the Philippines to awaken our people’s
consciousness in the nation’s cultural heritage and
encourage its preservation, promotion and development
- In the Court of First Instance, stress was laid on the
funds administered by the Center as coming from
donations and contributions and not a single centavo
raised by taxation
- Respondents argue EO 30 as: 1) legitimate exercise of
executive power and that 2) this is supplementary to
rather than a disregard of RA 4165 creating the National
Commission on Culture and that 3) petitioner Gonzales
did not have the requisite personality to contest as a
taxpayer the validity of EO 30 as the funds held by the
Cultural Center came from donations and contributions
and not one centavo came from taxation
- Later, PD 15 was issued creating the Cultural Center of
the Philippines
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner has standing
2. WON EO 30 encroached on the legislative prerogative
3. WON the issue on the validity of EO 30 became moot
and academic
HELD
1. The court shall rule that taxpayer has no legal
standing to question executive acts that do not involve
the use of public funds
2.The court shall rule that the President had the power
to administer a trust created by an agreement with a
foreign country
3.EO 30 was superseded by PD 15, hence the suit has
assumed a moot and academic character
Obiter
(1)-The funds administered by the President of the
Philippines came from donations and contributions and
not by taxation
-There was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or
monetary interest
(2) –As head of State, as Chief Executive, as spokesman
in domestic and foreign affairs, in behalf of the estate
as parens patriae, the President has authority to
implement for the benefit of the Filipino people by
creating the Cultural Center consisting of private citizens
to administer the private contributions and donations
given not only by the US government but also by private
persons
-Creation of rules governing the administration of a trust
may be concurrently exercised by the President and
Congress
Decision DISMISSED, No standing and even if there
was, still no encroachment and that it is already moot
and academic
CRUZ V SECOF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RES
PER CURIAM; 6 December 2000
FACTS
- Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997)
- Indigenous peoples/cultural communities (IP/ICC)
-Group of people identified by self-ascription and
ascription by others, who have continuously lived as HELD
organized community on communally bounded and There was NO MAJORITY VOTE reached as the Justices
defined territory; were equally divided at 7-7. The case was then
- Ancestral lands (sec.3b IPRA) redeliberated upon, but the voting still remained the
- Land occupied by members of the ICC/IP since time same. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED
immemorial, by themselves or through their pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or Procedure.
traditional group ownership,... including residential lots, - Those in favor of dismissing petition:
rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms, J. Kapunan, J. Davide Jr., J. Bellosillo, J. Quisumbing, J.
and tree lots. Santiago, J. Puno, J. Mendoza
- Ancestral domains (sec.3a IPRA) - Those in favor of granting petition:
- Areas generally belonging to ICC/IP comprising lands, J. Panganiban, J. Vitug, J. Melo, J. Pardo, J. Buena, J.
inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources Gonzaga-Reyes, J. De Leon
therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICC/IP, by themselves or through their SEPARATE OPINIONS
ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial continuously to the present... including
PUNO [dismiss]
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural,
- Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the
and other lands individually owned, hunting grounds,
Philippine Legal System
burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral
A. Laws of the Indies: All lands became the exclusive
and other resources, and lands no longer occupied
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown.
exclusively by ICC but to which they had traditional
B. Valenton vs. Murciano (1904): "While the State has
access, particularly the home ranges of ICC who are still
always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if
nomadic or shifting cultivators.
he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time,
- Procedure: CRUZ and EUROPA, as citizens and
yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof
taxpayers (upon the plea that questions raised are of
before the proper administrative officers, and obtain
"transcendental importance"), filed for PROHIBITION
from them his deed, and until he did that the State
(directing NCIP to cease from implementing IPRA and its
remained the absolute owner."
IR; DENR Secretary to cease from implementing Circular
C. Public Land Acts (PLA) and the Torrens System: Under
2; DBM Secretary to cease from disbursing public funds)
the PLA, "public land" referred to all lands of the public
and MANDAMUS (commanding DENR Secretary to
domain whose title still remained in the government.
comply with his duty of carrying out the State's
The Torrens system requires that the government issue
constitutional mandate) assailing certain provisions
an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the
of RA8371 (IPRA) as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
person named is the owner of such property described.
The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible.
ISSUES
D. Philippine Constitutions: The Regalian Doctrine was
The following provisions of RA8371 and its Implementing
established 1935 Constitution, and it was reiterated in
Rules were questioned -
the 1973 and 1987 Consti.
(1) Sections 3a, 3b, 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 amount to an
-Provisions of IPRA do NOT contravene the Constitution
unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over
(1) AD and AL are the private property of the IP
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (including the
and do not constitute part of the land of the
minerals and other natural resources therein) in violation
public domains, as they have acquired such
of the REGALIAN DOCTRINE.
properties by NATIVE TITLE (AD/AL) and TORRENS
(2) Sections 3a and 3b violate the RIGHTS OF
TITLE (AL).
PRIVATE LANDOWNERS.
a. Native title presumes that the land is private and was
(3) Sections 51, 52, 53, 59, 63, 65, 66 which define the
never public. Carino is the only case that specifically and
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and make customary
categorically recognizes native title.
law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
b. For purposes of registration under the PLA and the
ancestral domains and lands, violate the DUE
Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts AL
PROCESS clause of the Constitution.
into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by
(4) Rule 7, Part 2, Section 1 of the NCIP Admin. Order
No.1, which provides that "the administrative
the State. The necessary implication is that AL is private.
(2) The right of ownership and possession by the
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
ICC/IP to their AD is a LIMITED form of ownership
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship
and does not include the right to alienate such
for purposes of policy and program coordination", is
AD.
invalid as it infringes upon the President's power of
a. It is private because it is not part of the public domain.
control over executive departments.
But the AD is owned in common by the ICC/IP and not by
one particular person. Communal rights to the land are
held not only by the present possessors but extends to
all generations of the ICC/IP.
b. Lands may be transferred only to the members of the
same ICC/IP; in accord with customary laws; and subject
to the right of redemption of IP for a period of 15 years if
transferred to a non-member of IP.
c. The indigenous concept of ownership exists even
without a paper title.
(3) The Regalian Doctrine has not been violated as
the right of ICC/IP to develop lands and NR within
the AD does not deprive the State of ownership
over the NR, and of control and supervision in
their development and exploitation.
a. Sec.7a limits the right of ownership of the IP. But the
Implementing Rules of IPRA included the term "natural
resources" in such rights of ownership which is
CONTRARY to Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti.
b. The small-scale utilization of NR in Sec.7b of the IPRA
is allowed under par.3, Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti.
Managing and conserving these resources, by their very
nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
c. The large-scale utilization of NR in Sec.57 of IPRA may
be harmonized with par.1 and 4, Sec.2 Art.12 of the
1987 Consti. The grant of priority rights implies that
there is a superior entity that owns these resources and
who has the power to grant such preferential rights.
(4) IPRA is a recognition of our active participation
in the International Indigenous Movement.
VITUG [grant]
(1) IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain
the ancestral domains, as the notion of community
property involves matters of proprietary interest AND
also some forms of self-governance over the property.
(2) The decision of the US Court in Carino vs. Insular
Government cannot override the collective will of the
people expressed in the Constitution.
(3) Art.12 sec.5 par.2- "The constitutional aim is to get
Congress to look closely into the customary laws and,
with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to,
and make them part of the stream of laws." There
should be a balancing of interests between specific need
of IP and imperatives of national interest.
KAPUNAN [dismiss]
~Preliminary issues-
(1) The petition presents an actual controversy.
(2) Petitioners have the requisite standing.
As citizens, they possess the public right to ensure that
the national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in
violation of the Constitution. As taxpayers, they possess
the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
(3) The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an
improper remedy.
(4) Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe
the hierarchy of courts, (petition should have been filed
in the lower court first) the Court assumes jurisdiction in
view of the importance of the issues raised.
~Substantive issues-
(1) The provisions recognizing ownership of IP
over the ancestral lands and domains are not
unconstitutional.
a. The Regalian theory does not negate native title to
lands held in private ownership since time immemorial.
b. Sec.1 Art.12 of 1935 Constitution does not state that
certain lands which are "absolutely necessary for social
welfare and existence," shall then be owned by the
State.
c. Sec.5 Art.12 expresses sovereign intent to "protect
the rights of IP to their AL." Framers did not intend
Congress to decide whether AD shall be public or private
property, as they have acknowledged that AD shall be
treated as private property.
(2) The provisions of RA8371 do not infringe upon
the State's ownership over the natural resources
within the ancestral domains.
a. Sec.3a merely defines coverage of AD; its purpose is
definitional and not declarative of a right or title. It does
not ipso facto convert the character of such natural
resources as private property of the IP.
b. The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike
native title to land, has NOT been recognized in the
Philippines.
(3) The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the
utilization of natural resources are not
unconstitutional.
a. Sec.2(3) Art.12 of the 1935 Consti allows small-scale
utilization of natural resources by its citizens. The State
retains full control over such activities, through the
imposition of requirements and conditions for the
exploration, development and utilization of the NR.
b. Under sec.7b, rights given to IP are duly
circumscribed and are limited:
• to manage and conserve NR within territories;
• to benefit and share the profits from allocation
and utilization of NR;
• to negotiate the terms and conditions for
exploration of NR in the area (refers only to the
preliminary activity of search and prospecting of
mineral resources);
• to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project
that will affect AD;
• to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages sustained by such projects;
• to effective measures by the government to
prevent any interference with these rights
c. Priority rights do not mean exclusive rights. The grant
of said priority rights is not a blanket authority to
disregard pertinent laws and regulations.
~Corollary issues-
(1) IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.
a. The property rights referred to in Sec.56 ("Existing
property regimes should be protected") belong to those
acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or non-
indigenous. Where the law does not distinguish, the
courts should not distinguish.
b. The fact that NCIP shall be composed exclusively of
members of IP does not mean that the NCIP is incapable,
or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to
the non-IP.
c. The application of customary law is limited to disputes
concerning property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of the AD, where ALL parties
involved are members of IP.
(2) Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe
upon the President's power of control over the
Executive Department.
Although NCIP is independent to a certain degree, it was
placed by Congress "under the Office of the President"
and as such, is still subject to the President's power of
control and supervision under Sec.17 Art.7 of the Consti.
MENDOZA [dismiss]
(1) It is not a justiciable controversy.
Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do
not involve actual cases or controversies without
upsetting balance of power.
(2) Petitioners do not have legal standing.
In Tanada v. Tuvera, when the question is one of public
right and the object of mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as
the real party in interest. But in this case, “what public
right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA
does not apply to them except in general and in
common with other citizens??”
PANGANIBAN [grant]
- RA8371 is unconstitutional in that-
A. It recognizes and grants rights of ownership
over "lands of the public domain which are owned
by the State."
B. It lessens the authority of the State to oversee
the "exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources" which should under be the full
control and supervision of the State."
(1) All Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to
the Constitution. Because of the State's implementation
of policies considered to be for the common good, all
those concerned have to give up, under certain
conditions, even vested rights of ownership.
(2) The concept of ownership of ICC/IP, even if it is a
collective right, still perpetually withdraws such property
from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by
other citizens of the Republic. Ownership of NR is in ALL
the Filipino people.
(3) Sec.3 Art.12 of the Consti provides that Filipino
citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of
alienable public land, but RA8371 speaks of no area or
term limits to ancestral lands and domains. Based on
ethnographic surveys, solicitor general estimates that
AD cover 80% of our mineral resources and between 8
and 10 million of the 30 milion hectares of land in the
country.
(4) Sec.2 Art.12 of the Consti provides that the State
may directly undertake exploration, development and
utilization of NR or it could enter into co-production, joint
venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens or entities at least 60% Filipino-owned (and such
agreements shall not exceed 25 years). RA 8371
relinquishes this power in favor of ICC/IP and they may
even exercise such right without any time limit.
(5) Yes, ICC/IP should be given priority in the use of their
AD and AL but they should not be granted perpetual
ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth
to the exclusion of other law-abiding Filipino citizens.
SUITS AGAINST THE STATE
ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec 3: The State shall not be sued without its consent
SHAUF V COURT OF APPEALS
REGALADO; November 27, 1990
FACTS
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married
to an American who is a member of the United States Air
Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance
Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at
Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. She
had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air
Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four years
at the time she applied for the same position in 1976.
her application was forwarded to Anthony Persi, who had
some reservations regarding Shauf’s work experience.
Persi then requested the Civilian Personnel Office to
initiate immediate inquiry to the Central Oversea
Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO). Persi was then
informed by CORRO that an Edward B. Isakson was
selected for the position. Isakson was placed on the rolls
at Clark Air Base on January 1977.
By reason of her non-selection to the position,
Loida Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity
complain against respondents for alleged discrimination
against the former by reason of her nationality and sex.
Trial court held in favor of Shauf, while Court of Appeals
reversed decision.
ISSUES
1. WoN the officers of the US Armed Forces
performing official functions in accordance with
the powers vested in them under the Philippine
American Military Bases Agreement are
immune from suit (even w/o consent of the
State).
2. WoN the respondents are guilty of
discrimination against petitioner Shauf.
3. WoN Shauf should be awarded compensatory
damages.
HELD
As expressed in Art. XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Consti,
the state may not be sued without its consent. This is a
generally accepted principle of International law under
Art II, Section 2. The case at hand may be construed as a
suit against the US, since the damages to Shauf will be
taken from funds of the US. However, it is also applicable
to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. Unauthorized acts of government officials are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials by
one whose rights have been invaded by such offenses, is
not a suit against the State covered by the rule of
immunity. The respondents are being sued in their
private and personal capacity. The rationale for this
ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity
cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice. A public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice and
in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority
or jurisdiction.
Doctrine Yes. Regalado is concurred with by Melencio-
Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento.
1. The US officers are NOT IMMUNE from suit even
without the consent of the State.
2. Yes the petitioners are guilty of discrimination
against Shauf. Despite Shauf’s qualifications,
Persi did not even consider the former’s
application. Since the petitioner was able to
prove the discrimination in the non-
consideration of her application, the burden
shifted to the respondents. The respondents
however answered with mere denials of the
charges.
3. Shauf need not be awarded compensatory
damages. There was no proof that she really
was to earn $39,662 if she was employed at the
time. Damages which are merely possible
are speculative. There must be an actual
proof of loss.
WYLIE V RARANG
GUTIERREZ; May 28, 1992
FACTS
Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the assistant
administrative officer and commanding officer,
respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent
Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office of the
Provost Marshal assigned as the merchandise control
guard.
Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of
the “Plan of the Day” a daily publication that featured
among others, an “action line inquiry”. On feb.3,1978,
an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods
were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the
merchandise control inspector and that a certain
“Auring” was, in herself, a disgrace to the office. Rarang,
being the only person named Auring in the said office,
went to press an action for damages against Wylie and
Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was
indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven
by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent
publication.)
She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious,
and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach
her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in
performance of their official functions as officers of the
US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval
Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the
US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties involved.
Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because
acts were not official acts of the US government, but
personal and tortious acts (which are not included in the
rule that a sovereign country can’t be sued without its
consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed.
ISSUES
1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine
Territory, in discharge of their official duties, are immune
from suit.
2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortious act
while discharging official functions still covered by the
principle of state immunity from suit?
HELD
1. Yes, they are immune.
Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the
US government are immune from suit (but only when
they are acting/ discharging their official functions. 
this is part of the second issue)
Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 consti provides that state may not
be sued without its consent. But even without this
affirmation, court is still bound by the doctrine of
incorporation4. The doctrine is applicable not only to
suits against the state but also to complaints filed
against officials for acts allegedly performed by them in
discharge of their official duties.
4
principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations.
Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to
comply with these principles in its relations with other states
The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from
being sued in the courts of another State without its
consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence
of the principles of independence and equality of States.
Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has
been necessary to distinguish them –– between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to
acts jure imperii.
There is no question, therefore, that the petitioners
actively participated in screening the features and
articles in the POD as part of their official functions.
Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of
their official functions are immune from suit, then it
should follow that the petitioners may not be held liable
for the questioned publication.
It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued
in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts
in publishing a libelous article.
2. No.
Ratio Our laws and, we presume, those of the United
States do not allow the commission of crimes in the
name of official duty. The general rule is that public
officials can be held personally accountable for acts
claimed to have been performed in connection with
official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where
there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot
institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability
nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other
official of the Republic.
Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or
omission, causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD
dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the
character and reputation of the private respondent.
Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the
Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of
the name Auring if the article were published. The
petitioners, however, were negligent because under
their direction they issued the publication without
deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra
vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious
act which ridiculed the private respondent. The
petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable
for the damages they caused the private respondent.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V GUINTO
CRUZ; February 26, 1990
FACTS
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to review the decision of the RTC of Angeles
City
- This case is a consolidation of four separate cases, all
involving state immunity.
G.R. No. 76607
- Private respondents Valencia, Tanglao and del Pilar
sued officers of the U.S. Air Force in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for
contracts for barbering services in the said base.
- Respondents sought to compel the Philippine Area
Exchange (PHAX) and individual petitioners to cancel the
award to defendant Dizon, to conduct rebidding and to
allow respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to
continue operating concessions pending litigation.
- Respondent court issued an order directing petitioners
to maintain the status quo.
- Petitioners filed motion to dismiss and
opposition to the petition for preliminary
injunction on the ground that the action was a suit
against the United States, which has not waived
its non-suability, and that as officials/employees
of the U.S. Air Force, defendants were also
immune from suit.
- Trial Court denied the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction as well as the motion to dismiss.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction in the SC.
G.R. No. 79470
- Genove filed a complaint for damages against
Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal
as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at John
Hay Air Station in Baguio City. After investigation, the ff:
facts were ascertained:
- Genove poured urine into the soup stock used in
cooking vegetables served to club customers.
- Lamachia, as club manager, suspended Genove
and referred the case to the Board of Arbitrators,
which found him guilty and recommended his
dismissal.
- Defendants, joined by the United States of
America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging
that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force,
was immune from suit, and that the suit was in
effect against the United States, which has not
given its consent to be sued.
- Said motion was denied.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction in the SC.
G.R. No. 80018
- Luis Bautista, was employed as barracks boy in Camp
O’ Donnel, an extension of Clark Air Base.
- He was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by individual petitioners King, Dye and
Bostick, officers of the United States Air Force and
special agents of the United States Air Force Office of
Special Operations, for violating R.A. 6425, or the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
- Bautista was dismissed from employment.
- He then filed a complaint for damages against
individual petitioners.
- Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the defendants were
acting in their official capacity when they did the
acts complained of and that the suit was against
the United States without its consent.
- Motion was denied by respondent judge.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction in the SC.
G.R. No. 80258
- Private respondents filed a complaint for damages for
injuries sustained as a result of the acts of herein
petitioners.
- According to plaintiffs (herein respondents), defendants
(herein petitioners) beat them up, handcuffed them and
unleashed dogs on them which bit them and caused
them extensive injuries.
- According to defendants, the plaintiffs were arrested
for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were
struggling and resisting arrest.
- The United States of America and the
individually named defendants moved to dismiss
the case and argued that the suit was in effect a
suit against the United States which has not given
its consent to be sued. The defendants also
claimed immunity for acts done by them in the
performance of their official functions.
- Trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the
motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction in the SC.
ISSUES
1. WON the cases against the petitioners were suits
against the United States, to which it has not consented
2. WON the individual petitioners may invoke immunity
from suit by mere assertion that the acts were done by
them in the performance of their official functions as
officers or agents of the United States
HELD
1) Ratio If the case involves the state entering into a
contract in the discharge of its commercial, proprietary
and private function, then the state will be deemed to
have impliedly consented to the suit.
Reasoning
- The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the
1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law.
- All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over the other.
- The rule says that a state may not be sued without its
consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it
consents.
- Consent may be express or implied.
- Express-embodied in a general or special law
- Implied-when the state enters into a contract or it
commences litigation
- However, not all contracts operate as a waiver of non-
suability—a distinction must be made between contracts
entered into in a state’s governmental and sovereign
capacity or private, proprietary and commercial capacity
- The latter implies waiver of non-suability, the former
does not.
* If it is not proven that the acts were done by the
individual petitioners in the performance of their official
functions as officers or agents of the United States, then
they may not invoke immunity form suit.
- The doctrine of state immunity is also applicable
to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties.
- The fact that the acts were done by the
individual petitioners in the performance of their
official functions as officers or agents of the
United States is a matter of evidence, and charges
against them may not be dismissed just by mere
assertion. If the individual petitioners are found liable for
personal torts in which the US itself is not involved, then
they alone must satisfy the judgment.
2) Ruling: (Application of ratio in the different cases)
G.R. No. 76607
- Barbershops subject of the concessions granted by US
are commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
The contracts being decidedly commercial, petitioners
cannot plead any immunity.
- Petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. 79470
- Restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station
partake of the nature of a business enterprise
undertaken by the US government in its proprietary
capacity. Petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state
immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit
against them.
- However, notwithstanding these considerations,
complaint in the court below must still be dismissed.
Although suable, the petitioners are not liable because of
the strength of evidence that they acted properly in
terminating Genove for his disgusting offense.
- Petition is granted, case against petitioners is
dismissed.
G.R. No. 80018
- Individually-named petitioners were acting in the
exercise of their official functions, and not in their
private or unofficial capacity.
- It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of
the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for
acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its
consent to be sued.
- Petition is granted, case against petitioners is
dismissed.
G.R. No. 80258
- The court hesitates to make a conclusion because the
record is too meager to indicate if the individual
petitioners were acting in the discharge of their official
functions, or had actually exceeded their authority.
- Only after needed inquiry in the lower court shall have
determined in what capacity the individual petitioners
were acting will the Court determine if the doctrine of
state immunity is applicable.
- Petition is dismissed and the respondent court is
directed to proceed with the hearing and decision.
JUSMAG PHILIPPINES V. NLRC
PUNO; December 15, 1994
FACTS
- Florencio Sacramento was one of the 74 security
assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG
Phils.; he had been with JUSMAG for more than 20yrs
(1969-1992); was dismissed on April 27, 1992
- He filed a complaint with the Dept. of Labor and
Employment (March 31, 1992) on the ground that he
was illegally suspended and dismissed; asked for
reinstatement
- JUSMAG filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its
immunity from suit as an agency of US; also alleged
lack of employer-employee rel’p and it has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued
- Labor Arbiter Daniel Cueto dismissed complaint for
want of jurisdiction
- NLRC reversed—JUSMAG had lost its right not to be
sued based on: 1) estoppel- JUSMAG failed to refute the
employer-employee rel’p under the control test and 2) it
has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired
Sacramento’s services.
- NLRC relied on Harry Lyons vs. USA (“US Govt
waived its immunity from suit by entering into a
contract of stevedoring services, and thus, it
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of local courts”)
- JUSMAG now contends that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in reversing the labor
arbiter’s decision, in saying that JUSMAG waived its
immunity from suit, in finding an employer-
employee relp between JUSMAG and Sacramento,
and in considering JUSMAG estopped from denying
that respondent is its employee for failure to
present proof.
ISSUE
Is the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the
RP (JUSMAG-PHIL) immune from suit?
HELD
Ratio As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of
immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or
governmental activities. The mantle of state immunity
cannot be extended to commercial, private and
proprietary acts.
Reasoning
- When JUSMAG took the services of Sacramento, it was
performing a governmental function on behalf of the US
pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement. The suit
is, in effect, one against the US and, considering that the
US has not waived or consented to the suit, the
complaint cannot prosper.
- Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally
recognized principles of international law that the Phils.
Recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land.
This is anchored on the principle of sovereign equality of
states (an equal has no power over an equal).
Discussion
- Historical Background of JUSMAG
- was created pursuant to the Military Assistance
Agreement dated March 21, 1947 between the
Philippines and the US; primary task was to advise
and assist the Philippines on air force, army and
naval matters
- in 1991, US manifested its preparedness to provide
funds to cover the salaries of SASP and security
guards, the rent of bldgs, and housing, and cost of
utilities
- Memorandum of Agreement between AFP and
JUSMAG-Phils
- Salaries- for security guards and SASP
- SASP are employees of the AFP; under the
total operational control of the Chief JUSMAG-
Phils; AFP to assume the severance/retirement
pay liability for all appointed SASP
- It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services
of private respondent, it was performing a
governmental function on behalf of the US. Hence,
the suit is, in effect, one against the US
Government.
- In this jurisdiction, Immunity of State is a
universally accepted principle. Immunity is
understood as the exemption of the state and its
organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state.
- A state cannot be sued in the courts of another
state, without its consent or waiver. An exception
to the doctrine, however, was recognized in Santos,
et al vs. Santos, et al: “the state itself may be sued,
even without its consent, because by entering into a
contract, the sovereign state has descended the
level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is
implied from the very act of entering into such
contract.”
- it was in this light that the state immunity issue in
Harry Lyons vs. USA was decided
- Exception evolved: existence of contract does
not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all
times, be sued in local courts.
 - US vs. Ruiz: “...does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions”
- US vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al: “petitioners cannot
invoke the doctrine of state immunity...the
reason is that by entering into the employment
contract with Genove in the discharge of its
proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself
of its sovereign immunity from suit.”
- SASP are employees of the AFP as consistently
contended by JUSMAG, thus it is not estopped from
denying employer-employee relationship
Dispositive Petition for certiori is granted, resolution of
NLRC is reversed and set aside
PNB V CIR
FERNANDO; January 31, 1978
FACTS
- Petitioner PNB received a notice of garnishment which
was served upon its branch on QC by an authorized
deputy sheriff of the court
*** What was sought to be garnished was the money of
the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
deposited at the petitioner’s branch in QC in order to
satisfy the decision of the respondent court
- PNB filed a motion to quash the notice based on 2
grounds:
1. the appointment of respondent Gilbert Lorenzo
as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of
execution was contrary to law
*** PNB contends that the service of notice by the
authorized deputy sheriff of this court contravenes Sec.
11 of Commonwealth Act No. 1055
*** It argues that it is the sheriff of QC and not the
Clerk of this court who is its Ex-officio Sheriff, that
has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment and
that the actual service of the latter officer of said notice
is therefore not in order
2. the funds subject of the character “may be
public in character”
- COIR denied PNB’s motion to quash a notice of
garnishment
ISSUE
WON an order of Court of Industrial Relations (COIR)
denying, for lack of merit, petitioner PNB’s motion to
quash a notice of garnishment6 can be stigmatized as a
grave abuse of discretion.
5
“All writs and processes issued by the court shall be served and executed
free of charge by provincial sheriffs or by any person authorized by this
court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance
6 Voting 10 justices concur, 1 dissent, 3 took no part.
Garnishment – a legal warning concerning the attachment of property to
satisfy a debt
-- also the attachment of such property
HELD Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Court’s decision. Hence,
No. There’s no grave abuse of discretion. this petition for review on certiorari.
Ratio
1. RA No. 4201 has already repealed Commonwealth ISSUES
Act No. 103, and under this law, it is now the Clerk of (1) WON the Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real
this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would have
Therefore, the Clerk of this Court has the authority to warranted the publications of the notices of as would
issue writs of execution and notices have foreclosure
2. First, the tone in asserting this argument was even (2) WON the SSS is immune from suit
irresolute. And 2nd, the People’s Homesite and Housing (3) WON SSS can be held liable for damages.
Corporation had a juridical existence enabling it to sue
and be sued. The premise that the funds spoken of are HELD
public in character may be accepted in the sense that it (1) Ratio On questions of appreciation of evidence,
was government-owned. However, it does not follow factual findings of the lower court are not subject to
that they were exempt from garnishment. review by this Court.
Reasoning The reasoning used precedence to arrive at
SSS v CA this ratio. Applying the rule, it can be said therefore, that
the findings of the Court of Appeals that the mortgage-
MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 21. 1983
debtors have not in fact violated their contract because
SSS accepted their installment payments although given
FACTS
late will not be disturbed on appeal.
- In March 1963, spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro
(2) Ratio An entity performing governmental functions,
Cancio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate
by virtue of the explicit provision of an enabling law, is
loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at
deemed to have waived immunity from suit, although it
Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal covered by
does not thereby concede its liability.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2000 of the Register of
Reasoning Again, the leg of reasoning is ratio by
Deeds of Rizal its collateral. Pursuant to this real estate
precedence, citing Rayo v. Court of First Instance of
loan said spouses executed on March 26, 1963 the
Bulacan, (110 SCRA 457), which involved the National
corresponding real estate mortgage originally in the
Power Corporation as an entity performing governmental
amount of P39,500.00 which was later increased to
functions. In that case it said, “It is sufficient to say that
P48,000.00 covering said property.
the government has organized a private corporation, put
- On July 9, 1968, defendant SSS filed an application with
money in it and has allowed it to site and be sued in any
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the
court under its charter.” The enabling law is R.A. No.
real estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the
6395. Applying this rule in the present case, the SSS’
ground, among others that the conditions of the
own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and
mortgage have been broken since October 1967 with the
be sued in Court, the enabling law being R.A. 1161 and
default on the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the
P.D. 24. Hence, there’s a statutory consent by the SSS to
installments then due and payable on the principal debt
waive right of immunity from suit.
and the interest thereon, and all of the monthly
(3) Ratio No moral and/or temperate damages is to be
installments due and payable thereafter up to the
adjudged against a party which commenced foreclosure
present date. Notice of the Sheriff's Sale of the
proceedings in view of the irregular payments of the
mortgaged property was initially published in the Sunday
debtor of his installments.
Chronicle in its issue of July 14, 1968 announcing the
Decision (1) The ruling of the lower courts remain.
sale at public auction of the said mortgaged property.
While it is true that the payments of the monthly
Despite plaintiff’s letter to defendant demanding the
installments were previously not regular, it is a fact that
latter to withdraw foreclosure and discontinue the
as of June 30, 1968 the appellee, David B. Cruz and
publication of the notice of sale of their property
Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-date and current in the
claiming that plaintiffs were up-to date in the payment of
payment of their monthly installments. Having accepted
their monthly amortizations, defendant SSS still went on
the prior late payments of the monthly installments, the
to publish second and third publications of foreclosure.
appellant could no longer suddenly and without prior
- On July 24, 1968, the plaintiff Cruz spouses instituted
notice to the mortgagors apply for the extra-judicial
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for
foreclosure of the mortgage.
damages and attorney's fees against the SSS and the
(2) SSS is deemed to have waived its immunity from
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging, among other things,
suit.
that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly
(3) SSS cannot be held liable for damages.
amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment.
Trial Court rendered judgment against defendant SSS.
 SEPARATE OPINION
MAKASIAR [dissent]
• What was committed in this case was a tortious act
(grossly negligent bordering on malice or bad faith) of
the employees of the SSS in foreclosing the mortgage
of the wrong mortgage-debtor
• SSS cannot be held liable for the damages caused by
the tortious acts of its employees in the performance
of their regular functions
• SSS as a public instrumentality for social welfare is
immune from suit despite its Charter provision that it
can sue and be sued.
• SSS exercises purely governmental functions and
cannot be sued without its consent for the tortious
acts of its personnel
COMMISIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS
V BURGOS
DE CASTRO; March 31, 1980
FACTS
- Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu
- The facts of the case is as per above except that the
compensation determined is now the issue. The value of
the property was pegged at P 2.37 per square meter
based on the price used in the conveyance of several
pieces of property in the same area at about the same
time. However, the court a quo in determining due
compensation, considered the value of the pesos to the
dollar at the time the case was being decided. So
instead of just P14,615.79 the amount awarded became
P49,459.34. (the original amount of 14,615.79 divided
by 2 {the exchange rate at the time of the taking to be
P2.00 to US$1.00} and the product being multiplied by
6.775). Based on this amount, the court determined
interest to be P145,410.44. Total due from the
government, including attorney’s fee of ten percent
amounted to P214,356.75.
- Apparently, the court a quo, in revising upward the
compensation, relied on Article 1250 of the New Civil
Code which provides for payment of an obligation in an
amount different from what has been agreed on because
of the supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or
deflation.
- The government, through the Solicitor General,
appealed the decision contending that the court a quo
erred in applying its method and violated the high
court’s order to make as a basis of compensation the
price or the value of the land when it was taken. The
Solicitor General also took issue with the award of ten
percent as attorney’s fees as exhorbitant considering
that Amigable only sought P5,000.00.
ISSUES
1. WON the compensation awarded by the court is
proper
2. WON the attorney’s fees awarded were exorbitant
HELD
1) In a review of the relevant Article of the New Civil
Code, the Court noted that the provision applies only if
there was a contract or agreement. Using the precedent,
Velasco vs Manila Electric (L-19390 December 29, 1971),
the court expressed the view that the taking of private
property by the government in the exercise of its
eminent domain does not give rise to a contractual
obligation. Since there is no contract to speak of
because the obligation of the government sought to be
enforced does not originate from contract, then Article
1250 does not apply. The just compensation is the value
of the property at the time it was taken.
- Amigable is still entitled to interest on the price of
the land as there was no motion of reconsideration
from the Solicitor General before the decision
became final.
2) The Court noted that Amgable only sked for
P5,000 attorney’s fees and hence the amount
requested is reasonable.
Dispositive Judgment appealed is reversed as to the
basis of determining the price of the land. And the price
of P2.37 per square meter or total amount is P14,615.79
plus six percent per annum interest reckoned from the
time the property was taken to the time the
compensation is paid.
GOVERNMENT
UNITED STATES V DORR
LADD; May 19, 1903
FACTS
The defendants, Fred Dorr et al., have been convicted
upon a complaint charging them with the offense of
writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel
against the Government of the United States or the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The
complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the
Commission7. The alleged libel was published as an
editorial in the issue of “Manila Freedom” of April 6,
1902. Virulent attacks on the Civil Commission and its
7 N.B. We need to answer this question first in order to be able to resolve
“Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish,
or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or
the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or
obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate
others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or
incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the
safety and order of the Government, or who shall unknowingly conceal such
evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the
discretion of the court.” (Italics mine) 
members, for instance the appointment of one Tecson as
justice of the peace and the branding of Trinidad H.
Pardo de Tavera as a coward and a rascal, were
explicitly raised among others. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. What is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the
expression “the Insular Government of the Philippines”?8
2. Whether the article constitutes an offense under
section 8 of Act No. 292?
HELD
1. Ratio The term “government” as employed in Act
No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission is
used in the abstract sense of the existing political
system as distinguished from the concrete organism of
the Government – the Houses of Congress and the
Executive.
Reasoning There are two admissible meanings of the
term “government” provided: a. in a general and
abstract sense, the existing laws and institutions of the
Islands, or b. the aggregate of the individuals by whom
the Government of the Islands is, for the time being,
administered. The first admissible definition is derived
from the act of (the U.S.) Congress on July 14, 1798,
commonly known as the Sedition Act)9
2. Ratio The publication of an article can not be
punished under Act No. 292 of the United States
Philippine Commission as having seditious tendencies
unless it has a tendency to produce disaffection or a
feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to
the Government and obedient to its laws.
- The publication of an article abusive of the United
States Philippine Commission and its members is not a
libel upon the Government and does not fall within said
Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission.
Reasoning The article in question contains no attack
upon the government system of the U.S., and though
grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a
body and some of its individual members, it contains no
attack upon the governmental system by which
authority of the U.S. is enforced in these Islands.
Furthermore, it is the character of the men who are
intrusted with the administration of the government that
the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by
impugning the purity of their motives, their public
integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom of
8
the next issue.
9
“It is made an offense to write, print, utter, publish or cause to procure to
be written, printed, uttered, or published or to knowingly and willingly assist
or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and
malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United States,
or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said
Government, or either House of said Congress, or the said President, or to
bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute, or to excite
against them or either any of them the hatred of the good people of the
United States…"
their policy. The publication of the article therefore, no
seditious tendency being apparent, constitutes no
offense under section 8 of Act No. 292)
Dispositive The judgment of conviction is reversed and
the defendants are acquitted.
TERRITORY
ART I NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and water embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of
its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its
territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters of the Philippines.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046
An Act to Define the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea of the Philippines
- Approved: 17 June 1961
Whereas clauses –
1. The following form part of territorial sea of the Phils:
• All waters within limits set forth in Treaty of
Paris (1898), US-Spain treaty (1900), and US-
Britain treaty (1930).
• All waters around, between and connecting the
various islands of the archipelago.
• All waters beyond outermost islands of
archipelago but within limits of boundaries set
forth in such treaties.
2. The baselines from which the territorial sea of
Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining
appropriate points of the outermost islands of the
archipelago.
Section 1 – It defines and describes the baselines for the
territorial sea of the Phils.
Section 2 – All waters within the baselines provided in
sec1 are considered inland or internal waters of the
Phils.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446
R.A. 5446 is simply an Act to correct typographical
errors in Section 1 of R.A. 3046 defining the baselines of
the territorial sea of the Philippines. It further says that
the definition of the baselines of the territorial seas of
the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is
without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of
the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated
in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Phils.
has acquired dominion and sovereignty. Approved
September 18, 1968.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596
June 11, 1978 - Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1596 declaring
certain area (the Kalayaan Island Group or more
commonly known as the “Spratly Islands”) as Philippine
territory as well as providing for its Government and
Administration.
• said area is vital to the security and economic
survival of the Philippines and much of it is part
of the continental margin of the Phil.
archipelago
• the area does not legally belong to any state or
nation and by reason of history, indispensable
need, effective occupation and control
established in accordance with international
law, said area (including its sea-bed, subsoil,
continental margin and air space) must be
deemed to belong to and subject to the
sovereignty of the Phil.
• other states’ claims to some of the area cannot
prevail over the claims of the Philippines on
legal, historical, and equitable grounds
• named it “Kalayaan” and constituted it as a
distinct and separate municipality of Palawan
• administration and government shall be vested
in the Secretary of National Defense or in other
Civil govt. or AFP officers as may be designated
by the Pres.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1599
Establishing an Exclusive Economic
Zone and for Other Purposes
- Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a seazone over which
a state has special rights over the exploration and use of
marine resources – Wikipedia
- It extends from two hundred nautical miles beyond and
from the baselines from which the territorial sea
- when it overlaps another EEZ, the common boundaries
shall be determined by countries
- What can be exercised in EEZ?
o Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration
and exploitation, conservation and management
of the natural resources
o Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to
the establishment and utilization of artificial
islands, off-shore terminals, installations and
structures, the preservation of the marine
environment, including the prevention and control
of pollution, and scientific research
o Other rights recognized by international law or
state practice
- It also restricts other countries from exercising the
rights above in our EEZ.
- Recognizes that other countries have EEZs
- The President may authorize a government agency to
promulgate rules for the purposes of this decree
- Anyone who violates any provision of the decree shall
be subject to a fine (P2,000-P100,000) or imprisonment
(6 mos – 10 yrs) or both. Vessels and other equipment or
articles used shall be confiscated.
PEOPLE
PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of
Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society and establish s Government that shall embody
our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to
ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and
a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and
peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican
State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
Sec 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof,
all citizens may be required, under conditions provided
by law, to render personal, military or civil service.
Sec 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
Sec 16: The State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful
ART III BILL OF RIGHTS
Sec 2:
Sec 7:
ART VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Sec 4:
ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec 2:

ART XVIII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Sec 25:
TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
VITUG; March 3, 2004
FACTS
- On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines
under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP).
- In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented
himself to be a natural-born citizen.
- His real name was stated to be “Fernando, Jr.” or
“Ronald Allan” Poe, born in Manila on August 20,
1939.
- On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition
before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the
ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
- According to Fornier, FPJ’s parents were
foreigners – his mother Bessie Kelley Poe was an
American and his father Allan F. Poe was a
Spanish national being a son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject.
- Even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship
to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate.
- Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to
a certain Paulita Gomez before marrying
Bessie Kelley according to an “uncertified”
copy of a supposed certification of the
marriage in July 5, 1936.
- Even if no such prior marriage existed,
Allan F. Poe married Bessey Kelley only a
year after the birth of FPJ. The marriage
certificate of their marriage reflected the
date of their marriage to be on September
16, 1940 where Allan was 25, unmarried
and Filipino, and Bessie was 22, unmarried
and American.
- FPJ’s earliest established ascendant was his
grandfather Lorenzo Pou.
- No birth certificate for Lorenzo but his death
certificate issued upon his death in September 11,
1954 at age 84 identified him as a Filipino
residing in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
- Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan
was born on May 17, 1915. The birth certificate of
Allan showed that his father was an Español
father and to a mestiza Español mother.
Procedure
- In the January 19, 2004 hearing before the COMELEC,
Fornier presented the following pieces of evidence:
- Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ
- Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita
Gomez-Poe attesting that she had filed a bigamy
case against Allan F. Poe because of his
relationship with Kelley (in Spanish)
English translation of (b)
- Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan
F. Poe
- Certification from the director of the Records
Management and Archives Office stating that a
Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the Philippines before
1907
- Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of
the National Archives stating that there was no
available information regarding the birth of Allan
F. Poe
- FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among
others:
- Certification that there was no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in
the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan
- Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that there was no
available information about the marriage of Allan
F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
- Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe
- Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds
of Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
- Copies of tax declarations under the name of
Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley
- Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of
San Carlos, Pangasinan stating that the records of
the birth of the said office from 1900 to May 1946
were destroyed during World War II
- January 23, 2004 – COMELEC dismissed the Fornier
petition for lack of merit and Fornier filed a motion for
reconsideration on January 26, 2004. The motion was
denied by the COMELEC en banc on February 6, 2004.
- February 10, 2004 – Fornier filed a petition before the
Supreme Court, praying for TRO, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the
finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
- The two other petitions (Tecson and Desidero v.
COMELEC and Velez v. Poe) challenge the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC and assert that only the Supreme Court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
basic issue on the case.
ISSUES
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases
filed?
2. Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on
the ground that he materially misrepresented in his
certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born
Filipino?
HELD
1. Ratio Jurisdiction issue
- The COMELEC’s decision on disqualified cases
involving a presidential candidate could be
elevated to and could be taken cognizance by the
Supreme Court.
- The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would not
include cases directly brought before it
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
Reasoning
- Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases
filed?
- Fornier petition - Yes
- In seeking the disqualification of FPJ before the
COMELEC, Fornier relied on the following:
- “A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section
74 is false…” (Omnibus Election Code, Sec.
78)
- “…the Commission shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of
enduring free, orderly and honest
elections…” (Sec. 52, same)
- “any interested party” authorized to file a
verified petition to deny or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance
candidate (Art. 69, same)
- Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification
cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule
65). Aside from that, according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of
the Constitution, “any decision, order or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt thereof.”
- Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court
which includes the duty of the courts to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch of
instrumentality of the government. (Art. 8, Sec. 1,
Constitution).
- Tecson petition and Velez petition - No
- The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art.
7, Sec 4(7) of the Constitution in assailing the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction when it took cognizance of
 the Fornier petition because the “Supreme Court
sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
- A “contest” refers to a post-election scenario.
Election contests are either election protests or a
quo warranto which would have the objective of
dislodging the winner from office. The Rules of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal state:
- “Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all
contests…relating to qualifications of the
President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.” (Rule 12)
- “An election contest is initiated by the filing
of an election contest or a petition for quo-
warranto against the President or Vice-
President.” (Rule 13)
- “Only the registered candidate for President
or Vice-President who received the second or
third highest number of votes may contest
the election of the President or the Vice-
President…by filing a verified petition…within
30 days after the proclamation of the
winner.” (Rule 14)
- The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal
over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President and the Vice
President and not candidates for President or
Vice-President.
2. Ratio FPJ’s citizenship issue (Voting 6 concur, 7
dissent, 1 abstention and 1 separate opinion)
- The distinctions between legitimacy and
illegitimacy should only remain in the sphere of
civil law and should not unduly impinge on the
domain of political law.
- The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino regardless of
whether such children are legitimate of
illegitimate.
Reasoning
- Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on
the ground that he materially misrepresented in his
certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born
Filipino?
- Concept of citizenship
- Aristotle described a citizen as a man who
shared in the administration of justice and in the
holding of an office and the state would be
composed of such individuals in order to achieve
a self-sufficient existence.
- Citizenship deals with rights and entitlements on
the one hand and with concomitant obligations on
the other.
- Citizenship underwent changes in the 18th to 20th
centuries.
- In the 18th century, the concept was civil
citizenship which established the rights
necessary for necessary for individual
freedom (eg. Rights to property, personal
liberty and justice)
- In the 19th century, it expanded to include
political citizenship which encompassed the
right to participate in the exercise of political
power.
- In the 20th century, there was the
development of social citizenship which laid
emphasis on the right of the citizen to
economic well-being and social security.
- Internationalization of citizenship is an
ongoing development.
- Citizenship in the Philippines from the Spanish
times to the present
- During the Spanish period, no such term as
“Philippine citizens,” only “Spanish subjects.” In
church records, natives were identified as
“indios.”
- Spanish laws on citizenship included:
- Order de la Regencia of 1841
- Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 (defined
the political status of children born in the
Philippines)
- Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 1870
- The 1876 Spanish Constitution was not
extended to the Philippines because the
colony was to be governed by special laws.
- According to the Civil Code of Spain, the
following were Spanish citizens:
- Persons born in Spanish territory
- Children of a Spanish father or mother
even if they were born outside Spain
- Foreigners who have obtained
naturalization papers
- Those who, without such papers, may
have become domiciled inhabitants of any
town of the Monarchy
- Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated that the
civil and political status of the native inhabitants
would be determined by the US Congress.
Spanish subjects and natives who choose to
remain in the territory may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making a
declaration of their decision within a year from
the date of the ratification of the treaty. If no
such declaration is made, their allegiance shall be
held renounced and they would have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they reside.
- Upon ratification of the treaty, the native
inhabitants of the Philippines became Spanish
subjects.
- They did not become American citizens but
were issued passports describing them to be
citizens of the Philippines entitled to
protection of the US.
- Philippine Organic Act of 1902 – first appearance
of the term “citizens of the Philippine islands.” A
citizen of the Philippine islands under this Act
was:
- An inhabitant of the Philippines and a
Spanish subject on April 11, 1899.
- An inhabitant meant:
- A native born inhabitant
- An inhabitant who was a native of Spain
- An inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before April 11, 1899.
- Controversy as to the citizenship of a child
born between April 11, 1899 and July 1, 1902
as there was no citizenship law in the
Philippines. The common law principle jus
soli (principle of territoriality) was said to
govern those born in the Philippines during
this time.
- Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) – A native
born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to
be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899
if:
- A Spanish subject on April 11, 1899
- Residing in the Philippines on the said date
- Since that date, not a citizen of another
country
- 1935 Constitution – provided that jus sanguinis
(blood relationship) be the basis for citizenship, as
stated in Sec. 1, Art. 3:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution
- Those born in the Philippine Islands of
foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands
- Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines
- Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship
- Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law
- 1973 Constitution – Corrected Sec. 1, Art. 3 (4)
of the 1935 Constitution, which, when taken
together with the existing civil law provisions
would provide that women would automatically
lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of
their foreign husbands. This was deemed
discriminatory in that it incapacitated the Filipino
woman from transmitting her citizenship to her
legitimate children and required illegitimate
children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The provisions of Sec. 1, Art. 3 of the 1973
 Constitution state that the following are citizens of
the Philippines:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution
- Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines
- Those who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the 1935
Constitution
- Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law
- Add Sec. 2 of the same article which
provided that a female citizen of the
Philippines who marries an alien retainers her
Philippine citizenship unless by her act or
omission she is deemed to have renounced
her citizenship under the law.
- 1987 Constitution – aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable
proviso in the 1935 Constitution which outlines in
Article 4, Sec. 1 that the following are Filipino
citizens:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution
- Those whose fathers and mothers are
citizens of the Philippines
- Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
- Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
- The Constitution requires that the President of the
Philippines should be, among the many
requirements, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines (Art. 7, Sec. 2).
- Natural born citizen – citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship
- Citizenship of FPJ in relation to grandfather
Lorenzo Pou’s citizenship and father Allan F. Poe’s
citizenship
- Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen because
his father Lorenzo was also Filipino.
- Conclusions with some degree of certainty
to be drawn from the documents
presented:
- The parents of FPJ were Allen Poe and
Bessie Kelley.
- FPJ was born to them on August 20,
1939.
- Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married to each other on September
16, 1940.
- The father of Allan F. Poe was
Lorenzo Pou.
- For proof of filiation or paternity, the
mandatory rules of civil law would not apply
- At the time of his death on
September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Poe was
84 years old.
- The public documents submitted are
deemed trustworthy.
- The three documents (birth
certificate of FPJ, marriage certificate
of Bessie and Allan and the death
certificate of Lorenzo) were certified
true copies of the originals.
- The Rules of Court (130, Section 3)
state that when the subject of the
inquiry is the content of the document,
no evidence shall be admissible except
the original document itself. One of
the exceptions however is when the
original is a public record in the
custody of a public office is recorded in
a public office.
- As public documents, the three
documents are prima facie proof of
their contents as stated in the Rules of
Court (130, Section 44) that the entries
in official records made by a public
officer in the performance of his duty
are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. This is grounded on:’
of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made. The penalty affixed
to a breach of that duty. Routine and
disinterested origin of most such
statements. Publicity of the record
which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have
occurred
- It is safe to assume that Lorenzo Pou’s
place of residence at the time of death was
the same as his residence before death in
the absence of evidence that would attest
otherwise. In that case, Lorenzo Pou would
have benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill
effected in 1902. This citizenship would
then extend to his son Allan F. Poe, FPJ’s
father.
- Lorenzo born sometime in 1870
during the Spanish colonization period.
- Fornier argues that Lorenzo was not
in the Philippines during the crucial
period of 1898 to 1902 but there is no
existing record to attest to that claim.
- Fornier failed to show that Lorenzo
was out of the country during that
same time period.
- Lorenzo’s residence at the time of
death was in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
in this case. The duly notarized declaration
by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, FPJ’s maternal
aunt and sister of his mother Bessie, proving
the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own
paternal relationship with FPJ (living with
Bessie and the children in one house as one
family) would be accepted.
- Fornier argues that the mandatory rules
under civil rule should apply because FPJ was
an illegitimate son.
- Acknowledgement needed to
establish paternity (eg.
Acknowledgement in the birth
certificate by signing name)
- In the FPJ case, there was no
signature of Allan F. Poe in the birth
certificate of FPJ.
- 1950 Civil Code – acknowledgement
of illegitimate children of three types
which had to be done during the
lifetime of the presumed parent:
- Voluntary (expressly made in
record birth, will or a statement
before the court in authentic
writing)
- Legal (in favor of full blood
brothers and sisters of an
illegitimate child who was
recognized as natural)
- Compulsory (demanded
generally in cases when the child
had in his favor any evidence to
prove filiation)
- The Family Code has liberalized
the rules as stated in Articles 172,
173 and 175 and the rules have
retroactive effect (Article 255).
These provisions are there to
govern the private and personal
affairs of the family. There is little
indication that this should also
govern his political rights.
- This should be taken in the context of civil
law, being that branch of law which is
concerned with the organization of the
family and regulation of property. The
relevance of citizenship is exemplified in
Art. 15 of the Civil Code.
- The proof of filiation for purposes of
determining citizenship status should be
deemed independent from those
prescribed for civil code purposes. The
ordinary rules should govern.
- DNA testing to prove paternity could also
be resorted to.
- There is no jurisprudence to prove that an
illegitimate child cannot inherit his father’s
citizenship.
 - Fornier argues that even if Allan F. Poe were
Filipino, Allan’s citizenship would not have
been transmitted to FPJ because FPJ was
illegitimate.
- FPJ was alleged to be illegitimate because of
the bigamous marriage between his parents
Allan and Bessie for the reason that Allan
allegedly had a prior existing marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez. The Court held that
the veracity of this marriage between Paulita
and Allan is doubtful.
- Fornier also contended that even if Allan
and Bessie’s marriage was not bigamous, FPJ
was still illegitimate because his parents were
married after he was born. Fornier based his
arguments on the cases of Morano v. Vivo,
Chiongbian v. de Leon and Serra v. Republic.
- In the cases cited above, it is
important to note the lis mota in each
case. If the pronouncement of jus
sangunis was in the lis mota, it would
constitute doctrine courtesy of stare
decisis. If not, it is mere obiter dictum.
- In all of the mentioned cases, there
was no jus sanguinis in the lis mota of
the cases. If there was jus sangunis
mentioned, it was mere obiter dictum.
- The pronouncement that an illegitimate
child cannot inherit the father’s citizenship
has no textual basis in the Constitution and
violates the equal protection clause.
- For jurisprudence that regarded an
illegitimate child to inherit the mother’s
citizenship, it was there to ensure a Filipino
nationality for the child with the assumption
that the mother would gain custody.
- The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ since
he was born during that time period and it
states that Filipino citizens include those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
Decision
1. The evidence does not establish conclusively FPJ’s
citizenship but the evidence preponderates in his favor
to hold that he could not be guilty of misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy. Fornier v. COMELEC
DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC for dismissing the original
petition.
2. Tecson v. COMELEC and Velez v, Poe DISMISSED for
want of jurisdiction.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO
Jurisdiction
- SC is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction
- Tecson and Valdez petitions – petitioners cannot
invoke Art VII S4 of the Constitution because the
word “contest” means that the Court can only be
invoked after the election and proclamation of a
President or Vice President. There can be no
“contest” before a winner is proclaimed.
- Fornier petition – as a review under R64 in
relation to R65 of the RoC, Court has jurisdiction.
- COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it ruled that petitioner failed to prove by
substantial evidence that FPJ deliberately
misrepresented that he is a natural-born Filipino citizan
in his CoC
- Certiorari power of the SC to review COMELEC
decisions is a limited power
- Can only reverse or change the COMELEC
decision on the ground that COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion (despotic, arbitrary or
capricious)
- The ruling of the COMELEC denying the petition to
disqualify respondent Poe is based on substantial
evidence, hence is not despotic, whimsical or capricious
- Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC – - Favors of remand cannot be extended to the
misrepresentation must not only be material but
also deliberate and willful
- Petitioner has burden to prove evidence to show
that (1) respondent made misrepresentation in his
CoC, (2) that misrepresentation is material to the
position to which he is candidate and (3) that
material misrepresentation was made deliberately
and willfully
- Analysis of petitioner’s evidence
- Certificate of birth – only proved the date of birth
of FPJ, not that he is not a natural-born citizen
- Sworn statements of Paulita Gomez charging
Allan Poe with bigamy and marriage license of
between Allan Poe and Paulita Gomez, presented
thru Dir. Manapat – pulled out because they were
fabricated
- Respondent submitted affidavits that show
that the files submitted by the petitioner are
fabricated by Manapat’s instructions
- Petitioner claims that the affidavits must not
be considered because of technical grounds
- SC ruled that the COMELEC is a quasi-
judicial body and are not bound by the
technical rules of evidence.
- Birth certificate of Allan Poe – also fabricated;
does not prove anything besides birth
- Certification of Dir. Manapat that the National
Archives has no record that Lorenzo Pou entered
or resided in the Philippines before 1907 –
manufactured
- Certification of Estrella Domingo, OIC Archives
Div that the Register of Births that there is no
information on the National Archives on the birth
of Allan Poe to the spouse Lorenzo Pou and Marta
Reyes – lack of information is not proof
- Poe from the time of his involuntary birth has
always conducted himself as Filipino
- “For failure of the petitioner to discharge the
burden of proof, Poe is entitled to an outright
dismissal of the Fornier petition.” Poe does not
need to present contrary evidence for the burden
of proof is not shifted to him.
- Assuming that COMELEC gravely abused its jurisdiction
and the issue of whether respondent Poe is a natural-
born citizen Filipino should now be resolved, the Fornier
petition need not be remanded to the COMELEC for
further reception of evidence
- Remand to the COMELEC to give the petitioner a
second opportunity to prove his case is a palpable error
- “In light of these erudite opinions of our amici
curae, it is daylight clear that petitioner Fornier is
not only wring with his facts but also wrong with
his law.
- Remand means a new round of litigation in the
COMELEC when its proceedings have long been
closed and terminated; to give another chance to
prove facts which he failed to prove before
litigant because of political neutrality
- Remand will change the nature of a Sec 78 proceeding
by judicial legislation, hence, unconstitutional
- Principal issue: whether respondent deliberately
made a material misrepresentation in his CoC
when he wrote that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen
- Remanding the case to COMELEC will change the
character of a S78 proceeding (WON FOJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen will be the main issue
and not just an issue incidental to the issue of
material misrepresentation)
- SC cannot engage in judicial legislation as it is
something only legislature can change by another
law
- Remand will violate respondent Poe’s right to due
process, hence, unconstitutional
- If case were remanded to the COMELEC, the
body is no longer an impartial tribunal is there are
three of the seven members of the commission
that have given firm view that Poe is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen
- Remand will delay the resolution of the issue of
whether respondent Poe is qualified. Delay will also
prejudice his candidacy and will favor his political
opponents.
- “The right to run for public office includes the
right to equal chance to compete. The right to run
is empty if the chance to win is diminished of
denied a candidate.
- To avoid delay, the court should itself decide the issue
and declare respondent Poe as a natural-born citizen on
the basis of the evidence adduced before the COMELEC
 - Whether respondent Poe is illegitimate is irrelevant in
determining his status as natural-born citizen --- that is
the law.
- The law does not make any distinction in
applying jus sanguinis to illegitimate children.
- Morano v Vivo – WON the stepson was to file the
natural cerebral house.
- Chiongbian v de Leon – a legitimate son whose
father became Filipino because of election to a
public office before the 1935 constitution
- Serra v Republic – an illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother
- Paa v Chan – Quintin claims that his father is
Filipino because his grandmother is a Filipina. The
court ruled that since there is no proof that his
grandmother is Filipino then his father is not
Filipino thereby not making him Filipino as well.
The court’s ruling should have stopped here but
the SC followed with an obiter dictum that even if
Quintin’s father were Filipino, he would not be
Filipino because he was illegitimate.
- The statements on the illegitimate child
were unnecessary and were just obiter dicta
and not ratio decidendi, therefore do not
constitute stare decisis.
- Obiter dicta do not establish doctrine even if
repeated endlessly.
- Reasons why court should create new doctrine:
- There is no textual foundation
- It violates the equal protection clause
- People v Cayat – established the doctrine on
constitutionally allowable distinctions. Such
distinction must be germane to the purpose
of the law.
- Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor – “The duty
of this Court is to forsake and abandon any
doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the
law in force.”
- Ubi les non distinguit ne nos distinguere
debemus, especially if the distinction has no
textual
- Merlin Magallona – transmissive essence of
citizenship
- To establish that respondent Poe is a natural-born
citizen, all that is needed is proof of his filiation to his
father Allan Poe, a Filipino citizen --- that is the critical
fact.
- Filipino citizenship of Allan Poe, respondent’s father is
well established.
- To disqualify respondent Poe because he is illegitimate
will violate our treaty obligation.
Dispositive Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is
qualified to run for President involves a constitutional
issue but its political tone is no less dominant. The Court
is split down the middle on the citizenship of respondent
Poe, an issue of first impression made more difficult by
the interplay of national and international law. Given the
indecisiveness of the votes of the members of this Court,
the better policy approach is to let the people decide
who will be the next President. For on political
questions, this Court may err but the sovereign people
will not. To be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the
unelected members of this Court the right to elect in
behalf of the people.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434,
161634 and 161824 are DISMISSED.
DAVIDE
FACTS
- January 9, 2004 – Fornier filed petition to disqualify FPJ
and to cancel his certificate of candidacy for the May 10
elections because of he is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen
- January 23, 2004 – COMELEC dismissed the case
declaring that its jurisdiction is limited to all matters
relating to election, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial and city officials, but not
those of national officials like the president.
- but it has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
citizenship of national officials under sec 78 of
OECon petitions to deny due course or cancel
certificates of candidacy on the ground of false
material representation.
- Findings:
- Fornier evidence is not substantial
- FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material
representation when he stated that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen
- Tecson and Desiderio, Jr prayed special civil action of
certiorari under R65 RoC to challenge jurisdiction of
COMELEC over the issue of FPJ’s citizenship. They claim
that only the Sc has jurisdiction (ArtVII S4, consti)
- January 29, 2004 - Velez filed petition with the ff issues:
- Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
petitions to deny due course or cancel certificated
of candidacy of Presidential candidates
- Whether SC has jurisdiction over the petitions of
Tecson, Velez and Fornier
- Whether FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, if he’s
a natural-born Filipino citizen
Jurisdiction
- Tecson and Velez petitions
- The provision in the constitution only refers to
past-election remedies, they should have resorted
to pre-election remedies in the OEC which are
implemented by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
- Pre-election remedies are not within the
jurisdiction of the SC
- Under the OEC, COMELEC has original
jurisdiction to determine whether a candidate for
an elective office ineligible for the office for which
he filed his certificate of candidacy because of
any of the recognized grounds for disqualification.
- Fornier petition
- SC has jurisdiction over the case under (Art IX-A
S7 Consti )
- SC can take cognizance of issue of WON
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
challenged resolution by virtue of (ArtVIII S1
Consti)
WON FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen
Facts:
1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila,
Philippines.
2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16
September 1940.
4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo
Poe, albeit a Spanish subject, was not shown to have
declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Treaty
of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Ratio For the purposes of citizenship, an illegitimate
child whose father is Filipino and whose mother is an
alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child
to follow the citizenship of the father
COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen pursuant to Art IV
S1 per 3 consti. The provision did not make any
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children
of Filipino fathers.
Petitions are dismissed.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
May court exercise judicial power to disqualify a
candidate before the election?
- Court may not. It will wreck the constitutional right of
the people to choose their candidates.
Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC
- Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a retired member of
this Court, in his Separate Opinion said, “In my view, the
issue in this case is whether the Commission on
Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the
ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which
they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that
the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only
in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo
warranto or an election protest in the appropriate
forum.”
- Ruling of COMELEC is the same as Mandoza opinion.
- Disqualifying respondent Poe will be viewed as directed
against the “masses,” a situation not allowed by the
Constitution. The SC may become like the Iranian
Guardian Council.This Court, as the last guardian of
democracy, has the duty to protect the right of our
nation to a genuine, free and fair election.
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissinG Fornier’s petition for
disqualification against respondent
- Salcedo v COMELEC – the only instance when a petition
raising the qualifications of a registered candidate is
before election (S78 OEC)
- To justify the cancellation of CoC, false
representation mentioned must pertain to
material matter
- There must be deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide fact which would render a
candidate ineligible
- Fornier petition brought under R65 RoCP – where
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in Jan 23
and Feb 6 resolutions holding that “considering the
evidence presented by the petitioner is not substantial,
we declare that the respondent did not commit any
material misrepresentation when he stated in his CoC
that he is a natural born Filipino citizen”
Allegations in the COMELEC petition:
1. Respondent Poe committed false material
representation by stating in his Certificate of
Candidacy that he is a natural born Filipino
citizen; and
2. He knowingly made such false representation.
- FPJ is not a citizen because both his parents are
aliens.
- Director Manapat of the National Archives
falsified the marriage contract of FPJ’s parents
and his father’s birth certificate.
- Ei incumbit probation qui decit, non que negat. –
he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove;
S1 R131 RroE; Borlongan v Madrideo – burden of
proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of
an issue
- Fornier failed to prove allegations; writ of
certiorari can only be granted if it can be proven
that COMELEC committed a grave abuse of
discretion;
-Grave abuse of discretion – capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross that it amounted to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law
- We cannot discern from the records any indication that
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
Fornier’s petition. Indeed, his availment of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari is grossly misplaced.
Whether the respondent committed a material and false
representation when he declared in his CoC that he is a
natural-bron Filipino citizen
- COMELEC held that the FPJ did not commit any material
misrepresentation in his CoC because his father is a
Filipino by virtue of jus sanguinis and under the 1935
constitution.
- Valles v COMELEC – Philippine law on citizenship
adheres to jus sanguinis
- FPJ is Filipino citizen, having been born to a
Filipino father
- Petitioners claim that Allan Fernando Poe is a
citizen of Spain because his
- Marriage Contract with Paulita Gomez shows
that his parents are citizens of Spain.
- The marriage certificate was shown to have
been falsified.
- Fornier did not dispute that Allan Fernando Poe
is the father of FPJ
- Allan’s father, Lorenzo Pou is a Spanish subject
and an inhabitant of the Philippines on April 11,
1899 when Spain ceded the Philippines (Treaty of
Paris, Phil Bill 1902 and Jones Law)
- In re Bosque – expiration of the term of 18 months
without making an express declaration of intention to
retain their Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of the
latter and thereby becoming subjects of the new
sovereign in the same manner as the natives of these
islands
- Palanca v Republic –
- “A person, who was an inhabitant of the
Philippine Islands and a naturalized subject of
Spain on the 11th day of April 1899, is a Filipino
citizen, by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 4 of the
Act of Congress on 1 July 1902 and of Sec. 2 of
the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. Under the
Constitution, he is also a citizen of the Philippines
because he was such at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution.”
- Constitution did not specify in referring to those
whose fathers are Filipino citizens as to whether
this only applies to legitimate children or not.
- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus, especially if the distinction has no
textual foundation in the Constitution, serves no
state interest, and even imposes an injustice on
an innocent child. (Fr Bernas)
- To introduce a distinction between legitimacy or
illegitimacy in the status of the child vis-à-vis the
derivation of his citizenship from the father
defeats the transmissive essence of citizenship in
blood relationship. (Dean Merlin Magalona)
In fine, I reiterate that the COMELEC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in rendering its assailed Resolutions
dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004.
WHEREFORE, I concur with Justice Jose C. Vitug in his
ponencia and with Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno in his
Separate Opinion DISMISSING Fornier’s petition
CARPIO-MORALES
Issues for Resolution:
1) Whether this Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of presidential
candidates;
2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it issues its Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004
and Feb. 6, 2004, dismissing the Petition for
Disqualification;
3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino and therefore
qualified to seek election as President.
1) Jurisdiction:
- Petitions in G.R. Nos. 161464 and 161634
- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez assert that
this Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to
determine whether FPJ is qualified to be a
candidate for President: paragraph 7, Section 4
of Article VII of the Constitution:
- The Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules
for the purpose.
- refers to this Court’s jurisdiction over
electoral contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President,
and not to the qualifications or
disqualifications of a presidential
candidate. FPJ is still just a candidate;
petition: premature.
- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez claim that
the issue of FPJ’s qualification for the
Presidency may also be brought directly to this
Court on the basis of Section 1 of Article VIII of
the Constitution through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, specially
considering that the instant case is one of
transcendental importance.
- a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is not available where
there is another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law—like in this case: (to intervene in the
Petition for Disqualification)
- in determining whether procedural rules,
such as standing, should be relaxed on the
ground of “transcendental importance,” the
following should be considered: the lack of
any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions
being raised. Considering that the
substantive issues raised by petitioners
Tecson et al. and Velez in G.R. Nos. 161434
and 161634, respectively, are virtually
identical to those raised by petitioner
Fornier in G.R. No. 161824, this Court is not
convinced that the “transcendental
importance” of the issues raised herein
justifies a direct resort to this Court under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or the
exercise of its expanded certiorari
jurisdiction under Sec. 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
- Petition in G.R. No. 161824
 - this Court definitely has jurisdiction over the
petition for Certiorari questioning the
Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004,
issued by COMELEC: Section 7 of Art. IX-A of the
Constitution vests this Court with the power of
review over decisions, orders, or rulings of the
COMELEC.
- COMELEC’s Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter of
the Petition for Disqualification Under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
- not really a constitutional question…
2) Whether The COMELEC Acted with Grave Abuse
of Discretion in Dismissing the Petition for is
qualification for Lack of Merit.
- the COMELEC did indeed act with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing them:
- By resolving to dismiss the petition in the Petition
for Disqualification without stating the factual bases
therefore:
- Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides that “[n]o decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based.”
- By resolving to dismiss the Petition for
Disqualification without ruling categorically on the
issue of FPJ’s citizenship.
- To justify its evasion of the duty to rule
squarely on the issue of citizenship, the
COMELEC relies on this Court’s ruling in Salcedo
II v. Commission on Elections, and held that
held that Fornier should have presented “proof
of misrepresentation with a deliberate attempt
to mislead” on the part of FPJ— confined the
issue in the Petition for Disqualification to
whether FPJ “must have known or have been
aware of the falsehood as [allegedly] appearing
on his certificate.”
- Carpio-Morales: it is impossible for the
COMELEC to determine whether FPJ was aware
of a false material representation in his
Certificate of Candidacy without first
determining whether such material
representation (in this case, his claim of
natural-born citizenship) was false. The fact
alone that there is a public document (i.e., his
birth certificate) which FPJ might have relied
upon in averring natural-born citizenship does
not automatically exclude the possibility that
(a) there is other evidence to show that such
averment is false, and (b) that FPJ was aware of
such evidence.
3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
- Five crucial factual questions
(1) Whether Lorenzo Pou has been established to
be a Filipino citizen at the time of the birth of his
son, Allan F. Poe;
- the evidence presented does not show that nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his
Lorenzo Pou acquired Philippine citizenship by citizenship (nothing more to do to acquire
virtue of the Treaty of Paris or the Organic Acts citizenship = natural born).
covering the Philippine Islands. (no evidence as - no evidence has been submitted to show that
to his residence, only prima facie evidence.) Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge FPJ as his
(2) Whether Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ own son at birth
was a Filipino at the time of the birth of the latter; - Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and
- Claim: Allan F. Poe acquired Filipino citizenship was not acknowledged by his father, the only
independently of his father’s by virtue of jus possible Filipino parent, at the time of his
soli, Allan F. Poe having been allegedly born in birth, the inescapable conclusion is that he is
the Philippines on November 27, 1916. not a natural-born Philippine citizen.
- even assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe was Conclusion WHEREFORE, I vote to: (1) DISMISS the
born in the Philippines on November 27, 1916, petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 for being
such fact, per se, would not suffice to prove premature, (2) DECLARE COMELEC Resolutions dated
that he was a citizen of the Philippine Islands January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004, rendered in
absent a showing that he was judicially COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 NULL AND VOID, and (3)
declared to be a Filipino citizen: In Tan Chong v. DIRECT the COMELEC to cancel the Certificate of
Secretary of Labor, this Court ruled that the Candidacy of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando
principle jus soli or acquisition of citizenship by Poe Jr., for containing a false material representation.
place of birth was never extended or applied in
the Philippine Islands: IN RE: CHING
(3) Whether FPJ is a legitimate or illegitimate child;
KAPUNAN; October 1, 1999
- FPJ’s birth certificate indicates that his parents
were married, and that he is a legitimate child.
FACTS
However, the Marriage Contract of his putative
- Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar
parents, Fernando R. Pou and Bessie Kelley, is
- April 1964: Vicente D Ching born as the legitimate son
dated September 16, 1940, thereby indicating
of sps Tat Ching, Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay,
that he was born out of wedlock. Since, in the
Filipina, in La Union. Since birth, Ching has resided in
Marriage Contract, the two contracting parties,
the Phils
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, participated in
- During this time, the governing charter is the 1935
its execution, the entry therein with respect to
Constitution. Father’s citizenship is followed, with a
the date of their marriage should be given
right to elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
greater weight than the birth certificate, which
majority
was executed by a physician who had to rely on
- July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St. Louis
hearsay as regards FPJ’s legitimacy.
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the
- FPJ was born out of wedlock, and was thus an
’98 Bar Examinations.
illegitimate child at birth.
- Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the exams
(4) Whether Allan F. Poe has been legally
provided he must submit proof of his Phil citizenship
determined to be the father of FPJ (Assuming
- Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA,
arguendo that Allan F. Poe has been shown to have
Voter Cert from COMELEC, and Cert as a member of the
acquired Philippine citizenship)
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union also from
- As proof of his filiation, FPJ relies upon (1) the
COMELEC.
stipulation by petitioner Fornier, both before the
- April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and
COMELEC and this Court that Allan F. Poe is
Ching passed. He was further required to submit more
indeed the father of FPJ; (2) the declaration of
proof of citizenship.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas; and (3) a certified copy
- July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/ Affidavit of
of an affidavit of “Fernando R. Poe” for
Election of Phil Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance.
Philippine Army Personnel.
- OSG commented that Ching being the “legitimate child
- none of the proofs supplied are sufficient
of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother and born under
proofs of filiation under Article 172 of the
the 1935 Consti was a Chinese citizen and continued to
Family Code.
be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he
(5) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen.
elected Phil citizenship. If Ching formally elects Phil
- Carpio-Morales adopts the rule that an
citizenship, it would already be beyond the reasonable
illegitimate, child of an alien-mother who
time allowed by present jurisprudence
claims to be an offspring of a Filipino father
- Two conditions of an effective election of Phil
may be considered a natural-born citizen if he
citizenship (from OSG):
was duly acknowledged by the latter at
birth, thus leaving the illegitimate child with
 1st – the mother of the person making the election
must be a Phil citizen
2nd – election must be made upon reaching the age
of majority (w/c means a reasonable time
interpreted by the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs, from the
Velayo case; in Cuenco, noted that this pd not
inflexible, however, held in the same case that 7 yrs
not reasonable time)
- Ching, to support his cause, invokes these special
circumstances: continuous and uninterrupted say in the
Philippines, being a CPA, a registered voter, and elected
public official
ISSUE
1. WON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a
reasonable time
and if so, WON his citizenship has retroacted to the time
he took the bar.
2. WON Ching’s special circumstances entitle him to
citizenship
HELD
1. No, Ching’s election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable pd w/in which to
exercise the privilege. Being born in April 1964, he was
already 35 yrs old when he complied w/ the
requirements of C.A. No 625 in June ’99. He was already
more then 14 yrs over the age of majority.
Although the Court is sympathetic of his plight,
controlling statues and jurisprudence compel the Court
in its decision. Also, Ching has offered no reason why he
delayed his election of Phil citizenship, the latter not
being a tedious and painstaking process.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. It should be availed of
with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
2. No, the abovementioned special circumstances
cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Decision Court denies Vicente D Ching’s application for
admission to the Philippine Bar
BENGZON III V HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
KAPUNAN; May 7, 2001
FACTS
- Constitutional requirement for members of the House
of Representatives: “no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural born
citizen.”
- Teodoro Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
He was born in Tarlac on April 27, 1960. On November
5, 1985 he enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines. He took an
oath of allegiance to the US and as a consequence he
lost his Filipino Citizenship because under the
Commonwealth Act no. 63 a Filipino may lose his
citizenship by rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
Any doubts as to his citizenship at the time was settled
by his naturalization as a US citizen on June 5, 1990.
- May 17, 1994 he reacquired his citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630.
- He was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in 1998 and his opponent was
Bengson.
- Bengson filed a case Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
HRET claiming Cruz, not being a natural-born citizen by
the contention that Aricle IV, Sec 2 of the Consti defines
natural-born citizens as “citizens from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such
citizenship, was not eligible to be member of the House.
ISSUES
1. WON Cruz, a natural born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
via Repatriation, so that the question of WON he is
eligible to be a member of the House might be
addressed
2. - WON the HRET committed serious erros and grave
abuse of discreation amounting to excess of jurisdiction
in ruling in favour of Cruz as natural-born citizen
HELD
1. Yes.
Ratio Two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship
o By birth – natural born citizens
o Naturalization – Naturalized citizens (those
who become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under the
Commonwealth Act no. 473. To be naturalized,
an applicant has to prove that he possesses all
the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications
- 1987 Constitution only provides for 2 classes of
citizens:
o Natural born
Naturalized
o
- Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
reacquire it by naturalization, repatriation or by direct
act of Congress.
o Naturalization – mode for acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
o Repatriation – available for those who have
lost their citizenship due to desertion of the
armed forces, service in the armed forces
of the allied forces in WWII, service in the
armed forces of the US at any other time,
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien,
and political and economic necessity.
Process: taking an oath of allegiance to the
RP and registering it in the Local Civil
Registrar of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.
- Repatriation would result in the recovery of the original
nationality. He will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born citizen. Cruz recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen because of his repatriation.
Note: As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of taking
an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said
oath with the Local Civil Registry
- 1987 Constitution does not provide a separate category
for persons who after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquires it because they are either
natural born or naturalized depending on the reason for
the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by
the applicable law for reacquisition.
- Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
2. No.
Ratio HRET has been empowered by the Consti to be
the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the elction,
returns and qualifications of the members of the House.
Court’s jurisdiction is merely to check WON there has
been grave abuse; absent such showing, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power
SEPARATE OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Additional Facts:
- In the 1995 local elections, Cruz filed his certificate of
candidacy for Mayor declaring himself to be a
naturalized Filipino citizen
- Thereafter, Cruz ran for Congres, this time declaring
himself as natural-born
- Petitioner and respondent present opposing
interpretation of the phrase “from birth” in Art IV, Sec 2
of the Consti
- Petitioner avers: means starting from a definite
point and must be continuous, constant and without
interruption
- Respondent contends: refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a
“natural-born”
- J. Sandoval-Gutierrez holds:
- Natural-born citizens are so by virtue of birth
without performing any acts. To repatriate, Cruz
had to perform certain acts before he could again
become a Filipino citizen. Therefore, he does not
reaquire natural-born citizenship
- The history of the Consti shows that the meaning
and application of the requirement of being natural-
 born have become more narrow and qualified over
the years, more stringent; and the decision of HRET
in the case at bar reverses the historical trend and
clear intendment of the Consti, a matter which can
only be accomplished through consti amendment;
clearly, HRET has acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473
An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of
the Citizenship by Naturalization, and to
repeal Acts 2927 and 3448
Sec 1: Title: “Revised Naturalization Law” Sec 2:
Qualifications: Who may become citizens of the
Philippines by naturalization?
1. >21 years old at the day of the hearing of the
petition
2. resided in the Philippines for CONTINUOUS
period of >10yrs
3. of good moral character
+ believes in principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution (1935 Consti)
+ conducted himself in proper and irreproachable
manner during entire period of residence in the
Philippines in relation with constituted government and
community with community in which he is living
4. (must own real estate in the Philippines >
P5000) or Philippine currency or lucrative
trade/profession/lawful occupation
5. able to speak and write English/Spanish + any
one of the principal Philippine language
6. enrolled his MINOR children of school age in any
of the public schools/private schools during the
entire period of residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his
petition
…School:
- recognized by the Office of Private Education of
the Philippines
- teaches Philippine history, government and civics
and prescribes it as part of the school curriculum
Sec 3: Special qualifications: when the 10 year
qualification required in Sec2(2) could be reduced
to a continuous 5 years?
1. had honorably held office under the
Government of the Philippines/ under that of
any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or
political subdivisions thereof [aliens, particularly
American citizens, were the ones who were
governing the country prior to the
Commonwealth]
2. established new industry/ introduced a useful
invention in the Philippines
3. married to a Filipino woman
4. engaged as a teacher in the Philippines for >2
yrs
school: public/recognized private school + not
established for exclusive instruction of children of
persons of particular nationality/race
5. born in the Philippines
Sec 4: Who are disqualified? Persons…
a. opposed to organized government/affiliated
with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized
gov’t
b. defending/teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence/personal assault/assassination for the
success and predominance of their ideas
c. Polygamists/believers of polygamy
d. Convicted of crimes (moral turpitude)
e. Suffering from mental alienation/incurable
contagious disease
f. Not mingled socially w/ Filipinos, have not
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
customs, traditions, and ideals of Filipinos
g. Citizens/subjects of nations w/whom US and the
Philippines are at war – during such war
h. Citizens/subjects of foreign country [OTHER
THAN US!] whose laws don’t grant Filipinos
right to become naturalized citizens/subjects
Sec 5. Declaration of intention: file declaration
that it is his bona fide intention to become a
citizen of the Philippines
- under oath
- 1 year prior to the filing of petition for admission to
Philippine citizenship
of the Bureau of Justice
-contents+ name
+ age
+ occupation
+ personal description
+ place of birth
+last foreign residence and allegiance
+date of arrival
+name of vessel/aircraft (if any) in which he came to
the Philippines
+place of residence in the Philippines at the time of
making the declaration *to be valid: establish lawful
entry for permanent residence + issued certificate
showing date, place, and manner of arrival
*also state that he had enrolled his minor children in
school (see sec2(6))
*2 pictures of himself
Sec 6. Widow and minor children of aliens dying
after declaration of intention not required to file
declaration of intention
Sec 7. Petition for citizenship: requirements filed
with competent court
*a petition in triplicate
contents of petition:
+name and surname
+present and former places of residence
+occupation
+place and date of birth
+status; if married and the father, include name, age,
birthplace and residence of wife and each child
+approximate date of his/her arrival in the Philippines
+name of the port of debarkation + name of ship (if
remembered)
+declaration of qualifications and non-disqualification
+declaration that he has complied with sec. 5
+declaration of continuous residence in RP from date
of filing petition to admission as RP Citizen
*2 photographs of petitioner
*petition signed by applicant + supported by affidavit of
at least 2 credible persons (see provision for
requirements)
Sec 8. Competent court: CFI of province in w/c the
petitioner has resided for at least 1 yr immediately
preceding the filing of the petition
Sec 9. Notification and appearance. Tasks of clerk of
court
…publish petition for 3 consecutive weeks in OG and in
one of gen circulation newspapers in the province where
petitioner resides
…post copies of petitions in conspicuous places (contain
name, birthplace and residence of petitioner, date and
place of arrival, names of witnesses, date of hearing the
petition)
*hearing shall not be held w/n 90 days from date of last
publication of notice
…forward copies of the petition, sentence,
naturalization certificate and pertinent data to
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Justice, Provincial
Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary of the province,
and justice of peace of the municipality where petitioner
resides
Sec 10. Hearing of the petition.
*no hearing w/n 30 days preceding any election
*public hearing
*Solicitor-General/representative/provincial fiscal
appear for Commonwealth at all proceedings
*upon belief of court of qualifications and non-
disqualification of petitioner, court order proper
naturalization certificate in proper civil registry (required
in Sec. 10, Act No. 3753)
Sec 11. Appeal: to the SC
Sec 12: Issuance of the Certificate of
Naturalization: 30 days after and from date of notice
to the parties (in case of appeal, SC confirmed deci),
clerk of court issue naturalization certificate
contents of certificate of naturalization”
*file no. of petition
*number of naturalization certificate
*signature of the person naturalized affixed in the
presence of the clerk of court
*personal circumstances of the person naturalized
*dates of filing of declaration of intention and petition
*date of decision granting petition
 *name of the judge who rendered deci
*photograph of peti with dry seal of court w/c granted
petition
*oath declared in open court [refer to the original]
Sec 13. Record Books: clerk of court keep 2 books: (1)
record of petition and declarations of intentions in
chronological order; (2) record of naturalization
certificate
Sec 14. Fees.
*P30.00 (for recording of petition and for proceedings +
issuance of certificate)
*P24.00 (for each appeal and for connected services
rendered)
sec 15. Effect of naturalization on wife and children
*on wife: shall be deemed a citizen of Philippines (if just
married or also naturalized)
*on minor children:
…if born in the Philippines: Filipino
…if foreign-born but dwelling in the Philippines
during naturalization of parent: Filipino
…if foreign-born, not dwelling in the Philippines
during naturalization of parent: Filipino
during minority, unless resides in the
Philippines permanently and still a minor,
then legally Filipino upon age of majority
…if foreign-born after naturalization of parent:
Filipino unless fails to register and take
oath 1 yr after age of majority
Sec 16. Right of widow and children of
petitioners_who_have_died: continue proceedings,
same legal effect
Sec 17. Renunciation of title or orders of nobility:
unless w/ express consent of the National Assembly
Sec 18. Cancellation of naturalization certificates
issued
*upon motion made in proper proceedings by Solicitor-
General/representative/proper provincial fiscal
*cancelled by competent judge on the ff. grounds:
a. naturalization certificate obtained
fraudulently/illegally
b. person naturalized establishes permanent residence
outside Philippines w/n 5 yrs after issuance of
naturalization certificate
c. petition made on invalid declaration of intention
d. minor children shown to have failed to graduate
from school in sec 2 (6) through fault of parents either
by neglect to support or by transferring them to
another school(s)
e. naturalized citizen only used as a dummy to violate
constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine
citizenship
Sec 19 Penalties for violation of this Act: fine <
P5,000.00 or imprisonment< 5 yrs or both, naturalization
cancelled
Sec 20. Prescription: file complaint w/n 5 yrs from
detection/discovery of commission of offense
Sec. 21. Regulation and blanks.
*Secretary of Justice: issue necessary regulations
*Solicitor-General, subject to approval of Secretary of
Justice: naturalization certificate blanks, etc.
Sec 22. Repealing clause: Repeals Act. No. 2927 as
amended by Act No. 3448 [Naturalization Law]
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530
An Act Making Additional Provisions for
Naturalization
- Requires the publication of petitions for citizenship
(also required by previous law, prob. Act 423, below)
- Court will hear petitions for citizenship 6 months after
the publication
- Decisions granting the application become executory
only after 2 years, and
- The Solicitor General or his representative finds that
during the intervening time, applicant has:
 NOT left the Philippines
 Dedicated himself continuously to
lawful calling or profession
 NOT been convicted of any offense or
violation of govt. rules
 NOT committed any act prejudicial to
the interest of the nation or contrary to any
govt. announced policies
- After the finding, the order of the court granting
citizenship will be registered and the oath taken by the
applicant before he will be entitled to the privileges of
citizenship.
- Repealed inconsistent parts of Act No. 423.
- Approved, June 16, 1950.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63
An Act Providing for the Ways in which
Philippine Citizenship may be lost or
reacquired
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost.
(1) naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
constitution or laws of foreign country upon +21y.o.: a
Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship
while the RP is at war;
(4) rendering services to/accepting commission in, the
armed forces of foreign country: rendering of service
to/the acceptance of such commission in, the armed
forces of foreign country, and the taking of an oath of
allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of RP,
shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if
either of the ff. is present:
(a) RP has defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance
with the said foreign country; or
(b) said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory w/ consent of RP: Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service/or
acceptance of said commission, & taking the oath of
allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so
only in connection with his service to said foreign
country: & provided that any Filipino citizen who is
rendering service to/or is commissioned in, the
armed forces of foreign country under (a) or (b),
shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any
election of RP during period of service
to/commission in, the armed forces of said foreign
country. automatically entitled to full enjoyment of
civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen upon his
discharge;
(5) cancellation of certificates of naturalization;
(6) having been declared by competent authority, a
deserter of the AFP in time of war, unless pardon or
granted amnesty; &
(7) woman: marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the
laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his
nationality.
*** Sec 1 amended by RA 106, section 1, approved June
2, 1947
*when dual citizenship was allowed at that time:
…acquisition of citizenship by natural born Filipino
citizen from Iberian/democratic Ibero-American
countries/ United Kingdom if the law of that country
grants same privilege to its citizens –agreed upon by
treaty between the Philippines and foreign country
from which citizenship is acquired.
Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired.
(1) naturalization: applicant possess none of the
disqualification's prescribed in sec 2, Act No. 2927
(repealed by CA 473 – so sec 4)
(2) repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air
Corp: Provided, woman by sec 1(7) may be repatriated
in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the
termination of the marital status;(see PD 725 for more
details)
(3) direct act of the National Assembly.
Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. Apply Act No. 2927 (now CA
473) to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
naturalization provided for in the next preceding sec:
Provided, qualifications and special qualifications
prescribed in sec 3 & 4 of Act 2927 shall not be required
(sorry guys, I can’t find a copy of Act 2927 in the net so I
don’t know what these sections are in CA 473): further,
applicant…
(1) at least 21 y.o. + resided in RP at least 6 mos. before
he applies for naturalization;
(2) have conducted himself in proper and irreproachable
manner during
+the entire period of his residence in RP
+in his relations with the constituted government
+with the community in which he is living; and
(3) subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to
renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and
allegiance to the foreign authority/state/sovereignty of
which he was a citizen or subject.
Section 4. Repatriation: effected by merely taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth of
the Philippines (RP) and registration in the proper civil
registry. (used in the Bengzon Case)
Section 5. Similar to Sec 21 of CA 473
YU V DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
PADILLA; January 24, 1989
FACTS
- Petition for Habeas Corpus
- 1971 – Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971
valid for 5 years & renewed for same period upon
presentment before Portuguese consular officer
- Feb. 10, 1978 – He was naturalized as a Phil. citizen
- April 1980 – signed commercial documents in Hong
Kong (Companies Registry of Tai Shun Estate, Ltd.) and
he declared his nationality as Portuguese
- July 21, 1981 – He applied & was issued another
Portuguese passport in Tokyo. Passport will expire July
20, 1986.
Procedural Facts:
- July 4, 1988 – He filed for a petition for habeas corpus.
He was detained because the Commission on
Immigration & Deportation was processing his
deportation. CID claims that his acts are tantamount to
an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
- July 20, 1988 – oral arguments
- Nov. 10, 1988 – SC resolution denied petition for
habeas corpus & resolved issued on jurisdiction of CID
over naturalized Filipino citizen & validity of warrantless
arrest & detention. Yu filed MFR, denied w/finality. Filed
urgent motion for issuance of restraining order, denied.
- Dec. 5, 1988 – Yu filed motion for clarification w/prayer
for restraining order.
- Dec. 7, 1988 – SC issued TRO. CID ordered to cease &
desist from deporting Yu pending conclusion of hearings
before Board of Special Inquiry of CID.
- Dec. 13, 1988 – Respondent commissioner filed motion
to lift TRO saying the commission already issued a
summary judgment of deportation against Yu on Dec. 2,
88.
- Dec. 13, 1988 – Yu filed an urgent motion for release
from arbitrary detention. Opposed vigorously to lifting of
TRO.
- Yu ordered to explain why he should still be considered
a Phil citizen. He complied. His reply revealed
aforementioned substantive facts.
ISSUE
WON the acts of Yu constitute an express renunciation of
his Philippine citizenship.
HELD
Yes. Motion for release from detention denied. TRO
lifted.
Ratio
- Renunciation – made known distinctly & explicitly and
not left to interference or implication (BI Commissioners
vs. Go Gallano). His resumption/reacquisition of his
Portuguese citizenship and passport and representation
as a Portuguese even after he has acquired Filipino
citizenship are proof enough of his renunciation.
- He does not dispute the facts. He was given the
opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine
citizenship but he failed. There is no denial of due
process.
- Trial court should have jurisdiction over this case. But
due to petitioner’s insistence, SC had to do it.
- Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be
displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient.
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [concur]
Yu has failed to overcome presumption that he has
forfeited his status as naturalized Filipino by obtaining
Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued only
to nationals. No proof of Yu’s unequivocal & deliberate
renunciation of Phi. Citizenship w/ full awareness of its
significance & consequences as provided for in CA No.
63. Commercial documents signed are not proof enough
of renunciation.
FERNAN [dissent]
Summary procedure & pieces of documentary evidence
are not enough to reach such decision. Evidence must
be clear & express w/o room for interference or
implication. In a deportation proceeding where alien
claims citizenship w/substantial evidence, he’s entitled
to have his status determined by judicial & not an
executive tribunal. He deserves a full-blown trial under
more rigid rules of evidence in a court proceeding. SC is
not a trier of facts.
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
Summary procedure would not suffice. Something as
important as denaturalization should be filed &
prosecuted in proper trial court in accordance w/the due
process clause. When a person pleads vigorously that he
has not renounced his citizenship, he should at least be
given a full trial where his actions may be explored & the
facts fully ascertained. Dangerous precedent to allow
administrative officials to rule that one has renounced
his citizenship based on informal evidence. Mere use of a
foreign passport is not express renunciation. He may
have passport for other purposes (employment,
convenience). Some high gov’t officials have done acts
w/c are more indicative of express renunciation than
mere use of passport or different citizenship has been
signed. SC is not a trier of facts. Yu’s morality is beside
the point. He deserves his full day in court.
CORTES [dissent]
CID findings are subject to judicial review. Loss of Yu’s
Filipino citizenship has not been established. Evidence
presented were not authenticated by proper Philippine
consul, thus not substantial and are inadequate.
PEOPLE V AVENGOZA
RELOVA; December 7, 1982
FACTS
- Criminal Case; Appeal from Decision of CFI of
Camarines Sur
- Anselma Avengoza and husband Go Gam, a Chinese,
together with the former’s mother Gavina Avengoza and
Rafaela Anfante are being charged with violation of the
Anti-Dummy Law on transactions for the spouses to own
agricultural lands in the Philippines.
- Anselma Avengoza, upon marriage to Go Gam,
acquired Chinese citizenship
- The Anti-Dummy Law provides that only Filipino
citizens may own local agricultural land.
- Pending litigation, Go Gam and Gavina passed away.
- Upon Go Gam’s passing, Anselma executed an oath of
allegiance to the RP and filed it with the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer for the purpose of reacquiring her
citizenship by repatriation, averring by reason whereof
that her criminal liability is thereby extinguished; and
that the issue of the criminal case is rendered moot and
academic
- Trial court dismissed case principally predicated on its
opinion that Anselma had validly reacquired Philippine
citizenship
ISSUES
1. WON Anselma reacquired citizenship after executing
an oath of allegiance to the RP and filing it with the
Municipal Treasurer
2. if so, WON such reacquisition of citizenship exempted
her from liability for the violation of the Anti-Dummy Law
HELD
1. No.
Ratio Mere taking of oath of allegiance insufficient for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Would-be repatriate
should show conclusive proof that she has the
qualifications to be so repatriated. Anselma became an
alien by reason of her lawful marriage to a Chinese
citizen; however this does not necessarily mean that she
was a Filipino citizen prior to such marriage.
2. No.
Ratio Even had she been considered repatriated, like
an alien who became a naturalized Filipino citizen, her
repatriation will not exempt her from criminal liability for
violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

JAO V REPUBLIC
VASQUEZ; March 29, 1983
FACTS
- Modesta Jao claims to be a Philippine citizen because
she was born of a Chinese father and an illiterate Filipina
mother who were not legally married. - She married a
Chinese man and therefore lost her Philippine citizenship
but he is now dead.
- Her handicapped mother erroneously registered her as
an alien and she was issued an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR).
- She is claiming back her Phil. citizenship, by way of a
petition for repatriation filed in CFI of Davao.
- CFI issued an order declaring petitioner as “judicially
repatriated,” and ordered cancelled her ACR.
- Provincial Fiscal in behalf of the Republic, appealed the
case.
ISSUE
WON the judicial decree by the RTC was necessary for
repatriation.
HELD
Ratio Proceedings to declare a person as “judicially
repatriated” are a complete nullity. There is no law
requiring or authorizing that repatriation should be
effected by a judicial proceeding.
Reasoning In Lim v. Republic, 37 SCRA 783, it was held
that “there is no proceeding established by law or the
rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may
get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in
regard to his citizenship.” All that is needed for a female
citizen of the Phil. who lost her citizenship to an alien to
reacquire her Phil. citizen, upon the termination of her
martial status, “is for her to take necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Phil. and to register the
said oath in the proper civil registry.”
Disposition Decision appealed from is revoked and set
aside. 5 Justices concur.
Obiter Petitioner’s claim of Phil. citizenship prior to her
marriage for being allegedly an illegitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipina mother may not be
established in an action where the mother or her heirs
are not parties. It is the consistent rule in this jurisdiction
that Phil. citizenship may not be declared in a non-
adversary suit where the persons whose rights are
affected by such a declaration are not parties, such as
an action for declaratory relief, petition for judicial
repatriation, or an action to cancel registration as an
alien.
VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBAN
MALCOLM; March 25, 1919
FACTS
- Manila Mayor, Justo Lukban, wanting to exterminate
vice, ordered the closing of the city’s red light district.
The brothels were closed and the workers (170 women)
were rounded up and kept confined to their houses in
the district by the police for a little more than a week.
On the night of Oct.25, 1918, the women were forcibly
hustled aboard the steamers Corregidor and Negros and
sent off to Davao to work as laborers without their
consent, without opportunity to consult with
friends/family or to defend their rights. They reached
Davao 4 days later and were met by Francisco Sales,
governor of Davao and by hacendero Feliciano Yñigo and
Rafael Castillo, etc.
- During their voyage, the women’s relatives and friends
initiated an application for habeas corpus, alleging that
Justo Lukban, along with Anton Hohmann (the police
chief), and others deprived the women of their liberty.
The court awarded the writ of habeas corpus (w of hc)
and ordered Lukban and co. to bring the women before
the court. Although they returned with none of the
women, they were given another chance. The court
issued another order this time calling for the
respondents to produce all of the women not in Manila.
The respondents were only able to bring forward 8
women and challenged the issuance of the writ.
ISSUES
1. Re: the proper granting of the writ:
a. WON the petitioners had standing
b. WON the S.C. erred in assuming jurisdiction
c. WON the women were actually restrained of their
liberty
2. WON there was compliance with the court orders
3. On contempt of court
HELD
1a. Yes
Ratio When it is is impossible for a party to sign an
application for the w of hc, another person may submit it
in his/her behalf.
Reasoning It was impossible for the women to have
signed a petition for habeas corpus with the way their
expulsion was conducted. They were first isolated from
society and then shipped. It was consequently proper for
the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf.
1b No
Ratio The w of hc may be granted by the Supreme
Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the
Philippines. The SC can decide upon where the writ shall
be made returnable to (whether before the SC or before
a lower court).
Reasoning The CFI of Davao was not in session. The
case involves parties from different parts of the country.
Habeas Corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
1c. Yes
Ratio The forcible taking, isolation, and transfer of the
women is constitutive of deprivation of freedom of
locomotion.
Reasoning The essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary and
to relieve a person from such restraint if it is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.
2. 1st order: No. Respondents were not able to bring
the women before the court on the day named. The
court could have sent the respondents to jail however,
the court forebore drastic action because it did not want
the public to see a clash between executive officials and
the judiciary and because it wanted to give the
respondents another chance to demonstrate their good
faith and to mitigate their wrong.
2nd order: Yes. Respondents (through better effort) were
able to produce 8 women. The mandate called for all of
the women not in Manila. However, the court decided
that there was substantial compliance, noting the effort
(placards were posted, police helped, free shipping to
Manila was provided) and the fact that they had a
sincere desire to see the unhappy incident finally closed.
3. Ratio Only Lukban is guilty of contempt. His
intentions were commendable, his methods were
unlawful. An officer’s failure to produce the body of a
person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus, when he
has power to do so, is contempt committed in the face of
the court.
Reasoning He was primarily responsible for setting
forth this whole chain of events and had under his power
as head of the city government to facilitate the return of
the women to Manila but failed. The rest of the
respondents other than Lukban are not guilty of
contempt. Some were merely following the orders of
their superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. Another was
merely drawn into the case through miscommunication.
Disposition No further action on the w of hc. Lukban
found in contempt of court and shall pay Php 100 within
5 days. Rest of respondents found not to be in contempt
of court.
KURODA JALANDONI
MORAN; March 26, 1949
FACTS
Kuroda, a high ranking Japanese army official is being
charged by the Military Commission with failure to
perform duties as commander in preventing
crimes/atrocities against civilians, and POWs. In defense,
he is alleging that Executive Order No. 68 (EO68) which
established a Natl. War Crimes Office is unconstitutional
and that 2 prosecuting attorneys, Hussey and Port (both
American) have no authority to practice law in the
country. As such, the respondents should be prohibited
from proceeding with this case.
ISSUES
1. WON EO68 is unconstitutional
2. Re: Attys. Hussey and Port
A. WON they are qualified to practice in accordance with
the Rules of Court
B. WoN their appointment as prosecutors is violative of
the Constitution
HELD
1. Ratio The President as Commander in Chief is fully
empowered to consummate an unfinished aspect of war
which is the trial and punishment of war criminals
through the issuance and enforcement of EO68.
Reasoning EO68 was issued by the President to
establish a Natl. War Crimes Office and provide for rules
and regulations in trying accused war criminals. It
conforms to the generally accepted principles/policies of
international law, including the Hague Convention and
the Geneva Convention, which are part of the law of the
nation. Its promulgation was an exercise of the President
of his powers as Commander in Chief of the whole armed
forces. Iin Yamashita v. Tyer, the court held that “the
power to create a military commission for the trial and
punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war.
A military commission has jurisdiction so long as a
technical state of war continues.”
2A. Ratio The Military Commission is special military
tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules
of Court.
Reasoning There is nothing in EO68 which requires that
counsel appearing before said commissions must be
attys. qualified to practice law in the Phil. in accordance
with the Rules of Court.
2B. No
Ratio The appointment of the 2 American attorneys is
not violative of our national sovereignty.
Reasoning It is only fair and proper that the US, which
has submitted the vindication of crimes against her govt.
and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be
allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes.
Disposition The Military Commission having been
convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over
the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of
Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its
custody, this Court will not interfere with the due
processes of such Military Commission. Petition denied.
With costs de oficio.
ICHONG V HERNANDEZ AND SARMIENTO
LABRADOR; May 31, 1957
FACTS
- Injunction and Mandamus
- The Legislature enacted RA 1180 entitled ”An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business.” It prohibits aliens and
associations, partnerships, or corporations, which are not
wholly owned by citizens, to engage directly or indirectly
in the retail trade. In effect it nationalizes the retail
business.
- Procedure Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf
of other alien residents, corporations, and partnerships
adversely affected by RA 1180 filed a petition for
Injunction and Mandamus against Jaime Hernandez,
Secretary of Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City
Treasurer of Manila.
- Preliminary consideration of legal principles
involved
A. Police Power
- the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable
- necessary esp. in a modern democratic framework
B. Equal Protection Clause
- against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality; it requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions
- is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exists for making distinction between those who
fall within such class and those who do not.
- Criteria for Test of EPC
1. presence of public interest and welfare
2. existence of reasonable relation between
purposes and means
3. existence of reasonable basis for distinction and
classification made
C. Due Process clause
- has to do with reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power
- Questions for test:
1. Is there is a public interest/purpose?
2. Is the Act is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislature’s purpose; is it
not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive?
3. Can the aims conceived be achieved by the
means used or is it merely an unjustified
interference with private interest?
ISSUES
1. WON RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws.
2. WON RA 1180 deprives alien residents of their liberty
and property without due process of law.
3. WON the title of the Act is misleading or deceptive, as
it conceals the real purpose of the bill, which is to
nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from
engaging therein.
4. WON RA 1108 violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
HELD
1. No. The act does not transcend the limit of equal
protection established by the Constitution if there is a
question of public interest involved or pursued and the
classification or distinction used by the legislature, in
this case between nationals and aliens, is actual, real
and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated
alike, and as it cannot be said that classification is
patently unreasonable and unfounded.
Reasoning
a. Based on experience of the country, alien retailer has
shown disregard for his customers and the people on
whom he makes his profit. Aliens lack spirit of loyalty
and enthusiasm for the country. Alien participation in the
retail trade has been attended by intolerable practices
like the ff:
- hoarding essential commodities
- violating price control laws
- boycotting honest merchants and traders who
would not cater or yield to their demands
- believed to have evaded tax laws
- bribing public officials
b. Economic reason – alien retailer never really makes a
genuine contribution to national income and wealth
since the gains and profits he makes are not invested in
industries that would help the country’s economy and
increase national wealth.
c. precedents
Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, Gibbon vs. Ongden
Commonwealth vs. Hana, Anton vs. Van Winkle, Templar
vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners
- Essentially held that the difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police
power.
Takahashi vs. Fish and game Commission, Fraser vs.
McConway & Tarley
- held that the distinction between aliens and
citizens is not valid because the laws were found to
be arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the
result or product of racial antagonism and hostility,
and there was no question of public interest
involved or pursued.
2. No. There is due process if the laws passed are seen
to have reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
Reasoning
a. legitimacy of the purpose of the law
- Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens
of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our
economic life\
- Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the
people are subject to the economic control and
domination of others, especially if not of their own race
or country.
b Nationalistic protective policy laid down in the
Constitution
- Section 8 of Article XIV provides that “no franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines”
c. Provisions of law not unreasonable
- The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of
an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every
presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the
Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of
the law, it may not annul the legislation if not in excess
of the legislative power.
3. No. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in
the title. The general rule is for the use of general terms
in the title of the bill and the title need not be an index
to the entire contents of the law.
Reasoning
a. The term regulate is a broader term than either
prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always
been included within the term regulation.
4. No treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.
GONZALES V HECHANOVA
CONCEPCION; October 22, 1963
FACTS
- Respondent Exec. Sec. authorized importation of
foreign rice and created rice procurement committee.
Gonzales, a rice planter and President of Iloilo Palay and
Corn Planters Association, filed petition.
Procedure Case is an original action for prohibition
with preliminary injunction to restrain implementation of
decision of Exec. Sec. to import rice. Respondents were
required to file answer and hearing was set.
- on WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction
Petitioner’s stand:
- Yes, bec. RA 3452 explicitly prohibits importation of
rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration and any
other gov’t agency.
Respondents’ stand:
- Petitioner has no sufficient interest to file petition.
- Petitioner has not exhausted all administrative
remedies available before coming to court.
- Petitioner’s action is not sufficient and not governed
by RA 3452 because importation was authorized by
President as Commander in Chief for military stock pile
purposes. As such, Pres must prepare for threats
without waiting for any special authority.
- Also, they say it’s not under RA 3452 bec. the RAs
prohibit importation of rice and corn by “government
agency” and not the government itself.
- Even if the proposed importation violated the RAs, it
can still be permitted because it is for the benefit of the
people.
- The Phils is already under executive agreements with
contracts for purchase of rice with Vietnam and Burma.
In case of conflict between the RAs and the contracts,
the contracts should prevail because it came later.
These contracts have been consummated bec. the Phils.
has already paid.
ISSUE
WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction
HELD
- RA 3452 says that the gov’t policy is to purchase basic
foods directly from farmers in Phils. Petitioner has
sufficient interest.
- Case at bar involves question which is a purely legal
one. It falls under the exemption from the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
- The proposed importation is governed by RA 2207 and
RA 3452 bec it covers “all importations of rice and corn
into the Phils.”
- RA 2207 and 3452 also applies to importations of the
government itself bec. RA 2207 talks about imports
authorized by the President, by and on behalf of
government. RA 3452 also indicates that only private
parties may import rice under its provisions. These RAs
are only in addition to Commonwealth Act No. 138 which
says that in all purchases by gov’t, incl. those for armed
forces, preference is given to materials produced in the
Phils.
- The “benefit of the people” argument can’t be
accepted because there is no local rice shortage. And
the importation is said to be for stockpile of Army, not
for the civilian population.
- The contracts w/ Vietnam and Burma are not executive
agreements. Even if they were, they are unlawful, being
against the RAs. The alleged consummation does not
render this case academic. The contracts may have
already been entered into and the payment may have
been made but the actual importation has not yet taken
place.
Disposition- For lack of requisite majority, injunction
prayed for is DENIED.
- It is declared that Exec. Sec. has no power to authorize
importation in question and he exceeded jurisdiction in
granting authority. The importation is not sanctioned by
law and is contrary to its provisions.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
V SECRETARY OF DAR
CRUZ; July 14, 1989
FACTS
- The Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social
justice to "insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people," especially the, less privileged.
- In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding
specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private
property and equitably diffuse property ownership and
profits. Significantly, there was also the specific
injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian
reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from
the bondage of the soil."
- The 1987 Constitution, besides echoing these
sentiments, also adopted one whole and separate Article
XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights. One of its
sections:
- SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof
To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations and subject to
the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives
for voluntary landsharing.
- R.A, No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the
Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line
with the above-stated principles. This was substantially
superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27,
which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with
martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of
private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and
to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.
- On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of
the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree
as well as the manner of their payment. This was
followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential
Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229,
providing the mechanics for its implementation.
- With its formal organization, the revived Congress of
the Philippines (formally convened on July 27, 1987) took
over legislative power from the President and started its
own deliberations, including extensive public hearings,
on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The
result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This
law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect
insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
ISSUES
1. WON petitions are justiciable.
2. WON P.D. No. 27, Presidential Proclamation No. 131,
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 and R.A. 6657 contravene the
Constitution on the grounds inter alia of separation of
powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.
Sub issues
a. The determination of just compensation may be made
only by a court of justice and not by the President of the
Philippines.
b. The just compensation contemplated by the Bill of
Rights is payable only in money or in cash but not in the
form of bonds or other things of value.
c. In considering rentals as advance payment on the
land, E.O. No. 228 deprives the petitioners of their
property rights as protected by due process.
d. The equal protection clause is violated when the
burden of solving the agrarian problems is placed on the
owners only of agricultural lands.
e. In declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be
the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228
ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due
process.
f. The power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs
to Congress and not the President. Although petitioners
agree that the President could exercise legislative power
until the Congress was convened, they contend that she
could do so only to enact emergency measures during
the period.
g. The money needed to create the P50 billon special
fund under Proc. No. 131 is in futuro, not in esse, i.e., it
has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at that
time.
h. The sugar planters argued that they are a separate
group with problems exclusively their own and by being
lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, their
right to equal protection has been violated.
i. There was a failure to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the
powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the
fundamental right to own property.
j. The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-
registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of
the said land for an amount equal to the government
assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the
other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation,
he is unjustly required to immediately pay the
corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the
uniformity rule.10
k. E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement
that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in
its title.
HELD
1. RD: Yes. The Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied but even if they are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide
discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving
the serious constitutional questions raised.
2a. The determination made by the DAR is only
preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned.
Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to
review with finality the said determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. (Sec.
16f)
2b. It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for
the payment of just compensation is money and no
other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been
paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do
not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power
of eminent domain.11 This is not an ordinary
expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its
owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we
deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
2c. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its
Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full
owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired
by virtue of P.D. No. 27.
It was obviously referring to lands already validly
acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-
fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and
full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also
perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its
Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner
by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972
(pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just
compensation), shall be considered as advance payment
for the land.
2d. Equal protection simply means that all persons or
things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to
10
This was not discussed directly but may be construed as being under No.
1 above. It will still be the courts who will decide what just compensation
would be.
11
The power of eminent domain is one of the three inherent powers of the
State. It is the power “to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public
use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.” It is inherent
because it exists without need for legislation, i.e., even if it is not
sanctioned by any law or even the Constitution, the State may exercise it.
Why? Because these powers are necessary for a state to exist. The other
two are police power and taxation.
the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of
other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not
see.12
2e. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession
and ownership of the land to the government on receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP
bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains
with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.
2f. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 was authorized
under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution. It is not correct to say that these measures
ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power
for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless
modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared
invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto
become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of
the legislature that enacted it. Significantly, the
Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not
rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged
measures and has specifically provided that they shall
be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not
inconsistent with its provisions.
2g. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even
if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is
not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the
primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the
release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of
the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the
proclamation, which is agrarian reform. Section 24 and
Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With
particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could
not have been complied with for the simple reason that
the House of Representatives, which now has the
exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had
not yet been convened when the proclamation was
issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in
the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it
were, both houses of Congress.
2h. No evidence has been submitted to the Court that
the requisites of a valid classification have been
violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping
of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of
12
Frankly, I don’t like the way this ponente argues. He’s like saying, now I
don’t want to explain why. If you can’t see the reasoning it’s your fault.
Anyway, we’re infallible remember?  His next sentence: There is no need
to elaborate on this matter. Tsk…
the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of
the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have
been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary
and discriminatory.
2i. The power of expropriation is by no means absolute.
The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction
that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation" and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of
this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper
exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just
compensation.13
Some of the petitioners invoked their right of maximum
retention under Art. XIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution and
under P.D. 316 which was promulgated in
implementation of P.D. 27.
2j. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in
Sec. 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most
controversial provisions. (Sec 6: Max per landowner is 5
hec. 3 hec may be awarded to each child at least 15 yrs
old and actually tilling or directly managing the land)
2k. It is settled that the title of a bill does not have to be
a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the
matters embodied in the text are relevant to
each other.
Decision
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the
constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred
to the State only upon full payment of compensation to
their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers
under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights
of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention
rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions
therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the
petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED. (Unanimous court)
LUZ FARMS V SECRETARY OF DAR
PARAS; December 4, 1990
FACTS
- Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
13
There was a shift in subject after this. He tackled the argument on why
the State did not distribute public lands only by pointing out the
Constitution’s “the just distribution of all agricultural lands” clause. Then
he plays the political question card on the issue of why the distribution
would be private lands first.
- 6/10/88: Pres. Aquino approved RA 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which includes the
raising of livestock, swine and poultry
1/2/89: Sec. of Agrarian Reform (SAR) promulgated
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and
Profit Sharing for RA 6657 (S13 & S32)
- 1/9/89: SAR promulgated Rules and Regulations
implementing S11 (commercial farms)
-Luz Farms, petitioner, is a corporation engaged in
livestock/poultry, adversely affected by RA 6657
-petition prays that RA be declared unconstitutional; it is
also prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued to
enjoin the enforcement of the said law (injunction
denied)
8/24/89: court granted motion for reconsideration on
injunctive relief
-Luz Farms questions the following provisions of RA
6657:
• S3(b): includes raising of livestock in definition of
“Agricultural Enterprise/Activity”
• S11: defines “commercial farms” as “agricultural
lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and
swine raising
• S13: calls for production-sharing plan (distribute 3%
of gross sales & 10% of gross profits to workers as
additional compensation)
• S16(d) & 17: vests in DAR authority to determine
compensation to be paid for lands covered by RA
6657
• S32: spells out production-sharing plan in S13
-the constitutional provision under consideration is A13,
S4, “Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform”
which grants farmers and farm-workers who are
landless, the right to directly or collectively own the land
they are tilling
-livestock and poultry raising is different from crop
farming in that land is not a primary input in the former
ISSUE
WON S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional
insofar as said law includes the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage as well as in its
Implementing Rules and Guidelines
HELD
Instant petition GRANTED. S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657
are constitutional insofar as said law includes the raising
of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as
in its Implementing Rules and Guidelines are hereby
declared null and void for being unconstitutional and the
writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby made
permanent
Ratio the question raised is one of constitutional
construction; in construing any ambiguous provisions,
the courts may look to the debates of the concon
-the transcripts of the 1986 concon clearly show that the
meaning of the word “agricultural” (its dictionary
meaning aside) was never meant to include livestock
and poultry industries in its coverage;
there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands
in agrarian reform
-S13 & 32 calling for production-sharing is confiscatory
and is thus violative of due process
SEPARATE OPINION
SARMIENTO
-agrees that petition be granted but not that main issue
is one of consti construction and interpretation
A13, S4: “..in case of other farm workers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof…”—this phrase provides a
possible coverage of livestock, poultry and swine
-every presumption should be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute
ISSUE: WON assailed provisions violate equal protection
clause of the consti
-clearly, livestock & poultry lands and crop & tree farms
are not similarly situated, hence the inclusion of the
former in CARP would be violative of the equal
protection clause
GARCIA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CRUZ; December 2, 1991
FACTS
Petitioner challenges RA7042 on the ground that:
- It defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos and the protection of Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices
- He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of
foreign enterprises in this country and gives them unfair
advantages over local investments which are practically
elbowed out in their own land with the complicity of their
own government
- Under Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may
do business in the Philippines or invest in a domestic
enterprise up to 100% of its capital without need of prior
approval
o All that it has to do is register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission or the Bureau of Trade
Regulation and Consumer Protection in the case
of a single proprietorship
o “The SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, shall not
impose any limitations on the extent of foreign
ownership in an enterprise additional to those
provided in the Act”
- Under Section 7, “non-Philippine nationals may own up
to one hundred percent (100%) of domestic market
enterprises unless foreign ownership therein is
prohibited or limited by existing law or the Foreign
Investment Negative List under Section 8 hereof."
- However, the system of negative list under Section 8
abandons the positive aspect of regulation and exercise
of authority over foreign investments. In effect, it
assumes that so long as foreign investments are not in
areas covered by the list, such investments are not
detrimental to but are good for the national economy.
o List A – merely enumerate areas of activities
already reserved to Philippine nationals by
mandate of the Constitution and specific laws
o List B - contain areas of activities and enterprises
already regulated according to law and includes
small and medium-sized domestic market
enterprises or export enterprises which utilize raw
materials from depleting natural resources with
paid-in equity capital of less than the equivalent
of US$500,000.00; meaning, SMEs are for
Filipinos. Or even, Filipinos are not encouraged to
go big.
o List C - contain areas of investment m which
"existing enterprises already serve adequately the
needs of the economy and the consumers and do
not need further foreign investments."; However,
existing enterprises must be qualified as Filipino,
if not, it shall protect foreign enterprises too
- Section 9 is also attacked, because if a Philippine
national believes that an area of investment should be
included in list C, the burden is on him to show that
the criteria enumerated in said section are met
- Articles 2, 32, & 35 of the Omnibus Investments Code
of 1982 are done away with by RA 7042.
- By repealing Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987
Omnibus Investments Code, RA No. 7042 further
abandons the regulation of foreign investments by doing
away with important requirements for doing business in
the Philippines.
- The Transitory provisions of RA 7042, which allow
practically unlimited entry of foreign investments for
three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory
Foreign Investment Negative List, not only completely
deregulates foreign investments but would place Filipino
enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own country.
Sol-Gen answers:
- phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to
equity restrictions alone
o prior to the effectivity of RA 7042,
Article 46 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987 (EO No. 226), provided that a non-Philippine
national could, without need of prior authority
from the Board of Investments (BOI), invest in: (1)
any enterprise registered under Book I
(Investments with Incentives); and (2) enterprises
not registered under Book I, to the extent that the
total investment of the non-Philippine national did
not exceed 40% of the outstanding capital
o On the other hand, under Article
47 thereof, if an investment by a non-Philippine
nationals in an enterprise not registered under
Book I was such that the total participation by
non-Philippine nationals in the outstanding capital
thereof exceeded 40%, prior authority from the
BOI was required.
- With the introduction of the Negative List under
Sections 8 & 15, the areas of investments not open to
foreign investors are already determined and outlined;
hence, registration with the SEC or BTRCP, as the case
may be, is now the initial step to be taken by foreign
investors.
- This registration constitutes regulation and exercise of
authority over foreign investments. Under SEC and
BTRCP rules and regulations, foreign investors must first
comply with certain requirements before they can be
issued a license to do business in the Philippines.
- Section 7 of RA 7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to
own up to 100% of domestic market enterprises only in
areas of investments outside the prohibitions and
limitations imposed by law to protect Filipino ownership
and interest.
- The Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8
reserves to Filipinos sensitive areas of investments. List
C prohibits foreign investors from engaging in areas of
activities where existing enterprises already serve
adequately the needs of the economy and the
consumer.
o The Act opens the door to foreign investments
only after securing to Filipinos their rights and
interests over the national economy.
o List A – The provisions of the Constitution and
other specific laws regulate or limit the extent of
foreign ownership in enterprises engaged in areas
of activity reserved for Filipinos
o List B - contains areas already regulated pursuant
to law already makes it clear that it is regulatory.
It channels efforts at promoting foreign
investments to bigger enterprises where there is
an acute lack of Filipino capital; scheme is for
foreign investments to supplement Filipino capital
in big enterprises.
o List C - to allow healthy competition, Activities
which do not adequately meet-the needs of the
consumers should not be included in list C; if not,
consumers would be at the mercy of unscrupulous
producers
o Foreign Corporations under a valid license prior to
the enactment of RA 7042 necessarily come
within the protection of the law.
- Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDA
in determining the areas of investment for inclusion in
List C
o Petition for inclusion therein requires "a public
hearing at which affected parties will have the
opportunity to show whether the petitioner
industry adequately serves the economy and the
consumers."
o Provision is designed to protect the consumers as
not all existing enterprises satisfy the criteria
inclusion in List C.
- Regarding the repealing of provisions of the Omnibus
Investment Code
o purposely removed because the determination of
the areas of investment open to foreign investors
is made easy by the Foreign Investment Negative
List formulated and recommended by NEDA
following the process and criteria provided in
Sections 8 & 9 of the Act
- Re the Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List
o it practically includes the same areas of
investment reserved to Filipino under Section 5",
and the “SEC shall disallow registration of the
applying non-Philippine national if the existing
joint venture enterprises, particularly the Filipino
partners therein, can reasonably prove they are
capable to make the investment needed for the
domestic market activities to be undertaken by
the competing applicant.
Senator Paterno as Intervenor:
- the over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a
self-reliant economy, as well as the provisions designed
to promote full employment for Filipinos
- suggests that the constitutional challenge should be
rejected outright for noncompliance with the requisites
of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
constitutional question must be raised by a proper party;
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the
decision of the case.
ISSUES
1. WON there is actual controversy
2. WON petitioners have legal standing
3. WON constitutionality lis mota of the case
4. WON this entails a political question
HELD
1. There is at this point no actual case or controversy,
particularly because of the absence of the
implementing rules that are supposed to carry the Act
into effect
a. A controversy must be one that is appropriate or
"ripe" for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory
2. The petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, and
particularly as a member of the House of
Representatives, comes under the definition that a
proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger
of sustaining an injury as a result of the act
complained of.
3. The constitutional question has not been raised tardily
but in fact, as just remarked, prematurely.
- The constitutional challenge must be rejected for
failure to show that there is an indubitable ground for it,
not to say even a necessity to resolve it.
a. Policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the
acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to
the contrary. To doubt is to sustain.
b. based on the doctrine of separation of powers
which enjoins upon each department a becoming
respect for the acts of the other departments
c. theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the
President of the Philippines, a law has been
carefully studied and determined to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it
was finally enacted.
- the cause of unconstitutionality has not been proved by
the petitioner
d. Act does not violate any of the constitutional
provisions the petitioner has mentioned
4. What we see here is a debate on the wisdom or the
efficacy of the Act, but this is a matter on which we
are not competent to rule.
a. In Angara v Electoral Commission: "the judiciary
does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation."
b. allowed only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," 5 and may not annul an act of the
political departments simply because we feel it is
unwise or impractical.
c. There is no irregularity also, that shows that there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Decision Petition dismissed.
CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS
LAUREL; December 2, 1940
FACTS
- The Secretary of Public Works and Communications
(PWC) approved with modification the recommendation
that originated from the National Traffic Commission
(NTC), which was favorably indorsed by the Director of
Public Works (PW), that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue
be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between
the points and during the hours from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m.,
for a period of one year from the date of the opening of
the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila
and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus
adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all
animal drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick
up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.
- Commonwealth Act No. 548 gives the Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of the Public
Works and Communications the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads.
Procedure Maximo Calang, in his capacity as private
citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, filed a petition for a
writ of prohibition against the Chairman of NTC, Director
of PW, Acting Secretary of PWC, Mayor of Manila and
Acting Chielf of Police of Manila.
ISSUES
1. WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.
2. WON the rules and regulations promulgated
constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate
business or trade and abridge the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion.
3. WON the rules and regulations complained of infringe
the upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being of all
the people.
HELD
1. No.The Legislature cannot delegate power to make
law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the
law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend.
Reasoning
1. adherence to precedent
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, Wayman vs.
Southard – it was held here that discretion may be
delegated to executive departments or subordinate
officials the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact.
2. textual interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 548
The provision that “….the Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of the Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads…”, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly.
3. practicality
The complexities of modern governments, the
multiplication of the subjects of govt’l regulations, and
the increased difficulty in administering the law give
rise to the adoption, within certain limits, the
delegation of greater powers by the legislative and
vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative
and executive officials, not only in the execution of the
laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and
regulations.
2. No. The state may enact laws that may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupation if the said laws are intended to promote the
welfare of the public. (police power of the State)
Reasoning
1. precedents (US vs. Gomez, Dobbins vs.
Los Angeles & People vs. Pomar)
2. Paradox - The apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation
3. No. Social justice is promoted if the greatest good is
brought about to the greatest number.
BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION
PARAS; May 14, 1991
FACTS
- PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A and was
granted franchise under PD 1067-B to establish, operate
and maintain gambling casinos. PAGCOR proved to be a
potential source of revenue. Thus, PD 1399 was passed
for PAGCOR to fully attain its objectives. PD 1869 was
passed later on to enable PAGCOR/government to
regulate and centralize all games of chance, giving it
territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines.
PAGCOR became 3rd largest source of gov’t revenue,
next to BIR and Bureau of Customs. It sponsored socio-
cultural and charitable projects and at that time
employed 4,494 employees in its 9 casinos.
Procedure This is petition seeking to annul the
PAGCOR charter – PD 1869
ISSUES
Procedural Issue
WON petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers
can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869
Substantive Issue/s
WON PD 1869 should be annulled based on the ff
grounds:
1. it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and
order
2. it waived and intruded into the Manila City
government’s right to impose taxes and license fees
3. it violates equal protection clause in that it legalizes
PAGCOR but outlaws other forms of gambling and vices
4. it violates trend of government away from
monopolistic and crony economy
HELD
Procedural Issue:
- Considering transcendental public interest and the
Court’s duty to check on limits of other branches of
gov’t, SC brushed aside technicalities of procedure and
took cognizance of the petition.
Substantive Issues:
1. Gambling, unless allowed by law, is prohibited. But
prohibition does not mean that gov’t can’t regulate it in
exercise of police power. Police power is “state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote general
welfare.” PAGCOR has been beneficial, not just to gov’t,
but to society as well.
2. Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no
inherent right to impose taxes, its power to tax must
always yield to a legislative act. Municipal corporations
are mere creatures of Congress, therefore Charter of
Manila is subject to control by Congress. If Congress can
grant a municipal corporation the power to tax, it can
also provide exemptions or even take back the power.
Also, Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling
has long been revoked. The power is now vested
exclusively on national government.
Local governments, too, have no power to tax
instrumentalities of national government, such as
PAGCOR. PAGCOR is exempt from local taxes.
The power of local gov’t to impose taxes and fees is
always subject to limits w/c Congress may provide. It
can’t be violative, but consistent with principle of local
autonomy.
Local autonomy doesn’t make local gov’t sovereign w/in
state; it simply means decentralization. The local gov’t
has been described as a political subdivision of state
constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs. It can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of a
sovereign nation, it can’t be an imperium in imperio.
3. Equal protection doesn’t preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded diff. treatment as long
as classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The fact
that some gambling activities (e.g. sweepstakes, lottery,
races, cockfighting, etc.) are legalized while others are
prohibited does not render applicable laws such as PD
1869 unconstitutional.
Whether or not PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for
Congress to determine. But as of now, every law has in
its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law
to be nullified, there must be a showing of clear and
unequivocal breach of Constitution.
4. If PD 1869 runs counter to gov’t policies, it is for
Executive to recommend to Congress its repeal or
amendment. Judiciary does not settle policy issues.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
OPOSA V FACTORAN
DAVIDE; July 30, 1993
FACTS
- The overarching theme of the case deals with the
prevention the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country’s vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth.
- In 1991 a case was filed by minors (represented by
their parents) and the Philippine Ecological Network
(PENI) against the then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Fulgencio
Factoran, Jr. who was substituted by the new secretary,
Angel Alcala. The complaint was instituted to be a
taxpayer’s class suit as it alleges that all citizen’s of the
Philippines are entitled to benefit, use and enjoyment of
the country’s virgin tropical rainforests. The suit also
alleges that this suit represents people who are sharing
the same sentiment towards the preservation of our
natural resources (since not all of them could go before
the court). Furthermore, this was also asserted to be
representative of the current generation and generation
that are yet to be born.
- The suit calls for two primary actions that orders the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), its agents, representatives, and those acting on
its behalf to, 1. Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country and 2. to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, and renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
- The suit starts off with statement of facts regarding the
country, the country’s islands, its natural resources, and
scientific evidences pointing to the requirement for the
country to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology
(54% should be use for forest cover and 46% for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial, and
other uses). They asserted that deforestation resulted in,
a. water shortages b. salinization c. massive erosion and
loss of soil fertility d. extinction of some of the countries
flora and fauna e. disturbance and dislocation of
indigenous cultures f. siltation of rivers and seabed g.
drought h. increasing velocity of typhoon winds i.
flooding of lowlands j. siltation and shortening of the life
span of dams k. reduction of earth’s capacity to process
carbon dioxide.
- Initially the petition was dismissed on the grounds of
lack of cause of action, of being political question, and of
causing the impairment of contracts. The petitioners
filed for certiorari hence this case. They contend that
there is a cause of action using articles 19, 20, and 21 of
the Civil Code (the right to a sound environment),
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 that calls for the
creation of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) to safeguard the people’s right to a
healthful environment, Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1151 ( Philippine Environmental Policy), and Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution that recognizes the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
As well as the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man’s inalienable right
to self-preservation and self-perpetuation in natural law.
ISSUES
1. Locus Standi: WON the case is a class suit?
2. WON minors can assert that they represent other
generations and those succeeding theirs?
3. Merits: WON the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by
declaring the petitioners to have no legal right?
4. Whether or not granting the petition would violate the
non-impairment clause found in the Constitution?
HELD
1. Yes it is a class suit because the subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest to all
citizens of the Philippines and that it would be
impracticable to bring them all to court. The plaintiffs in
this case are numerous and representative enough to
ensure that all interests is protected.
2. Yes they can, following the concept of
intergenerational responsibility. Every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful environment.
3. Yes respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction because it
failed to recognize the legal right of the petitioners
which is the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
that is incorporated in the 1987 Constitution under
Section 16 Article II.
- Moreover, this rights need not be written in the
Constitution for this deals with rights that are assumed
from the very inception oh humankind. The reason why
it was written was because the framers feared that
without a mandate as stated in the state policies future
generations would inherit nothing to sustain life. It is
clear then that there is a legal right for a balanced
healthful ecology and the right to health. Given that it
could also be said that this right is further supported by
Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of
1987 making the cause of action existent.
4. No it does not violate the non-impairment clause
because licenses are not contracts, properties or a
property right that is protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. As the court held in Tan v.
Director of Forestry, a license is merely a permit or
privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful and is
not a contract. It is not irrevocable. The Chief Executive
may validly amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses
when national interests so require.
Given that it is not a contract, the non-impairment
clause cannot be invoked.
- Even if the licenses are contracts, the action stated in
the case still does not affect it given that no law or
action by the Chief Executive to amend, modify, replace,
or rescind licenses so it is could not as of the moment be
invoked. And furthermore, if there would be a law
passed it would not be considered as a violation of the
non-impairment clause as the very nature of the law
deals with the exercising of the police power of the state
to advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology. The non-impairment clause yields to
the police power of the state.
Decision Petition is granted. Petitioners may amend regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or practice medicine.
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. 2. The police power of the State is validly exercised CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT
if MALCOLM; February 23, 1909
DECS V SAN DIEGO - (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require FACTS
CRUZ; December 21, 1989
the interference of the State <lawful subject>; & - An appeal to review the judgment of the Supreme
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to Court of the Philippine Islands which affirmed a
FACTS
the attainment of the object sought to be judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
- decided en banc, unanimous decision
accomplished, not unduly oppressive upon individuals Benguet, dismissing an application for the registration of
- Respondent Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a BS Zoology
<lawful method> certain land.
graduate from UE. He has taken the NMAT four times
- The case at bar complies with this requisites... - Mateo Carino, an Igorot, filed an application for the
and flunked it as many times. His application to take a
<subject> It is the right and indeed the responsibility registration of a certain land in the Province of Benguet.
fifth examination was denied by petitioner DECS on the
of the State to insure that the medical profession is For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, in
basis of the “three-flunk rule” under MECS Order #12,
not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may 1899, the applicant and his ancestors had held the land
Series of 1972.
unwarily entrust their lives and health. as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it and
San Diego filed a petition for mandamus at the
<method> The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle. His
Valenzuela RTC, invoking his constitutional rights to
the medical schools and ultimately the medical father had cultivated parts and had used parts for
academic freedom and quality education. In an amended
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to pasturing cattle. He had received the land from his
complaint, he raised the additional grounds of due
be doctors. father in accordance with Igorot customs and had used it
process and equal protection and also challenged the
3. The right to quality education is NOT absolute. for pasture. They all had been recognized as owners of
constitutionality of the aforementioned order.
The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the the land by the Igorots. No document of title, however,
- Pendente lite, with the agreement of both parties, he
right to choose a profession or course of study, subject had issued from the Spanish crown and although I, in
was allowed to take a fifth attempt at NMAT. This
to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and 1893-1894, and again in 1896-1897, he made
attempt he also failed.
academic requirements." application for one under the royal decrees then in force,
- RTC decision released 4 July 1989 granted the petition
- It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality nothing has come of it. In 1901, he filed a petition,
and declared the challenged order invalid. It held that
education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the
the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a
must show that he is entitled to it because of his lands were registered to him, that process establishing
medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the
preparation and promise. only a possessory title.
police power.
4. What the equal protection clause requires is - Applicant claims that he now owns the land, and is
equality among equals. A law does not have to operate entitled to registration under the Philippine
ISSUE
with equal force on all persons or things to be Commission’s Act No,496 of 1902, which established a
WON a person who has thrice failed the National Medical
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. court for that purpose with jurisdiction throughout the
Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
- A substantial distinction exists between medical Philippine Archipelago, and authorized in general terms
Or, WON the three-flunk rule is a proper exercise of the
students and other students who are not subjected to applications to be made by persons claiming to own the
police power of the State
the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical land.
profession directly affects the very lives of the people, - The government claims that Spain had title to all the
HELD
unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to
Ratio Measures, such as admission exams and the
require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for permit private titles to be acquired; that there was no
three flunk rule, designed to gauge the
example, while belonging to an equally respectable prescription against the crown and that, if there was, a
academic preparation of an applicant fall within
profession, does not hold the same delicate decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a
the valid exercise of the police power of the
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not limited time to make the title good; that the applicant’s
State.
be similarly treated. land was not registered, and therefore became public
Reasoning
- There would be unequal protection if some land; that he United States succeeded to the title of
1. use of precedent: In Tablarin v. Gutierrez,
applicants who have passed the tests are admitted Spain, and that the he has no rights that the Philippine
unanimous Court upheld the constitutionality of the
and others who have also qualified are denied government is bound to respect.
NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to
entrance.
medical schools only to those who have initially proved
Note While every person is entitled to aspire to be a ISSUE
their competence and preparation for a medical
doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a WON the applicant owns the land
education.
doctor. The Court suggests the notion of appropriate
- analogy: Tablarin case & case at bar – issue is
calling. It is time indeed that the State took decisive HELD
academic preparation of the applicant. Admission test
steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by - Yes. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property
and the three-flunk rule are both valid measures in the
directing the student to the course for which he is best and rights acquired by the United States are to be
regulation of the medical profession. The regulation of
suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. administered for the benefits of the inhabitants of the
the practice of medicine in all its branches is a
Decision Petition is granted. Decision of Valenzuela Philippines. Thus, when, as far back as testimony or
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety
RTC reversed. Costs against private respondent San memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
of the public. This power to regulate and control the
Diego. under a claim of private ownership, it shall be presumed
practice of medicine also includes the power to
to have been held in the same way before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land.
- Under the laws of Spain, there is no clear proof that he
does not own the land. Spain did not assume to convert
all the native inhabitant of the Philippines into
trespassers or even into tenants at will. The fact was
that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to
the powers of Spain.
- Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 – Where such
possessor shall not be able to produce title deeds, it
shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession, as valid title by prescription. As prescription,
even against the Crown, was recognized by the laws of
Spain, the court sees no sufficient reason to admit that it
was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over
which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
- Decree of June 25, 1880 – For private ownership, there
must have been a grant by competent authority. For all
legal effects, those who have been in possession for
certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated
land, 20 years; for uncultivated, 30 years. When this
decree went into effect, the applicant’s father was owner
of the land by the very terms of the decree. This being
the case and the fact that his possession was not
unlawful (no attempt at any such proceedings against
him or his father was ever made), the regulation for the
registration of royal land wrongfully occupied does not
apply to him. Moreover, the decree was not calculated
to the mind of an Igorot Chief the notion that ancient
family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it.
Disposition Judgment reversed. Law and justice
require that the applicant should be granted what he
seeks, and should not be deprived of what by practice
and belief of those among whom he live, was his
property.
RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
MINDORO
MALCOLM; February 28, 1919
FACTS
- Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of
Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of
Mindoro to remove their residence from their native
habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at
Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there,
or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This
reservation, as appears from the resolution of the
provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares
of land, which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which
about three hundred Manguianes are confined. One of
the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation
and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and
placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped
from the reservation. The Manguianes sued out a writ of
habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they are
deprived of their liberty in violation of law.
- The return of the Solicitor-General alleges that on
February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro
adopted resolution No. 25 signed by the provincial
governor, Hon. Juan Morente, jr.. The law’s primary
objective is the advancement of the welfare of the non-
Christian people of Mindoro. In one of the Whereas
clauses, it was stated that the provincial governor is of
the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a
place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on.
Pursuant to the Governor’s powers under section 2077 of
the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake was selected as a site
for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro
subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the
Interior. Under the resolution of the Provincial Board, any
Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall
upon conviction be imprisoned not exceeding sixty days
in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Administrative Code. The resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the
executive order of the governor of the same province
copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the
protection of public forests in which they roam, and to
introduce civilized customs among them.
ISSUES
1. WON the Mangyan’s were deprived of due process
when their liberty to choose their homes were limited by
the law.
2. WON the Legislature exceeded its authority in
enacting the law mandating the forcible transfer of the
Mangyanes.
HELD
1. NO. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken
away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in
the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College
Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a
classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of
"due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his
life, liberty, property, and immunities under the
protection of the general rules which govern society." To
constitute "due process of law," as has been often held,
a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some
instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a
rule which is especially true where much must be left to
the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a
law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of
Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and
blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced
by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and
custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power in furtherance of the public good which
regards and preserves these principles of liberty and
justice must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado
vs. California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due process of
law" means simply * * * "first, that there shall be a law
prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the Government; second, that
this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it
shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of
a class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104,
affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.1) "What is due process of law depends on
circumstances it varies with the subject-matter and
necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peabody [1909],
212 U. S., 82.)
- There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a
right conception of liberty and does not practise liberty
in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to
do anything they will-going from one place to another in
the mountains, burning and destroying forests and
making illegal caiñgins thereon. Not knowing what true
liberty is and not practicing the same rightfully, how can
they allege that they are being deprived thereof without
due process of law?
- But does the Constitutional guaranty that no person
shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of
law apply to a class of persons who do not have a
correct idea of what liberty is and do not practice liberty
in a rightful way?
- To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an
erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what
liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the
Government should not adopt any measures looking to
the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
question. It will mean that this people should be let
alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of
savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to
understand liberty in its true and noble sense. In dealing
with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either
letting them alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one
more in accord with humanity and with national
conscience.
- The Mangyans will ultimately become a heavy burden
to the State and on account of their ignorance they will
commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will
be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may
want to abuse them.. They understand liberty as the
right to do anything they will-going from one place to
another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests
and making illegal caiñgins thereon. To allow them to
successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this
time will leave the Government without recourse to
pursue the works of civilizing them and making them
useful citizens. They will thus be left in a permanent
state of savagery and become a vulnerable point of
attack by those who doubt, may challenge the ability of
the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
- Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen
is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization
of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the Philippines.
Nor can one say that due process of law, has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according
to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.
2. NO. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of
the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is,
indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great
malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
- As a point which has been left for the end of this
decision and which in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude
which the courts should assume towards the settled
policy of the Government. In a late decision with which
we are in full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University
(200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can see no objection to the application of public
policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new
question that comes before the courts is, in the last
analysis, determined on that theory, when not
determined by differentiation of the principle of a
prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies
furnished by such prior cases. In balancing
conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the
scales which the court believes will best promote
the public welfare in its probable operation as a
general rule 2145 of the Administrative Code does
not deprive a person of his liberty without due
process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We
are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian
policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Decision Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore,
not issue.
SEPARATE OPINION
CARSON
- The legislative and administrative history of the
Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the standard of
civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to
have advanced, to justify its removal from the class
embraced within the descriptive term "non-Christian," as
that term is used in the Philippine statute-book, is that
degree of civilization which results in a mode of life
within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to
extend to, and enforce upon its membership the general
laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and
judicial, which control the conduct of the admittedly
civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life,
furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal
customs or practices which tend to brutalize or debauch
the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or
practices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives or
property of those who may be brought in contact with
the members of the tribe.
- So the standard of civilization to which any given
number or group of inhabitants of a particular province
in these Islands, or any individual member of such a
group must be found to have advanced, in order to
remove such group or individual from the class
embraced within the statutory description of "non-
Christian," is that degree of civilization which would
naturally and normally result in the withdrawal by such
persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-
Christian" tribe had they at any time adhered to or
maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would
qualify them whether they reside within or beyond the
habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a
mode of life independent of and apart from that
maintained by such tribe, but a mode of life as would not
be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of
the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they
are brought in contact.
- The contention that in this particular case, and without
challenging the validity of the statute, the writ should
issue because of the failure to give these petitioners as
well as the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes by
the reconcentration order an opportunity to be heard
before any attempt was made to enforce it, begs the
question and is, of course, tantamount to a contention
that there is no authority in law for the issuance of such
an order.
MOIR
- I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight,
but my sense of justice will not permit me to let this
decision go on record without expressing my strong
dissent from the opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in
by a majority of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze
the opinion or to go into the questions in detail. I shall
simply state, as briefly as may be the legal and human
side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.
- The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no
treaty with the Government of the Philippine Islands by
which they have agreed to live within a certain district
where they are accorded exclusive rights. They are
citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are
Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges
of any other citizen of this country. And when the
provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted
to take them from their native habitat and to hold them
on the little reservation of about 800 hectares, he
deprived them of their rights and their liberty without
due process of law, and they were denied the equal
protection of the law. The majority opinion says "they
are restrained for their own good and the general good
of the Philippines." They are to be made to accept the
civilization of the more advanced Filipinos whether they
want it or not. They are backward and deficient in
culture and must be moved from their homes, however
humble they may be and "brought under the bells" and
made to stay on a reservation. Are these petitioners
charged with any crime? There is no mention in the
return of the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of
any crime having been committed by these "peaceful,
timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."
- It has been said that this is a government of laws and
not of men; that there is no arbitrary body of individuals;
that the constitutional principles upon which our
government and its institutions rest do not leave room
for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary
power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by
these provisions which the people have, through the
organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of
all control exercised over them. In particular the
fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal
protection clause, thereof, forbids that the individual
shall be subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government; it was intended to prohibit, and
does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty,
or arbitrary spoliation of property.
- As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely
arbitrary or unreasonable classification, or which singles
out any particular individual or class as the subject of
hostile and discriminating legislation, is clearly
unconstitutional as being opposed to the fourteenth
amendment and especially to the equal protection
clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no
further discussion." (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U. S.
Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.) When we consider the
nature and the theory of our institutions of government,
the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and
review the history of their development, we are
constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave
room for the play and action of purely personal and
arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not
subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but
in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to
the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remain
with the people by whom and for whom all government
exists and acts. And the law is the definition and
limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there
must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person
or body, the authority of final decision; and, in many
cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely
political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal
of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure
of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the
fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, considered as individual possessions, are
secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are
the monuments showing the victorious progress of the
race in securing to men the blessings of civilization
under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the
famous language of Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the
Government of Commonwealth 'may be a government of
law and not of men.' For the very idea that one man may
be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or
any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at
the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
slavery itself." (Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 374.)
- It is said that the present law is an old Act being in
substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine Commission. But
it has never been brought before this court for
determination of its constitutionality. No matter how
beneficient the motives of the lawmakers if the law
tends to deprive any man of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, it is void. In my opinion the
acts complained of which were taken in conformity with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code not only
deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due
process of law, but will in all probability deprive them of
their life, without due process of law. History teaches
that to take a semi-nomadic tribe from their native
fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow confines
of a reservation is to invite disease and suffering and
death.
- From my long experience in the Islands, I should say
that it would be a crime of little less magnitude to take
the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where they have
reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and
fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more fertile,
unoccupied, malaria infested valleys which they look
down upon from their fields-than it would be to order
their decapitation en masse. There can be no denial that
the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are
in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the
Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat
and reconcentrated on a reservation-in effect an open
air jail-then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes,
who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so
may the Moros.
- There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in
the Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-nine governors
upon the prior approval of the head of the department
have the power under this law to take the non-Christian
inhabitants of their different provinces from their homes
and put them on a reservation for "their own good and
the general good of the Philippines," and the courts will
grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the
Philippine Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives,
may be subject to the unregulated discretion of the
provincial governor. And who would be safe? After the
reservation is once established might not a provincial
governor decide that some political enemy was a non-
Christian, and that he would be safer on the reservation.
No matter what his education and culture, he could have
no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the
court might be in a distant province and not within
reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is final.
- There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-
Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the same
category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be
so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on
a reservation-in effect an open air jail-then so may the
Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more
progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.
- I think this Court should declare that sections 2145 and
2759 of the Administrative Code of 1917 are
unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners
are illegally restrained of their liberty, and that they
have been denied the equal protection of the laws, and
order the respondents immediately to liberate all of the
petitioners.
PIT-OG V PEOPLE
FERNAN; October 11, 1990
FACTS
- Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
- There was a communal land in Laog, Mainit, Mt.
Province called the tayan. It was owned by the tomayan
group whose members were descendants of the original
owners thereof named Jakot and Pang-o. One of their
descendants, Pel-ey Cullalad, was requested by the
tomayan to act in their behalf in selling the 400-sqm
residential portion of the tayan, in order that the
tomayan would have something to butcher and eat
during a celebration called ato. The sale was made in
consideration of P1,500 and was made in favor of
Edward Pasiteng, whose house had been built thereon. It
was agreed that the unregistered property would be
registered under Sec. 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code as amended by Act No. 3344. Besides Cullalad,
several members of the tomayan affixed their signatures
or thumb marks on the notarized deed of sale.
Thereafter, Pasiteng declared the property as his own for
taxation purposes and paid taxes thereon.
- In 1983, while Pasiteng was out hunting, Erkey Pit-og
(aka Mary Pit-og) and her companions destroyed the
fence erected by Pasiteng and cut down and took away
the sugarcane worth P1,000 and the banana fruits
valued at P100 found in the area. Pasiteng reported the
matter to the police. Three days later, the police filed a
complaint for theft against Erkey Pit-og in the Municipal
Trial Court of Bontoc.
- Pit-og pleaded not guilty of theft on the ground that the
tayan belonged to her, her father Lobchoken being a
descendant Jakot. She did not declare the land for
taxation purposes because no one in the tomayan was
allowed to declare the land as his own. However, any
member of the tomayan could make improvements on
the land and claim them as his own. Anyone who
abandoned the land would be succeeded only by other
members. No person outside the tomayan could succeed
to the cultivation of the tayan.
- Lobchoken, planted sugarcane in the tayan in Loag and
when he died, his widow Pidchoy and their children
continued cultivating the land. They also built a granary
thereon. The land was later given to Pit-og by Pidchoy
for cultivation. Thereafter, the family allowed Pasiteng to
build a house behind the place where Pit-og and her
family used to have a house because Edward was
Erkey's uncle being the brother of her father. Erkey
planted the bananas and avocado trees in the area and
harvested the sugarcane. No one had ever prevented
her from cutting the sugarcane and the other plants.
The municipal trial court discredited Pit-og's story
emphasizing that her claim of continuous occupation and
possession of the land was baseless as she had "no
papers to show" or prove such claim. It found that an
the elements of theft under Article 308 of the RPC were
present and accordingly rendered the judgment of
conviction.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the lower courts with the following findings and
observations:
- Pasiteng’s claim of ownership is documented by a
Deed of Conveyance, a public document which was
executed between him and the members of the tomayan
group. The validity of this public document has never
been questioned by any one of the previous owners
belonging to the tomayan group. Furthermore, the tax
declarations in the name of and the realty tax payments
by, Pasiteng, although not conclusive proofs of
ownership, are, nevertheless, prima facie evidence of his
possession of the land in question. In contrast to these
documentary evidence, petitioner offers nothing better
than her bare claim. The personal property taken by
accused-petitioner not being hers but those of Pasiteng,
and she gained from the taking thereof without the
consent of the owner, accused-petitioner is guilty of the
crime of theft.
ISSUES
1. WON Pit-og had criminal intent in taking the
sugarcane and the bananas.
2. WON the present case is criminal or civil in nature.
HELD
1. Erkey Pit-og could not have had criminal intent
because she took the sugarcane and bananas believing
them to be her own.
- Edward Pasiteng relied heavily on his documentary
evidence to prove ownership over the sugarcane and
bananas. A careful study of these documents, in
conjunction with the testimonial evidence extant in the
record, however, discloses matters which put a cloud of
doubt upon Pit-og’s culpability. The deed of sale
describes the property as containing an area of 400 sqm,
while the tax declarations show that the property
contains an area of 512 sqm. The testimonies presented
by the prosecution and the defense show that the areas
cultivated by Pasiteng and Pit-og were adjacent and so
close to each other that the possibility of confusion as to
who planted which plants is not remote. In fact, before
the filing of this case, Pit-og had sued Pasiteng's son,
Donato, who allegedly cut down bananas she had
planted in the area. The fact that Edward had built a
fence around the area he claimed as his does not
necessarily prove that he enclosed only the 400 square
meters he had purchased from the tomayan. After all, he
had declared as his own for taxation purposes 112
square meters more than the area he bought.
- There is on record a survey plan of the 512 square-
meter area claimed by Edward but there are no
indications therein of the exact area involved in this
case. Proof on the matter, however, is important for it
means the Identification of the rightful owner of the
stolen properties. It should be emphasized that to prove
the crime of theft, it is necessary and indispensable to
clearly Identify the person who, as a result of a criminal
act, without his knowledge and consent, was wrongfully
deprived of a thing belonging to him.
2. The legal issues that must be ironed out with regard
to claims of ownership over the tayan should be
threshed out in an appropriate civil action.
- Obiter dicta related to Article II Section22 re
Indigenous Community
- We see this case as exemplifying a clash between a
claim of ownership founded on customs and tradition
and another such claim supported by written evidence
but nonetheless based on the same customs and
tradition. when a court is beset with this kind of case, it
can never be too careful More so in this case, where the
accused, an illiterate tribeswoman who cannot be
expected to resort to written evidence of ownership,
stands to lose her liberty on account of an oversight in
the court's appreciation of the evidence.
Disposition Erkey Pit-og is ACQUITTED for lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt that she committed the crime
of theft. No costs.
KILOSBAYAN, INC V MORATO
MENDOZA; November 16, 1995
FACTS
- Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this
case
Petitioners contend that the decision in the first case
has already settled
(1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing
to sue and
(2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as
amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
can enter into any form of association or collaboration
with any party in operating an on-line lottery, and
these questions can no longer be reopened.
- Petitioners argue that the two justices who changed
their votes did not act according to law and that the two
new appointees regardless of the merits of the case
must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos
appointees who were dissenters in the first case and
constitute the new majority in the second lotto case.
- SC said the decision in the first case was a split
decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of the original
majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it
was not surprising that the first decision in the first case
was later reversed.
- SC cited the case of Feliciano v. Aquinas (also a split
decision) which was overturned in People v. Yang.
ISSUES
1. WON the constitutional policies and principles (Art II
Sec 5 ,Sec 12, Sec 13, Sec 17) invoked by the petitioners
may be resorted to for striking down laws or official
actions which are inconsistent with them
2. WON the petitioners have standing to sue on
constitutional grounds, given that the Constitution
guarantees to people’s organizations “effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political
and economic decision making (Art XIII Sec 16).
3. WON, as settled in the first case, the PCSO under its
charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) cannot enter into
any form of association or collaboration with any party in
operating an on-line lottery.
HELD
1. NO. As already stated, however, these provisions are
not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can
be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for
legislative or executive action. By authorizing the
holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect
determined that consistently with these policies and
principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given
this authority. That is why we said with respect to the
opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro,
"the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to
deal with the activity as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).
2. NO. It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question
the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract
entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are
assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of
constitutionality but only of contract law, which
petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot
raise.
- Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization does not
give it the requisite personality to question the validity
of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides
that "the State shall respect the role of independent
people's organizations to enable the people to pursue
and protect, within the democratic framework, their
legitimate and collective interests and aspirations
through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to
"effective and reasonable participation at all levels of
social, political, and economic decision-making shall not
be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§ 15-16)
- These provisions have not changed the traditional rule
that only real parties in interest or those with standing,
as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The
jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving
constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and
controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This
requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial
function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the
courts from decision-making in the political departments
of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just
any party.
- Petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be
sustained because this case does not involve illegal
disbursement of public funds. Nor as concerned citizens
can they bring this suit because no specific injury
suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who
are members of Congress, their right to sue as
legislators cannot be invoked because they do not
complain of any infringement of their rights as
legislators.
3. Indeed in the first case it was held that the PCSO
under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) cannot
enter into any form of association or collaboration with
any party in operating an on-line lottery HOWEVER THE
QUESTIONS RAISED IN THIS CASE ARE LEGAL
QUESTIONS AND THE CLAIMS INVOLVED ARE
SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE INVOLVED IN
THE PRIOR CASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. AS ALREADY
STATED, THE ELA IS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM
THE CONTRACT OF LEASE DECLARED VOID IN THE FIRST
CASE.
Also, the Court noted in its decision that the provisions
of the first contract, which were considered to be
features of a joint venture agreement, had been
removed in the new contract.
VALMONTE V BELMONTE, JR
CORTES; February 13, 1989
FACTS
- Petitioners are media practitioners who wish to confirm
reports that certain members of the Batasang
Pambansa, including some members of the opposition,
were granted “clean” loans from the GSIS before the
February 1986 elections. Petitioner Valmonte filed a
special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction, praying that respondent Belmonte, in his
capacity as GSIS General Manager, be directed to:
1. Furnish petitioners with a list of the names of the
members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who were
able to secure “clean” loans from the GSIS immediately
prior to the February 7, 1986 elections through the
intercession of then-First Lady Imelda Marcos.
2. Furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing said loans.
3. Allow petitioners access to public records for the
subject information.
ISSUES
Procedural: Have petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies?
Substantive:
1. Does the information sought by petitioners fall under
“matters of public concern”?
2. Does a confidential relationship exist between GSIS
and its borrowers?
3. Are loan transactions of the GSIS, being merely
incidental to its insurance function, private in nature?
HELD
Procedural: No. The principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions,
among which is when only a question of law is involved.
The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the
interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, can be passed upon by the court more
competently than GSIS or its Board of Trustees.
Substantive:
1. Yes. The public nature of GSIS funds and the public
office held by the alleged borrowers make the
information sought clearly a matter of public interest
and concern.
2. No. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in
his private capacity and not to public and governmental
agencies like the GSIS. The right cannot be invoked by
juridical entities, as a corporation has no right to privacy
in its name. The entire basis of the right to privacy is an
injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a
corporation would have no such ground for relief.
However, even the concerned borrowers themselves
may not succeed if they chose to invoke this right. Public
figures, most especially those holding responsible
positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their
actions being subject to closer public scrutiny.
3. No. The “constituent-ministrant” dichotomy
characterizing government function has long been
repudiated. The government, whether carrying out its
sovereign attributes or running some business,
discharges the same function of service to the people.
That the GSIS was exercising a proprietary function in
granting the loans would not justify the exclusion of the
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to
information. Transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special
legislation, are within the ambit of the people’s right to
be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings.
• Petitions are entitled to access to the documents
subject to reasonable regulations. The petition is
held to be meritorious as to the 2nd and 3rd
alternative acts sought by petitioners.
• The same cannot be said, however, of the 1 st act
sought. Although citizens are entitled to “access to
official records”, the Constitution does not accord
them a right to compel custodians of public records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in
their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern. It is essential for a writ of
mandamus to lie that the applicant has a well-
defined, clear and certain right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the
defendant to perform the act required.
CHAVEZ V PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
PANGANIBAN; December 9, 1998
FACTS
- These are the main questions raised in this original
action seeking (1) to prohibit and “enjoin respondents
[PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into,
perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the
heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos x x x
relating to and concerning the properties and assets of
Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or
abroad – including the so-called Marcos gold hoard”; and
(2) to “compel respondents to make public all
negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or
perfected, and all documents related to or relating to
such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG
and the Marcos heirs.”
- Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, former solicitor general,
brought this action in response to news reports in
September 1997 referring to (1) the alleged discovery of
billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various
coded accounts in Swiss banks, and (2) the reported
execution of a compromise between the government
(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or
share these assets. Acting on a motion of petitioner, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order dated March
23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their agents and/or
representatives from “entering into, or perfecting and/or
executing any agreement with the heirs of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning
their ill-gotten wealth. On August 19, 1998, Gloria,
Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed
before the Court a motion for intervention. They aver
that they are “among the 10,000 claimants whose right
to claim from the Marcos family and/or the Marcos estate
is recognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos”.
ISSUES
Procedural:
1. WON the petitioner has the personality or legal
standing to file the instant petition; and
2. WON this Court is the proper court before which this
action may be filed.
Substantive:
1. WON this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to
the public the details of any agreement, perfected or
not, with the Marcoses; and
2. WON there exist any legal restraints against a
compromise agreement between the Marcoses
and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses’ ill-
gotten wealth.
HELD
Procedural:
1. Yes. When the issue concerns a public right and the
object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties
in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is
a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the
laws, he need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result of the action.
2. Yes. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly
confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus. The argument of
respondent that petitioner should have properly sought
relief before the Sandiganbayan in which enforcement of
the compromise agreements was pending resolution
seems to have merit, if petitioner was merely seeking
to enjoin the enforcement of the compromise and/or to
compel the PCGG to disclose to the public the
terms contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner
is here seeking the public disclosure of “all
negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or
perfected, and documents related or relating to such
negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the
Marcos heirs”. In other words, the petition is not merely
confined to the Agreements that have already been
drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future
undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged
Marcos loot. The core issue boils down to the precise
interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin
constitutional provisions on “public transactions”.
Substantive:
1. Yes. There is no doubt that the recovery of the
Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest. “Ill-gotten
wealth”, by its very nature, assumes a public character.
The assets and properties referred to supposedly
originated from the government itself. To all intents and
purposes, therefore, they belong to the people.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
that “transactions” contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of a
transaction, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its
officers, as well as other government representatives, to
disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
2. Yes. A cursory perusal of the General and
Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the
Marcos heirs reveals serious legal flaws.
i) While a compromise in civil suits is expressly
authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as
regards criminal liability. The authority must be
specifically conferred. In the present case, the
power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on
PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14 as amended by EO No.
14-A. However, the Agreements do not conform to the
requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity
cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the
principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth
cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan. The
provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide
information or testify against a respondent, defendant or
accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.
ii) Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG
commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the property
to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear
violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to
grant tax exemptions is vested in Congress and, to a
certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. The PCGG
has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even
under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-
gotten wealth cases. Even granting that Congress enacts
the law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on
their properties, such law will definitely not pass
the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of
Rights. Any special grant of exemption in favor only of
the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will
also violate the constitutional rule that “taxation shall be
uniform and equitable”.
iii) The government binds itself under the General
Agreement to cause the dismissal of all cases against
the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and
other courts. This is a direct encroachment on
judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal
jurisdiction. Well settled is the doctrine that once a case
has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction,
the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the
full discretion and control of the judge. Jurisdiction, once
acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a
resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the
information or to dismiss the complaint. Thus, the PCGG
cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases
against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said
dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion.
iv) The government also waives all claims and
counterclaims, “whether past, present, or future,
matured or inchoate,” against the Marcoses. This all-
encompassing stipulation is contrary to law. Under the
Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived.
This is a palpable violation of the due process and equal
protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively
ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law.
v) The Agreements do not provide for a definite or
determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill
their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before
the Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets.
vi) The Agreements do not state with specificity the
standards for determining which assets shall be forfeited
by the government and which shall be retained by the
Marcoses. While the Supplemental Agreement provides
that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the
$356 million Swiss deposits (less government recovery
expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only to
the said deposit. No similar splitting scheme is defined
with respect to the other properties. Neither is there,
anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis
for the 25-75 percent sharing ratio.
vii) The absence of then-President Fidel Ramos’ approval
of the principal Agreement, an express condition
therein, renders the compromise incomplete and
unenforceable. Nevertheless, even if such approval were
obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN; May 19, 1999
FACTS
Ma. Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos II and
Irene Marcos-Araneta filed before the court a motion for
leave to intervene and a motion for partial
reconsideration, alleging that they were parties and
signatories to the General and Supplemental
Agreements which this Court declared “NULL AND VOID
for being contrary to law and the Consitution.” They
claim to “have a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties or an interest
against both as to warrant their intervention.” They add
that their exclusion from the instant case resulted in a
denial of their constitutional rights to due process and to
equal protection. They also the raise the “principle of
hierarchical administration of justice” to impugn the
Court’s cognizance of petitioner’s direct action before it.
ISSUES
Procedural:
WON the Motion for Leave to Intervene should be
allowed.
Substantive:
1. WON the exclusion of the movants from the
proceedings regarding the Agreements to which they
were parties and signatories was a denial of “their
property right to contract without due process of law”;
2. WON the Court violated the principle of hierarchical
administration of justice by ruling upon the validity of
the Agreements;
3. WON the issue of right to information raised by
petitioner was rendered moot and academic by the
submission by the movants of the Motion for Approval of
Compromise Agreements to the Sandiganbayan;
4. WON there was ratification of the Agreements by
partial implementation; and
5. WON the issue raised by petitioner presented an
actual case and a justiciable question.
HELD
Procedural:
No. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, provides
that a motion to intervene should be filed before
rendition of judgment. Intervention can no longer be
allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.
Substantive:
1. No. A contract that violates the Constitution and the
law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and
creates no obligations. In legal terms, the movants have
really no interest to protect or right to assert in this
proceeding. Moreover, the movants are merely
incidental, not indispensable, parties to the instant
case. The petition of Francisco I. Chavez sought
to enforce a constitutional right against the PCGG and to
determine whether the latter has been acting within the
bounds of its authority.
2. No. The principle of hierarchy of the courts generally
applies to cases involving factual questions, since the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Inasmuch as the
petition at bar involves only constitutional and legal
questions concerning public interest, the Court resolved
to exercise primary jurisdiction on the matter.
3. No. The Chavez petition was not confined to the
concluded terms contained in the Agreements, but
likewise concerned other ongoing and future
negotiations and agreements, perfected or not. It was
therefore not rendered moot and academic simply by
the public disclosure of the subject Agreements.
4. No. The PCGG’s grant to the claimants’ mother of
access rights to one of their sequestered properties
cannot ratify the Agreements. Being null and void, they
are not subject to ratification.
5. Yes. Mandamus, over which this Court has original
jurisdiction, is a proper recourse for a citizen to
enforce a public right. There is no political
question involved. The power and authority of the PCGG
to compromise is not the issue. But, clearly, by violating
the Constitution and the laws, the PCGG gravely abused
its discretion.
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN
(BAYAN) V ZAMORA
BUENA; October 10, 2000
FACTS
- This is a consolidation of 5 petitions assailing the
constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement.
(Trivia: Si Prof Te ang counsel para sa ibang petitioners)
- March 14, 1947 – The Philippines and USA forged a
Military Bases Agreement, formalizing, among others,
the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US
military personnel.
- August 30, 1951 – The Philippines and USA entered into
a Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the treaty, the parties
agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their
territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft.
- 1991- RP-US Military Base Agreement expired. Senate
rejected proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security. (Goodbye… but Mutual
Defense Treaty still in effect.)
- February 10, 1998 – President Ramos approved Visiting
Forces Agreement, after a series of conferences and
negotiations.
- October 5, 1998 – President Estrada, through Secretary
of Foreign affairs, ratified VFA.
- May 27, 1999- Senate passed Resolution No. 18,
concurring with the ratification of the VFA. (Who
concurred: Fernan, Ople, Drilon, Biazon, Tatad,
Cayetano, Aquino-Oreta, Barbers, Jaworski, Magsaysay
Jr, Osmeña, Flavier, Defensor-Santiago, Ponce-Enrile,
Sotto, Revilla, Coseteng, Honasan. Total=17. Who
rejected: Guingona, Roco, Osmeña III, Pimentel,
Legarda-Leviste. Total=5)
- The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating
circumstances and conditions under which US Armed
Forces and defense personnel may be present in the
Philippines. The VFA is an agreement which defines
treatment of US troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It also defines the rights of the US and the
Phil government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA.
2. WON the VFA is governed by the provisions of Sec 21,
Article VII (concurrence of 2/3 of the members of the
Senate) or Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities not allowed in the
Phils except under a treaty duly concurred in by Senate,
and when Congress requires, ratification by a majority of
votes cast by the people in a national referendum, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State)
3. WON VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine
sovereignty.
a. WON the Philippine Courts will be deprived of
their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed
by the US Military personnel.
b. WON the Supreme Court will be deprived of its
jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or higher.
4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with
the VFA?
5. WON the VFA violates Sec 1 Article III (equal
protection clause), Sec 8 Article II (prohibition against
nuclear weapons), and Sec 28(4) Article VI (taxation) of
the 1987 Constitution.
HELD
1. No (and Yes). As taxpayers, petitioners have NO legal
standing as there are no public funds raised by taxation
in the case. Also, petitioner-legislators do not possess
the requisite locus standi as there is absence of clear
showing of any direct injury to their person or to the
institution to which they belong. HOWEVER, the issues
raised in the petitions are of paramount importance and
of constitutional significance. It is of TRANSCENDENTAL
importance, so the Court brushes aside procedural
barriers and takes cognizance of the petitions.
2. It is governed by BOTH provisions. Section 25
Article XVIII applies as it specifically deals with treaties
involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
(The ‘or’ is important to take note as it signifies
independence of one thing from the others. Thus, it can
just be an agreement covering only troops – not bases—
like the VFA. Also, Section 25 Article XVIII makes no
distinction whether the troops or facilities will be
“transient” or “permanent”, so the VFA is covered by
this provision). On the other hand, Section 21 Article
VII find applicability with regard to the issue and for the
sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate
(Sec 21 Art VII requires 2/3 of the members of the
Senate, while Sec 25 Art XVIII just says “duly concurred
in by the Senate” with no specified number).
- Were the requirements of Section 25 Art XVIII complied
with?
Section 25 Art XVIII requires the following conditions:
a) it must be under a treaty. -- Complied
with. We treat VFA as a treaty.
b) the treaty must be duly concurred in
by the Senate, and so required by the Congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people
in a national referendum. -- Complied with. 17 of 23
Senators concurred (Senator Gloria Arroyo was
elected VP). Requirement of ratification in a
national referendum unnecessary since Congress
has not required it.
c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State (US).-- Complied with. Ambassador
Hubbard’s letter states that the VFA is binding on
the US gov’t and that in international legal terms
such agreement is a ‘treaty’.
- A ‘treaty’, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, is an “international instrument
concluded between States in written form and governed
by the international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments.”
- In international law, there is no difference between
treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect
upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating
functionaries have remained within their powers.
3. Section 2 Article II of the Constitution declares that
the “xxx Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
land xxx” (this doesn’t really answer the issue above,
but the ponente didn’t really discuss an answer WON the
VFA is an abdication of sovereignty.. oh well… here
goes…)
- With the ratification of the VFA, it becomes obligatory
and incumbent on our part to be bound by the terms of
the agreement. As a member of the family of nations,
the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally
accepted rules for the conduct of its international
relations. We cannot readily plead the Constitution as a
convenient excuse for non-compliance with our
obligations, duties and responsibilities under
international law.
- Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of
States adopted by the International Law Commision
1949 provides that every state has a duty to carry out
in good faith its obligations. Article 26 of the Convention:
pacta sunt servanda.
4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with
the VFA? No.
- Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despostic manner.
- The Constitution vests the power to enter into treaties
or
International agreements in the President, subject only
to the concurrence of the members of Senate. The
negotiation of the VFA and the ratification of the
agreement are exclusive acts of the the President, in the
lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic
powers granted by the Constitution.
- As to the power to concur with treaties, the
Constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone.
Thus once the Senate performs that power, or exercises
its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the
Constitution, the concurrence cannot be viewed to
constitute an abuse of power.
Decision Petitions Dismissed
11 concurring, 3 dissenting, 1 take no part.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO [dissent] Malaysia, became interested to offer its services
- Most significant issue is whether the VFA violates Sec and resources to PCSO and organized with some
25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (see requirements Filipino investors in March 1993 a corporation
above). known as the Philippine Gaming Management
- POINT 1: Respondents claim that the requirements do Corporation (PGMC).
not apply as the VFA contemplates a temporary visit of 2. Before August 1993, PCSO finally formally
the troops, while the provision applies to a permanent issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease of
presence of foreign troops. Contract of an on-line lottery system for PCSO.
The said temporary nature of the VFA cannot stand. Considering the citizenship requirement in the RFP
Neither the VFA nor the Mutual Defense Treaty between ("Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at
RP and US provides the slightest suggestion on the least 60% of its shares owned by Filipino
duration of the visits. VFA does not provide for a specific shareholders"), PGMC claims that Berjaya Group
and limited period of effectivity. undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to
40%, by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign
- POINT 2: The requirement that it be “recognized as a stockholdings to local investors.
treaty by the other contracting state” is crystal clear and 3. Aug. 15, 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO.
was put there by the framers inorder not to repeat the The bids were evaluated by the Special Pre-
anomalous asymmetry of the 1947 Military bases Qualification Bids and Awards committee (SPBAC)
agreement where we recognized it as a treaty but the for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was
US treated it as an executive agreement. thereafter submitted to the Office of the President.
- The VFA is equivalent to a sole executive agreement in (This was preceded by complaints from the
the US. The Court will be standing on unstable ground if Committe's Chairperson, Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera.)
it places a sole executive agreement like the VFA on the 4. Oct. 21, 1993, the Office of the President
same constitutional plateau as a treaty, as there are still announced that it had given PGMC the go-signal to
questions on the constitutional basis and legal effects of operate the countr's on-line lottery system.
sole executive agreements under the US law. Announcement was published in Manila Times, PDI,
- “With the cloud of uncertainty still hanging on the and Manila Standard on Oct. 29.
exact legal force of sole executive agreements under the 5. Nov. 4, 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter
US constitutional law, this Court must strike a blow for to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up
the sovereignty of our country by drawing a bright line of an on-line lotttery system on the basis of serious
between the dignity and status of a treaty in contrast moral and ethical considerations. KILOSBAYAN
with a sole executive agreement. However we may wish reiterated its vigorous opposition to “lotto” at the
it, The VFA as a sole executive agreement cannot climb meeting of the Committee on Games and
to the same lofty height that the dignity of a treaty can Amusements of the Senate on Nov. 12, 1993
reach. Consequently, it falls short of the requirement set 6. Nov. 19, 1993, the media announced that
by Sec 25 Art XVIII of the 1987 Constitution that the despite the opposition, Malacanang will push
agreement allowing the presence of foreign military through with operation of lotto, that it is actually
troops on Phil soil must be ‘recognized as a treaty by the PCSO which will operate the lottery while winning
other contracting state’. I vote to grant the petitions.” corporate bidders merely lessors.
7. Dec. 1, 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested copies of
all documents pertaining to the lottery award from
KILOSBAYAN, INC. V GUINGONA, JR. Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., who
DAVIDE; May 5, 1994 informed KILOSBAYAN that the documents will be
transmitted before the end of the month. However
FACTS on the same date, an agreement denominated as
Nature: Special civil action for prohibition and “Contract of Lease” was finally executed by PCSO
injunction, praying for a TRO and preliminary injunction, and PGMC.
to prohibit and restrain implementation of "Contract of 8. Considering the denial by the Office of the
Lease" between PCSO and PGMC in connection with on- President of its protest and the statement of
line lottery system a.k.a. "lotto". Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that
1. Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), "only a court injunction can stop Malacañang," and
the imminent implementation of the Contract of
PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system
Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-
for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and
petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.
diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before
PETITIONERS' CLAIM
March 1993, after learning that PCSO was interested
- Petitioners claim that PCSO cannot validly enter into
in operating an on-line lottery system, Berjaya
the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it
Group Berhad, a multinational company in
is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and
conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or
"association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B)
of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which
prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities
"in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity, foreign or
domestic." And that there are terms and conditions of
the Contract "showing that respondent PGMC is the
actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO."
- The petitioners also point out that the Contract of
Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a
telecommunications network that will connect all the
municipalities and cities in the territory. However, PGMC
cannot do that because it has no franchise from
Congress to construct, install, establish, or operate the
network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as
amended.
- Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled
corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a
franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, since "the
subscribed foreign capital" of the PGMC "comes to about
75%, as shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of
Incorporation," it cannot lawfully enter into the contract
in question because all forms of gambling — and lottery
is one of them — are included in the so-called foreign
investments negative list under the Foreign Investments
Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital
is allowed.
- Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of
Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it to establish
and operate an on-line lottery and telecommunications
systems.
RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS
- Private respondent PGMC asserts that "(1) [it] is merely
an independent contractor for a piece of work and (2) as
such independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator
of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing
its franchise, 'in collaboration, association or joint
venture' with PGM.
- Finally, it states that the execution and implementation
of the contract does not violate the Constitution and the
laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the lottery
franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial
or legal, which should be ventilated in another forum;
and that the "petitioners do not appear to have the legal
standing or real interest in the subject contract and in
obtaining the reliefs sought."
- Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant
Executive Secretary Renato Corona, and the PCSO
maintain that the contract of lease in question does not
violate Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 42, and that the petitioner's interpretation of the
phrase "in collaboration, association or joint venture" in
Section 1 is "much too narrow, strained and utterly
devoid of logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO, as a
corporate entity, is vested with the basic and essential
prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or
contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of its
purposes and objectives." What the PCSO charter "seeks
to prohibit is that arrangement akin to a "joint venture"
or partnership where there is "community of interest in
the business, sharing of profits and losses, and a mutual
right of control," a characteristic which does not obtain
in a contract of lease." They further claim that the
establishment of the telecommunications system
stipulated in the Contract of Lease does not require a
congressional franchise because PGMC will not operate a
public utility
- They also argue that the contract does not violate the
Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the Articles of
Incorporation of PGMC authorize it to enter into the
Contract of Lease; and that the issues of "wisdom,
morality and propriety of acts of the executive
department are beyond the ambit of judicial review."
Finally, they allege that the petitioners have no
standing to maintain the instant suit.
ISSUES
Procedural: WON the petitioners have locus standi.
Substantive: WON the Contract of Lease is legal and
valid in light of RA 1169 as amended by BP Blg. 42,
which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries "in collaboration, association, or joint venture
with any person, association, company, or entity,
whether domestic or foreign."
HELD
1. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the
petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A
party's standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the
issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases,
this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.'
- The Court found the instant petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people
even in the remotest barangays of the country and the
counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as
the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition
and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court
hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the
respondents tried to take advantage of
2. Contract of Lease is void for being contrary to law.
PGMC is not only a Lessor, PCSO in the least will be
conducting lotteries “ in collaboration or association”
and in the most “in joint vernture” with PGMC. The
manegerial and technical expertise of PGMC are
indespensible to the operation of the on-line lottery
system, whereas PCSO only has its franchise to offer.
- By the exception explicitly made in paragraph B,
Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot share its
franchise with another by way of collaboration,
association or joint venture. Neither can it assign,
transfer, or lease such franchise.
- It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government
to individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and
franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly
against the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or
privilege in derogation of the common rights of the
public must prove his title thereto by a grant which is
clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot enlarge
it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable
inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally granted is
withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication."
- Whether the contract in question is one of lease or
whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor
should not be decided on the basis of the title or
designation of the contract but by the intent of the
parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of
the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The
intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
- A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of
the contract and a consideration of the
contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC
indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a
contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an
independent contractor for a piece of work, but one
where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or
association, in the least, or joint venture, at the most,
exists between the contracting parties.
(Collaboration is defined as the acts of working
together in a joint project. Association means the act
of a number of persons in uniting together for some
special purpose or business. Joint venture is defined as
an association of persons or companies jointly
undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally all
contribute assets and share risks. )
- The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC
reveal that the PCSO had neither funds of its own nor the
expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery
system, and that although it wished to have the system,
it would have it "at no expense or risks to the
government." Because of these serious constraints and
unwillingness to bear expenses and assume risks, the
PCSO was candid enough to state in its RFP that it is
seeking for "a suitable contractor which shall build, at its
own expense, all the facilities needed to operate and
maintain" the system; exclusively bear "all capital,
operating expenses and expansion expenses and risks."
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [concurring]
- PGMC is plainly a partner of PCSO in violation of the law
no matter how the assistance is called or the contract
denominated.
PADILLA [concurring]
- Contract of Lease between PCSO and PGMC is a joint
venture because each part contributes its share in the
enterprise project. PGMC contributes the facilities,
technology and expertise, while PCSO contributes the
market through the dealers and in the totality the mass
of Filipino gambling elements. PGMC will get its 4.9% of
gross receipts; the residue of the whole exercise will go
to PCSO, this is a joint venture plain and simple.
MELO [dissenting]
- This case does not involve a challenge on the validity of
a statute nor an attempt to restrain expenditure of
public funds. The contract involves strictly corporate
money.
- By considering this case as a taxpayer's suit could not
cure the lack of locus standi on the part of the
petitioners. The contract does not involve an illegal
disbursement of public funds. No public fund raised by
taxation is involved.
PUNO [dissenting]
- Courts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases
dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their
doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance.
- It is clear that the requirement of locus standi has not
been jettisoned by the Constitution for it still commands
courts in no uncertain terms to settle only “actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable”/
- Rationale for the standard of locus standi is to assure a
vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and
perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's
overruling the determination of a coordinate,
democratically elected organ of government.
KILOSBAYAN, INC., ET AL. VS. MORATO
MENDOZA; July 17, 1995
FACTS
- As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375
(Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110
(1994) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on the
ground that it had been made in violation of the charter
of the PCSO, the parties entered into negotiations for a
new agreement that would be "consistent with the
latter's [PCSO] charter . . . and conformable to this
Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision."
- On January 25, 1195 the parties signed an Equipment
Lease Agreement (thereafter called ELA) whereby the
PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories
to the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3
% of the gross amount of ticket sale derived by the PCSO
from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall
be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000.00
per terminal in Commercial Operation. The rental is to be
computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly
rentals in any year fall short of the annual minimum
fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees to pay the
deficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket sales.
(Pars. 1-2)
Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of
tickets is alloted to charity. (R.A. 1169, § (B) )
The term of the leases is eight (8) years, commencing
from the start of commercial operation of the lottery
equipment first delivered to the lessee pursuant to the
agreed schedule. (Par. 3)
- In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ
its own personnel. (Par. 5) It is responsible for the loss
of, or damage to, the equipment from any cause and for
the cost of their maintenance and repair. (Pars. 7-8)
Upon the expiration of the leases, the PCSO has the
option to purchase the equipment for the sum of P25
million.
- A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court by the
PGMC in accordance with its manifestation in the prior
case. On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to
declare the ELA invalid on the ground as the Contract of
Leases nullified in the first case. Petitioners seek the
declaration of the amended ELA as null and void.
- The PCSO and PGMC filed a separate comments in
which they question the petitioners' standing to bring
suit. The Kilosbayan, In. is an organization described in
its petition as "composed of civic-spirited citizens,
pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders who are
committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national
renewal." Its trustees are also suing in their individual
and collective capacities as "taxpayers and concerned
citizens." The other petitioners (Sen. Freddie Webb, Sen.
Wigberto Tañada and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo) are members
of the Congress suing as such and as "taxpayer and
concerned citizens."
- Respondents question the right of petitioners to bring
this suit on the ground that, not being parties to the
contract of lease which they seek to nullify, they have no
personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by
the enforcement of the contract. Petitioners on the other
hand contend that the ruling in the previous case
sustaining their standing to challenge the validity of the
first contract for the operation of lottery is now the "law
of the case". and therefore the question of their standing
can no longer be reopened.
- Petitioners likewise invoke the following Principles and
State Policies set forth in Art. II of the Constitution:
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the employment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy. (§5)]
The natural and primary right and duty of the parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. (§12)
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation
building and shall promote their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nacionalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
The state shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism
and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and development. (§17)
(Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 7)
ISSUES
1. Does Kilosbayan et. al. have standing to sue?
2. Does the decision in Kilosbayan v. Guingona
constitute the “law of the case”, thus precluding
respondents from assailing the legal standing of
petitioners?
3. May the provisions under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies be readily invoked by any person in
the absence of Congressional legislation (i.e., self-
executing)?
HELD
Ratio
1. A ruling in a previous case is binding only insofar as
the specific issue in that case is concerned. Parties may
be the same but cases are not.
2. Provisions under the Declaration of Principles and
States are not self-executing.
General Reasoning
- Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that of "law of
the case", nor that of conclusive of judgment poses a
barrier to a determination of petitioners' right to
maintain this suit.
- Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. But in this case,
concern for stability in decisional law does not call for
adherence to what has recently been laid down as the
rule. The previous ruling sustaining petitioners'
intervention may itself be considered a departure from
settled rulings on "real parties in interest" because no
constitutional issues were actually involved. Just five
years before that ruling this Court had denied standing
to a party who, in questioning the validity of another
form of lottery, claimed the right to sue in the capacity
of taxpayer, citizen and member of the Bar. (Valmonte v.
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, G.R. No. 78716, Sept .
22, 1987) Only recently this Court held that members of
Congress have standing to question the validity of
presidential veto on the ground that, if it true, the
illegality of the veto would impair their prerogative as
members of Congress. Conversely if the complaint is not
grounded on the impairment of the powers of Congress,
legislators do not have stnding the question the validity
of any law or official action (Philippine Constitution
Association v Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994))
- There is an additional reason for a reexamination of the
ruling on standing. The voting on petitioners' standing in
the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7)
members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6)
denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The majority
was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be
maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition,
there have been changes in the members of the Court,
with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the
appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice
Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on
the maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing.
Specific Reasoning
1. NO. The question whether the petitioners have
standing to question the Equipment or ELA is a legal
question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which the
petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is
essentially different from the 1993 Contract of lease
entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the
determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that
the petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of
the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not
preclude determination of their standing in the present
suit.
- Not only is petitioners' standing a legal issue that may
be determined again in this case. It is, strictly speaking,
not even the issue in this case, SINCE STANDING IS A
CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HERE NO
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS ACTUALLY INVOLVED. 14
The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real
parties in interest" within the meaning of Rule 3, §2 of
the Rules of Court which requires that "Every action may
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party in interest."
- Noting this distinction, petitioners have not shown that
they are the real party in interest. They have not
demonstrated that the Contract entered into by the
PCSO would directly injure or affect their rights.
2. NO. Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to
bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of the
case." We do not think this doctrine is applicable
considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to
G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation: The doctrine
applies only when a case is before a court a second time
after a ruling by an appellate court.
- The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of
an appellate court, ,merely expresses the practice of the
courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It
differs from res judicata in that the conclusive of the first
14
COMMENT OF BRYAN_SJ: The logic of the Court in this case now
becomes clearer: The concept of legal standing is a constitutional
law concept which is INAPPLICABLE IN CASES WHERE THERE ARE
NO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED. In cases where no
constitutional issues are raised the governing principle should be
the concept of “real party in interest” in the Rules of Court.
judgment is not dependent upon its finality. The first
judgment is generally, if not universally, not final, It
relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its
questions of law, and is confined in its operation to
subsequent proceedings in the same case . . . ."
(Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503,
521 (1979) )
- It follows that since the present case is not the same
one litigated by he parties before in G.R. No. 113375,
the ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the
law of this case." The parties are the same but the cases
are not.
- Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit
foreclosed by the related doctrine of "conclusiveness of
judgment." According to the doctrine, an issue actually
and directly passed upon the and determined in a former
suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future
action between the same parties involving a different of
action. (Peñalosa v. Tuason , 22 Phil. 303, 313 (1912);
Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 (1960))
- It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel
does not apply to issues of law, at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. (Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 , 222
(1979); BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n. 2
(3rd Ed., 1988)) Following this ruling it was held in
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed. 898
(1947) that where a taxpayer assigned to his wife
interest in a patent in 1928 and in a suit it was
determined that the money paid to his wife for the years
1929-1931 under the 1928 assignment was not part of
his taxable income, this determination is not preclusive
in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts to
his wife under another deed of assignment for other
years (1937 to 1941). For income tax purposes what is
decided with respect to one contract is not conclusive as
to any other contract which was not then in issue,
however similar or identical it may be. The rule on
collateral estoppel. it was held, "must be confined to
situations where the matter raised in the second suit is
identical in all respects with that decided in the first
preceding and where the controlling facts and applicable
legal rules remain unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599-600, 92
L. Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if the relevant facts in the
two cases are separate even though they may be similar
or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal
issues which occur in the second case. Thus the second
proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction
identical with but in a form separable form, the one dealt
with in the first proceeding. In that situation a court is
free in the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue. . . ." (333 U.S.
at 601, 92 L. Ed. at 908)
3. NO. These are not, however, self executing provisions,
the disregard which can give rise to a cause of action in
the courts.
- They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. Thus,
while constitutional policies are invoked, this case
involves basically questions of contract law. More
specifically, the question is whether petitioners have
legal right which has been violated.
SEPARATE OPINION
FELICIANO [dissent]
- I find myself regretfully quite unable to join the
majority opinion written by my distinguished brother in
the Court, Mendoza, J.
- I join the penetrating dissenting opinions written by my
esteemed brothers Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ. In
respect of the matter of locus standi, I would also
reiterate the concurring opinion I wrote on that subject
in the first Kilosbayan case.1 All the factors which, to my
mind, pressed for recognition of locus standi on the part
of petitioners in the first Kilosbayan case, still exist and
demand, with equal weight and insistence, such
recognition in the present or second Kilosbayan case, I
fear that the Court may well have occasion in the future
profoundly to regret the doctrinal ball and chain that we
have today clamped on our own limbs.
PADILLA [concur]
- I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the
petition in this case. It is the duty of the Supreme Court
to apply the laws enacted by Congress and approved by
the President, (unless they are violative of the
Constitution) even if such laws run counter to a
Member's personal conviction that gambling should be
totally prohibited by law.
- In my separate concurring opinion in the first lotto case
(G.R. No. 113375), expressed the view that the rule on
locus standi, being merely a procedural rule, should be
relaxed, as the issue then was of paramount national
interest and importance, namely, the legality of a lease
contract into by PCSO with PGMC whereby the former
sought an "on-line high-tech" lottery, undeniably a form
of gambling, the terms of which clearly pointed to an
"association, collaboration or joint venture" with PGMC.
REGALADO [dissent]
- Be that as it may, since the majority opinion has now
evolved other adjective theories which are represented
to be either different from or ramifications of the original
"standing to sue" objection raised in the first lotto case. I
will hazard my own humble observations thereon.
1. There is, initially, the salvo against the adoption of the
"law of the case" doctrine in the original majority
ponencia. It is contended that this doctrine requires, for
its applicability, an issue involved in a case originating
from a lower court which is first resolved by an appellate
court, that case being then remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings and with the prior
resolution by the higher court of that issue being the
"law of the case" in any other proceeding in or a
subsequent appeal from the same case. It is insinuated
that said doctrine exists only under such a scenario.
- It may be conceded that, in the context of the cited
cases wherein this doctrine was applied, two "appeals"
are generally involved and the issue resolved in the first
appeal cannot be reexamined in the second appeal. If
so, then what is necessarily challenged in the first
recourse to the higher court is either an interlocutory
order of the court a quo elevated on an original action
for certiorari or an appealable adjudication which
nonetheless did not dispose of the entire case below
because it was either a special proceeding or an action
admitting of multiple appeals.
- That is the present reglementary situation in the
Philippines which, unfortunately, does not appear to
have been taken into account when the double-appeal
procedure involved in one particular American concept
was cited as authority in the majority opinion. No
attempt was made to ascertain whether in the American
cases cited the lex fori provided for identical or even
substantial counterparts of our procedural remedies of
review by a higher court on either an appeal by certiorari
or writ of error, or through an original action of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus. Yet on such unverified
premises, and without a showing that the situations are
in pari materia, we are told that since the case at bar
does not posses the formatted sequence of an initiatory
action in a lower court, an appeal to a higher court, a
remand to the lower court, and then a second appeal to
the higher court, the "law of the case" doctrine cannot
apply. I have perforce to reject that submission as I
cannot indulge in the luxury of absolute espoused by this
majority view.
- I fear that this majority rule, has unduly constricted the
factual and procedural situations where such doctrine
may apply, through its undue insistence on the remedial
procedure involved in the proceedings rather than the
juridical effect of the pronouncement of the higher court.
Even in American law, the "law of the case" doctrine was
essentially designed to express the practice of courts
generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided 5
and, thereby, to emphasize the rule that the final
judgment of the highest court is a final determination of
the rights of the parties. 6 That is the actual and basic
role that it was conceived to play in judicial
determinations, just like the rationale for the doctrines of
res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment.
- Accordingly, the "law of the case" may also arise from
an original holding of a higher court on a writ of
certiorari, 7 and is binding not only in subsequent
appeals or proceedings in the same case, but also in a
subsequent suit between the same parties. 8 What I wish
to underscore is that where, as in the instant case, the
holding of this highest Court on a specific issue was
handed down in an original action for certiorari, it has
the same binding effect as it would have had if
promulgated in a case on appeal, Furthermore, since in
our jurisdiction an original action for certiorari to control
and set aside a grave abuse of official discretion can be
commenced in the Supreme Court itself, it would be
absurd that for its ruling therein to constitute the law of
the case, there must first be a remand to a lower court
which naturally could not be the court of origin from
which the postulated second appeal should be taken.
2. Obviously realizing that continued reliance on the
locus standi bar to petitioner's suit is not an ironclad
guaranty against it, the majority position has taken a
different tack. It now invoked the concept of and the
rules on a right of action in ordinary civil actions and,
prescinding from its previous positions, insists that what
is supposedly determinative of the issue of
representation is contract law and not constitutional law.
On the predicate that petitioners are not parties to the
contract, primarily or subsidiarily, they then are real
parties in interest, and for lack of cause of action on
their part they have no right of action. Ergo, they, cannot
maintain the present petition.
As a matter of a conventional rule of procedure, the
syllogism of the majority can claim the merit of logic but,
even so, only on assumed premises. More importantly,
however, the blemish in its new blueprint is that the
defense of lack of a right of action is effectively the
same as lack of locus standi, that is, the absence of the
remedial right to sue. As the commentators of Castille
would say, the objection under the new terminology is
"lo mismo perro con distinto collar." That re-christened
ground, as we shall later see, has already been
foreclosed by the judgment of the Court in the first lotto
case.
It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to
enforce a cause of action. For its purposes, the majority
urges the adoption of the standard concept of a real
party in interest based on his possession of a cause of
action. It could not have failed to perceive, but
nonetheless refuses to concede, that the concept of a
cause of action in public interest cases should not be
straitjacketed within its usual narrow confines in private
interest litigations.
Thus, adverting again to American jurisprudence, there
is the caveat that "the adoption of provision requiring
that an action be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest does not solve all questions as to the
proper person or persons to institute suit, although it
obviously simplifies procedures in actions at law. . .
There is no clearly defined rule by which one may
determine who is or is not real party in interest, nor has
there been found any concise definition of the term. Who
is the real party in interest depends on the peculiar facts
of each separate case, and one may be a party in
interest and yet not be the sole real party in interest." 9
(Emphasis supplied.)
The majority opinion quotes the view of a foreign author
but unfortunately fails to put the proper emphasis on the
portion thereof which I believe should be that which
should correctly be stressed, and which
correspondingly reproduce:
It is important to note. . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underspinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular
plaintiff is the real party in interest or has the capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed
towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain
an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as of broader policy
concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in
certain areas. 10 Indeed, if the majority would have its
way in this case, there would be no available judicial
remedy against irregularities or excesses in government
contracts for lack of a party with legal standing or
capacity to sue. This legal dilemma or vacuum is
supposedly remediable under a suggestions submitted in
the majority opinion, to wit:
Denial to petitioners of the right to intervene will not
leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the
execution of government contracts. Questions as to the
nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for
a public bidding before they may be made can be raised
in an appropriate complaint before the Commission on
Audit or before the Ombudsman. . . In addition, the
Solicitor General is authorized to bring an action for quo
warranto if it should be thought that a government
corporation . . . has offended against its corporate
charter or misused its franchise. . .
- The majority has apparently forgotten its own
argument that in the present case petitioners are not the
real parties, hence they cannot avail of any remedial
right to file a complaint or suit. It is, therefore, highly
improbable that the Commission on Audit would deign to
deal with those whom the majority says are strangers to
the contract. Again, should this Court now sustain the
assailed contract, of what avail would be the suggested
recourse to the Ombudsman? Finally, it is a perplexing
suggestion that petitioners ask the Solicitor General to
bring a quo warranto suit, either in propria persona or ex
relatione, not only because one has to contend with that
official's own views or personal interests but because he
is himself the counsel for respondents in this case. Any
proposed remedy must take into account not only the
legalities in the case but also the realities of life.
3. The majority believes that in view of the retirement
and replacement of two members of the Court, it is time
to reexamine the ruling in the first lotto case. A previous
judgment of the Court may, of course, be revisited but if
the ostensible basis is the change of membership and
known positions of the new members anent an issue
pending in a case in the Court, it may not sit well with
the public as a judicious policy. This would be similar to
the situation where a judgment promulgated by the
Court is held up by a motion for reconsideration and
which motion, just because the present Rules do not
provide a time limit for the resolution thereof, stays
I unresolved until the appointment of members
sympathetic thereto. Thus, the unkind criticisms of
"magistrate shopping" or "court packing" levelled by
disgruntled litigants is not unknown to this Court.
- I hold the view that the matter of the right of
petitioners to file and maintain this action - whether the
objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or
right of action - has already been foreclosed by our
judgment in the first lotto case, G.R. No. 113375. If the
majority refuses to recognize such right under the "law
of the case" principle, I see no reason why that particular
issue can still be ventilated now as a survivor of the
doctrinal effects of res judicata. 11
It is undeniable that in that case and the one at bar.
there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action. Evidently, the judgment in G.R. No. 113375 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, it was an
adjudication on the merits, and has long become final
and executory. There is, to be sure, an attempt to show
that the subject matter in the first action is different
from that in the instant case, since the former was the
original contract and the latter is the supposed
expanded contract. I am not persuaded by the proffered
distinction.
The removal and replacement of some objectionable
terms of a contract, which nevertheless continues to
operate under the same basis, with on the property, fore
the same purpose, and the same contracting parties
does not suffice to extinguish the identity of the subject
matter in both cases,. This would be to exalt form over
substance. Furthermore, respondents themselves
admitted that the new contract is actually the same as
the original one, with just some variants in the terms of
the latter to eliminate those which were objected to. The
contrary assumption now being floated by respondents
would create chaos in our remedial and contractual laws,
open the door to fraud, and subvert the rules on the
finality of judgments.
- Yet, even assuming purely ex hypothesi that the
amended terms in the expanded lease agreement
created a discrete set of litigable violations of the
statutory charter of the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes
Office, thereby collectively resulting in a disparate
actionable wrong or delict, that would merely constitute
at most a difference in the causes of action in the former
and the present cases. Under Section 49(c). Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, we would still have a situation of
collateral estoppel, better known in this jurisdiction as
conclusiveness of judgment. Hence, all relevant issues
finally adjudged in the prior judgment shall be conclusive
between the parties in the case now before us and that
definitely includes at the very least the adjudgment
therein that petitioners have the locus standi or the right
to sue respondents on the contracts concerned.
In their case - whether of res judicata, on which I insist,
or of conclusiveness of judgment, which I assume
arguendo - what is now being primarily resisted is the
right of petitioners to sue, aside from the postulated
invalidity of the contract for the government-sponsored
lottery system. It does seem odd, if not arcane, that
petitioners were held to have the requisite locos standi
or right of action on said G.R. No. 113375 and, for that
matter, were likewise so recognized in the expanded
value added tax (EVAT) case, 12 but are now
mysteriously divested of the "place of standing"
allegedly due to, for legal purposes, a compelling need
for reexamination of the doctrine, and, for economic
reasons, an obsession for autarky of the nation.
4. I repeat what I said at the outset that this case should
be decided on the merits and on substantive
considerations, not on dubious technicalities intended to
prevent on inquiry into the validity of the supposed
amended lease contract. The people are entitled to the
benefit of a duly clarified and translucent transaction,
just as respondent deserve the opportunity, and should
even by themselves primarily seek, to be cleaned of any
suspicions or lingering doubts arising from the fact that
the sponsors for jail alai and, now, of lotto are different.
- On the merits, to obviate unnecessary replication I
reiterate my concurrence with the findings and
conclusions of Mr. Justice Davide in this dissenting
opinion, the presentation whereof is completely devoid
of strained or speculative premises, and moreover has
the virtue of being based on his first-hand knowledge as
a legislator of the very provisions of the law now in
dispute. In this instance and absent any other operative
data. I find the same to be an amply sufficient and highly
meritorious analysis of the controversy on the contract.
- One concluding point. I am not impressed by their
stance of the majority that our taking cognizance of this
case and resolving it on the merits will hereafter invite
others to unduly overburden this Court with avoidable
importunities. This sounds like a tongue-in-riposte since
the Court has clearly indicated that it sets aside
objections grounded on judge-made constitutional
theories only under cogent reasons of substantial justice
and paramount public interest.
On the contrary, to pay unqualified obedience to the
beguiling locos standi or right of action doctrines posited
by the majority in this case would only not be an
abdication of a clear judicial duty. It could conceivably
result in depriving the people of recourse to us from
dubious government contracts through constitutionally
outdated or procedurally insipid theories for such
stultification. This is a contingency which is not only
possible, but probable under our oligarchic society in
esse; and not only undesirable, but repugnant within a
just regime of law still in posse.
DAVIDE [dissent]
- I register a dissenting vote.
- I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in
Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Guingona, et al. 1 referred to
as the first lotto case) regarding the application or
interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B,
Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169), as
amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue of locus
standi of the petitioners to question the contract of lease
involving the on-line lottery system entered into
between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary
doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and stare
decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of
the people, specially the lawyers and litigants, in the
certainly and stability of the pronouncements of this
Court. It opens the floodgates to endless litigations for
re-examination of such pronouncements and weakens
this Court's judicial and moral authority to demand from
lower courts obedience thereto and to impse sanctions
for their opposite conduct.
- It must be noted that the decision in the first lotto case
was unconditionally accepted by the PCSO and the
PGMC, as can be gleaned from their separate
manifestations that they would not ask for its
reconsideration but would, instead, negotiate a new
equipment lease agreement consistent with the decision
and the PCSO's charter and that they would furnish the
Court a copy of the new agreement. The decision has,
thus, become final on 23 May 1994. 2
- As the writer of the said decision and as the author of
the exception to paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No.
1169, as amended, I cannot accept the strained and
tenuous arguments adduced in the majority opinion it
justly the reversal of our rulings in the first lotto case.
While there are exceptions to the aforementioned
doctrines and I am not inexorably opposed to upsetting
prior decisions if warranted by overwhelming
considerations of justice and irresistible desire to rectify
an error, none of such considerations and nothing of
substance or weight can bring this case within any of the
exceptions.
- In the said case, we sustained the locus standi of the
petitioners, and in no uncertain terms declared:
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental
importance to the public. The issues it raised are of
paramount public interest and of a category even higher
than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people
even in the remotest barangays of the country and the
counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as
the billions of pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing than of the petitioners deserves recognition
and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court
hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the
respondents tried to take advantage of.
- In this concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano further showed substantive grounds or
considerations of importance which strengthened the
legal standing of the petitioners to bring and maintain
the action, namely: (a) the public character of the funds
or other assets involved in the contract of lease; (b) the
presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional
or legal provision by the public respondent agency; (c)
the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specified interest in raising the questions involved
therein; and (d) the wide range of impact of the contract
of lease and of its implementation.
Only last 6 April 1995, in the decision in Tatad vs.
Garcia, 3 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Camilo
D. Quiason who had joined in the dissenting opinions in
the first lotto case the petitioners, locus standi therein,
invoked and applied the ruling on locus standi in the first
lotto case. He stated:
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow
taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the
national government or government-owned or controlled
corporations allegedly in contravention of the law
(Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994] and
to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are
involved (Bugnay Construction and Development
Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 [1989].
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is
not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and
uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to
institute the present action.
- Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, who had also
dissented in the first lotto case on the issue of locus
standi; unqualifiedly concurred with the majority opinion
in Tatad. Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the writer of
the ponencia in this case, also invoked the locus standi
ruling in the first lotto case to deny legal standing to
Tatad, et al. He said:
- Nor do petitioners have standing to bring this suit as
citizens. In the cases in which citizens were authorized to
sue, this Court found standing because it though the
constitutional claims pressed for decision to be of
"transcendental importance," as in fact it subsequently
granted relief to petitioners by invalidating the
challenged statutes or governmental actions. Thus in the
Lotto case [Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110
(1994)] relief by the majority for upholding petitioner's
standing, this Court took into account the "paramount
public interest" involved which "immeasurably affect[ed]
the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people . . . and the counter-productive and retrogressive
effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system."
Accordingly, the Court invalidated the contract for the
operation of the lottery.
- Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Associate Justice
Abdulwahid A Bidin, Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno,
Jose C. Vitug, and Ricardo J. Francisco, joined him in his
concurring opinion. Except for the Chief Justice who took
part in the first lotto case and Justice Francisco who was
not yet a member of this Court at the time, the rest of
the Justice who joined the concurring opinion of Justice
Mendoza had dissented in the lotto case on the said
issue.
- Under the principle of either the law of the case of res
judicata, the PCSO and the PGMC are bound by the
ruling in the first lotto case on the locus standi of the
petitioners and the application or interpretation of the
exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No.
1169, as amended. Moreover, that application or
interpretation has been laid to rest under the doctrine of
stare decisis and has also become part of our legal
system pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code which
provides: 'Judicial decisions applying interpreting the
laws or the constitution shall from part of the system of
the Philippines."
- These doctrines were not adopted whimsically or
capriciously. They are based on public policy and other
considerations of great importance and should not be
discarded or jettisoned in a cavalier fashion. Yet, they
are now put to naught in this case.
- The principle of the law of the case "is necessary as a
matter of policy to end litigation. There would be no end
to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated
appeals, compel a court to listen to criticism on their
opinions, or speculate on chances from changes in its
members." 7
- It is, however, contended that the law of the case is
inapplicable that doctrine applies only when a case is
before an appellate court a second time after its remand
to a lower court. While indeed the statement may be
correct, it disregards the fact that the case is nothing but
a sequel to and is, therefore, for all intents and
purposes, a continuation of the first lotto case. By their
conduct, the parties admitted that it is, for which reason
the PGMC and the PCSO submitted in the first lotto case
a copy of the ELA in question, and the petitioners
commenced the instant petition also in the said case.
Our resolution that the validity of the ELA could not be
decided in the said case because the decision therein
had became final does not detract from the fact that this
case is but a continuation of the first lotto case or a new
chapter in the raping controversy between the
petitioners, on the one hand, and the PCSO and the
PGMC, on the other, on the operation of the on-line
lottery system.
Equally unacceptable is the majority opinion's rejection
of the related doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment of
the ground that the question of standing is a question,
as this case involves a different or unrelated contract.
The legal question of locus standi which was resolved in
favor of the petitioners in the first lotto case is the same
in this case and in every subsequent case which would
involve contracts relating or incidental to the contract or
holding of lotteries by the PCSO in collaboration,
association; or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity. And, the contract in
question is not different from or unrelated to the first
nullified contract, for it in nothing but a substitute for the
latter. Respondent Morato was even candid enough to
admit that no new and separate public bidding was
conducted for the ELA in question because the PCSO was
of the belief that the public bidding for the nullified
contract was sufficient.
Its reliance on the ruling in Montana vs. United States 8
that preclusion or collateral estoppel does not apply to
issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated
claims are involved, is misplaced. For one thing, the
question of the petitioners' legal standing in the first
lotto case and in this case is one and the same issue of
law. For another, these cases involve the same and not
substantially unrelated subject matter, viz., the second
contract between the PCSO and the PGMC on the
operation of the on-line lottery system.
The majority opinion likewise failed to consider that in
the very authority it cited regarding the exception to the
rule of issue preclusion (Testament of the Law, 2d
Judgments $ 28), the second illustration stated therein is
subject to this NOTE: "The doctrine of the stare decisis
may lead the court to refuse to reconsider the question
of sovereign immunity," which simply means that stare
decisis is an effective bar to a re-examination of a prior
judgment.
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim
that a principle or rule of law which has been established
by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will
be followed in other cases involving a similar situation. It
is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability in the law and does not require identity or
privity of parties. 9 This is explicitly fleshed out in Article
8 of the Civil Code which provides that decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall
form part of the legal system. Such decisions "assume
the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the
extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must
control the actuations not only of those called upon to
aside thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
obedience thereto."10 Abandonment thereof must be
based only on strong and compelling reasons - which I
do not find in this case - otherwise, the becoming virtue
of predictabiity which is expected from this Court would
be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in
the stability of its solemn pronouncements diminished.
The doctrine of res judicata also bars a relitigation of the
issue of locus standi and a re-examination of the
application or interpretation of the exception clause in
paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended.
Section 49 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on effects of
judgment expressly provides:
(b)In all other cases the judgment or order is, with
respect to the matter cases the judgment or order is,
with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to
other matter that could have been parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceedings,
litigating for the same thing in the same title and in the
same capacity.
This doctrine has dual aspects: (1) as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
demand, or cause of action; and (2) as preclusion to the
relitigation of particular facts of issues in action between
the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
11 Public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of judicial
time, and the interest of litigants as well as the peace
and order of society, all require that stability should be
accorded judgments: that controversies once decided on
their merits shall remain in repose; that inconsistent
judicial decisions shall not be made on the same set of
facts; and that there be an end to litigation which,
without the said doctrine, would be endless. It not only
puts an end to strife, but recognizes that certainty in
legal relations must be maintained. It produces certainty
as to individual rights and gives and respect to judicial
proceedings. 12 The justifications given in the majority
opinion to underrate the ruling locus standi and to
ultimately discard it are unconvincing. It is not at all
true, as the majority opinion contends, that "[t]he
previous sustaining petitioners intervention may in fact
be considered a departure from settled ruling on real
party in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved."
It must be pointed out that the rule in ordinary civil
procedure on real party in interest was never put in
issue in the previous case. It was the clear
understanding of the Members of the Court that in the
light of the issues raised and the arguments adduced
therein, only locus standi deserved consideration.
Accordingly, the majority opinion and the separate
dissenting opinions therein dwelt lengthily on locus
standi and brought in the process a vast array of
authorities on the issue. Moreover, as explicitly stressed
in the concurring opinion of Justice Feliciano, both
constitutional and legal issues were involved therein.
Finally, as shall hereafter be discussed, in public law the
rule of real party in interest is subordinate to the
doctrine of locus standi.
- Equally unconvincing is the majority opinion's
contention that the ruling locus standi in the first lotto
case may not be preserved because the majority vote
sustaining the petitioners' standing was a "tenuous one"
that may not be maintained in a subsequent litigation,
and that there had been changes in the membership of
the Court due to the retirement of Justices Isagani A.
Cruz and Abdulwahid A. Bidin and the appointment of
Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Ricardo J. Francisco. It
has forgotten that, as earlier stated, the ruling was
reiterated in Tatad vs. Garcia. Additionally, when in his
concurring opinion in the Tatad case, Justice Mendoza
denied locus standi to Tatad, et al., because their case
did not have the same importance as the lotto case, he
thereby accepted the concession of standing to the
petitioners in the lotto case. I wish to stress the fact that
all the Justices who had dissented in the first lotto case
on the issue of locus standi were either for the majority
opinion or for the concurring opinion in the Tatad case.
Hence, I can say that the Tatad case has given vigor and
strength to the "tenuous" majority in the first lotto case.
The majority opinion declares that the real issue in this
case is not whether the petitioners have locus standi but
whether they are the real parties-in-interest. This
proposition is a bold move to set up a bar to taxpayer's
suits or cases invested with public interest by requiring
strict compliance with the rule on real party in interest in
ordinary civil actions, thereby effectively subordinating
to that rule the doctrine of locus standi. I am not
prepared to be a party to that proposition.
- The downgrading of locus standi and its subordination
to the restrictive rule on real party in interest cannot be
justified by the claim that is involved here is contract
law, not constitutional law. True, contract law is
involved. We are not, however, dealing here with an
ordinary contract between private parties, but a contract
between a corporation wholly owned by the government
- hence, an instrumentality of the government - and a
private corporation for the contract of the lotto, which is
invested with paramount and transcendental public
interest and other public policy considerations because
the lotto has counter - productive and retrogressive
effects which are as staggering as the billions of pesos it
is expected to raise and provokes issues that
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral
well-being of the people. We said so in the first lotto
case.
GARCIA V BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
GUTIERREZ; November 9, 1990
FACTS
- A petition to annul and set aside the decision of the
Board of Investments (BOI)/ Department of Trade and
Industry approving the transfer of site of the proposed
petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the
shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to
naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
- P.D. No. 1803 reserved 576 hectares of public domain
in Lamao, Libay, Bataan for the Petrochemical Industrial
Zone under the administration, management and
ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC).
- Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed
the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied
with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals. It specified Bataan as plant site, and one
of the terms and conditions for registration was the use
of naphtha cracker and naphtha as feedstock for fuel for
its plant, which was to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC
was issued a certificate of registration on Feb. 24, 1988.
- BPC was given pioneer status ands accorded fiscal and
other incentives, like, (1) exemption from taxes on raw
materials, (2) eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on
naphtha if and when it is used as raw materials for the
petrochemical plant.
- In February 1989, A.T. Chong, Chairman of USI Far East
Corporation, the major investor in BPC expressed to DTI
Secretary his desire to amend the original registration
certification of its project by changing the job site from
Bataan to Batangas because of the insurgency and
unstable labor situation in Bataan and the presence in
Batangas of a huge LPG depot owned by Philippine Shell
Corporation. Other requested amendments are as
follows: (1) increasing the investment amount from $220
million to $320 million; (2) increasing the production
capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and
polypropylene plant; (3) changing the feedstock from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG.
- On May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision stating
that, The BOI recognizes and respects the principle that
the final choice is still with the proponent who would in
the final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for
the project.
- In the petition entitled “Congressman Enrique T. Garcia
v. The Board of Investments”, this court ordered BOI as
follows: (1) to publish the amended application for
registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2)
to allow the petitioner to have access to its records on
the original and amended applications for registration,
as a petrochemical manufacturer, of the respondent
Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding, however,
privileged papers containing its trade secrets and other
business and financial information, (3) to set for hearing
the petitioner’s opposition to the amended application in
order that he may present at such hearing all the
evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to
the transfer of the site of the BPC petrochemical plant to
Batangas.
- Garcia filed motion for reconsideration asking the Court
to rule on whether or not the investor given the initial
inducements and other circumstances surrounding its
first choice of plant site may change simply because it
has the final choice on the matter. The Court merely
ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest in
the case by his failure to appear in the hearing that was
set by BOI.
- A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was
filed, asking that the Court resolve whether or not the
foreign investor has the right of final choice of plant site;
that the non-attendance of the petitioner at the hearing
was because the decision was not yet final and
executory, and therefore petitioner has not waived his
right. Court resolution stated that BOI, not the investor
has final choice on the matter and that even a choice
approved by BOI may not be ‘final’ for supervening
circumstances and changes in the conditions of a place
may dictate a corresponding change in the choice of
plant site in order that the project will not fail. However,
petition was denied.
- Instant petition relies on the ruling that investor has no
right of final choice.
ISSUES
1. WON the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan
or should be transferred to Batangas
2. WON its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be
changed to naphtha and/or LPG the approved amended
application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical
Corporation (LPC)
3. WON the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the
investor who has the final choice of the site and the
decision on the feedstock constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the
investor, national interest notwithstanding
HELD
1. On Justiciablity: There is an actual controversy. The
Court has constitutional duty to step into this
controversy to determine the paramount issue.
2. The decision to transfer to Batangas and to shift the
use of feedstock is unjustified.
- The Bataan site is ideal, the result of careful study.
- The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that
the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or
unstable labor situation warrant a transfer to the plant
site in Batangas.
- The Bataan Refining Corporation, a government owned
Filipino corporation, can provide the feedstock
requirement of the plant in Bataan, whereas the country
is short of LPG and there is a need to import for the use
of the plant in Batangas. Transfer will divert scarce
dollars unnecessarily.
- R.A. 6767 exempted naphtha as feedstock from ad
valorem tax but excluded LPG from the exemption. This
law was specifically for the petrochemical industry.
Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or
contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock
from naphtha to LPG.
- Capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC
does not have to buy the land for the project and its
feedstock shall be limited to naphtha.
- With the plant site in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a
partner, thus giving the government participation in the
management of the project instead of a firm which is a
huge multinational corporation.
3. BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in
approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from
Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of
feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for
the main reason that the final say is in the investor all
other circumstances to the contrary not withstanding.
- The government has already granted incentives for this
particular venture. Through the BOI decision, it
surrenders even the power to make a company abide by
its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicion of
unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is
undoubtedly in the best interests of the Filipino people.
- This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the
government expressed in numerous laws (i.e. Art. 2,
1987 Omnibus Investments Code) and the Constitution
(Sec. 1 and 10, Art. XII; Sec. 19, Art. II) to run its own
affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.
Disposition: Petition granted. Decision set aside as
null and void.
SEPARATE OPINION
GRINO-AQUINO [dissenting]
- There is no provision in the 1987 Investments Code
prohibiting the amendment of the investor’s application
for registration of its project, neither does the law
prohibit the BOI from approving the amended
application.
- The matter of choosing an appropriate site for the
investor’s project is a political and economic decision
which only the executive branch, as implementer of
policy formulated by the legislature, is empowered to
make. It is not for this Court to determine what is, or
should be, the BOI’s “final choice” of plant site and
feedstock.
- The petitioner’s recourse against the BOI’s action is by
an appeal to the President (Sec. 36, 1987 Investments
Code), not to this Court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA [dissenting]
- [The majority Decision] has made a sweeping policy
determination and has unwittingly transformed itself into
what might be termed a “government by the Judiciary,”
something never intended by the framers of the
Constitution when they provided for separation of
powers among the three co-equal branches of
government and excluded the Judiciary from policy-
making.
ART VI: LEGISLATURE
TOLENTINO V SECRETARY OF FINANCE
MENDOZA; August 25, 1994
FACTS
- These are original actions in SC. Certiorari and
prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716.
- RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system by amending National Internal Revenue
Code.
- Bet Jul 22, 1992 and Aug 31, 1993, bills were
introduced in House of Reps to amend NIRC relative to
VAT. These were referred to House Ways and Means
Committee w/c recommended for approval H No 11197.
- H No. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was
approved by House of Reps after third and final rdg.
- It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means. The Committee
submitted report recommending approval of S No 1630,
submitted in substitution of S No 1129, taking into
consideration PS Res No 734 and H No 11197
- Senate approved S No 1630 on second rdg, and on
third rdg by affirmative votes of 13 and 1 abstention.
- H No 11197 and S No 1630 were referred to
conference committee w/c after meeting 4 times,
recommended that HB in consolidation w/ SB be
approved in accordance w/ bill as reconciled and
approved by the conferees.
- The Conference Committee Bill was approved by
House of Reps and Senate. The enrolled bill was
presented to President who, on May 5, 1994 signed it. It
became RA 7716. On May 12, it was published in 2
newspapers of gen circulation and it took effect on May
28.
- RA 7716 amended § 103 and made print media subject
to VAT in all aspect of operations. However, Sec of
Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94
exempting circulation income of print media. Income fr
advertisements are still subject to VAT.
- Implementation was suspended until Jun 30 to allow
time for registration of businesses. Implementation was
stopped by TRO fr Court, by vote of 11 to 4.
- Petitioners contend:
Re: Art VI Sec 24
1. Although H No 11197 originated fr House of Reps, it
was not passed by Senate but was consolidated w/
Senate version in the Conference Committee to
produce the bill. The verb “shall originate” is qualified
by the word “exclusively”.
2. The constitutional design is to limit Senate’s power
in revenue bills to compensate for the grant to the
Senate of treaty-ratifying power.
3. S No 1630 was passed no in substitution of H No
11197 but of another Senate bill (S No 1129). Senate
merely took H No 11197 into consideration in enacting
S No 1630.
Re: Art VI Sec 26(2)
1. The second and third rdgs were on the same day,
Mar 24, 1994.
2. The certification of urgency was invalid bec there
was no emergency. The growing budget deficit was
not an unusual condition in this country.
3. Also, it was S No 1630 that was certified urgent,
not H No 11197.
Re: BCC acted within its power
1. RA 7716 is the bill which the BCC prepared. BCC
included provisions not found in the HB or SB and
these were “surreptitiously” inserted. BCC met behind
closed doors.
2. Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the
stenographic notes by ellipses.
3. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in
preparation of BCC Report because Report didn’t
contain “detailed and explicit statement of changes”
4. It is required that the Committee’s report undergo
three rdgs in the two houses.
- Petitioner Philippine Airlines Inc contends:
Re: Art VI Sec 26(1)
1. Neither H No 11197 nor S No 1630 provided for
removal of exemption of PAL transactions fr payment
of VAT and this was made only by the BCC. This was
not reflected in the title.
2. Besides, amendment of PAL’s franchise may be
made only by special law which will expressly amend
the franchise (§24 of PD 1590).
- Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines
contends:
Re: Art III Sec 1
1. Withdrawal of exemption of some cooperatives
while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives
not only goes against policy to promote cooperatives
but also violate equal protection of law.
Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association contends:
2. VAT will reduce mark up of its members by as
much as 90%.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:
3. VAT will drive some of its members out of
circulation.
- Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:
Re: Art III Sec 4
1. It questions law bec exemption previously granted
to press under NIRC was withdrawn. Although
exemption was subsequently restored, PPI says
there’s possibility that exemption may still be
removed by mere revocation by Secretary of Finance.
Also, there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press
freedom because of VAT on gross receipts on
advertisements.
2. RA 7716 singled out press for discriminatory
treatment, giving broadcast media favored treatment.
3. Imposing VAT only on print media whose gross
sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000
is discriminatory.
4. The registration provision of the law is invalid when
applied to the press.
- Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends:
Re: Art III Sec 5
1. Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax
exemption because that power is vested in Congress
and the Secretary’s duty is to execute the law and the
removal of exemption of religious articles violates
freedom of thought/conscience.
- Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association contends:
Re: Art III Sec 10
1. Imposition of VAT violates constitutional provision
on no law impairing obligation of contracts
- Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association
contends:
Re: Art II Sec 17
1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will
violate govt mandate to prioritize education
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 24 of Consti
(revenue bill originating exclusively fr House of Reps)
2. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 26(2) of Consti
(three readings on separate days)
3. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee acted
within its power
4. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 26(1) of Consti (only
one subject which is expressed in title) / WON
amendment of § 103 of NIRC is fairly embraced in title of
RA 7716 although no mention is made therein
Substantive:
5. WON Art III § 1 (deprivation of life/liberty/property;
equal protection) is violated
6. WON Art III § 4 (freedom of speech/expression/press)
is violated
7. WON Art III § 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated
8. WON Art III § 10 (no law impairing obligation of
contracts) is violated
9. WON Art VI § 28(1) (uniform/equitable; evolve
progressive system of taxation) is violated
10. WON Art VI § 28(3) (church/parsonage etc. for
religious purpose exempt) is violated
11. WON Art II § 17 (gov’t priority on education, science
and tech) is violated
HELD
- Not all are judicially cognizable, bec not all Consti
provisions are self executing. Other govt depts. are also
charged w/ enforcement of Consti.
Procedural
Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity
of the RA must be resolved in its favor. An enrolled copy
of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of
its due enactment. This is not to say that the enrolled
bill doctrine is absolute. But where allegations are
nothing more than “surreptitiously” inserting provisions,
SC declines going behind enrolled copy of bill. SC gives
due respect to other branches of gov’t.
1. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 24
a. It’s not the law but the revenue bill which is required
to originate exclusively in the House of Reps. A bill
originating in House may undergo extensive changes in
Senate. To insist that a revenue statute (and not the
bill) must be the same as the House bill would deny the
Senate’s power to concur with and propose
amendments. It would violate coequality of the
legislative power of the two houses.
b. Legislative power is issue here. Treaty-ratifying power
is not legislative power but an exercise of check on
executive power.
c. There’s no difference bet Senate preserving house bill
then writing its own version on one hand and on the
other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the
subject matter. Consti simply says that it’s the initiative
for filing the bill that must come fr House of Reps. The
Reps are expected to be more sensitive to the local
needs.
Nor does Consti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill
in anticipation of its receipt of bill fr House so long as
action by Senate is withheld pending receipt of House
bill. It was only after Senate rcvd H No 11197 that
legislation in respect of it began w/ referral to Senate
Committee on Ways and Means.
2. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2)
a. It was because Pres certified S No 1630 as urgent.
This certification dispensed w/ printing and rdg the bill
on separate days. The phrase “except when the
President certifies to the necessity…” qualifies two
stated conditions: (1) the bill has passed 3 rdgs on
separate days and (2) it has been printed in final form
and distributed 3 days before finally approved. To
construe that the “except” clause dispenses only with
printing would violate grammar rules and would also
negate the necessity of the immediate enactment of the
bill.
Example is RA 5440 which had 2nd and 3rd rdgs on the
same day after bill had been certified urgent.
b. No Senator controverted factual basis of the
certification and this should not be rvwd by the Court.
c. It was S No 1630 that Senate was considering. When
matter was before the House, Pres likewise certified H
No 9210 then pending.
3. YES the BCC acted within its power
a. “Give and take” often marks the proceedings of BCC.
There was also nothing unusual in the executive
sessions of the BCC.
Under congressional rules, BCCs are not expected to
make material changes but this is a difficult provision to
enforce. The result could be a third version, considered
an amendment in nature of substitute, the only
requirement that the 3rd version be germane to subject
of the HB and SB. It is w/in power of BCC to include an
entirely new provision. After all, report of BCC is not
final and still needed approval of both houses to be
valid.
b. This could have been caused by stenographer’s
limitations or to incoherence that sometimes
characterize conversations.
c. Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate
the changes. This is standard practice in bill-drafting.
Also, SC is not proper forum for these internal rules.
d. If this were the case, there would be no end to
negotiation since each house may seek modifications of
the compromise bill. That requirement must be
construed only to mean bills introduced for the first time
in either house, not the BCC report.
4. NO, there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)
a. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the
VAT system, one way is to widen the base by
withdrawing some exemptions. To insist that PD 1590 in
addition to § 103 of NIRC be mentioned in title, would be
to insist that title of a bill be a complete index of its
content.
b. That was just to prevent amendment by an
inconsistent statute. And under Consti, grant of
franchise for operation of public utility is subject to
amendment, alteration, repeal by Congress when
common good requires.
Substantive
- as RA 7716 merely expands base of VAT as provided in
the orig VAT law, debate on wisdom of law should be in
Congress.
5. NO there is no clear showing that Art III Sec 1 is
violated
- When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is
freedom that commands respect; when property is
imperiled, lawmakers’ judgment prevails.
a. This is actually a policy argument.
b. This is a mere allegation.
c. This is also short of evidence.
6. NO Art III Sec a is not violated
a. There’s no violation of press freedom. The press is
not immune fr general regulation by the State.
b. It’s not that it is being singled out, but only because
of removal of exemption previously granted to it by
law. Also, the law would be discriminatory if the only
privilege withdrawn is that to the press. But that is
not the case. The statute applies to a wide range of
goods and services.
c. It has not been shown that the class subject to tax
has been unreasonably narrowed. This limit does not
apply to press alone but to all sales.
d. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of
the cost of registration. Registration is a central
feature of the VAT system. It is a mere administrative
fee, not a fee on exercise of privilege or right.
7. NO Art III Sec 5 is not violated
a. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally
applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious
materials by religious org.
8. NO Art III Sec 10 is not violated
a. Parties to a contract can’t fetter exercise of taxing
power of State. Essential attributes of sovereign is
read into contracts as a basic postulate of legal order.
9. VAT distributes tax burden to as many goods and svcs
as possible, particularly to those w/in reach of higher
income grps. Business establishments with annual gross
sales of < P500,000 are exempted.
Also, regressivity is not a negative standard. What is
required is that we “evolve” a progressive taxation
system.
10. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally
applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious
materials by religious org.
11. NO there is no violation of Art II Sec 17
a. Same reason/ratio under issues on free
speech/press.
Decision Petitions are dismissed.
Notes VAT is levied on sale, barter/exchange of goods
and svcs. Then, it’s equal to 10% of gross selling price
Narvasa, Separate Opinion
Cruz, Separate Opinion
Padilla, Separate Opinion
Vitug, Separate Opinion
Regalado, Dissenting Opinion
Davide, Dissenting Opinion
Romero, Dissenting Opinion
Bellosillo, Dissenting Opinion
Puno, Dissenting Opinion
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V ERMITA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005
FACTS
- The increasing budget problems of the government in
the form of fiscal problems, revenue generation, and
fiscal allocation inadequacy prompted the congress to
create a law to address such problems. This gave way to
the Expanded Vat Law (E-Vat Law) otherwise known as
Republic Act No. 9337. The case revolves around the
constitutionality of the Republic Act 9337 that increased
the Value-Added Tax percentage from 10% to 12%. In
this case there were 4 different petitioners: Abakada
Guro Party List, Association of Pilipinas Shell
Dealers/Petron/Caltex, Senators Pimentel/ Estrada, L./
Estrada, J. / Lacson/ Lim/ Madrigal/ Osmeña,
Congressman Escudero, and Governor Garcia. All of
them question the constitutionality of RA 9337.
- Backgrounder on Value-Added Tax (VAT):
> VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied
on the sale, barter, exchange, or lease of goods or
properties and services.
> It is an indirect tax on expenditure. The seller of
goods or services may pass on the amount of tax paid
to the buyer. VAT is intended to fall on the immediate
buyers and end-consumers.
- RA 9337’s legislative history is as follows:
It originated from House Bill 3555 that was approved on
the 27th of January 2005 and House Bill 3705 that was
approved on the 28th of February 2005 and Senate Bill
1950 that was approved on the 13th of April 2005. This
was later consolidated the Bicameral Conference
Committee. The Bicameral Conference Committee
inserted and deleted some of the original provisions. The
Bill was approved on the 11th of May 2005 by the Senate
and 10th of May 2005 by the House of Representatives.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee has
strictly complied with the rules of both houses thereby
remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by
congress.
2. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee violated
Article VI Sec 26 that states that no amendment would
be done after three readings.
3. WON there was a violation of the Origination Clause
as stated in Art VI Sec 24.
Substantive
4. WON there was undue delegation to the President and
Secretary of Finance.
5. WON a VAT law such as that of RA 9337 is in violation
of the Constitutional provision Art VI Sec 28 (1) that
requires taxation to be uniform, equitable and that the
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
HELD
1. The Supreme Court decided that it would not rule on
the violation of the senate and house rules unless there
is a showing that it is in clear violation of a constitutional
provision or of the rights of private individuals. (favorite
ratio Ü)
2. No, because the amendment rule refers only to the
procedure to be followed by each house of Congress
with regard to bills in each of the said respective houses
before the bill is transmitted to the other house for its
concurrence and amendment.
3. No, the Senate within the said provision only proposed
amendments after the House Bills were approved. The
Bill still originated through the House of Representatives.
4. No, because the President is just executing the law
and is still working within the standard and policy of the
law. The Secretary of Finance is also not given undue
delegation as he is considered as an alter ego of the
president thus following the same logic, he is only
executing the law.
5. While the VAT is currently not yet progressive it still is
directed towards a goal of a progressive taxation.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of RA 9337 is unconstitutional as 1)
the increase of tax rates on domestic, resident foreign
and nonresident foreign corporations, 2) the increase of
tax credit against taxes due from nonresident foreign
corporations on intercorporate dividends, and 3) the
reduction of the allowable deduction for interest expense
were not really part of the House version of the E-VAT
Law therefore in violation of the origination clause in
Article VI Section 24.
BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE
PADILLA; November 20, 1991
FACTS
- Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
- 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed w/ the
Sandiganbayan the civil case no. 0035, “RP vs. Benjamin
‘Kokoy’ Romualdez, et al.”
-The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and
Juliette Romualdez took advantage of their relationship
w/ Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to engage
in schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of the
Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others:
-obtaining control over Meralco, Benguet Mining Co.,
Shell, PCI Bank, etc., selling interests to PNI Holdings,
Inc. (corporators, Bengzon Law Offices), the concealment
of the assets subject to the complaint from the PCGG
under the veil of corporate identity, etc.
8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the
Romualdez companies for 5M (far below market value)
without PCGG approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group,
owned by Pres. Aquino’s brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa
–Sen. Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a
possible violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act w/c prohibits any relative of the
President by affinity or consanguinity up to the 3rd civil
degree, to intervene in any transaction w/ the
government
-the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon
Committee)
-the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo
Lopa to testify on “what they know” about the sale of
the 36 Romualdez corporations
-at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify,
the former invoking the due process clause, and both
averring that such testimonies would “unduly prejudice”
the defendants of civil case no.0035
-petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition,
praying for a temporary restraining order and/or
injunctive relief, claiming that the Committee acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose
-the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the
Congress or its committees from making inquiries in aid
of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers
(quoting Angara v. Comelec)
-the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the
view that it has the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries and determine the scope and extent of the
power of the Blue Ribbon Committee
ISSUES
1. WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid
of legislation.
2. WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive
domain of another branch of government.
3. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to
due process.
HELD
1. NO Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is not in aid of
legislation
- Sen. Enrile’s inquiry merely intended to find out WON
Ricardo Lopa had any part in the alleged sale of the
Romualdez corporations—there was no intended
legislation as required by A6 S21 of the constitution. As
held in Jean L. Arnault v. Leon Nazareno et al., the
inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of
a power vested in the Committee by the Constitution. In
Watkins v. US it was held that Congress’ power of inquiry
is broad but limited, that is, it may not pry into private
affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a
legitimate task of congress—no inquiry is an end in itself.
2. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain
of another branch of government
- Since the issue had been pre-empted by the
Sandiganbayan, any further investigation by Congress
would only serve to complicate matters and produce
conflicting opinions—as held in Baremblatt v. US,
Congress cannot inquire into matters w/c are exclusively
the concern of the Judiciary.
3. YES the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due
process
- It has been held that “a congressional committee’s
right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations
placed by the Constitution on governmental action,
including…the Bill of Rights”. As held in Hutcheson v. US,
it can’t be assumed that legislative purpose is always
justified by public need; Congress cannot tread on
private rights. The doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan states
that the Constitutional right against self-incrimination
extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and in
cases in w/c the witness is an accused.
Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by
the Committee to appear, testify, and produce evidence
before it because such inquiries would not be in aid of
legislation and if pursued, would be violative of the
principle separation of powers between the legislative
and the judicial departments, as ordained by the
Constitution. The petition is GRANTED.
SEPARATE OPINION
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is
in aid of legislation.
-the power of Congress to conduct investigations is
inherent and needs no textual grant—even so, it is
expressly granted by A6 S21.
Barsky v. US: the possibility that invalid as well as valid
legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit
the power of inquiry
US v. Deutch: Congress has the right to secure
information in order to determine WON to legislate on a
particular subject matter on w/c it is w/in its
constitutional powers to act.
US v. Orman: where the information sought concerns
what Congress can legislate, a legitimate legislative
purpose must be presumed.
-the requirement that an inquiry be “in aid of legislation”
is easier to establish here where Congress’ legislative
field is unlimited unlike in the US. Also, it is not
necessary that every question be material to the
proposed legislation, but directly related to the subject
of the inquiry.
-the legislative purpose is distinctly different from the
judicial purpose; Congress may investigate for its own
purposes even thought the subjects of the investigation
are currently under trial.
Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right
to due process.
-A6 S21 provides that “the rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”
However, such a restriction does not call for the
complete prohibition of such investigations where a
violation of a basic right is claimed, but rather only
requires that such rights be respected.
-the right against self-incrimination may only be invoked
when incriminating questions are posed, but the witness
may not refuse to take the witness stand completely. In
the case at bar, no incriminating questions had been
asked, hence the allegation of violation of rights is
premature.
CRUZ [dissent]
Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is
in aid of legislation.
Arnault v. Nazareno: the Court is bound to presume that
an action of a legislative body is w/ legitimate object if it
is capable of being so construed, and It has no right to
assume the contrary.
-an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money, in
this case, the possible violation of RA 3019 in the
disposition of the Romualdez corporations, is an
indispensable duty of the legislature
Mcgrain v. Daugherty: it is not necessary that the
resolution ordering an investigation …expressly state
that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of
proposed legislation
Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right
to due process.
-the petitioners are not facing criminal charges; as
ordinary witnesses, they may only invoke the right
against self-incrimination only when such a question is
posed, and cannot refuse taking the witness stand
outright.
SENATE V ERMITA
CARPIO-MORALES;
FACTS
- this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari
and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of E.O.
no. 46415 issued Sept. 28, 2005
- Consti Provisions allegedly violated: Art. VI Sec. 1, 21,
22,; Art. III Sec. 4, 7; Art. II Sec. 28; Art. XI Sec 1; Art. XIII
Sec. 16
- Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate
Investigation Committees issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Dept. including the AFP and
PNP for them to appear in public hearings on inquiries
concerning mainly: (A) The alleged overpricing in the
NorthRail Project (B) the Wire-Tapping activity (C) the
Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable contract
- The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed
requests for postponement of hearings for varying
reasons such as existence of urgent operational matters,
more time to prepare a more comprehensive report, etc.
Sen. Drilon, however, did not accede to their requests
because the requests were sent belatedly and that
preparations and arrangements have already been
completed.
- On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which
took effect immediately. Citing E.O. 464, the Executive
Dept. officials subject to Senate investigations claimed
that they were not allowed to appear before any Senate
or Congressional hearings without consent (written
approval) from the President, which had not been
granted unto them; their inability to attend due to lack of
appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to E.O.
464. Thereafter, several cases were filed challenging
E.O. 464 and praying for the issuance of a TRO enjoining
respondents from implementing, enforcing, and
observing the assailed order. Respondent Executive
Secretary Ermita et al., prayed for dismissal of petitions
for lack of merit.
ISSUES
Primary Issue
15
E.O. 464 “Ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers,
adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of
public officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under
the Constitution, and for other purposes.”
1. WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry
vested in the Congress
Secondary Issues
2. Justiciability of the case:
a. Legal standing of petitioners:
G.R. 169777 Senate of the Phils.
G.R. 169659 BAYANMUNA, COURAGE, CODAL
G.R. 169660 Francisco Chavez
G.R. 169667 Alternative Law Groups (ALG)
G.R. 169834 PDP-Laban
G.R. 121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP)
b. Actual Case or Controversy
3. WON E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
4. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of
discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
HELD
Primary Issue
1. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive
branch to withhold information sought by the Congress
in aid of legislation, without it asserting a right to do so,
and without stating reasons therefor.
- Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of
executive privilege, Congress nonetheless has the right
to know why the executive dept. considers requested
information privileged. E.O. 464 allows the executive
branch to evade congressional requests for information
without the need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By mere
expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power
of Congress is frustrated. Resort to any means by which
officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge
information cannot be presumed to be valid.
Reasoning
Executive Privilege
-The power of the President and other high-level
executive branch officers to withhold certain types of
information of a sensitive character from Congress, the
courts and the public.
- The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. VI Sec.21
This is the power of the Legislature to make
investigations and exact testimony that it may exercise
its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. It gives
the Congress the power to compel the appearance of
executive officials to comply with its demands for
information.
- Inquiry in Art. VI Sec. 22 (question hour)
As determined from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, this provision was intended
to be distinguished from inquiries in aid of legislation, in
that attendance here is merely discretionary on the part
of the department heads.
- Sec. 1 of E.O. 464
Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited
only to executive dept. heads and to appearances in the
question hour (because of its specific reference to sec.
22 of art VI) makes it valid on its face.
- Sec. 2 (a) of E.O. 464
It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads
of office mentioned in section 2(b), on what is covered
by the executive privilege. It does not purport to be
conclusive on the other branches of government. It may
be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the
Pres. regarding the nature and scope of executive
privilege.
- Sec. 2 (b) of E.O. 464
Provides that once the head of office determines that a
certain info. is privileged, such determination is
presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the
effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before
Congress, only to the express pronouncement of the
Pres. that it is allowing the appearance of such official. It
allows the Pres. to authorize claims of privilege by mere
silence, and such presumptive authorization is contrary
to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Due to the fact
that executive privilege is of extraordinary power, the
Pres. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it.
Such power must be wielded only by the highest official
in the executive hierarchy.
- Sec. 3 of E.O. 464
Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. It is invalid per se. In so far as it does not assert
but merely implies the claim of executive privilege. It
does not provide precise and certain reasons for the
claim. Mere invocation of E.O. 464 coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her
consent, is woefully insufficient for Congress to
determine whether the withholding of information is
justified under the circumstances of each case, severely
frustrating its power of inquiry.
Secondary Issues
2. a. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners:
Rule 1: Legislators have standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office and are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which they claim infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of
transcendental importance there must be a showing
of: 1. the character of the funds (public)/assets
involved 2. a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition 3. lack of a
party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions raised.
The Senate of the Philippines
- The Senate, including its individual members, by virtue
of their fundamental right for intelligent public decision-
making and sound legislation is the proper party to
assail an executive order which allegedly stifles the
ability of the members of Congress to access information
crucial to law-making. It has a substantial and direct
interest over the outcome of such a controversy.
Party List (BayanMuna, COURAGE, CODAL)
- The party-list representatives have standing, it is
sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on
their constitutional rights and duties as members of
Congress to conduct investigations in aid of legislation
and conduct oversight functions in the implementation
of laws.
IBP, Chavez, ALG (invoking right to info. on matters of
public concern)
- When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in
assailing the constitutionality of laws must be direct and
personal. The Court held in Francisco v. Francisco that
when a proceeding involves assertion of a public right,
the mere fact that the person filing is a citizen satisfies
the requirement of personal interest.
PDP-Laban (claiming standing due to the
transcendental importance of issue)
- There being no public funds involved and there being
parties with more direct and specific interest in the
controversy (the Senate and BayanMuna), gives PDP-
Laban no standing.
b. Actual case or controversy (was not taken up by the
Court)
- A challenged order which has already produced results
consequent to its implementation and where such
results are the subject of questions of constitutionality, is
ripe for adjudication.
- The implementation of E.O. 464 has resulted in the
officials excusing themselves from attending the Senate
hearings. It would be sheer abandonment of duty if the
Court would refrain from passing upon the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.
3. Yes. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation
are presumed to be a matter of public concern,
therefore, it follows that any executive issuance tending
to unduly limit disclosures of information in such
investigations deprives the people of information.
4. Yes. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the
executive branch, it has a direct effect on the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern
therefore it is not exempt from the need of publication.
Due process requires that the people should have been
apprised of the issuance of E.O. 464 before it was
implemented.
Decision Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections
2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void while sections 1
and 2(a) are VALID.
GUINGONA V CARAGUE
GANCAYCO; April 22, 1991
FACTS
- The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4B in automatic
appropriation (86.8 going to debt service) and P155.3
from the General Appropriations Act or a total of
P233.5B; only P27B was allotted for DECS. Petitioners, as
members of the Senate, question the constitutionality of
the automatic appropriation for debt service in the said
budget as provided for by Presidential Decrees 81, 117,
and 1967.
- Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary
to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the Constitution. And as provided
by Art. 7 of the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary to
the Constitution, it shall be void.
- They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are
no longer operative since they became functus oficio
after President Marcos was ousted. With a new congress
replacing the one man-legislature, new legislation
regarding appropriation should be passed. Current
appropriation, operating on no laws therefore, would be
unenforceable.
- Moreover, they contend that assuming arguendo that
the said decrees did not expire with the ouster of
Marcos, after adoption of the 1987 Constitution, said
decrees were inconsistent with Sec. 24, Article VI of the
Constitution which stated that:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then
a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said
automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said
decrees violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides as follows
Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty
and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an
undue delegation of legislative power to the President
who determines in advance the amount appropriated for
the debt service.
- SolGen argues, on the other hand, that automatic
appropriation provides flexibility: ". . . First, for example,
it enables the Government to take advantage of a
favorable turn of market conditions by redeeming high
interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to
shift from short-term to long-term instruments, or to
enter into arrangements that could lighten our
outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset,
debt-to-debt or other such schemes. Second, the
automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties
in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what
has been previously programmed. The annual debt
service estimates, which are usually made one year in
advance, are based on a mathematical set or matrix or,
in layman's parlance, `basket' of foreign exchange and
interest rate assumption's which may significantly differ
from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on
the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic
appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has to
await and depend upon Congressional action, which by
the time this comes, may no longer be responsive to the
intended conditions which in the meantime may have
already drastically changed. In the meantime, also,
delayed payments and arrearages may have
supervened, only to worsen our debt service-to-total
expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or
demand for immediate-payment even before due dates.
- Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and
indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance of the
person of President Marcos and his legislative power
goes against the intent and purpose of the law. The
purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person
of Marcos."
ISSUES
1. WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt service as
compared to its appropriation of P27.7B for education in
violation of Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution.
The State shall assign the highest budgetary
priority to education and ensure that teaching
will attract and retain its rightful share of the
best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment.
2. WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative, and
if they are, do they violate Sec. 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitutional.
3. WON there was undue delegation of legislative power
by automatic appropriation.
HELD
1. The Court disagrees that Congress’ hands are
hamstrung by the provision provided. There are
other imperatives of national interest that it must
attend to; the amount allotted to education,
27.8B, is the highest in all department budgets
thereby complying with the mandate of having
the highest priority as stated above. The
enormous national debt, incurred by the previous
administration, however, still needs to be paid.
Not only for the sake of honor but because the
national economy is itself at stake. Thus, if
Congress allotted more for debt service such an
appropriation cannot be considered by this Court
as unconstitutional.
2. Yes, they are still operative. The transitory provision
provided in Sec. 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution
recognizes that:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances not inconsistent
with the Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked.
- This transitory provision of the Constitution has
precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the
social order so that legislation by the then President
Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in
force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the
Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed or
revoked.
- Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by
implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the
principle that construction of the Constitution and law is
generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively
unless it is so clearly stated.
3. No. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as
amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967
is that the amount needed should be automatically set
aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to
pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness
incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become
due without the need to enact a separate law
appropriating funds therefore as the need arises. The
purpose of these laws is to enable the government to
make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to
protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.
- Although the subject presidential decrees do not state
specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very
nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts
nevertheless are made certain by the legislative
parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not
of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed
for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the
principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking
charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the
bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of
indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by
virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due.
No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the
limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of
the Treasury.
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
He sees that an essential requirement for valid
appropriation is that the sum authorized for release
should be determinate or determinable. The Presidential
Decrees do not satisfy this requirement. As to the
ponencia’s reference to “legislative parameters provided
by law”, Cruz says no such regulatory boundaries exist.
PADILLA [dissent]
- He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by
saying that Sec. 29(1)Article VI implies that a law
enacted by Congress (and approved by the President)
appropriating a particular sum or sums must be made
before payment from the Treasury can be made. Laws
should be construed in light of current laws and not
those made by a one-man legislative branch.
- Besides, these decrees issued by President Marcos
relative to debt service were tailored for the periods
covered by said decrees. Today it is Congress that
should determine and approve the proper appropriations
for debt servicing, as this is a matter of policy that, in his
opinion, pertains to the legislative department, as the
policy-determining body of the Government.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION V ENRIQUEZ
QUIASON; August 19, 1994
FACTS
- House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of
1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both
houses of Congress on December 17, 1993.
- On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill
into law, and declared the same to have become
Republic Act No. 766316, the General Appropriation Act
(GAA) of 1994. On the same day, the President delivered
his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions
of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions. No step was taken in either House of
Congress to override the vetoes.
- In G.R. No. 113105, Philippine Constitution
Association (PHILCONSA) et al. prayed for a writ of
prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a)
Article 41 on the Countrywide Development Fund or
“pork barrels,” the special provision in Article I entitled
Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, (b)
Article 48 on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the
amount appropriated under said Article 48 in excess of
the P37.9 B allocated for the DECS; and (c) the veto of
the President of the Special Provision of Article 48 of the
GAA of 1994
- In G.R. No. 113174, 16 Senators question: (1) the
constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the
President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c)
Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR),
(e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU's)
and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and (2)
the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision
in the appropriation for debt service.
16
Entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES"
- In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Romulo and Tañada
together with the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-
stock domestic corporation, sued as taxpayers,
challenging the constitutionality of the Presidential veto
of the special provision in the appropriations for debt
service and the automatic appropriation of funds
therefor.
- In G.R. No. 113888, Senators Romulo and Tañada
contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four
special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and
(2) the conditions imposed by the President in the
implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority
(NHA).
- In view of the importance and novelty of most of the
issues raised in the four petitions, the Court invited
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former
Associate Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae.
G.R. No. 113105
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing17
Substantive
2. WON the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) or
“pork barrels” is an encroachment by the legislature on
executive power, since said power in an appropriation
act is in implementation of a law
3. WON the act of Congress giving debt service and not
education18 as the highest priority in the allocation of
budget unconstitutional
4. WON the special provision allowing a member of
Congress to realign his allocation for operational
expenses to any other expense category is
unconstitutional, as it is contrary to Article VI Section
25(5) of the 1987 Constitution19
HELD
Procedural
1. A member of Congress has the legal standing to
question the validity of a presidential veto or any other
17
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners
in G.R. No. 113105, he claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other
petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they
do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.
18
Article XIV Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution states that: "The State
shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment."
19
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."
act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress.
Reasoning: Ponencia relied on precedent (Gonzales v.
Macaraig) and a US case (United States v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co) as secondary source to recognize legal
standing. Then in forming the ratio decidendi, it again
relied on US cases as secondary sources (Coleman v.
Miller, Holtzman v. Schlesinger) as well as the opinion of
Justice Fernando as Amicus Curiae.
Substantive
2. The power of appropriation lodged in Congress carries
with it the power to specify the project or activity to be
funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed
and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
Reasoning: The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers
and other priority projects and activities and credit
facilities to qualified beneficiaries…" It was Congress
itself that determined the purposes for the
appropriation. Executive function under the CDF involves
implementation of the priority projects specified in the
law. The authority given to the members of Congress is
only to propose and identify projects to be implemented
by the President. Hence, under Article 48 of the GAA of
1994, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under
the CDF, it is the President who shall implement them. In
short, the proposals and identifications made by the
members of Congress are merely recommendatory.
3. The constitutional provision which directs the State
shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education
is merely directory.
Reasoning: It relied on precedence, Guingona, Jr. v.
Carague. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to “assign
the highest budgetary priority to education” it does not
thereby follow that Congress is deprived of its power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and
for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
4. The members only determine the necessity of the
realignment of the savings in the allotments for their
operating expenses but it is the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives who shall
approve the realignment.
Decision
Procedural
1. Petitioners, as members of Congress have locus standi
Substantive
2. No. The CDF is not an encroachment by the legislature
on executive power, hence constitutional
3. No. Congress’ act is not unconstitutional. It simply
exercises its power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state
policies or objectives.
4. No. It is not unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 113105
G.R. No. 113174

ISSUE
WON veto of the special provision of Article 48 of the
GAA of 1994 in the appropriation for debt service
without vetoing the entire P86.3 B for said purpose is
unconstitutional
Or, simply put: WON the President exceeded the item-
veto power accorded by the Constitution20
HELD
Any provision which does not relate to any particular
item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of
appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate
provision”21 which can be vetoed separately from an
item.
Reasoning: The issue, according to the ponencia is a
mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v.
Macaraig, Jr. Hence, it used this case as precedent. It
also cited another case, Henry v. Edwards to support its
ratio. Citing Gonzales: As the Constitution is explicit that
the provision which Congress can include in an
appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it
follows that any provision which does not relate to any
particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond
an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate
provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item.
Citing Henry v. Edwards: When the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill,
such provisions must be treated as 'items' for purposes
of the Governor's (President’s) item veto power over
general appropriation bills.
Decision
Yes. The President vetoed the entire paragraph 1 of the
Special Provision of the item on debt service, including
the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said
item "shall be used for payment of the principal and
interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that
"in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the
liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." The
said provisos, being appropriate provisions since they
germane to and have a direct connection with the item
on debt service, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the
item veto of said provisions is void.
G.R. No. 113174
G.R. No. 113766
G.R. No. 113888
20
Article VI Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution states that: “The
President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but veto shall mot affect the item or
items to which he does not object.”
21
Also included in the category of “inappropriate provisions” which are
intended to amend our laws, because clearly these laws have no place in an
appropriations bill, and therefore unconstitutional.
ISSUES
1. WON the veto for revolving funds of State Universities
and Colleges (SUC’s) is unconstitutional
2. WON the veto of the provision in the appropriation for
the Department of Public Works and Highways on 70%
(administrative) / 30% (contract) ratio for road
maintenance is unconstitutional
3. WON the veto of the provision on purchase of
medicines by AFP is unconstitutional
4. WON the veto of special provisions on prior approval
of Congress for purchase of military equipment is
unconstitutional
5. WON the veto of provision on use of savings to
augment AFP pension funds is unconstitutional
6. WON the President’s directive that the
implementation of the Special Provision to the item on
the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential
approval is tantamount to an administrative embargo of
the congressional will to implement the Constitution's
command to dissolve the CAFGU's, therefore
unconstitutional (Issue on Impoundment22)
7. WON veto of the President setting conditions or
guidelines in the appropriations for the Supreme Court,
Ombudsman, COA, DPWH and CHR is unconstitutional
HELD
[1] to [5] Any provision which does not relate to any
particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond
an item of appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate
provision” which can be vetoed separately from an
item23
Reasoning: Same ratio decidendi from the issue in the
previous section is applied in the 5 issues in this section.
Hence the reasoning for the ratio is the same as well.
(Notice how the ratio is applied in the ruling or
dispositive)
6. Any provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law requiring legislative approval of
executive acts must be incorporated in a separate
substantive bill.
Reasoning: The ponencia simply cited notes from
journals24 in discussing the issue of Impoundment to
support his reasoning in the present case.
7. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use
of public funds authorized by Congress is simply an
22
This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President
to impound is put in issue. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the
President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress.
It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes:
Impoundment of Funds, Harvard Law Review)
23
Note that this ratio is also applied in issue [6] aside from the ratio which I
formulated there. This can be implied from, “Again we state: a provision in
an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws.”
Hence, this is an “inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately.
24
Notes: Impoundment of Funds, Harvard Law Review; Notes: Presidential
Impoundment Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, Georgetown
Law Journal; Notes Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and
Congressional Power, Yale Law Journal
exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to
see that laws are faithfully executed.
Decision
1. No. There was no undue discrimination when the
President vetoed said special provisions.
2. Yes. The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a
veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the
said item shall be expended - 70% by administrative and
30% by contract.
3. Yes. Being directly related to and inseparable from the
appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the
AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the
President without also vetoing the said item.
4. No. Any provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of
executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and
substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate"
provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly
vetoed.
5. No. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of
Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the
AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and
Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections
25(5)25 and 29(1)26 of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Thus veto is not unconstitutional.
6. No. The provision in an appropriations act cannot be
used to repeal or amend other laws. Impliedly, this is an
“inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed
separately.
7. No. By setting guidelines or conditions in his veto, the
President is simply exercising his constitutional duty to
implement the laws faithfully.
Dispositive
Petitions DISMISSED, except with respect with respect to
[1] G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they
pray for the annulment of the veto of the special
provision on debt service specifying that the fund
therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the
principal and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to
pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators", and [2] G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it
prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the 2nd
paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of
appropriation for the DPWH; and (b) Special Provision
25
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."
26
"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law"
No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the AFP which is
GRANTED.
Voting: 14 Concur, 1 Dissent
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [concur and dissent]
- I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D.
Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms the Court's
decision in Gonzalez v. Macaraig
- An inappropriate provision is still as provision, not an
item and therefore outside the veto power of the
Executive.
VITUG [concur]
- I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress,
more than the President and his colleagues, would have
the best feel on the needs of their own respective
constituents. It is not objectionable for Congress, by law,
to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may
be minded; to give that authority, however, to the
individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am
afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible.
GONZALES V MACARAIG
MELENCIO-HERRERA; November 19, 1990
FACTS
- The Senate questioned the constitutionality of the
Presidential veto of special and general provisions,
particularly Sec. 55 of the General Appropriations Bill for
1989
- The petitioners claim they have locus standi on the
ground of:
- being member and ex-officio members of the Finance
Committee
- substantial taxpaers whose vital interests might be
affected
- The respondents in this case are member of the
Cabinet who are sued in their official capacity for the
implementation of the General Appropriations Act of
1989
- December 16, 1988 - The House of Representatives
passed HB 19186 (GA Bill for 1989)
- eliminated/decreased items included in the proposed
Budget of the President
- presented to President for approval
- December 29, 1988 - The bill was signed into law
(became RA 6688)
- The President vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec.
55
- February 2, 1989- Senate expressed through Senate
Resolution No. 381 that the veto of Sec. 55 was
unconstitutional
- April 11, 1989 - Petition for prohibition/mandamus was
filed
- assailed the legality of veto of Sec. 55
- enjoined the implementation of RA 6688
- No restraining order was implemented by the
Supreme Court
- September 7, 1989 - Court resolved to give due course
to the petition
- Jan. 17, 1990 - Motion for Leave to File and to Admit
Supplementary Petition which raised the same issue as
the original petition (questioning the presidential veto)
- The vetoed provisions include:
- Sec. 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 - an item
submitted by the President which has been reduced
by Congress cannot be restored/increased. An item is
deemed disapproved if there is no corresponding
appropriation in the Act.
- Sec. 16 of the Appropriations Act of 1990 - similar to
Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Act except that this
was lumped together with the use of savings
- The basic difference between both provisions is that
in the 1989 Appropriations Act, the "use of savings" is
in Section 12, apart from Section 55 whereas in the
1990 \Appropriations Act, "use of savings" and the
vetoed provision are both in Sec. 16
- The reason for the veto:
- Violates Art. 6, Sec 25(5)
- Nullifies the constitutional and statutory authroity of
the President, the Senate President, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and the Heads of Con-Coms to
augment any item in the General Appropriations law
- If allowed, the President and the other
abovementioned officials cannot augment any item
and appropriation from their savings even if special
circumstances like calamity
- Petitioners' arguments:
1) The president's line veto power regarding the
appropriations bill is limited to item/s and does not
cover provisions and therefore exceeded her authority
(Sections 55 and 16 are provisions)
2) When the president objects to provisions of an
appropriation bill, it is not possible to exercise the
item veto power but should veto the whole bill as well
3) The item veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that
would be legislation already (violative of separation of
powers)
4) Power of augmentation in Article 6, Sec. 25(5) is
provided by law so Congress has prerogative to
impose restrictions in the exercise of that power
- SolGen's arguments:
1) The issue is a political question and the petitioners
have a political remedy which is to override the
veto.
2) Sec. 53 is a rider which is extraneous to the
Appropriations Act and should merit a veto.
3) The power of the president to augment items in
appropriations for the executive branches already
provided for in Budget Law (specifically Sec. 44 and 45
of PD 1177 as amended by RA 6670)
4) The President is empowered to veto provisions of
other distinct and severable parts.
ISSUES
1. WON the issue is justiciable
2. WON the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill and its counterpart Sec. 16 of the
1990 Appropriations Bill is unconstitutional and without
effect
HELD
1. The issue is justiciable, not political.
a) There is an actual case or justiciable controversy
between the Senate and the Executive that the
Supreme Court may take cognizance of. The Demetria
v. Alba case declared that the Supreme Court has the
duty to declare acts of a government branch void if
beyond that branch's powers
b) Judicial arbitration needed because the petitioners
stress the imperative need for definitive ruling by the
Court
c) The petitioners have locus standi because the suit is
a taxpayer's suit. The Sanidad ruling (the Court may
or may not entertain a taxpayer's suit) and the
Tolentino v. COMELEC ruling (members of the
Senate have personality when a Constitutional issue is
raised) were used. This is also not the first time
that the veto power was discussed.
i) Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice - Court upheld the
veto but reversed by the US Supreme Court because
of the Appropriations Bill was not involved.
ii) Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia - rejected the veto
in an Appropriations Bill
2. NO the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill and its counterpart Sec. 16 of the
1990 Appropriations Bill is constitutional
*The extent of item veto power still includes the vetoing
of provisions.
- Art. 6 Sec. 27 - Veto power of the President
Paragraph 1 - general veto power of the President and
if exercised would veto the entire bill
Paragraph 2 - the item-veto of line-vbeto allows a veto
over a particular item in an appropriations, revenue or
tariff bill. The president may not veto less than all of
an item (no authority to veto part of an item and
approve the remaining portion of that item).
- Originally referred to veto of items of appropriations
bills in the Organic Act of Aug. 29, 1916
- 1935 Constitution, Art. 6, Sec 11(2) - The veto was
more expansive since it included provisions and items in
revenue and tariff bills
- 1973 Constitution - more compact version and refers to
the Prime Minister as the only official who has the power
- 1987 Constitution - verbatim reproduction of 1973
provision except that a different public official (the
President) was now involved and eliminated the
reference to a veto of a provision
- The Court held that even if there was an elimination of
any reference to the veto provision, the extent of the
President's veto power as previously defined by the
1935 Constitution has not changed.
- An item in a bill relates to the particulars, details,
distinct and severable parts of the bill whereas a
provision is of a more general nature.
- A restrictive interpretation as espoused by the
petitioners disregards the basic principle that a distinct
and severable part of the bill may be the subject of a
separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional
mandate that any provision in the general appropriations
bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation and that any such provision shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates.
- A provision does not relate to the entire bill.
- The exercise of veto power does not partake of a
legislative power as stated in the Bengzon case:
- The legislature has the power to enact laws while the
Chief Executive has the negative power by the
constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will
of the legislature.
- The President finds its authority in the Constitution.
- The Courts indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto in the same way that they
presume constitutionality of an act passed by the
Legislature.
* Secs. 55 and 16 are inappropriately called provisions.
- Even if assuming that provisions are beyond the
executive power to veto, Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are not
provisions in the budgetary sense.
- Based on Art. 6, Sec. 25(2), a provision should relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein.
Secs. 55 and 16 do not fit this requirement.
a) no relation to a particular or distinctive
requirement. They apply generally to all items
disapproved or reduced by Congress in the
Appropriations Bill.
b) disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be
found in the Bill.
c) vetoed sections are more of an expression of
Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Secs.
55 and 16 are inappropriate provisions that should be
treated as items for the purpose of the veto power.
*Sections 55 and 16 are inappropriate conditions and
are therefore susceptible to a veto.
- Petitioners argue that Congress is free to impose
conditions in an Appropriations Bill and where
conditions are attached, veto powers do not have the
power to strike them out.
- These rules are settled in the sense that Congress can
impose conditions on expenditure of funds and that the
Executive cannot veto a condition of an appropriation
while allowing the appropriation itself to stand.
- But for the rule to apply, restrictions should be in the
real sense of the term. Restrictions should exhibit a
connection with money items in a budgetary sense in
the schedule of expenditures. The test is
appropriateness.
- Secs. 55 and 16 are held to be inappropriate
conditions.
- Actually general law measures more appropriate for
substantive and therefore separate legislation.
- Neither shows the necessary connection with a
schedule of expenditures. Items reduced or disapproved
by Congress are not on the enrolled bill and can only be
detected when compared with the original budgetary
submittals of the President.
* The power of augmentation and the validity of the veto
- The President vetoed Sections 55 and 16 because they
nullified the authority of the Chief Executive and heads
of different branches of government to augment any
item in the General Appropriations Law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations (with reference to Art. 6, Sec.
25(5)).
- The power to augment lies dormant until authorized by
law.
- The constitution allowed the transfer of funds for the
purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another
item in the appropriation of a government branch so as
to afford considerable flexibility in the use of public
funds.
- Separation of powers is endangered in no way.
- Secs. 55 and 16 prohibit this augmentation and impair
the constitutional and statutory authority of the
President in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
- The special power of augmentation from savings is
merely incorporated in the GA Bill. The GA Bill is one of
primary and specific aim to make appropriation of
money from the public treasury. The power of
augmentation from savings is not considered a specific
appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation item
inserted in an appropriation measure.
- To sanction this practice would withhold the power
from the Executive and other officials and put in
jeopardy the exercise of that power.
- If the legislature does believe that the exercise of the
veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional, a
veto may be overriden by the votes of 2/3 of the
members of Congress. But Congress made no attempt
to do so.
ATITIW V ZAMORA
TINGA; September 30, 2005
FACTS
- This is a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
declaratory relief as taxpayers, seeking the declaration
of nullity of paragraph 1 of the Special Provisions of RA
8760 (General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000. Also
seeking the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
or TRO to enjoin implementation of the questioned
provision. However, the 2000 GAA has long been
implemented, the issuance is already moot and
academic. But the Court shall pass upon the
constitutional issues.
- Brief historical account of the Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR):
- President Aquino initiated a series of peace talks to
deal with insurgency in the Cordilleras. These dialogues
focused on the establishment of an autonomous
government in the Cordilleras.
- Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution ordains
the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras, and Section 18,
Article X mandates the congressional enactment of
the organic acts for each of the autonomous regions.
- President Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 220 on July
15, 1987, creating the CAR, which is the interim and
preparatory body tasked to administer the affairs of
government in the Cordilleras.
-Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, on October 23, 1989,
Congress enacted RA 6766 (An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for for the Cordillera Autonomous Region). A
plebiscite was held where the people of the Cordilleras
could ratify the Organic Act. However, the creation of an
autonomous region was overwhelmingly rejected in all of
the Cordilleras except for the Ifugao province. The Court
ruled that Ifugao alone cannot validly constitute the CAR
and upheld the disapproval of the Organic Act. The Court
also declared E.O. No. 220 to be still in force and effect.
-February 15, 2000: President Estrada signed into law
the 2000 GAA which includes the assailed Special
Provisions:
“1. Use of Fund. The amounts herein appropriated
shall be used to wind up the activities and operations
of the CAR, including the payment of separation and
retirement benefits of all affected officials and
employees…”
-July 20, 2000: President Estrada issued E.O. No. 270
extending the implementation of the winding up of
operations of the CAR.
ISSUES
1. WON the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is a
rider and as such is unconstitutional
2. WON the Philippine Government, through Congress,
can unilaterally amend/repeal E.O. No. 220
3. WON the Republic should be ordered to honor its
commitments as spelled out in EO 220.
HELD
1. NO the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is not a
rider TF it is constitutional
a. A rider is a provisions which is alien to or not germane
to the subject of the bill in which it is incorporated. 2
provisions of the Constitution prohibit them: Art VI: Sec
25(2) “No provisions or enactment shall be embraced in
the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein…”
and Sec 26(1) “Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be embraced in
the title thereof”
- The rule should not be construed so strictly as to tie the
hands of Congress: it simply requires that all the
provisions are either appropriation items, or non-
appropriaton items which relate specifically to
appropriation items.
- Test: It must be 1) Particular – if it relates specifically to
a distinct item of appropriation; 2) Unambiguous – when
its application is apparent on the face of the bill and
needs no reference to details/souces outside the bill; 3)
Appropriate – when its subject does not necessarily have
to be treated in a separate legislation.
- The assailed provision does not constitute a rider: it
passes the above test.
Ratio when a provision is particular, unambiguous, and
appropriate to the appropriations bill to which it belongs,
it shall not be considered to be a rider
b. Petitioners allege:
- that instead of providing a budget for
the CAR, it had the effect of abolishing the CAR
- since a special law created the CAR,
the 2000 GAA is not the place for amending or
repealing a standing law.
- However, the CAR was not abolished. It has only been
deactivated.
- Abolish – to do away with, annul, abrogate, destroy
completely, office ceases to exist;
- Deactivate – render inactive, break up by discharging
or reassigning personnel, office continues to exist, albeit
dormant.
- But even if the limitation of the CAR’s budget had the
effect of abolishing certain offices, the Congress has he
power to do so.
- creation of public offices is primarily a legislative
function
- office created by the legislature is wholly within the
power of that body, and it may abolish the office if it
sees fit.
c. The CAR created through EO 220 is not the
autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. EO
220 has not established an autonomous regional
government; rather, it has only created an
administrative region. It can be considered a regional
coordinating agency of the National Government.
2, 3: Except for the contention that the assailed
paragraph is a rider, the rest of the arguments look into
the wisdom and efficacy of said provisions. Political
questions
Still
1. Contention that Congress can’t unilaterally amend or
repeal EO 220: Rejected. There is no such thing as an
irrepealable law.
2. Implementation of EO 220 is an executive prerogative
while the sourcing of funds to support CAR’s activities is
legislative. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the Court
cannot correct the acts of the Executive or Congress.
ARROYO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
FRANCISCO; July 14, 1995
FACTS
- Petition for review of the decision of the HRET
- 11 May 1992: Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr. (AS) & Joker P.
Arroyo (JA) ran for congressman for the lone district of
Makati. Board of canvassers proclaims A as winner. AS
files an election protest before HRET, seeking revision
and recounting of ballots in 75% of the precincts. His
grounds: alleged irregularities/anomalies in the
tabulation and entries of votes & massive fraud. JA files
counter-protest questioning residence qualification of
AS; dismissed by HRET.
- HRET undertakes revision of ballots. Serious
irregularities found. Justice Gancayco’s Report and
Recommendation confirm irregularities and anomalies
engineered by some HRET officials and personnel:
Arroyo votes were consistently reduced … while Syjuco
was always constant…”
- Revision completed. Reception of evidence followed. JA
submits certified true copies of the Revision Reports and
election returns. AS submits over 200,000 pages of
documentary evidence, “mere photocopies and not
certified or authenticated by comparison with the
original documents or identification by any witness…."
- In his memorandum cum addendum, AS changes his
original posture (revision and recount of ballots) to what
he calls a “truly innovative and NON-TRADITIONAL
process" — the PRECINCT-LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED
EVIDENCES.
- By reason of the new allegations and substantial
amendments (which broaden the scope of his protest,
change his theory of the case or introduce additional
causes of action in violation of Rule 28 Revised Rules of
the Tribunal), HRET ordered him to show cause why his
protest should not be dismissed.
- 15 February 1994: by a 6-3 vote (the six Congressmen-
members as against the three Justices-members), HRET
resolved not to dismiss the protest, to continue with the
examination and evaluation of the evidence on record,
and thereafter to decide the case on the merits.
- JA moved to dismiss the protest but to no avail. No
hearings were conducted thereafter.
- 25 January 1995: HRET, by the same 6-3 vote rendered
its now assailed Decision annulling JA's proclamation, &
declaring AS as the duly elected congressman. Said
decision also refers the case to COMELEC & the Office of
the special Prosecutor for appropriate actions.
- Without filing MFR, JA files the present case before SC.
ISSUES
1. WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in
a. proceeding to decide the protest based on AS’
“precinct level document based anomalies/evidence"
theory;
b. rendering judgment on the kind of evidence before
it and the manner in which the evidence was
procured; &
c. annulling election results in some contested
precincts.
2. WON Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt
HELD
1. YES HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
a. The "precinct level document based
anomalies/evidence" theory
- This innovative theory broadened the scope of the
election protest beyond what AS originally sought. This is
clearly substantial amendment of the election protest
expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal
rules. Impropriety of private respondent's belated shift of
theory was sensed by majority members of HRET but
they still resolved not to dismiss the protest…this a
clear indication of grave abuse of discretion. No
further hearings were conducted…JA's right to due
process was clearly violated.
- Substantial amendments to the protest maybe allowed
only within the same period for the filing of the election
protest 15 which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules, is ten
(10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The rule
in an election protest is that the protestant or
counterprotestant must stand or fall upon the issues he
had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior
to the lapse of the statutory period for the filing of
protest or counter
protest. A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by
the cause of action he stands on and cannot be
permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his
theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek
to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum
or on appeal. <principle of estoppel>
b. The kind of evidence used and how they were
procured
- Photocopies violate the best evidence rule: no
evidence shall be received which is merely
substitutionary in its nature so long as the original
evidence can be had. Certain vital election documents
(such as certified xerox copy of the number of registered
voters per precinct and photocopies of statements of
votes) were procured at the sole instance of the ponente
of the majority decision, never offered in evidence by
either of the parties.
- Majority congressmen-members of the Tribunal by
themselves without the participation of any of the three
(3) remaining Justices-members, declared that 10,484 of
the contested signature are fake. This grossly violates
Rules 68 &5 of HRET Rules (all questions shall be
submitted to the Tribunal as a body; and presence of at
least one (1) Justice-member is required to constitute a
valid quorum).
c. Nullification of election results
- HRET proceeded to annul votes without a dint of
compliance with the 2 mandatory requisites for the
annulment of election returns based on fraud,
irregularities or terrorism:
i. that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total
number of votes in the precinct or precincts were
involved, &
ii. that the votes must be shown to have been affected
or vitiated by such fraud, irregularities or terrorism.
- Elections should never be held void unless they are
clearly illegal; it is the duty of the court to sustain an
election authorized by law if it has been so conducted as
to give a free and fair expression of the popular will, and
the actual result thereof is clearly ascertained. Absent
fraud, mere irregularities or omissions committed by
election officials which do not subvert the expression of
popular will cannot countenance the nullification of
election results. Corollarily, the misconduct of election
officers or irregularities on their part will not justify
rejecting the whole vote of a precinct (as was done in
this case) where it does not appear that the result was
affected thereby, even though the circumstances may
be such as to subject the officers to punishment. 32
These omissions are not decisive since actual voting and
election by registered voters had taken place in the
questioned precincts.
- General rule: a tribunal rendering a decision must be
given an opportunity to rectify its error through a motion
for reconsideration. BUT partiality of the majority of the
members of the Electoral Tribunal having been shown,
recourse for a reconsideration of its decision becomes
nugatory and an immediate recourse to this Court can
be had based on the fundamental principle of due
process. A prior motion for reconsideration can be
dispensed with if petitioner's fundamental right to due
process was violated.
- Persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunal's own
governing rules and of even the most basic rules of
evidence cannot be justified by simply invoking that
procedural rules should be liberally construed. Rule 80 of
the very same internal rules expressly makes the Rules
of Court, Supreme Court decisions, and Electoral
Tribunal decisions of suppletory application.
- Unwavering reverence to the rules of evidence as
provided by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence is
because they have been tested through years of
experience as the most effective means of ferreting out
the truth in any judicial controversy. Rules and
uniformity of procedure are as essential to procure truth
and exactness in elections as in anything else.
- Thus, with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings
before HRET and its majority decision in the election
protest filed by AS, Joker Arroyo’s proclamation as the
winning congressman of the then lone district of Makati
is deemed not to have been challenged at all.
2. YES Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt
- Since his statements in his Addendum which he
prepared without aid of counsel appear to seriously
undermine the integrity of some members of the Court
- Want of intention to undermine the integrity of the
Court is no excuse for the language employed by private
respondent for it is a well-known and established rule
that derogatory words are to be taken in the ordinary
meaning attached to them by impartial observers
Decision WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is hereby GRANTED, and public respondent
HRET's majority decision dated January 25, 1995 is SET
ASIDE. Private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., having
been found guilty of indirect contempt, is hereby fined
the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to be
paid within five (5) days from receipt of this decision.
BONDOC V PINEDA
GRINO-AQUINO; September 26, 1991
FACTS
- In the local and congressional elections held on May 11,
1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc
of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for
the position of Representative for the Fourth District of
the province of Pampanga.
- On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the
election with a lead of 3,300 votes. In due time, Bondoc
filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is
composed of (9) members: 3 Justices of the Supreme
Court and 6 members of the House of Representatives
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented
therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman
Associate Justice, SC
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
Associate Justice, SC
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
Associate Justice, SC
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
Cong, 1st Dist., Benguet, LDP
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member
Cong, 1st Dist., Palawan, LDP
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member
Cong 2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija, LDP
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member
Cong, 1st Dist., Davao del Sur, LDP
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member
Cong, 4th Dist., Batangas, LDP
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member
Cong, 2nd Dist., Zamb del Sur, (GAD, now NP).
- July 1989 – Bondoc filed petition
- Oct 1990 - Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of
twenty-three (23) votes. LDP members in the Tribunal
insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots
cast in some precincts, delaying the finalization of the
decision by at least (4) months. The reexamination and
re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing
Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Cong Camasura
voted with the SC Justices and Cong Cerilles to proclaim
Bondoc the winner of the contest.
- March 4, 1991 – Cong Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose
S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Sec Gen that he voted for Bondoc
in the final tally in the case. This revelation stirred a
hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of
plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc
majority in the Tribunal.
- March 5, 1991 - HRET issued a Notice of
Promulgation of Decision on March 4, 1991 in
HRET Case No. 25.
- March 13, 1991 – Cong. Cojuangco informed Cong.
Camasura by letter that on Feb 28, 1991 LDP had
already expelled him and Cong Benjamin Bautista for
having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino
of "Danding" Cojuangco, and for having invited LDP
members in Davao del Sur to join said political party.
Cong Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about
the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and
asked the HoR, through the Speaker, to take note of it
especially in matters where party membership is a
prerequisite.
- March 14, 1991 - the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme.
Jus Herrera, received a letter dated March 13, 1991,
from the Office of the Sec Gen of the HoR, informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the
HoR decided to withdraw the nomination and
rescind the election of Cong Camasura, Jr. to the
House of Electoral Tribunal.
- Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised
the CJ and Assoc Jus of the SC of this "distressing
development' and asked to be relieved from their
assignments in the HRET because promulgation of the
decision previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is
sought to be aborted. The decision reached (5 to 4 vote)
may now be expected to be overturned on a motion for
reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have
been defeated. It was also said that:
> Proportional representation in the Tribunal (Art VI,
Sec 17 Const) should be amended to provide instead
for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935
Const: (3) members chosen by the House or Senate
upon nomination of the party having the largest
 number of votes and (3) of the party having the
second largest number of votes: and a judicial
component consisting of three (3) justices from the SC
> Suggestions:
+ The Senate Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the HoR and vice
versa. So that there would be lesser chances of non-
judicial elements playing a decisive role in the
resolution of election contests.
+ There should also be a provision in the
Constitution that upon designation to membership
in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should
divest themselves of affiliation with their respective
political parties, to insure their independence and
objectivity. (like that’s possible)
- During HRET open session, Tribunal issued a resolution
canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case
No. 25 because the decision lacks the concurrence of the
5 members without Cong Camasura's vote as required
by Sec 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore,
cannot be validly promulgated.
- March 19, 1991 - SC declined the request of the
justices to be relieved of their membership in the
tribunal and directed them to do their duties. The court
even said that all members of these bodies are
appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations
in the decision of the cases before them and that in the
contemplation of the Constitution the members-
legislators, sit in the Tribunal no longer as reps of their
political parties but as impartial judges. The term of
office of every member thereof should be considered co-
extensive with the corresponding legislative term and
may not be legally terminated except only by death,
resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid
cause, not including political disloyalty.
- March 21, 1991 - petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus was filed by Dr. Bondoc against Reps Pineda,
Palacol, Camasura, Jr., or any other rep who may be
appointed Vice Rep and HRET praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13, 1991, 'to
withdraw the nomination and to rescind the
nomination of Rep. Camasura, Jr. to HRET
2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever
may be designated in place of Camasura from
assuming and discharging functions as a member of
the HRET
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to
immediately reassume and discharge his functions as
a member of the HRET; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and
equitable.
- The Court required the respondents to comment on the
petition
> Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the
petition.
> Cong Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of
the petition as the Congress' is the sole authority that
nominates and elects from its members. HRET
allegedly has the sole power to remove any member
whenever the ratio in the representation of the
political parties in the House or Senate is materially
changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or
expulsion from the political party; that a Tribunal
member's term of office is not co-extensive with his
legislative term, for if a member of the Tribunal who
changes his party affiliation is not removed from the
Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating
representation based on political affiliation would be
completely nullified; and that the expulsion of
Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a
party affair" of the LDP and the decision to rescind his
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole
prerogative of the House-of-Representative
Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question
beyond the reach of judicial review.
> Cong Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the
petitioner has no cause of action against him because
he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for
membership in the HRET. Moreover, the petition failed
to implead the House of Representatives as an
indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET
that withdrew and rescinded Congressman
Camasura's membership in the HRET.
> Sol Gen also argued that the inclusion of the HRET
as a party respondent is erroneous because the
petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal.
The petitioner does not question any act or order of
the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is
the act of the HoR of withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Camasura as a member of
the HRET.
- Bondoc replied that HRET acknowledged that decision
by canceling the promulgation of its decision in HRET
Case No. 25 to his prejudice. Bondoc also explained that
Cong Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents
because after the HoR had announced the termination of
Cong Camasura's membership in the HRET several
newspapers reported that the HoR would nominate and
elect Palacol to take Camasura’s seat in the Tribunal.
ISSUE
WON the HoR can interfere with the disposition of an
election contest in the HRET through "reorganizing" the
representation in the tribunal of the majority party
HELD
- Sec 17 reechoes Sec 11, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution, except the provision on the representation
of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now
based on proportional representation from all the
political parties, instead of equal representation of three
members from each of the first and second largest
political aggrupations in the Legislature.
- The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the
1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the
House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647,
February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function
as a nonpartisan court. It is a non-political body in a sea
of politicians.
- To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET
must be independent.
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created
for the specific purpose of determining contests relating
to election returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly may not be interfered with by the
judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests
relating to the election and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
+ Resolution of the House of Representatives violates
the independence of the HRET. —
The resolution of the HoR is a clear impairment of the
constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal
to be the sole judge of the election contest between
Pineda and Bondoc.
+ Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination
of membership in the HRET. —
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-
partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality, and independence
even independence from the political party to which they
belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party
discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal.
+ Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right
to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional
election contests are entitled to security of tenure just as
members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal
may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as,
the expiration of the term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he
represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another
political party, or removal for other valid cause. A
member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that
he has formally affiliated with another political group. As
the records of this case fail to show that Congressman
Camasura has become a registered member of another
political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the
HRET was not for a valid cause; hence, it violated his
right to security of tenure.
- Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was
not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere
with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to
deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in
his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is
clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17,
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
- Ratio The House Electoral Tribunal, being an agency
independent of the legislature, may not be interfered
with by the House
Decision WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of
the HoR withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the
election of Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of
the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and
void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and
Cong Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his
position as a member of the HRET. The HRET Resolution
No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, canceling the
promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr.
Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set
aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in
the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the
speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of
justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY
PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof
on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal.
Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief
Justice.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ.,
took no part.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [dissent]
-A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is
that the powers of government are distributed among
three (3) great departments. Each separate from, yet
coordinate and co-equal with the others each one
deriving its authority directly from the fundamental law.
- This does not extend to the point that those in
authority in one department can ignore and treat the
acts of those in authority in the others, done pursuant to
the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not
binding in every other department.
- The HoR has the power to nominate the members of
the House Electoral Tribunal provided that the
proportional representation of parties is maintained.
- The power to appoint or designate a member of the
House of Representatives to be a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal must necessarily include the power to
remove said member.
- The question that must be asked in testing the validity
of such legislative act is, does the House of
Representatives have the power to do what it has done
and not whether the House of Representatives should
have done what it has done.
- The judiciary cannot question a legislative act done
within the constitutional authority of the legislature The
judicial department has no power to review even the
most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, taken in the exercise of power committed
exclusively to it by the Constitution. To hold otherwise
would be to invalidate the principle of separation of
powers.
SARMIENTO [dissent]
- I believe that the questions as Jus Padilla raised it —
can the Court annul an act of Congress, revamping its
House Electoral Tribunal? — is a political question and a
question in which the Court cannot intervene.
- The jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to
strike down excesses of any agency of Government, but
the Charter did not alter or discard the principle of
separation of powers.
- Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the
Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers within the
lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and
Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the
"dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their
independence.
LOZADA V COMELEC
DE CASTRO; January 27, 1983
FACTS
- Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada and Romeo Igot filed a petition
for mandamus as a representative suit27 to compel the
respondent COMELEC to call a special election to fill up
existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim
Batasan Pambansa. The petition is based on Section
5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution28.
- Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bona fide
elector of Cebu City and a transient voter of Quezon
City, who desires to run for the position in the Batasan
Pambansa; while Igot alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has
standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a
special election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution.
As reason for their petition, petitioners allege that they
are deeply concerned with their duties as citizens, and
27
for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election
irrespective of party affiliation
28
Article VIII, Sec.5 (2): In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa
eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on
Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after
the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
that they filed this petition in behalf of all other Filipinos
since subjects are of profound and general interest.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners had standing to file for petition for
mandamus
2. WON SC has jurisdiction to entertain this petition
3. WON Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution
applies to the Interim Batasang Pambansa
HELD
1. petitioners had no standing to file for petition for
mandamus
- As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant
petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money
is being illegally spent. Action complained of is the
inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, and
therefore involves no expenditure of public funds. It is
only when an act complained of, which may include a
legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal
expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer
suit may be allowed.
- As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite
interest or personality to qualify them to maintain and
prosecute the present petition, for to have legal standing
is to have personal and substantial interest in the case,
or sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
Interest held in common by all members of the public is
of abstract nature (as is the injury that will be sustained)
and may not be used as standing to sue. Concrete injury,
whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable
element for one to have personality in a dispute.
2. SC has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition
- The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is
only to review by certiorari the latter's decision, orders
or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C,
Section II of the 1973 Constitution29. In this case, there is
no such decision, order or ruling. Even from the
standpoint of an action for mandamus, with the total
absence of a showing that COMELEC has unlawfully
neglected or refused the performance of a ministerial
duty, it is not shown that petitioners have a clear right to
the holding of a special election which is equally the
clear and ministerial duty of COMELEC.
- Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary
appropriation for special elections, and this power of the
may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts
much less may COMELEC compel the Batasan to
exercise its power of appropriation. From the role
Batasan Pambansa has to play in the holding of special
elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the
expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on
the matter must come from said body, not the
29
Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
his receipt of a copy thereof.
COMELEC. The power to appropriate is the sole and
exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the
exercise of which may not be compelled through a
petition for mandamus.
4. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution does not
apply to the Interim Batasang Pambansa
- The cited provision of the 1973 Constitution is not
intended to apply to the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
- The strongest reason for this is the fact that the Interim
Batasang Pambansa was to be composed by the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, as well as
the then incumbent President and Vice-President, and
the members or the Senate and House of
Representatives of Congress under the 1935
Constitution. With such number of representatives
representing each congressional district, or a province,
not to mention the Senators, there was felt absolutely no
need for filling vacancies occurring in the Interim
National Assembly, considering the uncertainty of the
duration of its existence.
- The provision is intended to apply to the regular
Batasang Pambansa, because a province or
representative district would have only one
representative in said body. The need to fill up the
Interim Batasang Pambansa is neither imperative nor
urgent, as there would always be adequate
representation for every province which forms only part
of a certain region, specially considering that the Body is
only transitory in character.
- That the provision is found in the main body of the
Constitution and not in included in Transitory Provisions
adds to the intention that the provision applies only to
the regular, and not interim, Batasang Pambansa.
Decision Petition dismissed.
PACETE V SECRETARY OF COMMISSION
FERNANDO; July 23, 1971
FACTS
Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the
then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as
Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed
office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties
as such. As his appointment was made during recess of
Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on
Appointments at its next session in 1965. Appointment
was unanimously confirmed on May 20, 1965 (with
Senate President and Chairman of Commission on
Appointments Ferdinand Marcos even sending him a
congratulatory telegram). Nine months after his
confirmation, on February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of
Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as
municipal judge. Petitioner was informed that on May 21,
1965, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the
Commission on Appointments) wrote to its Chairman
stating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration of
the appointment in view of derogatory information which
he had received.
ISSUES
1. WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration
with the Commission on Appointments (CA), without
being acted on, suffices to set at naught a
confirmation duly made of an ad interim appointment.
2. WON the issue is a justiciable question, with the CA
being an independent organ of the Constitution.
HELD
1. As per Altarejos v. Molo, the confirmation
stands; it must be given force and effect.
Ratio Petitioner buttresses his plea for prohibition on
the ground that the letter of then Senator Ganzon, even
on the assumption that it was a motion to reconsider an
appointment duly confirmed, was without force and
effect as it was not approved by the body as a whole.
Reasoning
a. The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v.
Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of
the Commission on Appointments, which reads:
“Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may
be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not
more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority
of the members present concur to grant a
reconsideration, the appointment may be laid on the
table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion.”
Holding of the Court was that the mere filing of a
reconsideration did not have the effect of setting
aside a confirmation. In the case, Aldeguer’s
(respondent in Altarejos case) theory would give to the
mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect
which it would have if the motion approved, and hence,
would dispense with the necessity of such approval, for
which the concurrence of a majority of the members
present is necessary. This is inconsistent with Rule 21 of
the Revised Rules of the Commission.
In case of an adjournment sine die the period
for filing the motion for reconsideration having
expired, under Section 22, then the motion for
reconsideration not having been acted upon is
not approved and therefore, has no effect
whatsoever.
What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not
nullified simply by a motion of reconsideration being
filed, without its being voted upon and approved.
b. “The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but
such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of
Congress.”
- A distinction is made between the exercise of such
presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the CA
when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In
the former, the President nominates, and only upon the
consent of the CA may the person assume office. As with
ad interim appointments, the appointment takes effect
at once. The appointment is effective until disapproval
by the CA or until the next adjournment in Congress.
There must either be a rejection by the CA or
nonaction on its part.
2. The insistence of respondent that the question
involved is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court is
untenable. It would extend the boundaries of the political
question doctrine beyond its legitimate limits. The courts
are called upon to see to it that private rights are not
invaded.
- Although the CA is not a power in our tripartite system
of government, it is to all intents and purposes, like the
Electoral Tribunals, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ. Its actuation in the
exercise of its power to approve appointment submitted
to it by the President of the Philippines is exempt from
judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the
powers as will constitute a denial of due process.
AVELINO V CUENCO
PER CURIAM; March 4, 1949
RESOLUTION on Original action in the SC
FACTS
- Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial review
of internal affairs of the legislature. The Court refused to
look into the legality of the election of a Senate
President, in view of the separation of powers, the
political nature of the controversy and the Senate’s
constitutional power to elect its own president
Before the opening of a morning session of the Senate,
Senators Lorenzo Tañada and Prospero Sanidad
prepared a resolution enumerating charges30 against the
then Senate President Jose Avelino. AVELINO presided
the session and called the meeting in order, and except
for a senator who was confined in a hospital and another
who is in the United States, all the Senators were
present.31
- TAÑADA sought to be recognized, but AVELINO and his
followers prevented TAÑADA from delivering his
privilege speech. A commotion later ensued, upon which
AVELINO and 9 other senators left the session hall.
Subsequently, the Senate President Pro-tempore took
the Chair and proceeded with the session. The remaining
30
BRYAN SJ: Among which were advocacy of the graft and
corruption in the government (particularly those committed by the
Liberal Party, to which AVELINO was a member); questionable
possession of checks totaling more than P500,000 after AVELINO’s
assumption of office; and justification of electoral fraud.
31
Similar to the 1987 Const, the Senate is composed of 24
senators under the 1935 Const.
senators unanimously approved, among others, a
resolution “declaring vacant the position of the President
of the Senate and designating… Mariano Jesus Cuenco
Acting President of the Senate." The next day the
President of the Philippines recognized CUENCO as
acting Senate President.
- Hence, the present petition, AVELINO asking the Court
to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust
CUENCO.
ISSUE
WON SC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
HELD
NO (6-4 vote)
Ratio The issue of the validity of the election of the
new Senate President is a political question.
Reasoning
- The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation
of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect
its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We should abstain
in this case because the selection of the presiding officer
affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty
at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate
them. If the majority of the Senators want AVELINO to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall, not
in the Supreme Court.
- The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of
the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede
might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state of
things has been proved that might change the temper of
the Filipino people as peaceful and law-abiding citizens.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded
by the Chief Executive to CUENCO makes it advisable, to
adopt the hands-off policy enunciated by this Court in
matters of similar nature.
Decision Petition dismissed.
SEPARATE OPINION
PERFECTO [dissent]
- There was illegal adjournment of the morning session.
The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive
prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be
exercised by any single individual, without usurpation of
the collective prerogatives. The functions of the Senate
and its opportunity to transact official business cannot
be left to the discretion of a single individual without
jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative
deliberative body is established in a democratic social
order.
- There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate
which expressly or impliedly authorizes an adjournment
without the consent of the body or one which authorizes
the presiding officer to decree motu propio said
adjournment, and the sound parliamentary practice and
experience in this country and in the United States of
America, upon which ours is patterned, would not
authorize the existence of such a provision.
- AVELINO alleges that he ordered the adjournment
because the motion of a senator to said effect was
properly made and met with no objection. The evidence,
however, fails to support AVELINO’s claim. The
circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal
adjournment and the walk out of AVELINO and his
supporters from the session hall had the purpose of
defeating or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed
investigation of the charges against AVELINO and of his
impeding ouster, by the decisive votes of CUENCO's
group.
- The rump session (i.e. the session after the AVELINO
group walkout) had no valid quorum to transact
business. – The Constitution provides: “A majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business…”
[cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The majority
mentioned in the provision cannot be other than the
majority of the actual members of the Senate. The words
"each House" in the above provision refer to the full
membership of each chamber of Congress. The Senate is
composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot
be less than 13. 12 is only half of 24. Nowhere and at no
time has one-half ever been the majority. Majority
necessarily has to be more than one-half.
FERIA [concur]
- If the rump session was not a continuation of the
morning session, was it validly constituted? Yes. At the
beginning of the rump session there were at least 14
senators. Also, in view of the absence from the country
of one senator, 12 senators constitute a majority of the
Senate of 23 senators. When the Constitution declares
that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a
quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members.
There is a difference between a majority of "all the
members of the House" and a majority of "the House",
the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore
an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority
of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
RESOLUTION on Motion for
Reconsideration
FACTS
- In Avelino II, the Court, in light of events subsequent to
Avelino I (i.e., refusal of the Avelino group to return to
the session hall despite the compulsory process served
upon them), reversed its original decision and now
assumed jurisdiction over the case
ISSUES
1. WON SC will assume jurisdiction over this case
2. WON election of Cuenco as Senate President is valid
HELD
1. The Court has resolved (7-4 vote) to assume
jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent
events which justify its intervention.
2. Partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of
this Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Feria
[and] Perfecto, JJ. in their separate opinions, to declare
that there was a quorum at the session where CUENCO
was elected acting Senate President. Chief Justice
[Moran] agrees with the result of the majority's
pronouncement on the quorum, it appearing from the
evidence that any new session with a quorum would
result in CUENCO's election as Senate President, and
that the CUENCO group has been trying to satisfy [the
constitutional] formalism by issuing compulsory
processes against senators of the AVELINO group, but to
no avail, because of the latter's persistent efforts to
block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this
reason, [the Chief Justice] believes that the CUENCO
group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of
the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in
conformity with substantial justice and with the
requirements of public interest.
Decision The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that
CUENCO has been legally elected as Senate President
and the petition is dismissed.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERIA [concur]
I maintain my opinion that there was a quorum in the
(rump) session. Among others, the amendment of the
quorum provision from "the majority of all the members
of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do
business," into "a majority of each House shall constitute
a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on
the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but
on actual members or incumbents, and this must be
limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to
discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or
absence from the jurisdiction of the House or for other
causes which make attendance of the member
concerned impossible, even through coercive process
which each House is empowered to issue to compel its
members to attend the session in order to constitute a
quorum.
PERFECTO [concur]
- The words "all the members" used in the original, for
the determination of the quorum of the National
Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as
regards the Houses of Congress, because they were a
mere surplusage. I, as Member of the Second National
Assembly and in my capacity as Chairman of the
Committee on Third Reading, was the one who proposed
the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of
each House" can mean only the majority of the members
thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the
members.
The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as
such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning. A
majority means more than one-half (1/2). It can never be
identified with one-half (1/2) or less than one-half. The
Senate is composed of 24 senators. The majority of said
senators cannot be less than thirteen 13. 12 do not
constitute the majority in a group composed of 24 units.
No amount of mental gymnastics or juristic logodaedaly
will convince anyone that one of two equal numbers
constitute a majority part of the two numbers combined.
The 5 fingers of one hand cannot be the majority of the
combined 10 fingers of the two hands. Majority is
incompatible with equality. It implies the idea of
superiority. Majority presupposes the existence of a total
and, in the present case, the total number of 24 senators
composing the Senate.
- The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are
now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of
choosing CUENCO merely as Acting Senate President,
the presence of the 12 senators was enough quorum.
The Constitution provides: “A majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum…, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance
of absent Members in such manner and under such
penalties as such House may provide" [again, cf Art. VI,
Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The "smaller number" referred
to has to act collectively and cannot act as collective
body to perform the functions specifically vested in it by
the Constitution unless presided by one among their
number. The collective body constituted by said "smaller
number" has to take measure to "compel the attendance
of absent members," so as to avoid disruption in the
functions of the respective legislative chamber. Said
"smaller number" may be 12 or even less than 12
senators to constitute a quorum for the election of a
temporary or acting president, who will have to act until
normalcy is restored.
- At the hearing of this case, CUENCO manifested that he
was looking for an opportunity to renounce the position
of Acting Senate President, and that if AVELINO should
attend the sessions of the Senate and insist on claiming
the presidency thereof, CUENCO would allow AVELINO to
preside over the sessions. AVELINO’s refusal to attend
the sessions, notwithstanding CUENCO’s commitment to
allow him to preside over them, can and should logically
be interpreted as an abandonment which entails
forfeiture of office.
OSMENA V PENDATUN
BENGZON; October 28, 1960
FACTS
- On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in
a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the
serious imputations of bribery against the President. The
House of Representatives, through Resolution No. 59,
created a special committee of 15 members to
investigate the truth of the charges against the
President. It summoned Osmeña to appear before it to
substantiate his charges.
- On July 14, 1960, Osmeña filed with the Supreme Court
a petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Congressman Salipada Pendatun and the fourteen other
members of the Special Committee. He asked that said
resolution be annulled and that said members of the
special committee be enjoined from proceeding in
accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing
them to require him to substantiate his charges against
the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do
so, he must show cause why the House should not
punish him. Osmeña alleged: (1) the Constitution gave
him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words
spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2)
that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for
which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could
be questioned and disciplined therefor, the House took
up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of
the House provides that if other business has intervened
after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in
debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be
subject to censure by the House
- Aware of the petition, the special committee continued
to perform its task, and after giving Osmena a chance to
defend himself, submitted its report on July 18, 1960,
finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly
behavior. Acting on such report, the House approved on
the same day-before closing its session-House
Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as
recommended, and suspending him from office for
fifteen months.
- Thereafter, Osmeña took the additional position that
the House has no power, under the Constitution, to
suspend one of its members.
- On July 19, 1960, the respondents filed their answer,
challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the
petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its
members with suspension, upheld House Resolution
No. .175 and then invited attention to the fact that
Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the
Committee-whose members are the sole respondents-
had thereby ceased to exist.
ISSUES
1. WON the Constitution gives members of Congress
complete parliamentary immunity for words spoken in
the House
2. WON the Speech of Osmeña constituted unruly
behavior for which he could be punished
3. WON Osmeña can be held to answer for or be
censured by the House, given that other business had
intervened after gave the speech in question
4. WON the House has the power to suspend its
members
HELD
1. NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution which
provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress,
the Senators or Members of the House of
Representatives "shall not be questioned in any other
place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6,
clause I of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States,
wherein the provision has always been understood to
mean that although exempt from prosecution or
civil actions for their words uttered in Congress,
the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself.
- Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative
body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof.
2. YES. The House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution
has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the
matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of
which the House knows best but which can not be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's
conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby
have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate
branch of the Government. The theory of separation of
powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in
such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere.
- "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is
plenary, subject only to such limitations as are found in
the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed
to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil., 192, 212.)
3. YES. Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by
the House, such approval amounted to a suspension of
the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous
consent. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and
with their observance, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite
number of members has agreed to a particular
measure."
4. YES. For unparliamentary conduct, members of
Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be
censured, committed to prison, suspended, even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The practice
and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to
take, disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion have been
recognized in the United States. The Rules of Philippine
House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary
practices of the Congress of the United States shall
apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
Decision Petition DISMISSED.
ASTORGA V VILLEGAS
MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1974
FACTS
- Original Action in the SC. Mandamus, injunction and/or
prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction
- HB No. 9266 was filed and was passed on the third
reading without amendments in the House of
Representatives (HoR). It was referred to the Senate
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities headed by Sen. Roxas. Sen. Roxas suggested
a minor amendment on HB 9266. However, this
recommendation was not acted upon by the Senate
during its second hearing, and instead, approved in toto
Sen. Tolentino’s substantial amendment on the section
definig the powers and duties of the VM.
- After that the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to
the HoR that HB. No. 9266 had been passed by the
Senate with amendments. However, the attached
amendments were not Sen. Tolentino’s but Sen.
Roxas’amendments. The HoR signified its approval of HB
No. 9266 (with Roxas amendment) and printed copies of
it which were certified and attested by the Secretary of
the HoR, the Speaker of the HoR, the Secretary of the
Senate, and the Senate President. The Secretary of the
House transmitted 4 copies of the bill to the President of
the Philippines, who affixed his signatures by way of
approval – enacted the bill into R.A. No. 406532
32
An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the
City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Section 10 and 11 of RA
No. 409, Otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
- The respondent mayor (Villegas) publicly denounced
the RA, then Sen. Tolentino made a press statement that
the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed by the President is
not the version passed by the Senate since it did not
contain the amendments he made. The Senate President
then informed the President that the enrolled copy of the
signed HB 9266 was not the bill duly approved by
Congress and that his signature is invalid and had no
effect, and could not validate the bill which was not the
version approved by the Congress. The President then
withdrew his signature on the HB 9266.
- With the withdrawal of signatures of the Senate
President and the President of the Philippines, Villegas
issued circulars ordering city government officials and
operators of business establishments to disregard the
provisions of RA 4065. He likewise ordered the Chief of
Police to recall the police officers assigned to the vice-
mayor presumably under the said RA.
- As a reaction, the petitioner vice mayor (Astorga) filed
a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition
with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction”
to compel respondents to comply with the provisions of
RA 4065.
- Respondents argued that RA 4056 never became law
since (1) it was not the bill approved by Congress and (2)
entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled
bill should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
Since Mayor Villegas was going abroad on an official trip,
Court issued restraining order for Astorga to not exercise
the powers vested to him as Acting Mayor under the RA
4065.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court could resolve the issue
regarding the “enrolled bill doctrine”
2. WON the attestation of the presiding officers of
the Congress approves the bill and validates it into a
law
3. WON in the absence of the attestation of the
presiding officers, the “journal entry” in the Journals of
Congress could constitute proof of due enactment
4. WON RA 4065 was duly enacted and therefore
did not become a law
HELD
1. Ratio YES. The enrolled copy of the resolution
and the legislative journals are conclusive upon the
Courts under Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by
Act. No. 2210 as evidence for the due enactment of a
bill.
Obiter
- compared this case to the Mabanag v. Lopez Vito
where the Court denied to resolve the issue of WON a
resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an
amendment to the 1935 Constitution to be appended as
an ordinance thereto had been passed by a “vote for
three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives” pursuant to Article XV of
the Constitution, saying that it involved a political
question (enrolled bill doctrine) which is not in the
province of the judiciary.
- using J. Bengzon’s separate opinion in the same case, J.
Makalintal said that the case at bar is justiciable since
enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative
journals are conclusive upon the courts based on Section
313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as proof of
due enactment of provisions of acts.
- basis of the enrolled bill theory: respect due to coequal
and independent departments which requires the judicial
department to “accept, as having passed the Congress,
all bills authenticated by it.
2. Ratio NO. The final passage of the bill ends the
lawmaking process and the certification/attestation of
the bill is only a mode of authentication devised by the
Congress which does not add the validity of the bill nor
cure any defect already present upon it.
Obiter effects of Attestation of the bill: just a mode of
authentication; signify the Chief Executive that the bill
being presented to him has been duly approved by
Congress and is ready for his approval or disapproval
3. Ratio YES. If attestation is absent and is not
mandated in the Constitution for the validity of a
statute, the courts may resort to the journals and
other records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment.
Obiter Attestation by the presiding officers is not
mandated in the Constitution as a proof of due
enactment of a bill, but requires a Journal of the
Congress’ proceedings [comparison of Constitutions:
1935 consti vs 1987 Consti: Sec 10(4) = Art VI, sec 26
(2); Sec. 21(2) = Art VI, sec 27(1)]
4. Ratio NO. Given that (1) the Court could
resolve the issue regarding the enrolled bill doctrine,
(2) that the Court could use the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress and, in the absence of
the latter, the records of the proceedings of the
Congress entered into the Journals of Congress as
proof of the due enactment of RA 4065 since the law is
deemed enacted after the passage of the bill in the 3rd
reading and the attestation of the presiding officers
just serve as a mode of authenticating the bill, (3)
that, upon referring to the journal entries of the
proceedings of congress, the Court discovered that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced
to the HB but were not incorporated in the printed text
which was signed by the President of the Philippines,
and (4) that the President of the Philippines and of the
Senate already withdrew their signatures, then RA
4065 was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become a law.
Decision RA 4065 was declared not to have been duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. TRO made
permanent. [8 concur, 2 no part, 1 did not take part (I
don’t know the difference), 1 on leave = 12 only]
MARTINEZ V MORFE
FERNANDO; March 24, 1972
FACTS
- Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr.
were delegates of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
facing criminal prosecution
o Martinez was charged with falsification of a public
document for stating under oath in his certificate of
candidacy for delegate to the Constitutional
Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when
in truth he was born on June 20, 1946
o Bautista was accused of violating Section 51 of the
Revised Election Code in that he gave and distributed
free of charge, food, drinks, and cigarettes at two
public meetings
- Both wanted the respective warrants of arrest issued
against them to be quashed, by virtue of the
parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates,
traceable to Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution as
construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal
Code
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioners are immune from arrest
2. No. Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code is
2. WON Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution should
inoperative.
be construed together with Article 145 of the Revised
Penal Code, thereby expanding congressional immunity
HELD
1. No. Parliamentary immunity does not cover criminal
arrests.
• Under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132,
otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the
parliamentary immunities of a senator or a
representative.
• Article VI Section 15 of the Constitution provides:
“The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of peace, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech o debate therein, they
shall not be questioned in any other place.”
• Immunity from arrest does not cover any
prosecution for treason, felony and breach of peace
o Treason-levying war against the Republic and
adhering to enemies and giving them aid and
comfort
FACTS
o Felony-an act or omission punishable by law
o Breach of peace-covers any offense whether
defined by RPC or any special statute
• History of parliamentary immunity shows that it was
never intended to exempt members of the National
Assembly from criminal arrest
• The power or right of the State to claim privileges is
due to the fact that it has the right to carry out its
function without obstacle
• In England, operation of parliamentary privilege
excludes all crimes, applies only to prosecutions of
civil nature
• There is a full recognition of the necessity to have
members of the Congress, and likewise, delegates
of the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge
responsibilities
• However, when it comes to freedom from arrest, it
would amount to the creation of a privileged class if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense,
they would be immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the
same.
• A legislator or a delegate can perform his functions
efficiently and well without the need for any
transgression of criminal law.
• If a legislator or delegate is facing criminal
prosecution, he should be treated like any other
citizen considering that there is a strong public
interest in seeing to it that a crime should not go
unpunished.
• Article 145 penalizes a public officer or employee
who shall, during the session of Congress, arrest or
search any member thereof, except in case such
member has committed a crime punishable under
the RPC by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
• RPC took effect on January 1, 1932, before the
enforcement of the 1935 Constitution
• Art. XVI, Sec, 2 of the 1935 Constitution states: “All
laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force
until the inauguration the Commonwealth of the
Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution,
until amended, altered, modified or repealed by the
Congress of the Philippines…”
• Article 145 which accords legislators a generous
treatment exempting them from arrest even if
warranted under the penal law, is inconsistent with
the Constitution, and is consequently inoperative.
JIMENEZ V CABANGBANG
CONCEPCION; August 3, 1966
- Ordinary Civil Action for the recovery of several sums
of money by way of damages for the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome
Cabangbang
- Defendant moved to dismiss upon ground that letter is
a privileged communication and not libelous since he
was a member of the House of Representatives and
Chairman of House Committee on National Defense
- The letter in question is an open letter to the President
of the Philippines dated Nov 14, 1958 while congress
was presumably not in session.
- Defendant caused the publication of the letter in
several newpapers.
- The open letter was an exposé on allegedly three
operational plans. The first plan is said to be an insidious
plan or a massive political build up of then Sec. of Nat’l
Defense, Jesus Vagas, by propagandizing and
glamorizing him in such a way as to be prepared to
become candidate for President in 1961. (Plan II – A coup
d’etat;Plan III – A modification of Plan I)
- The letter also implicated that the “planners” have
under their control the following : (1) Col. Nicanor
Jimenez , (2)Lt.Col. Jose Lukban,(3) Capt. Carlos Albert,
(4)Col Fidel Llamas, (5) Lt. Col Jose regala, (6)Maj. Jose
Reyna…….”It is of course possible that the officers
mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which
they may have absolutely no knowledge.”
- Lower Court dismissed
- Petitioners appealed
ISSUES
1. WON the publication is a privileged communication
2. (if not) WON it is libelous
HELD
1. NO. The publication in question is not absolutely
privileged. It was an open letter to the President
published by the defendant when the Congress was not
in session. And in thus causing it to be published he was
not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any House Committee.
- The phrase “speech or debate therein” as used in
Article VI, Sec 15 of the 1935 Constitution refers to
utterances made by congressmen in the performance of
their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress
while it is in session, as well as bills introduced in
Congress whether it is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the discharge
of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
function as such, at the time of the performance of the
acts in question.
2. NO. The letter in question is not sufficient to support
plaintiffs’ action for damages. Although the letter says
that plaintiffs are under the control of the planners, the
defendant likewise added that it was possible that
plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan which they may
have absolutely no knowledge. The statement is not
derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them
to recover damages.
PELAEZ V AUDITOR GENERAL
CONCEPCION; September 24, 1965
FACTS
- During the period from September 4 to October 29,
1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, issued Executive Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and
126 to 129; creating 33 municipalities.
- RAC Section 68
- provides, among others, that the President may by
executive order define the boundary of municipality,
increase or diminish its territory provided that the
authorization of the Congress of the Phil shall first be
obtained.
- The petitioner argued that these EOs are null and void
because of RA 2370 Section 3 which provides that
barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed” except by Acts of Congress or
of the corresponding provincial board “upon petition of a
majority of the voters in areas affected” and the
“recommendation of the council of the municipality in
which the proposed barrio is situated.”
- Procedure Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him,
as well as his representatives and agents, from passing
in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.
- The mayors who were adversely affected by the EOs
intervened in the case.
- Atty. Enrique Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-
Fernando appeared as amici curiae.
ISSUES
1. WON the executive orders are null and void upon the
ground that Section 68 of RAC, which was the basis of
the EOs has been impliedly repealed by RA 2730.
2. WON the power of the President to create
municipalities under RAC amount to an undue delegation
of legislative power.
HELD
1. Yes. RA 2370’s denial of the presidential authority to
create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger
power to create municipalities, each of which consists of
several barrios.
2. Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. There could only be a
due delegation of legislative power if the law is (a)
complete in itself – it must set forth the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the “delegate”
- and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.
- Sec 28 of RAC does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix
the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented
by the President. Neither does it give a standard
sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects of the power
the President.
Reasoning
a. adherence to precedent (Schechter Poultry Corp vs.
US)
- It was held here that in Recovery Act there was an
undue delegation of legislative power because it supplies
no standards for any trade, industry or activity.
b. Constitutional provision (incompatible and
inconsistent with RAC)
- Sec 10 of Art VII of 1935 Constitution ordains:
“The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by LAW. (take note: such control does not
include the authority either to abolish or create)
Decision The Executive Orders are declared null and
void ab initio and the respondent are permanently
restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said Eos or any
disbursement by the municipalities concerned.
ARNAULT V NAZARENO
OZAETA; July 18, 1950
FACTS
- This refers to two land deals entered into by the
Philippine government as follows:
1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE
- The Philippine government leased from San Juan de
Dios Hospital for twenty five years the Buenavista estate
and had an option to purchase the same for P 3.0
million. This purchase option was exercised by the then
occupation republic by tendering the owner the sum of P
3.0 million and, on its rejection, depositing the said
funds in Court on June 21, 1944 together with the
accrued rentals of P 324,000.
- San Juan de Dios on June 29, 1946 sold this same
property to Ernest H. Burt, an non-resident American for
P 5,000,000 with the initial downpayment of P 10,000
with the balance payable under very favorable terms.
Burt was unable to comply with the terms agreed.
2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE
- On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase from
Philippine Trust Corporation, the Tambobong estate for P
1.2 million with a downpayment of P 10,000.00 and
terms which are as generuous as those from San Juan de
Dios. There was however no other payment received
from Burt.
- The Philippine government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, acquired this same property from its
original owner for the sum of P 750,000 and
subsequently instituted a notarial demand upon Burt for
the resolution and cancellation of his contract of
purchase with Philippine Trust for non payment. The
Court of First Instance in this case ordered the
cancellation of Burt’s title and the issuance of a new one
under the name of Rural Progress Administration.
- For one reason or another, despite the fact the
Philippine government already owned both the above
estate, it again bought the same from Burt for a total
consideration of P 5,000,000 (P 4.5 million for
Buenavista and P 500,000 for Tambobong). The
government paid initially P 1,000,000 for Buenavista and
the full amount of P 500,000 for the Tambobong estate
through two corporations acting as Burt’s attorneys-in-
fact. These two were represented in the trasaction by
one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault.
- It was also brought out that the Rural Progress
Administration was headed at that time by the Justice
secretary who was at the same time Chairman of the
Philippine National Bank, the institution that lent the
funds to Rural Progress.
- The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led
into the Philippine Senate adopting Resolution 8 which
created a special committee to investigate the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal.
- The committee was tasked, among others, with
determining:
a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchase
b. the fairness of the purchase price
c. the parties involved/responsible for the deal
- During the public hearings of the Committee, various
witnesses were called. Among them and apparently the
most important was Jean Arnault, the person who
represented Burt in the transactions.
- During the said hearing, Arnault confirmed receiving
the money from the government and withdrawing, in
cash, P 440,000 which he gave to someone on
instruction of Burt. When asked to identify the person he
gave the money to, he replied that he did not know his
name despite the fact that he met the person on many
occasions. When pressed to answer, he also said that
answering the question might incriminate him. Based on
this refusal, the senate approved a resolution on May 15,
1950 arraigning him for contempt and subsequently
found him guilty of the charge. He was committed to the
custody of the Senate Sergeant at arms until he reveals
the name of the person he gave the money to. The
Senate adjourned three days later. The work of the
Committee however was extended via Resolution 16.
- Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ
of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court to obtain his
release cited the following grounds:
 a. the Senate has no power to punish him for
contempt since the requested information is not
material to the intended legislation and his refusal to
answer has not impeded or obstructed the legislated
process. The Senate has already approved bills related
to the transactions.
b. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in
contempt for a term beyond its legislative session.
c. the information sought will be self-incriminating
- rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Court went
into the general principles of law with regard the power
of either house of Congress to punish a person not a
member for contempt as this case is the first of its kind
to be tried under the Philippine constitution. In so doing,
the Supreme Court had to draw from American
precedents in recognition of the fact that the
Constitution of the Philippines were patterned after
largely American institutions and practices. The
discussions were as follows:
a. There is no expressed provisions in the constitution
which grant power to either House to investigate or
exact testimonies to exercise legislative function.
However, this power of inquiry, and the process to
enforce it, is a necessary element to enable the body
to wisely and effectively perform their respective
legislative functions. In the absence of information
that it requires, Congress has no other recourse but to
get the same from others who have them. At times,
the information required are not entirely accurate or
complete. Given this, Congress has the implied
coercive to obtain such information.
b. The power to compel is limited to information
required in a matter into which Congress has
jurisdiction to inquire.
ISSUES
WON the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted
HELD
a. The requested information is needed to comply with
the direction of the senate as contained in Resolution
Nos. 8 & 16 to secure the names of the persons
responsible for the transaction. The materiality of the
question asked in the public hearing should be
determined by its direct relation to the matter being
inquired into and not by its indirect relation to any
proposed or possible legislation. The only time that the
Supreme Court may interfere with the Senate is when a
petitioner is being forced to answer questions which are
not pertinent to the matter inquiry. In this case and
citing McGrain vs Daugherty, Congress would be guilty of
a clear abuse of authority in the exercise of its power. As
to whether the information sought to be elicited is
material to an proposed legislation, the Court could not
say as this is not within their scope.
- Citing the case Re: Chapman, where the petitioner was
jailed for contempt of the US Senate for refusing to
answer questions with regard accounts of Senators in his
company, the Supreme Court held that the Philippine
Senate has the authority to compel Arnault and if he so
refuses to give the information, also the power find him
in contempt and to imprison him until he complies with
said requirement.
b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison
does not end with the termination of the legislative
session. The opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with
regard the Candido Lopez case where he opines that the
imprisonment of Lopez terminates when the House of
Representatives adjourns. Citing however the McGrain
case again, the Court said that, unlike the House of
Representatives which losses all its members every four
years (hence its term is only four years), the Senate is
deemed as a continuing body whose members are
elected for a six year term and are so divided that only a
third of the seats become vacant every two years.
Hence, the power of the Senate to hold Arnault is a
continuing power. The only caveat of the Supreme Court
in this case is that if the Senate disregards the proper
limitation to jail parties in contempt, the remedy is with
the Court.
c. Arnault’s claim to self incrimination cannot be
sustained citing Mason vs US as a precedent. The Court
must be given the chance to determine from all the facts
and circumstances whether the witness is justified in
refusing to answer any question which could incriminate
him. Arnault’s testimony was obviously false. He
obviously knew the name of the person he gave the
money to. His refusal to testify truthfully is punishable
with contempt.
Decision Petition is denied
SEPARATE OPINION
TUASON [dissent]
- The power of the legislative body to punish for
contempt is based on the necessity for its attainment of
the ends. The power is however not absolute. And this is
precisely where disagreement occur.
- Justice Tuason is of the opinion that the question being
asked has no relation whatsoever to the contemplated
legislation. A stated reason for the insistence on getting
an answer to the question as to who received the money
is supposedly to vindicate or clear the names of the
persons suspected of getting the money (Antonio
Quirino, one of the suspects, is the brother of President
Quirino). The Senate is not the proper forum for such
vindication. The Senate investigation seems to have
only one objective and this is to prepare the way for
court action since they could not expect the Justice
department to take the initiative to investigate and
prosecute the responsible parties as it seems that the
Secretary of the Justice department had a hand in the
transaction. This is not the a duty of the Legislative
department.
- The Committee’s report has been submitted to the
entire Senate. And as a matter of fact three bills were
passed by the Senate in connection with the
investigation. This being the case there is no need to
extract names. The importance of names is when it
comes to a criminal prosecution.
- In ending, Justice Tuason stated that the investigation
of the Senate is commendable and legal. His main
objection lies in the fact that the Senate has
overstepped its authority and trespassed on the territory
of other braches of government “when it imprisoned a
witness for contumacy on a point that is unimportant,
useless, impertinent and irrelevant, let alone moot”.
LIDASAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
SANCHEZ; October 25, 1967
FACTS
- On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law
House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in
dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec
verba, reads:
SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan,
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis,
Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the
Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of
Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities
and constituted into a distinct and independent
municipality of the same province to be known as the
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur.
The seat of government of the municipality shall be in
Togaig.
SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of
the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen
hundred sixty-seven general elections for local
officials.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
- It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum
just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon,
Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and
parcel of another municipality, the municipality of
Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of
Lanao del Sur. Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of
Parang, Cotabato, prays that Republic Act 4790 be
declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's
resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967
implementing the same for electoral purposes, be
nullified.
ISSUES
1. WON the title of RA 4790 conforms with the
constitutional requirement that the subject of a bill shall
be expressed in the title NO
2. WON RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to
the nine barrios in Lanao del Sur NO
3. WON petitioner has legal standing to challenge the
statute YES
HELD
1. The title - "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" 8 - projects
the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur
is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao
del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del
Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title
misleading, deceptive. Such title did not inform the
members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it
did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself
that part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province
of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.
2. Where a portion of a statute is rendered
unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will
be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. But
when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent
and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the
legislature would not pass the residue independently,
then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or
connected, must fall with them. When the foregoing bill
was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality
of the twenty-one barrios - not nine barrios - was in the
mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly
evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted
into law, states that the seat of the government is in
Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in
Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of
questions, thus: Could the observations as to
progressive community, large aggregate population,
collective income sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality, still apply to a motely group of only nine
barrios out of the twenty-one?
3. Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in
the 1967 elections His right to vote in his own barrio
before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may
not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different
from his actual residence. He may not desire to be
considered a part of hitherto different communities
which are formed into the new town; he may prefer to
remain in the place where he is and as it was
constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and
benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the
candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of
desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his
vote should be cast for the officials in the town before
dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the
purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the
benefit, amongst others, of the community affected
thereby, 16 it stands to reason to say that when the
constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of
that community is affected, he may become a suitor to
challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by
Congress.
MILLER V MARDO
BARRERA; July 31, 1961
FACTS
- These are different cases taken together as they
present only one identical question
- 1st case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill
Miller at the DoL, claiming that he is a driver of Miller
and was arbitrarily dismissed without separation pay
- Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing
Officer Mardo of the DoL on ground that HO has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case
- Court rendered decision though that Reorg. Plan 2-A
did not repeal Judiciary Act that conferred to CFI original
jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims re
violations of labor standards
- 2nd case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the DoL
against Chin Hua Trading Co., for not being paid
overtime and vacation leave pay as a driver in the
company
- same circumstances as 1st case, and court issued
permanent injunction against hearing the cases by the
Hearing Officer, as Reorg. Plan 2-A is null and void.
- 3RD case: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFI a complaint
against Sen Bee Trading Company for being underpaid,
not being paid overtime, without sick leave and vacation
leave pay, as a seamstress
- Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insisted that CFI
does not have jurisdiction as money claims must be filed
with Regional Office of DoL under Reorg. Plan 2-A
- 4th case: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at
the DoL Sia Leng did noy\t file an answer and a decision
was rendered in favor of Romero. But Labor
Administrator Hernando refused to issue the writ of
execution of the ecision as he believed that Sia Seng
deserved to be heard
they insist as well that Reorg. Plan is not validly
passed as a statute and unconstitutional
- 5th case: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DoL a complaint
against Fred Wilson and Co., as he was summarily
dismissed wihout cause, without separation pay, and
without sufficient notice.
- They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative
body, with no power to adjudicate money claims
- Certiorari, prohibition and injuction was filed as well –
that Reorg Plan is null and void insofar as it vest
original exclusive jurisdiction over money claims
ISSUES
1. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A, prepared and
submitted under the authority of RA 997 as amended by
RA 1241, is valid, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the
Regional Offices of the Department of Labor to decide on
claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation
pay, etc.
2. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A was validly passed by
Congress
HELD
1. No it is not valid.
- While the Reorganization Commission could create
functions, it referred merely to administrative and not
judicial functions such as deciding on money claims.
Judicial power rests exclusively on the judiciary
- While legislature may confer administrative boards
quasi-judicial powers, it must be incident to the exercise
of administrative dunctions
- Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannot be
implied from a mere grant of power to create functions
in connection with reorganization of the Executive
2. No it was not validly passed by Congress
- A law is not passed by mere silence or non-action of
Congress even if it be stated in Sec 6(a) of RA 997
- It is contrary to well-settled and well-understood
parliamentary law- that two houses are to hold separate
sessions for their deliberations and the determination of
the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the
separate determination of the other.
TANADA V TUVERA
ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985
FACTS
- Petition to review the decision of the Executive
Assistant to the President.
- Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters
of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article
IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed
on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality
to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel public duty, they need not show any
specific interest. Respondents further contend that
publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUE
WON publication in the Official Gazette is an
indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs,
LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates
HELD
Yes. It is the people’s right to be informed on matters of
public concern & corollarily access to official records, &
to documents & papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law
(Sec. 6, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid &
enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise
effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states
its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication
in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts.
The publication of presidential issuances “of public
nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of
due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially informed of its contents.
Decision Respondents ordered to publish in Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general
application, and unless so published shall have no
binding force and effect.
Important Point It illustrates how decrees & issuances
issued by one man — Marcos — are in fact laws of
general application and provide for penalties. The
constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative
powers.
- The generality of law (CC Art. 14) will never work w/o
constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides that
publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice
& is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse.
- Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.
TANADA V TUVERA
CRUZ; December 29, 1986
FACTS
- In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court
affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of
these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect."
- This is a motion for reconsideration/clarification of the
first decision, specifically, on the following questions:
ISSUES
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general
applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
HELD
1 & 2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not
only to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. We hold
therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are
presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
3. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number of
the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement
of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.33
4. We have no choice but to pronounce that under
Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must
be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from
such publication or after a different period provided by
the legislature.
5. We also hold that the publication must be made
forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect
to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the
parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a
mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to
cause its publication as required. This is a matter,
however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO V
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
TINGA; February 24, 2004
FACTS
- LDP together with other political parties formed a
coalition called Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
33
This was the manner in which the General Appropriations Act for FY
1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest,
was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to
withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
- KNP has chose Fernando Poe as its Standard Bearer for
the President of the Phils in the May 2004 elections
- LDP filed with COMELEC a petition to certify nomination
of candidates for the upcoming elections
- on Dec. 8, 2003, LDP filed a Manifestation informing the
COMELEC
a) that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo
Angara or his authorized representative may endorse
the certificate of candidacy of the party’s official
candidates
b) that LDP had placed its Secretary General,
Representative Agapito Aquino, on “indefinite forced
leave” and Ambassador Enrique Zaldivar was the
Acting Sec-Gen
- Rep. Aquino contended that the Party Chairman does
not have authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on
the Sec-Gen and asked COMELEC to disregard the
Manifestation
- pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination was
filed with COMELEC, naming Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDP’s
Standard Bearer for president; the certificate was signed
by Rep. Aquino
- the COMELEC, noting that the conflict was an internal
party matter and that the period for filing for the
Certificate of Nomination was about to end, granted the
petition for both Petitioner (Angara) and Oppositor
(Aquino) in that it recognized all the candidates
nominated by both parties as the official candidates of
the LDP identifying each set of candidates as the
“Angara Wing” and the “Aquino Wing”
- Angara filed the present petition assailing the
COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion
ISSUE
WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
applied equity and divided LDP into “wings”
HELD
YES there was grave abuse of discretion. The only issue
to be resolved by the Commission was who as between
the Chairman and the Secretary General had the
authority to sign the certificates of candidacy. To
resolve the issue, the COMELEC need only to refer to the
Party Constitution. Equity is applied only if there
absence of law that can be applied to resolve the issue
which is not the case here.
- as provided in the 1987 Constitution the COMELEC
has the authority to ascertain the identity of the
political parties and its legitimate officers;
consequently it has the power to settle any
controversy regarding leadership of the party as an
incident to its power to register political parties. This
matter is important in determining as to who between
Aquino and Angara had the authority to certify LDP’s
candidates
- According to the Party Constitution, it is the
Chairman who has the power to sign documents in
 behalf of the party; the Sec-Gen has power to sign
documents only when authorized by the Chairman.
That Aquino had been given authority in the past, as
found by the COMELEC during the 2001 elections, it
does not follow that said authority is still existing since
it can be gathered in Angara’s Manifestation that
Aquino’s authority had been revoked, which the
Chairman may do so in his discretion as implied in his
authority to grant such power
- However, the lack of authority of Aquino to certify
candidates does not cancel the certificates he signed.
The candidates named will only be treated as
independent candidates following COMELEC
Resolution No. 6453, section 7
- The COMELEC, by allowing two wings to nominate
their own candidates, confused the electorate as to
which set of candidates truly represent the ideologies
that the LDP represents
- The constitutional policy towards a free and open
party system envisions a system that shall “evolve
according to the free choice of the people” and not
one molded by the COMELEC
BRILLANTES V COMELEC
CALLEJO; June 15, 2004
FACTS
- On 12/22/97, Congress enacted RA 8436, authorizing
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for
the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating results of the national and local
elections for May 11 ’98. Also allowed the acquisition of
automated counting machines (ACM) and other devices
to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
However, the failure of the machines to read ballots
correctly deferred implementation of modernization
plan.
- 10/29/02, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 02-0170, a
three-phase modernization program for the 2004
elections.
o Phase 1 – computerized registration and validation
Encountered problems in implementation because
machine was reverting to old listing of voters
o Phase 2 – computerized voting and counting
Scrapped because COMELEC had to maintain manual
voting and counting system due to the problems
encountered with validation
o Phase 3 – Electronic transmission of unofficial
results (which is challenged in this case)
- Despite failure of the first 2 phases, COMELEC through
its commissioners still decided to implement Phase 3
- GMA issued EO 172 which allocated P250,000,000 to
fund the AES for the May 10 ’04 elections. Also issued
EO 175, giving an additional P500M budget for the AES
project.
- Senate President Drilon had misgivings about the
proposed electronic transmission of results because
according to the Constitution (Art VII, Sec 4), Congress
has the sole authority to canvass votes for President and
VP. Implementing Phase 3 would be pre-emptive of the
authority of Congress and would also lack constitutional
authority
- Aside from Drilon’s apprehension, there were budget
problems for implementation because the money
allocated by GMA had already been used for phases 1
and 2. COMELEC, however, still conducted a field test of
the electronic transmission of results (phase 3) on
04/27/04 (Separate opinions of COMELEC officials found
on p. 277. Read just in case.)
- COMELEC, 2 weeks before the national and local
elections, approved RESOLUTION 6712 stating the
implementation of phase 3 and declared that results of
each city/municipality shall be electronically transmitted
in advance to COMELEC, Manila. They established a
National Consolidation Center (NCC), Electronic
Transmission Centers (ETC) for each city/municipality
and a special ETC at COMELEC for the absentee voters.
(procedure p. 278). Note that the results garnered in the
procedure are of unofficial character.
- Hence, petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention
brought their misgivings to SC.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners have locus standi
2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing RA
6712
HELD
1. Petitioners claim their standing as taxpayers and
since the Resolution obviously involves the expenditure
of funds, they do have the requisite standing to question
its validity. Most of the petitioners-in-intervention are
also part of NAMFREL, the citizens’ authorized arm to
conduct an unofficial quick count during elections.
Lastly, Drilon and De Venecia are heads of Congress, the
sole authority for canvassing votes for President and VP.
2. The resolution usurps the tabulation of election results
based on a copy of the election returns the sole and
exclusive authority of Congress to canvass votes for
President and VP. COMELEC’s claim that it is not
prohibited because it is an unofficial vote is
unacceptable.
- the resolution goes against the constitutional provision
that no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec 29, Art
VI). Because the tabulation in the resolution is unofficial
in character, it is not an appropriation made by law. In
fact, it may be considered a felony under Art 217 under
the Penal Code (malversation of public funds/property).
- it disregards existing laws that any unofficial counting
of votes is done by NAMFREL by using a copy of the
election returns. Not even COMELEC is authorized to use
a copy of election returns for counting.
- COMELEC failed to notify authorized representatives of
accredited political parties and all candidates of the
proposed use of technology for the elections under Sec
52 of the Omnibus Election Code. There are 2 conditions
that COMELEC must comply with before undertaking
technology for electoral purposes: take into account the
situation prevailing and the funds available, and notify
authorized representatives. These conditions give the
affected people an opportunity to object if need be.
Details on p 302-303.
- resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis for
COMELEC to undertake a separate and unofficial
tabulation of results. It also doesn’t make sense that
Phase 3 of the program should go on when the first two
phases have been scrapped. They should be taken as a
whole and not independent of each other. In the first
place, there is a great possibility that the unofficial
results will differ greatly from the official count so what
is the use of spending all that money for something
uncertain, something that the NAMFREL had always
undertaken? It is an unnecessary waste of government
funds and effort.
- COMELEC uses the problem of dagdag-bawas as a
reason for the resolution. Accdg to them, modernization
of the election will decrease the possibility of dagdag
bawas but it doesn’t make sense because dagdag-bawas
is a result of human intervention. No matter how modern
the technology for electoral purposes is, there will
always be the need for human intervention so the
problem will not be eradicated.
Decision PETITION GRANTED. Resolution No. 6712 is
NULL AND VOID.
PLDT V PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
MAKALINTAL; August 29, 1975
FACTS
- September, 1964 – the Public Service Commission
assessed several public utilities for supposed
supervision and regulation fees for that year
- PLDT (P214,353.60); Manila Electric Company -
P727,526.00; Bolinao Electronics Corporation -
P11,610.40; Philippine Stearn Navigation Company -
P23.921.60; and General Shipping Company -
P33,146.80
- The assessed fees were based upon the value of
the respective properties or equipment pursuant to
Section 40(e) of the Public Service Act as amended by
Republic Act 3792
- After paying the demanded amounts, the said
corporations sent Separate letters to the Commission,
(except the Philippine Steam Navigation Company which
filed a formal petition instead) requesting for
reconsideration of the assessments  their ground:
under the said Section 40(e), such assessments
should be based not on the value of the properties
but upon the subscribed and paid up capital
stocks of the corporations.
- 28 September 1966—Public Service Commission denied
request for reconsideration. Their reason:
o the clause "or of the property and equipment,
whichever is higher" in section 40(e) of the Public
Service Act as an alternative base for supervision
fees collectible, applies to both stock and non-stock
corporations.
o to use the value of property and equipment as an
alternative base for fixing the rates only in case of
public services not issuing shares would result in
unreasonable discrimination against the latter
o a comma after the words "capital subscribed or
paid" and another after the words "Capital
invested," immediately preceding the clause
"property and equipment, whichever is higher,"
indicates the intention of the legislature to
constitute the latter as an alternative of both stock
and non-stock corp.
ISSUES
1. WON the law itself draws a distinction between public
utilities issuing shares and those that do not as the
capital invested is difficult to ascertain where no shares
have been issued. Thus, the value of their property or
equipment should provide as an alternative rate base for
this class of operators
2. WON reliance on the use of comma/punctuation
should have bearing
3. WON there is alleged disproportion of the total
amount to be collected as supervisory fees
HELD
1. NO. No showing of difficulty in ascertaining actual
capital investment of public service operators that do
not issue stocks. These companies are required to
submit annual reports of finances and operations
2. reliance on punctuation is too risky a method of
statutory construction
- the punctuation of the provision in question has
undergone no alteration at all
- the consideranda on punctuation was merely employed
to reinforce its main argument that nothing in the law
justifies a discriminatory application of the value of the
property or equipment (as alternative rate base) solely
to operators not issuing shares of capital stock.
3. the very statute indicates that such fees as are
therein fixed were designed to raise revenue for the
general expenses of the Commission, and were not
limited to reimbursement of actual expenditures in
supervision.
- we are in accord with petitioner operators that the
Commission was in error in collecting the fees in
question on die basis of the original cost of their
property and equipment without due allowance for
depreciation.
Decision judgment MODIED in the sense that the
supervision fees payable under Republic Act No. 3792
should be computed upon present values of properly and
equipment in use; the appealed resolution of the Public
Serviice Commission is AFFIRMED
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT
DESICCATORS V PHILIPPINE COCONUT
AUTHORITY
MENDOZA; February 10, 1998
FACTS
- Nov. 5, 1992 APCD brought suit to enjoin PCA from
issuing permits to applicants for the establishment of
new desiccated coconut processing plants— issuance
would violate PCA’s Admin. Order No.02 series of 1991
as applicants were seeking to operate in congested
areas
- Nov.6 trial court issued TRO enjoining PCA from
ussiung licenses
- Pending the case, PCA issued on March 24, 1993
Resolution No.018-93 providing for the withdrawal of the
PCA from all regulation of coconut product processing
industry; registration would be limited to the monitoring
of their volumes of production and admin of quality
standards
- PCA then issued certificates of registration to those
wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants
ISSUE
- Whether or not the PCA can renounce the power to
regulate implicit in the law creating it for that is what the
resolution in question actually is.
HELD
- The power given to the PCA “to formulate and adopt a
general program of dev’t for the coconut and other
palms oil industry” is not a roving commission to adopt
any program deemed necessary to promote the dev’t of
the coconut and other palm oils industry, but one to be
exercised in the context of the regulatory structure.
Reasoning
- PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30, 1973
to take over the powers and functions of the Coconut
Coordinating Council, the Phil. Coco Admin, and the Phil.
Coco Research Institute
- By PD1468 on June 11, 1978, it was made an
independent public corp...charged with carrying out
State’s policy to promote the rapid integrated dev’t and
growth of the coco and other palm oil industry and to
ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants
and beneficiaries through a regulatory scheme set up by
law
- Aug.28, 1982 by EO826 gov’t temporarily prohibited
the opening of new coco processing plants and on Dec.6
phased out some of the existing ones--- because of
overproduction in the industry resulting, ultimately, in
the decline of the export performance of coco-based
products
- Oct.23, 1987 PCA adopted Resolution No.058-87
authorizing establishment and operation of additional
DCN plants because of increased demand in world
market
- The above measures were adopted within the
framework of regulation as established by law “to
promote rapid integrated dev’t and growth of coco and
other palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco
farmers become direct participants and beneficiaries
- the questioned resolution allows not only indiscriminate
opening of new plants, but the virtual dismantling of the
regulatory infrastructure
- PD1468 Art.II Revised Coco Code—the role of the PCA is
to “formulate and adopt a general program of dev’t for
the coco and other palm oil industry in all its aspects”
o By limiting the purpose of reg. to merely monitoring
volumes of production and admin. Of quality
standards, PCA in effect abdicates its role and
leaves it almost completely to market forces how
the industry will develop
- Constitution Art.XII
o Sec.6 ...duty of the State to promote distributive
justice and to intervene when the common good so
demands
o Sec.19 State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies
when public interest so requires
o Any change in policy must be made by the
legislative dept of the gov’t. The regulatory system
has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an
administrative agency to dismantle it.
Decision Petition GRANTED; resolution NULL and VOID
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO [dissent]
- The resolution deregulating the coco industry is a valid
exercise of delegated legislation. Such resolution is in
harmony with the objectives sough to be achieved by
the laws regarding the coco industry, particularly “to
promote accelerated growth and dev’t of the coco
industry” and “the rapid integrated dev’t and growth of
the coconut industry”
- The time has come for admin policies and regulations
to adapt to ever-changing business needs rather than to
accommodate traditional acts of the legislature
- Trimming down an admin agency’s functions of
registration is not an abdication of the power to regulate
but is regulation itself
SANTIAGO V GUINGONA
PANGANIBAN; November 18, 1998
FACTS
- On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines
convened for the first regular session of the eleventh
Congress. Elections for the officers of the Senate were
held on the same day with Fernan and Tatad nominated
to the position of Senate President. Fernan was declared
the duly elected President of the Senate. The following
were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro
tempore, and Sen. Drilon as majority leader.
- Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming the
position of minority leader, with the agreement of
Senator Santiago. He explained that those who had
voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while
only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the "minority."
- On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body
that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By
virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized
Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
- On July 31, 1998, Senators Santiago and Tatad
instituted an original petition for quo warranto to seek
the ouster of Senator Guingona as minority leader of the
Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the
rightful minority leader. They allege that Senator
Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to
Senator Tatad.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court have jurisdiction over the petition
2. WON there is an actual violation of the Constitution
3. WON Guingona is usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader
4. WON Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Guingona as the minority leader
HELD
1. Yes, the court has jurisdiction. It is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether
indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or gravely abuse their discretion in
exercise of their functions and prerogatives
- The petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection
of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the
Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part
of respondents.
- Avelino v. Cuenco tackled the scope of the Court's
power of judicial review; that is, questions involving an
interpretation or application of a provision of the
Constitution or the law, including the rules of either
house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction
of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative
or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever
the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies or
previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit
in defining the scope of judicial power. The present
Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial
prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
- "Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
2. No, there was no actual violation of the Constitution.
- While the Constitution mandates that the President of
the Senate must be elected by a number constituting
more than one half of all the members thereof, it does
not provide that the members who will not vote for him
shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who could
thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
- While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the
other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that "each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary." The method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred
by the constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this
Court.
- Congress verily has the power and prerogative to
provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is
certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to
prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this
prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound
to protect and uphold - the very duty that justifies the
Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming
regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal
workings of the Senate.
3. No, Respondent Guingona was not usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader.
- Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary
assumption and exercise of power by one without color
of title or who is not entitled by law. In order for a quo
warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing
must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the
office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent. In this case, petitioners did not present
sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to
the office of the Senate minority leader.
4. No, Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse
of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader.
- By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.
- Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion
as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona
as the minority leader.The latter belongs to one of the
minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP.
By unanimous resolution of the members of this party
that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as
such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition
by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two
Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
- Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate
President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no
provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules
of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been
violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority.
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE
COALITION V LIM
CARPIO-MORALES; October 24, 2003
FACTS
- Petitioners: John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition,
Mateo Carino Foundation Inc., Center for Alternative
Systems Foundation, Inc., Regina Victoria Benafin
represented and joined by her mother Elisa Benafin,
Izabel Luyk represented and joined by her mother
Rebecca Luyk, Katherine Pe represented and joined by
her mother Rosemarie Pe, Soledad Camilo, Alicia Pacalso
alias “Kevab,” Betty Strasser, Ruby Giron, Ursula Perez
alias “Ba-yay,” Edilberto Claravall, Carmen Caromina,
Lilia Yaranon, Diane Mondoc
- Respondents: Victor Lim, President Bases Conversion
and Development Authority; John Hay Poro Point
Development Corporation, City of Baguio, TUNTEX,
ASIAWORLD, DENR
- Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory
relief with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of injunction assailing the constitutionality of
Presidential Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994,
“Creating and Designating a Portion of the Area Covered
by the Former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special
Economic Zone Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227”
- RA 7227: An Act Accelerating the Conversion of
Military Reservations into other Productive Uses,
Creating the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds therefor and
for Other Purposes OR “Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992”
> setting out policy to accelerate sound and balanced
conversion into alternative productive uses of former
military bases under the 1947 Philippine-United States
of America Military Bases Agreement, namely Clark
and Subic military reservations including extension
Camp John Hay Station in Baguio
> created Bases Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA), Subic Special Economic (and free
port) Zone (Sebuc SEZ)
> granted Subic SEZ incentives such tax and duty-free
importations, exemption of businesses from local and
national taxes
> gave authority to the President to create through
executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of
the local government units directly affected, other
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Clark (Pampanga),
Wallace Air Station (La Union), and Camp John Hay
(Baguio)
- Aug 16, 1993 – BCDA entered MoA and Escrow
Agreement with TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD, private
corporations under laws of British Virgin Islands, in
preparing for a joint venture for development of Poro
Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as a premier
tourist destinations and recreation centers
- Dec 16, 1993 – BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD
executed a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) binding
themselves to put up a joint venture company called
Baguio International Development and
Management Corporation leasing areas within Camp
John Hay and Poro Point for tourism and recreation
Sangguaniang Panglungsod of Baguio City’s
Resolutions to BCDA
> Sept 29, 1993 –to exclude all the barangays partly
and totally located within Camp John Hay from the
reach and coverage of any plan or program for
development
> Jan 19, 1994 – abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its
ownership over homelots being occupied by residents
of 9 barangays surrounding CJH
> Feb 21, 1994 – 15-point concept of the
development of CJH which includes protection of the
environment, making of a family-oriented tourist
destination, priority in employment of Baguio
residents, free access to base area, guaranteed
participation of the city government in the
management and operation of the camp, exclusion of
the previously mentioned 9 bgys, liability for local
taxes of businesses
BCDA-TUNTEX-ASIAWORLD response
> modified the proposal stressing the need to declare
CJH a SEZ as a condition to its full development
according to RA 7227
- May 11, 1994 – sanggunian passed resolution asking
mayor to order determination of realty taxes which may
be collected from real properties of CJH checking if CJH
real properties exempt from taxes and economic activity
from local and national taxes
- June 1994 – sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255
(Series of 1994) seeking and supporting subject to its
concurrence, the issuance of Pres. Ramos of presidential
proclamation declaring area of 288.1 hectares of the
camp as a SEZ in accordance to RA 7227
- July 5, 1994 – Ramos issued Proc No. 420 establishing
a SEZ on Camp John Hay which reads
Pursuant to powers vested in me by the law and the
resolution of concurrence by the City Council of
Baguio… create and designate… former Camp John
Hay… as John Hay Special Economic Zone
Sec 1. Coverage of John Hay SEZ: 288.1 hectares out
of 677 hectares surveyed and verified by DENR
Sec 2. Governing Body: pursuant to Sec 15 of RA
7227, the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA) is established to govern JHSEZ,
authorized to determine utilization and disposition of
lands subject to private rights and in consultation and
coordination with the City Government of Baguio after
consultation with its inhabitants, and to promulgate
necessary policies, rules, and regulations to govern
and regulate the zone thru the John Hay Poro Point
Development Corporation (JHPPDC), the implementing
arm for its economic development and optimum
utilization
Sec 3. Investment Climate in JHSEZ: pursuant to Sec
5(m) and Section 15 of RA 7227, the JH Poro Point
Development Corporation shall implement necessary
policies, rules and regulations governing the zone,
including investment incentives, in consultation with
pertinent government departments. The zone shall
have all the applicable incentives of the SEZ under
Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives
granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus
Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act
of 1991, and new investment laws that will be
enacted.
Sec 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices,
Agencies and Instrumentalities: All heads of
departments, etc of the government are directed to
give full support to BCDA and/or implementing
subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate necessary
approvals to expedite programs.
Sec 5. Local Authority: The affected local government
units shall retain basic autonomy and identity.
- April 25, 1995 – petition for prohibition, mandamus
and declaratory relief challenging Proc. No. 420’s
constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of MoA
and JVA between BCDA and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD
- Petitioner’s Allege:
1. Proc. No. 420 grants tax exemptions is invalid and
illegal as it is an unconstitutional exercise by the
President of a power granted only to the Legislature
2. Proc. No. 420 limits the powers and interferes with
the autonomy of the City of Baguio is invalid, illegal
and unconstitutional
3. Proc. No. 420 is unconstitutional that it violates the
rule that all taxes should be uniform and equitable
4. MoA having been entered into only by direct
negotiation is illegal
5. terms and conditions of the MoA is illegal
6. the conceptual development plan of respondents
not having undergone environmental impact
assessment is being illegally considered without a
valid environmental impact assessment
- a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction prayed to
enjoin BCDA, JHPPDC and the city government from
implementing Proc. No. 420 and TUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD from proceeding with their plan
respecting CJH’s development pursuant to the JVA
- Public respondents (BCDA, JHPPDC, City of
Baguio) Allege
1. issues are moot and academic because in
November 21, 1995 BCDA formally notified TUNTEX
and ASIAWORLD of the revocation of the MoA and JVA
2. in maintaining the validity of Proc. No. 420,
extending to the JHSEZ economic incentives to those
enjoyed by Subic SEZ (established in RA 7227), the
proclamation merely implements the legislative intent
of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of
business activity or investment
3. denying Proc. No. 420 derogates the local
autonomy of Baguio City or violative of the equal
protection clause
4. petitioners have no standing to being suit even as
taxpayers in the absence of an actual controversy
5. disregarded hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies
- Petitioners Reply
1. doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply since they are invoking the exclusive
authority of SC under Section 21 of RA 7227 to enjoin
or restrain implementation of projects for conversion
of the base areas
2. they possess standing to bring petition as
taxpayers
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON petitioners violated doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies
2. WON issues regarding TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD is
moot and academic
3. WON present petition complies with the requirements
of SC’s exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issues
Substantive
4. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional by providing for
national and local tax exemption within and granting
other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ
5. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or
interfering with local autonomy of Baguio City
HELD
1. Although judicial policy of SC entails not entertaining
declaratory relief or direct resort to it except when the
redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts,
or when exceptional and compelling circumstances
warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of SC’s primary jurisdiction, under Sec 21 of
RA 7227, only SC has the power to enjoin
implementation of projects for the development of
the former US military reservations therefore SC will
take cognizance of this petition.
Reasoning
- Also SC retains full discretionary power to take
cognizance of such petition. Besides, remanding this
case to the lower courts may unduly prolong
adjudication of the issues
- transformation of an area in CJH into a SEZ is not a
simple re-classification of an area TF a crucial issue.
Conversion involves
> focal point for investments by local and foreign
entities
> site for vigorous business activity spurring country’s
economic growth
> like Sub SEZ, turning into self-sustaining, industrial,
commercial, financial and investment center
> critical links to a host of environmental and social
concerns affecting communities are located and
nation in general
> challenges in providing an ecologically sustainable,
environmentally sound, equitable transition for city in
CJH reversion to government property e.g. problem of
scarcity of water supply in Baguio City
2. Revocation of the agreements with private
respondents made issues regarding them as moot and
academic.
3. Yes, present petition complies with requirements for
judicial review.
Reasoning
- Requisites of exercise of power of judicial review
1. existence of an actual or an appropriate case
> not conjectural or anticipatory; definite and
concrete; parties pitted against each other due to
their adverse legal interests
> in present case, there is a real clash of interests
and rights between petitioners and respondents
arising from issuance of Proc. No. 420 converting
a portion of CJH into a SEZ where petitioners insist
Proc. No. 420 has unconstitutional provisions and
the respondents claiming otherwise
> Pimentel, Jr. v Aguirre: By the mere enactment
of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged act, the dispute is deemed to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without
an overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of
the Constitution and/or law is enough to awaken
judicial duty
2. personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question
> RA 7227 requires concurrence of the affected
local government units to the creation of SEZs
and this grant by law on LGUs of the right to
concurrence is equivalent to vesting a legal
standing on LGUs (recognition of real interests of
communities in the utilization of such base areas)
> as INHABITANTS OF BAGUIO, assailing Proc No.
420, is personal and substantial that they have
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the government act being challenged; material
interest for what is at stake in the enforcement of
Proc. No. 420 is the very economic and social
existence of the people of Baguio City
> Garcia v Board of Investments: residents of
Limay, Bataan where SC characterized their
interest in the establishment of a petrochemical
plant in their place as actual, real, vital and legal
for it would affect not only their economic life but
even the air they breathe
> Petitioners Edilberto Claravall and Lilia Yaranon
were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the
time; duties included deciding for and on behalf of
their constituents on the question of concurrence
to Proc. No. 420; they opposed Res. No. 255 which
supported Proc. No. 420
3. pleaded in the earliest opportunity
4. constitutional question is the lis mota of the
case
- 3 and 4 no question since action filed purposely to
bring forth constitutionality issues
4. Unless limited by a provision in the Constitution, if
there is no express extension of tax exemption and
other economic incentives granted by law, any
presidential proclamation granting such extension
through implication is unconstitutional because it
violates Art VI Sec 28(4) which gives the legislature, not
the executive, the full power to exempt any person or
corporation or class of property from taxation and its
power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax.
Reasoning
- Art VI Sec 28(4): No law granting any tax exemption
shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of
all the members of Congress.
- Sec 3 Proc. No. 420: Investment Climate in JH SEZ: …
the zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the
SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable
incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the
Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991 and new investment laws that
may be hereinafter enacted
> Sec 12 RA 7227: Subic SEZ
(b & c) exemption from tariff or custom duties,
national and local taxes of business entities
(d) free market and trade of specified goods or
properties
(f) liberalized banking and finance
(g) relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors
- deliberations of Senate confirm exclusivity to Subic
SEZ of the tax and investment privileges
(discussing Sec 12 RA 7227)
Angara: … we must confine these policies to Subic
and provide that “THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE
OF SUBIC SHALL BE ESTABLISHED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES”…
it is very clear that these principles and policies
are applicable only to Subic as a free port
… so we agreed that we will simply limit the
definition of pweors and description of the zone to
Subic but that does not exclude the possibility of
creating other economic zones within the
baselands
… the provision now will be confined only to Subic
> RA 7916: The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995
- privilege of export processing zone-based
businesses of importing capital equipment and raw
materials free from taxes, duties and other
restrictions
> Omnibus Investment Code of 1987
- tax and duty exemptions, tax holiday, tax credit,
and other incentives
> RA 7042: Foreign Investments Act of 1991
- applicability to the subject zone of rules governing
foreign investments in the Philippines
- It is clear that under Sec 12 RA 7227 ONLY the SUBIC
SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption,
investment incentives and the like and no express
extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to
be created at the time via presidential proclamation ;
also grant of privileges to JH SEZ finds no support in the
other laws specified under Sec 3 Proc. No. 420 which are
already extant before the issuance of the proclamation
or the enactment of RA 7227
- SC can void an act or policy of the political
departments of the govt on two grounds – infringement
of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion – and
clearly, Proc. No. 420 infringes upon the Constitution
5. NO because when the law merely emphasizes or
reiterates the statutory role or functions is has been
granted.
Reasoning
- under RA 7227, BCDA is entrusted with the following
(a) to own, hold and/or administer the military
reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station,
O’Donnell Transmitter Station… which may be
transferred to it by the President
- such broad rights of ownership and administration
vested in BCDA over CJH, BCDA virtually has control over
it subject to certain limitations of law
Decision Sec 3 of Proc. NO.420 is null and void and
declared no legal force and effect. Proc. No. 420,
without the invalidated portion, remains valid and
effective
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC V
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 12, 2003
FACTS
- June 16, 2000 – NTC, pursuant to its rule-making
and regulatory powers, issued Memorandum
Circular (MC) No. 13-6-2000. It promulgated rules and
regulations on the billing of telecommunications
services:
1. Billing statements shall be received by the service
subscriber (SS) not later than 30 days from the end
of each billing cycle. In case it is received beyond 30
days, SS shall have a grace period within which to
pay the bill. During such period, SS shall not be
disconnected from service by the public
telecommunications entity (PTE).
2. There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted
to a voice mailbox, voice prompt, recorded message
or similar facility excluding the customer’s own
equipment.
3. PTEs shall verify identification and address of each
purchaser of prepaid SIM cards. Prepaid call cards
and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from
the date of first use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards
shall be given 45 days from the date it is fully
consumed but not beyond 2yrs 45 days from date of
first use to replenish SIM card. The validity of an
invalid SIM card shall be installed upon request of
the SS at no addtl charge except the presentation of
a valid prepaid call card.
4. SS shall be updated of the remaining value of their
cards before the start of every call using the cards.
5. The unit of billing for (Cellular Mobile Telephone)
CMT service whether postpaid or prepaid shall be
reduced from 1min/pulse to 6sec/pulse. The
authorized rates per minute shall be divided by 10.
- The MC provided that it shall take effect 15 days
after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and three certified copies furnished at the UP
Law Center.
- June 22, 2000 – MC was published in the Philippine
Star; MC provisions regarding sale and use of prepaid
cards & unit of billing took effect 90 days from effectivity
of MC
- August 30, 2000 – NTC issued a Memorandum to all
CMT service operators (SO) which contained
measures to minimize incidence of stealing of cell
phone units. It directed CMT SO to:
1. Strictly comply with MC requiring the presentation
and verification of the identity and addresses of
prepaid SIM card customers
2. Require all respective prepaid SIM card dealers to
comply with MC
3. Deny acceptance to the networks those customers
using stolen cell phone units or cell phone units
registered to somebody else when properly
informed of all information relative to the stolen cell
phone units
4. Share all necessary info of stolen cell phone units to
all other CMT SO in order to prevent their use
5. Require all existing prepaid SIM card customers to
register and present valid identification cards.
- October 6, 2000 – NTC issued another
Memorandum addressed to all PTEs, which was
“for strict compliance.”
1. All prepaid cards and all SIM packs used by
subscribers of prepaid cards sold on Oct. 7, 2000
and beyond shall be valid for at least 2 years from
date of first use.
2. The billing unit shall be on a 6sec pulse effective
October 7, 2000.
- Procedure
• October 20, 2000 – ISLACOM and PILTEL filed
against the NTC an action for Declaration of
Nullity of MC (the Billing Circular) and of the
Oct. 6 Memorandum, with prayer for injunction and
TRO in the RTC-QC on the grounds that-
a. NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods since such jurisdiction belongs to
the DTI under the Consumer Act of the Phils
b. MC is oppressive and violative of the Due Process
Clause (deprivation of property)
c. MC will result in the impairment of the viability of
prepaid service by unduly prolonging the
expiration of prepaid SIM and call cards
d. Requirements of identification of prepaid card
buyers and call balance announcement are
unreasonable
• GLOBE and SMART filed a joint Motion to Admit
Complaint-in-Intervention
• October 27, 2000 – RTC issued TRO enjoining NTC
from implementing MC
• November 20, 2000 – RTC denied NTC’s motion to
dismiss for lack of merit. Injunction is granted, pending
finality of the decision of the case.
• October 9, 2001 – CA granted NTC’s petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
• January 10, 2002 – Motions for Reconsideration were
denied by CA
ISSUES
1. WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear
this case
2. WON the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies is applicable
HELD
Obiter Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative
or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers.
• Quasi-legislative power is the power to make
rules and regulations, which should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to such administrative agency. The
regulations must be germane to the purposes of the
law, and not in contradiction to the standards
prescribed by law.
• Quasi-judicial power is exercised by an
administrative agency when it performs in a judicial
manner an act which is essentially of an executive
nature, where the power to act in such a manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the administrative duty entrusted to
it.
1. Yes.
Ratio In cases assailing the validity of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency in the
performance of its QUASI-LEGISLATIVE function, the
regular courts have jurisdiction. The power of JUDICIAL
REVIEW is vested in the courts by the Constitution. The
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction is only applicable when
the administrative agency is exercising its QUASI-
JUDICIAL function.
- Art.VIII Sec.1 1987 Consti: Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the gov’t.
- Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: The courts will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior
to the resolution of that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the admin.
tribunal to determine technical matters of fact.
2. No.
Ratio In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a
rule issued by an administrative agency, in exercise of
its QUASI-LEGISLATIVE powers, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. Only
judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies
made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is
subject to the exhaustion doctrine (Assoc. of Phil.
Coconut Desiccators v. PHILCOA).
- Even if the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies is applicable, records show that petitioners
have complied with such requirement:
- During deliberation stages of MC, petitioners registered
their protests and submitted proposed schemes for the
Billing Circular.
- After issuance of MC, petitioners wrote successive
letters asking for the suspension and reconsideration of
the MC.
- Such letters were not acted upon and instead, NTC
issued 10/06/00 Memorandum. This was taken by
petitioners as a clear denial of their requests.
Decision Consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The
decision of CA and its Resolution are reversed. The case
is REMANDED to the RTC-QC for continuation of the
proceedings.
ART VII: EXECUTIVE
GONZALES V MARCOS
FERNANDO; July 31, 1975
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND
IMPERIUM)
MARCOS V MANGLAPUS
CORTES; September 15, 1989
FACTS
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family
filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the
court to order the respondents to issue travel documents
to them and to enjoin the implementation of the
President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners state that the right of the Marcoses to return
to the Philippines is guaranteed under Sections 1 and 6
of the Bill of Rights, arguing that before the right to
travel may be impaired by any authority/agency of the
government, there must be legislation to that effect.
They also invoke generally accepted principles of
international law: (1) Art. 13, par. 2 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that
everyone has the right to leave any country, including
his own, and to return to his own country, and (2) Art.
12, par. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which states that “no one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.” Respondents contend that the issue of whether
the two rights claimed by the Marcoses collide with the
more primordial and transcendental right of the state to
security and safety of its nationals involves a political
question and is non-justiciable. In support thereof, they
cite Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution. They also point
out that the decision to bar Marcos and family from
returning to the Philippines for reasons of national
security and public safety has international precedents.
ISSUES
1. WON the President has the power under the
Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
2. WON the President acted arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.
HELD
1. Yes. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of “executive power.”
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to
be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more
than the sum of the specific powers so enumerated.
- The request/demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to
return to the Philippines cannot be considered in light
solely of the constitutional provision guaranteeing liberty
of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the
present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare.
2. No. The President did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously and whimsically in determining that the
return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the
national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return. The documented history of the efforts of the
Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
and the precarious state of the economy were the
factual bases for the President to conclude that the
return of the Marcoses during that time would only
exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against
the State and instigate more chaos. The State, acting
through the Government, is not precluded from taking
preemptive action against threats to its existence if,
though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to
become serious and direct. The preservation of the State
– the fruition of the people’s sovereignty – is an
obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to
preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the
faithful execution of the laws, cannot shirk from that
responsibility.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNAN [concur]
History and time-honored principles of constitutional law
have conceded to the Executive Branch certain powers
in times of crisis or grave and imperative national
emergency. Many terms are applied to these powers:
“residual,” “inherent,” “moral,” “implied,” “aggregate,”
“emergency.” Whatever they may be called, the fact is
that these powers exist, as they must if the governance
function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out
effectively and efficiently.
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon
lawful order of the court, not of an executive officer, not
even the President. I do not think that we should
differentiate the right to return home from the right to
go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. If at all,
the right to come home must be more preferred than
any other aspect of the right to travel.
CRUZ [dissent]
Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and liberty
of abode that Aquino then invoked.
PARAS [dissent]
The former President, as a Filipino citizen, has the right
to return to his own country, except only if prevented by
the demands of national safety and national security.
PADILLA [dissent]
With or without restricting legislation, the right to travel
may be impaired or restricted in the interest of national
security, public safety, and public health. Power of the
state to restrict the right to travel finds abundant
support in police power. The government failed to
present convincing evidence to defeat Marcos’ right to
return to this country.
SARMIENTO [dissent]
The right to return to one’s own country cannot be
distinguished from the right to travel and freedom of
abode. While the President may exercise powers not
expressly granted by the Constitution but may
necessarily implied therefrom, the latter must yield to
the paramountcy of the Bill of Rights. Under the new
Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only
within the limits provided by law. The President has been
divested of the implied power to impair the right to
travel. The determination of whether the Marcos’ return
poses a threat to national security should not be left
solely to the Chief Executive; the Court itself must be
satisfied that the threat is not only clear but also
present.
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
PUNO;
(SEE DIGEST UNDER REMAKING THE
CONSTITUTION)
VILLENA V SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
LAUREL; April 21, 1939
FACTS
- Jose D. Villena, then Mayor of Makati, sought to restrain
the Secretary of the Interior (SI) and his agents from
proceeding with the investigation against him until this
case was settled by the SC.
- Upon the request of the SI, the Division of Investigation
of the Department of Justice conducted an inquiry into
the conduct of Villena. He was found to have committed
bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and
unauthorized practice of the law profession.
- Feb. 8, 1939 ~ SI recommended to the President that
Villena be suspended so as to prevent the coercion of
witnesses. The President verbally granted the
recommendation on the same day.
- Feb. 9,1939~ SI suspended Villena from office and
instructed the Provincial Governor of Rizal to advise
Villena of his suspension.
- Feb. 13,1939~SI wrote Villena specifying the charges
against him and notifying him that Emiliano Anonas was
the special investigator of the case.
- Feb. 17, 1939~ the date set by Anonas when the
formal investigation would begin. But eventually
postponed to March 28,1939 due to several incidents
and postponements.
- Hence, this petition for Prelim Injunction. Villena
contends that:
> SI has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend him, to
file administrative charges against him, and to decide
the merits of the charges because the power to
suspend, to try and punish municipal elective officials
is lodged in some other agencies of the government.
> SI’s acts are null and void because:
+ SI usurped the power given by the Constitution to
the President when SI suspended him (Villena).
+ SI must exercise the power to supervise in
accordance with the provisions of law and the
provisions of law governing the trials and charges of
against elective municipal officials are those
contained in sec. 2188 of the Administrative Code
as amended.
+ SI is exercising an arbitrary power by converting
himself into a complainant and at the same time the
judge of the charges he filed against him.
+ SI’s action didn’t follow the procedure under Sec.
2188 of the AC, which requires that a complaint be
based on a private person’s or citizen’s sworn
statement.
- Villena prays that a writ of Preliminary Injunction be
issued to stop the SI and his agents from proceeding
further with the investigation until this case is heard;
that SI be declared as without authority to suspend him
and order his reinstatement in office; that SI be declared
as without authority to file charges against him and to
investigate such charges.
- His petition for the writ of preliminary injunction was
denied.
- The Solicitor General contends that:
> Sec. 79 (C) in relation with sec. 86 of the Revised AC
expressly empowers the SI to “order the investigation
of any act or conduct of any person in the service of
any bureau or office under his department” and in
connection therewith to “designate an official or
person who shall conduct such investigation.”
> Sec. 2188 of the Revised AC, invoked by Villena,
doesn’t preclude SI from exercising the powers stated
in Sec. 79 in connection to Sec. 86. Also, that invoked
section, must be read in relation to sec. 37 of the
Reorganization Law of 1932.
> Villena didn’t question the jurisdiction of the SI at
the start of the investigation but merely contended
that such charges were not in accordance with law for
the reason that they didn’t bear the oaths of the
complaints.
> The authority of a department head to order the
investigation of a subordinate necessarily carries with
it by implication the authority to take such measures
as he may deem necessary to accomplish the purpose
of the investigation, including suspending the officer;
plus, the President authorized the suspension.
> Courts of Equity have no power to restrain public
officials by injunction from performing any official act,
which they are required by law to perform, or acts,
which are not in excess of the authority, and discretion
reposed in them.
ISSUES
1. WON the SI has the legal authority to order an
investigation, by a special investigator appointed by him,
of the charges of corruption and irregularity against
Villena.
2. WON the SI has the legal authority to suspend Villena
pending the investigation of the charges.
HELD
1. The SI is invested with authority to order the
investigation of the charges against the petitioner,
Villena, and to appoint a special investigator for that
purpose.
- Sec. 79 of the Revised AC speaks of direct control,
direction and supervision over bureaus and offices under
the jurisdiction of the SI but it should be interpreted in
relation to sec. 86 of the same Code which grants to the
Dept of Interior “executive supervision over the
administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered
cities and other local political subdivisions.”
- Citing Planas v. Gil: “ Supervision is not a meaningless
thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without
limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into
facts and conditions in order to render the power real
and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and
rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be
founded upon knowledge of actual facts and conditions
disclosed after careful study and investigation.”
2. There is no clear and express grant of power to the
secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is
under investigation.
- NOTE: There was an argument regarding the verbal
approval or acquiescence of the President to the
suspension. It was said that if the justices were to accept
that the President had the authority to suspend the
petitioner, then the suspension made by the SI, since the
President approved it, should be sustained. Then this
was followed by the discussion regarding certain acts of
the President that could not be validated by subsequent
approval or ratification. There are certain constitutional
powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive that
should be exercised in person (i.e. suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus and proclamation of martial law and
the exercise of pardon.) But there were doubts regarding
the verbal approval by the President of the suspension if
such could be considered as ratification in law (with law
giving the power to suspend being the Chief Exec.)
Hence, the ratio.
Ratio “xxx…under the presidential type of government
which we have adopted and considering the
departmental organization established and continued in
force by par. 1, sec. 12, Art.VII of our (1935)
Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or the law to act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive.”
Obiter With reference to the Executive Dept of the
Gov’t, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is
readily visible without the projection of judicial
searchlight, and that it is, the establishment of a single,
not plural, Executive.
- The First Section of Article VII of the Constitution,
dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the
enunciation of the principle that “The executive power
shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.”
- Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the
various departments, their personality is reality but the
projection of that of the President.
- Citing Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. US~ “each head of
a department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego
in the matters of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority.”
- As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted
departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is
by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of
valid legislation in the particular field.
- The President should be answerable for the acts of
administration of the entire Executive Department
before his own conscience
Note Read this case in relation to Sec. 1 and 17 of Art.
7 of the 1987 Constitution.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS V MABALOT
BUENA; February 27, 2002
FACTS
- On February 19, 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B.
Garcia, Jr. issued Memorandum Order No. 96-735
addressed to Land Transportation Franchising
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin
directing him to “effect the transfer of regional functions
of that office to the DOTC-CAR Regional Office…”
- On March 13, 1996, Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order against DOTC
Secretary and LTFRB chair, praying among others that
Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared “illegal and
without effect.”
- On March 20, the lower court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining DOTC Secretary from
implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735. The
lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on
April 8, 1996.
- On January 29, 1997, then DOTC Secretary Amado
Lagdameo issued Department Order No. 97-1025
establishing the DOTC-CAR Regional Office “as the
Regional Office of the LTFRB-CAR and shall exercise the
regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR…”
- On March 31, 1999, the lower court rendered a decision
declaring Memorandum Order Nos. 96-735 and 97-1025
“null and void and without any legal effect as being
violative of the provision of the Constitution against
encroachment on the powers of the legislative
department and also of the provision enjoining
appointive officials from holding any other office or
employment in the Government.”
ISSUE
WON the assailed memorandum orders establishing the direct supervision and control of the LTFRB Central
DOTC Regional Office as an LTFRB Regional Office is Office, pending the creation of a regular LTFRB Regional
unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of Office.
legislative power.
BENGUET EXPLORATION V DEPARTMENT
HELD
- The President may, through his/her duly constituted OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
political agent and alter ego, legally and validly decree RESOURCES
the reorganization of the National Government in FERNANDO; February 28, 1977
exercise of authority granted by law.
- A public office may be created through any of the
FACTS
following modes: (1) by the Constitution (fundamental
- Sofia Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse
law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or
claim against a domestic Mining corporation’s (Benguet
(3) by authority of law. The creation and establishment
Exploration, Inc.) Lode Lease Agreement covering three
of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the
mining claims in Benguet, Mountain Province.
third mode.
- Bureau of Mines dismissed the adverse claim
- The President, through Administrative Order No. 36
- Reyes appealed to the Department of Agriculture and
directed the various departments and agencies of
Natural Resource maintaining the sufficiency of her
government to immediately undertake the creation and
establishment of their regional offices in CAR.
adverse claim
- At first the Department dismissed the appeal but on a
- It is as if the President himself carried out the creation
second motion for reconsideration and ordered a formal
and establishment of the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office,
hearing of the case
when in fact, the DOTC Secretary directly and merely
- Benguet Exploration, Inc. filed petition for review
sought to implement the Chief Executive’s
Administrative Order.
ISSUES
- The President’s control over all executive departments
1. WON the decision rendered by the Director of Lands
come from Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
approved by the Secretary, upon a question of fact, is
Constitution, while the continuing authority to reorganize
justiciable
the national government is vested by Presidential
2. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No.
Resources can be precluded from conducting his own
1416 (as ruled in Larin Vs. Executive Secretary).
inquiry
- Villena vs Secretary of the Interior: “without minimizing
3. WON Secretary Pascual, in calling for a hearing, failed
the importance of the heads of various departments,
to abide by the requirements of the law
their personality is in reality but the projection of that of
the President.” Thus, their acts, “performed and
HELD
promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
1. A decision rendered by the Director of Lands and
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and commerce,
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to
Executive.”
be reviewed by the courts unless there is a showing that
- The designation and subsequent establishment of
such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud,
DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of the LTFRB in CAR
imposition or mistake, other than error of judgment in
and the concomitant exercise and performance of
estimating the value or effect of evidence, regardless of
functions by the former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional
whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of
Office fall within the scope of the continuing authority of
evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon which
the President to effectively reorganize the DOTC (and
the finding in question could be made
other departments).
Reasoning
- In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid
Acts of a department head, performed and promulgated
provided it is pursued in good faith. A reorganization is
in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved
carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumably the
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. The
acts of the Chief Executive
reorganization in this case was decreed “in the interest
2. The State acting through the legislature through its
of service” and “for purposes of economy and more
power of imperium acting as a sovereign regulating
effective coordination of the DOTC functions in CAR.”
property to come up with rules with which to exercise its
- The assailed orders are also not in violation of Sections
power of dominium as owner of the property cannot act
7 and 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution since the
arbitrarily but in accordance with law
organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR are, in effect, merely
Reasoning
designated to perform the additional duties and
functions of an LTFRB Regional Office subject to the
Indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not
a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to
how such title has been acquired
3. The Mining Act speaks of findings of facts of the
Director of Mines “when affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources being final and
conclusive,” in which case the aggrieved party may file a
petition for review with this Court where only questions
of law may be raised
Reasoning No such affirmance by the secretary that’s
why he ordered a hearing. It is but a right and proper in
the interest of justice that a formal hearing on the merits
of this case be conducted
Decision: petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Unanimous
LANSANG V GARCIA
CONCEPCION; December 11, 1971
FACTS:
- 8 consolidated petitions of writ of habeas corpus.
Other petitions:
L-33965 Arienda vs Sec of National Defense
L-33973 David vs Garcia
L-33982 Prudente v Yan, Garcia
L-34004 Tomas vs Garcia
L-34013 Rimando vs Garcia
L-34039 De Castro vs Rabago
L-34265 Oreta vs Garcia
L-34339 Olivar vs Garcia
- August 21, 1971 – Plaza Miranda bombing. 8 persons
died, several injured
- August 23, 1971- President Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 889 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, by virtue of the powers vested upon the
President by ART VII Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution.
His reason was that “lawless elements have created a
state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety
and the security of the State…” and that “public safety
requires immediate and effective action”
- Several people were apprehended and detained
including the petitioners on “reasonable belief” that they
had “participated in the crime of insurrection or
rebellion.”
- August 30, 1971 – Proclamation 889-A amended
Proclamation 889.
- September 18 and 25, October 4, 1971 --
Proclamations 889-B, 889-C and 889-D lifted the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in some provinces, sub-provinces, cities, EXCEPT in
Bataan, Benguet, Bulacan, Camarines Sur, Ifugao,
Isabela, Laguna, Lanao, North and South Cotabato,
Nueva Ecija, Nueva Viscaya, Pampanga, Quezon, Rizal,
Tarlac, Zambales, Aurora, Quirino, and 18 cities
including Manila.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court had authority to and should inquire
into the existence of the factual bases required by the
Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the
writ
2. WON the Proclamation was valid/ constitutional. WON
it complied with ART III Section 1 par 1434 and ART VII
Section 10 par 235 of the Constitution?
3. WON the President act arbitrarily in issuing PN 889
4. WON the Petitioners are covered by PN 889. WON
petitioners detained should be released
HELD
1. YES. Upon deliberation, the Court abandoned the
doctrine in Barcelon v Baker and Montenegro v
Castañeda (determination by the President of existence
of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus should be
conclusive upon the courts. The President, with all the
intelligence sources was in a better position than the SC
to ascertain the real state of peace and order). The grant
of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute no
unqualified. The authority to suspend the privilege of the
writ is circumcised, confined, restricted (more so
because it is stated in the negative – “shall not be…
except”), and like the limitations and restrictions
imposed upon the legislative department, adherence
thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper
bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice.
- The Executive is vested with the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ, and the Executive is supreme within
its own sphere, however, the separation of powers goes
hand in hand with the system of checks and balances.
The authority to determine whether or not the Executive
acted within the sphere allotted to him is vested in the
Judiciary.
2. YES.
a. Proclamation 889, as amended by Proclamation 889-
A, declared the existence of an uprising -- “lawless
elements xxx joined and banded their forces together for
the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and
are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and
rebellion xxx”
b. The 2 conditions for a valid suspension a) there must
be ‘invasion, insurrection, or rebellion’ or ‘imminent
danger thereof’ and b) ‘public safety must require the
aforementioned suspension’ are PRESENT.
c. The 1st condition can be attested through
jurisprudence (there were a lot of cases already –
34
“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except
in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, in any way of which events the same may be suspended
wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.”
35
“The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, he may
suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law.”
HUKBALAHAP, etc). The emergence and establishment of
CPP NPA is proof of the existence of a rebellion.
d. The 2nd condition is justified through the reports of the
acts of the NPA (its infiltration of several mass-based
organizations, various killings and bombings, encounters
with the military, etc) and the threat it poses to the
public safety. According to intelligence reports, the CPP
and its front organizations are capable of preparing
powerful explosive, and that there was a plan of a series
of assassinations, kidnappings, mass destruction of
property, etc.
3. NO. The President did not act arbitrarily. He had
possession of intelligence reports, he consulted his
advisers, and had reason to feel that the situation was
critical. The suspension of the privilege of the writ in the
entire Philippines was justified as he could not have
ascertained the places to be excluded at the time of the
proclamation, and he gradually lifted the suspension.
4. Some petitioners were already released and with
respect to them, the issue is moot and academic. As to
petitioners David, Felipe, Olivar, de los Reyes, del
Rosario and Sison, still under detention, they have been
charged with violation of the Anti-Subversion Act/
accused of overt acts covered by the PN 889. The PN
889 being valid, their release may not be ordered by the
SC, but the CFI is directed to act with utmost dispatch in
conducting the preliminary investigation of the charges
and to issue corresponding warrants of arrest if probable
cause is found or otherwise , to order their release.
Decision President did not act arbitrarily. PN 889 not
unconstitutional. Petitions L33964, L33965, L33982,
L34004, L34013, L34039, L34265 dismissed. CFI to
conduct investigation and issue warrants of arrest or
order of release as to petitioners still under detention.
All concur. Fernando dissents only as to the fourth issue.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [dissent]
- I find it difficult to accept the conclusion that the six
petitioners still under detention should be set free.
- The petitioners ought not to be further deprived of their
liberty in the absence of a warrant of arrest for whatever
offense they may be held to answer, to be issued by a
judge after a finding of probable cause. That is to comply
with the constitutional requirement against
unreasonable search and seizure.
- To keep them in confinement after ordinary processes
of the law are to be availed of is to ignore the safeguard
of the Bill of Rights that no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
AQUINO V PONCE ENRILE
MAKALINTAL; September 17, 1974
FACTS
- September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
signed Proclamation No. 1081, proclaiming a state of
Martial Law in the Philippines
- September 22, 1972, General Order No. 2 was signed
by the President which provided an order to the
Secretary of National Defense to arrest and take into
custody the individuals named in the list for being
participants in the conspiracy to seize political and state
power in the country and to take over the government
by force
- Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile,
immediately effected the arrest of the herein petitioners
- Petitioners sought relief from Court, filing petitions for
habeas corpus
- Respondents filed their “Return to Writ and Answer to
the Petition” and prayed that the petition be dismissed
- Pending resolution of these Petitions, petitioners,
except for two (Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Sen. Jose
Diokno), were released from custody on different dates
under a “Conditional Release”
- December 28, 1973, Diokno filed a Motion to Withdraw
Petition, imputing delay in the disposition of his case,
and asseverating that because of the decision of the
Court in the Ratification Cases and the action of the
Members of the Court in taking an oath to support the
New Constitution, he cannot “reasonably expect to get
justice in this case”
- The respondents opposed the motion on the grounds
that there is a public interest in the decision of these
cases and that the reasons given for the motion to
withdraw are untrue, unfair and contemptuous.
- The Court denied Diokno’s motion with a vote of 5 to 7
- Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee,
Muňoz-Palma, Aquino and Barredo voted to grant
Diokno’s motion to withdraw petition
ISSUES
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the
constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial
law
2. WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the
circumstances required by the Constitution for the
proclamation of a state of martial law
3. WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them
the relief of habeas corpus
HELD
All petitions dismissed except those which have been
previously withdrawn by the respective petitioners with
the approval of this Court.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and
Aquino, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., in a separate opinion, explains his reasons
for his concurrence in the dismissal of all the petitions.
Fernando, J., concurs and dissents in a separate
opinion.
Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., concurs in the dismissals in a separate
opinion.
Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the
constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of
martial law (justiciability of the martial law
proclamation)
CASTRO [justiciable]
- cited Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court asserted the
power to inquire into the “existence of the factual bases
for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in order to determine the sufficiency thereof.”
- The judicial department can determine the existence of
conditions for the exercise of the President’s powers and
is not bound by the recitals of his proclamation. But
whether in the circumstances obtaining public safety
requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law is
initially for the President to decide. The President’s
findings as to necessity is persuasive upon the courts.
FERNANDO [justiciable]
- The action taken by any or both the political branches
whether in the form of a legislative act or an executive
order could be tested in court. Where private rights are
affected, the judiciary has the duty to look into its
validity. A showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government may not be and obstacle to
judicial inquiry. Its improvident exercise or the abuse
thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy.
Necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the
courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches
have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law.
The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
- The range of permissible inquiry to be conducted by
the Court is necessarily limited to the ascertainment of
whether or not such a suspension, in the light of the
credible information furnished by the President, was
arbitrary. The question before the judiciary is not the
correctness but the reasonableness of the action taken.
- Referred to Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court
sustained the presidential proclamation suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as there was no
showing of arbitrariness in the exercise of a prerogative
belonging to the executive, the judiciary merely acting
as a check on the exercise of such authority. Chief
Justice Concepcion in his opinion: In the exercise of such
authority, the function of the Court is merely to check,
not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely
whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of
his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him
or the determine the wisdom of his act.
TEEHANKEE [justiciable]
"it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said
factual bases [stated in the proclamation suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or placing the
country under martial law as the case may be, since the
requirements for the exercise of these powers are the
same and are provided in the very same clause] in order
to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof."32
The Court stressed therein that "indeed, the grant of
power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor
unqualified. The authority conferred upon by the
Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the
Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The
precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as
well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates
the former in the negative, evidently to stress its
importance, by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended x x x.' It is only
by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the
privilege 'in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion'-
or under Art. VII of the Constitution, 'imminent danger
thereof-'when the public safety requires it, in any of
which events the same may be suspended wherever
during such period the necessity for such suspension
shall exist.' Far from being full and plenary, the authority
to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus
circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the
prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its
existence, but also, as regards the time when and the
place where it may be exercised. These factors and the
aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and
define the extent, the confines and the limits of said
power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the
limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental
Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto
and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be
inquired into by the courts of justice. Otherwise, the
explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be
meaningless. Surely, the frames of our Constitution
could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful
exercise in futility."
BARREDO [qualified vote: justiciable]
- The inquiry which the Constitution contemplates for the
determination of the constitutional sufficiency of a
proclamation of martial law by the President should not
go beyond facts of judicial notice and those that may be
stated in the proclamation,, if these are by their very
nature capable of unquestionable demonstration.
- While a declaration of martial law is not absolutely
conclusive, the Court’s inquiry into its constitutional
sufficiency may not, contrary to what is implied in
Lansang, involve the reception of evidence to be
weighed against those on which the President has acted,
nor may it extend to the investigation of what evidence
the President had before him. Such inquiry must be
limited to what is undisputed in the record and to what
accords or does not accord with facts of judicial notice.
- It is entirely up to the Court to determine and define its
own constitutional prerogatives vis-à-vis the
proclamation and the existing martial law situation,
given the reasons for the declaration and its avowed
objectives.
1. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
This means among other things that all the powers
of the government and of all its officials from the
President down to the lowest emanate from it.
2. The Judiciary provisions of the Constitution point to
the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of all
conflicts as to what the Constitution or any part
thereof means.
3. In the same way the Supreme Court is the
designated guardian of the Constitution, the
President is the specifically assigned protector of
the safety, tranquility and territorial integrity of the
nation. This responsibility of the President is his
alone and may not be shared by any other
Department.
4. The Constitution expressly provides that “in case of
invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent
danger thereof, when the public safety requires it,
the Executive may place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law”
5. In the same manner that the Executive power
conferred upon the Executive by the Constitution is
complete, total and unlimited, so also, the judicial
power vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior
courts, is the very whole of that power, without any
limitation or qualification.
6. Even the basic guarantee of protection of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law
readily reveals that the Constitution’s concern for
individual rights and liberties is not entirely above
that for the national interests, since the deprivation
it enjoins is only that which is without due process of
law and laws are always enacted in the national
interest or to promote and safeguard the general
welfare.
7. Whereas the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution
explicitly enjoins that the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, there is no
similar injunction whether expressed or implied
against the declaration of martial law.
- Political questions are not per se beyond the Court’s
jurisdiction…but that as a matter of policy, implicit in the
Constitution itself, the Court should abstain from
interfering with the Executive’s Proclamation.
ANTONIO [political question]
- The right of a government to maintain its existence is
the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty. To protect the
nation's continued existence, from external as well as
internal threats, the government "is invested with all
those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of
adopting the Constitution, were generally considered to
belong to every government as such, and as being
essential to the exercise of its functions"
- These powers which are to be exercised for the nation's
protection and security have been lodged by the
Constitution under Article VII, Section 10 (2) thereof, on
the President of the Philippines, who is clothed with
exclusive authority to determine the occasion on which
the powers shall be called forth.
- Cited Barcelon vs. Baker : The existing doctrine at the
time of the framing and adoption of the 1935
Constitution was that of Barcelon v. Baker. It enunciated
the principle that when the Governor-General with the
approval of the Philippine Commission, under Section 5
of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, declares that a
state of rebellion, insurrection or invasion exists, and by
reason thereof the public safety requires the suspension
of the privileges of habeas corpus, this declaration is
held conclusive upon the judicial department of the
government. And when the Chief Executive has decided
that conditions exist justifying the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, courts will
presume that such conditions continue to exist until the
same authority has decided that such conditions no
longer exist. These doctrines are rooted on pragmatic
considerations and sound reasons of public policy. The
"doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute
gives a discretionary power to any person, such person
is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of those facts" has been recognized by all
courts and "has never been disputed by any respectable
authority." The political department according to Chief
Justice Taney in Martin v. Mott, is the sole judge of the
existence of war or insurrection, and when it declares
either of these emergencies to exist, its action is not
subject to review or liable to be controlled by the judicial
department of the State.
MAKASIAR [political question]
AQUINO [political question]
FERNANDEZ [political question]
- The Constitution is sufficiently explicit in locating the
power to proclaim martial law. It is similarly explicit in
specifying the occasions for its exercise. "In case of
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof, when the public Safety requires it, he (the
President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines) may suspend the privileges of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law."
- The power to proclaim martial law is exclusively vested
in the President. The proclamation and its attendant
circumstances therefore form a political question.
- Unless this Court decides that every act of the
executive and of the legislature is justiciable there can
be no clearer example of a political question than
Proclamation No. 1081. It is the exercise by the highest
elective official of the land of a supreme political duty
exclusively entrusted to him by the Constitution. Our
people have entrusted to the President through a
specific provision of the fundamental law the awesome
responsibility to wield a powerful weapon. The people
have entrusted to him the estimation that the perils are
so ominous and threatening that this ultimate weapon of
our duly constituted government must be used.
- The Supreme Court was not given the jurisdiction to
share the determination of the occasions for its exercise.
It is not given the authority by the Constitution to
expand or limit the scope of its use depending on the
allegations of litigants. It is not authorized by the
Constitution to say that martial law may be proclaimed
in Isabela and Sulu but not in Greater Manila. Much less
does it have the power nor should it even exercise the
power, assuming its existence, to nullify a proclamation
of the President on a matter exclusively vested in him by
the Constitution and on issues so politically and
emotionally charged. The Court's function in such cases
is to assume jurisdiction for the purpose of finding out
whether the issues constitute a political question or not.
Its function is to determine whether or not a question is
indeed justiciable.
- Granted that Proclamation No. 1081 is not political but
justiciable, it is still valid because the president has not
acted arbitrarily in issuing it.
ESGUERRA [political question]
- I maintain that Proclamation No. 1081 is constitutional,
valid and binding; that the veracity or sufficiency of its
factual bases cannot be inquired into by the Courts and
that the question presented by the petitions is political in
nature and not justiciable. Whether or not there is
constitutional basis for the President’s action is for him
to decide alone.
- Ruled Barcelon vs. Baker over Lansang vs. Garcia
MUNOZ-PALMA [justiciable]
With Lansang, the highest Court of the land takes upon
itself the grave responsibility of checking executive
action and saving the nation from an arbitrary and
despotic exercise of the presidential power granted
under the Constitution to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and/or proclaim martial law; that
responsibility and duty of the Court must be preserved
and fulfilled at all costs if We want to maintain its role as
the last bulwark of democracy in this country.
WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then
the circumstances required by the Constitution for
the proclamation of a state of martial law
CASTRO [valid]
- Our Constitution authorizes the proclamation of martial
law in cases not only of actual invasion, insurrection or
rebellion but also of “imminent danger” thereof.
- The so called “open court” theory does not apply to the
Philippine situation because our 1935 and 1973
Constitutions expressly authorize the declaration of
martial law even where the danger to public safety
arises merely from the imminence of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion. Moreover, the theory is too
simplistic for our day, what with the universally
recognized insidious nature of Communist subversion
and its overt operations
FERNANDO [valid]
While it is beyond question that the 1973 Constitution
stipulates, in a transitory provision, that: All
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent
President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall
remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after
lifting of martial law or the ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions,
or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless
expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the
regular National Assembly.
TEEHANKEE [no pronouncement]
BARREDO [valid]
The proclamation had merely put the Constitution in a
state of anesthesia, since a major surgery is needed to
save the nation’s life.
MUNOZ-PALMA [valid]
The extreme measure taken by the President to place
the entire country under martial law was necessary. The
President's action was neither capricious nor arbitrary.
An arbitrary act is one that arises from an unrestrained
exercise of the will, caprice, or personal preference of
the actor, one which is not founded on a fair or
substantial reason, is without adequate determining
principle, nonrational, and solely dependent on the
actor's will. Such is not the case with the act of the
President, because the proclamation of martial law was
the result of conditions and events, not of his own
making, which undoubtedly endangered the public
safety and led him to conclude that the situation was
critical enough to warrant the exercise of his power
under the Constitution to proclaim martial law
WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling
them the relief of habeas corpus
CASTRO [legal]
- Given the validity of the proclamation of martial law,
the arrest and detention of those reasonably believed to
be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it is well nigh
beyond questioning.
- In the cases at bar, the respondents have justified the
arrest and detention of the petitioners on the ground of
reasonable belief in their complicity in the rebellion and
insurrection. Except Diokno and Aquino, all the
petitioners have been released from custody, although
subject to defined restrictions regarding personal
movement and expression of views. As the danger to
public safety has not abated, I cannot say that the
continued detention of Diokno and Aquino and the
restrictions on the personal freedoms of the other
petitioners are arbitrary, just as I am not prepared to say
that the continued imposition of martial rule is
unjustified.
FERNANDO [proclamation of martial law
does not automatically carry the
suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus]
It is not to be denied that where such a state of affairs
could be traced to the wishes of the President himself, it
carries with it a presumption of validity. The test is
again arbitrariness as defined in Lansang. While the
detention of petitioners could have been validly ordered,
as dictated by the very proclamation itself, if it
continued for an unreasonable length of time, then his
release may be sought in a habeas corpus proceeding.
BARREDO [legal]
- The imposition of martial law automatically carries with
it the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in any event, the Presidential order of arrest and
detention cannot be assailed as deprivation of liberty
without due process.
- The primary and fundamental purpose of martial law is
to maintain order and to insure the success of the battle
against the enemy by the most expeditious and efficient
means without loss of time and with the minimum effort.
This is self-evident. The arrest and detention of those
contributing to the disorder and especially of those
helping or otherwise giving aid and comfort to the
enemy are indispensable, if martial law is to mean
anything at all.
ANTONIO [legal]
- The Court is precluded from inquiring into the legality
of arrest and detention of petitioners. Having concluded
that the Proclamation of Martial Law on September 21,
1972 by the President of the Philippines and its
continuance are valid and constitutional, the arrest and
detention of petitioners, pursuant to General Order No. 2
dated September 22, 1972 of the President, as amended
by General Order No. 2-A, dated September 26, 1972,
may not now be assailed as unconstitutional and
arbitrary.
- It should be important to note that as a consequence of
the proclamation of martial law, the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus has been impliedly suspended.
Authoritative writers on the subject view the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus as an incident, but an
important incident of a declaration of martial law.
FERNANDEZ [the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is ipso facto suspended upon a
proclamation of martial law]
MUNOZ-PALMA [not legal, the
proclamation of martial law did not
carry with it the automatic suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus]
- First, from the very nature of the writ of habeas corpus
which as stressed in the early portion of this Opinion is a
"writ of liberty" and the "most important and most
immediately available safeguard of that liberty", the
privilege of the writ cannot be suspended by mere
implication. The Bill of Rights (Art. III, Sec. 1(14), 1935
Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 15, 1973 Constitution)
categorically states that the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended except for causes
therein specified, and the proclamation of martial law is
not one of those enumerated.
- Second, the so-called Commander-in-Chief clause,
either under Art. VII, Sec. 10(2), 1935 Constitution, or
Art. IX, Sec. 12, 1973 Constitution, provides specifically
for three different modes of executive action in times of
emergency, and one mode does not necessarily
encompass the other, viz, (a) calling out the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawlessness, etc., (b)
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
and (c) placing the country or a part thereof under
martial law. In the latter two instances even if the causes
for the executive action are the same, still the
exigencies of the situation may warrant the suspension
of the privilege of the writ but not a proclamation of
martial law and vice versa.
- Third, there can be an automatic suspension of the
privilege of the writ when, with the declaration of martial
law, there is a total collapse of the civil authorities, the
civil courts are closed, and a military government takes
over, in which event the privilege of the writ is
necessarily suspended for the simple reason that there
is no court to issue the writ; that, however, is not the
case with us at present because the martial law
proclaimed by the President upholds the supremacy of
the civil over the military authority,and the courts are
open to issue the writ.
IBP V ZAMORA
KAPUNAN; August 15, 2000
FACTS
- In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in
Metro Manila, President Estrada, in a verbal directive,
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint
visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and
suppression.
- The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of
the AFP, the Chief of Staff of the PNP and the Secretary
of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to
execute and implement the said order.
- The PNP Chief, through Police Superintendent Edgar
Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000,
which contains the ff:
> Purpose: for the suppression of crime prevention
and other serious threats to national security
> Situation: Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have
been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but
also by organized syndicates whose members include
active and former police/military personnel. The police
visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the
incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by
active or former police/military personnel.
> Mission: sustained street patrolling to minimize or
eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially
those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates
whose members include those that are well-trained,
disciplined and well-armed active or former
PNP/military personnel
> Concept in Joint Visibility Patrol Operations:
a. Conducted jointly by the National Capital
Region Police Office and the Philippine Marines
to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to
preserve the internal security of the state
against insurgents and other serious threat to
national security, although the primary
responsibility over Internal Security Operations
still rest upon the AFP.
b. Principle of integration of efforts: work Ratio 1: When questions of constitutional significance
cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
focused, effective and holistic approach in review only if the following requisites are complied with,
addressing crime prevention. namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
c. A provisional Task Force Tulungan case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
shall be organized to provide the mechanism,
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
structure and procedures for the integrated
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
planning, coordinating, monitoring and
Ratio 2: When the issues raised are of paramount
assessing the security situation.
importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
d. Areas for deployment: Monumento Circle, SM
technicalities of procedure.
City North Edsa, Araneta Shopping Center,
a. The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the
Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial
requisites of standing in this case.
Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and
> Definition of locus standi
Domestic Airport.
+ a personal and substantial interest in the case
- On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed petition to annul LOI
such that the party has sustained or will sustain
02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Marines,
direct injury as a result of the governmental act
null and void and unconstitutional because no
that is being challenged
emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would
+ “interest” means a material interest, an interest
justify the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement
in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished
work (violates Art 2, Sec. 3), deployment constitutes an
from mere interest in the question involved, or a
insidious incursion by the military in a civilian function of
mere incidental interest
government (violates Art. 16, Sec. 5), and deployment
+ gist: whether a party alleges such a personal
creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
perform civilian functions of the government. It also
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
makes the military more powerful than what it should
the presentation of issues upon which the court
really be under the Constitution.
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
- The President confirmed his previous directive on the
questions
deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24
> The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to
January 2000, addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff and
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
PNP Chief. The President expressed his desire to improve
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through
standing in this case
more effective crime prevention program including
> IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial
increased police patrols. He further stated that to
interest in the resolution of the case. It has not shown
heighten police visibility in the Metropolis, augmentation
any specific injury, which it has suffered or may suffer
from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as
by virtue of the questioned government act.
Commander-in Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
2. The President did not commit grave abuse of
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff
discretion in calling out the Marines
and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
Definition of political question
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to
- concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
not the legality, of a particular act or measure being
lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the
assailed
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
- (Tanada v. Cuenco) questions which are to be
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
only.
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive department;
ISSUES
if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the
1. WON the President’s factual determination of the
Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
particular branch of government or to the people
review
themselves then it is held to be a political question
a. WON petitioner has legal standing
- (Baker v. Carr) prominent on the surface of any case
2. WON the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP
held to be a political question is found a textually
in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
provisions on civilian supremacy, over the military and
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
the civilian character of the PNP
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
HELD
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
1. On Judicial Review
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s
 undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for
questioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on the one question
Ratio 3: When the grant of power is qualified, conditional
or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the
prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or
the limitations respected, is justiciable—the problem
being one of legality or validity.
Ratio 4: When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination as to whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official
whose action is being questioned.
- grave abuse of discretion: capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility
- There is no evidence to support the assertion that
there exist no justification for calling out the armed
forces. Likewise, there is no evidence to support the
proposition that grave abuse was committed because
the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to
violate the constitutional provision on civilian
supremacy over the military.
There is a clear textual commitment under Art. VII, Sec.
18, par. 1 of the Constitution to bestow on the President
full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and
to determine the necessity for the exercise of such
power The full discretionary power of the President to
determine the factual basis for the exercise of the
calling out power is also implied and further reinforced
in the rest of the said provision.
- Congress may revoke proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court
may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
There is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call
out the armed forces
- Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the
terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
other matters.
- Fr. Bernas: graduated power of the President as
Commander-in-Chief; when he exercises this lesser
power of calling on the armed forces, when he says it
is necessary, his judgment cannot be reviewed by
anybody
- Besides the absence of textual standards that the
Court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. On the other hand, the
President has a vast intelligence network to gather
information.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the
civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian
character of the police force
Constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement
- limited participation by the Marines
- real authority belongs to the PNP
Deployment of the Marines does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force
- the real authority in these operations is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and
not with the military
- since none of the Marines was incorporated or
enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to a civilian position to speak of
- the Marines render nothing more than
assistance required in conducting the patrols;
there can be no “insidious incursion” of the
military in civilian affairs nor can there be a
violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution
Military assistance to civilian authorities in various
forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction
- Military assistance in: elections, administration
of the Phil. Red Cross, relief and rescue
operations, conduct of licensure exams, sanitary
inspections, conduct of census work, etc.
- Systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet,
never before questioned
- Mutual support and cooperation between the
military and civilian authorities, not derogation of
civilian supremacy
Decision Petition dismissed
- 10 concur (Kapunan, Davide, Melo, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon)
- 5 concur in the result (Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing)
- 1 on official leave (Bellosillo)
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO
- Political questions are defined as those questions which
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government They have
two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised
by the people in their primary political capacity and (2)
matters which have been specifically delegated to some
other department or particular office of the government,
with discretionary power to act.
- (Barcelon v. Baker) Under our form of government, one
department has no authority to inquire into the acts of
another, which acts are performed within the discretion
of the other department. Whenever a statute gives
discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by
him upon his own opinion of certain facts, the statute
constitutes him the sole judge of the existence of those
facts. The exercise of this discretion is conclusive upon
the courts. Once a determination is made by the
executive and legislative departments that the
conditions justifying the assailed acts exist, it will
presume that the conditions continue until the same
authority decide that they no longer exist. The executive
branch, thru its civil and military branches, are better
situated to obtain information about peace and order
from every corner of the nation, in contrast with the
judicial department, with its very limited machinery
- (Alejandrino v. Quezon) Under the Jones Law, the power
of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly
behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive
member from the exercise of his office. The Supreme
Court does not possess the power of coercion to make
the Philippine Senate take any particular action. The
Philippine Legislature or any branch thereof cannot be
directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative
powers by any judicial process
- (Vera v. Avelino) Legislature has the inherent right to
determine who shall be admitted to its membership
- (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito) A proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by
Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity
- (Arnault v. Balagtas) The process by which a
contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature is a
necessary concomitant of the legislative process and the
legislature’s exercise of its discretionary authority is not
subject to judicial interference
- (Osmena v. Pendatun) The Court did not interfere with
Congress’power to discipline its members
- (Avelino v. Cuenco) The Court could assume jurisdiction
over the controversy in light of the subsequent events
justifying intervention among which was the existence of
a quorum
- (Tanada v. Cuenco) The Senate is not clothed with “full
discretionary authority” in the choice of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal and the exercise of its power
thereon is subject to constitutional limitations, which are
mandatory in nature.
- (Cunanan v Tan, Jr.) The Commission on Appointments
is a creature of the Constitution and its power does not
come from Congress but from the Constitution
- (Gonzales v. Comelec) The question of whether or not
Congress, acting as a constituent assembly in proposing
amendments to the Constitution violates the
Constitution was held to be justiciable and not a political
issue. The power to amend the Constitution or to
propose amendments thereto is not included in the
general grant of legislative powers to Congress. As a
constituent assembly, the members of Congress derive
their authority from the fundamental law and they do
not have the final say on whether their acts are within or
beyond constitutional limits
- (Tolentino v. Comelec) Acts of a constitutional
convention called for the purpose of proposing
amendments to the Constitution are at par with acts of
Congress acting as a constituent assembly
- In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question
doctrine and assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of powers
conferred upon the Legislature
- The Court hewed to the same line as regards the
exercise of Executive Power
- (Severino v. Governor-General) When the Legislature
conferred upon the Governor-General powers and
duties, it did so for the reason that he was in a better
position to know the needs of the country than any
other member of the executive department, and with
full confidence that he will perform such duties as his
judgment dictates
- (Abueva v. Wood) Under the principle of separation
of powers, it ruled that it was not intended by the
Constitution that one branch of government could
encroach upon the field of duty of the other. Each
department has an exclusive field within which it can
perform its part within certain discretionary limits.
- (Forbes v. Tiaco) The President’s inherent power to
deport undesirable aliens is universally denominated
as political, and this power continues to exist for the
preservation of peace and domestic tranquility of the
nation
- (Manalang v. Quitoriano) The appointing power is the
exclusive prerogative of the President upon which no
limitations may be imposed by Congress except those
resulting from the need of securing concurrence of the
Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of
the limited legislative power to prescribe qualifications
to the given appointive office
- (Untal v. Chief of Staff, AFP) As Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces, the President has the power to
determine whether war, in the legal sense, still
continues or has terminated. It is within the province
of the political department and not the judicial
department of government to determine when war is
at the end
- (Montenegro v. Castaneda) The authority to decide
whether the exigency has arisen requiring the
suspension of the privilege belongs to the President
and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts.
- (Lansang v. Garcia) The suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus was not a political question. The power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
neither absolute nor unqualified because the
Constitution sets limits on the exercise of executive
discretion on the matter. These limits are: (1) that the
privilege must not be suspended except only in cases
of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent
danger thereof; and (2) when the public safety
requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity
for the suspension shall exist. The extent of the power,
which may be inquired into by courts is defined by
these limitations. The function of the Court is not to
supplant but merely to check the Executive; to
ascertain whether the President has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise
the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom
of his act.
- (Javellana v. Executive Secretary) While a majority of
the Court held that the issue of whether or not the
1973 Constitution was justiciable, a majority also ruled
that the decisive issue of whether the 1973
Constitution had come into force and effect, with or
without constitutional ratification, was a political
question
- (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile) The Court upheld the
President’s declaration of martial law. On whether the
validity of the imposition of martial law was a political
or justiciable question, the Court was almost evenly
divided.
- (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile) The issuance of the
Presidential Commitment Order by the President was
not subject to judicial inquiry. In times of war or
national emergency, the President must be given
absolute control for the very life of the nation and
government is in peril
- (Morales, Jr. v. Enrile) By the power of judicial review,
the Court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
a person’s detention from the moment he was taken
into custody up to the moment the court passes upon
the merits of the petition
- The language of Art. VIII, Sec. 1 clearly gives the Court
the power to strike down acts amounting to grave abuse
of discretion of both the legislative and executive
branches of government
- It is clear that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces of the Philippines, may call out the
armed forces subject to two conditions: (1) whenever it
becomes necessary; and (2) to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably, these
conditions lay down the sine qua requirement for the
exercise of the power and the objective sought to be
attained by the exercise of the power. They define the
constitutional parameters of the calling out power.
Whether or not there is compliance with these
parameters is a justiciable issue and is not a political
question.
- On the use of Bernas’ opinion: The Constitution does
not derive its force from the convention which framed it,
but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be
arrived at is that of the people.
- When private justiciable rights are involved in a suit,
the Court must not refuse to assume jurisdiction even
though questions of extreme political importance are
necessarily involved.
VITUG
The act of the President in simply calling on the armed
forces of the Philippines, an executive prerogative, to
assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols in the metropolis,
does not constitute grave abuse of discretion that would
now warrant an exercise by the Supreme Court of its
extraordinary power as so envisioned by the
fundamental law.
MENDOZA [concur and dissent]
- The judgment on the substantive constitutional issues
raised by petitioner must await an actual case involving
real parties with injuries to show as a result of the
operation of the challenged executive action
- A citizen’s suit challenging the constituti0onality of
governmental action requires that (1) the petitioner
must have suffered an “injury in fact” of an actual or
imminent nature; (2) there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action by this Court
- Only a party injured by the operation of the
governmental action challenged is in the best position to
aid the Court in determining the precise nature of the
problem presented.
- Because of the absence of parties with real and
substantial interest to protect, we do not have evidence
on the effect of military presence in malls and
commercial centers
- Dismiss suit on the ground of lack of standing of
petitioner and the consequent lack of an actual case or
controversy
SANLAKAS V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TINGA; February 3, 2004
FACTS
- July 27, 2003 – Some 300 junior officers and enlisted
men of AFP, armed with ammunitions and explosives,
stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati. They
demanded the resignation of GMA, Defense Secretary
and the PNP Chief.
- Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 both declaring “a state of
rebellion” and calling out the AFP to suppress the
rebellion.
- Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after
negotiations.
- August 1, 2003 – President lifted the declaration.
- PARTIES
> Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PD)
o Sec 18, Art 7 does not require declaration of a
state of rebellion to call out the armed forces
 o There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite
period since Oakwood occupation had ceased.
> Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens,
taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers
o Declaration is constitutional anomaly
that confuses because overzealous public officers
acting pursuant to the proclamation are liable to
violate the constitutional rights of citizens
o Circumvention of the report
requirement in Sec 18, Art 7, commanding the
President to submit a report to Congress within 48
hours from proclamation of martial law
o Presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency powers as
Congress has not delegated any such power to
the President
> Rep. Suplico et al as citizens and members of House of
Representatives
o Their rights, powers, and functions were allegedly
affected
o Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an
exercise of emergency powers and therefore is a
usurpation of the power of the Congress in Art 6,
Sec 23 par 2
> Sen. Pimentel
o Issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive
exercise of a martial law power that has no
constitutional basis
> Solicitor-General
o Case has become moot because of the lifting of
the declaration
ISSUES
1. WON issue is justiciable given mootness of the issue
and legal standing of the parties
b. WON petitioners have legal standing
2. WON issuances of the President are valid
HELD
1. The President, in declaring state of rebellion and in
calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on
the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article 7 as opposed
to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2), Article 6.
- Justiciable even if moot
- Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review
- Lacson v. Perez – mootness preclude the Court from
addressing its Constitutionality
- Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have legal
standing because when an act of the Executive injures
the institution of the Congress and causes a derivative
but substantial injury, then any member can file suit
(Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez)
- Sanlakas, PM, and SJS have no legal standing because
they did not obtain any direct injury from the
governmental act that is being challenged. People’s
organization status would not vest them with the
requisite personality to question the validity of the
presidential issuances (Kilosbayan v. Morato)
- SJS as taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing
because there was no illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation
2. Presidential issuances are valid
- Art 7, Sec 18 – Sequence of graduated powers: 1.calling
out power, 2.power to suspend writ of habeas corpus,
3.power to declare martial law.
- 2 and 3 require concurrence of actual invasion or
rebellion AND that public safety requires the exercise of
such power. These are not required in calling-out power
(IBP v. Zamora)
- It does not expressly prohibit the President from
declaring a state of rebellion. The Constitution vests the
President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but
with first and foremost, Executive powers
- US Constitutional history: commander-in-chief powers
are broad enough as it is and become more so when
taken together with the provision on executive power
and presidential oath of office
- President’s authority to declare state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive
and at the same time draws strength from her
commander-in-chief powers
- The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to
the nation that such a state exists and the armed forces
may be called to prevent or suppress it.
- Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality
protected rights (Lacson)
- President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity of the
exercise of such power. There is no proof that the
President acted without factual basis.
- Declaration of state of rebellion does not amount to
declaration of martial law.
DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; May 3, 2006
FACTS
- On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency,
thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon
me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: “The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain
law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
- The declaration is premised military and police
intelligence containing concerted efforts of Left and
Right wing factions to bring down the Arroyo
Government.
- On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5
implementing PP 1017 (hence, the same premise as
PP1017), thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me
under the Constitution as President of the Republic
of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the
Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006,
do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism
and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of
the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the
necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence.
- On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the
declaration of a state of national emergency and after all
these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP
1017.
ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate President Arroyo.[4] They considered the aim
to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the
reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7,
2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to
the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
SIGNIFICANTLY, THERE WAS NO REFUTATION
FROM PETITIONERS’ COUNSELS.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel
Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento,
Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of
the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny,
escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain
defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon
the people to “show and proclaim our displeasure at the
sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only
by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing
red bands on our left arms.” [5]
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold
of a document entitled “Oplan Hackle I ” which detailed
plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine
Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City.
The plot was to assassinate selected targets including
some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself.[6]
Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo
decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The
next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was
found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was
recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas
province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash
disks containing minutes of the meetings between
members of the Magdalo Group and the National
People’s Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette
cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive
documents.[7] Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced
through DZRH that the “Magdalo’s D-Day would be on
February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.”
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo
Lomibao intercepted information that members of the
PNP- Special Action Force were planning to defect.
Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General
Marcelino Franco, Jr. to “disavow” any defection. The
latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement:
“All SAF units are under the effective control of
responsible and trustworthy officers with proven
integrity and unquestionable loyalty.”
On the same day, at the house of former
Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquino’s
brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials
plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration.
Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor
Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government
official about his group’s plans if President Arroyo is
ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta.
Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander
of the Army’s elite Scout Ranger. Lim said “it was all
systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo.”[8]
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col.
Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that
a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to
provide a critical mass and armed component to the
Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005.
According to these two (2) officers, there was no way
they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too,
were breaking the chain of command to join the forces
foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has
remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the
chain of command. He immediately took custody of
B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the
Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of
political and revolutionary work within the military and
the police establishments in order to forge alliances with
its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio
“Ka Roger” Rosal declared: “The Communist Party and
revolutionary movement and the entire people look
forward to the possibility in the coming year of
accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the
Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to
rule that it will not take much longer to end it.”[9]
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman
for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central
Mindanao, publicly announced: “Anti-Arroyo groups
within the military and police are growing rapidly,
hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the
families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who
undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field.”
He claimed that with the forces of the national
democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative
political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have
been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the
President’s ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the
first half of 2006.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing
of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan
and Bataan was also considered as additional factual
basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is
the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the
death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the
Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front
organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and
25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.[10]
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President
convened her security advisers and several cabinet
members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace
and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the
PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the
chain of command remains solid and undivided. To
protect the young students from any possible trouble
that might break loose on the streets, the President
suspended classes in all levels in the entire National
Capital Region.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S.
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it
is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements
for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and of assembly.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-
Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the
CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear
case of “censorship” or “prior restraint.” They also
claimed that the term “emergency” refers only to
tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences,
hence, there is “absolutely no emergency” that warrants
the issuance of PP 1017.
In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are
Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty
one (21) other members of the House of
Representatives, including Representatives Satur
Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and
Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 constitute “usurpation of legislative powers”;
“violation of freedom of expression” and “a declaration
of martial law.” They alleged that President Arroyo
“gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed
forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the
possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there
is necessity to do so.”
In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-
KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate
unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and
decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis;
and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right
of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their
grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law
Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section
4[15] of Article II, (b) Sections 1,[16] 2,[17] and 4[18] of Article
III, (c) Section 23[19] of Article VI, and (d) Section 17[20]
of Article XII of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo
I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an “arbitrary and
unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law
powers.” And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a
declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that “it
amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency
powers without congressional approval.” In addition,
petitioners asserted that PP 1017 “goes beyond the
nature and function of a proclamation as defined under
the Revised Administrative Code.”
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner
Loren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 are “unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom
of expression, including its cognate rights such as
freedom of the press and the right to access to
information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed
under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.” In
this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented
her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
- In respondents’ Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor
General countered that: first, the petitions should be
dismissed for being moot; second, petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483
(KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz
et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary
for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as
respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and
legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the
people’s right to free expression and redress of
grievances.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the moot and academic principle
precludes the Court from taking cognizance of
the cases
2. WON petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.),
G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et
al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424
(Legarda) have legal standing
Substantive
3. WON Supreme Court can review the factual
basis of PP 1017
4. WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
HELD
Procedural
1. NO. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution;[31] second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
[32]
third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public;[33] and fourth, the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review.[34]
Reasoning
- Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;[31]
second, the exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved;[32] third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public;[33] and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review.[34]
- All the foregoing exceptions are present here and
justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the
instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There
is no question that the issues being raised affect the
public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic
rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the
press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines
or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the
bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the
military and the police, on the extent of the protection
given by constitutional guarantees.[35] And lastly,
respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition.
Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. In
their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case,
respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s
Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.[36]
However, they failed to take into account the Chief
Justice’s very statement that an otherwise “moot” case
may still be decided “provided the party raising it in a
proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced
or damaged as a direct result of its issuance.” The
present case falls right within this exception to the
mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
2. YES. The requirement of Locus standi which is the
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question shall be set aside by the Court whenever it is
shown that the case is of transcendental importance.
Reasoning
- Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question.”[37] In private suits,
standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest”
rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.” Accordingly, the
“real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”[38]
Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his
own right to the relief sought.
- By way of summary, the following rules may be culled
from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be
accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
1. the cases involve constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
4. or concerned citizens, there must be a showing
that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
5. or legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
- Now, the application of the above principles to the
present petitions.
- The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396,
particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The
same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409,
Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They
alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and
“unlawful search” committed by police operatives
pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General
does not question their legal standing.
- In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen
alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers.
They also raised the issue of whether or not the
concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the
alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used.
Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those
affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their
Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court
the alleged violations of their basic rights.
- In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the
liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,[60] Kapatiran Ng
Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,
[61]
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[62] Basco v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[63] and
Tañada v. Tuvera,[64] that when the issue concerns a
public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen
and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
- In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly
may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing.
Organizations may be granted standing to assert
the rights of their members.[65] We take judicial
notice of the announcement by the Office of the
President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for
public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5.
- In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are
national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any
direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution
or its members may suffer as a consequence of the
issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[66] the Court held that
the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly
true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this
case. This is too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view
of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court
declares that petitioner have locus standi.
- In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality
as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no
allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The
fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence.
She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation
that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired
by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a
media personality will not likewise aid her because there
was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances
prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her
submission that she has pending electoral protest before
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no
relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017
will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But
considering once more the transcendental importance of
the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing
rules.
- It must always be borne in mind that the question of
locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of
proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying
legal tenet of the “liberality doctrine” on legal standing.
It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount
importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice
Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with
bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical
matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the
“transcendental importance” doctrine, a relaxation of
the standing requirements for the petitioners in the “PP
1017 cases.”
- This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have
locus standi.
- Incidentally, IT IS NOT PROPER TO IMPLEAD PRESIDENT
ARROYO AS RESPONDENT. SETTLED IS THE DOCTRINE
THAT THE PRESIDENT, DURING HIS TENURE OF OFFICE
OR ACTUAL INCUMBENCY,[67] MAY NOT BE SUED IN ANY
CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASE, AND THERE IS NO NEED TO
PROVIDE FOR IT IN THE CONSTITUTION OR LAW. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President,
the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to
the performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which
impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many
great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government. However, this does not mean that the
President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other
official, he remains accountable to the people[68] but he
may be removed from office only in the mode provided
by law and that is by impeachment.[69]
Substantive
3. The President’s “calling-out” power is a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. However, “this does
not prevent an examination of whether such
power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in
a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.”
This ruling is based on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987
Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments. Under the new
definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not
only “to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but also
“to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.” The latter part
of the authority represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to review what was
before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of
the political departments of the government.[81] It
speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power
but also of duty. [82]
- However, “judicial inquiry can go no further than to
satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is
correct,” but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.”
Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but
arbitrariness.[83] It is incumbent upon the petitioner
to show that the President’s decision is totally
bereft of factual basis” and that if he fails, by way of
proof, to support his assertion, then “this Court cannot
undertake an independent investigation beyond
the pleadings.
- Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s
exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is
totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor
General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum
shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming
part of the records. Petitioners presented nothing to
refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President
was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
4. YES. Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the
constitutional exercise of the President of his/her calling
out of power, the Courts shall have authority to inquire
into the factual basis of such exercise to determine
whether it was within the constitutionally permissible
limits or whether grave abuse of discretion attended its
exercise. (This interpretation was based on Article VIII,
section 1
a. Facial Challenge. Facial invalidation of laws
(overbreadth doctrine) shall not be resorted to in the
absence of clear showing that (1) the law involves the
exercise of free speech; (2) that there can be no
instance that the assailed law may be valid; and that (3)
the Court has no other alternative remedies available.
- Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a law shall be
facially invalid only if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.
Reasoning
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face
because of its “overbreadth.” They claim that its
enforcement encroached on both unprotected and
protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens.
- A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth
doctrine, is uncalled for. First and foremost, the
overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases.
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,
[104]
the US Supreme Court held that “we have not
recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment” (freedom
of speech). Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not
intended for testing the validity of a law that “reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive
control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.” Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection
and rebellion are considered “harmful” and
“constitutionally unprotected conduct.”
- Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as
“manifestly strong medicine,” to be used “sparingly
and only as a last resort,” and is “generally
disfavored;”[107] The reason for this is obvious.
Embedded in the traditional rules governing
constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person
to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to
challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably
be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other
situations not before the Court.[108]
- And third, a facial challenge on the ground of
overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that
there can be no instance when the assailed law
may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to
show whether this situation exists.
- Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for
vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is facially
invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application.”[110] It is subject to the same principles
governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an
analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in
free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that
a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is
vague in all its possible applications. Again,
petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP
1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed
to establish that men of common intelligence cannot
understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis. The authority of the President
to exercise his calling out power to suppress lawless
violence shall not be deemed to include the power to
authorize: (a) arrests and seizures without judicial
warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of
news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees, as these powers can be
exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only
where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
- The take care power of the President, which includes
the power to enforce obedience of laws shall not be
deemed to include calling the military to enforce or
implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws
governing family and property relations, laws on
obligations and contracts and the like.
- The ordinance power of the President shall not include
the power to make “decrees” with the same force and
effect as those issued by President Marcos.
- In the absence of delegated authority from Congress,
the authority of the President to declare a state of
emergency shall not be deemed to include the power to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
- Acts of terrorism no matter how repulsive shall not be
deemed to be punishable in the absence of legislation
clearly defining said acts and providing specific
punishments therefor.
Reasoning
Calling-out Power
- The Constitution grants the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated powers. These are:
the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces
“to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.” Considering the circumstances then
prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue
PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence
network, she is in the best position to determine the
actual condition of the country.
- Under the calling-out power, the President may
summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing
lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This
involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes
beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered
illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be
careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke
a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser
power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the
greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
- It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a
distinction between the President’s authority to declare
a “state of rebellion” (in Sanlakas) and the authority to
proclaim a state of national emergency. While President
Arroyo’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion”
emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the
statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4,
Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President
fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, upon the existence of
which the operation of a specific law or regulation
is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an
executive order.
- President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion”
was merely an act declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under
Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of
Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and
deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more
than that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take
over privately-owned public utility and business affected
with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the
exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal
significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
- Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP
1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so.
What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings.
It is plain therein that what the President invoked was
her calling-out power.
- In his “Statement before the Senate Committee on
Justice” on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said that of the three powers of the President
as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial
Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a
strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly.
It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the
government. It is placed in the keeping of the President
for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people
from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy
their individual freedoms.
- Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a
declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by
the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify
acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law
can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a
perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done
contrary to its command is ultra vires. Specifically, (a)
arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on
public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and
agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of
Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised
by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where
there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus.
- Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP
1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely
an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out
power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing
or suppressing lawless violence.
“Take Care” Power
- The second provision of PP 1017 pertains to the power
of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which
reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
- As the Executive in whom the executive power is
vested,[115] the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be
embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. Before assuming office, he is required to
take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President
of the Philippines, he will, among others, “execute its
laws.”[116] In the exercise of such function, the President,
if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office
as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
country,[117] including the Philippine National Police[118]
under the Department of Interior and Local Government.
[119]
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate
“decrees”?
- PP 1017 states in part: “to enforce obedience to
all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.”
- The President is granted an Ordinance Power under
Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987), which allows her to issue
executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations,
memorandum orders/circulars, general or special orders.
President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the
foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar
to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP
1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the
same category and binding force as statutes because
they were issued by the President in the exercise of his
legislative power during the period of Martial Law under
the 1973 Constitution.[121]
- The assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar
as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article
VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor
a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees
and laws through the military?
- As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no
authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees
are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With
respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to enforce
or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws
governing family and property relations, laws on
obligations and contracts and the like. She can only
order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws
pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017
states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders, and
regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and
as provided in Section 17, Article
XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a state of national
 emergency.
- The import of this provision is that President Arroyo,
during the state of national emergency under PP 1017,
can call the military not only to enforce obedience “to all
the laws and to all decrees x x x” but also to act
pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which
reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national
emergency, when the public interest
so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking
the above provision when she issued PP 1017?
- During the existence of the state of national
emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President,
without any authority or delegation from Congress, to
take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.
- This provision was first introduced in the 1973
Constitution. In effect at the time of its approval was
President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated
September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of
National Defense to take over “the management,
control and operation of the Manila Electric Company,
the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the
Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air
Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the
successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to
contain, solve and end the present national emergency.”
- Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of
Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s inclusion
of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment
on the legislature’s emergency powers.
- A distinction must be drawn between the President’s
authority to declare “a state of national emergency”
and to exercise emergency powers. To the first,
Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power,
hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues
arise.
- Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-
thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled,
voting separately, shall have the sole power to
declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
- It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the
above provision refers not only to war but also to “other
national emergency.” If the intention of the Framers
of our Constitution was to withhold from the President
the authority to declare a “state of national emergency”
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power)
and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could
have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that
Congress should first authorize the President before he
can declare a “state of national emergency.” Therefore,
President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a
state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment.
- But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the
taking over of privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest, is a different matter. This
requires a delegation from Congress.
- Constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be
construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses,
sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to
the same subject matter will be construed together and
considered in the light of each other.[123] Considering
that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI
relate to national emergencies, they must be read
together to determine the limitation of the exercise of
emergency powers.
- Generally, Congress is the repository of
emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such
powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However,
knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be
possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution
deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions,
thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period
only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to
carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.[124]
- Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect
of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states
that the “the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress,
not the President. Now, whether or not the President
may exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
- Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence
of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing
danger to life or well-being beyond that which is
accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the
elements of intensity, variety, and perception.
Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in
the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a
wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3)
principal heads: a) economic, b) natural disaster,[129]
and c) national security.
- “Emergency,” as contemplated in our Constitution, is of
the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic
crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other
similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.
[131]
This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional
Commission.
- Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII,
invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this
Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize
her during the emergency to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.
- Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can
declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. The President cannot decide whether
exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take
over of privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President has no
power to point out the types of businesses affected with
public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the
powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress.
c. Applied Challenge. The Court shall not declare laws
as invalid solely on the basis of their misapplication or
abuse or susceptibility to abuse by the people tasked to
implement them.
- The arrest of Randy David and other acts done by the
authorities pursuant to the parts of the laws herein
considered unconstitutional are also deemed
unconstitutional without prejudice to the filing of
necessary administrative, criminal or civil actions
against specific abuses committed by authorities.
Reasoning
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and
G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general,
does the illegal implementation of a law render it
unconstitutional?
- Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to
declare statutes invalid although they may be
abused and misabused[135] and may afford an
opportunity for abuse in the manner of
application.[136] The validity of a statute or ordinance is
to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its
effects in a particular case.[137] PP 1017 is merely an
invocation of the President’s calling-out power. Its
general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all
forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had
accomplished the end desired which prompted President
Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017
allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct
illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional
rights.
- Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance
unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor
committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion
by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be
measured is the essential basis for the exercise of
power, and not a mere incidental result arising
from its exertion.[138] This is logical.
- President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect
the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are “acts and
commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.” They are internal rules issued by the
executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the
proper and efficient administration of law. Such
rules and regulations create no relation except between
the official who issues them and the official who receives
them.[139] They are based on and are the product of, a
relationship in which power is their source, and
obedience, their object.[140] For these reasons, one
requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must
be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.
- G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to
immediately carry out the “necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.”
- Unlike the term “lawless violence,” the phrase “acts of
terrorism” is still an amorphous and vague concept.
Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing
acts of terrorism.
- The absence of a law defining “acts of terrorism” may
result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police
or military.
- So far, the word “terrorism” appears only once in our
criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16,
1981 enacted by President Marcos during the Martial
Law regime.
- P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which
outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted
by President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two
(2) laws, however, do not define “acts of terrorism.”
Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is
President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the
discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism.
Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without
restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate
arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and
residences, taking over the media enterprises,
prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and
gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these
can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts
go far beyond the calling-out power of the President.
Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the “acts of
terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
VALIDITY OF SPECIFIC ACTS CONDUCTED BY
AUTHORITIES PURSUANT TO PP 1017 AND G.O.
NO. 5
- In the Brief Account[144] submitted by petitioner David,
certain facts are established: first, he was arrested
without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested
him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at
Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted,
photographed and booked like a criminal suspect;
fourth, he was treated brusquely by policemen who
“held his head and tried to push him” inside an
unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of
Batas Pambansa No. 880[145] and Inciting to
Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours;
and seventh, he was eventually released for
insufficiency of evidence.
- The Constitution enunciates the general rule that no
person shall be arrested without warrant. The
recognized exceptions are in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -
A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
- Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above
justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During
the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition
and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting
officers could invoke was their observation that
some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous
assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the
rally.[146] Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered
his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not
wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing
it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting
to sedition. Further, he also stated that there is
insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP
880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David
was the leader of the rally.[147]
- But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et
al. is that not only was their right against warrantless
arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably
assemble.
- “Assembly” under Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution
means a right on the part of the citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It
is a necessary consequence of our republican institution
and complements the right of speech. This right is not
to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, the
right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or
censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior
issuance of a permit or authorization from the
government authorities except, of course, if the
assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a
permit for the use of such place, and not for the
assembly itself, may be validly required.
- The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al.
were arrested while they were exercising their right to
peaceful assembly. They were not committing any
crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and
present danger that warranted the limitation of that
right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP
880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General,
during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting
officers’ conduct.
- On the basis of the above principles, the Court
likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the
members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted.
Their dispersal was done merely on the basis of
Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits previously
issued by local government units. This is arbitrary.
The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a
blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of
assembly is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent.”[149] Tolerance is the rule and
limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that
an assembly presents a clear and present danger that
the State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise
it.With the blanket revocation of permits, the
distinction between protected and unprotected
assemblies was eliminated.
- Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate
assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local
government units. They have the power to issue permits
and to revoke such permits after due notice and
hearing on the determination of the presence of clear
and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even
notified and heard on the revocation of their permits.
The first time they learned of it was at the time of the
dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect.
When a person’s right is restricted by government
action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it
that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to
procedure.
- G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents
another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of
the press. Petitioners’ narration of facts, which the
Solicitor General failed to refute, established the
following: first, the Daily Tribune’s offices were searched
without warrant; second, the police operatives seized
several materials for publication; third, the search was
conducted at about 1:00 o’ clock in the morning of
February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in
the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except
the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen
stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune
offices.
- Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government
officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was
quoted as saying that such raid was “meant to show a
‘strong presence,’ to tell media outlets not to
connive or do anything that would help the rebels
in bringing down this government.” Director
General Lomibao further stated that “if they do not
follow the standards –and the standards are if
they would contribute to instability in the
government, or if they do not subscribe to what is
in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 – we
will recommend a ‘takeover.’” National
Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged
television and radio networks to “cooperate” with the
government for the duration of the state of national
emergency. He warned that his agency will not
hesitate to recommend the closure of any
broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for
media coverage during times when the national
security is threatened.
- The search is illegal. Rule 126, Section 4 of The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requires that a
search warrant be issued upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offence to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a
house, room, or any other premise be made in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in
the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9
states that the warrant must direct that it be served in
the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in
the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time
of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the
CIDG operatives.
- Not only that, the search violated petitioners’ freedom
of the press. The best gauge of a free and democratic
society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its
media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff[152] this Court held
that --
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were
the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum”
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and
sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers
were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous
restraint or censorship abhorrent to the
freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual
denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic
framework where a free, alert and even
militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
- While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not
padlocked and sealed like the “Metropolitan Mail” and
“We Forum” newspapers in the above case, yet it
cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded
their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of
materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in
the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the
arrogant warning of government officials to media, are
plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the
repressive government who tells the citizen that he
may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no
less than what he is permitted to say on pain of
punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. [153]
Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to
these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-
government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate
the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it
involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to
comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of
a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts
to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.
[154]
- Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor
General admitted that the search of the Tribune’s offices
and the seizure of its materials for publication and other
papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible
“for any purpose,”
- The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of
these issuances. Suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is
limited to the calling out by the President of the military
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant
to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts
which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution,
this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and
illegal.
- In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban’s concurring opinion, attached hereto, is
considered an integral part of this ponencia.
Decision
- WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The
Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as
it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP
to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as
decrees promulgated by the President, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP
1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but
such declaration does not authorize the President to take
over privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest without prior legislation.
- G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a
standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that
“acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
- The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald
Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU
and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the
absence of proof that these petitioners were committing
acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on
media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well
as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and
whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
BAUTISTA V SALONGA
PADILLA; April 13, 1989
FACTS
- Petition for certiorari to review decision of Commission
on Appointments
- Pres designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista
as Acting Chair of CHR, who took oath of office before CJ
Fernan. She discharged functions/duties of Chair of CHR.
- Bautista rcvd letter fr Sec of Commission on
Appointments requesting her to submit info and docs in
connection w/ her confirmation as Chair of CHR.
- Secretary again wrote to Bautista to request her
presence at a meeting to deliberate on her appointment.
- Bautista wrote to Chair of Commission on
Appointments, saying why she considered Comm on
Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her
appointment.
- As conveyed in a letter to the Exec Secretary,
Commission on Appointments disapproved Bautista’s
“ad interim” appointment as Chair.
- Bautista’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
- A Manila Standard news item reported that Pres
designated Mallillin as Acting Chair of CHR pending
resolution of Bautista’s case.
- Bautista filed this petition w/ prayer for issuance of
restraining order to enjoin Commission of Appointments
not to proceed w/ deliberation on her appointment.
- Bautista filed amended petition for restraining order
impleading Mallillin as respondent. She also filed ex-
parte motion to stop Mallillin fr exercising fcns of Chair
and fr demanding courtesy resignations fr officers.
- Court issued TRO regarding Mallillin but not regarding
Commission on Appointments, being instrumentality of
coequal branch.
- Bautista was extended by Pres to permanent
appointment as Chair on Dec 17, 1988. This
appointment was for Pres solely to make.
ISSUES
1. WON appointment by Pres of Chair of Commission on
Human Rights is to be w/ or w/o confirmation of
Commission on Appointments
2. WON Pres could extend another appointment to
petitioner on Jan 14, 1989 an ad interin appointment or
any other kind of appointment to same office of Chair of
CHR that called for confirmation by Commission on
Appointments.
3. WON in appointments solely for Pres to make, the
Pres can voluntarily submit such appointment to
Commission on Appointment for confirmation.
4. WON the petition has become moot and academic.
HELD
1. NO
- CHR Chair position is not among positions mentioned
in Sec 16 Art 12 of Consti. Therefore, appointment must
be w/o review of Commission on Appointments.
- Unlike Chair/Members of CSC, COMELEC and CoA, the
position of CHR Chair does not have express provision
that appointment should be with consent of Commission
on Appointments.
- Sec 2(c) of EO 163 says CHR Chair is among those w/c
Pres is authorized by law to appoint.
2. NO
- Bautista’s appointment on Dec 17, 1988 as Chair was
a completed act on the part of the Pres.
- No new appointment could be made to position
already filled by a previously completed appointment,
accepted by appointee through qualification and
assumption of duties.
- Even if Pres could submit to Commission on
Appointments an appointment that belongs solely to her,
still, there was no vacancy on Jan 14 1989.
- Nor can respondents contend that the new
appointment on Jan 14 was an ad interim appointment
bec it does not apply to appointments solely for Pres to
make. It extends only to those where review of Comm
on Appointments is needed. That is why those types of
appointments remain valid until disapproval by
Commission on Appointments or until next adjournment
of Congress.
3. NO
- To say otherwise is to say that Pres w/ Congress can
from time to time move power boundaries in Consti.
- Neither Exec nor Legislative can create power where
Consti confers none. If Consti made appointment
exclusive for Pres, Pres can’t grant power of participation
in Commission on Appointments. Nor can Commission
on Appointments create power to confirm appointments
that Consti has reserved to Pres alone.
4. NO
- Respondent contends that w/ or w/o confirmation,
Bautista can be removed fr office anytime at pleasure of
Pres. And w/ disapproval of appointment/nomination by
Commission on Appointments, there was greater reason
for her removal. Thus, issue is moot and academic. SC
disagrees and says petitioner came in timely manner
and didn’t show intention of abandoning her petition.
- EO 163 speaks of term of office (7 yrs without
reappointment) while EO 163-A speaks of tenure in office
(at pleasure of Pres). The diff bet term and tenure is
impt. Consistent w/ CHR’s needed independence, tenure
in office can’t be later made dependent on pleasure of
Pres.
Obiter
- Sarmiento III V. Mison
- Issue: Which appointments under 1987 Consti are
to be w/ and w/o review of Commission on
Appointments?
- Ratio: Only appointments mentioned in 1 st sentence
of Sec 16 Art VII are to be reviewed by Commission.
Other appointments by President are to be made w/o
participation of Commission.
- Held: Appointment of Mison as Bureau of Customs
head is valid.
- Marbury V. Madison
- Ratio: Once appointment is made, Pres’ power over
the office is terminated in all cases, where by law the
officer is not removable by him.
Decision Petition is granted; TRO is made permanent
against Mallillin; Petitioner Bautista is lawful Chair of
CHR, she may be removed only for cause.
Gutierrez Jr., Dissenting Opinion
Cruz, Dissenting
Griño-Aquino, Dissenting
SARMIENTO V MISON
PADILLA; December 17, 1987
FACTS
- Petitioners Sarmiento and Arcilla who are taxpayers,
lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and Constitutional Law professors seeks to
enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. In addition,
they would want to enjoin Budget Secretary Guillermo
Carague from disbursing Mison’s salary and
emoluments. The grounds for the petition was that
Mison’s stay in Office is unconstitutional as there was no
confirmation coming from the Commission on
Appointments that is “required” by the Constitution. The
Commission on Appointments was allowed to intervene
in the court proceeding.
- The case was considered justiciable given that there is
great public interest such as the need for stability in
public service. This disposed the question of whether
this is the proper remedy to question respondents right
to the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and also that of the legal standing of the
petitioners.
- The Constitutional Provision under careful examination
is Article VII Section 16, which states that:
“The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of the departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.”
ISSUE
WON Mison’s stay in Office was Constitutional
HELD
- Yes it is constitutional.
- Reading Article VII Section 16 there are 4 groups of
officers who the President is able to appoint. The first
group would be the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. The second group
is composed of those officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. The
third group are those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint. Lastly, the fourth group,
are those officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
- To interpret the law the Justices went back in history to
look at the previous constitutions, the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions. In the 1935 Constitution all appointments
is subject to the approval of the Commission on
Appointments while this was removed in the 1973
Constitution wherein the President is able to appoint
without the need for the approval of the Commission on
Appointments. Both were problematic as the 1935
provision became a venue of “horse-trading” (used for
political leverage) while the 1973 provision gave too
much power to the President. The court held that the
1987 provision on appointment was the middle ground
that was sought by the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
- Looking through the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission they said that the clear and positive intent
of the framers were to make those officers in the first
sentence the individuals that are subject to the approval
and confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
while those on the second and third sentence need not
seek such confirmation. Given that the position as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is not under
those specified in the first sentence but the second,
therefore petitioner Mison is not in need of the approval
of the Commission on Appointments and thus should be
able to exercise full authority and functions and be
entitled to his salary and emoluments.
Decision Petition DISMISSED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Cortes, Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento-
concurring (11)
Gutierrez, Cruz- dissenting (2)
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
There is a need to look at the provision in its entirety.
The focus of the records was merely on the first
sentence of the provision and the not on the following
sentences. Those are crucial given that the position in
question falls under the latter. Also, the records of the
Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic aids and
are at best persuasive only and not necessarily
conclusive. In addition, strictly interpreting the third
sentence may create an absurdity for it gives Congress
the discretion of not creating a law that would give the
President the power to appoint those who are lower in
rank. An irony arises when those in a lower position
require the approval of the Commission on
Appointments while those who are higher in position
would not.
PIMENTEL V ERMITA
CARPIO; October 13, 2005
FACTS
- 7/26/2004: Congress commenced their regular session
- 8/25/2004: The Commission on Appointments
(composed of members of Congress) was constituted
+ meanwhile, GMA issued appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments:
Arthur Yap (DOA), Alberto Romulo (DFA), Raul
Gonzales (DOJ), Florencio Abad (DOE) Avelino Cruz
(DND),
Rene Villa (DAR), Joseph Durano (DOT), Mike Defensor
(DENR)
+ the aforementioned respondents took their oaths of
office and assumed their duties as acting secretaries
- 9/8/2004: a group of senators, headed by Sen.
Pimentel, filed this present petition for certiorari and
prohibition, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to
declare these appointments by GMA unconstitutional
- 9/23/2004: GMA issued ad interim (temporary)
appointments, replacing respondents’ acting capacity
- Sol Gen argues
+ petition is moot because GMA had issued the ad
interim appointments after the recess of Congress;
prohibition may not enjoin acts already done.
+ the power to appoint is executive in nature—the
Commission of Appointments, though it be composed
of members of Congress, is a body independent of
Congress, and its executive power emanates from the
Consti.
+ only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-
Estrada and Osmena, as members of the Commission,
possess standing in the present petition.
- Petitioners’ Argument
+ petitioners assert that GMA cannot issue such
appointments because no law grants such a power
S10 Ch2 B4, EO 292: “…in case of a vacancy in the
Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who
can be designated as Acting Secretary…”
+ while Congress is in session, no appointments can
be made w/o the consent of the Commission
Respondents’ Argument:
-respondents assert that GMA can issue such
appointments for the reason that no law prohibits it
S16 Ch5 T1 B3, EO 292: “The Pres. shall exercise the
power to appoint such officials as provided by…the law”
S17 Ch5 T1 B3, EO 292: the Pres. may appoint an
officer already in service or any other competent person
ISSUE
WON GMA’s appointment of respondents as acting
secretaries w/o the consent of the Commission of
Appointments while Congress is in session is
unconstitutional
HELD
- the court held that the President may make such
appointments, as the law expressly provides it
S17 Ch5 Title 1 Book 3, EO 292: “… the President
may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to
perform the function of an office in the executive
branch…”
- EO 292 applies to appointments vested in the President
by law—Congress is not the only source of law
S17(3) of the previous provision states: “In no case
shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.”
Petitioners fail to consider that this provision acts as a
safeguard against the abuse of such appointments
- a department secretary is considered an alter ego of
the President, that is, it holds a position of great trust
and confidence. Hence, Congress cannot impose that the
undersecretary automatically be appointed—the Pres.
must appoint an alter ego of her choice.
J. Bernas, SJ.: “acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy; ad interim
appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress and require submission to the Commission of
Appointments for approval or rejection.”
- notwithstanding Bernas’ textbook definition, the court
finds no abuse of appointments in the present case as
such were issued immediately upon the recess of
Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
Decision Petition DISMISSED
MATIBAG V BENIPAYO
CARPIO; April 2, 2002
FACTS
- The Case: Petition for Prohibition w/ prayer for a writ of
prelim injunction and TRO. Petitioner questions the
appointment and the right of respondents to remain in
office as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC
- On Feb.2, 1999, Petitioner Ma. Angelina Matibag was
appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director
IV” of the Education and Information Dept. (EID), her
appointment was renewed on Feb 15, 2000 in a
“Temporary” capacity and renewed yet again on Feb 15,
2001 in the same “Temporary” capacity.
- On March 22, 2001 PGMA appointed ad interim,
respondents Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman
and Resurreccion Borra, and Florentino Tuason as
COMELEC commissioners respectively, for a term of 7
years, expiring on Feb. 2, 2008. They took their oaths
and assumed their positions with the President
submitting their ad interim appointments to the
Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 for
confirmation. The Commission on Appointments,
however, did not act on their appointments.
- On June 1, 2001, PGMA renewed their ad interim
appointments with the term and the expiration
remaining the same (for 7 years and expiring on Feb 2,
2008). The new appointees took oath a 2nd time and the
same was transmitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation on June 5, 2001. The
Congress adjourned before the Commission could act on
the appointments resulting in the renewal of their ad
interim appointments by the President for the 3rd time on
June 8, 2001.
- Benipayo, acting as COMELEC chairman, assigned a
Velma Cinco as officer-in-charge of EID and reassigned
petitioner to the Law Dept, a move which she requested
reconsideration for, citing Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular no. 7 (transfer of employees
prohibited during election period: Jan.2-June 13, 2001).
Benipayo denied the request and citing COMELEC
Resolution no. 3300. Petitioner appealed to the
COMELEC, filed an administrative and criminal complaint
with the Law Dept against Benipayo and while the
complaint was pending, she also filed this action. She
claims that ad interim appointments violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC, and on temporary appointments and
reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner
also assails her reassignment to the Law Dept, the
appointment of Cinco as well as the disbursements
made by the COMELEC Finance Services Dept officer by
way of salaries and emoluments in favor of respondents.
- PGMA, on Sept. 6, 2001 renewed once again the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for
a term of 7 years expiring on Feb. 2, 2008.
ISSUE
1. WON Benipayo’s ad interim appointment and
assumption of office as COMELEC chairman is
constitutional
2. WON issue is justiciable
3. If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were indeed appointed
lawfully, WON the renewal of their appointments and
subsequent assumption of office was constitutional
4. WON petitioner’s removal and reassignment is illegal
(done w/o approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body)
5. WON the Officer-in-charge of COMELEC Finance
Services Dept, in making disbursements in favor of the
new appointees, acted in excess of jurisdiction.
HELD
1. An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment made by the Pres. in the meantime that
Congress is in recess. It is not an appointment in a
temporary or acting capacity. It takes effect immediately
and can no longer be withdrawn by the Pres. once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
Reasoning
- Although the last sentence of Art IX-C Sec 1(2) of the
Constitution says, “In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity,” an ad interim appointment is not a temporary
appointment. A distinction was made between the two in
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v IAC, where it was
held that an ad interim appointment as defined in
Black’s Law Dictionary is one that is appointed to fill a
vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during
the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular
incumbent. But such is not the meaning nor the use
intended in the context of Phil. law. Ad interim is used to
denote the manner in which said appointments were
made, that is, done by the President, in the meantime,
while the body, which is originally vested with the power
or appointment, is unable to act.
- Although the 1935 Consti did not have the provision
prohibiting temporary or acting appointments, this Court
then decided such an appointment in Nacionalista Party
v Bautista as unconstitutional declaring that, “It would
be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of
the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent
Commissioner than to designate one to act temporarily.
Likewise, In Brillantes v Yorac, decided under the
present Constitution, this Court struck down as
unconstitutional the designation by then Pres. Aquino of
Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC.
- Art. IX-A §1 should be harmonized with Art. VII §16. for
to hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires
the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointments before the appointees can assume
office will negate the President’s power to make ad
interim appointments.
- The original draft of Art. VII §16 did not provide for ad
interim appointments, however, it was reinstated to
avoid interruptions in vital govt services that would
result from prolonged vacancies in govt offices. The ad
interim appointment has since been practiced by
Presidents Aquino, Ramos and Estrada.
2. Justiciability of the case: The Court determined the
justiciability of the case by tackling the requisites of
judicial review raised by the respondents which they
claimed to be lacking (actual case/controversy was not
raised)
> personal and substantial interest of the party
Petitioner has a personal and material stake in the
resolution of the case. If Benipayo’s appointment is
unlawful, petitioner’s reassignment is without legal
basis; if it is lawful, then she has no cause to
complain provided that it was done in accordance
with the Civil Service Law. Because of her personal
and material stake in the resolution of the
constitutionality of respondent’s assumption of
office, she has locus standi to raise it as a
constitutional issue
> exercise of judicial review must be pleaded at the
earliest opportunity
It is not the date of filing of the petition that
determines whether the constitutional issue was
raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest
opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise
it in the pleadings before a competent court that
can resolve the same, such that, “if it is not raised in
the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial,
and if not considered at the trial, it cannot be
considered on appeal.”
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad
interim appointments when she filed her petition
before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity
for pleading the constitutional issue before a
competent body.
> the constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the
case
The Respondents claim that the legality of
petitioner’s reassignment from the EID to the Law
Dept. is the issue. The Court, however, held that
unless the constitutionality of Benipayo’s
appointment is determined, the legality of
petitioner’s assignment cannot be determined,
therefore the lis mota of this case is clearly the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
3. The phrase “without reappointment” in Art. IX-C §1(2)
applies only to appointments by the President and
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
regardless of WoN such person appointed completes the
term of office.
Reasoning The phrase “without reappointment” does
not apply to the renewal of appointments to Benipayo,
Tuason and Borra because there were no previous
appointments that were confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments.
- The renewal of their appointments was by-passed by
the Commission on Appointments. It was not acted upon
on the merits at the close of the session of Congress.
There was no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. It is
therefore neither fixed nor an unexpired term. Absent
such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee as
recognized in Sec.17 of the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments. Moreover, their appointments were all for
a fixed term expiring on Feb. 2, 2008, clearly not in
breach of the 7 year term limit.
4. The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly
authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC
personnel and the person holding that office, in a de jure
capacity, is Benipayo. He has full authority to exercise all
the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim
appointment remains effective. Moreover, in COMELEC
Resolution no. 3300, the COMELEC en banc, approved
the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel
during the election period.
5. Because Benipayo is held to be the lawful COMELEC
chairman, the Officer-in-Charge did not act in excess of
his jurisdiction, in the disbursement of their salaries.
Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Concurred with by JJs: Davide, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De
Leon, and Sandoval-Gutierrez.
Puno and Vitug, JJs, were on official leave.
Consti Provisions cited:
Art. IX-A §1 The Consti Commissions… COMELEC… shall
be independent
Art. IX-C §1(2) Nature and term of appointment of
Comelec chairman and commissioner: (7 years w/o
reappointment). In no case shall there be appointment in
a temporary or acting capacity.
Art. VII §16 power of Pres. to make appointments
during recess of Congress… effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress.
CONSTANTINO V CUISA
TINGA; October 13, 2005
FACTS
- This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
assails said contracts which were entered into pursuant
to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for
1992. It seeks to enjoin respondents from executing
additional debt-relief contracts pursuant thereto.
- The Financing Program was devised under President
Corazon Aquino to manage the country’s external debt
problem through a negotiation-oriented debt strategy by
means of two debt-relief options: 1) cash buyback of
portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount, or 2)
allowed creditors to convert existing Philippine debt
instruments into bonds/securities.
- Petitioners challenge the Program as follows:
1. That it is beyond the powers granted to the
President under Section 20, Article VII of the
Constitution:
The President may contract or guarantee foreign
loans in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines…
That buyback and securitization/bond conversion
schemes are neither “loans” nor “guarantees,”
and hence, beyond the power of the President.
2. That assuming the above as constitutionally
permissible, it is only the President who may exercise
the power to enter into these contract and such power
may not be delegated.
3. That the Program was made available for debts
fraudulently contracted or void. Petitioners rely on
1992 Commission on Audit report identifying several
“behest” loans contracted or guaranteed fraudulently
during the Marcos regime. That since these were
eligible for buyback or conversion, they would be void
for being waivers of the Republic’s right to repudiate
the void or fraudulently contracted loans.
- For their part, respondents dispute the points raised by
petitioners. They also question the standing of
petitioners and the justiciability of the issues presented.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi.
2. WON the case is ripe for adjudication
Substantive
3. WON the scope of section 20, Article VII includes
bond-conversion and buyback
4. WON the power to incur foreign debts is expressly
reserved by the Constitution in the person of the
President and may not be delegated
5. WON there has been grave abuse of discretion and
violation of constitutional policies
HELD
1. The Court’s cognizance of this petition will not only
determine the validity or invalidity of the subject pre-
termination (buyback) and bond-conversion of foreign
debts but also create a precedent for other debts or
debt-related contract executed or to be executed in
behalf of the President by the Secretary of Finance.
Seen in this light, the transcendental importance of the
issues herein cannot be doubted.
- Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the
context of alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a
relatively minor significance. By the very nature of the
power wielded by the President, the effect of using this
power on the economy, and the well-being in general of
the Filipino nation, the Court must set aside the
procedural barrier of standing and rule on the justiciable
issues presented by the parties.
2. The Court holds that some issues are not ripe for
adjudication.
One such issue raised by petitioners is the allegation
that respondents waived the Philippines’ right to
repudiate void and fraudulently contracted loans is not
justiciable.
- Records do not show whether the so-called behest
loans were subject of the debt-relief contracts.
- Moreover, asserting a right to repudiate void or
fraudulently contracted loans begs the question of
whether indeed particular loans are void or fraudulently
contracted. Petitioners’ theory depends on a prior
annulment or declaration of nullity of the pre-existing
loans, which thus far have not been submitted to this
Court.
- As a final point, petitioners have no real basis to fret
over a possible waiver of the right to repudiate void
contracts. Respondents unequivocally assert that the
Republic did not waive any such right, it having
incorporated a “no-waiver” clause in the agreements.
- Obiter Many advocates that the Republic should
renege on obligations that are considered as
“illegitimate.” However, such course of action would
have adverse repercussions. Among the consequences
is that the standard cross-default provisions in Philippine
foreign loans may come into effect, in which case,
default even in one loan would be ground for other
creditors to declare default on other loans.
- In any event, the discretion on the matter lies not with
the Courts but with the executive.
3. On Bond-Conversion
- An investor who purchases a bond is lending money to
the issuer, and the bond represents the issuer’s
contractual promise to pay interest and repay principal
according to specific terms. The language of the
Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows
the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It
makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of
loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt
instruments are more onerous than others.
- The only restriction that the Constitution provides aside
from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is
that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by
law. In this regard, it is noted RA 245 as amended by PD
142 entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance
to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures Authorized by
Law, and for Other Purposes, allows foreign loans to be
contracted in the form of bonds thus:
… the Secretary of Finance, with the approval of the
President… after consultation with the Monetary
board, is authorized to borrow… and to issue therefore
evidences of indebtedness… may be of the following
types: Treasury bonds…
- Also under the foregoing provision, sovereign bonds
may also be provided for the purchase, redemption, or
refunding of nay obligation, either direct or guaranteed,
of the Philippine Government.
On the Buyback Scheme
- It is true that in the separation of powers, it is Congress
that manages the country’s coffers by virtue of its taxing
and spending powers. However, the law-making
authority has promulgated a law ordaining an automatic
appropriations provision for debt servicing. The Court in
Guingona v. Carague, held:
Debt service is not included in the General
Appropriation Act, since authorization therefore
already exists under RA 4860 and 245, as amended,
and PD 1967. In the light of this subsisting
authorization, Congress does not concern itself with
details for implementation by the Executive. Upon
such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be
said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive.
- Specific legal authority for the buyback even without
further action from Congress is established under
Section 2 of RA 240 thus:
… the Secretary of Finance shall cause to be paid out
of any moneys in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated… any interest falling due, or accruing on
any portion of the public debt authorized by law. He
shall also cause to be paid out… the principal amount
of any obligations which have matured… or, if
redeemed prior to maturity, such portion of the
face value as is prescribed by the terms and
conditions under which such obligations were
originally issued.
- Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the
grant of the foreign borrowing power. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions
as may be necessary to effectuate its object and
purpose.
- Also, the Constitution, as a rule, does not enumerate –
let alone enumerate all – the acts which the President (or
any other public officer) may not do, and the fact that
the Constitution does not explicitly bar the President
from exercising a power does not mean that he or she
does not have that power.
4. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of
Finance implement the decision of the President to
execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by
the fact that the process of establishing and executing
strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep
within the realm of the expertise of the Department of
Finance. If the President were to personally exercise
every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, this would
negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof are
accorded, and would unduly hamper the President’s
effectivity in running the government.
- Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified
political agency. Though the President is the Executive
of the Government and no other, the heads of the
executive department occupy political positions and hold
office in an advisory capacity and should be of the
President’s bosom confidence and alter ego in the
matters of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority subject to the
direction of the President. And it is upon the Secretary
of Finance as the alter ego of the President to deal with
matters regarding the sound and efficient management
of the financial resources of Government.
- And although there are powers vested in the President
that may not be delegated are only those that call for
the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those
exercised by co-equal branches of government, e.g.
power to suspend the write of habeas corpus and
proclaim martial law (Par. 3 Sec 11, Art VII) and the
benign prerogative of mercy (Par. 6 Sec 11, Art VII), the
power to contract or guarantee foreign debts does not
fall within the same exceptional class.
- Another important qualification is that the Secretary of
Finance or any designated alter ego of the President is
bound to secure the latter’s prior consent to or
subsequent ratification of his acts. A lack of showing
that President Aquino countermanded the acts of
respondents leads us to conclude that the said acts
carried presidential approval.
5. Petitioners cite an article by Jude Esguerra that under
the Program a best case scenario would give a yield
significantly lower than estimated by the Program and a
worst case scenario where what can be gained in the
best case is lesser than what can be lost in this worst
case. In addition, petitioners postulate a more simple
rescheduling agreement in place of the debt-relief
package. Petitioners allege therefore that the Program
violates constitutional state policies to promote a social
order that will “ensure the prosperity and independence
of the nation” and free “the people from poverty, foster
social justice in all phases of national development,” and
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
- The Court held that the policies set by the Constitution
as litanized are not a panacea that can annul every
governmental act sought to be struck down. Insofar as
the case at bar, the court can make no conclusion other
than that respondents’ efforts were geared towards
debt-relief with marked positive results and towards
achieving the aforementioned constitutional policies.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN
- Indubitably, former President Aquino’s decision to
honor outstanding debts of the Republic was purely an
executive call; hence, beyond judicial scrutiny. For this
reason, neither can respondents be faulted for
implementing the Program executed pursuant to that
constitutional executive policy.
- Also, that petitioners question the legality of several
foreign loans necessitates a review of the assailed
contracts. Because the petitioners failed to substantiate
the charges, the argument cannot be addressed. A
determination of the validity of such allegations requires
a review of factual matters. The Supreme Court is not a
trier or facts. The proper action for petitioners is to file
their petition in the lower courts, which had concurrent
jurisdiction over the subject matter and which are better
equipped to conduct a firsthand examination of factual
evidence in support of their allegations. This
notwithstanding, there is nothing in this decision to
preclude the Department of Justice or the Office of the
Ombudsman from initiating an investigation of the
alleged fraudulent loans. Suppletorily, probable cause
must be shown in order that prosecution may be brought
to bear.
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS V MINISTER
FERNANDO; October 30, 1981
- Free Telephone Workers Union, herein petitioner,
attacks the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg.
13036 (BP 130) in so far as it amends Art. 264 of the
36
"In labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely
affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to
public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of
energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones, the
Minister of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one
Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor and
Employment the power and discretion to assume
jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory
arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission,
and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective
bargaining. Petitioner contends that [a] BP 30 is an
undue delegation of legislative powers [b] such
conferment of authority may also run contrary to the
assurance of the State to the workers' right to self-
organization and collective bargaining.
- Procedure
+ Sept. 14, 1981 notice of strike with the Ministry of
Labor for unfair labor practices stating the following
grounds: 1) Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a
Code of Conduct; 2) Illegal terminations and suspensions
of officers and members as a result of the
implementation of said Code of Conduct; and 3)
Automatic treatment as of sick leaves as AWOL with
suspensions, in violation of Collective Bargaining
Agreement
+ Sept. 15, 1981, notification to the Ministry of
compliance with the 2/3 strike vote and other formal
requirements of the law and Implementing Rules.
Conciliation meetings called by the Minister followed.
+ Sept. 25, 1981, respondent certified the labor dispute
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the
private respondent's establishment.
+ Hearing at NLRC was set on Sept. 28. Petitioner filed
petition to SC the next day. Court issued resolution for
respondents to file answer. After parties were duly heard
y SC on Oct. 8, case was ripe for decision.
ISSUES
1. WON BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of
Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing
or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting
the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify
the same to the NLRC is unconstitutional for being
violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative
power
2. WON there is unconstitutional application of BP 130
HELD
1. The delegation to the Minister of Labor of the power
to assume jurisdiction in a labor dispute likely to affect
the national interest or to certify the same to the NLRC
for arbitration does not constitute undue delegation of
legislative powers.
Reasoning:
First. It lays down the premise. The power which would
be denied the Minister of Labor by virtue of such
has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the
employers shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
The Minister may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to
ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may
issue to enforce the same."
principle is within the competence of the President, who
in its opinion can best determine national interests, but
only when a strike is in progress. Such admission is
qualified by the assumption that the President "can
make law." But what possesses significance for the
purpose of this litigation is that it is the President who
"shall have control of the ministries." It points that the
adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in
the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially
presidential character.37 Then it cites the expanse of the
powers of the President by the provisions in the
Constitutions both of 1935 and 1973. (Note: My reading
here is that the power by the Minister of Labor to
assume jurisdiction in a labor dispute is an executive
function)
Second. The ponencia cited precedence to develop its
argument. Villena v. Secretary of Interior says that "all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive.” In other words, without minimizing the
importance of the heads of the various departments,
their personality is in reality but the projection of that of
the President. (Note: It used this doctrine in a later case
Phil. American Management Co. v. Phil. American
Management Employees Association)
Third. Even on the assumption that the authority
conferred to the Minister of Labor partakes of a
legislative character, still no case of an unlawful
delegation of such power may be discerned. It cites Edu
v. Ericta: To determine whether or not there is an undue
delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions
when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
and what is the scope of his authority. [a] Distinction
between delegation of power to make the laws which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation
of authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no
valid objection can be made; [b] To avoid unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of' principle and lays down fundamental policy;
[c] Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. In
People v Exconde: regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be
37
Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: "The President
shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the
Philippines." Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation that it is a
presidential system that obtains in our government. Thus: "All powers
vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and
the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon
any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless
the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise."
not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards
that the law prescribes. BP 130 did not violate these
guidelines.
Fourth. The ponencia stressed the ruling in People v.
Vera, saying that though scholarly and erudite, it
aroused apprehension for being to rigid. The liberal
approach in the ruling in Edu v. Ericta as reinforced in
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration v. Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices recognized that:
“It would be self-defeating in the extreme if the
legislation intended to cope with the grave social and
economic problems of the present and foreseeable
future would founder on the rock of an unduly restrictive
and decidedly unrealistic meaning to be affixed to the
doctrine of non-delegation.”
- Also quoting Professor Jaffe: “The occasions for
delegating power to administrative offices [could be]
compassed by a single generalization. Thus: Power
should be delegated where there is agreement that a
task must be performed and it cannot be effectively
performed by the legislature without the assistance of a
delegate or without an expenditure of time so great as
to lead to the neglect of equally important business.
Delegation is most commonly indicated where the
relations to be regulated are highly technical or where
their regulation requires a course of continuous
decision.”
2. In the absence of factual determinations (by the
Ministry of Labor and the NLRC), this Court is not in a
position to rule on whether or not there is
unconstitutional application.
Decision
[1] No. BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of
Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing
or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting
the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify
the same to the NLRC is NOT on its face unconstitutional
since there was no undue delegation of legislative
power.
[2] There is no ruling on the question of whether or not
BP 130 has been unconstitutionally applied in this case,
for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization
and free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged,
disputed by private respondent, the matter is not ripe for
judicial determination
Dispositive Petition Dismissed.
Voting 11 concur, no dissent.
AYTONA V CASTILLO
BENGZON; January 19, 1962
FACTS
- December 29, 1961 – Pres. Carlos P. Garcia appointed
Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank.
Aytona took his oath of office on that day.
- December 30, 1961 – President-elect Diosdado
Macapagal took his oath of office
- December 31, 1961 – Macapagal issued Administrative
Order # 2 recalling, withdrawing and cancelling all ad
interim appointments made by Garcia after December
13, 1961 (the date Macapagal was proclaimed as the
elected president by Congress)
- January 1, 1962 – Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo
as ad interim governor of the Central Bank
- January 2, 1962 – Both Aytona and Castillo exercised
the powers of their office but Castillo informed Aytona of
his appointment. The next day, Aytona was prevented
from holding office
- Aytona instituted a quo warranto which challenged
Castillo's right to exercise the powers of Governor of
Central bank. Aytona claims he was:
1. validly appointed
2. qualified for the post
3. and that the subsequent appointment and
qualification of Castillo was void because the
occupation was occupied by him
- Castillo argued that the appointment of Aytona had
been revoked by AO 2.
ISSUE
WON the new President (Macapagal) had the power to
issue the order of the cancellation of the ad interim
appointments made by the past President (Garcia) even
after the appointees had already qualified.
HELD
Castillo is the rightful governor of the Central Bank.
- December 29, 1961 – Garcia sent to the Commission
on Appointments (not yet in session) a communication
submitting for confirmation ad interim appointments of
several officials including the Central Bank Governor in
the person of Aytona. There were three other
communications regarding the same matter submitted
on the same day.
- All in all there were 350 midnight appointments by
Garcia.
- In revoking the appointments, Macapagal acted based
on the following reasons:
1)outgoing President should have refrained from
filling vacancies to give the new President the
opportunity to consider names in the light of new
plicies
2)Scandalously hurried appointments in mass do
not fall within the intent and spirit of the
constitutional provision authorizing the issuance
of ad interim appointments
3)Appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust
because they were issued only upon the condition
that the appointee would immediately qualify
obviously to prevent a recall by the incoming
 President which would result to those deserving
the appointment of the new President to be
declined and by-passed
4)Abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment
and qualifications evinced a desire on the part of
the outgoing President to merely subvert the
policies of the incoming administration
- Many of the persons mentioned in the December 29
communication did not qualify.
- It is Malacanang's practice to submit ad interim
appointments only when the Committee on
Appointments is in session so that only those who have
accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted
for confirmation.
- It is common sense to believe that after the
proclamation of the election of Macapagal, Garcia's
administration was no more than a caretaker
administration. He was supposed to prepare for the
orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President
and he should not do acts which he ought to know,
would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor.
- The appointment of 350 people in one night could be
regarded as abuse of Presidential prerogatives.
- When the President makes appointments with the
consent of the Commission of Appointments, he has the
benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim
appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is
bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection
either by previous consultation with the members of the
Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the
reason for such selection.
- But in this case Garcia should have been doubly careful
because:
– the Commission that would consider the
appointments is different from the one existing
during the time the appointments were made
– the names are to be submitted by his
successor who may not fully approve of the
appointments
- The Court chose not to disregard Administrative Order
2 and cancelled the midnight appointments. There are
precedents that once an appointment has been issued, it
cannot be reconsidered. But none of the precedents
have involved mass ad interim appointments.
QUIMSING V TAJANGLANGIT
BARRERA; February 29, 1964
FACTS
- May 20, 1960- Quimsing designated Acting Chief of
Police of Iloilo City
- Dec. 20, 1961- Pres. Garcia extended an ad-interim
appointment to Quimsing to the same position
- Dec. 28, 1961- Quimsing took his oath of office,
continued discharging functions of Chief of Police
- May 16, 1962- Quimsing’s, as well as other people’s
appointments were confirmed
- May 17, 1962- at the session of the Commission on
Appointments, a motion for reconsideration of all the
confirmed appointments was approved, and the
Commission was adjourned with no future date fixed for
its next meeting
- June 11, 1962- President Macapagal designated
Eduardo Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo.
- Hence this -Petition for prohibition to restrain Eduardo
Tajanglangit from occupying the position of Chief of
Police to which petitioner Quimsing had previously been
appointed and duly qualified and the functions of which
he was actually discharging.
ISSUE
WON Quimsing’s appointment was not lawfully
confirmed, because of the motion for reconsideration of
his confirmation, which has, to the present, remained
unacted upon
HELD
The appointment of Tajanglangit to the position of Chief
of Police of Iloilo City was null and void, because said
position was not vacant.
- The revised rules of the Commission on Appointments
provide:
“SEC. 21: …Any motion to reconsider the vote on any
appointment may be laid on the table, and this shall be a
final disposit on such a motion
“SEC. 22: Notice of confirmation or disapproval of an
appointment shall not be sent to the President of the
Philippines before the expiration of the period for its
reconsideration, or while a motion for reconsideration is
pending.”
- The Commission had not disapproved of Quimsing’s
appointment, it was merely under reconsideration. It has
been established that on July 19, 1962, Quimsing’s
appointment was delivered to Malacanang. This, as well
as the provisions above, supports the conclusion that the
laying of a motion for reconsideration on the table does
not have the effect of withholding the effectivity of the
confirmation, nor is it synonymous with disapproval of
the appointment. In fact, it is recognition that the
appointment was confirmed.
PEOPLE V VERA
LAUREL; November 16, 1937
FACTS
- 15 October 1931: information for criminal case “People
v. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.” filed in CFI Manila. In the
said case, HSBC, being the offended party, intervened as
private prosecutor.
- 8 January 1934: after a protracted trial, CFI rendered a
judgment of conviction sentencing MCU to
imprisonment.
- 26 March 1935: SC upholds sentence of conviction w/ a
slight modification of the duration of imprisonment.
- 17 December 1935: MFR and 4 motions for new trial by
MCU denied by Phil SC.
- 18 December 1935: final judgment was entered by Phil
SC. MCU seeks to elevate the case to US SC.
- November 1936: US SC denies petition for certiorari.
- 24 November 1936: Phil Sc denies MCU’s petition for
leave to file a 2nd alternative MFR or new trial; &
remands the case to CFI Manila for execution of the
judgment.
- 27 November 1936: MCU files application for probation
under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the Phil
Legislature. CFI Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding,
refers the application to the Insular Probation Office
(IPO)
- 18 June 1937: IPO recommends denial of MCU’s
application for probation
- 5 April 1937: hearing of the petition before CFI Manila,
7th branch with Judge Jose O. Vera presiding. HSBC &
the Fiscal of the City of Manila file separate oppositions
to the granting of probation. HSBC attacks
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 on the following
grounds: equal protection of the laws (its
applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands);
undue delegation of legislative power (section 11 of
the said Act endows prov’l boards w/ power to make said
law effective or otherwise in their respective provinces).
- 28 June 1937: Judge Jose O. Vera of CFI Mnla
promulgates resolution with a finding that MCU is
innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted but
denying the latter's petition for probation.
- 3 July 1937: counsel for MCU files exception to the
resolution denying probation & notice of intention to file
MFR. This was followed by a series of alternative motions
for new reconsideration or new trial. A motion for leave
to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33
(34) attorneys was also filed. (Attorney Eulalio Chaves, 1
of the 34, subsequently filed a petition for leave to
withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground
that the motion was circulated at a banquet given by
counsel for MCU & that he signed the same "without
mature deliberation & purely as a matter of courtesy.”)
HSBC files opposition to motion for intervention.
- 6 August 1937: the Fiscal of the City of Mnla files
motion w/ TC for issuance of an order to execute
judgment of Phil SC in said case & to commit MCU to jail
in obedience to said judgment.
- 19 August 1937 is the date set for hearing on the
various motions for CFI’s consideration. On this same
date, this instant case was field before Phil SC to put an
end to what they alleged was an interminable
proceeding in CFI Mnla.
- Note Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While
a probation case may look into the circumstances
attending the commission of the offense, this does not
authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this
court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom
its own admission reliance was merely had on the
printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. If
each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the
privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court,
there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos
would result. <emphasis on the hierarchy in the
Philippine judicial system>
ISSUES
1. WON the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been
properly raised in these proceedings
2. if YES, WON said Act is constitutional
a. WON Act No. 4221 encroaches upon the pardoning
power of the Executive
b. WON section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power
c. WON the Probation Act violates Bill of Rights
provisions on equal protection of the laws
3. WON the entire Act should be avoided
HELD
1. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will
not be determined by the courts unless that question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and
is necessary to a determination of the case. <lis mota>
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions BUT
resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies,
particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of
law even if available, are not plain, speedy and
adequate. <e.g. in mandamus proceedings, in an action
of quo warranto, in habeas corpus proceedings, on an
application for injunction to restrain action under the
challenged statute, & even on an application for
preliminary injunction where the determination of the
constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the
case, or through petitions for prohibition and certiorari.
- Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands,
section 516: Philippine SC is granted concurrent
jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance
over inferior tribunals or persons, and original
jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such
courts are exercising functions without or in excess of
their jurisdiction.
- General rule: the question of the validity of the
criminal statute must be raised by a defendant in the
trial court and be carried regularly in review to the
Supreme Court. BUT in cases where a new act seriously
affected numerous persons and extensive property
rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions,
the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the
issue of the act's validity promptly before it and decide
in the interest of the orderly administration of justice.
- The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ
issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed
to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the
inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it
is not legally vested. General rule: the merit of
prohibition will not lie where the inferior court has
jurisdiction independent of the statute the
constitutionality of which is questioned. BUT where the
inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction
exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be
prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that
statute. A CFI sitting in probation proceedings is a court
of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings
is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine
Legislature. It is unquestionable that the constitutional
issue has been squarely presented not only before this
court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by
the private prosecution.
- The power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to
permanently refuse to do so. The authority to define and
fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes
the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for
the purpose of executing the statute, elements of
consideration which would be otherwise beyond the
scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve
from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained
according to the methods by it provided belongs to the
executive department.
- Cooley on Constitutional Limitations: A court will not
consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a
statute by one who has no interest in defeating it
because his rights are not affected by its operation. The
power to declare a legislative enactment void is one
which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human
judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where
he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and
official oath decline the responsibility.
- General rule: only those who are parties to a suit may
question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a
judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where
the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of
the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality
will be considered on its being brought to the attention
of the court by persons interested in the effect to be
given the statute.
- General rule: the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised
by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the
trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not
considered on appeal. BUT courts, in the exercise of
sounds discretion, may determine the time when a
question affecting the constitutionality of a statute
should be presented. In criminal cases, the question may
be raised for the first time at any stage of the
proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Same
is true in civil cases if it appears that a determination of
the question is necessary to a decision of the case. Also,
a constitutional question will be considered by an
appellate court at any time, where it involves the
jurisdiction of the court below
- General rule: the person who impugns the validity of
a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The People of
the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having Act No.
4221 set aside. Of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-
settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of
its own laws. The constitution is the supreme law, and to
its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people
must bow. The state is always interested where the
integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
- A judge should not judicially declare a statute
unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality is
tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in
order to determine the right of a party litigant. An officer
on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its
provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that
he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in
enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if
the statute be unconstitutional. Executive officers (e.g.,
the state auditor and state treasurer) should not decline
to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a
statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is
unconstitutional.
- The mere fact that the Probation Act has been
repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not
been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila
but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him
as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People
of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity.
For courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only
when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not
been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to
allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are
justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as
valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.
- Is the determination of the constitutionality of Act No.
4221 is necessary to resolve the instant case? While the
court will meet the question with firmness, where its
decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and
just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to
waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on
other points.
- General rule: the determination of a constitutional
question is necessary whenever it is essential to the
decision of the case, as where the right of a party is
founded solely on a statute the validity of which is
attacked. There is no doubt that Cu Unjieng draws his
privilege to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now
being assailed.
- Moreover, the Probation Act is a new addition to our
statute books and its validity has never before been
passed upon by the courts; many persons accused and
convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for
probation; some of them are already on probation; more
people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in
the future; and the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has
been at large for a period of about four years since his
first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to
prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public
policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221
be now resolved.
- Also, in Phil SC’s ruling in an analogous situation in Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, the Court said: "Inasmuch as the
property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand
merchants are affected by these proceedings, and
inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet
interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public
welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we
have determined to overrule the defense of want of
jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue.
We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a
relaxation of the general rule." Phil SC’s ruling on this
point was sustained by the US SC. “A more binding
authority in support of the view we have taken can not
be found.”
2. <the essence of judicial duty> It is the office and duty
of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by
clear implication from the provisions of section 2,
subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the
Constitution, may declare an act of the national
legislature invalid because in conflict with the
fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to
enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not
hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting
aside a statute in conflict therewith.
- Fundamental criteria: all reasonable doubts should
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is
presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The
members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive
have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it
must be presumed that they have been true to this oath
and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law
they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The
courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to
overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three
grand departments of the governments. The judiciary
ought to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed
through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief
Executive.
- The President of the Philippines had already expressed
his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation
Act. In a message dated September 1, 1937, he
recommended to the NA its immediate repeal, resulting
in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the NA repealing the
probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein
mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President
on September 13, 1937, much against his wish. In
vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his
constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons
which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but
his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination
of actual controversies submitted for our determination.
Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these
circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on
way or another and prevent us from taking what in our
opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given
case. We are independent of the Executive no less than
of the Legislative department of our government —
independent in the performance of our functions,
undeterred by any consideration, free from politics,
indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the
accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as
we understand it.
- The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on
three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches
upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and
(3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
a. Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act
No. 4221 vests in the Governor-General of the
Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and
reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is
now vested in the President of the Philippines (A7,
s11(6)). Our Constitution also makes specific mention of
"commutation" and of the power of the executive to
impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions,
restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper; and
to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the NA. But
the pardoning power has remained essentially the same.
- Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the
Chief Executive. The exercise of the power may not,
therefore, be vested in anyone else. Where the
pardoning power is conferred on the executive without
express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and
the legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor
delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the
proper exercise thereof.
- Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case: US SC
ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending
sentenced was void. Under the common law the power
of the court was limited to temporary suspension and
the right to suspend sentence absolutely and
permanently was vested in the executive branch of the
government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of
Congress to establish probation by statute was
conceded.
- US v Murray: when a person sentenced to
imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his
sentence, that court has no power under the Probation
Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though
the term at which sentence was imposed had not yet
expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of
the probation Act was not considered but was assumed.
US SC denied the right of the district courts to suspend
sentence. The court pointed out the necessity for action
by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation
powers in the future.
- Riggs v US: the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth
Circuit held that the constitutionality of Probation Act of
March 4, 1925 have been sustained by the Circuit Court
of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the
same was held in no manner to encroach upon the
pardoning power of the President.
- 1916: US SC, in plain and unequivocal language,
pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to
enact probation laws. A federal probation law was
actually enacted in 1925. The constitutionality of the Act
has been assumed by the US SC in 1928 and
consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a
number of earlier cases. The Philippine Legislature, like
the US Congress, may legally enact a probation law
under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and
all penal offenses. Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has
defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their
violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated
the desire to vest in the courts -- particularly the trial
courts -- large discretion in imposing the penalties which
the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that
justice can best be served by vesting this power in the
courts, they being in a position to best determine the
penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly
circumstanced, should suffer. <Revised Penal Code,
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Parole Act, Juvenile
Delinquency Law, (Adult) Probation Law, etc show the
intention of the legislature to “humanize” the penal
laws.>
- Some US cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to
vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of
a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so
would encroach upon the pardoning power of the
executive. Other cases, however, hold contra. Phil SC
elects to follow the long catena of authorities holding
that the courts may be legally authorized by the
legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of
a system of probation however characterized.
- Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they
the same. They are actually district and different from
each other, both in origin and in nature. Probation, the
power to suspend sentence, was always a part of the
judicial power. It simply postpones the judgment of the
court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and
liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and
become operative when judgment is rendered. The
power to grant reprieves and pardons, on the other
hand, was always a part of the executive power. A
pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the
punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that
in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he
had never committed the offense. It removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil
rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him a new credit and capacity.
- Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve
and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass vs.
State: the power to suspend the sentence does not
conflict with the power of the Governor to grant
reprieves. A reprieve postpones the execution of the
sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for
an indefinite time. A commutation is but to change the
punishment assessed to a less punishment.
- State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court: A "pardon" is
an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted
with the execution of the laws which exempts the
individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment
the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is a
remission of guilt, a forgiveness of the offense.
"Commutation" is a remission of a part of the
punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one
originally imposed. "Reprieve" or "respite" is the
withholding of the sentence for an interval of time, a
postponement of execution, a temporary suspension of
execution.
- The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning
power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect
to those serving their probationary sentences, remains
as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never
been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the
court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.
b. Under the Consti, gov’t powers are distributed among
3 coordinate and substantially independent organs:
legislative, executive and judicial. Each department
derives its authority from the Constitution, the highest
expression of popular will. Each has exclusive
cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction,
supreme within its own sphere.
- The power to make laws (the legislative power) is
vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec.
12) and in a unicameral National Assembly by the
Constitution (A6,s1). The Philippine Legislature or the
National Assembly may not escape its duties and
responsibilities by delegating that power to any other
body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas
delegata non delegare potest, an accepted corollary of
the principle of separation of powers.
- The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of
legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits
of exceptions like: (1) delegation of legislative powers to
local authorities; (2) to such agencies in US territories as
Congress may select; (3) to the people at large; and (4)
to those whom the Constitution itself delegates such
legislative powers (e.g., the President). The case before
us does not fall under any of these exceptions.
- Test of Undue Delegation: to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions
when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing
was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
delegate of the legislature. BUT to a certain extent
matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of
the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does
not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
- In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various
provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all.
The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If
the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline
to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not
susceptible of any other interpretation.
- The true distinction is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made.
- It is true that laws may be made effective on certain
contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or
the adoption by the people of a particular community.
The legislature may delegate a power not legislative
which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to
ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated.
There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining
the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the
taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process
common to all branches of the government.
- The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative
will must, of course, come from Congress, but the
ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act
shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may
designate. The legislature, then may provide that a
contingencies leaving to some other person or body the
power to determine when the specified contingencies
has arisen. In the case at bar, the various provincial
boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power
of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their
respective provinces.
- While the legislature may suspend a law, or the
execution or operation of a law, a law may not be
suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law
to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be
general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for
particular localities. Here the sovereign and absolute
power resides in the people; and the legislature can only
exercise what is delegated to them according to the
constitution. It is manifestly contrary to the first
principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the
spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen
should enjoy privileges and advantages which are
denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant
one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or
actions from which all others under like circumstances
are exempted.
- True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular
locality different from those applicable to other localities.
But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely
local in character which should receive different
treatment in different localities placed under different
circumstances. While we do not deny the right of local
self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of
purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or
for the people of small communities to pass upon, we
believe that in matters of general of general legislation
like that which treats of criminals in general, and as
regards the general subject of probation, discretion may
not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute
as provided in Act No. 4221. The validity of a law is not
tested by what has been done but by what may be done
under its provisions.
- A great deal of latitude should be granted to the
legislature not only in the expression of what may be
termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and
execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would
become oppressive and yet imbecile." The mass of
powers of government is vested in the representatives of
the people and that these representatives are no further
restrained under our system than by the express
language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by
particular provisions which by clear intendment, have
that effect. (Angara case)
- We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
this reason, unconstitutional and void.
c. This basic individual right sheltered by the
Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate
instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many
constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and
eminent domain. BUT what may be regarded as a denial
of the equal protection of the laws in a question not
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every
case can be formulated.
- Class legislation discriminating against some and
favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a
reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or
capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to
be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class.
- In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality
may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of
legislative power, although perhaps this is not
necessarily the result in every case. While inequality
may result in the application of the law and in the
conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is
not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may
be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation
Act creates a situation in which discrimination and
inequality are permitted or allowed.
- There is no difference between a law which denies
equal protection and a law which permits of such denial.
A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions.
Statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of
their effect in operation. If the law has the effect of
denying the equal protection of the law it is
unconstitutional.
3. In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is
against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will
resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional
provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid,
and is so independent and separable that its removal will
leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act
substantially unaffected by the process.
- Where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the
Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be
enforced. The void provisions must be eliminated
without causing results affecting the main purpose of the
Act, in a manner contrary to the intention of the
Legislature. What remains must express the legislative
will, independently of the void part, since the court has
no power to legislate.
- In the case at bar, section 11 (which makes the
Probation Act applicable only in those provinces in which
the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries
of probation officers) is so inseparably linked with the
other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the
section what would be left is the bare idealism of the
system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large
number of people who may be deserving of the intended
beneficial result of that system.
- Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom
and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We
may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as
has been said regarding progressive interpretation and
judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are
not permitted to read into the law matters and
provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose —
not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.
The clear intention and policy of the law is not to make
the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation
officers in the provinces but to make the provinces
defray them should they desire to have the Probation
Act apply thereto.
- Probation as a development of a modern penology is a
commendable system. Probation laws have been
enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what
modern criminologist call the "individualization of the
punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the
character of the criminal and the circumstances of his
particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to
aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It takes
advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids
imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of
reform.
Decision WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221 is hereby declared
unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement
regarding costs. So ordered.
TORRES V GONZALES
FELICIANO; July 23, 1987
FACTS
- an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of
petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at the
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
- Sometime before 1979, Torres was convicted by the
CFI of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was
sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from (11) yrs,
(10) mos and (22) days to (38) yrs, (9) mos. and (1) day,
and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75. These
convictions were affirmed by the CA. The maximum
sentence would expire on 2 Nov 2000.
- On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted by
the President on condition that petitioner would "not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.
Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded
against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner
accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
- On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole
resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation
of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In
making its recommendation, the Board relied upon the
decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons
and Espuelas us. Provincial Warden of Bohol. The
petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa,
which were then pending trial before the RTC, and
convicted by the RTC of the crime of sedition, which was
then pending appeal before the IAC. Many other charges
have been brought against the petitioner, although some
have been identified as dismissed.
- On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice
wrote to the President informing her of the Resolution of
the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional
pardon previously granted to petitioner.
- On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the
conditional pardon of the petitioner.
- On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice
issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest
and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner
was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to
serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
- Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of
Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not
violate his conditional pardon since he has not been
convicted by final judgment. Petitioner also contends
that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before
he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and
accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights
under the due process clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE
WON conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is
necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested
and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance
of his original sentence.
HELD
- Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons. - It was held that the
determination if the parole had been breached rested
exclusively in the sound judgment of the GovGen and
that such determination would not be reviewed by the
courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on
parole upon the judgment of the power that had granted
it, the Court held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of
the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon
which his recommitment was ordered." Tesoro had in
effect agreed that the GovGen's determination (rather
than that of the regular courts of law) that he had
breached one of the conditions of his parole by
committing adultery while he was conditionally at
liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him.
- Sales vs. Director of Prisons - The executive clemency
is extended upon the conditions named in it, and it is
accepted upon those conditions. The governor may
withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and the
governor shall himself determine when that contingency
has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to
bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted
and agreed that, whenever the governor should
conclude that he had violated the conditions of his
parole, an executive order for his arrest and
remandment to prison should at once issue, and be
conclusive upon him.
- Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol - The Court
reaffirmed the Tesoro and Sales rulings. "Due process is
not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in
court and been afforded the opportunity to defend
himself during his trial for the crime of inciting to
sedition with which he was charged, that brought about
or resulted in his conviction, sentence and confinement
in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned
it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his
constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by
the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or
power of the Executive to determine whether a condition
or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated To
no other department of the Government [has] such
power been entrusted."
The status of our case law on the matter under
consideration may be summed up in the following
propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the
terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of
a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences
of such breach, may be either a purely executive act,
not subject to judicial scrutiny under Sec 64 of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial
act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of
a conditional pardon under Art 159 RPC. Where the
President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) RAC, no
judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime
is necessary, much less conviction therefore by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique
judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial
due process in his trial and conviction for the offense
for which he was conditionally pardoned, Sec 64 (i)
RAC is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
- A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner
herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted
by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or
crimes with which he was charged before the criminal
penalty for such subsequent offense(s) ran be imposed
upon him. Since Art 159 RPC defines a distinct,
substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is
regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must
be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment
before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed
in Art 159.
- In proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him
under Sec 64 (i) RAC; or (ii) to proceed against him
under Art 159 RPC, upon a convict who "having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
violate any of the conditions of such pardon."
Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Sec 64 (i) RAC.
Decision Petition dismissed
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
- As many as such charges may be, none of them so far
has resulted in a final conviction, without which he
cannot be recommitted under the condition of his
pardon.
- Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. (People efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled
v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59). A prima facie case only to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a
justifies the filing of the corresponding information, but patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to
proof beyond reasonable doubt is still necessary for the nation”.
conviction. - Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the
- The executive can only allege the commission of crime courts and Amnesty Commissions should apply the
and thereafter try to prove it through indubitable benefits granted to cases coming within their province or
evidence. If the prosecution succeeds, the court will then jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person
affirm the allegation of commission in a judgment of charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence
conviction. presented shows that the accused is entitled to said
The current doctrine holds that, by virtue of Sec 64(i) benefits.
RAC, the President may in his judgment determine - If the courts have to proceed to the trial or hearing of a
whether the condition of the pardon has been violated. case and decide whether the offense committed by the
- I agree that the authority is validly conferred as long as defendant comes within the terms of the Amnesty
the condition does not involve the commission of a crime Proclamation although the defendant has pleaded not
but, say, merely requires good behavior from the guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions
pardonee. can not do so.
- (This case is under “Executive” of our outline, and the
following, although really obiter, is most relevant to this
BARRIOQUINTO V FERNANDEZ
section)
FERIA; January 21, 1949
Difference of Amnesty from Pardon
FACTS Pardon Amnesty
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. -granted by the Chief -by proclamation of the
Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment, while Executive, thus a private president with the
Barrioquinto’s trial was delayed because he was arrested act which must be pleaded concurrence of the
later than Jimenez. Both submitted their cases to the and proved by the person Congress, and is a public
Guerilla Amnesty Commission pursuant to Proclamation pardoned and which the act of which the courts
No. 838 which the said commission remanded to the CFI courts may not take notice may take judicial notice.
of Zamboanga without deciding if they were entitled to of.
amnesty or not on the ground that neither of them has Granted to one after Granted to classes of
admitted to the commission of the offense. conviction persons or communities
who may be guilty,
ISSUE generally before or after
WON confession to the crime is necessary to be entitled institution of prosecution
to the benefits of Proclamation No. 8 (grant of amnesty) and sometimes after
conviction
HELD -looks forward and relieves -looks backward and
- In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the offender of consequences abolishes and puts into
Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not of crime; abolishes and oblivion the offense itself,
necessary that he should admit having committed the forgives punishment, but as though he had
criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and doesn’t abolish civil liability committed no offense
allege the amnesty as a defense. For whether or not he Doesn’t restore rights to Rights not affected as the
admits or confesses having committed the offense with hold public office, suffrage, offender is treated as if he
which he is charged, the Commissions should conduct unless expressly restored committed no crime at all
summary hearing of the witnesses both for the by pardon
complainants and the accused, on whether he has
committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance Decision respondents ordered to hear and decide the
to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war applications for amnesty of petitioners unless courts
have already decided WoN they are entitled to benefits
38
Proclamation No. 8 (dispositive): I, Manuel Roxas, President of the of amnesty.
Philippines, in accordance with the provisions of Article VII, section 10,
paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an
amnesty in favor of all persons who committed any act penalized under the SEPARATE OPINION
Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and committed during the
period from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the PERFECTO [concur]
Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and occupation.
This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against chastity or to acts
committed from purely personal motives.
To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided
by a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission only the following
elements are essential:
1. that he is charged or may be charged with an
offense penalized under the RPC, except those
against chastity or for purely personal motives;
2. that he committed the offense in furtherance of
the resistance to the enemy;
3. that it was committed during the period from
December 8, 1941, to the date when the area where
the offense was committed was actually liberated
from enemy control and occupation.
If these three elements are present in a case brought
before a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, the latter
cannot refuse to hear and decide it under the
proclamation. There is nothing in the proclamation to
even hint that the applicant for amnesty must first admit
having executed the acts constituting the offense with
which he is charged or may be charged.
TUASON [dissent]
- As to the determination of the pretended right of the
defendants, to the benefits of amnesty, the two orders of
the Commission are decisions on the merits, definite and
final as far as the Commission is concerned. The fact
that the defendants denied having committed the crime
imputed to them was cited by the Commission as ground
for its decision to turn down their application. That
circumstance was not given as ground for refusal to act.
The Commission has thus amply performed the duties
required of it by the Amnesty Proclamation in both the
matters of investigating and deciding.
- The Amnesty Commissions are executive
instrumentalities acting for and in behalf of the
President. They are not courts; they are not performing
judicial functions, and this Court has no appellate
jurisdiction over their actuations, orders or decisions.
- Mandamus is ordinarily a remedy for official inaction.
(Guanio vs. Fernandez) - The Court can order the
Commission to act but it can not tell the Commission
how to act. How or for whom a case should be decided is
a matter of judgment which courts have no jurisdiction
to control or review. The writ of mandamus will not issue
to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public
officer where the law imposes upon a public officer the
right and the duty to exercise judgment. In reference to
any matter in which he is required to act, it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court. (Blanco vs. Board of Medical Examiners)
- Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime.
When an accused says that he has not committed a
crime he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also self-
evident that where the Amnesty Proclamation imposes
certain conditions, it is incumbent upon the accused to
prove the existence of those conditions. A petition for
amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegations
against him before he is allowed to set out such facts as,
if true, would defeat the action. It is a rank inconsistency
for one to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act of
which, according to him, he is not responsible.
MONSANTO V FACTORAN
FERNAN; February 9, 1989
FACTS
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and
three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment and payment of fine. Petitioner appealed
her conviction to the SC which affirmed the same. She
filed a motion for reconsideration, but while the motion
was pending, she was extended absolute pardon on
December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos, which she
accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote Calbayog City Treasurer
requesting that she be reinstated to her former post. The
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated
to her position without the necessity of a new
appointment not earlier than the date she was extended
the absolute pardon, but she still has to pay. Seeking
reconsideration, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing
that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the government
has never been interrupted, and therefore the date of
her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982.
Petitioner contended that:
• she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of
her suspension.
• she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.
ISSUES
1. WON a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a
new appointment.
2. WON petitioner is still liable to pay civil indemnities
notwithstanding pardon.
HELD
1. Ratio Pardon is defined as “an act of grace,
proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution
of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is
bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed. It is the private, though official
act of the executive magistrate xxx and not
communicated officially to the Court. “This was
governed by the 1973 Constitution.
Reasoning
- People v. Lising
“xxx acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former
public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to
his former position and entitlement to payment of
his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him
during the period of his suspension pendent elite.
“In fact, in such a situation, the former public
official must secure a reappointment before he can
reassume his former position. xxx “
- The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal
penalty. Temporary absolute disqualification bars the
convict from public office or employment, such
disqualification to last during the term of the sentence.
- In the present case, it is not material when the pardon
was bestowed, whether before or after the conviction,
for the result would still be the same. Having accepted
the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have
abandoned her appeal and her unreversed
conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the
character of finality. Pardon implies guilt. It does
not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and
the conviction thereof, as opposed to the Ex Parte
Garland, Pelobello, and Cristobal cases. It involves
forgiveness, and not forgetfulness.
- While the Court is prepared to concede that pardon
may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal
indictment if only to give a meaning to the fiat that a
pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe
to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of
an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be
treated as if he were innocent. Pardon cannot mask
the acts constituting the crime.
- Public offices are intended primarily for the
collective protection, safety and benefit of the
common good. They cannot be compromised to
favor private interests. A pardon, albeit full and
plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power
from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to
be of bad character.
2. As for the exemption from the payment of the civil
indemnity, the Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability is
governed by RPC, and subsists notwithstanding service
of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served
by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Decision The assailed resolution of former Deputy
Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. is
affirmed.
1. Petitioner is not automatically reinstated, and must
apply for appointment to her former position.
2. Petitioner is not entitled to any backpay, and must
pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.
 MACAGA-AN V PEOPLE NO. Acts of the President in contravention with the laws, violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and
which he himself promulgated in the exercise of his prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the
FELICIANO; July 39, 1987
concurrent legislative powers, are void and of no effect. judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is
Reasoning Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports
FACTS
The benefits of amnesty were never available to the from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero
- The 22 petitioners include municipal treasurers of
petitioners under PD 1182. seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator
various municipalities of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del
- Under said law, the crimes to be amnestied must of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of
Sur, and the Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial
have been for violations of subversion laws or for Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the
Treasurer's Office of Lanao del Sur, as well as the
crimes against public order under the RPC. Among petitioner. Both officials refuse to issue the required
Provincial Auditor and the Assistant Provincial Auditor of
those disqualified from amnesty under PD 1182 are export license on the ground that the exportation of
Lanao del Sur. Petitioners were charged and convicted in
those “who, while holding public office or shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this Executive
33 cases for estafa through falsification of public and
employment… diverted public funds from the lawful Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No.
commercial documents (Article 315, in relation to Article
purpose for which they had been appropriated.” In the 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the
17 1, Revised Penal Code) in a decision of the
instant case, petitioners were charged with and Government of the Republic uf the Philippines during the
Sandiganbayan promulgated on 15 July 1981. The total
convicted of Art. 315 viz Art 171, RPC. Art. 315 is period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other
amount of Government funds (treasury warrants)
under Crimes Against Property, while Art. 171 is under purposes. The petitioner, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a
involved was somewhat over P2.7 million.
Crimes Against Public Interest. Clearly, petitioners are tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista
- The petitioners state that they applied for amnesty
among those expressly disqualified under PD 1182. Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the
through the 3rd and 11th Amnesty Commission (sic) of
Neither were petitioners able to avail of amnesty under Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing money
Lanao del Sur and Marawi City and that on 2 February
PD 1082. under this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056
1985, they were granted conditional amnesty by the said
- The offenses for which amnesty may be granted is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates
Commission, subject to the approval or final action of the
under PD 1082 are acts “penalized by existing laws in P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with,
President of the Philippines pursuant to P.D. No. 1082,
the furtherance of… resistance to the duly constituted and incidental to, the holding of the national elections to
dated 2 February 1977. The Amnesty Commission, the
authorities of the Republic…” by members and be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio
petitioners continue, endorsed the amnesty applications
supporters of MNLF, Bangsa Moro Army and other Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this
of the petitioners to the President, recommending
“anti-government groups with similar motivations and Court to prevent the respondents from disbursing,
approval thereof or grant of executive clemency to the
aims.” The “resistance” referred to is typified by the spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any
petitioners. The petitioners' amnesty applications are
offenses of rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or part of it.
said to have been submitted to the Office of the
conspiracy to commit rebellion or sedition, all offenses - Petitioners rest their case chiefly on the proposition
President by the then Presidential Assistant Victor
with a political character and all of which are that the C.A. No. 671 ( An Act Declaring a State of Total
Nituda. Former Governor Mohammed Ali Dimaporo, the
embraced in the RPC under Crimes Against Public Emergency as a Result of War involving the Philippines
petitioners further state, made written representations
Order. On the other hand, the acts of which petitioners and Authorizing the President to Promulgate Rules and
dated 27 January 1986 with former President Marcos
were convicted were ordinary crimes without any Regulations to Meet such Emergency) has ceased to
concerning the petitioners' applications during a political
political complexion and consisting simply of diversion have any force and effect, thereby rendering the
rally of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan on 22 January
of public funds to private profit. assailed Executive Orders null and void.
1986. Mr. Marcos apparently wrote on the upper
- We do not discount the possibility that the former
righthand corner of former Governor Dimaporo's letter
President did in fact act in contravention of PDs 1082 ISSUE
the following: "Approved" and signed the same with a
and 1182 by granting the amnesty claimed by WON the emergency powers delegated to the President
partly illegible date. The petitioners state, finally, that
petitioners, and that by such act, he may indeed have had ceased when Congress held its regular session
the original copies of the amnesty papers were in the
aroused expectations (however unjustified under the
possession of then Presidential Adviser Joaquin Venus
terms of existing law) in the minds of the petitioners. If HELD
and were lost or destroyed at Malacañang "during the
such be the case, then the appropriate recourse of YES. Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative
February 1986 bloodless military revolution" and could
petitioners is not to this Court, nor to any other court, when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946,
not now be located.
but rather to the Executive Department. and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226
- The respondent court held that the benefits of amnesty
Decision Petition denied. were issued without authority of law.
were never available to the petitioners under P.D. No.
- Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the
1182 as amended by PD 1429. They further contend that
duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has
the applicable law to them is PD 1082, which granted ARANETA V DINGLASAN
to be sought for in its nature, the object to be published,
amnesty to those resisting the duly constituted TUASON; August 26, 1949 the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the
authorities in several parts of Mindanao.
Constitution.
FACTS - Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
ISSUE
- The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders "In time of war or other national emergency, the
WON President Marcos’ grant of amnesty to the
of the President avowedly issued in virtue of Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
petitioners is in accordance with law.
Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L- limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations
HELD
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential to carry out a declared national policy."
buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under - The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution
prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in
duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of
emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be
said to be an emergency." It is to be presumed that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this
limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the
law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the
principle that the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers.
- The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal
the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution
either. If a new and different law were necessary to
terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation
would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain;
that which was intended to meet a temporary
emergency may become permanent law; for Congress
might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the
repeal might not meet with the approval of the
President, and the Congress might not be able to
override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the
anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers
by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them
except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take
them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to
be, the law.
- Section 4 of Act No. 671 stipulates that "the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force
and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall
otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding the
repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express
provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations
issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the
belief held by the National Assembly that there was no
necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if
having no idea about the time the Emergency Powers
Act was to be effective the National Assembly failed to
make a provision for its termination in the same way
that it did for the termination of the effects, and
incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in
repealing or annulling the rules and regulations
promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain
in force, since, in that case, the President could not only
make new rules and regulations but he could restore the
ones already annulled by the legislature.
- More anomalous than the exercise of legislative
functions by the Executive when Congress is in the
unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that
there would be two legislative bodies operating over the
same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously,
mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the
emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be
suspended while Congress was in session and be revived
after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be
eliminated. Congress by a 2/3 vote could repeal
executive orders promulgated by the President during
congressional recess, and the President in turn could
treat in the same manner, between sessions of
Congress, laws enacted by the latter. In entire good
faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the
country as they saw them, a former President
promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals
after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by
Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an
executive order on export control after Congress had
refused to approve the measure.
- Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis
in the language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the
National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency
powers of the President to the time the Legislature was
prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or
other causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:
"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as
practicable upon the convening of the Congress of
the Philippines report thereto all the rules and
regulations promulgated by him under the powers
herein granted."
- The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be
only one meeting of Congress at which the President was
to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not
say each meeting, which it could very well have said if
that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did
not think that the report mentioned in section 3 was to
be the first and last and did not think that upon the
convening of the first Congress Act No. 671 would lapse,
what reason could there be for its failure to provide in
appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent
reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to
continue making laws in the form of rules, regulations
and executive orders, were as important, or as
unimportant, as the initial one.
- As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's
statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is
enlightening and should carry much weight, considering
his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the
law. Pres. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a
special session, who recommended the enactment of the
Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author,
and who was the very President to be entrusted with its
execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good
Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period"
and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These
phrases connote automatic extinction of the law upon
the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote
that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not
to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period.
They signify that the same law, not a different one, had
to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.
- Pres. Quezon in the same paragraph of his
autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he
issued the call for a special session of the National
Assembly "when it became evident that we were
completely helpless against air attack, and that it was
most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its
next regular session which was to open on January 1,
1942." It can easily be discerned in this statement that
the conferring of enormous powers upon the President
was decided upon with specific view to the inability of
the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor
than this inability could have motivated the delegation of
powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the
National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and
continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of
democratic institutions could not have been conceived
under any circumstance short of a complete disruption
and dislocation of the normal processes of government.
The period that best comports with the constitutional
requirements and limitations, with the general context of
the law and with what we believe to be the main if not
the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period
coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a
period ending with the convening of that body.
- In setting the first regular session of Congress instead
of the first special session which preceded it as the point
of expiration of the Act, the purpose and intention of the
National Assembly is given effect. In a special session,
the Congress may "consider general legislation or only
such subjects as the President may designate." (Section
9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the
power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed
except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
- After all the criticisms that have been made against the
efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the
fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of
government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in
preference to the commingling of powers in one man or
group of men. The Filipino people by adopting
parliamentary government have given notice that they
share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this
system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is,
under this framework of government, legislation is
preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting
periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the
history of the United States, the basic features of whose
Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific
functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been
surrendered to another department, not even when that
Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was
engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the
Union. The truth is that under our concept of
constitutional government, in times of extreme perils
more than in normal circumstances the various
branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the
ability to act, are called upon to perform the duties and
discharge the responsibilities committed to them
respectively.
Decision Petitions GRANTED.
QUA CHEE GAN V DEPORTATION BOARD
BARRERA; September 30, 1963
FACTS
- Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila denying the
petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or prohibition,
certiorari, and mandamus filed by the petitioner-
appellants
- The petitioners were charged before the Deportation
Board (DB) with having purchased $130,000.00 US
dollars without the necessary license from the Central
Bank of the Philippines and having remitted the same to
HK; and three of the petitioner-appellants with having
attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and US
Governments in order to evade prosecution for said
unauthorized purchase of US dollars.
- After filing of deportation charges, presiding member
of the DB issued a warrant of arrest for the said aliens
but upon filing of a surety bond and cash bond, the
petitioner-appelants were provisionally set free.
- The petitioner-appellants then filed a joint motion to
dismiss the charges on the grounds that (1) deportation
charges do not constitute legal ground for deportation of
aliens and (2) the DB has no jurisdiction to entertain
such charges, but was denied by the DB. The petitioner-
appellants then filed a petition for habeas corpus
and/or prohibition which was remanded to the CFI of
Manila. The CFI issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, restraining DB from hearing the deportation
charges against the petitioners, pending final
termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition
proceedings. DB filed its answer to the original petition,
maintaining that the DB, as an agent of the Prexi, has
jurisdiction over the charges and the authority to order
their arrest. CFI dismissed the petition, hence this
appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON the deportation charges constitute legal ground
form deportation of the petitioner-appellants
2. WON, conceding without deciding that the President
can personally order the arrest of the alien complained
of, such power can be delegated by him to the DB
HELD
1. Yes. The act of profiteering, hoarding, or
blackmarketing of US dollars violate Central Bank
regulations and could be treated as ECONOMIC
SABOTAGE, which is a ground for deportation under RA
503 amending Sec 37 of CA 613.
2. No. Official functions requiring the exercise of
discretion such as the power to arrest cannot be
delegated to an agent of the President.
Obiter
2 ways to deport an undesirable alien:
• Section 37, CA No. 613 (Immigration Act of
1940): Commissioner of Immigration empowered to
effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after
previous determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of ground or
grounds therefore BUT did not concentrate
exercise power to deport to the
Commissioner, as seen in Sec 52 [which is the
repealing clause of the Immigration Act, which
expressly exempted Sec 69 of Act 2711
• Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
(Act No. 2711): only indicates that the Executive
or his authorized agent could only
deport/expel/exclude from RP aliens upon
conducting a prior investigation of the ground of
such action and the rest of it indicates the
procedure concerning the protection of the said
alien during the deportation proceedings. [indication
of the recognition of the existence of power of the
executive to deport aliens]
President’s power under Sec. 69, Act 2711 may be
delegated: proofs through history
• EO No. 494 (first EO of Gov-Gen Murphy,
1934): constitute a board to take actions on
complaints against foreigners, conduct
investigations and make recommendations
• EO No. 33 (Quezon, 1936): creation of DB to
receive complaints against aliens, to conduct
investigations (under Sec 69, Act 2711) and make
recommendations – authorized by President
***TAKE NOTE: Power to INVESTIGATE, not POWER TO
ORDER ARREST OF THE ALIEN
• EO 69 (Roxas, 1947): orders respondents in
deportation proceedings to file a bond with the
Commissioner of Immigration to ensure their
appearance and facilitate execution of deportation
order whenever the President decides the case
against the respondent
***TAKE NOTE: Filing of BOND, NOT AUTHORIZE
ARREST OF THE RESPONDENT
• EO 398 (Quirino, 1951): reorganized the DB and
authorized the DB, upn filing of formal charges by
the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue warrant
for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold
him under detention during the investigation unless
he files a bond (so here, PRESIDENT ALREADY
AUTHORIZED ARREST OF RESPONDENT ALIENS)
On rights of the accused: Sec 1, ART III of 1935
CONSTI = Sec 2, ART III, 1987 CONSTI
This provision specifies that the probable cause must
be determined by the judge after examination under
oath of the complainant and the witness produced
unlike that of the 4th Amendment, Philippine Bill, or
Jones Act which does not determine who exactly would
determine the probable cause for the order of arrest.
The Consti is silent on whether a warrant of arrest may
be issued upon determination of the probable cause
by other authority besides the Judge.
*DURING INVESTIGATION, IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT
THE ALIEN BE ARRESTED. IT IS ENOUGH THAT A BOND
BE REQUIRED TO INSURE THE APPEARANCE OF THE
ALIEN DuriNG THE INVESTIGATION.
Decision EO 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers
the DB to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal
charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and
prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of
said aliens, is declared illegal.
Order of arrest null and void, bonds filed decreed
cancelled. Decision appealed from affirmed with
modification.
ART VIII: JUDICIARY
DEMETRIA V ALBA
FERNAN; February 27, 1987
FACTS
- Petitioners, in this petition for prohibition with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction assailed the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the
“Budget Reform Decree of 1977” on the ff. grounds:
o it infringes upon the fundamental law by
authorizing the illegal transfer of public moneys
o it is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to
specify the objectives and purposes for which the
proposed transfer of funds are to be made
o it allows the President to override the safeguards,
form and procedure prescribed by the
Constitution in approving appropriations
o it amounts to undue delegation of legislative
powers
o the transfer of funds by the President and the
implementation thereof by the Budget Minister
and the Treasurer are without or in excess of their
authority and jurisdiction
- Solicitor General, for the public respondents,
questioned the legal standing of petitioners. He further
contended that:
o The provision under consideration was enacted
pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973
Constitution
o Prohibition will not lie form one branch of the
government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the
performance of duties within the latter’s sphere of
responsibility
- On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a
Reply to the Comment
- Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the
administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of
the present case in abeyance
- The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to
dismiss setting forth as ground therefore, abrogation of
Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution, rendering the petition moot and
academic
ISSUES
1. WON the case is justiciable
2. WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutional
HELD
1. YES
- The court cited Ecelio Javier v. COMELEC where it said
that: “This Court will not disregard and in effect condone
wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the
case has become moot and academic.”
- As regards taxpayers’ suit, this Court enjoys that open
discretion to entertain the same or not
- Where the legislature or the executive branch acts
beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the
other branches of the government had assumed to do,
as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred
by the Constitution “in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.”
2. YES. Paragraph 1of Section 44 of Presidential Decree
No. 1177, being repugnant to Section 16(5) Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution, is null and void.
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: “The President
shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which
are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau,
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.”
- Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: “No law shall
be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.”
- Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical
- For flexibility, the Constitution provided a leeway
- The purpose and condition for which funds may be
transferred were specified
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the
privilege granted under Section 16(5), and empowers
the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard to WON the funds to be
transferred are savings, or WON the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer is
to be made
- It completely disregards the standards set in the
fundamental law, amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative power
DE AGBAYANI V PHILIPPINE NATIONAL DE LA LLANA V ALBA
BANK FERNANDO; March 12, 1982
FERNANDO; April 29, 1971
FACTS
- The National Assembly enacted the Batas Pambansa
FACTS
Blg. 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
- Francisca De Agbayani obtained a P450.00loan from
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other Purposes".
PNB dated July 19, 1939 maturing on July 19, 1944,
BP 129 mandates that Justices and Judges of inferior
secured by real estate mortgage
courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal courts,
- As of November 27, 1959 the loan balance was
except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the
P1,294.00
Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior
- July 13 1959, PNB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
courts established by such Act, would be considered
proceedings in the office of Pangasinan Provincial
separated from the Judiciary. The intent of this Act is to
Sherriff for the recovery of the unpaid loan balance
attain (1) more efficiency in the disposal of cases, (2)
- August 10, 1959 Plaintiff filed suit against PNB and
improvement in the quality of justice dispensed
Sheriff alleging that 15 years having elapsed from the
by the court, (3) democratization of social and economic
date of maturity the mortgage have prescribed.
opportunities and the substantiation of the true meaning
- PNB prayed for the dismissal since the defense of
of social justice.
prescription would not be available in the period of
- Procedure De La Llana,a judge, together with other
March 10, 1945 , when EO 32 providing for a moratorium
petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or
on debts was issued, to July 26, 1948 when RA 342
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the
which extended the period of moratorium was declared
Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on
invalid, were to be deducted from the time during which
Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any
PNB took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan
action implementing BP 129.
- Lower court ruled in favor of De Agbayani
ISSUES
ISSUES
1.WON the petitioners have legal standing.
1. WON a statute subsequently adjudged as invalid
2.On Constitutionality of BP 129
should be deemed to have force and effect before the
a. WON there was lack of good faith on the part of
declaration of its nullity.
Legislature in its enactment.
2. (if yes) WON prescription ran during the eight year
b. WON the abolition of an office by the Legislature is
period that EO 32 and RA 342 was in force.
valid.
c. WON the provision of BP 129 (regarding fixing of
HELD
compensation and allowances of members of Judiciary
1. YES Prior to the declaration of nullity a challenged
by the Executive) constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative or executive act must have been in force and
legislative power.
effect.
d. WON BP 129 is violative of the security of tenure
- The actual existence of a statute, prior to the
(Art. X Sec 7 of 1973 Constitution) enjoyed by
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact
incumbent justices and judges and the Supreme
and may have consequences which cannot be justly
Court's power to discipline and remove judges.
ignored.
2. NOBecause of the judicial recognition that moratorium
HELD
was a valid governmental response to the plight of the
1.YES. The petitioners, being members of the bar and
debtors who were war sufferer the SC has made clear its
officers of the court and taxpayers, have a personal and
view in a series of cases that during the eight year
substantial interest in the case such that he has
period that EO 32 and RA 342 was in force, prescription
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
did not run. (cases decided: Day v. CFI, Republic vs.
enforcement.
Hernaez.
2.a. NO. The Legislature, after careful study and
- Orthodox view on an unconstitutional act: An
evaluation of the judicial system in the country, found
unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order
out that institutional reforms is both pressing and
or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that
urgent.
infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or
b. YES. The abolition of an office,if within the
duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it.
competence of a legitimate body and if done in good
- SC said, in Agbayani vs. PNB that orthodox view is
faith suffers from no infirmity.
unrealistic and that until after the judiciary declares its
Reasoning
invalidity it is entitled to obedience and respect.
0 adherence to precedent (in Bendanillo Sr. v. Provincial
Gov and in Zandueta v. De La Costa, the Court also held
that the abolition of an
office is valid)
- Interpretation of the Consti provision - Article VII Sec 2
of 1973 Consti "vests in the NA the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts, subject to certain limitation in the case of SC." In
short, the NA has the power to abolish an office that it
created.
c. NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power
if the law is complete and provides for a standard.
Reasoning
- In this case, the Act provides a clear standard. The
President may be authorized to fix the allowances and
compensation but guided by the
Letter of Implementation No. 93 and pursuant to PD 985.
d. NO. Removal from office is different from termination
by virtue of the abolition of the office. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would
thereby lose his position. In the case of abolition, there is
in law no occupant. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office.
Reasoning
- Conflicting constitutional provisions, the power of the
NA to abolish an office on one hand and the security of
tenure, on the other, must be reconciled and
harmonized. Reconciliation and balancing is well high
unavoidable under the fundamental principle of
separation of powers.
- Political theory (Holmes and Tuazon): There is more
truism and actuality of interdependence among different
branches of government
than in independence and separation of powers.
Decision: Dismissed. The unconstitutionality of BP 129
has not been shown.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE [dissent]
The express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure
of judges must prevail over the implied constitutional
authority to abolish courts and to oust judges. Such
subjection of a judge to public "harassment and
humiliation ....can diminish public confidence in the
courts." The ills the judiciary suffers from were caused
by impairing its independence: they will not be cured by
totally destroying their independence. It would be
ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due
process cannot count it on themselves.
BARREDO [concur]
Inferior courts are mere creatures of law (of the
Legislature) . It follows that it is within the legislature' s
power to abolish or reorganize them no matter what the
cost is. He personally believes that the present situation
in the judiciary calls for its reorganization. He believes
that the Constitution is a living instrument which
translates and adapts itself to the demands of obtaining
circumstances (realist approach in interpreting the
Consti)
AQUINO [concur in the result]
For him the suit is premature, but affirming expressly
that the abolition was in good faith. CONCEPCION
(concurs in the result)
GUERRERO [concur]
Social justification and the functional utility of the law to
uphold its constitutionality is the ratio decidendi of this
case. For him, inquiring into the wisdom of the law is a
political question. Public office is a privilege in the gift of
the State and not a right. Dura lex sed lex, even though
it is harsh.
ABAD SANTOS [concur and dissent]
Concurs but dissented on the ground that the statute
being free from any constitutional infirmity, the
"Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power
to fill the newly created judicial positions without any
obligation to consult with the Supreme Court and to
accord its views the fullest consideration.
DE CASTRO [concur except as qualified]
The power of the Legislature to create courts also
includes the power to abolish them. When there is a
conflict between public welfare(the duty of the
legislature to provide a society with a fair and effective
judicial system) and personal benefit (security of
tenure), the latter must of necessity to yield to the
former. The abolition of the courts is a matter of
legislative intent into which no judicial inquiry is proper.
Petition is premature. No actual controversy yet. Not
until the abolition of courts is not done, can there be
possibly a violation of the security of tenure. "Salus
populi est suprema lex" - The welfare of the people is the
supreme law.
MELENCIO-HERRERA [concur]
Tenure of Judges is different from tenure of Courts. A
legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to
courts. The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges
applies only as their Courts exist.
ERICTA [concur]
No law is irrepealable. The power to create an office
includes the power to abolish them. "Salus populi est
suprema lex" - The welfare of the people is the supreme
law.
PLANA [concurs and dissent]
Actual and not merely presumptive good faith attended
its enactment. His qualification being that the "President
is under no obligation to consult with the SC and the SC
as such is not called upon to give legal advice to the
President."
PEOPLE V CUARESMA
NARVASA; April 18, 1989
FACTS
- On the basis of affidavits of Luz Lumacao and her
witness, Soledad Tanilon, both dated August 21,1978
which were sworn to before the First Assistant City Fiscal
of Dumaguete City, said Assistant Fiscal filed on the
same day an information with the City Court Judge of
Dumaguete City charging Rosie Cuaresma with oral
defamation. The complaint was docketed as Criminal
Case Number 7238.
- Rosie Cuaresma moved to quash the case contending
that the case had been commenced by an information
by the fiscal instead of a complaint of the offended party
as required by Article 360 of the revised Penal Code. The
said article provides that criminal action for defamation
cannot be prosecuted de oficio except at the instance of
and upon the complaint expressly filed by the offended
party.
- The Judge, on August 4, 1980, denied the motion on
the basis of the Supreme Court ruling in Fernandez v.
Lantin, 74 SCRA 338 (1976), which stated that the error
can be corrected by the filing of the sworn statement of
the complainant, assuming it contains all the information
required under the Rules, with the Court to comply with
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. Alternatively, the
fiscal can file with the court a verified complaint of the
offended party. In the order denying the quashal, the
judge, however, required the fiscal to file the verified
complaint within ten days. The fiscal complied with the
order by filing the needed document on the same day.
- Cuaresma filed another motion to quash three months
later alleging that the offense had prescribed since the
filing of the original information o August 2, 1978 did not
interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the
crime ( two months from discovery) and that said
prescriptive period had long lapsed prior to the
submission of the corrective complaint on august 4,
1980. Judge granted her the motion stating that “it was
the filing of the verified that conferred jurisdiction upon
the Court and this was on August 4, 1980”.
- The fiscal belatedly filed a motion for consideration on
Jube 26, 1981 which was denied for lack of merit and for
having been filed out of time.
- Hence this action for certiorari with the Supreme Court
as filed by the Second Assistant City Fiscal on May 31,
1984 or three years after the dismissal of the motion to
reconsider.
ISSUE
WON the Supreme Court should give due course to the
application for certiorari
HELD
1. The order of dismissal dated April 4, 1980 is a final
order having been disposed of by the Court. The appeal,
if taken in a timely fashion, could have succeeded as the
order of the Court was tainted by an error of law. The
filing of the complaint in the form of an affidavit, the
investigation by the fiscal, and the subsequent filing of
the information with the Court did indeed toll the period
of prescription.
2. The filing of the writ for certiorari was also improper in
several counts:
a. The filing should have been done by the Solicitor
General instead of the Second Assistant City Fiscal and
was dismissible on this account [Republic v Partisala ,
118 SCRA 870 (1982)].
b. Remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any
agency or officer exercising judicial functions or
of any judge which are claimed to be without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the
correct procedure is the filing of an appeal as the
judgment rendered is an error in law and not grave
abuse of discretion.
c. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to issue
extraordinary writs (e.g. certiorari, mandamus, etc.) is
not exclusive and granted to lower courts. There is
also a hierarchy that should be followed in matters of
this nature. Direct action to the Supreme Court will be
allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefore. And these reasons should be
clearly set out in the petition.
Decision Petition dismissed.
YNOT V INTERMEDIATE APPELATE
COURT
CRUZ; March 20, 1987
FACTS
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when
they were confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of EO No. 626-A.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing
of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering
the merits of the case, the court sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity. The thrust of his petition is that the executive
order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is
that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without
according the owner a right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. He complains that the measure should not have
been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional.
There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the
legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES
1. WON the SC impliedly affirmed the constitutionality of
EO No. 626-A
2. WON lower courts have authority to rule on
constitutionality of statute
3. WON EO No. 626-A violates due process
4. WON EO No. 626-A is an invalid exercise of police
power
5. WON EO No. 626-A is an invalid delegation of
legislative power
HELD
1. NO. While also involving the same executive order,
the case of Pesigan v. Angeles is not applicable here.
The question raised there was the necessity of the
previous publication of the measure in the Official
Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We
imposed the requirement then on the basis of due
process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not,
as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm
the constitutionality of EO No. 626-A.
2. YES. While lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the
highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in,
among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of
certain measures. This simply means that the resolution
of such cases may be made in the first instance by these
lower courts.
3. YES. The minimum requirements of due process are
notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not
be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness. In the instant
case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00,
which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court.
The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment,
which was carried out forthright. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers.
4. YES. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for
the promotion of the general welfare. To justify the State
in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and
so is a lawful subject of EO No. 626-A. But while the
amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second requirement,
that there be a lawful method. To strengthen the original
measure, EO No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on
the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao, regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another." The
object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing.
5. YES. Section 1 of EO No. 626-A reads: “The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order
as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as
the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.”
There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition. Definitely, there is
here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping
authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
BENGZON V DRILON
 GUTIERREZ; April 15, 1992 WON the veto by the president of certain provisions in o The purpose retirement laws like such is to
the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 entice competent men and women to enter the
relating to the payment of the adjusted pension of the government service and retire with relative
FACTS
retired Justices of the SC and the CA security
- Petition to review the constitutionality of the veto by
the President of certain provisions of the General
HELD
Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Fiscal Year 1992
- The President did not veto items but provisions of the
GARCIA V MACARAEG
- Petitioners are retired justices of the SC and the CA BARREDO; May 31, 1971
law in the GAA.
who were receiving monthly pensions under RA No.910
- While veto power is generally all or nothing,
as amended by RA No. 1797
vetoing the entire bill or none at all, it does not FACTS
- Respondents Drilon et al are sued in their official
hold when it comes to appropriation, revenue or - Administrative complaint filed by Paz M. Garcia against
capacities of the Executive, involved in the
tariff bills. Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Judge of the CFI of Laguna
implementation of the release of funds under the GAA
o The Constitution has a item veto power to avoid Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former
- RA910 was enacted in 1953 to provide retirement
inexpedient riders being attached to an capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of
pensions to Justices of the SC and the CA who have
indispensable appropriation or revenue his oath of office as judge ... gross incompetence,
rendered service at least 2o years either in the judiciary
measure; only a particular item or items may be violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948,
or in any branch of govt, or in, both, or having attained
vetoed as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof.
the age of 70, or who resign by reason of incapacity to
o Item in a bill refers to the particulars, the - Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of
discharge the duties of the office; he shall receive until
details, the distinct and severable parts; it is a Laguna and San Pablo City with station at Calamba on
his death the salary which he has received at the time of
specific appropriation of money, not some June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly
his retirement
general provision of law, which happens to be created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch.
- RA910 was amended by RA1797. Identical retirement
put into an appropriation bill After consultations with the officials of the province of
benefits were given to Consti Commissions and the AFP,
o The President did not veto the general fund Laguna, the municipality of Calamba and the
under RA1568, as amended by RA3595, and PD578,
adjustment of 500M, to meet certain obligations Department of Justice, he decided to accept the offer of
respectively
WHICH is an ITEM. the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space
- Marcos issued successive decrees which automatically
o What she vetoed were provisions – methods for the courtroom and offices of the court, to utilize the
readjusted the retirement pensions of military officers
financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial
and enlisted men. But those in the judiciary and the and systems placed by Congress to insure that government for the purchase of the necessary supplies
Consti Commissions were not included in this automatic obligations would be paid when they fell due and materials and to rely on the national government for
readjustment, as Marcos repealed the automatic o Thus, augmentation of specific appropriations the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190
readjustment provisions (Section 3-a of RA1797 and
found inadequate to pay retirement benefits is of the Revised Administrative Code, all these items must
RA3595) for the judiciary and the Consti Commissions
a provision and not an item be furnished by the provincial government The provincial
- Realizing this unfairness, Congress in 1990 sought to
o Actually, what she really vetoed were RA1797 officials of Laguna, however, informed him that the
reenact the repealed provisions by approving a bill on
and the Resolution of the SC dated Nov 1991. province was not in a position to do so).
the matter (HB16297 and SB740)
WHICH SHE CANNOT VETO. - As to the space requirements of the court, the
- Pres. Aquino vetoed the HB on the ground that it would
- The repealing decrees (PD644) of Marcos re taking Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured him that the court
erode the foundation of the policy on standardization of
away the automatic readjustment for the judiciary never could be accommodated in the west wing of the
compensation under the Salary Standardization Law,
became valid law because it was never published, Calamba municipal building as soon as the office of the
RA6758
pursuant to the Tanada v Tuvera doctrine; RA 1797 was municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to
- On the other hand, retired CA justices Barcelona and
never repealed and there was no need for an HB in 1990 another location. When the projected transfer of the
Enriquez filed a petition for readjustment of their
to restore it so even the president’s veto of the HB does municipal treasurer's office was about to be effected, the
pensions in accordance with RA1797 by reasoning out
not even have any effect in the continuing treasurer and several municipal councilors objected. The
that PD644 repealing RA1797 did not take effect as
implementation of the law municipal mayor then requested Macaraig to look over
there was no valid publication pursuant to Tanada v
- The Veto by the president trenches upon the some of the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with the
Tuvera, supposedly promulgated in 1975 but published
constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the commitment that the municipal government will
only in the OG in 1983; Court authorized it as a result
Judiciary shoulder the payment of the rentals. Respondent's first
- As a result of the resolution by the Court, Congress
o Guaranty of full flexibility to allocate and utilize choice was the second floor of the Republic Bank branch
included in the GAA appropriations for the Judiciary
their resources with the wisdom and dispatch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when the owner
intended for the payment of adjusted pensions rates for
that their needs require of the building refused to reduce the rent to P300 a
the retired justices
o Power to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates month. The next suitable space selected by Macaraig
- In Jan 1992, President vetoed portions of Section 1, and
of compensation not exceeding highest rates was the second floor of the Laguna Development Bank.
the entire Section 4 of the Special Provision for the SC
authorized by law After a month's negotiations, the municipality finally
and the Lower Courts on the ground that the President
o Veto is tantamount to dictating to the judiciary signed a lease agreement with the owner on October 26,
vetoed the HB on the matter already, and such
how its funds should be utilized 1970. Another month passed before the municipal
appropriation would erode the policy of salary
- The Justices have a right to their pensions pursuant to government could release the amount necessary for the
standardization
RA1797 improvements to convert the space that was rented,
which was a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom
ISSUE
and offices for the personnel of the court and for the
assistant provincial fiscal. Thereafter, upon Macaraig's
representations, the provincial government appropriated
the amount of P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies
and materials needed by the court. Early in December,
1970 respondent also placed his order for the necessary
equipment with the Property Officer of the DOJ but,
unfortunately, the appropriation for the equipment of the
CFI was released only on December 23, 1970 and the
procurement of the equipment chargeable against this
allotment is still under way.
- When Macaraig realized that it would be sometime
before he could actually preside over his court, he
applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he
had worked in the DOJ, Macaraig had, due to pressure of
duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his
forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond
the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The
Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon him
to forego his leave and instead to assist him,
without being extended a formal detail, whenever
he was not busy attending to the needs of his
court.
- Complainant Garcia alleged:
> That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971
inclusive, respondent has not submitted his monthly
reports containing the number of cases filed, disposed
of, decided and/or resolved, the number of cases
pending decisions for one month, two months to over
three months, together with the title, number, number
of hours of court session held a day.
> That he has not submitted his certificate of service
(New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966) from July to
December, 1970 and from January to February, 1971
inclusive.
> That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, CFI of Laguna
and San Pablo and knowing fully well that he has
never performed his official duties or discharged the
duties appertaining to his office, he has collected and
was paid his salaries from July 1970 to February 1971
in flagrant violation of Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
> That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly
reports on the accomplishments of the Court
constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
ISSUE
WON respondent is guilty of dishonesty, violation of his
oath of office as judge, gross incompetence and violation
of Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the
Department of Justice and RA 296 or the Judiciary Act of
1948 particularly Sections 5, 55 and 58
HELD
- Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular
No. 10 of the Department of Justice are not applicable to
a Judge not actually discharging his judicial duties.
Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties
under the circumstances does not constitute
incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer who
gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume
his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being
'a judge without a sala,' but forces and circumstances
beyond his control prevented him from discharging his
judicial duties. Respondent's collection of salaries as
judge does not constitute dishonesty because aside from
the time, effort and money he spent in Organizing the
CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department of Justice.
- None of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court
looks with favor at the practice of long standing of
judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary
even if it were only in connection with his work of
exercising administrative authority over the courts. The
line between what a judge may do and what he
may not do in collaborating or working with other
offices or officers under the other great
departments of the government must always be
kept clear and jealously observed, lest the
principle of separation of powers on which our
government tests by mandate of the people thru
the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices
purportedly motivated by good intentions in the
interest of the public service. The fundamental
advantages and the necessity of the independence of
said three departments from each other, limited only by
the specific constitutional precepts on check and
balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of
any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the Judiciary
under our present constitutional scheme of government
that no Judge of even the lowest court in this Republic
should place himself in a position where his actuations
on matters submitted to him for action or resolution
would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst
still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any
authority other than the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say,
the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this
practice is discontinued.
Decision Complaint dismissed. (8 votes to dismiss,
Castro & Teehankee took no part.)
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [concur]
- Respondent Judge Macaraig should not be held in any
wise accountable. No taint of bad faith can be attached
to his conduct. What he was required to do was in
accordance with the practice heretofore followed by the
Department of Justice. He is, under the statute in force,
under the administrative supervision of its head. Nor can
the good faith of Secretary of Justice Abad Santos be
impugned. What was done by him was likewise in
accordance with what previous secretaries of justice
were accustomed to do. The root of the evil then is
the statutory authority of the Department of
Justice over courts of first instance and other
inferior courts. While a distinction could be made
between the performance of judicial functions which in
no way could be interfered with by the Department and
the task of administration which is executive in
character, still the conferment of such competence to a
department head, an alter ego of the President, is to my
mind, not only unwise but of doubtful constitutionality.
For in issuing administrative rules and regulations over
matters deemed non-judicial, they may trench upon the
discretion of judges which should be exercised according
to their conscience alone. What is more, the influence
that the Secretary has over them is magnified. It is
already unavoidable under our scheme of government
that they court his goodwill; their promotion may at
times depend on it. With this grant of authority, the
assertion of independence becomes even more difficult.
it is thus objectionable in principle and pernicious in
operation. That certainly is not the way to reduce to the
minimum any participation of the executive in judicial
affairs arising from the power to appoint. As it is, even
when the government as the adverse party in criminal
cases, tax suits, and other litigations is in the right, a
favorable decision from the lower courts could be looked
upon with suspicion. The judiciary must not only be
independent; it must appear to be so.
- The presence in the statute books of such power of
administrative oversight then, is, to my mind,
anomalous. More specifically, were it not for such power
granted the department head, respondent Judge in this
case could not have been called upon to assist the
Secretary of Justice. Considering that the
Constitutional Convention is about to meet, it is to
be hoped that it be made clear that the judiciary
is to be totally freed from any supervisory
authority of an executive department. (Take note guys
that this case was decided just a day before the Manila Hotel inaugural
session of the con-con that created the 1973 Consti. And remember that
the supervision of the CFI and other inferior courts (under the DOJ in the
1935 Consti) was transferred to the SC under the new Consti which
provision was copied in the 1987 Consti. I guess this case was influential in
making that change possible. By the way, Macaraig was a former UP law
prof.)
BADUA V CORDILLERA BODONG
ADMINISTRATION
GRINO-AQUINO; February 14, 1991
FACTS
Respondent David Quema alleges that he is the owner of
a parcel of land which he mortgaged to Dra. Valera. He
was able to redeem the property but only after 22 years.
On the other hand, petitioner spouses claim the property
was sold to them by Dra. Valera. Quema filed a case
before the Barangay Council but when it failed to settle,
he filed a complaint in the tribal court of the Maeng
Tribe. (The disputed land is located in Villaviciosa, Abra)
The tribal court decided in favor of Quema. But as the
spouses did not immediately vacate the land, they
received a warning order from the Cordillera People’s
Liberation Army (CPLA). Petitioners filed this action
alleging that respondent Cordillera Bodong
Administration’s decision is void for lack of judicial power
or jurisdiction. Respondent contends the Supreme Court
has no jurisdiction over tribal courts because they are
not part of the judicial system.
ISSUE
WON a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration can render a valid and executory decision
HELD
NO. Decision of tribal court is annulled for lack of
jurisdiction. The creation of the Cordillera Autonomous
Region was rejected in a plebiscite by the provinces and
cities of the Cordillera Region hence the Cordillera
Bodong Administration, the indigenous and special
courts for the indigenous cultural communities and the
CPLA as a regional command of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines do not legally exist. The Maeng Tribal Court
not being constituted into an indigenous court, it is but
an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and
traditions of an indigenous cultural community. Such
tribal courts are not part of the Philippine Judicial
System which consists of the Supreme Court and
the lower courts which have been established by
law. They do not possess judicial power.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY V COURT
OF APPEALS
ROMERO; February 5, 1996
FACTS
- Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) entered into three
contracts regarding various services at the South
Harbor:
> With Ocean Terminals Services, Inc. (OTSI). OTSI
was granted exclusive right to manage and operate
stevedoring services at the South Harbor
> With Marina Port Services Inc. (MPSI). MPSI was
granted exclusive management and operation of
arrastre and container handling services at the South
Harbor
> With 7-R Ports Services. 7-R was granted
warehousing services
- On November 28, 1991, the contract with MPSI was
renewed. Part of the contract required the MPSI to cause
integration of storage, arrastre and stevedoring services
at the South Harbor. Consequently, OTSI and 7-R
assigned their respective stevedoring and warehousing
services to MPSI. In effect MPSI had the duty and
responsibility to manage, operate and render the
following services:
- Arrastre- receiving, handling, checking as well as
custody and delivery of cargo services. These are
services done on land.
- Stevedoring- all work performed on board vessel, that
is, the process of loading and unloading cargo, stowing
inside hatches, compartments and on deck or open
cargo spaces on board vessels.
- Container Terminal Handling- the services of
handling container discharged or loaded unto vessels.
- Storage- storing of containers, bulk and break bulk
cargoes in all storage areas at the South Harbor.
- April 2, 1992, PPA entered into a contract with
petitioner Manila Floating Silo Corporation (MAFSICOR)
whereby the latter was granted right, privilege,
responsibility and authority to provide, operate a floating
bulk terminal facilities for bulk cargoes bound for the
South Harbor with a proviso that use of such facility shall
not be compulsory to bulk shippers or importers.
Contract would be enforced for 5 years and shall be on
an interim basis until an actual land based bulk terminal
plant for the Port of Manila.
- Sept. 8, 1192, PPA and MAFSICOR entered a
supplemental agreement stating that manpower needed
for stevedoring services shall be hired from OTSI.
- MPSI filed a petition against PPA and MAFSICOR for
“declaratory relief, final injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary prohibitory
injunction claiming that said contract was in complete
derogation of their rights under their contract with PPA.
- RTC of Manila through judge Veridiano II, issued TRO
directing PPA to maintain status quo and enjoining
MAFSICOR from bringing in the floating terminal and set
a hearing on the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
- PPA filed an opposition to the issuance of said writ
stating PPA-MAFSICOR contract actually supports PPA-
MPSI contract as stevedoring manpower would be hired
from MPSI. And that on a 2-day public hearing, most of
the registrants agreed to the operation of the floating
terminal.
- MAFSICOR also filed an urgent motion for the lifting of
the TRO and a denial of the the preliminary injunction on
the ground that an injunctive relief is not available in an
action for declaratory relief. They filed another motion to
dismiss complaint stating that declaratory relief was not
available to MPSI because MAFSICOR was not a party in
the PPA-MPSI contract therefore they were not a party-
in-interest.
- AUGUST 25, 1993, trial court denied writ of preliminary
injunction and lifted TRO stating that first, the right to
operate a floating terminal was not on the PPA-MPSI
contract and there would be no conflict between
contracts with MPSI and MAFSICOR since MPSI is not the
sole entity authorized to render stevedoring services in
the South Harbor and besides, stevedoring services for
MAFSICOR shall be provided by OTSI. Second, contract
with MAFSICOR was noon-exclusive meaning MPSI could
also operate a floating terminal. Third, injunctive relief
may not be granted for an action for declaratory relief.
Further, MPSI could not question PPA-MAFSICOR contract
they being not a party thereto.
- MPSI filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the court on Sept. 15, 1993.
- Meanwhile on Sept. 3 1993, Katipunan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Daungan (KAMADA) the bargaining
agent or the 4000 stevedores employed by MPSI, filed a
complaint against MPSI, PPA and MAFSICOR for the
annulment of PPA-MAFSICOR contract alleging that the
operation of the floating bulk would duplicate their
function of stevedoring in the South Harbor. They also
alleged that MAFSICOR had not contacted them on the
matter regarding the hiring of their services in the
supplemental contract. Also, KAMADA said that the
requirement of MAFSICOR of trained and qualified
stevedores (since services in the floating terminal would
be done by machine), certainly some of their member
employees would be deprived.
- Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Mabunay.
Court granted TRO stating great and irreparable injuries
upon the applicant would result before the matter can be
heard on notice.
- MAFSICOR filed a motion to dismiss civil case and for
the lifting of the TRO (complete reasons in p.224-25).
Reasons included Court Circular No. 13-93 which
prohibits the issuance of injunction against certain
government agencies including public utilities. Motion
was denied.
- Sept. 10, 1993, MAFSICOR filed a supplement to its
motion to dismiss and to lift TRO, raising as an additional
reason, Section 1 of P.D. no. 1818 which states that:
“no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute
or controversy involving an infrastructure project…
including among others public utilities for the
transport of goods or commodities, stevedoring and
arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons,
entity or government office from proceeding with…
the operation of such public utility…”
- MPSI opposed stating MAFSICOR is not a public utility
nor is performing a public function and thus non public
interest may be affected.
- Judge Mabunay denied MAFSICOR’s motion.
- Sept. 28,1993, KAMADA case was resolved by Judge
Mabunay in which writ was denied due to failure of
KAMADA to present clear and convincing evidence of any
damages it will suffer.”
- Another case was filed by yet another party. This was a
case for injunction with provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction involving the same PPA-MAFSICOR
contract. This was filed by the Chamber of Customs
Brokers Inc., the only accredited association for customs
brokers in the country, stating that they were never
informed of the proposal to put up a floating grains
terminal and that operation of such would adversely
affect and prejudice its members (reason in p.226-227).
- Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Bayhon.
Court issued a restraining order. In due course, on
October 1, 1993, lower court issued a preliminary
injunction upon the filing of MPSI of an injunction bond.
- PPA and MAFSICOR filed before the SC a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for an issuance of
a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. Petition impleaded
Judge Verdiano as a public respondent. Petition also
prayed Judges Mabunay and Bayhon be administratively
dealt with for disregarding Circular No. 13-93.
- Pursuant to Sec. 9(1) of B.P. 29, SC referred case to
Court of Appeals.
- October 13, 1993, CA issued a writ of preliminary
injunction finding that MPSI has exclusive stevedoring
rights at the South Harbor and that the operation of a
floating grains terminal by MAFSICOR would overlap on
the rights of MPSI. On the applicability of PD 1818 and
Circular No. 13-93, court stated that what is being
stopped temporarily is private respondent’s operation of
the floating bulk terminal facility that would lessen
MPSI’s stevedoring services as it infringes on the latter’s
contractual right.
- MAFSICOR filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied.
- On June 8, 1994, CA decided that writ of preliminary
injunction is made permanent and that Judge Bayhon be
permanently enjoined from issuing injunctive orders
during the trial of the case in the court.
- Thus, CA affirmed the exclusivity of the stevedoring
contract in favor of MPSI. That being so, it precluded
infringement of the PPA-MPSI contract by the PPA-
MAFSICOR contract. CA explained that the floating grains
terminal is simply a mechanized unloading of grains
cargo from the vessel to the barge or other transport
facilities. And also that what is solely done by stevedores
is substituted by machines complemented by needed
stevedores. With respect to the supplemental agreement
which states that stevedores would be hired by
MAFSICOR from OTSI, court stated that it was just an
adjustment in order not to violate PPA-MPSI contract.
And that MAFSICOR can legally excuse themselves from
the contract because OTSI already assigned its
stevedoring services to MPSI. As regards to forum
shopping allegation of MAFSICOR (filing of separate
petitions by MPSI, KAMADA and Chamber), court said
that there was no forum shopping because petitioners
had separate and distinct legal personalities. There also
was no proof that they confabulated to forum-shop. On
the applicability of PD 1818, CA affirmed its Oct.13
ruling.
- PPA and MAFSICOR filed a motion for review on
certiorari alleging that Court of Appeals decision: a)
violates PD 1818 and Circular No. 13-93, the
constitutional principle of separation of judicial and
executive powers and prescription against forum
shopping, b) supplants the discretion of the trial court to
pass upon the propriety of a preliminary injunction and
c) is contrary to the evidence on record.
ISSUE
WON PD 1818 applicable to the case
HELD
YES
Ratio “no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or
controversy involving an infrastructure project…
including among others public utilities for the
transport of goods or commodities, stevedoring
and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or
persons, entity or government office from proceeding
with… the operation of such public utility…”
- Clearly, the prohibition in PD 1818 does not cover
infrastructure alone. It includes among others
stevedoring services. The law being clear, there is no
room for interpretation or construction. A verbis legis
non est recendum (from the words of a statute there
should be no departure).
- PD 1818 applies “in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases.” It is founded
on the principle that to allow courts to determine such
matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the
administrative machinery.
- In Republic v. Capulong discretion was defined as “a
power or right conferred upon them by law of acting
officially under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by
the judgment or conscience of others.
- Entering into a contract for the operation af a floating
grains terminal notwithstanding the existence of other
stevedoring contracts pertaining to the South Harbor is
undoubtedly an exercise of the discretion on the part of
the PPA. No other persons or agencies are in a better
position to gauge the need for the floating terminal than
the PPA; certainly not the courts. Courts have no
brooding of such administrative agencies (Hon. Reinerio
Reyes et al v. Hon Doroteo Caneba et al). courts will
intervene only to ascertain whether a branch or
instrumentality of the Government has transgressed its
constitutional boundaries (Bureau Veritas v. Office of the
President). Under the separation of powers, the courts
may not tread into matters requiring the exercise of
discretion of a functionary or office in the executive and
legislative branches, unless it is clearly shown that the
government official or office abused his or its discretion.
In this case there is no showing that the PPA
abused its discretion in entering into the contract
with MAFSICOR. Judge Veridiano correctly
concluded that there is no provision for the
putting up of a floating grains terminal in the PPA-
MPSA contract. All it covers are the general
services of stevedoring. While the operation of a
floating grains terminal may be considered as part
and parcel of stevedoring as such operation
merely entails the mechanization of stevedoring,
it was considered by the PPA, in the exercise of its
discretion, as necessary to improve the services
rendered in the South Harbor in the meantime
that no land-based bulk terminal is yet
operational.
- There are actually instances when PD 1818 should not
find application. These are a) where there is clear and
grave abuse of discretion b) where the effect of the non-
issuance of an injunction or a restraining order would be
to “stave off implementation of a government project.”
In this case the operation of a floating bulk terminal
would augment and improve the over-all operations at
the port of Manila and/or stevedoring services awarded
to MPSI.
- Another contention against the applicability of PD 1818
is that MAFSICOR is a private entity. Such contention
betrays a failure to comprehend the functions of the
PPA. One of the duties of the PPA is to provide services
(whether on its own, by contract or otherwise) within the
Port Districts … to make or enter contracts of any kind or
nature to enable it to discharge its functions under its
decree.
- Section 1 of PD 1818 clearly states that an injunction
may not be issued to prevent any person or persons,
entity or government official from undertaking the
protected activities enumerated. The prohibition
therefore applies regardless of whether or not the entity
or person being enjoined is a public or private person or
entity, provided that the purpose of the law to protect
essential government projects in pursuit of economic
development is attained.
- court did not resolve main issues offered (such as the
exclusivity of the PPA-MPSI contract) for resolution
therein which necessitates trial on merits. However court
took note of the allegations against two judges
Decision Petition on certiorari granted decision of the
CA is reversed and set aside.
IN RE: VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA
NARVASA; November 9, 1998
FACTS
- The Resolution of the Court En Banc, handed down on
May 14, 1998, sets out the relevant facts.
- Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are
the appointments signed by the President under date of
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court
of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan
City, respectively.
- received at the Chief Justice's chambers on May 12,
1998
- view by Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
Consultant of the Council, who had been a member of
the Committee of the Executive Department and of the
Committee on the Judicial Department of the 1986
Constitutional Commission: that on the basis of the
Commission's records, the election ban had no
application to appointments to the Court of
Appeals. Without any extended discussion or any prior
research and study on the part of the other Members of
the JBC, this hypothesis was accepted, and was then
submitted to the President for consideration, together
with the Council's nominations for eight (8) vacancies in
the Court of Appeals
- April 6, 1998: Chief Justice received an official
communication from the Executive Secretary
transmitting the appointments of eight (8) Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals all of which had been
duly signed on March 11, 1998 by the President
- In view of the fact that all the appointments had been
signed on March 11, 1998 - the day immediately before
the commencement of the ban on appointments
imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution -
which impliedly indicated that the President's Office did
not agree with the hypothesis that appointments to the
Judiciary were not covered by said ban, the Chief Justice
resolved to defer consideration of nominations for the
vacancy in the Supreme Court created by the retirement
of Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco
- May 4, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from the
President, addressed to the JBC, requesting transmission
of the "list of final nominees" for the vacancy" no later
than Wednesday, May 6, 1998," in view of the duty
imposed on him by the Constitution "to fill up the
vacancy . . . within ninety (90) days from February 13,
1998, the date the present vacancy occurred."
- May 5, 1998: Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III
requested the Chief Justice for "guidance" respecting the
expressed desire of the "regular members" of the JBC to
hold a meeting immediately to fill up the vacancy in the
Court in line with the President's letter . The Chief Justice
advised Secretary Bello to await the reply that he was
drafting
- May 6, 1998: the Chief Justice sent his reply to the
President-- stating that no sessions had been scheduled
for the Council until after the May elections because of
the "need to undertake further study of the matter,"
prescinding from "the desire to avoid any constitutional
issue regarding the appointment to the mentioned
vacancy"; delivered to Malacañang May 6, 1998, and a
copy given to the Office of Justice Secretary Bello
- Justice Secretary and the regular members of the
Council had already taken action –on May 6, 1998 they
came to an agreement on a resolution: they drew
attention to Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution
(omitting any mention of Section 15, Article VII) as well
as to the President's letter of May 4, with an appeal that
the Chief Justice convene the Council for the purpose "on
May 7, 1998
- CJ convoked the Council to a meeting at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon of May 7, 1998
- May 7, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from
President: "the election-ban provision applies only to
executive appointments or appointments in the
executive branch of government," the whole article
being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.'", "firmly and
respectfully reiterate(d) . . . (his) request for the Judicial
and Bar Council to transmit . . . the final list of nominees
for the lone Supreme Court vacancy."
- May 8, 1998: Chief Justice replied: --Section 15 of
Article VII imposes a direct prohibition on the President
which is the general rule, the only exception being only
as regards "executive positions"(judicial positions are
covered by the general rule)
- Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, unlike Section 15, Article
VII, the duty of filling the vacancy is not specifically
imposed on the President
- normally, when there are no presidential elections
Section 4 (1), Article VIII shall apply but when (as
now) there are presidential elections, the
prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into
play: the President shall not make any
appointments
- requesting the regular Members of the Judicial and Bar
Council to defer action on the matter until further advice
by the Court
- May 8, 1998: another meeting was held; closed with a
resolution that "the constitutional provisions be referred
to the Supreme Court En Banc for appropriate action
- May 12, 1998: Chief Justice received from Malacañang
the appointments of two (2) Judges of the Regional Trial
Court mentioned above; places on the Chief Justice the
obligation of transmitting the appointments to the
appointees so that they might take their oaths and
assume the duties of their office (trouble is that in doing
so, the Chief Justice runs the risk of acting in a manner
inconsistent with the Constitution)
- the Court Resolved that pending the foregoing
proceedings and the deliberation by the court on the
matter, and until further orders, no action be taken on
the appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta
which in the meantime shall be held in abeyance and not
given any effect and said appointees shall refrain from
taking their oath of office and the Judicial and Bar
Council is INSTRUCTED to defer all action on the matter
of nominations
- Valenzuela took his oath on May 14, 1998 -- In his
"Explanation" he stated that he did so because on May
7, 1998 he "received from Malacañang copy of his
appointment . . ." which contained the following
direction: "By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter
upon the performance of the duties of the office"
- The Relevant Constitutional Provisions
Section 15, Article VII:
"Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein prejudice public service or
endanger public safety."
Section 4 (1), Article VIII:
"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in
its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof ."
Section 9, Article VIII:
"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of
the list."
ISSUE
WON during the period of the ban on appointments
imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the
judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII
HELD
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on
March 30, 1998 were unquestionably made during the
period of the ban. Such appointments come within the
operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments
which are considered to be for the purpose of buying
votes or influencing the election.
Reasoning
- While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is
undoubtedly in the public interest there is no showing in
this case of any compelling reason to justify the making
of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the
other hand, there is a strong public policy for the
prohibition against appointments made within the period
of the ban.
- Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the
President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within
the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by
Section 15 of Article VII.
- journal of the commission which drew up the present
Constitution discloses: desire to make certain that the
size of the Court would not be decreased for any
substantial period as a result of vacancies, the insertion
in the provision of the same mandate that "IN CASE OF
ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF." was proposed
- Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2)
those made for partisan considerations. The first refers
to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section
15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight"
appointments
- the Court recognized that there may well be
appointments to important positions which have to be
made even after the proclamation of the new President.
Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so
spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action
and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be
made by the outgoing President
- The exception allows only the making of temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the
appointing power of the President during the period of
the ban.
- Considering the respective reasons for the time frames
for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on
the President's power of appointment, it is this Court's
view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict,
the former should yield to the latter
- the Constitution must be construed in its entirety as
one, single instrument; instances may be conceived of
the imperative need for an appointment, during the
period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in
the Supreme Court.
- concerning Valenzuela's oath-taking and "reporting for
duty"--
Standing practice is for the originals of all appointments
to the Judiciary to be sent by the Office of the President
to the Office of the Chief Justice, the appointments being
addressed to the appointees "Thru: the Chief Justice,
Supreme Court, Manila." It is the Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court, in the Chief Justice's behalf, who
thereafter advises the individual appointees of their
appointments and also of the date of commencement of
the pre-requisite orientation seminar to be conducted by
the Philippine Judicial Academy for new Judges.
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION V
OCURT OF APPEALS
MARTINEZ; July 23, 1998
FACTS
- Oil & Natural Gas Commission (petitioner)- a foreign
corporation owned and controlled by the Government of
India
- Pacific Cement Company (respondent) -a private
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines.
- The two parties entered into a contract on Feb 26,
1983, where respondent undertook to supply the
petitioner (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement;
petitioner to pay ($477,300.00)
- The oil well cement was loaded on the ship MV
SURUTANA NAVA in Surigao City, for delivery at Bombay
and Calcutta, India.
- respondent had already received payment but failed to
deliver the oil well cement  due to a dispute between
the ship owner and respondent, the cargo was held up in
Bangkok and did not reach its point of destination
- so they just agreed that the private respondent will
replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement
with Class "G" cement cost free. However, upon
inspection, the Class "G" cement did not conform to the
petitioner's specifications.
- The petitioner then informed the private respondent
that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to
Clause 16 of their contract
- July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator (Shri N.N. Malhotra)
resolved the dispute in petitioner's favor
- Respondent- to pay $ 899,603.77 + 6% interest
- To enable the petitioner to execute the award, it filed a
Petition before the Court in India praying that the
decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in
India which the said court granted
- The plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from defendant
US$899,603.77 with 9% interest per annum till the last
date of realization
- However, respondent refused to pay
- Petitioner filed a complaint to RTC of Surigao
- RTC and CA dismissed the complaint
ISSUES
1. WON the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent under
Clause 16 of the contract; phrased differently, WON the
non-delivery of the said cargo is a proper subject for
arbitration under the above-quoted Clause 16
2. WON the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable
in this jurisdiction
HELD
1. YES. the correct interpretation to give effect to both
stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be
confined to all claims or disputes arising from or relating
to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or
quality of the materials of the supply order/contract, and
for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes.
- For the sake of argument, granted that the non-
delivery of the oil well cement is not a proper subject for
arbitration, the failure of the replacement cement to
conform to the specifications of the contract is a matter
clearly falling within the ambit of Clause 16.
2. YES.
- This Court has held that matters of remedy and
procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal
law of the forum. 32 Thus, if under the procedural rules
of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment
may be rendered by adopting the arbitrators findings,
then the same must be accorded respect
- if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an
Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon
failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts
in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the
foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise
- the private respondent herein, as the party attacking a
foreign judgment, has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity which it failed to do in the
instant case.
Decision Petition GRANTED
ART X: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ABBAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CORTES; November 10, 1989
FACTS
- Petitioner Abbas, a representative of other
taxpayers in Mindanao, filed this petition to(1)
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary
of Budget and Management from releasing funds
to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare
R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional
- The 1987 Constitution provides for regional
autonomy through Article X, section 15 which
provides that "there shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines."
- To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution
further provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general
supervision over autonomous regions to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and
responsibilities not granted by this Constitution
or by law to the autonomous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act
for each autonomous region with the assistance
and participation of the regional consultative
commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of
nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic
act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the
executive and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise
provide for special courts with personal, family,
 and property law jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that
only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this
Constitution shall, within eighteen months from
the time of organization of both Houses, pass
the organic acts for the autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and
subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning
development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism
development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the
cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized
by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order
within the regions shall be the responsibility of
the local police agencies which shall be
organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized
in accordance with applicable laws. The defense
and security of the region shall be the
responsibility of the National Government.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No.
6734 was enacted and signed into law on August
1, 1989.The present controversy relates to the
plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)
cities in Mindanao and Palawan, scheduled for
November 19, 1989, in implementation of
Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing
for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao."
ISSUES
1. WON certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict
with the Tripoli Agreement.
2 .WON R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the
Constitution.
HELD
1. No, RA 6743 does not conflict with the Tripoli
Agreement.
SC finds it neither necessary nor determinative of
the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli
Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine
Government whether under public international or
internal Philippine law. The Constitution itself
provides for the creation of an autonomous region
in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry
into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore
be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus,
any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No.
6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement
will not have the effect of enjoining the
implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for
the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is
a binding treaty or international agreement, it
would then constitute part of the law of the land.
But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A.
No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the
Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as
the latter.
2. No, R.A. No. 6734 does not violate 1987
Constitution.
a. Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734
unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions
of the Constitution on the autonomous region
which make the creation of such region dependent
upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
The reference to the constitutional provision
cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that
the creation of the autonomous region shall take
place only in accord with the constitutional
requirements. Second, there is a specific provision
in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the
Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the
same requirements embodied in the Constitution
and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec.
1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later
than one hundred twenty (120) days after the
approval of this Act: Provided, That only the
provinces and cities voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and
cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain
the existing administrative determination, merge
the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734,
the creation of the autonomous region shall take
effect only when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite,
and only those provinces and cities where a
majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be
included in the autonomous region. The provinces
and cities wherein such a majority is not attained
shall not be included in the autonomous region. It
may be that even if an autonomous region is
created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and
nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2)
of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The
single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution
and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative
of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in
R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
b. Equal protection of the law – Petitioner insists
that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because
only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao
and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all
of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
included in the Organic Act, possess such
concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and
other relevant characteristics. By including areas
which do not strictly share the same characteristic
as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has
expanded the scope of the autonomous region
which the constitution itself has prescribed to be
limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The
Constitution lays down the standards by which
Congress shall determine which areas should
constitute the autonomous region. Guided by
these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by
Congress of the areas that share common
attributes is within the exclusive realm of the
legislature's discretion. Any review of this
ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom
of the law. SC cannot do this without doing
violence to the separation of governmental
powers
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable
classification. The guarantee of equal protection is
thus not infringed in this case, the classification
having been made by Congress on the basis of
substantial distinctions as set forth by the
Constitution itself.
c. Free exercise of religion – Petitioner questions
the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it
violates the constitutional guarantee on free
exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection
centers on a provision in the Organic Act which
mandates that should there be any conflict
between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the
Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and
the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah
courts created under the same Act should apply
national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic
law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which
makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be
subjected to any "man-made" national law.
Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by
enumerating possible instances of conflict
between provisions of the Muslim Code and
national law, wherein an application of national
law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious
convictions.
Judicial power includes the duty to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As
a condition precedent for the power to be
exercised, an actual controversy between litigants
must first exist. In the present case, no actual
controversy between real litigants exists. There
are no conflicting claims involving the application
of national law resulting in an alleged violation of
religious freedom. The Court in this case may not
be called upon to resolve what is merely a
perceived potential conflict between the
provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
TANO V SOCRATES
DAVIDE; August 21, 1997
FACTS
- special civil action for certiorari and prohibition praying
to:
1. declare as unconstitutional:
(a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992,
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa
(b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22
January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L.
Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and
(c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan;
2. enjoin the enforcement thereof; and
3. restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors
of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of the
Regional Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and
hearing cases concerning the violation of the
Ordinances and of the Office Order.
- Ordinance No. 15-92
- took effect on January 1, 1993
- entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT
OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,
1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF,"
- Purpose: to effectively free our water from Cyanide
and other Obnoxious substance
- unlawful for any person, business enterprise,
company to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any
point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of
any live fish (all alive, breathing not necessarily
moving, used for foor and for aquarium purposes) and
lobster except SEA BASS (apahap), CATFISH (hito-
hito), MUDFISH (dalag), AND MILKFISH FRIES.
- Penalty: fine of not more than P5,000.00,
imprisonment of not more than 12 mos and/or
cancellation of their permit to do business in the City
of Puerto Princesa
- Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993
- pursuant to City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74
(requirement of mayor’s permit) and Ordinance No.
15-92 (banning of shipment of live fish and lobster),
authorized and directed to check or conduct
necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish
and lobster to ascertain whether the shipper
possessed the required Mayor's Permit issued by this
Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or
clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
- Resolution No. 33
- prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying,
selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms coming from Palawan waters
(mameng, suno, panther/senorita, taklobo, mother of
pearl, giant clams, tiger prawn, loba/green grouper,
tropical aquarium fishes) for a period of five years
- WHEREAS
- studies disclose only 5% of the corals of Palawan
remain to be in excellent condition
- cannot be gainsaid that destruction and
devastation of the corals of our province were
principally due to illegal fishing activities like
dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing, use of
other obnoxious substances
- need to protect and preserve the existence of the
remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated
ones to regenerate within 5 years
- RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect
the environment and impose appropriate penalties
e.g. to dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing
- Ordinance No. 2
- prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying,
selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms coming from Palawan waters
(mameng, suno, panther/senorita, taklobo, mother
of pearl, giant clams, tiger prawn, loba/green
grouper, tropical aquarium fishes) for a period of
five years
- Policy Considerations:
- Sec. 2-A (RA 7160: policy of the state that
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to be self-reliant
communities, more responsive and accountable
local government structure through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units
shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources.
- Sec. 5-A (RA 7160): Any fair and reasonable
doubts as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the Local Government Unit
concerned
- Sec. 5-C (RA 7160). The general welfare
provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to LGU in
accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
community.
- Sec. 16 (RA 7160). Every LGU shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance; and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
- Policy of the Province of Palawan: to protect and
conserve the marine resources of Palawan
- Penalty: fine of not more P5,000.00, and/or
imprisonment of 6 mos to 12 mos and confiscation
and forfeiture of paraphernalia
- Petitioners Allege:
- Ordinances deprived them of due process of law (no
consultation), their livelihood (all the fishermen of
Palawan), and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade (Airline Shippers Association of
 Palawan), in violation of Art XII Sec 2 (2) (3)
39
and Art
40 41
XIII Sec 2 , 7 (1987).
- Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation or
condition under which the Mayor's permit could be
granted or denied (Mayor - absolute authority WON to
issue permit)
- Ordinance No. 2 altogether prohibited the catching,
gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of
live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any
distinction whether it was caught or gathered through
lawful fishing method
- fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways
- members of Airline Shippers Association were
unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and
entering contracts essential to carry out their
business endeavors to a successful conclusion
- if Ordinance No. 2 is null and void, TF criminal cases
against Tano et al have to be dismissed
- Interests of petitioners
- Tano et al: to prevent prosecution, trial and
determination of the criminal cases until constitutionality
or legality of the said Ordinances they allegedly violated
shall have been resolved
- Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and 77
fishermen: declaratory relief because Ordinances
adversely affects them
ISSUES
1. WON SC has jurisdiction
2. WON Ordinances 15-92, Office Order 23, Ordinance 2
of Resolution 33 are constitutional
HELD
1.NO because there is clear disregard for hierarchy of
courts and petitioners have no cause of action BUT SC
opt to resolve this case because of the lifetime of the
challenged Ordinances is about to end (1993-1998).
Reasoning
Petitioners Tano, et al WRT cause of action
39
Art XII Sec 2 (2): The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and
reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
(3) The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fisherworks in rivers, lakes, bays and
lagoons.
40
Art XIII Sec 2: The promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of
initiative and self-reliance.
41
Art XIII Sec 7: The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen,
especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal
marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide
support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research,
adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other
services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such
resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fisherworks shall receive a
just share form their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
- no cause of action because there is no showing that the
petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the information in
their respective criminal cases that would have this
remedy proper therefore the petitioners cannot allege
the lower courts of having acted in excess of their
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
- If petitioners filed motion to quash information, it
should have contained that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense because the ordinances in question
are unconstitutional. BUT if their Motion to Quash was
denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial
without prejudice to reiterating special defenses and if
an adverse decision is rendered, an appeal should have
been the proper remedy. And if there is an exceptional
circumstance where special civil action for certiorari may
be filed, the lower court must be accorded a Motion for
Reconsideration to allow itself to correct any errors
Petitioners Airline Shippers et al WRT Declaratory Relief
- SC is not possessed of original jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of
law are involved being settled that the SC merely
exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions
People v Cuaresma
- There is after all hierarchy of courts. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is established policy… strict
adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be
a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers
to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary
writs… directly and immediately by the highest tribunal
of the land...
Santiago v Vasques
- judicial policy that SC will not entertain direct resort to
it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
BUT, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted
in the exercise of powers under the new LGC
relative to the protection and preservation of the
environment and are thus novel and or paramount
importance. No further delay then may be
allowed.
2. YES, since it is settled that laws, including ordinances
of LGUs enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and
the petitioners did not present clear, convincing and
unequivocal evidence to overthrow this assumption.
Reasoning
Peralta v COMELEC
- presumption of constitutionality of laws including
ordinances of LGUs and to overthrow this
presumption, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt.
Subsistence or Marginal Fishermen
- There is no showing that any of the petitioners
qualify as subsistence or marginal fishermen
> Airline Shipping Association of Palawan: a private
association composed of marine merchants
> Virginia and Robert Lim: merchants
> the rest of petitioners: fishermen without any
qualification to their status
- Since consti does not provide for the definition of
subsistence or marginal
Marginal Fisherman
- Generally, an individual engaged in fishing whose
margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish is
barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of
gathering fish
- Sec 13 RA7160 an individual engaged in subsistence
fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or
exchange of agricultural or marine products produced
by himself and his immediate family
Subsistence Fishermen
- Generally, one whose catch yields but the irreducible
minimum for his livelihood
Art XII Sec 2
- aim primarily not to bestow any right of subsistence
fishermen but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nation’s marine wealth
- provision merely recognizes priority to subsistence
fishermen
Sec 149 of LGC
- only provision of law which speaks of preferential
right of marginal fishermen
Joint Administrative Order No. 3 (1996)
- prescribed guidelines concerning preferential
treatment of small fisherfolk relative to fishery right in
Sec 149 but this case does not involve such fishery
right
Protection of the Environment v Right of Marginal
Fishermen
Art XIII Sec 7
- speaks not only of communal marine and fishing
resources but of their protection, development, and
conservation
Art XII Sec 2 (Regalian Doctrine)
- marine resources belong to the State and EDU shall
be under full control and supervision of the State
Constitutional Commission
- between Rodrigo and Bengzon
- marginal fishermen subject to rules and regulations
and local laws
Oposa v Factoran
- even though balanced and healthful ecology is
under Declaration of Principles and State Policies it
does not follow that is less important the civil and
political rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights… for it
concerns self-preservation and self-perpetuation… this
basic right need not be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind
Sec 16 LGC
- right of people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in General Welfare Clause
Realization of the General Welfare Clause,
Decentralization and Exercise of Police Power
Sec 5(c) LGC
- general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be
liberally interpreted to give more powers to the LGU in
accelerating economic development and upgrading
the quality of life
Fishery Laws
- that LGU may enforce under Sec 17 in municipal
water include
- PD 704
- PD 1015 – closed season
- PD 1219 – exploration, exploitation, utilization,
conservation of coral resources
- PD 5474 – unlawful to catch, sell, etc. ipon during
closed season
- PD 6451 – prohibits and punishes electrofishing
Memorandum of Agreement (1994)
- between Dept of Agriculture and DILG
- issuance of permits to construct fish cages, gather
aquarium fishes, gather kapis shells, gather/culture
shelled mollusks, establish seaweed farms, establish
culture pearls, transports fish and fishery products and
establishment of closed season
RA 7611 Strategic Environment Plan for Palawan Act
- comprehensive framework for sustainable
development of Palawan compatible with protecting
and enhancing the natural resources and endangered
environment of the province which shall serve to guide
the local government of Palawan nd the government
agencies concerned in the formulation and
implementation of plans, programs and projects
affecting Palawan
Principal Objectives of Ordinances
1) establish closed season for the species covered in
the said ordinances for a period of five years
2) to protect the corals in the marine waters of Puerto
Princesa and Palawan from further destruction due to
illegal fishing activities
Jurisdiction of BFAR or LGU
- Bellosillo: Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance 15 Series of 1992
because supposed to be within the jurisdiction and
respoinsibility of BFAR (Fisheries and Aquatic Resources)
under PD 704 otherwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975
TF unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of
DNR (Natl Res)
- Majority: BFAR jurisdiction over management,
conservation, development, etc not all-encompassing;
excludes municipal waters; BFAR no longer under DNR,
now under DoA TF incorrect to challenge that ordinances
unenforceable because no approval of Sec of DENR but
of Sec of DoA instead; BUT this can be dispensed with
because of Repealing Claus of LGC insofar as those
provisions are inconsistent and power to enact
ordinances to enhance right of people to a balanced
ecology contained in the General Welfare Clause in the
LGC
Decision Petition dismissed for lack of merit and TRO
lifted
Voting 10 concur, 4 dissent, 1 on leave
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA [concur]
- fully concurs with the decision
- two important points: uphold presumption of validity of
the ordinances in view of total absence of evidence that
undermine their factual basis AND need not allow
shortcircuiting of the normal process of adjudication on
the mere plea that unless we take cognizance of
petitions like this, by-passing the trial courts, alleged
violations of constitutional rights will be left unprotected,
when the matter can be very well be looked into by trial
courts and in fact it should be brought there
BELLOSILLO [dissent]
- Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto
Princesa to enact Ordinance 15 Series of 1992 because
supposed to be within the jurisdiction and respoinsibility
of BFAR (Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) under PD 704
otherwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975 TF
unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of
DNR (Natl Res)
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V ROMULO
CALLEJO; May 30, 2004
FACTS
- EO 48 – issued by Pres. Estrada on 12/07/98 entitled
“Establishing a Program for Devolution Adjustment and
Equalization”:
• Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund
was created
• DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be
determined by the Oversight Committee based on
appraisal surveys by DILG
• Oversight Committee (which was constituted
under Local Gov’t Code of 1991) has been tasked to
issue implementing rules and regulations governing
equitable allocation and distribution of the said fund
to the LGUs
- GAA of 1999 – In this General Appropriations Act, the
program was renamed as Local Gov’t Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF)
• Php96.78B was the allotted share of the LGUs in the
IR taxes
• “SpecialProvisions” included that the amount of
Php5B shall be earmarked for LGSEF, and it shall be
released to the LGUs subject to the IRR
(Implementing Rules and Regulations) prescribed by
the Oversight Committee
• Internal Revenue Allotment shall be released
directly by the DBM to the LGUs concerned
- OCD Resolutions – Oversight Committee allocated
Php5B as follows:
• Php2B in accordance with formula sharing scheme
prescribed under LGC of 1991
• Php2B allocated with a modified CODEF sharing
scheme
• Php1B to be earmarked to support local affirmative
action projects and other priority initiatives;
proposals were to be submitted by the LGUs to the
Oversight Committee subject to its approval (OC
prescribed a Criteria for Eligibility)
- GAA of 2000 – Also contained a proviso earmarking
Php5B of the IRA for the LGSEF (similar to GAA of 1999)
• Php3.5B shared by the LGUs using a percentage-
sharing formula agreed upon by the various
Leagues of LGUs
• Php1.5B to be earmarked for projects, which are to
be endorsed to and approved by the Oversight
Committee
- GAA of 2001 – GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted
and OC allocated Php5B LGSEF as follows:
• Php3B according to the modified codal formula
• Php1.9B is earmarked for priority projects
• Php100M for capability building fund subject to OC’s
approval
- Procedure
Province of Batangas, represented by Gov.
MANDANAS filed a petition for CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION, and MANDAMUS to declare as
unconstitutional the assailed provisos in GAA of 99, ’00,
’01 and OCD Resolutions and was issued against Exec.
Sec. ROMULO (Chairman of Oversight Committee on
Devolution), Sec. BONCODIN (Dept. of Budget and
Mngmt.), and Sec. LINA (DILG)
- Petitioner’s grounds –
• Violative of Sec.6 Art.10 of 1987 Consti (just share
must be automatically released to the LGUs)
• Vesting the Oversight Committee with authority in
determining distribution and release of LGSEF is
contrary to the principle of local autonomy
• Improper sharing scheme (provisos modified
sec.285 of LGC) resulting to an illegal amendment
by the Executive branch of substantive law
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON petitioner has legal standing
2. WON petition involves factual questions properly
cognizable by lower courts
3. WON petition has been rendered moot and academic
Substantive
4. WON assailed provisos violate constitutional provision
on local autonomy
5. WON the assailed provisos result to a proper
amendment of sharing scheme provided in LGC
HELD
1. Yes.
- The petitioner seeks relief in order to protect or
vindicate its own interests, which pertains to the
LGUs’ share in the national taxes (IRA). The
potential injury it stands to suffer is the diminution of its
share in the IRA, which is clearly “a plain, direct and
adequate interest.”
2. No.
- It involves a legal question (on what is the
proper legal interpretation) which is to be settled
by the SC. Also, the facts necessary to resolve the issue
need not be determined by a trial court since they are
not disputed.
3. No.
- Even if the LGSEF for ’99, ’00, and ’01 have already
been released, there is still compelling reason for the SC
to resolve substantive issues.
- “Even in cases where supervening events,
whether intended or accidental, had made the
cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve
the legal or constitutional issues raised to
formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, bar and public.”
Obiter
- Sec.25 Art.2: The State shall ensure the autonomy of
local governments.
- Sec.2 Art.10: The territorial and political subdivisions
shall enjoy local autonomy.
- President’s power over LGUs is one of general
supervision, and this excludes power of control. (Drilon
v. Lim: “The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such
rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them.”)
- Autonomy is either DECENTRALIZATION of
ADMINISTRATION or decentralization of POWER.
- LOCAL AUTONOMY means a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization. LGUs are subject
to regulation, however limited, for no other purpose than
to enhance self-government.
- Local autonomy includes both ADMINISTRATIVE
(autonomy in the exercise of its functions) and FISCAL
AUTONOMY (power to create own sources of revenue, in
addition to equitable share in national taxes.)
4. Yes.
- Sec.6 Art.10 mandates that -
o LGUs shall have a JUST SHARE in the NATIONAL
TAXES
o “Just share” shall be DETERMINED BY LAW
o “Just share” shall be AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED
to the LGUs
- As such, the LGUs are NOT required to perform
any act to receive the “just share” accruing to
them from national taxes (Sec.286 LGC: It shall be
released to them without need of further action.”) The
provision is IMPERATIVE. Any retention is prohibited.
- Ratio To subject the distribution and release of the
LGSEF to implementing rules and regulations, including
mechanisms prescribed by the OC, as sanctioned by the
provisos in the GAAs of ’99, ’00, ’01 and the OCD
Resolutions makes the release NOT automatic, which
violates the Constitution.
- OC exercising jurisdiction and control contradicts
principle of local autonomy. There is also NO STATUTORY
BASIS for this power since the OC was created merely to
formulate rules and regulations for efficient
implementation of the LGC (only ad hoc character)
- As evident from the Con-Com deliberations, the
Automatic release provision was intended to
GUARANTEE principle of local autonomy.
5. No.
- The sharing scheme provided for in the LGC is
fixed and may not be reduced except “in the
event that the national government incurs an
unmanageable public sector deficit.” (Sec.285 LGC:
Provinces – 23%, Cities – 23%, Municipalities – 34%,
Barangays – 20%)
- Congress may amend LGC but should do so
through a separate law, and not just through an
appropriations law.
Decision Petition granted.
• Provisions relating to LGSEF declared
unconstitutional.
• Respondents are directed to rectify unlawful
distribution of LGSEF.
• Entire IRA to be released automatically without
further action by LGUs.
MIRANDA V AGUIRRE
PUNO; September 16, 1999
FACTS
- Special Civil Action in Supreme Court. of prohibition
with prayer for preliminary injunction.
- Petitioners are Miranda, mayor of Santiago City at time
of filing of petition, and residents of Santiago City
(located in Province of Isabela)
- Respondents are executive, local government and
budget secretaries, and public officials of the province of
Isabela
- Intervenor is winner of additional seat in provincial
board brought about by the “reallocation.”
- Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 8528 –
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF RA 7720(AN
ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO
AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS
THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.)
- The RA deletes the word “independent” and
treats Santiago City just as a component city. Its
territory and territorial jurisdiction remains unchanged.
- Petitioners believe that this amounts to a
conversion of Santiago City and must therefore be
decided by the city’s citizens in a plebiscite, of which the
RA has no provisions provided for. Respondents, on the
other hand, deem that this is a mere reclassification.
ISSUES
1. WON issue is justiciable
2. WON a plebiscite must be provided
HELD
1. Ratio The enumeration in Section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution shall include any material change in
the political and economic rights of the local government
unit(s) directly affected.
- Petitioners have standing. The change will affect the
powers of the mayor and the voting exercise of
residents.
- Not a political question. Petitioners claim that under
Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right
to approve or disapprove RA 8528 in a plebiscite before
it can be enforced. The Court has the duty to ensure that
Congress complies with the Constitution in law-making.
2. Ratio The change from independent component city
to component city shall amount to a conversion which
therefore requires a plebiscite as contemplated in Rule
II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Local Government Code.
- Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, or divided, merged, or abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.”
- Respondents emphasize that the change provided in
the RA is not among those enumerated in the foregoing
provision. Moreover, the territory and boundaries of
Santiago City remained unchanged.
- But the ponente points out that there is a common
denominator among those enumerated in the provision –
all of them result to a material change in the political
and economic rights of the local government units
directly affected and the people therein. The same
applies to the present case.
- As the petitioners mentioned, the change of Santiago
City from independent component city to component city
will have the following effects:
• From being directly under the Office of the
President, the city will be reverted to the
Provincial Government of Isabela, thereby
 increasing its land area and subsequently
increasing its share in the internal revenue
allotment.
• Taxes which the city collects for its benefit will be
redefined and may be shared with the province.
• Allocation of operating funds will now come from
the Province which amounts to a decrease in the
city’s funds.
• Registered voters of Santiago City will vote for
and can be voted as provincial officials
• City officials, especially the mayor, will now be
under the control of the Provincial Governor
• Resolutions and ordinances by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod will now be subject to review of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
- Clearly this amounts to a conversion if not a downgrade
of Santiago City.
- Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is
in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:
- “(f) Plebiscite –(1) no creation, conversion, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
of LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in
the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be
conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such
action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.”
Decision Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is
declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is
hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist
from implementing said law.
Voting 10 concur; 4 dissent
TORRALBA V MUNICIPALITY
MELENCIO-HERRERA; January 29, 1987
FACTS
- Residents and taxpayers of Butuan City with Torralba,
a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the same
city contend that Batas Pambansa (BP) 56, creating the
Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur,
violated Sec. 3, Art. 11 of the 1973 Constitution: No
province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject
to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Petitioners argue
that under the said provision, the Local Government
Code must first be enacted to determine the criteria of
the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of the boundary of any province, municipality,
or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had
as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed,
the statute could not have possibly complied with any
criteria when respondent Municipality was created.
Hence, it is null and void.
- The Local Government Code was enacted only on 10
February 1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the
Code was not yet in existence. A plebiscite had also
been conducted among the people of the unit/units
affected by the creation of the new Municipality, who
expressed approval thereof; and that officials of the
newly created Municipality had been appointed and had
assumed there respective positions as such.
ISSUE
WON BP Blg 56 is unconstitutional.
HELD
- No. The absence of the Local Government Code at the
time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended
to cripple legislative competence to create municipal
corporations. Sec. 3, Art. 11 of the 1973 does not
prohibit the modification of territorial and political
subdivisions before the enactment of the Local
Government Code. It contains no requirement that the
Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for
creating a new municipality, in much the same way that
creating a new municipality does not preclude the
enactment of a Local Government Code. What the
constitutional provision means is that the once said Code
is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of
local government units should conform to the criteria
thus laid down. In the interregnum, before the
enactment of such code, the legislative power remains
plenary except that the creation of the new local
government unit should be approved by the people
concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
- The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat
conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted
and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and
approved the creation of the new local government unit.
Further, it is a long-recognized principle that the power
to create a municipal corporation is essentially
legislative in nature. Absent any constitutional
limitations, a legislative body may create any
corporation it deems essential for the more efficient
administration of government. The creation of the new
municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of the
legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in
the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
TAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ALAMPAY; July 11, 1986
FACTS
- A plebiscite was held on January 3, 1986 which divided
the province of Negros Occidental into two – Negros del
Norte and Negros Occidental.
- The petitioners, residents of the province of Negros
Occidental, challenge the constitutionality of the Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885, the act which created Negros del
Norte. The said law provides that some cities from the
island of Negros would be separated in order to create
the new province, subject to a concurrence of the
majority in a plebiscite.
- The petitioners contend that the act is not in accord
with the Local Government Code as in Article 11, Section
3 of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that a
plebiscite be held “in the unit or units affected”. The
petitioners said that Negros Occidental is a unit affected
by the creation of the new province, thus, they should be
allowed to vote. Also, they contend that the minimum
requirement of 3500 square kilometers for the creation
of a new province (as provided by the Local Government
Code) has not been complied since the Negros del Norte
is only comprised of 2856.56 square kilometers. They
pray that the plebiscite be declared null and void, and
that the Court order the COMELEC to conduct another
plebiscite which includes Negros Occidental.
- The respondents, meanwhile, argue that the term “unit
or units affected” does not include Negros Occidental. As
such, they cited a Paredes vs. Executive Secretary,
where the court ruled that only the members of the
newly created barangay are allowed to vote in the
plebiscite. Also, they contend that Negros del Norte
actually is comprised of 4,019.95 square kilometers,
thus, it has met the requirement of the LGC. Lastly, they
argue that since the plebiscite has already happened,
the case is moot and academic.
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic
2. WON the act complied with the constitutional
requirements
HELD
1. No. The case cannot be truly viewed as moot and
academic. The legality of the plebiscite itself is being
challenged by the petitioners. The Court has the duty to
repudiate acts which run counter to the Constitution,
done by whatever branch of government.
2. No.
Plebiscite
- The province of the Negros Occidental should be
allowed to vote in the plebiscite. It is clear that they are
part of the “units affected” by the creation of the new
province, it being the “parent province”.
- The case cited by the petitioners, Paredes vs. Executive
Secretary, is different with the case at bar. It merely
includes the division of a barangay, the smallest political
unit. This case refers to a division of the largest political
unit, a barangay, thus there will be more problems
involved. The Court also looked at the dissent of Justice
Vicente Abad Santos in that case, which mimics they
decision of the Court in this case.
- Looking at Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, the bill wherein
BP Blg. 885 originated, it clearly said that a plebiscite
“shall be conducted in the areas affected”. BP Blg. 885,
on the other hand, says that a plebiscite “shall be
conducted in the proposed new province which are the
areas affected”. The Court found no legal basis for the
change.
- The Court also declared the pronouncement in Paredes
vs Executive Secretary is abandoned.
- However, the act being unconstitutional, the Court
cannot direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, there
being no legal basis to do so.
Minimum area requirement
- Upon examining the certification issued by the
Provincial Treasurer, the new province, at most, has a
land area of only 2765.4 square kilometers.
Respondent’s contention that the term “land area” is
meant to include not only land, but water also cannot be
appreciated. The Court looked at the last sentence of the
first paragraph of Sec 197 of the LGC which states that
“the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
or more islands”. It is clear that the use of the word
territory has reference only to land mass since it speaks
of territory not needing to be contiguous or adjacent to
each other.
Decision Petition granted. BP Blg. 885 declared
unconstitutional. The plebiscite is void as well as the
proclamation of Negros del Norte as a new province and
the appointment of its new officials.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE
- congratulated the Court in its unanimity in the decision.
- Additional facts: Act was approved in “deep secrecy
and inordinate haste” in
the last day of session, Dec 3, 1985. Though the act
provided that a plebiscite be conducted 120 days its
approval, but the plebiscite was held in Jan 3, 1986. The
petitioners filed the case in Dec 23, 1985, even as no
printed copies of the Act were available, since its has not
been published. Since it was Christmas break at that
time, the petition was only acted upon by the Court only
on January 7, 1986, after the plebiscite has been held.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
CORTES; January 29, 1990
FACTS
- Note Read first sec. 15-21, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution for this case.
- The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated
July 15,1987, which created the Cordillera Administrative
Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-
empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress
(see sec. 18, Art. X) and the creation of the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of
the act through a plebiscite.
- Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the
exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6
of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR), which covers the provinces
of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2].
- It was created to accelerate economic and social
growth in the region and to prepare for the
establishment of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras [sec. 3].
- Its main function is to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the region,
particularly, to coordinate with the local government
units as well as with the executive departments of the
National Government in the supervision of field offices
and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting
projects and activities in the region [sec. 5)].
- It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing
national and local government projects in the region.
- The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a
policy formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board
as an implementing arm (secs. 7, 8 and 10].
- The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall
exist until such time as the autonomous regional
government is established and organized [sec. 17].
- Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No.
220, its last "Whereas" clause provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress
and the enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera
autonomous region, there is an urgent need, in the
interest of national security and public order, for the
President to reorganize immediately the existing
administrative structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to
the existing political realities therein and the
Government's legitimate concerns in the areas,
without attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty
of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an
autonomous region on a permanent basis.
- During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No.
6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and
signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the
offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its
transitory nature.
ISSUE
1. WON EO No. 220 is unconstitutional because it pre-
empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress
and the creation of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the said
organic act through a plebiscite
2. WON EO No. 220 created a new territorial and political
subdivision with CAR
3. WON the creation of the CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the
provinces
HELD
1. EO. No. 220 is constitutional.
- Petitioners’ assertions that the President has pre-
empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting
said organic act.
- EO No. 220 does not create the autonomous region
contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides
for transitory measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground
for autonomy.
- The President is acting on a contingency. The
complex procedure in Art. X of the Constitution will
take time.
o The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative
powers, as the first Congress had not yet
convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures
to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in
the meantime that the organic act had not yet
been passed and the autonomous region created.
- The transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily
mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition
asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the
Cordilleras."
o EO No. 220 created a region, covering a specified
area, for administrative purposes with the main
objective of coordinating the planning and
implementation of programs and services [secs. 2
and 5].
o The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not
supplant the existing local governmental
structure, nor are they autonomous government
agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism
for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing
local governments, the agencies of the National
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes,
and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the
Cordilleras.
- The Congress was convened. It enacted Republic Act
No. 6658, which created the Cordillera Regional
Consultative Commission. (per Sec. 18, Art. X). The
President then appointed its members.
o The commission prepared a draft organic act,
which became the basis for the deliberations of
the Senate and the House of Representatives. The
result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act
for the Cordillera autonomous region, which was
signed into law on October 23, 1989.
o A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to
be conducted shortly, shall complete the process
outlined in the Constitution, in the meantime, E.O.
No. 220 had been in force and effect for more
 than two years and despite E.O. No. 220, the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras is still to be
created. Events have shown that petitioners' fear
that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation
of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was
totally unfounded.
2. It did not create a new territorial and political
subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger
subdivision.
- The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and
political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical
personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
o Neither is it vested with the powers that are
normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the
power to sue and be sued, the power to own and
dispose of property, the power to create its own
sources of revenue, etc.
o As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily
to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas.
- Considering the control and supervision exercised by
the President over the CAR and the offices created under
E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable
participation of the line departments of the National
Government, the CAR may be considered more than
anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the
National Government, similar to the regional
development councils which the President may create
under the Constitution (Art. X, see. 14).
o These councils are "composed of local
government officials, regional heads of
departments and other government offices, and
representatives from non-governmental
organizations within the region for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the
autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate
the economic and social growth and development
of the units in the region."
3. The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the
1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these
regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an
autonomous regional government with a basic structure
consisting of an executive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal, family and
property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous
regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
- The concept of local autonomy:
 It must be clarified that the constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution
[Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or, cast in
more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No.
L31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 11.]
 The CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency
that would prepare the stage for political
autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the
resulting gap in the process of transforming a
group of adjacent territorial and political
subdivisions already enjoying local or
administrative autonomy into an autonomous
region vested with political autonomy.
Decision Petition to declare EO No. 220 as
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Voting All 15 justices concurred with J. Gutierrez, Jr.
concurring in the result since for him the issue has
become moot and academic because Republic Acts No.
6658 and No. 6766 superseded the assailed EO already.
ORDILLO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GUTIERREZ; December 4, 1990
FACTS
- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766
entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of the
provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra
and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their
votes in a plebiscite.
- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889
votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the rest provinces
and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of
total population, and as such has the second smallest
number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.
- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has
been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast
only in the province of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also
issued a memorandum for the President reiterating
COMELEC resolution, stating that “…Ifugao being the
only province which voted favorably – then. Alone,
legally and validly constitutes CAR.”
- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No.
6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday
of March 1991.
- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary
issued February 5, 1990 a memorandum granting
authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly
created under Executive Order No. 220.
- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order
No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and
all offices under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished
in view of the ratification of Organic Act.
- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the
said Region be composed of more than one constituent
unit.
- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:
a. declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259,
the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice,
Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No.
6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from
implementing the same and spending public funds
for the purpose
b. declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the
Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera
Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in
force and effect until another organic law for the
Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by
Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters
in the constituent units.
ISSUE
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province
which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly
constitute such region.
HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute
the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
a. The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution – provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas connote that “region” is to be
made up of more than one constituent unit. The
term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two
or more provinces.
- rule in statutory construction must be applied
here: the language of the Constitution, as much
as possible should be understood in the sense it
has in common use and that the words used in
constitutional provisions are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed.
b. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the
Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with
provisions which rule against the sole province of
Ifugao constituting the Region.
- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended
that a single province may constitute the
autonomous region.
- If this were so, we would be faced with the
absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a
set of provincial officials and another set of
regional officials exercising their executive and
legislative powers over exactly the same small
area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in
the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and
2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)
- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional
Government for its initial organizational
requirements can not be construed as funding
only a lone and small province [Art XXI sec 13(B)
(c)]
- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials
“coming from different provinces and cities” in
 the Region, as well as tribal courts and the
development of a common regional language. (Art
V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)
- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the
COMELEC would not only violate the letter and intent of
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be
impractical and illogical.
Decision Petition (both a and b) granted.
BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT
GAMING CORPORATION
PARAS; May 14, 1991
FACTS
- Petitioners are taxpayers and practicing lawyers.
Petitioner Basco is the Chairperson of the Committee on
Laws of the City Council of Manila. On July 1981 PAGCOR
was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government
to regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law
- Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of PD
1869 and they pray for its annulment based on the ff.
grounds:
"A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a
third person willing right recognized bylaw. It waived
the Manila City government's right to impose taxes
and license fees, which is recognized by law.
"B. The law has intruded into the local government's
right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined
principle of local autonomy.
"C. It violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR - conducted
gambling. while most other forms of' gambling are
outlawed. together with prostitution, drug trafficking
and other vices;
"C. It violates the avowed trend of the government
away from monopolistic and crony economy and
toward free enterprise and privatization.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners have standing to question and seek
the annulment of PD 1869
2. WON PD 1869 violates the principle of local autonomy
of Manila
3. WON PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause
HELD
1. Yes, petitioners have standing to question and seek
the annulment of PD 1869.
- Considering the importance to the public of the case at
bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the
1987 Constitution, to determine whether or riot the other
branches of government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court
has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has
taken cognizance of this petition.
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party
as applied in the cases before the Supreme Court, it
holds that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and
intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in
danger of' sustaining an immediate injury as a result of
the acts or measures complained of." And even if,
strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition,
it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive
the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.
2. No, PD 1869 does not violate the local autonomy of
Manila with regard to its exemption clause.
a. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal
corporation hits no inherent right to impose taxes. Its
"power to tax" must always yield to a legislative act
which is superior having been passed upon by the
state itself which has the "inherent power to tax"
b. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to
control by Congress. The City of Manila's power to
impose license fees on gambling, has long been
revoked. As early as 197.5, the power of local
governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of
"franchise. licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D.
No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National
Government.
Therefore, only the National Government has the
power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation
of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or
collect license fees which is a consequence of the
issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in
the City of Manila.
3. No, PD 1869 does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution
- The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall. The mere fact
that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449)
horse racing (R -A. 306 as amended by RA 983),
sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended
by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions. while
others are prohibited, does not render the applicable
laws, P.D. 1869 for one. unconstitutional.
JUDGE LEYNES V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
CORONA; December 11, 2003
FACTS
- Petitioner is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, was formerly
assigned in the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro
as the sole presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court.
- His salary and representation and transportation
allowance (RATA) were drawn from the budget of the
Supreme Court. In addition, he received a monthly
allowance from the local funds of the Municipality of
Naujan starting 1984.
- March 15, 1993- the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan,
through Resolution No. 057, sought the opinion of the
Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer
regarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of a
monthly allowance by the municipality to petitioner
judge.
- May 7, 1993- the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously
approved Resolution 101, increasing petitioner judge’s
monthly allowance starting May 1993.
- February, 17, 1994- Provincial Auditor Salvacion M.
Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the
payment of the monthly allowance and to require the
immediate refund of the amounts previously paid. Her
directive was based on the following:
1. Section 36, RA No.7645, General Appropriations
Act of 1993
2. National Compensation Circular No. 67 of the
Department of Budget and Management
- Petitioner Judge appealed to Commission on Audit,
Regional Director upheld opinion of Provincial Auditor
Dalisay and added that Resolution No. 101 Series of
1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to
comply with Section 3 of the Local Budge Circular No. 53
outlining the conditions for the grant of the allowances
to judges and other national officials or employees by
the local government units.
- Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of
the Regional Director to the Commission on Audit.
- September 14, 1999- Commission on Audit issued its
decision affirming Resolution of the Regional Director.
1. the main issue is whether or not the municipality
can validly provide RATA to its municipal judge
2. Section 36 of RA 7645 states:
- Payable from the programmed/appropriated
amount and others from personal services savings
of the respective offices where the officials or
employees draw their salaries;
- Not exceeding the rates prescribed by the Annual
General Appropriations Act;
- Officials/amployees on detail with other offices or
assigned to serve other offices or agencies shall
be paid from their parent agencies
- No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more
than one source.
2. The municipal government may provide additional
allowances and other benefits to judges and other
national government officials or employees
assigned or stationed in the municipality,
provided, that the finances of the municipality
allow the grant thereof pursuant to Section 447,
Par. 1 RA 7160, and provided further that similar
allowances/additional compensation are not
granted by the national government to the
official/employee assigned to the local
 government unit as provided under Section 3(e)
of local Budget Circular No. 53.
3. Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 101 is null and
void. The Honorable Judge Tomas C. Leynes,
being a national government official is prohibited
to receive additional RATA from the local
government fund pursuant to Section 36 of the
General Appropriations Act and National
Compensation Circular No. 67.
- Position of Commission on Audit
> The municipality could not grant RATA to judges in
addition to the RATA already received from the Supreme
Court
1. National Compensation Circular No. 67
- the RATA of national officials and employees shall
be payable from the programmed appropriations
or personal services savings of the agency where
such officials or employees draw their salary and
- no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more
than one source
2. General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA 7645)
- the RATA of national officials shall be payable
from the programmed appropriations of their
respective offices
3. Local Budget Circular No. 53
- prohibits local government units from granting
allowances to national government officials or
employees stationed in their localities when such
allowances are also granted by the national
government or are similar to the allowances
granted by the national government to such
officials or employees
- Position of Petitioner
> Municipality is expressly and unequivocally
empowered by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code of
1991) to enact appropriation ordinances granting
allowances and other benefits to judges stationed in its
territory.
> DBM cannot amend or modify a substantive law like
the Local Government Code 1991 through mere budget
circulars.
ISSUE
WON Judge Leynes can validly receive allowance from
municipality
HELD
- Ratio When a national official is on detail with another
national agency, he should get his RATA only from his
parent national agency and not from the other national
agency he is detailed to.
-Respondent COA erred in opposing the grant of the
monthly allowance by the Municipality of Naujan to
petitioner Judge Leynes
- Reasoning
• RA 7645 is amended by NCC No. 67. No,
administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate,
modify, or nullify a statute.
• The Constitution guarantees the principle of local
autonomy
- Article 10, Section 2
• An ordinance must be presumed valid in the
absence of evidence showing that it is not in
accordance with the law.
ART XI: ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS
FRANCISCO V HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
PER CURIAM; September 27, 2005
FACTS
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. vs. The House Committee on
Justice, represented by Its Chairman, Rep. Simeon
Datumanong, The House of Representatives,
represented by Its Speaker, Rep. Jose de Venecia and
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
MINUTE RESOLUTION
- Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 September
2005: DENIED WITH FINALITY as no substantial
arguments were presented to warrant the reversal of the
questioned resolution
- Urgent Motion for Consolidation dated 24 September
2005 DENIED for lack of merit
- Letter dated 26 September 2005 NOTED WITHOUT
ACTION
FRANCISCO V NAGMAMALASAKIT NA
MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC.
CARPIO-MORALES; November 10, 2003
FACTS
- Art 11, Sec 8 Constitution – Congress shall promulgate
its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this Section.
- November 2001 - 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) superseding the Rules approved by
11th Congress
> Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House
files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen
files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a
Member of the House through a resolution of
endorsement against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against such official are
deemed initiated on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or
resolution against such official, as the case may be,
is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House
votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in
substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as
the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the
Members of the House, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.
> Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from
the date impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated
against the same official.
- July 2002 – House of representatives adopted a
Resolution directing Committee on Justice to conduct
an investigation in aid of legislation on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Judiciary Development Fund
- June 2003 – Pres. Estrada filed the first impeachment
complaint against Davide and 7 associate justices for
culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public
trust, and other high crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico,
Zamora, and Dilangalen  House Committee on Justice
dismissed the complain because insufficient in
substance
- October 2003 – Rep. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed
second impeachment complaint founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry; resolution of
endorsement/impeachment was signed by at least 1/3 of
all the members of the House of Representatives
ISSUES
1. WON issue is justiciable
2. WON Rules of Procedure for Impeachment
Proceedings adopted by 12th Congress is constitutional
and second impeachment complaint is valid
HELD
1. Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave
the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for judicially discoverable
standards for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion through power of judicial review.
o Locus standi - Case is of transcendental pubic
importance.
o Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had
been filed and the 2001 rules had been
promulgated and enforced.
 o Lis mota - (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule
V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by
the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result
thereof, the second impeachment complaint is
barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
o Judicial Restraint – not an option because the
Court is not legally disqualified; no other tribunal
to which the controversy may be referred.
2. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
o Interpretation of the term “initiate” – takes place
by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of
the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by filing by at least 1/3
of the members of the HR with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Sec 3 (5) of
Art XI becomes clear.
o Sec 3 (5) of Article XI – once an impeachment
complains has been initiated, another complaint
may not be filed against the same official within a
period of one year.
o Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by
the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the
House of Representatives of a verified complaint
or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of
the members of the House. These rules clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the
rules give the term “initiate” a meaning different
meaning from filing and referral.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V
DACOYCOY
PARDO; April 29, 1999
FACTS
- Respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was charged with
habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism before
the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the
Commission conducted a formal investigation, and
thereafter, promulgated its resolution finding no
substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual
drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Commission
found respondent guilty of nepotism on two counts as a
result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped
Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and
their assignment under his immediate supervision and
control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the
penalty of dismissal from the service.
- The Commission denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration.
- Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a special
civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction to
set aside the Civil Service Commission’s resolutions. The
Court of Appeals then reversed and set aside the
decision of the Civil Service Commission, ruling that
respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons
Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism.
The Court of Appeals further held that it is "the person
who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned,
as it is he who performs the prohibited act." It likewise
declared null and void the Civil Service Commission’s
resolution dismissing him from the service.
- The Commission then filed an appeal via ceriorari
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
1. WON respondent is guilty of nepotism
2. WON the Commission is the "party adversely affected
by the decision" of the Court of Appeals who may file an
appeal therefrom
HELD
1. YES
- Under the definition of nepotism (Section 59 of
Executive Order 292), one is guilty of nepotism if an
appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of
the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.
- the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who
the appointing or recommending authority is. To
constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an
appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative
within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person
exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
- Respondent is the Vocational School Administrator,
Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern
Samar. He did not appoint or recommend his two sons to
the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trades. It was Mr. Jaime Daclag,
Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who
recommended the appointment of Rito. Mr. Daclag's
authority to recommend the appointment of first level
positions such as watchmen, security guards, drivers,
utility workers, and casuals and emergency laborers for
short durations of three to six months was
recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved
by DECS Regional Director Eladio C. Dioko, with the
provision that such positions shall be under Mr. Daclag’s
immediate supervision. Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director
III, DECS Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito
Dacoycoy driver of the school. Mr. Daclag also appointed
Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. However, it was
respondent Dacoycoy who certified that “funds are
available for the proposed appointment of Rito
Dacoycoy” and even rated his performance as “very
satisfactory”. On the other hand, his son Ped stated in
his position description form that his father was “his next
higher supervisor”. The circumvention of the ban on
nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag
was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy,
who was the school administrator. He authorized Mr.
Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level
employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr.
Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent’s
two sons and placed them under respondent’s
immediate supervision serving as driver and utility
worker of the school. Both positions are career positions.
- To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of
respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or
recommending authority in the appointment of his two
sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.
- Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil
service and the efficiency of its personnel. The basic
purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism
also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended
to be a comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling to
restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is
textually very broad and comprehensive. If not within
the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be
nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it
raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what
we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or
reward the ‘outstanding’ civil servants, but also to plug
the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to
insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures
in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention
of the law."
2. YES
- There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may
appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the
Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was the
respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal
from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
court required the petitioner therein, here respondent
Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as
public respondent as the government agency tasked
with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory
provisions on the civil service.
- Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Civil Service Commission and held
respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal
the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme
Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared
not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P.
Suan, who was merely a witness for the government.
Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become
the party adversely affected by such ruling, which
seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as
an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling,
we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that "the phrase ‘party adversely
affected by the decision’ refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed
for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the
form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer,
removal or dismissal from office" and not included are
"cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not
more then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is
exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for
appeal." In other words, we overrule prior decisions
holding that the Civil Service Law "does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating
officers or employees from administrative
charges."
- The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil
Service Commission, to support its ruling is misplaced.
The issues in Debulgado are whether a promotional
appointment is covered by the prohibition against
nepotism or the prohibition applies only to original
appointments to the civil service, and whether the
Commission had gravely abused its discretion in
recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment
given to petitioner after the Commission had earlier
approved that appointment. Debulgado never even
impliedly limited the coverage of the ban on nepotism to
only the appointing or recommending authority for
appointing a relative. Precisely, in Debulgado, the Court
emphasized that Section 59 "means exactly what it says
in plain and ordinary language: x x x The public policy
embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in
importance, and the Court had neither authority nor
inclination to dilute that important public policy by
introducing a qualification here or a distinction there."
Decision Petition granted. The Court of Appeals'
decision is reversed and the resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission are revived and affirmed.
SEPARATE OPINION
MELO [dissent and concur]
- Although I completely agree with the result and
likewise with the wisdom in which the issues relating to
nepotism are threshed out in the majority opinion, I do
not agree with the majority opinion stating that the Civil
Service Commission may appeal a judgment of
exoneration in an administrative case involving
nepotism. And Mr. Justice Puno would go further by
allowing even a private complainant – and by
implication, a complainant office, to appeal a decision
exonerating or absolving a civil service employee of
charges against, or even imposing a penalty upon him.
This totally contravenes our well-settled ruling in several
cases.
- The Court of Appeals exonerated respondent Dacoycoy
of the charge of nepotism. From such “adverse
decision”, the Civil Service Commission, through its
Office for Legal Affairs, interposed the present appeal by
way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Under existing laws and
jurisprudence this is not allowed, so this Court ruled in
the above-cited cases. If this point is not stressed by the
Court, the present decision might be misconstrued as a
watering down of the settled doctrine.
- It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provision of law.
- A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as “The
Philippine Civil Service Law” shows that said law does
not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating
officers or employees from administrative charges.
- Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
- "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more that thirty
days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or
dismissal from office."
- Said provision must be read together with Section 39
paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 (should be 807) which
contemplates:
"Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by
the party adversely affected by the decision."
- The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision"
refers to the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary
action which may take the form of suspension, demotion
in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. The remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a
case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges
against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of
said charges, as in the case, there is no occasion for
appeal.
- Based on the above provision of law, appeal to the Civil
Service Commission in an administrative case is
extended to the party adversely affected by the
decision, that is, the person or the respondent employee
who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for
more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the
disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to
the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days’ salary.
Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed within
fifteen days from receipt of the decision.
- It is my submission that the prerogative to now
determine whether this practice of disallowing appeals in
cases of exoneration should still continue or not,
exclusively belongs to Legislature. The Court cannot and
should not arrogate this policy-making power of
Congress unto itself, not even in the guise of the
exercise of its expanded power of judicial review under
the 1987 Constitution. Only Congress has authority to
remedy inadequacies in the wisdom of a law, should it
find any, especially when the definite intention of the
existing law was to disallow the State to appeal from
judgments of exoneration. Any attempt by the Court to
transgress this most basic principle in the separation of
powers between these two branches of government
would to my mind, result in the abhorrent act of judicial
legislation.
- Effective June 1, 1995, Revised Administrative Circular
No. 1-95 ordained that, appeals from awards, judgments
or final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency (which includes the Civil Service
Commission) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions shall be taken by filing a verified petition for
review with the Court of Appeals. Although in general,
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals may be filed via a
verified petition for review on certiorari with this Court
(where pure questions of law, distinctly set forth therein,
may be duly raised), an appeal involving a judgment or
final order of the Court of Appeals exonerating a
government employee in an administrative case, in
particular, falls within the ambit of the provisions of
Section 39, paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807.
It is elementary that a special law such as Presidential
Decree No. 807 takes precedence over general rules of
procedure such as Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. No
appeal may, therefore, be taken under Rule 45.
- Moreover, it is recognized in our jurisdiction that an
administrative case which could result in the revocation
of license, or similar sanctions like dismissal from office,
constitutes a proceeding which partakes of a criminal
nature. Being such, provisions of law pertaining thereto
must perforce be construed strictly against the State,
just as penal laws are strictly construed strictly against
the State. Any ambiguity, should there be any, must be
resolved in favor of the respondent in the administrative
case. The term "party adversely affected" should not be
construed as to include the State in administrative
charges involving nepotism.
- To allow appeals from decisions, be they exonerative or
otherwise, against civil service employees would, to my
mind, be stocking the stakes too much against our civil
servants. It should be noted in this regard that the
greater bulk of our government workers are ordinary
people, working under supervision and, more often than
not, exposed to political pressure and the influence of
peddlers of power. Their simple status notwithstanding,
they are not easily cowed and intimidated. Many,
though, are threatened with complaints, transfer of
station, or demotion, if they refuse to do the bidding of
some unscrupulous superiors or politicians. I can,
therefore, understand why the law and our jurisprudence
disallow appeal by the complainant from decisions in
administrative cases, be they exonerative or otherwise.
Verily, an employee may be hounded into spending up
to his last resources and losing his self-respect and
honor by successive appeals.
- What will happen, if for instance, the respondent
government employee is initially exonerated or given a
light penalty, and the complainant may appeal, insisting
that the employee is guilty or that he deserves a heavier
penalty? And, if the Civil Service Commission thereafter
metes out a penalty not to the liking of the complainant,
the matter may still be elevated to the Court of Appeals
or even this Court? Where else will all this end, if not in
the physical and financial exhaustion of the respondent
civil servant? Again, I wish to stress that I speak here of
the ordinary employees. The big shots in government
who commit wrongs may somehow hereby benefit, but
then we shall be content in concluding that we decided
in favor of the many, that the good of the majority
prevailed.
- A judgment of exoneration by the Court of Appeals, as
in the case of a judgment of exoneration by the Civil
Service Commission or the now defunct Merit System
Protection Board, may indeed prove to be truly adverse
to the government agency concerned and eventually to
the State as a whole. This is especially so when there
had been lapses in the interpretation and/or application
of the law as in the present case. This notwithstanding,
the right to appeal, which is merely statutory may not be
invoked, much less exercised, when the law does not
provide any. Again, until and unless Congress exercises
its prerogative to amend such law, this Court is bound by
it and has no other recourse except to apply the same.
Fortunately for petitioner but not so for respondent, the
latter failed to invoke the foregoing general rule. In a
similar case, we held that the party favored by such law
who fails to interpose any objection to an appeal may be
deemed to have waived this right.
- Premises considered and with the above observations, I
vote to grant the petition as stated in the dispositive
thereof.
PUNO [concur]
- Appeal to the Civil Service Commission in
administrative case is extended to the party adversely
affected by the decision, that is, the person of the
respondent employee who has been meted out the
penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine
in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in
rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even
final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission
in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not
more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary. Appeal in cases allowed by
law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the
decision.
- It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provision of law.
- By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may
be availed of only in a case where the respondent is
found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when
the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this
case, there is no occasion for appeal.
- The phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’
refers to the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary
action which may take the form of suspension, demotion
in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from
office.
- With humility, I make the submission that is time to
strike down the doctrine disallowing appeals to the Civil
Service Commission when the decision exonerates a
government official or employee from an administrative
charge. The doctrine is principally based on a constricted
interpretation of Section 39 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service
Law) which states:
“Sec. 39. (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be
made by the party adversely affected by the
decision within fifteen days from receipt of the
decision unless a petition for reconsideration is
seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided
within fifteen days. x x x”
- According to Paredes, Mendez and Magpale, the
phrase “party adversely affected by the decision” refers
alone to the respondent government official or employee
against whom the administrative case is filed. They
excluded from its compass the party complainant whose
charge is dismissed. Hence, when the respondent
government official or employee is exonerated, the
decision is deemed final as the party complainant is
precluded from appealing.
- I find it difficult to agree with the above interpretation
which is not only too narrow but is subversive of the
essence of our civil service law. In the case at bar,
private respondent is the Vocational Administrator of the
Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. His charged with
the offense of nepotism for the appointment of two sons
as driver and utility worker under his immediate control
and supervision. It is beyond argument that nepotism is
an
prohibited by our civil service law for it breeds
inefficiency, if not corruption, in government service.
The critical question, therefore, is: who has the standing
to prevent the violation of this law and protect public
interest? I submit that a taxpayer has the standing to
bring suit to void nepotic acts for he has an interest that
“appointments in the civil service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness x x x.” A taxpayer has a
right to good government and good government cannot
result from appointments determined by bloodlines. The
Civil Service Law itself recognizes that there are offenses
which can be the subject of a complaint by any private
citizen. Thus, Section 37 of the law allows any private
citizen to file a complaint against a government official
or employee directly with the Commission. Section 38
also recognizes that “administrative proceedings may be
commenced against a subordinate officer or employee
by the head of the department or office of equivalent
rank, or head of local government or chiefs of agencies,
or regional directors or upon sworn written complaint of
any other persons.” The general rule is that one
who has a right to be heard has standing to seek
review of any ruling adverse to him. Hence, if a
private citizen has the right to file an administrative
complaint, he must also have the right to appeal a
dismissal of his complaint, unless the law clearly
precludes his right of appeal for indubitable policy
reasons. A contrary rule will diminish the value of the
right to complain. The cases of Paredes, Mendez and
Magpale do not give any policy reasons why the
dismissal of a charge of nepotism cannot be appealed.
They merely resort to doubtful inferences in justifying
the bar to appeals. Such an approach goes against the
rule that “preclusions of judicial review of administrative
action . . . is not lightly to be inferred.
- In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not
categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law.
For what the law declares as "final" are decisions of
heads of agencies involving suspension for not more
than 30 days or fine in an amount not exceeding 30 days
salary. But there is a clear policy reasons for declaring
these decisions final. These decisions involve minor
offenses. They are numerous for they are the usual
offenses committed by government officials and
employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will
doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our
administrative system and defeat the expectation of fast
and efficient action from these administrative agencies.
Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its
deleterious effect on government cannot be over-
emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The
objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts,
hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism
cannot be given immunity from review, especially
judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that
since some decisions exonerating public officials from
minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a
decision acquitting a government official from a major
offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.
- Similarly, the doctrine barring appeal cannot be
justified by the provision limiting the jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission to review decisions involving:
(1) suspension for more than thirty (30) days; (2) fine in
an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary; (3)
demotion in rank or salary; and (4) transfer, removal or
dismissal from office. Again, there is nothing in this
provision indicating legislative intent to bar appeal from
decisions exonerating a government official or employee
from nepotism. Statutory preclusion of appeals is the
exception rather than the rule, for as stressed by Mr.
Justice Douglas, "tolerance of judicial review has been
more and more the rule against the claim of
administrative finality." Yet the cases of Paredes,
Mendez and Magpale precisely barred all appeals
despite lack of an explicit, positive provision in the Civil
Service Law.
- Moreover, the case at bar involves the right of a party
adversely affected to resort to judicial review. This
case does not involve the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission, i.e., whether or not it has the
power to review a decision exonerating a government
official from a charge of nepotism. The facts show that it
was the Civil Service Commission that at the first
instance found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism. It was
Dacoycoy who appealed the decision of the Civil Service
Commission to our regular court, more exactly, the Court
of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of Court. As Dacoycoy
only impleaded Suan as respondent, the Court of
Appeals ordered that the Civil Service Commission
should also be impleaded as party respondent. The
Court of Appeals then reversed the Commission as it
cleared Dacoycoy from the charge of nepotism. The
question therefore is whether or not this Court is
precluded from reviewing the decision of the Court of
Appeals on a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Again,
I submit that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this
review. Indeed, under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of
this Court has even been expanded "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government." The question is not our lack of
jurisdiction but the prudential exercise of power. In
certiorari cases alleging grave abuse of discretion, our
given task is to determine how much is too much of an
abuse.
- To my mind, it is also of de minimis importance that
the petition of thus Court was filed by the Civil Service
Commission. The records will reveal that Suan, the
original complainant, wrote to the Civil Service
Commission urging it to make the appeal ostensibly for
lack of means. But even without Suan, I submit that
the nature of the issue in the case at bar and its
impact on the effectiveness of government give
the Civil Service Commission the standing to
pursue this appeal. The issue in the case at bar is
basically a legal one, i.e., the proper interpretation of
who can be convicted of nepotism, and undoubtedly, this
Court has the authoritative say on how to interpret laws.
Administrative agencies have always conceded that the
final interpretation of laws belongs to regular courts. And
the issue has broad implications on the merit and fitness
philosophy of our civil service system. Under Sec. 3,
Article IX (B) of our Constitution, it is the Civil Service
Commission that has oversight of our civil service
system. It is thus the party better equipped to argue the
diverse dimensions of the issue. It is also the most
affected, for it has the duty not to stand still when
nepotic practices threaten the principle of meritrocacy in
our government. It seems to me self evident that this
type of injury to public interest can best be vindicated by
the Commission and not by a private person.
- There are other disturbing implication if we do not
junk the doctrine of non-reviewability of decisions
exonerating government officials from charges of
nepotism. For one, the doctrine unduly favors officials
charged with nepotism, for while we allow further review
of their conviction, we disallow review of their
exoneration, regardless of the errors. This distorted rule
contravenes our distaste against nepotism, a practice
whose continuance can fatally erode faith in
government. For another, perpetuating a nepotic act, an
evil that should be extirpated wherever found, can never
be the intent of our legislators who crafted our Civil
Service Law. For still another, completely cutting
off access to judicial review goes against the spirit
of the 1987 Constitution expanding the
jurisdiction of this Court. Putting up borders of
non-reviewability weakens the judiciary’s
checking power. Indeed, shielding abusive
administrative actions and decisions from judicial
oversight will ultimately erode the rule of law. As
Justice Brandeis opined, "supremacy of law demands
that there shall be an opportunity to have some court
decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied and
whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated
was conducted regularly."
- I join the majority opinion.
ROMERO [dissent]
- Does the Civil Service Commission have the legal
personality to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals
exonerating an employee charged in an administrative
case, which decision, in effect, reversed and nullified the
Commission’s finding that the respondent employee is
guilty as charged?
- After an exhaustive and careful scrutiny of P.D. No. 807
(otherwise known as the Civil Service Law), Executive
Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987) as well as the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, I
find no legal basis to support the contention of the
majority that the Commission has that legal personality.
- The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel
agency of the government. Corollarily, it is equipped
with the power and function to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it
directly or on appeal, including contested appointments
and to review decisions and actions of its offices and the
agencies attached to it. This is in consonance with its
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all officers and employees in the civil
service and upon all matters relating to the conduct,
discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by
law. It is thus clear that the Civil Service Commission has
been constituted as a disciplining authority.
- Section 34, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
provides the answer as to who may appear before the
Commission, thus:
"Administrative proceedings may be commenced
against a subordinate officer or employee by the
following officials and employees:
(a) Secretary of department;
(b) Head of Office of Equivalent rank;
(c) Head of Local Government Unit;
(d) Chief of Agency;
(e) Regional Director; or
(f) Upon Sworn, Written complaint of Any
other Person."
- Consequently, the complaint can either be the
Secretary of department, head of office of equivalent
rank, head of a local government unit, chief of agency,
regional director or any other person or party. The
phrase ‘any other party’ has been understood to be a
complainant other than the head of department or office
of equivalent rank or head of local government or chiefs
of agencies or regional directors.
- The respondent, on the other hand, is any subordinate
officer or employee. Nowhere can be found, expressly or
impliedly, in Section 34 of Rule XIV of Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, the Commission as
one of the parties, either as complainant or respondent
in an administrative case. Logically and by necessary
implication, it cannot considered either a complaint or a
respondent. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The
express mention of one person, thing or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others. Based on the
foregoing, there is no other conclusion but that the Civil
Service Commission is not a party to an administrative
proceeding brought before it. As provided by Supreme
Court Administrative Circular 1-95, decisions, orders or
rulings of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court, now to the Court of Appeals, on
certiorari by the aggrieved party. By inference, an
aggrieved party is either the one who initiated the
complaint before the Commission or the respondent, the
person subject of the complaint. In fact, the question as
to who is an “aggrieved party” has long been settled in a
litany of cases. An aggrieved party in an administrative
case is the government employee against whom an
administrative complaint is filed. The Civil Service
Commission is definitely not a government employee.
Neither is it an agency against whom an administrative
charge is filed. While it may be argued that, in a sense,
the government is an "aggrieved party" in administrative
proceedings before the Commission, it nevertheless is
not the "aggrieved party" contemplated under P.D. No.
807 or the Civil Service Law.
- Having established that the Civil Service Commission is
not a party, much less an aggrieved party, then
indubitably, it has no legal personality to elevate the
case to the appellate authority. The Commission,
therefore, has no legal standing to file the instant
petition.
- While admittedly, the Civil Service Commission is
considered a nominal party when its decision is brought
before the Court of Appeals, such is only a procedural
formality. As with appellate processes, a nominal party is
not the aggrieved party. Its inclusion as a party is based
primarily on the fact that the decision, order or ruling it
issued is being contested or assailed and secondarily, for
purposes of enforcement. By analogy, the Commission in
the performance of its quasi-judicial functions is just like
a judge who should "detach himself from cases where
his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The
raison d’etre for such doctrine is that a judge is not an
active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the
opposing parties to contend their individual positions
and for the appellate court to decide the issues without
his active participation. By filing this case, petitioner in a
way ceased to be judicial and has become adversarial
instead."
- I dissent from the ponencia’s conclusion that the
Commission may appeal a judgement of exoneration in
an administrative case involving nepotism in light of the
foregoing disquisition.
ART IX: CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS
CIVIL SERVICE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES V CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION
PANGANIBAN; April 3, 2001
FACTS
- Dr. Alfredo De Torres is UPLB Assoc Prof., who went on
vacation LOA w/o pay, during which he served as official
rep to the Centre on Integrated Rural Devt for Asia and
the Pacific (CIRDAP). CIRDAP requested UPLB for
extension of LOA but was denied by Director of ACCI of
UPLB. The Director advised De Torres to report for duty.
Also. UPLB Chancellor de Guzman apprised him on rules
of Civil Service and possibility of being considered
AWOL. When De Torres wrote that he will continue with
CIRDAP, Chancellor warned that UPLB would be forced to
drop him fr rolls of personnel.
- After almost 5 yrs of absence w/o leave, De Torres
wrote that he was reporting back to duty at UPLB.
Chancellor Villareal said he should have come fr an
approved leave. ACCI Director said De Torres was
considered AWOL and advised him to reapply. But
Chancellor Villareal reversed his stand and said De
Torres may report bec records do not show that he had
been officially dropped. ACCI requested ruling from Civil
Service Commission.
- CSC ruled that De Torres have been dropped fr service.
Petitioners sought recourse before the CA but the
petition was dismissed.
ISSUE
WON De Torres’ automatic separation from civil service
was valid
HELD
NO. Automatic dismissal was invalid.
- Section 33, Rule XVI of Revised Civil Service Rules
speaks of automatic separation even w/o prior notice
and hearing.
- Quezon v. Borromeo: chief nurse of Iligan City
Hospital requested for two extensions of leave. Both
granted. She sought third extension. It was not acted
upon. It was ruled that she violated Sec 33. She was
dropped.
- Isberto v. Raquiza: Employee, absent w/o official leave
ought to have known that he was deemed automatically
separated.
- Ramo v. Elefaño: Petitioner was dropped fr service for
her failure to return to duty after expiration of leave of
absence.
- There is sufficient notice when Chancellor advised
petitioner and warned of possibility of being considered
AWOL. But in those three cases, the petitioners were
actually dropped. Here, De Torres was never actually
dropped. He remained in the rolls. His salary was even
increased several times during his absence. His
appointment was also reclassified. These are acts
inconsistent w/ separation. UP has chosen not to
exercise its prerogative to dismiss petitioner.
- Here, UP exercised academic freedom. It has power to
determine who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, who may be admitted to study. CSC has
no authority to dictate UP the outright dismissal of its
personnel.
CUEVAS V BACAL
MENDOZA; December 6, 2000
FACTS
- Justice Cuevas, Executive Secretary Zamora, and Atty.
Demaisip v Atty. Bacal
- This case is a petition for certiorari of a previous ruling
of the Court of Appeals regarding the legality of the
appointment and transfer of Josefina Bacal to the Office
of the Regional Director of the Public Attorney’s Office.
Josefina Bacal is a Career Executive Officer III which she
alleges entitled her to the position of Chief Public
Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office.
- Bacal passed the Career Executive Services
Examinations in 1989 and on 1994 was conferred CES
eligibility and was appointed as Regional Director of the
PAO. On January 5, 1995 she was appointed to the rank
of CESO III and on November 5, 1997 the Secretary of
Justice appointed her as Chief Public Attorney that was
confirmed by President Ramos on February 5, 1998,
wherein she took her oath and assumed office.
- On July 1, 1998 Carina Demaisip was appointed Chief
Public Defender by Pres. Estrada while Bacal was
appointed Regional Director without her consent.
Demaisip took her oath of office on the 7th of July. Bacal
filed a petition quo warranto that questioned her
replacement to the Supreme Court that was dismissed
without prejudice for it to refiled in the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals ruled in Bacal’s favor.
ISSUES
1. WON the case should be dismissed for its failure to
exhaust administrative remedies through an appeal to
the Office of the President
2. WON Bacal’s removal amounted to a removal without
cause (which is illegal)
3. WON by the mere fact of being appointed would
enable the individual to acquire security of tenure
4. WON a Career Executive Service personnel can be
shifted from one office to another without violation of
their right to security of tenure as their status and
salaries is based on their ranks and not on their jobs
5. WON Demaisip has a security of tenure
HELD
1. No, because the administrative decision sought to be
reviewed is that of the President himself. No appeal need
be taken to the Office of the President from the decision
of a department head because the latter is in theory the
alter ego of the former. In addition, exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the
question raised is purely legal.
2. No, her appointment to the position of Chief Public
Attorney requires her to be appointed to a CES Rank
Level I which never materialized. If the rank of an
individual is not appropriate to the position her
appointment is deemed to be temporary and she cannot
claim security of tenure. The right to tenure is conferred
upon the individual filling the position based on the
possession of required qualifications. The general rule
would be that those who were qualified would be
appointed, but as an exception, those with insufficient
qualifications may be appointed but merely in an acting
capacity.
3. No, security of tenure is acquired with respect to the
rank and not to the position. In addition, the guaranty of
security of tenure is applicable only to those in the first
and second level in the civil service.
4. No, reading through PD No. 1 that created the
Integrated Reorganization Plan, the Career Executive
Service provides that reassignments or transfers are
allowed provided that it is made in the interest of public
service and involves no reduction in the rank or salary of
the individual and that this should not be done more
oftener than two years. If the individual deems it as
unjustified s/he may appeal to the President. The rule
that an employee can claim security of tenure is
applicable only to Election Registrars, Election Officers,
also in the Commission on Elections, and Revenue
District Officers in thew Bureau of Internal Revenues.
Bacal was just CESO III therefore, she is meant to qualify
in the position where she was subsequently appointed to
which is Regional Director.
5. No, she does not. The security of tenure is also not
permanent following the same logic that was used for
Bacal, Demaisip having not acquired the qualification of
CES Rank Level I implies that her stay in the position is
temporary.
CANONIZADO V AGUIRRE
GONZAGA-REYES; January 25, 2000
FACTS
- PETITITON to declare RA 8851 (RA 8551)
unconstitutional
- the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) was
originally created under RA 6975 entitled “An Act
Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A
Reorganized Department Of The Interior And Local
Government, And For other Purposes”.
- under RA 6975, petitioners Alexis Canonizado, Edgar
Torres, Rogelio Pureza, and respondents Jose Adiong and
Dula Torres were appointed as NAPOLCOM
commissioners on Jan. 1991 for six year terms
- 3/6/1998: RA 8551, aka the “Philippine National Police
Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998” took effect,
declaring the terms of the current commissioners
expired
- the petitioners question the constitutionality of S4 of
RA 8551 which amends S13 of RA 6975, altering the
composition of NAPOLCOM as well as S8, which removes
them from office and allegedly violates their security of
tenure.
- as members of the civil service, the petitioners cannot
be removed from office except for causes “provided by
law”, that is, with legal cause and not merely for reasons
deemed fit by the appointing power
- the creation or abolition of public offices is primarily a
legislative function; Congress may abolish any office w/o
impairing the officer’s right to continue in his position.
This power may be exercised for reasons such as a lack
of funds or the interests of the economy; abolition must
be made in good faith, not personal or political reasons
ISSUES
1. WON there was a bona fide reorganization of
NAPOLCOM
2. WON there was a valid abolition of the petitioners’
offices
HELD
1. NO. Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as
“a collegial body w/in the DILG”, and under RA 8551 it
was defined as “an agency attached to the Department
for policy and program coordination.” This increase in
the agency’s autonomy does not result in the creation of
an entirely new office. S4 of RA 8551amends the
NAPOLCOM’s composition by adding the PNP Chief as an
ex-officio member, requiring the membership of 3
civilian commissioners, a fourth commissioner from the
law enforcement sector and at least one female
commissioner. Such changes are trivial and do not affect
the nature of the NAPOLCOM; in fact, the powers and
duties of NAPOLCOM remain unchanged. Reorganization
only takes place when there is an alteration of the
existing structure of the office including lines of control
and authority and may involve a reduction of personnel
or abolition of offices if done in good faith (economic
purposes, bureaucratic efficiency, etc.) Despite the new
law, NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the
same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory
and adjudicatory functions.
2. NO. Respondents stress that S8 of RA 8551 discloses
legislative intent to abolish NAPOLCOM pursuant to a
bona fide reorganization. As held in UP Board of Regents
v. Rasul, the removal of an incumbent is not justified if
the functions of the old and new positions are the same,
that is, if there is no true reorganization. The court finds
that RA 8551 does not expressly abolish the petitioners’
positions upon examination of the changes introduced
by the new law. In the event of a reorganization done in
good faith, no dismissal actually occurs because the
office itself ceases to exist. If the abolition merely seeks
to enact a change of nomenclature or attempt to
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil
service personnel, then the abolition is void ab initio. In
the case at bar, no bona fide reorganization had been
mandated by congress; hence, petitioners were removed
from office with no legal cause, making S8 of RA 8551
unconstitutional, and entitling them to immediate
reinstatement.
Decision -Petition GRANTED, but only to the extent of
declaring S8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional for violating the
petitioners’ rights to security of tenure. Petitioners are
entitled to reinstatement.
GAMINDE V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
PARDO; December 13, 2000
FACTS
- The Case: Special civil action of certiorari seeking to
annul and set aside two “decisions” of the Commission
on Audit (COA)
- On June 11, 1993, Petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde was
appointed as ad interim Commissioner of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) by then Pres. Ramos for a
term expiring Feb. 2, 1999. She assumed office after
taking her oath and her appointment was confirmed by
Congress.
- Before the end of her term, or on Feb. 24, 1998,
petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the Pres.
as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply, the
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (now Associate Justice)
Corona, in a letter, opined that petitioner’s term would
expire on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2, 1999. She thus
remained in office after Feb. 02, 1999, relying on the
said advisory opinion.
- On Feb. 04, 1999, CSC Chairman Alma De Leon,
requested opinion from the COA on whether petitioner
and her co-terminous staff should continue to be paid
their salaries notwithstanding the fact that their
appointment had already expired. COA General Counsel
issued an opinion that the petitioner’s appointment had
indeed expired.
- CSC Resident Auditor issued a notice disallowing in
audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to
petitioner and her staff, a decision which petitioner
appealed to the COA en banc. The appeal was
dismissed, COA affirmed the disallowance, and held that
the issue of petitioner’s term of office may be addressed
by mere reference to her appointment paper which had
Feb. 02, 1999 as expiration date. COA also stated that
the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an
extension of her term, not even with the implied
acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, she was again denied; hence
this petition.
ISSUE
WON petitioner Atty. Gaminde’s term of office, as
CSCommissioner, expired on Feb. 2, 1999 or on Feb. 2,
2000
HELD
It expired on Feb. 2, 1999. For Commissioners (5 year
term) the count is:
Feb.02, 1987---Feb.02, 1992---Feb.02, 1999---
Feb.02, 2006…
Ratio The appropriate starting point of the terms of
office of the first appointees to the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on
Feb. 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987
Constitution in order to maintain the regular interval of
vacancy every 2 years consistent in the previous
appointment intervals.
Reasoning
- The term of office of the Chairman and members of the
Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987
Constitution under Art IX-B Sec. 1(2). The 1973
Constitution introduced the first system of a regular
rotation or cycle in the membership of the CSC (Art. XII
Sec. 1(1), 1973 Consti). It was a copy of the
Constitutional prescription in the amended 1935
Constitution of a rotational system for the appointment
of the Chairman and members of the Commission on
Elections (Art. X Sec. 1, 1935 Consti, as amended).
- In Republic v Imperial, it was said that “the operation of
the rotational plan requires two conditions: (1) that the
terms of the first (3) Commissioners should start on a
common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death,
resignation or disability before the expiration of the term
should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of
the term.”
- Consequently, the terms of the first Chairman and
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under
the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date,
irrespective of the variations in the dates of
appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in
order that the expirations of the firs terms of 7, 5 and 3
years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2-year
interval between the expiration of the terms.
- In the law of public officers, “term” of office is
distinguished from “tenure” of the incumbent. The term
means the time during which the officer may claim to
hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The
tenure represents the term during which the incumbent
actually holds the office. The term of office is not
affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter
than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of
the incumbent.
- Although Art. XVIII Sec. 15 provides that incumbent
members of the Constitutional Commissions shall
continue in office for one year after the ratification of
this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for
cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties
of their office or appointed to a new term, what it
contemplates is “tenure” not “term.” The term “unless”
imports an exception to the general rule. Clearly, the
transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members
of the Consti Commissions shall continue… for 1 year
after ratification of the Consti under their existing
appointments at the discretion of the appointing power
who may cut short their tenure by reasons the reasons
stated therein. However, they do not affect the “term” of
office fixed in Art. IX, providing for a 7-5-3 yr rotational
interval for the 1st appointees.
Decision Term of office expired on Feb. 2, 1999.
However, petitioner served as de facto officer in good
faith until Feb. 2, 2000 and thus entitled to receive her
salary and other emoluments for actual service
rendered. COA decision disallowing salaries/emoluments
is reversed.
Voting 10 Concur, Bellosillo No part., Related to one of
the parties, Puno, concur (In the result), De Leon, Jr.,
Concurring and Dissenting opinion
Mendoza, Joins De Leon’s dissent
SEPARATE OPINION
DE LEON [concur and dissent]
Dissents:
-the term of petitioner expired on Feb. 2, 2000 not on
Feb. 2, 1999 as explained in ponencia.
-the term of the first set of CSCommissioners appointed
under the 1987 Constitution commenced on the Feb. 2,
1988 not on the date of its ratification on Feb. 2, 1987.
Concurs:
-that the salaries and emoluments which petitioner as
CSCommissioner received after Feb. 2, 1999 should not
be disallowed by COA.
BLAQUERA V ALCALA
PURISIMA; September 11, 1998
FACTS
- G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are
cases for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the
constitutionality and validity of AO 29 and 268
- Petitioners are officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies who were paid
incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to EO 292
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292.
- In 1993, then President Ramos issued AO 29 authorized
the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year
1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and
reiterating the prohibition under Section 7 of AO 268
(issued by President Aquino), enjoining said grants
without prior approval of the President. Section 4 of AO
29 directed “all departments, offices and agencies which
authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive
Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section
1 hereof to immediately cause the return/refund of the
excess.” In compliance therewith, the heads of the
departments or agencies of the government concerned,
who are the herein Respondents, caused the deduction
from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts
needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
- To prevent the Respondents from making further
deductions from their salaries or allowances, the
Petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief.
- In G.R. No. 119597, the facts are different but the
petition poses a common issue with the other
consolidated cases. The Petitioner, Association of
Dedicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(“ADEPT”), is an association of employees of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (“PTA”) who were granted
productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992
pursuant to RA 6971, otherwise known as the
Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus was,
however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the
ground that it was prohibited under AO 29. The
disallowance of the bonus in question was finally brought
on appeal to the Commission on Audit (COA) which
denied the appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON with regard to G.R. No. 119597, Incentives under
RA 6971 are applicable to ADEPT employees
2. WON AO 29 and 268 (being Presidential
pronouncements) are violative of the provisions of EO
292 (being a law passed by the legislature), and hence
null and void, and WON AO 29 and 268 unlawfully usurp
the Constitutional authority granted solely to the Civil
Service Commission
3. WON the forced refund of incentive pay is an
unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation
4. WON assuming arguendo that the grant of incentives
was invalid, the same should be the personal liability of
officials directly responsible therefore in accordance with
section 9 of AO 268
HELD
1. There are generally two types of GOCCs:
1. Those incorporated under the general
corporation law. Employees of this type have
the right to bargain (collectively), strike, and
other such remedies available to workers of
private corporations. Functions are mainly
proprietary.
2. Those with special charter (a.k.a. original
charter), which are subject to Civil Service
Laws, have no right to bargain (collectively).
Incorporated in pursuance of a State Policy.
- Only GOCCs incorporated under the general
corporation law, and thus performing proprietary
functions, are included under the coverage of RA 6791.
GOCCs created in pursuance of a policy of the state and
those whose officers and employees are covered by the
Civil Service are expressly excluded.
- The legislative intent to place only GOCCs performing
proprietary functions under the coverage of RA 6971 is
also gleanable from the other provisions of the law
making reference to remedies available only to laborers
akin to the private sector.
- Also, pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987, which provides for the establishment of
Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and
Incentives Award Systems for GOCCs with original
charters, it is thus evident that the PTA is already within
the scope of an incentives award system.
2. In accordance with EO 292, the functions of the Civil
Service Commission have been “decentralized to the
offices and agencies where such functions can be
effectively performed;” specifically, the implementation
of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award
System ahs been decentralized to the President or to the
head of each department or agency (as his/her alter
ego).
- The President is the head of government. His/her
power includes control over executive departments.
Control means “the power to alter what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.” In issuing AO 29 limiting the amount of benefits,
enjoining heads of departments from granting benefits
without prior approval from him/her, and directing the
refund of any excess over the prescribed amount, the
President was just exercising his power of control over
executive departments. Specifically, seeing that the
incentives program was producing demoralization
instead of the original goal of encouragement, owing to
the fact that employees not receiving the incentives felt
slighted and underappreciated, the President merely
exercised his power of control by modifying the acts of
the respondents who granted incentive benefits without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the President.
- Neither can it be said that the President encroached
upon the authority of the Civil Service Commission to
grant benefits to government employees. AO 29 and
268 did not revoke, but rather only regulated, the grant
and amount of incentives.
3. Not all contracts entered into by the government will
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must
be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts.
The acts involved in this case are governmental.
Besides, incentive pay is in the nature of a bonus, which
is not a demandable or enforceable obligation.
4. Absent a showing of bad faith, public officers are not
personally liable for damages resulting form the
performance of official duties.
Decision In upholding the Constitutionality of AO 268
and 29, the Court reiterates the doctrine that in
interpreting statutes, that which will avoid a finding of
unconstitutionality is to be preferred.
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in
good faith, the Court cannot countenance the refund of
the incentives which amount the petitioners have
already received, as a corollary, further deductions from
salaries are thus enjoined.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
PADILLA; May 5, 1994
FACTS
- Nature Petitions for prohibition to stop the threatened
illegal transfer, disbursement, and use of public funds in
a manner contrary to the Constitution and the law
- 18 April 1994: Petitioner Liga Ng Mga Barangay, an intending to effect the transfer of funds which would be
organization of barangays, represented by petitioner in direct contravention of Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) of the
Alex David (as taxpayer and as president and secretary- Constitution
42
general of the organization) filed this petition for
prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining
HELD
order.
Any threat or attempt to pursue a transfer of funds
- 22 April 1994: Another petition raising the same issues
scheme that exists only in newspaper reports is not
were filed.
sufficient factual basis to render such scheme by the
- Petitioners question what they perceive as “the
COMELEC unconstitutional.
threatened illegal transfer, disbursement, and use of
Reasoning
public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution
1. [a] The threat to pursue the scheme, if ever there was
and the law” relative to the conduct of the forthcoming
one, existed only in newspaper reports which could have
barangay elections. They claim that in the General
misled the general public, including the petitioners, into
Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1994, only P137,878,000.00
believing that the same emanated from impeccable
were appropriated by the Congress for the holding of the
sources. [b] Court acknowledges petitioners have
said elections. The petitioners claim that by early 1994,
displayed vigilance and acted with the best of intentions,
Congress itself has made the assessment that the
but they should have first obtained an official statement
money is insufficient to defray cost of holding the
or at least confirmation from respondents as to the
elections. Petitioners allege that in order to augment
veracity of the report instead of relying on the
said amount, respondents have threatened and are
newspaper article.
about to transfer/re-allocate certain moneys to be
2. The court went further in saying – actually, in
sourced from the executive and legislative branches of
affirming the arguments of the respondents – that
government to COMELEC, which in turn will use it to fund
consistent with Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution, the
the elections: [a] P180M from the appropriation of the
following may be availed by the COMELEC to defray the
DILG, [b] P160M from the Countryside Development
cost of the forthcoming barangay elections:
Fund; P70M from the Senate; P30M from the HReps; and
[a] Article IV of the Omnibus Election Code provides that
[c] P43M from the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) of
LGUs should appropriate funds for the barangay
Provinces, Cities and Municipalities (Note: This is the
elections. COMELEC may make arranges with local
scheme that is being assailed in the issue of this case)
governments to comply with this article pursuant to its
- 21 April 1994: Court resolved to require respondents to
constitutional authority to enforce and administer all
submit comment on the petition within the non-
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections.
existentiable period of 5 days
COMELEC may also issue an appropriate directive for the
- 26 April 1994: Respondents through the Solicitor
province city, or municipality to advance election
General filed their comment. They claim that petitioners
expenses that are chargeable to it. Since the President
acted solely on the basis of reports made in the
exercises general supervision of all local governments,
newspaper (“Barangay Poll Funds Found” article from
the COMELEC may course its directives to local
the Manila Bulletin) and did not bother to confirm the
governments through the Office of the President and to
veracity of article. They also claim that said reports were
be implemented by DILG. (Note: This is based on the
mere unofficial proposals/suggestions made in the
Opinion No. 51, s. 1994 of Sec. of Justice which was cited
process of searching for funds. COMELEC further alleges
as authority)
that that it intends to fund the barangay elections from
[b] Sections 17 and 19 of GAA for FY 1994 where it was
the money allotted by Congress for the purpose and
stated that the Heads of Constitutional Commissions
from its own savings resulting from unused funds. The
under Article IX of the Constitution…are hereby
Solicitor General supports the stand of the respondents,
authorized to augment any item in this Act for their
as it is according to Sec. 25 (5), Article VI of the
respective offices from savings in other items of their
Constitution and Sectoons 17 (Use of Savings) and 19
respective appropriations.
(Meaning of Savings and Appropriations) of the GAA for
Fiscal Year 1994.
Decision Petitions DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Voting 14 concur, no dissent.
- Respondents also maintain that funds from LGUs may
also be used to help defray the cost of the forthcoming
barangay elections. They cite Opinion No. 51 of the LOONG V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Secretary of Justice, dated 19 April 1994, which says that PUNO; April 14, 1999
under Sec. 50 of the Omnibus Election Code, LGUs are
required to appropriate funds for barangay elections 42
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
ISSUE House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
WON the existence or lack of factual basis on WON the augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
impleaded public respondents are attempting, or offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

FACTS
- RA 8436 prescribed the adoption of an automated
election system
> Was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections in
the ARMM which includes Sulu
> Atty. Jose Tolentino was the head of the COMELEC
Task Force in Sulu
- Sulu voting readily peaceful except that there was a
problem with the automated counting of votes
> Discrepancies were reported (May 12, 1998)
between the election returns and the votes cast for
mayor in the muncipality of Pata (later on confirmed
when checked by Atty. Tolentino)
> The automated counting of ballots in Pata were
suspended and the problem was immediately
communicated to the COMELEC technical experts
> The problem was caused by the misalignment of the
ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local
ballots but nothing was wrong with the machines.
- Emergency meeting called by Atty. Tolentino
participated in by military police officials and local
candidates. Petitioner Loong was among those who
attended along with private respondent Tan.
> Discussed how ballots should be counted.
> Shift to manual count recommended by Brig. Gen.
Espinosa and Subala, PNP Director Alejandrino,
gubernatorial canddidates Tan and Tulawie and
congressinal candidate Tulawie
> Automated count insisted by gubernatorial
candidates Loong and Jikiri. Written position papers
were required to be submitted.
> Local ballots in five municipalities were rejected by
automated machines (Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul
and Jolo). Ballots rejected because of the wrong
sequence code.
> COMELEC issued Minute Resolution 98-1747
ordering manual recount in Pata. By 12 midnight of
May 12, Atty. Tolentino had sent an en banc report to
the COMELEC reommending manual recount in the
whole province of Sulu because it is possible that the
same problem would extend to other provinces in
Sulu.
> The COMELEC approved of Atty. Tolentino's
recommendation with the following implementation
procedures:
+ Counting machines from Jolo be transported to
Manila in the PICC to keep COMELEC away from
bloodshed between AFP and MNLF
+ Authorize the official travel of the board of
canvassers concerned for the conduct of the
automated and manual operations of the counting
of votes at PICC
+ To authorize the presence of only the duly
authorized representative of the political parties
concerned and the candidate watchers both
outside and inside the perimeters of the PICC
> May 15, 1998 – COMELEC laid down rules for manual
count through Minute Resoln 98-1796
> May 18, 1998 – Loong filed objection to Minute
Resolution 98-1796
+ Violates provisions of RA 8436 providing for
automated counting of ballots in ARMM.
Automated count is mandatory and could not be
substituted by manual counting.
+ Ballots were rejected because ballots were
tampered with and/or the texture was different
from the official ballot
+ Counting machines designed in such a way as
only genuine official ballots could be read by the
machine
+ Other counting machines in other municipalities
were in order.
> COMELEC still began with the manual count on May
18.
> Loong filed petition for certiorari with Supreme
Court:
+ COMELEC issued Minute Resolutions without
prior notice and hearing to him
+ Order for manual counting violated RA 8346
+ Manual counting gave opportunity to election
cheating:
< Counting by human hands of fake,
tampered and counterfeit ballots which
machines were programmed to reject
< Opportunity to substite ballots in PICC
< 22 Board of Election Inspectors for 1,194
precincts gives sufficient time to change and
tamper ballots
< Opportunity to delay the proclamation of
winning candidates through dilatory moves in
pre-proclamation controversy because the
returns and certificates are already made by
man
> Tan proclaimed winner in Sulu. Loong garnered 3rd
highest votes.
ISSUES
1. WON petition for certiorari was appropriate remedy to
invalidate COMELEC resolutions
2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdisction in order manual count
a. Is there legal basis for manual count?
b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
c. Was there denial of due process when COMELEC
ordered manual count?
3. Won it is proper to call for special election for the
position of Sulu governor assuming the manual count is
illegal and result is unreliable.
HELD
1. Certiorari is the proper remedy according to Art. 9,
Sec. 7 of the Constitution
- Interpretation of RA 8436 must be made in relation the
COMELEC's broad power in Art. 9, Section 2(1) “to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election.”
- Adjudicatory for the petitioner, private respondent and
intervenor so there are enough considerations for the
certiorari jurisdiction.
2. No grave abuse of discrection amounting to lack of
jurisdiction because the post election realities show that
the order for the manual count was not arbitrary,
capricious or whimsical.
a. There was legal basis for the manual count.
- RA 8436 cannot be insisted upon after the
machines rejected the local ballots in five
municipalities of Sulu. The errors were not machine
related by were because of the ballots.
- Congress failed to provide for remedy when the
error in counting is not machine-related. The
vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC
from levitating the problem. Article 9, Section 2(1)
of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad
power “to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.”
b. There was reasonable factual basis.
- Automated machines failed to read the ballots
correctly in Pata. Local ballots in Jolo, Siasi, Tapal,
Indanan and Talipao were rejected.
> Flaws were carefully analyzed by COMELEC
experts and found nothing wrong with the
machines but with the ballots.
> To continue with the automated count would
result in a grossly erroneous result.
- COMELEC had to act derisively in order to restore
peace and order, especially since past election
tensions have been created by failures in automated
counting. Military and authorities recommended
manual counting to preserve peace and order.
c. There was no denial of due process when COMELEC
ordered the manual count.
- They were given every opportunity to oppose the
manual count of local ballots in Sulu.
> Orally heard
> Written position papers
> Representatives escorted transfer of ballots
and automated machines to Manila
> Watchers observed manual count
- The integrity of the local ballots was safeguarded
when they were transferred from Sulu to Manila and
when they were manually counted.
- Manual count is reliable because when the
COMELEC ordered manual count, it issued
corresponding rules and regulations to govern the
counting and the ballots were not difficult to
understand.
3. A special election for Sulu governor is improper.
- A special election only governs exceptional
circumstances. The plea can only be grounded on a
failure of election.
> A failure of election applies when “on account
 of force majeure, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes, the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the dosing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody of canvass
thereof.”
> A plea for special election must also be
addressed to the COMELEC not to the SC (Section
6 of the Omnibus Election Code should be read in
relation to RA 7166).
> Grounds for failure of election involve questins
after the fact. They can only be determined by
the COMELEC en banc after due notice and
hearing to the parties. Loong did not do this in
the present case. His plea for special election was
an afterthought.
- To hold a specal election would be
discriminatory.
> All elected officials in Sulu now discharging
functions.;
> Tan's election cannot be singled out as invalid
for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
In addition
- COMELEC was organied under Comm. Act 607 in
August 1940. The power to enforce election laws was
originally vested in the President and exercised through
the Dept. of Interior.
- 1940 amendments to 1935 Constitution transformed
the COMELEC to a constitutional body. COMELEC was
granted power to have “exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections.”
- 1973 Constitution broadened powers of the COMELEC
by making it the sole judge of all election contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the national legislature and elective
provincial and city officials. It was given judicial power
asde from the traditional administrative and executive
functions.
- 1987 Constitution added powers to the COMELEC by
allowing it to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections,
plebiscites, initiative, referenda and recalls. It also
includes contets involving elective municipal and
barangay officals.
SANCHEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
MELENCIO-HERRERA; June 19, 1982
FACTS
- Jan. 30, 1980 local elections- Sanchez and Biliwang ran
for Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga
- Biliwang was proclaimed winner
- Sanchez filed with COMELEC a Petition to declare null
and void the local elections due to alleged large scale
terrorism
- Ultimately, the COMELEC found that after the voting
was over in the local elections, terrorism and
irregularities were committed- counters were threatened
by armed goons and policemen into making spurious
election returns in favor of Biliwang.
- Thus, COMELEC issued a resolution ordering:
1. The annulment the Jan. 30, 1980 election and the
setting aside of the proclamation of Biliwang
2. To certify to the President/Prime Minister and the
Batasang Pambansa the failure of election, so that
remedial legislation may be enacted, and pending
such enactment, the President/PM may appoint
municipal officials in San Fernando
- Sanchez sought reconsideration of the COMELEC
Resolution certifying the failure of election, and praying
instead that COMELEC call a special election in San
Fernando
- COMELEC denied reconsideration
- Both Biliwang and Sanchez filed petitions with the SC,
which were consolidated into the following issues:
ISSUES
1. WON the COMELEC has the power to annul an entire
municipal election on the ground of post-election
terrorism
2. WON the COMELEC has the authority to call for a
special election
HELD
1. Biliwang asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to
annul elections of municipal officials because, under
Section 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the power to try
election contests relative to elective municipal officials is
vested in the CFI
- SC: It may be true there is no specific provision vesting
COMELEC with authority to annul an election. Under the
1935 Constitution, the SC said that COMELEC did not
have this power, and that instead the power lay with the
Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral
Tribunal. Now, however, it is “the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa
and elective provincial and city officials.” The COMELEC
must be deemed possessed of the authority, in line with
its plenitude of powers and its function to protect the
integrity of elections.
2. COMELEC opined that it had no powers to order the
holding of a new or special election, because the actual
election itself took place, and in a proper, orderly
fashion. According to COMELEC, the Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52 grants COMELEC authority to call for a new or
special election only in a failure of election, but in this
case, there was a failure to gauge the true and genuine
will of the electorate, as opposed to a failure of election
(tainted casting of ballots (failure of election) vs. tainted
counting of ballots (failure to gauge the will))
- SC: to state that this is not the failure of election
contemplated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 because
elections did take place is too tenuous a distinction. In
practical effect, no election has been held; there has
been in truth and in fact, a failure to elect. This
interpretation only hampers the effectiveness of the
COMELEC and delays the opportunity to the voters to
cast their votes.
Decision The SC upholds the power and prerogative of
the COMELEC to annul an election and to call for a
special election.
UNIDO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BARREDO; April 3, 1981
FACTS
- Appeal by the UNIDO (a political org
campaigning for "NO" votes to amendments to the
1973 Consti proposed by the Batasang
Pambansa), from the resolutions of COMELEC
dated March 18 and March 22, 1981.
- 5 March 1981: COMELEC issued 3 Resolutions
providing for Rules and Regulations concerning
the plebiscite campaign:
(1) Resolution No. 1467 providing for equal
opportunity on free public discussions and
debates;
(2) Resolution No.1468 providing for equal time
on the use of the broadcast media (radio & TV)
<equal as to duration and quality…at the same
rates or given free of charge>; &
(3) Resolution No.1469 providing for equal
space on the use of the print media; but
COMELEC recognizes the principle of self-
regulation & shall practice only minimal
supervision.
- 10 March 1981: UNIDO writes to COMELEC re:
news that Pres. Marcos will lead the campaign for
"Yes" votes in his 2-hr nationwide "Pulong-Pulong
sa Pangulo" radio-TV program on March 12, which
will be carried live by 26 television and 248 radio
stations throughout the country. Citing the said
COMELEC resolutions, they demand exactly the
same number of TV and radio stations all over the
country to campaign for 'No' votes.
- 17 March 1981: UNIDO writes a follow-up letter
to COMELEC, stating that on March 21, they will
hold a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda,
Quiapo, Manila, & requesting that it covered by
radio and television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M. They
expect COMELEC to direct the radio & TV facilities
to comply with their request.
- 18 March 1981: COMELEC issued Resolution
saying UNIDO’s request "cannot be granted and is
hereby denied" & that
(1) 'Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo' is not a political
or partisan vehicle but an innovative system of
participatory democracy where the President as
leader of the nation enunciates certain
programs or policies…. Its format is intended to
result in effective multi-way consultation
between the leader of the nation and the
people; and that
(2) UNIDO, not having the same constitutional
prerogatives vested in the President/Prime
Minister, has no right to 'demand' equal
coverage by media accorded President Marcos
but is free to enter into appropriate contracts
with the TV or radio stations concerned.
COMEMEC cannot direct these media to grant
free use of their facilities.
- 20 March 1981: UNIDO writes another letter as
MFR. Denied by COMELEC for lack of merit.
Hence, this appeal before SC. Petitioner raises the
following grounds:
(1) COMELEC resolutions in question are
contrary to the Constitution and the law, for
being unjust, unfair & inequitable. They violate
the basic principles of equality, good faith and
fair play, & are not conducive to insure free,
orderly and honest elections;
(2) UNIDO’s request/demand for equal broadcast
media of its public meeting/rally at Plaza
Miranda was arbitrarily denied. The campaign
for NO votes should be granted the same right &
equal use of facilities granted Marcos’ campaign
for YES.
ISSUE
WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion
HELD
“…for being beyond what the charter, the laws
and pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate,
for being more than what the opposition is duly
entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or
privilege inherent in the head of state to directly
dialogue with the sovereign people when the
occasion demands, for being impractical under
prevailing circumstances, and for its failure to
join in the instant petition indispensable
parties, thereby depriving the Court of
jurisdiction to act, and for these alone among
other reasons which there is hardly time to state
herein, the prayer in the instant petition cannot be
granted. “
- The proposed changes of the Charter are of deep
and transcendental importance and the more the
people are adequately informed about the
proposed amendments, their exact meaning,
implications and nuances, the better.
- Denial of due process is considered generally as
the first and the most valued right of everyone
under the Bill of Rights. UNIDO should have made
the television and radio stations (who will be
directly affected by any injunction of the Comelec
upon SC’s orders) parties to this case. Said parties
are indispensable without which the Court cannot
proceed properly.
- In fact, petitioner has not shown, for apparently
they have not done so, that they have requested
any TV or radio station to give them the same
time and style of "pulong-pulong" as that which
they afforded the President. Also, there are other
groups and aggrupations not to speak of
individuals who are similarly situated as petitioner
who would also want to be heard.
- The "free orderly and honest elections" clause of
the Constitution is applicable also to plebiscites,
particularly one relative to constitutional
amendments. It is indispensable that they be
properly characterized to be fair submission: the
voters must of necessity have had adequate
opportunity, in the light of conventional wisdom,
to cast their votes with sufficient understanding of
what they are voting on.
- Nothing can be of more transcendental
importance than to vote in a constitutional
plebiscite. It is the duty of the Comelec to see to it
that the sale of air time by TV and radio stations
insures that time equal as to duration and quality
is available to all contending views.
- Curtailment of the freedom of speech and the
press of television and radio stations is
permissible for election purposes.
- The head of state of every country in the world
must from the very nature of his position, be
accorded certain privileges not equally available
to those who are opposed to him. When the head
of state wants to communicate on matters of
public concern, no government office or entity is
obliged to give the opposition the same facilities.
They have to avail themselves of their own
resources.
- In instances where the head of state is at the
same time the president of the political party that
is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he
speaks with two voices when he dialogues with
the governed. When the President spoke in
"Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" he spoke as President-
Prime Minister and not as head of the KBL, the
political party now in power.
- The petitioner had not adequately shown that
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Comelec has indeed the power to supervise
and regulate the mass media with respect to the
equal opportunity provisions, but such authority
arises only when there is a showing that any
sector or member of the media has denied to any
party or person the right to which it or he is
entitled. Comelec is not supposed to dictate to the
media.
- There are other political parties similarly situated as
petitioner. To grant to petitioner what it wants, it must
necessarily follow that such other parties should also be
granted. That would be too much to expect from the
media that has also its own right to which it or he is
entitled. Comelec is not supposed to dictate to the
media.
Decision Appeal dismissed.
CHAVEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BIDIN; July 3, 1992
FACTS
- Petition for the issuance of a TRO enjoining COMELEC
from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate.
- May 5, 1992 - Court issued a Resolution of the case
"Francisco Chavez v. Comelec, et al.," disqualifying
Melchor Chavez from running for Senator in the May 11,
1992 elections. The petitioner then filed an urgent
motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate
to all its agents and the general public the resolution;
and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of
Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of
candidates, tally sheets, election returns and "to count
all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez
in favor of Francisco I. Chavez . . . ."
- May 8, 1992 - Comelec issued a resolution which
resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the
list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order
the crediting of all "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner
as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in
the list of qualified candidates. On Election Day, Melchor
Chavez remained undeleted in the list of qualified
candidates. Commissioner Rama issued a directive over
the radio and TV ordering that all “Chavez” votes be
credited to the petitioner however it did not reach all the
precincts
- Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to perform its
mandatory function under Sec. 7, RA 7166 which states
that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be the
duty of the Commission to instruct without delay the
deletion of the name of said candidate.
- Confusion arose as the "Chavez" votes were either
declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election
Inspectors (BEIs).As a result, "Chavez" votes were not
credited in favor of petitioner.
- May 12, 1992 - Comelec issued another Resolution
directing all municipal and city election registrars
throughout the country to examine the minutes of voting
submitted by the BEIs and to credit all the "Chavez"
votes, which have been declared stray or invalidated by
the BEIs, in favor of petitioner.
- Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved
futile because it did not reach all the various BEIs
throughout the country on time for implementation and
that the minutes of voting did not indicate the number of
"Chavez" votes which were declared stray or invalidated.
- May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before
the respondent Comelec praying the latter to (1)
implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de
officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes to scan for the
"Chavez" votes for purposes of crediting the same in his
favor; (3) make the appropriate entries in the election
returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the
proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.
- Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to
act on his petition, petitioner filed this urgent petition for
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance
of a TRO, enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the
24th highest senatorial candidate, without first
implementing Comelec's resolution of May 12, 1992 and
acting upon petitioner's letter/complaint dated May 14,
1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992. Petitioner
alleges that respondent Comelec acted capriciously and
whimsically and with grave abuse of discretion.
- June 8, 1992, Sen Agapito Aquino prayed for the
dismissal of the instant petition on the ground that the
law does not allow pre-proclamation controversy
involving the election of members of the Senate.
ISSUE
1. WON SC has jurisdiction over the case
HELD
1. Jurisdiction
- The alleged inaction of Comelec in ordering the
deletion of Melchor Chavez's name in the list of qualified
candidates does not call for the exercise of the Court's
function of judicial review. The Court can review the
decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases of
grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the
discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not
those arising from the exercise of its
administrative functions.
- Comelec can administratively undo what it has
administratively left undone. Comelec has ordered the
deletion of Melchor Chavez's name not only on the
official list of candidates, but also on the election
returns, tally sheet and certificate of canvass. Hence,
petitioner's allegation that respondent Comelec failed to
implement the resolutions does not hold water.
- Petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy
being in the nature of a pre-proclamation. While the
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-
proclamation controversies involving local elective
officials, such are not allowed in elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives.
- Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:
"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in
Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and
Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes
of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator
and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-
proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating
to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of
canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing
body motu propio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
xxx xxx xxx
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or
municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal
certificates of canvass before the provincial boards of
canvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro
Manila Area, shall be specifically noted in the minutes of
their respective proceedings."
What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in
the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be
manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the
certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be
corrected and/or objections thereto must have been
made before the board of canvassers and specifically
noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
- The petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction
of "manifest error's in the certificates of canvass or
election returns" before the Comelec but for the re-
opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the
ballots contained therein. He has not even pointed to
any "manifest error" in the certificates of canvass or
election returns he desires to be rectified. There being
none, the proper recourse is to file a regular election
protest which exclusively pertains to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal.
- The word "sole" underscores the exclusivity of the
Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to
their respective Members is therefore the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the
Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction
to act on the complaint of petitioner involving, as it does,
contest relating to the election of a member of the
Senate. Petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular
election protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal
after the winning senatorial candidates have been
proclaimed.
- Petitioner argues that a recount before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal would force him to shell out the
expenses imposes not only a property requirement for
the enjoyment of the right to be voted upon but also a
price on the right of suffrage which would ultimately
stifle the sovereign will.
- The law is very clear on the matter and it is not right
for petitioner to ask this Court to abandon settled
jurisprudence, engage in judicial legislation, amend the
Constitution and alter the Omnibus Election Code. The
mandatory procedures laid down by the existing law in
cases like the one at bar must be faithfully followed. The
proper recourse is for petitioner to ask not this Court but
the Legislature to enact remedial measures.
- Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: "… (1) Errors in
the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are
proper subject for election protest and not for recount or
reappreciation of ballots. (2) The appreciation of ballots
is not part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers.
The function of ballots appreciation is performed by the
board election inspectors at the precinct level. (3) The
scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the
issues enumerated under Sec. 243 OEC. The complete
election returns whose authenticity is not in question,
must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of
canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning
candidates.
"The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is
clearly not among the issues that may be raised in
pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of
invalidation of "Sanchez" votes intended for him
bear no relation to the correctness and
authenticity of the election returns canvassed.
Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted
the Comelec or the board of canvassers the power
in the canvass of election returns to look beyond
the face thereof, once satisfied of their
authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256)."
- Petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in
the certificates of canvass or election returns before the
Comelec which would warrant their correction.
Decision Premises considered, the Court Resolved
to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.
Narvasa, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Padilla, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Notes Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as "any
question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of
the board of canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate or by any registered political party or coalition
of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233,
234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
election returns." [Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code).
BUAC AND BAUTISTA V COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND CAYETANO
PUNO; January 26, 2004
FACTS
- Buac and Bautista filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus to compel the COMELEC to take cognizance
of contests involving the conduct of a plebiscite and the
annulment of its result.
- In April 1988, a plebiscite was held to ratify the
cityhood of Taguig (converting Tagiug into a highly
urbanized city). The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers
(PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixty-four
(64) other election returns, declared that the “No” votes
won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion
of Taguig into a city. However, upon order of the
COMELEC, the PBOC reconvened and completed the
canvass of the plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming
that the negative votes still prevailed.
- Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the
casting and counting of votes, Buac and Bautista filed
with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of
the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for
revision and recount of the ballots. The COMELEC
treated the petition as an election protest.
- Cayetano intervened in the case. He filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a
plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the
subject of an election protest, and such must be within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
- COMELEC initially gave due course to the petition and
ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case, but this was
overturned completely upon the MFR of Cayetano.
ISSUE
WON COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide cases
regarding plebiscite contests.
HELD
YES
Ratio COMELEC has jurisdiction over plebiscite contest
contests as power to decide such cases is part of the
power vested by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC
43
under Art. IX(C) Sec. 2(1) .
Reasoning: there are 7 reasons given.
43
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers
and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
1. Part of judicial power is the settlement of conflicting
rights as conferred by law. Under the present case,
there is no involvement of the violation of any legally
demandable right, for it merely involves the
ascertainment of the vote of the electorate of Taguig.
2. Jurisdiction of RTC is only on civil actions. A Plebiscite
is NOT a civil action but a determination of public will.
3. To grant jurisdiction to RTC would result to
jumbled justice. There would be confusion if plebiscite
contest cases were given to the RTC for what if the
plebiscite was a national one. Every RTC in the
Philippines would have jurisdiction over nationwide
plebiscite, which runs contrary to the principle that
jurisdiction of an RTC is limited to their region.
4. The Consti gives jurisdiction of contests involving only
election of officers to the courts (part of judicial
function) or to administrative tribunals (exercising
quasi-judicial power). As such, jurisdiction over
plebiscite contests is not vested on the courts.
5. The Constitutional mandate to COMELEC to enforce
and administer laws and regulations relative to
conduct of plebiscites (among others) includes the
power to ascertain the true results of such plebiscite.
It includes the power to do all that is necessary to
achieve honest and credible plebiscites.
*The provision granting COMELEC jurisdiction over
contests re: elected officials is not limiting in the sense
that it only limits quasi-judicial power of COMELEC to
such cases. The power to ascertain true results is
implicit in its power to enforce all laws relative to the
conduct of plebiscite.
6. COMELEC is best suited to have jurisdiction over such
cases because of their indisputable expertise in
election and related laws.
7. MFR of Cayetano filed out of time (filed 10 days, not
the prescribed 5 days, after receipt of the Order or
Resolution of COMELEC).
Decision COMELEC directed to reinstate the petition to
annul the results and decide it without delay.
SEPARATE OPINION
CARPIO-MORALES [dissent]
- Quasi-judicial function of COMELEC is limited to
contests involving election of regional, provincial, and
city officials (limited to what the provision in the Consti
said). As such, jurisdiction must be granted to the RTC,
since no other court or agency has jurisdiction over it.
- Present contest is based on allegations of fraud and
irregularities, which involves a legal question that is
determinable by a judicial or quasi-judicial body.
- There is also the involvement of a demandable right
(right to a canvass free from fraud, anomalies, and
irregularities) which arose from their right to to vote in a
plebiscite.
- Jurisdiction is settled upon determining WoN there is
involvement of a judicial controversy or a purely
administrative function. In this case, it is clearly judicial.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS V
MINISTER OF LABOR
GUTIERREZ; August 3, 1983
FACTS
- Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a
registered labor federation while the other petitioners
are its affiliate unions with members from among the
employees of the following offices, schools, or
government-owned or controlled corporations: PNB,
MWSS, GSIS, SSS, PVTA, PNC, PUP. The workers in the
respondent institutions have not directly petitioned the
heads of their respective offices or their representatives
in the Batasang Pambansa. They have acted through a
labor federation and its affiliated unions. The workers
and employees are taking collective action through a
labor federation which uses the bargaining power of
organized labor to secure increased compensation for its
members.
- The petitioners contend that they should be included as
recipients of the P.D. 851 Christmas bonus which states:
SECTION 1. All employers are hereby required to
pay all their employees receiving a
basic salary of not more than P 1000 a
month, regardless of the nature of
their employment, a 13th-month pay
not later than December 24 of every
year.
SECTION 2. Employers already paying their
employees a 13th-month pay or its
equivalent are not covered by this
Decree.
- Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
PD 851 provides:
“Section 3. Employees covered. – The Decree shall apply
to all employers except to:
b) The Government and any of its political
subdivisions, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, except those corporations
operating essentially as private subsidiaries of the
Government;”
- The petitioners argue that regulations adopted under
legislative authority must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law and for the sole purpose of carrying
into effect its general provisions. A legislative act cannot
be amended by a rule and an administrative officer
(Minister of Labor) cannot change the law.
ISSUE
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case;
2. WON branches, agencies, subdivisions, and
instrumentalities of the Government included among the
“employers” under PD 851 are required to pay all their
employees receiving a basic salary of less than P1000
13th-month pay;
3. Whether or not branches, agencies, subdivisions, and
instrumentalities of the Government are allowed to
collectively bargain for wages and benefits.
HELD
1. The Court does not have jurisdiction over the
petition.
Reasoning The petitioners are faced with a procedural
barrier. The petition is one for declaratory relief, an
action not embraced within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. There is no statutory or
jurisprudential basis for petitioners’ statement that the
SC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
declaratory relief suits where only questions of law are
concerned.
HOWEVER, the petition has far reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved.
2. Government employees are not entitled to 13th-
month pay as provided in PD 851.
Ratio Unless so specified, the government does not fall
within the terms of any legislation or decree (STATCON).
Reasoning The Republic of the Philippines, as
sovereign, cannot be covered by a general term like
“employer” unless the language used in the law is clear
and specific to that effect.
In fact, it has been expressly stated in Section 3 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 851 that
Government subdivisions, etc. are not covered by the
Decree. The benefit is extended only to employees of
private companies/ corporations. In addition, Sec. 2 of
PD 851 bars the petitioners from receiving the bonus,
since government offices have instituted an across the
board wage increase.
3. Public officers and employees may not join
associations which impose the obligation to
engage in concerted activities in order to get
salaries, fringe benefits, and other emoluments
higher than or different from that provided by law
and regulation.
Reasoning Since the terms and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law¸ government
workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from
their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in
private industry is that industrial peace cannot be
secured through compulsion by law. Relations between
private employers and their employees rest on an
essentially voluntary basis. In government employment,
it is the legislature and the administrative heads (when
properly delegated the power) of government which fix
the terms and conditions of employment.
- Under the present Constitution, government-owned or
controlled corporations are specifically mentioned as
embraced by the civil service (Section 1, Article XII-B).
This was to correct the situation where more favored
employees of the government could enjoy the benefits of
two worlds. Salaries and fringe benefits of those
embraced by the civil service are fixed by law. As
such petitioners have no standing to bargain collectively
(or to bargain at all) for wages.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [concur pro hac vice]
- This is in conformity to the prevailing doctrine of
statutory construction that unless so specified, the
government does not fall within the terms of any
legislation or decree.
- ART. XIII Sec. 1: “Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility xxx”
> Under the Constitution there can be no right to
strike by them nor to take a mass leave which is a way
of doing indirectly what is not legally allowable.
- Government workers cannot use the same weapons
employed by workers in the private sector to secure
concessions from employers (terms are fixed by law).
MAKASIAR [dissent]
- All the “whereases” are the premises of the decree
requiring all employers to pay all their employees
receiving a basic salary of not more than P1000 a
month. All working masses, without exception whether
private sector or public, are also suffering from ravages
of inflation, and are entitled to properly celebrate
Christmas every year.
- Both the employees of the respondents and the
employees of the private sector are similarly situated
and have collective bargaining agreements with their
respective employers.
NATIONAL SERVICE CO. V NLRC
PADILLA; November 29, 1988
FACTS
- Nature: Special civil actions for certiorari to review the
decision of the NLRC.
- Summary: In NASECO, the Court explained that the civil
service under the 1987 Const does not cover employees
from GOCCs organized as subsidiaries under the general
corporation law. Accordingly, employees in such GOCCs
are under NLRC’s jurisdiction. By further implication, the
auditing power of COA does not apply over said GOCCs.
- Eugenia Credo was an employee of NASECO, a
corporation that provides manpower services to PNB and
its agencies. Because of certain administrative charges
against her such as discourtesy and insubordination, she
was dismissed from NASECO in 1983. In the same year
Credo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was
eventually decided by the NLRC in 1984 in her favor.
- NASECO contends, among others, that the NLRC has
44
no jurisdiction to order Credo's reinstatement. NASECO
claims that, as a GOCC [by virtue of its being a
subsidiary of the National Investment and Development
Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary of the PNB, which in
turn is a GOCC], the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees are governed by the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations. In support of this
argument, NASECO cites National Housing Corporation
vs. Juco [134 SCRA 172 (1985)], where SC held that
"employees of GOCCs are governed by the civil service
law.”
ISSUE
For the purpose of determining whether the case falls
under the NLRC or CSC, WON NASECO (without original
charter) covered by the civil service as defined in the
1987 Constitution
HELD
- GOCCs without legislative charter shall not be deemed
to be embraced by the term civil service under the
Constitution. By implication, labor disputes in said
GOCCs shall fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRC. By
further implication, the auditing power of COA shall not
apply to them.
Reasoning In the matter of coverage by the civil
service of GOCCs, the 1987 Constitution starkly varies
from the 1973 Constitution, upon which NHC is based.
Under the 1973 Const, it was provided that
"[t]he civil service embraces every…
instrumentality of the Government,
including every government-owned or
controlled corporation."
- On the other hand, the 1987 Const provides that [Art.
IX-B, Sec. 2(1)]
“[t]he civil service embraces all…
instrumentalities… of the Government,
including government owned or
controlled corporations with original
charters."
- Thus, the situation sought to be avoided by the 1973
Constitution and the NHC case regarding subsidiary
corporations created under the Corporation Code, whose
"officials and employees would be… free from the strict
accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and
the regulations of the Commission on Audit,” appear
relegated to relative insignificance by the above 1987
Constitutional provision. By clear implication [of Art. IX-
B, Sec. 2(1)], the Civil Service does not include GOCCs
44
BRYAN_SJ: NLRC does not have jurisdiction over those covered
by the CSC. It had jurisdiction on labor issues of private
corporations or broadly speaking, private businesses.
which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCCs under the
general corporation law.
45
- On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that
governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in
place at the time of [SC’s] decision thereof, the NLRC
has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an
admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of
the PNB, the NASECO is a GOCC without original
46
charter. NLRC decision affirmed.
CRISTOBAL V MELCHOR
MUNOZ-PALMA; July 29, 1977
FACTS
- Jose Cristobal was formerly employed as a private
secretary in the President's Private Office in Malacañan,
having been appointed to that position on July 1, 1961
with a salary of P4,188.00 per annum. On the second
week of January, 1962, the then Executive Secretary
Amelito Mutuc, thru a letter, informed the plaintiff that
his services as private secretary in the President's
Private Office were terminated effective January 1, 1962.
A similar letter was addressed by Sec. Mutuc to some
other employees in the Office of the President (OP). The
dismissed employees appealed to the President by
means of letters dated January 3, 1962 and January 26,
1962 for a reconsideration of their separation from the
service. In a letter dated February 21, 1962, their
request for reconsideration was denied by Secretary
Mutuc, acting 'by authority of the President'.
- On March 24, 1962, five of the employees who were
separated (excluding Cristobal) filed a civil action before
the CFI of Manila against Secretary Mutuc and the Cash
Disbursing Officer of the OP praying for reinstatement
and the payment of their salaries effective as of January
1, 1962. From a judgment dismissing their complaint,
the said employees appealed to the Supreme Court
which rendered a decision promulgated on November
29, 1968 reversing the dismissal of their complaint and
declaring their removal from office as illegal and
contrary to law, and ordering their reinstatement and
the payment of their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to
the date of their actual reinstatement.
- Sometime in May, 1962, when the civil action filed by
Raul Ingles, et al was still pending in the CFI of Manila,
the dismissed employees who filed said action were
recalled to their positions in the OP, without prejudice to
45
BRYAN_SJ: A corporation can be created generally in two ways:
by incorporation under the Corporation Code, or by special law.
Corporations created by special law are also called corporations
with special/original charters.
46
BRYAN_SJ: What the Court seems to mean is that although PNB
has an original charter, and hence covered by civil service law,
NASECO (as PNB’s sub-subsidiary) was organized under the
Corporation Code. Hence, NASECO is under NLRC’s jurisdiction.
the continuation of their civil action. With respect to the
other employees who were not reinstated – Cristobal
included, efforts were exerted by Sec. Mutuc to look for
placements outside of Malacañan so that they may be
reemployed. Cristobal waited for Sec. Mutuc to make
good his assurance that he would be recalled to the
service, until the latter was replaced by other executive
secretaries who likewise assured the plaintiff of
assistance to be reemployed at the opportune time.
- After the decision of the SC promulgated on November
29, 1968, the plaintiff addressed a letter to the OP dated
January 19, 1969, requesting reinstatement to his former
position and the payment of salary from January 1, 1962
up to the time of actual reinstatement, supposedly in
accordance with said decision. This request was denied
repeatedly by the OP in successive letters addressed to
the plaintiff dated September 1, 1969, January 19, 1970,
April 23, 1970, May 23, 1970, and May 19, 1971, the last
of which declared the matter 'definitely closed',
- Consequently, Cristobal filed on August 10, 1971, with
the CFI of Manila a complaint against then Exec. Sec.
Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala, Cash Disbursing
Officer of the OP, and praying for the following: 1.
Declaring his dismissal as illegal and contrary to law; 2.
Ordering Sec. Melchor to certify his name in the payroll
of the OP, to be retroactive as of January 1, 1962, the
effective date that he was illegally dismissed from the
service; 3. Ordering Arcala to pay all the emoluments
and/or salary to which the plaintiff is entitled effective as
of January 1, 1962; and 4. Ordering them to allow him to
continue with the performance of his duties in the
Secretary Office Staff, Office of the President of the
Philippines.
- The defendants, represented by the Solicitor General
alleged that Cristobal had no cause of action as he is
deemed to have abandoned his office for failure to
institute the proper proceedings to assert his right within
one year from the date of separation pursuant to Sec.
16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, he having come to
court only after the lapse of more than nine years,
thereby in effect acquiescing to his separation, and
therefore he is not entitled to any salary from
termination of his employment.
- On May 18, 1972, the trial court rendered its decision
dismissing the complaint reasoning that: Section 16 of
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that an
action against a public office or employee may not be
filed for the plaintiff’s ouster from office unless the same
is commenced within one year after the cause of the
ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold much office or
position arose. This period of one year is a condition
precedent for the existence of the cause of action for
quo warranto. The rationale of this doctrine is that the
Government must be immediately informed or advised if
any person claims to be entitled to an office or position
in the civil service, as against another actually holding-
it, so that the Government may not be faced with the
predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the
person actually holding the office although illegally, and
another for one not actually rendering service although
entitled to do so. The fact that the petitioner sought to
pursue administrative remedies to secure his
reinstatement does not excuse the failure to file the
action within the one year period.
ISSUE
WON Cristobal has abandoned his right to seek judicial
relief for not having filed his complaint within the one-
year period provided for in Section 16, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court
HELD
NO. The Court agrees that in actions of quo warranto
involving right to an office, the action must be instituted
within the period of one year from the time the cause of
action arose; Persons claiming a right to an office of
which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately
take steps to recover said office and that if they do not
do so within a period of one year, they shall be
considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. However, this doctrine of laches (laches
is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it) which is invoked to defeat
Cristobal's suit, is not applicable in this case. There are
certain exceptional circumstances attending which take
this case out of the rule.
Reasoning
1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part
of Jose Cristobal amounting to abandonment of his right
to reinstatement in office.
> Upon receipt of the letter or January 1, 1962 advising
him of his separation from the service, Cristobal, with
the other dismissed employees, sought reconsideration
in a letter dated January 3, 1962, calling inter alia the
attention of then Sec. Mutuc that he was a civil eligible
employee with eight years of service in the government
and consequently entitled to security of tenure under the
Constitution. This was followed by another letter of
January 26, 1962. Reconsideration having been denied, a
complaint was filed on March 24, 1962, with the CFI of
Manila entitled Ingles vs. Mutuc, which prayed for
reinstatement and payment of salaries as of January 1,
1962, wherein the SC held that the removal of the
plaintiff-employees was illegal and contrary to law and
that they were entitled to be reinstated with payment of
their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to the date of their
actual reinstatement.
> Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case,
it is true, but his non-participation is not fatal to his
cause of action. During the pendency of the civil case,
Cristobal continued to press his request for
reinstatement together with the other employees who
had filed the complaint and was in fact promised
reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later. More
importantly, Cristobal could be expected - without
necessarily spending time and money by going to court -
to relic upon the outcome of the case filed by his co-
employees to protect his interests considering the
similarity of his situation to that of the plaintiffs therein
and the identifical relief being sought.
2. It was an act of the government through its
responsible officials more particularly then Sec. Mutuc
and his successors which contributed to the alleged
delay in the filing of Cristobal's present complaint for
reinstatement.
> After the Ingles suit was filed in court, the dismissed
employees, Cristobal included, continued to seek
reconsideration of their dismissal. It was then that Sec.
Mutuc assured the employees that without prejudice to
the continuation of the civil action, he would work for
their reinstatement. Accordingly, some of the dismissed
employees were recalled to their respective positions in
the OP among whom were the plaintiffs in the civil case
and several others who were not parties therein. Sec.
Mutuc even tried to place the others outside of the
Malacañan Office. In the meantime, however, Sec.
Mutuc was replaced by other Exec. Secretaries to whom
Cristobal over and over again presented his request for
reinstatement and who gave the same assurance that
Cristobal would be recalled and re-employed at "the
opportune time".
> It was this continued promise of the government
officials concerned which led Cristobal to bide his time
and wait for the Office of the President to comply with its
commitment. Furthermore, he had behind him the
decision of the Supreme Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc which
he believed should be applied in his favor. But when
Cristobal, in answer to his various letters, received the
letter of May 19, 1971 from the Office of the President
denying his reinstatement and declaring the matter
"definitely closed" because of his failure to file an action
in court within one year from his separation, it was only
then that he saw the necessity of seeking redress from
the courts.
> Surely, it would now be the height of inequity and
injustice, if after Cristobal relied and reposed his faith
and trust on the word and promises of the former
Executive Secretaries who dealt with him and who
preceded the herein respondent Sec. Melchor, that the
court hold that he lost his right to seek relief because of
lapse of time.
3. The dismissal of appellant Cristobal was contrary to
law on the strength of the Supreme Court's decision in
Ingles vs. Mutuc.
> In Ingles, the defendants maintained that the principal
issue in the case was whether or not the employees
were occupying positions primarily confidential in nature
and therefore subject to removal at the pleasure of the
appointing power, and that this issue was to be resolved
in the affirmative. The Court held: that one holding in
the government a primarily confidential position is
"in the Civil Service" and that "officers or
employees in the unclassified" as well as "those in
the classified service" are protected by the
provision in the organic law that "no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law"
(Section 4, Article XII, 1935 Constitution); that while the
incumbent of a primarily confidential position
holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing
power and such pleasure turns into displeasure,
the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed"
but that his term merely "expires"; that there was
no evidence to indicate that the respective positions of
the dismissed employees were "primarily confidential" in
nature and on the contrary the compensation attached
and the designation given thereto suggest the purely or
at least mainly clerical nature of their work; and
consequently, considering that the dismissed employees
were admittedly civil service eligibles with several years
of service in the Government, their removal from office
was "illegal and contrary to law".
> No evidence was adduced by the government to show
that Cristobal's position was "primarily confidential". On
the contrary as stated by this Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc,
the compensation attached to his item and the
designation of the position indicate the purely clerical
nature of his functions. In fact, none of the letters sent to
him from the OP ever indicated that he was holding his
position at the pleasure of the appointing power or that
his services were terminated because his term of office
had "expired". The only reason given - and this appears
in the letter of September 1, 1969 from the OP - was that
he failed to institute the proper proceeding to assert his
right, if any, to the position within the period of one year
from the date of termination and under settled
jurisprudence he is deemed to have abandoned his right
to said office or acquiesced in his removal.
> In granting relief to the Cristobal on the matter of back
salaries, however, there is no proof to show that from
January 1, 1962 up to the promulgation of this decision,
Cristobal at no time worked or was employed at some
other office. The court cannot ignore the probability of
Cristobal's having sought employment elsewhere during
that period to support himself and his family.
Considering the lapse of almost nine years before he
filed this suit, the resolved to grant back salaries at the
rate last received by him only for a period of five (5)
years without qualification and deduction.
> The Public Officials concerned are directed to reinstate
Jose Cristobal, either in the OP or in some other
government office, to any position for which he is
qualified by reason of his civil service eligibility, subject
to present requirements of age and physical fitness; and
to pay him back salaries for a period of 5 years at the
rate of P4,188.00 per annum without qualification and
deduction.
Decision Decision set aside.
ACOLOLA V TANTUICO
SANTOS; June 27, 1978
FACTS
- Nature ORIGINAL PETITION for certiorari, mandamus
with preliminary injunction.
- Petitioner Arturo A. Acolola was assigned as Provincial
Auditor of Capiz on April 16, 1972. Sometime before
December 12, 1972, an administrative complaint was
filed against him charging him with various
irregularities in connection with the discharge of
his duties. The complaint was subsequently dismissed.
- On December 27, 1974 he was again administratively
charged with offenses ranging from "misconduct,
neglect of duty to incompetence in the
performance of official duties," which charges were
likewise dismissed.
- On December 3, 1976, while petitioner was assigned as
Acting Highway Engineering District Auditor of
Romblon, private respondent Horacio A. Martinez, a
contractor of Public Works Project in the province of
Romblon, filed another complaint against petitioner
charging him, this time, with
(1) Delaying action on payment of vouchers.
(2) Delaying action on request for inspection of
accomplished work:
(3) Refusal to assign an auditor's representative to
check deliveries of materials at job sites at the time of
deliveries;
(4) Piecemeal suspension of vouchers:
(5) Demanding free transportation and meals when on
inspection of materials delivered or work
accomplished, and
(6) Demanding P24,000 cost of plane fare for his twin
daughter's trip to the United States.
- Upon the recommendation of the Civil Security Office of
the Commission on Audit, an entrapment scheme was
devised and executed on December 15, 1976. Petitioner
was apprehended by the PC Provincial Command in the
act of receiving from complainant Horacio A. Martinez,
the amount of P2,000.00 in marked P20 bills as bribe
money, while he was about to enter his room at the
Seaside Hotel.
- On January 12, 1977, a formal administrative
charge was preferred against him. At the same time the
preventive suspension of petitioner was ordered by
the respondent pursuant to Section 41, Presidential
Decree No. 807. Respondent, now petitioner, answered
the charge.
- On May 12, 1977, petitioner was summarily
dismissed from the service, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 807, dated October 6, 1975.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration praying for a
formal investigation denied, appeals to Court, seeking:
(1) the review and reversal of the order of May 27, 1977
of the Acting Chairman Cormnission on Audit, (Hon.
Francisco S. Tantuico Jr.) summarily dismissing him from
the service, on the grounds that respondent acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion and the said order is violative of his
constitutional rights; and (2) his reinstatement to his
former position. Petition was given due course,
respondents required to file their comments, TRO issued.
- On March 18, 1978, the Solicitor General for and in
behalf of respondent Tantuico, Chairman of COA, filed
the required comment and prayed that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner filed his rejoinder
(should be reply) to the said comment on April 20, 1978.
ISSUE
WON the respondent Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, could summarily dismiss petitioner pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 807.
HELD
Ratio Yes, the respondent Chairman of COA could
summarily dismiss petitioner Pursuant to PD 807.
Section 40 of Presidential Decree No. 807 specifically
provides:
"SEC. 40. Summary Proceedings.-No formal investigation
is necessary and the respondent may be immediately
removed or dismissed if any of the following
circumstances is present:
(a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of
guilt is strong.
(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been
repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to
believe that he is guilty of the present charge.
(c) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.
- Resort to summary proceedings by disciplining
authority shall be done with utmost objectivity and
impartiality to the end that no injustice is committed:
Provided, That removal or dismissal except those by the
President, himself, or upon his order, may be appealed
to the Commission."
- Petitioner was caught red-handed by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary in the entrapment operations,
and the evidence against him was over whelming which
warranted his summary dismissal from the service under
PD 807. The seriousness of the offense charged, the
circumstances surrounding its commission and the
evidence of guilt, being overwhelming and indubitably
strong, the interest of the public service demanded the
drastic remedy of summary dismissal, which respondent
Chairman of the Commission -on Audit judiciously took
against petitioner.
Decision Petition DISMISSEd for lack of merit. TRO
LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
Voting 4 concur: Fernando (Chairman), Barredo,
Antonio, and Aquino
1 on official leave: Concepcion Jr.
SANDIGANBAYAN
NUNEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN
FERNANDO; January 30, 1982
FACTS
- Petitioner Rufino Nuñez was accused before the
Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents committed in connivance
with his other co-accused, all public officials
- Informations were filed on February 21 and March 26,
1979
- On May 15, petitioner filed a motion to quash on
constitutional and jurisdictional grounds
- Respondent court denied the motion, as well as the
MFR
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the SC, assailing the validity of PD 1486, as
amended by PD 1606, creating the Sandiganbayan
ISSUE
WON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is
violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex
post facto clauses of the Constitution
HELD
Petition dismissed. Petitioner has been unable to make a
case calling for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1606.
Ratio
On the equal protection clause of the Constitution…
- Petitioner’s premise is that the Sandiganbayan
proceedings violates petitioner’s right to equal
protection because:
> Appeal, as a matter of right, became minimized into
a matter of discretion
> Appeal was limited to questions of law, excluding a
review of facts and trial evidence
> There is only one chance to appeal conviction, by
certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two
chances
while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal
as a matter of right covering questions of law and of
facts, and to two appellate courts (CA and SC)
- Classification satisfies the test announced by this court
in People v. Vera
> Must be based on substantial distinction
> Must be germane to the purposes of the law
> Must not be limited to existing conditions only and
must apply equally to each member of the class
- The Constitution specifically makes mention of the
creation of a special court, in response to problem,
namely, the dishonesty in the public service.
- Petitioners, should therefore have anticipated that a
different procedure that would be prescribed for that
tribunal would not be violative of the equal protection
clause
- The general guarantees of the Bill of Rights must give
way to specific provisions of the Constitution, for the
promotion of the general welfare, which is the end of the
law
On the ex post facto provision of the Constitution…
- Petitioner’s contention that the challenged Presidential
Decree is contrary to the ex post facto law is premised
on the allegation that “petitioner’s right of appeal is
being diluted or eroded efficacy wise.
- Justice Makasiar, in the Kay Villegas Kami decision,
defined an ex post facto law as one which:
> makes criminal an act done before the passage of
the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act
> aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was
when committed
> changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed
> alters the legal rules on evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the
offense
> assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only,
in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful
> deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty
- the “lawful protection” to which an accused “has
become entitled” is qualified, not given a broad scope
- the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory
right to appeal can hardly be argued to be embraced
therein
- the test to whether the ex post facto law is
disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan in
Thompson v. Utah, is “taking from an accused any right
that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the
constitution as vital for the protection of life and
liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him”
- the omission of the CA as an intermediate tribunal does
not deprive the petitioner of a right vital to the
protection of his liberty
- his innocence or guilt is passed upon by a three-judge
court, where a unanimous vote is required
- if convicted, the SC has the duty to see whether any
error of law was committed
- the SC in determining whether to give due course to
the petition for review must be convinced that the
constitutional presumption of innocence has been
overcome
- SC carefully scrutinizes whether the quantum of
evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied
- It is farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that
the omission of the CA as a reviewing authority results in
the loss of “vital protection of liberty.”
On the due process clause of the Constitution…
- Petitioner alleges lack of fairness
- In Arnault v. Pecson, the court declared that what is
required for compliance with the due process mandate in
criminal proceedings is “a fair and impartial trial and
reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense
- In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if
the accused is “informed as to why he is proceeded
against and what charge he has to meet, with his
conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not
tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut
it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a
valid law.”
- If an accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly
process of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to
be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority
of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of
law.
ZALDIVAR V SANDIGANBAYAN
PER CURIAM; May 19, 1988
FACTS
GR Nos. 79690-707
- Petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar (Antique Governor)
sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
Raul Gonzales from proceeding with the prosecution and
hearing of Criminal cases Nos. 12159 – 12161 and
12163-12177
- Petitioner alleged that said cases were filed by
Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority
since the 1987 Constitution conferred upon the
Ombudsman (not the present Tanodbayan) the authority
to file cases with the Sandiganbayan
GR No. 80578
- Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar, on substantially the same
grounds as first petition, sought to restrain Tanodbayan
Gonzales from conducting preliminary investigations and
filing similar cases with the Sandiganbayan
ISSUES
1, WON the Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution,
have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and direct the filing of cases with the Sandiganbayan
HELD
NO. The incumbent Tanodbayan, under the 1987
Constitution is without authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases
with the Sandiganbayan
- The Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution, has
been transformed into the Office of the Special
Prosecutor which shall continue to function and exercise
its powers provided by law, EXCEPT those conferred on
the Office of the Ombudsman created under the sam
Constitution (1987).
- The 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman
as distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan
has the duty to investigate on its own, or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
- The Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzales) is thus a
subordinate of the Tanodbayan(Ombudsman) and can
investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter’s
authority or orders.
Obiter Raul Gonzales does not remain as Ombudsman
in as much as he has not been replaced because he has
never been the Ombudsman. The Office of the
Ombudsman is a new creation under Article XI of the
1987 constitution different from the Office of the
Tanodbayan created under PD 1607.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
EXPORT PROCESING ZONE AUTHORITY V
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
GRINO-AQUINO; April 14, 1992
FACTS
- Nature Special Civil Action for certiorari and
prohibition to review the orders of the Commission on
Human Rights
- P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain
parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as
the “Cavite Export Processing Zone” (CEPZ). The area
was divided into four four Phases and Phase IV was
bought by Filoil and was later sold to EPZA.
- Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several
individuals, had entered the premises and planted
agricultural products therein without permission from
EPZA or Filoil. To convince the intruders to depart
peacefully, EPZA paid a P10K-financial assistance to
those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims.
Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, the
father of the respondent Loreto Aledia.
- Ten years later, the private respondents filed in CHR a
joint complaint praying for “justice and other reliefs and
remedies”. The CHR conducted an investigation.
- According to CHR, EPZA, together with help of PNP,
bulldozed and level the area, despite the fact that the
occupants presented a letter from the Office of the
President of the Phil ordering postponement of
bulldozing.
- Because of this, the CHR issued an Order of injunction
to desist from committing further acts of demolition,
terrorism and harassment until further orders from the
CHR and to appear before the Commission for a
dialogue.
- However, the same group again bulldozed the area and
allegedly handcuffed private respondent Valles, pointed
their firearms at others and fired a shot in the air.
- The CHR issued another injunction Order reiterating the
same order.
- Procedure
1. EPZA filed in CHR a motion to lift the Order of
injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs
and temporary restraining orders but this was denied.
2. EPZA filed a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for issuance of restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction. It was granted by
the Court.
3. CHR filed a Motion to lift the restraining order
contending that CHR has the power not only to
investigate but also to provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the under
privileged whose human rights have been violated or
need protection (Art. 13 Sec. 18, 1987 Consti)
ISSUE
WON the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction or restraining order against supposed violators
of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist
from continuing the acts complained of
HELD
NO. Not being a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial
body, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction, for it may only be issued by the
judge of any court in which the action is pending (within
his district), or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of
the Supreme Court or by the judge of the Regional Trial
Court.
Reasoning
1. adherence to precedent
- In Hon. Isidro Carino vs. CHR the Court held that the
CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial
body. Fact-finding function is different from adjudication
and cannot be likened to a judicial function.
2, textual interpretation of the text - plain meaning
- The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to
“provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the under privileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection” may not be construed to
confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the
intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
“Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
la.” It is never derived by implication.
- “preventive measures and legal aid services” refer ti
extrajudicial and judicial remedies which the CHR may
seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims.
Decision The petition for certiorari and prohibition is
GRANTED. Orders of injunction of CHR are ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. TRO which the Court issued is made
PERMANENT.
ART XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND PATRIMONY
KRIVENKO V DIRECTOR OF LANDS
MORAN; November 15, 1947
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND
IMPERIUM)
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS
BELLOSILLO; February 3, 1997
FACTS
- Respondent GSIS, pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC which owns the
historic Manila Hotel. In a closed bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51 % of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
- Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated
28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent
letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-
three Million Pesos (P33-000,000.00) as Bid Security to
match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong
Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
- On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may
be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale
to the Malaysian firm. On 10 September 1996 the instant
case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was
referred to it by the First Division.
- The petitioner argues the following:
1. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second Par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and
has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippines heritage and
culture. To all intents and purpose, it has become a
part of the national patrimony.
2. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares
of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the
business of the hotel which is owned by respondent
GSIS, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a
part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of
the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving
51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
covered by the term national economy, to which Sec.
10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
3. It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila
Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
also unquestionably part of the national economy
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the
bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules
mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may
offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of
price per share.
- Respondents maintain that:
1. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
requires implementing legislation(s). Thus, for the said
provision to operate, there must be existing laws "to
lay down conditions under which business may be
done."
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila
Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony
which only refers to lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth
in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as
cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art.
XII, 1987 Constitution. While petitioner speaks of the
guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that
have transpired therein which make the hotel historic,
these alone do not make the hotel fall under the
patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of
the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its
own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a
State.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the
national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation,
not the hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the
MHC cannot be considered part of the national
patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of
the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution,
petitioner should have questioned it right from the
beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
4. The reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. I., of
the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced.
Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting
a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes
place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares.
5. The prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse
of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not
exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical
manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was
not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus
should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to
what it demands and respondents do not have an
imperative duty to perform the act required of them
by petitioner.
ISSUES
1. WON Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is non-self-executing
2. WON the Manila Hotel falls under the term national
patrimony
3. WON 51% of the equity of MHC can be considered
part of national patrimony
4. WON petitioner should be allowed to match the
highest bid
5. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD
1. NO. A provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when,
or whether, they shall be effective. Sec. 10, second par.,
of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for
purposes of style. The argument of respondents that the
non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par. of Art.
XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third
paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are
not self-executing is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is
still to enact measures to encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in
the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation
to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the
third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the
second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in order to
give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may
be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable.
2. YES. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources,
but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila
Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. Its existence is impressed with public
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle
for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy
and patrimony.
3. YES. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the
MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the
land on which the hotel edifice stands. Respondents
further argue that the constitutional provision is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by
itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct
from the government are considered "state action"
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a "public function"; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private
actor as to make the government responsible for his
action; and, (3) when the government has approved or
authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third
categories of "state action." Therefore the transaction,
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command.
4. YES. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian
firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the
highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder
after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the
Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the
highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder
will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor
are they under obligation to enter into one with the
highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents
are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Paragraph V. J. I of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for
any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest
bid in terms of price per share. The constitutional
mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block
of shares immediately to the foreign bidder
notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the
highest, bid. Where a foreign firm submits the highest
bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to
be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give
life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of
the 1987 Constitution. The argument of respondents that
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to
Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the
beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and
foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino
qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the
highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case
before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered
by Renong Berhad. Only after it had matched the bid of
the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by
respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the
latter have a cause of action.
5. YES. Since petitioner has already matched the bid
price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative
but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the
Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to
execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
Voting Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan,
Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur with the main
opinion.
Narvasa, C.J, joins Justice Puno in his dissent.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [concur]
- Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony"
consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty
God (Preamble) in our territory (Article 1) consisting of
land, sea, and air. The concept of national patrimony has
been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race.
The Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national
patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional
protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its
operation. This institution has played an important role
in our nation's history, having been the venue of many a
historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as
the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of
state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.
- "Preference to qualified Filipinos," to be meaningful,
must refer not only to things that are peripheral,
collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the
very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public
bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the
national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must
allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher bid
of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only
when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-
Filipino are equal in which case, the award should
undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The
Constitutional preference should give the qualified
Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid
of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the
qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.
VITUG [separate]
- The provision in our fundamental law which provides
that "(i)n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is self-
executory. The provision does not need, although it can
obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law
or a set of rules.
- The term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the
country's natural resources but also to its cultural
heritage. A "historical landmark”, Manila Hotel has now
indeed become part of Philippine heritage.
- The act of the GSIS, a government entity which derives
its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in
MHC should be considered an act of the State subject to
the Constitutional mandate.
- On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to
qualified Filipinos," the only meaningful preference
would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match
the foreign bid. The magnitude of the bids is such that it
becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand
exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view,
could trigger the right of preference.
MENDOZA [separate opinion in the
judgment]
- The only way to enforce the constitutional mandate
that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national patrimony the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos" is to allow petitioner
Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian
firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling
shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation.
- We are dealing here not with common trades or
common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in
our midst, but with the sale of government property,
which is like the grant of government largess or benefits.
Therefore no one should begrudge us if we give
preferential treatment to our citizens.
- Nor is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a
Filipino bidder to match the highest bid of an alien could
encourage speculation, since all the Filipino entity would
then do would be not to make a bid or make only a
token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has
submitted the highest bid, make an offer matching that
of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules
on public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is
a minimum bid required. If the Filipino entity, after
passing the prequalification process, does not submit a
bid, he will not be allowed to match the highest bid of
the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only
to those who have "validly submitted bids."
TORRES [separate]
- History, culture, heritage, and tradition are not
legislated and is the product of events, customs, usages
and practices. It is actually a product of growth and
acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the
spirit and soul of a people. The Manila Hotel is part of our
history, culture and heritage. The Manila Hotel is witness
to historic events which shaped our history for almost 84
years. The history of the Manila Hotel should not be
placed in the auction block of a purely business
transaction, where profit subverts the cherished
historical values of our people.
PUNO [dissent]
- The vital issues can be summed up as follows:
1. Whether Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII of the
Constitution is a self-executing provision and
does not need implementing legislation to carry
it into effect;
2. Assuming Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII is self
executing, whether the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term "State,"
hence, mandated to implement Sec. 10, Par. 2
of Art. XII of the Constitution;
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it
failed to give preference to petitioner, a
qualified Filipino corporation, over and above
Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the
sale of the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation;
5. Whether petitioner is estopped from
questioning the sale of the shares to Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation.
- 1st issue: courts as a rule consider the provisions of the
Constitution as self executing, rather than as requiring
future legislation for their enforcement. If they are not
treated as self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be
easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Case law also
lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not
self-executing where it merely announces a policy and
its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the
means by which the policy shall be carried into effect.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing.
By its express text, there is a categorical command for
Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in
certain areas of investments in the country and to
encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned
Filipino enterprises. The second and third paragraphs of
Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State
and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three
great branches of our government. Their coverage is also
broader for they cover "the national economy and
patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the]
national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of
investments." Their language does not suggest that any
of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege
to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason
whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional
and it is now.
- The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of
the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the
disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records
of the Constitutional Commission show that the
Commissioners entertained the same view as to its
meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo,
"patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources
but also to the cultural heritage of our race. The unique
value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture
cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the
hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. The Hotel may
not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural
treasure pursuant to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does
not exclude it from our national patrimony.
- The third issue is whether the constitutional command
to the State includes the respondent GSIS. The GSIS is
not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public
corporation created by Congress and granted an original
charter to serve a public purpose. As a state-owned and
controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the
policies spelled out in the Constitution especially those
designed to promote the general welfare of the people.
One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the
people elevated as a constitutional command.
- To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the
degree of the preferential right. Consequently, we must
turn to the rules and regulations of respondents
Committee on Privatization and GSIS to determine the
degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a
qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A look at the rules
and regulations will show that they are silent on the
degree of preferential right to be accorded a qualified
Filipino bidder. However, they cannot be read to mean
that they do not grant any degree of preference to
petitioner for Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution is
deemed part of said rules and regulations. I submit that
the right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied
the bid of Renong Berhad. In that instance, all things
stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder
should be preferred. Under the rules, the right to match
the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest
bidder cannot be awarded the block of shares" No reason
has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad.
It qualified as a bidder. It complied with the procedure of
bidding. It was declared as the highest bidder by the
GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves
the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did
not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino the
privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the
rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand.
- Petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of
Renong Berhad. It knew that the rules and regulations do
not provide that qualified Filipino bidder can match the
winning bid after submitting an inferior bid. It knew that
the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners
qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot
be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard
them when it loses.
PANGANIBAN [dissent]
- The majority contends the Constitution should be
interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is
concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the
right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win. No
statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his
bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the
absence of such empowering law, the majority's strained
interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes
unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a
ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no
foreigner can win.
- Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such
judicial legislation is short-sighted and, viewed properly,
gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interests. It
encourages other countries - in the guise of reverse
comity or worse, unabashed retaliation - to discriminate
against us in their own jurisdictions by authorizing their
own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher
bids of Filipino enterprises solely, while on the other
hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain
unchallenged by their nationals.
- In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent
of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the
constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may
be allowed only where all the bids are equal. The
Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino
only when the scores are tied. But not when the
ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the
highest score.
MINERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES V SECRETARY
ROMERO; January 16, 1995
FACTS
- Controversy is due to the change introduced by Art XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of
exploration, development and utilization of the country’s
natural resources. Utilization of inalienable lands of
public domain through license, concession or lease is no
longer allowed in the present Consti.
- With the state in full control and supervision, the only
options for mineral exploration development and
utilization is only through direct undertaking or by
entering into co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with
foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
development and utilization.
- The President may enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils…
- In view of these provisions, the President issued
Executive Order No. 211 and No. 279. The former
prescribes interim procedures in the processing and
approval of applications for the exploration,
development and utilization of minerals pursuant to the
1987 Consti. The latter authorizes the DENR secretary to
negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production or
production-sharing agreements, and prescribed
guidelines for these agreements and those with foreign-
owned corporations
- To implement the legislative acts, the DENR Secretary
promulgated AO Nos 57 and 82. The former converts all
existing mining leases or agreements prior to the 1987
Consti into production-sharing agreements except small-
scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand, gravel
and quarry resources cover an area of 20 hectares or
less. The latter laid down the Procedural Guidelines on
the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
Through Negotiation (MPSA).
- It is for these AOs that the MAP, Inc. filed the petition
- They contend that:
o The issuance of the AOs was in excess of his rule-
making power under EO279
o The AOs violate the non-impairment of contract
provision under Art 3, Sec 10 of the 1987 Consti
as
 AO57 unduly pre-terminates
existing mining leases and other mining
agreements and converts it into production-
sharing agreements within a year of its
effectivity and
 AO82 declares that failure to
submit Letter of Intent and MPSA within 2
years of effecitivity of guidelines shall cause
the abandonment of their mining, quarry and
gravel permits
o AOs have the effect of repealing or abrogating
existing mining laws which are not inconsistent
with the provisions of EO279 as the Eos merely
reiterated the acceptance and registration of
declarations of location and all other kinds of
mining applications by the Bureau of Mines and
Geo-Sciences under PD 463, as amended, until
Congress opts to modify the same
- A TRO was given enjoining the implementation of the
AOs. The Continental Marble Corp. also intervened as its
DENR refused to renew its mining permit
ISSUES
1. WON DENR Sec committed grave abuse of discretion
in promulgating AOs 57 and 82
2. WON PD 463 continues to subsist insofar as it allows
licenses, concessions and leases for the exploration,
utilization and development of mineral resources
3. WON AO 57 and 82 impairs vested frights as to violate
the non-impairment of contract doctrine as
guaranteed by Art 3, Section 10 of the Consti
4. WON AO 57 and 82 authorizes automatic conversion
of mining leases and agreements granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Consti into production sharing
agreements
HELD
- There is no clear showing that the DENR Sec has
transcended the bounds demarcated by EO279 for the
exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to grave
abuse of discretion
o The power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules and regulations in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited
only to carrying into effect what is provided in the
legislative enactment
o By such regulations, the law cannot be
extended. So long as the relate solely to carrying
into effect the provision of law, they are valid
o The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted
o In case of discrepancy between the
basic law and a rule issued to implement said law,
the basic law prevails as rule or regulation cannot
go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law
o Sec 6 of EO269 specifically authorized
the said official to promulgate such
supplementary rules and regulations as may be
necessary to effectively implement the provisions
of the law. More so, the subject sought to be
governed and regulated is germane to the objects
and purposes of EO279, specifically issued to
carry out the mandate of the 1987 Consti
- PD 463 is not the governing law anymore as it
pertained to the old system of exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources through license,
concession or lease which has been disallowed by Article
XII, Section 2 the 1987 Consti., except those provision in
PD463 that are not inconsistent with the provisions of
EO279
o To continue the licenses, concessions or lease
would be inconsistent witht raison d’etre of
EO279 and contravening the express mandate of
the Article XII, Section 2 the 1987 Consti.
o The Consti only orders that the State have full
control and supervision of the mineral resources
and the only mode for its exploration, utilization
and development is through a direct act, or may
enter into co-production, joint venture, production
sharing agreements or into agreement with
foreign-owned corporations involving technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country.
- The AOs do not unduly preterminate existing mining
leases in general as it does not apply retroactively to
license, concession of lease granted by government
under the 1973 Consti or before the effectivity of the
1987 Consti but to those granted after the effectivity of
the 1987 Consti and shall be subject to modifications
and alterations which Congress may adopt
o As such, by issuing EO279, the President validly
modified or altered the privileges granted as well
as the terms and conditions of mining leases
under EO211
 o Moreover, even if there were contracts, leases or
agreements granted by the State such as those
granted by EO211, these are still subject to
alterations through a reasonable exercise of the
police power of the State and even the court
recognizes the superiority of police power over
the sanctity of the contract especially when such
power is exercised to preserve the security of the
state and the means adopted are reasonably
adapted to the accomplishment of that end and
are, therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive.
o The State may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of
contract from altering, modifying and amending
the mining leases or agreements granted under
PD 463 or EO211
o The object of this police power is clear – the
exploration, development and utilization of
mineral resources are matters vital to the public
interest and the general welfare of the people
- There is not provision in AO57 that leads to the
conclusion of an authorization of automatic conversion of
mining leases and agreements granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Consti pursuant to EO211, into
production-sharing agreements
o The use of the term production-sharing
agreement implies negotiation and cannot be
presumed as a unilateral declaration on the part
of government
o The MPSA requires a meeting of the minds of the
parties after negotiations are arrived at in good
faith and in accordance with procedure as laid out
in AO 82
Decision AO 57 and 82 are valid and constitutional
REPUBLIC V COURT OF APPEALS AND
DELA ROSA
CRUZ; April 15, 1988
FACTS
- Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a
parcel of land divided into 9 lots in Tuding, Itogon,
Benguet Province on February 11, 1965 on his own
behalf and on behalf of his children. According to the
application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose dela Rosa and
Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime
Alberto, respectively in 1964. Balbalio and Alberto
testified that they had acquired the subject land by
virtue of prescription.
- It was opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots
1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation as to portions of Lots 1-
5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic through the
Bureau of Forestry Development as to Lots 1-9. Benguet
opposed on the ground that June Bug mineral claim
covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934
by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly who located
the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October
14, 1909. Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all
of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on
December 25, 1930 and recorded on January 2, 1931 in
the Office of the mining recorder of Baguio. The
locations of the mineral claims were made in accordance
with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
- The Bureau of Forestry Development argued that the
land sought to be registered was covered by the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217
dated February 16, 1929. By reason of its nature, it was
not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935
and 1973.
ISSUE
WON the Benguet and Atok Mining Companies have
exclusive rights to the property in question.
HELD
YES. Though the property was considered forest land
and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve,
this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet
and Atok at that time. The perfection of the mining
claim converted the property into mineral land and
under the laws then in force removed it from the public
domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive
rights over the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as the purchase of
the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land
became the private property of the locators, they had
the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet
and Atok.
- There was insufficient evidence of open, continuous,
adverse and exclusive possession submitted by the
applicants to support their claim of ownership. They
acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its
registration in 1965.
- This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which is
intended for the benefit of the State, not of private
persons. The rule reserves to the State all minerals that
may be found in public and even private land. Thus, if a
person is the owner of agricultural land in which mineral
is discovered, his ownership of such land does not give
him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals
without the permission of the State to which such
minerals belong.
- Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property
in question by virtue of their respective mining claims
which they validly acquired before the Constitution of
1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested
rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was
not and could not have been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor
could its use could be shared simultaneously by them
and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes.
Voting Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Gancayco and Griño-
Aquino, concur.
ATOK BIG WEDGE MINING V COURT OF
APPEALS
PARAS; January 18, 1991
FACTS
- Fredia Mineral claim was located in Itogon, Benguet by
A. I. Reynolds in 1930. The mineral claim was duly
recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder. In 1931,
the mineral claim was sold by A.I. Reynolds to petitioner.
Since then petitioner has been in continuous and
exclusive ownership and possession of said claim.
- In 1964, respondent Liwan Consi constructed a house
in the land where the claim was located. It was only in
1984 when he was told that said lot belonged to Atok.
Respondent contends that he had been paying taxes on
said land which his father had occupied before him.
Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry. The MTC
dismissed the case. The RTC decided in favor of Atok.
Upon appeal by Consi, the CA dismissed the forcible
entry action ruling that both Consi and Atok are holders
of possessory titles, the former through long term
occupancy, and the latter by virtue of its being the claim
locator.
ISSUE
WON an individual’s long term occupation of land of the
public domain vests him with such rights over the same
as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim
HELD
NO. The perfection of the mining claim converted the
property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain. As the land
had become private property of the locators (A.I.) they
had the right to sell it to Atok. Where there is a valid
location of mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public and the property of
the locator. (Note however that the sale in the case
took place in 1931) Atok then have exclusive rights to
the property in question by virtue of their respective
mining claims which they validly acquired before the
1935 Constitution prohibited alienation of all lands of the
public domain except agricultural lands, subject to
vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.
- Neither could Consi argue long term possession. His
possession was not in the concept of owner of the
mining claim but of the property as agricultural land.
Since the subject lot is a mineral land, private
respondent’s possession did not confer upon him
possessory rights,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V KALAHI
INVESTMENTS
 MADIALDEA; January 31, 1989 could comply with the mining laws, his possessory rights have been complied by applicant- the Court or the
of ownership are as good as though secured by patent.” Bureau of Mines
- It also claims registration of title based on its actual,
FACTS
open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession HELD
- On December 12, 1963, Kalahi Investment Inc., moved
in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years or 1. NO. In the recent case of Santa Rosa Mining Co. v
for an advanced hearing of Lot No. 1851-B, Floridablanca
confirmation of imperfect title under Sec. 48 (b) CA141 Hon Minister of Natural Resources Jose Leido jr. and
Cadastre. Evidence was presented and Kalahi’s title was
as amended by RA No. 1942. Director of Mines Juanito Fernandez the SC ruled that
to be registered under the provisions of Act 496.
- In its decision, the court a quo denied the claim for while it recognized that the right of a locator of a mining
- It was later on found out that this lot was a vast land of
registration ruling that a) the 123 mining claims are claim is a property right, this right is not absolute. It
mountain ranges covering an area no less than
governed by mining law; hence under the jurisdiction of is merely a possessory right more so when
886,021,588 square meters. This lot contains the alleged
the Bureau of Mines which is the proper agency to petitioner’s claims are still unpatented. “Mere
123 mineral claims of Kalahi. It was also found out that
enforce the claims and to adjudicate the rights of the location does not mean absolute ownership over the
the said lot was labeled as timber land under RA 3092. in
claimants, which in fact Kalahi recognized when it filed located claim. It merely segregates the located land or
the land classification of the province of Pampanga and
an application for lease with said Bureau, and b) that the area from the public domain by barring other would-be
Zambales, these lands were also considered part of the
claim for confirmation of imperfect title based on the locators from locating the same and appropriating for
Project No. 11, Timber Land.
evidence of Public Land Law provisions: themselves the minerals found therein… the intention of
- The Bureau of Forestry’s opposition on the registration
- The lands in the public domain are classified under the lawmaker is that the locator should faithfully and
of the lot is based on the ground that these lands are
three main categories: Mineral, Forest and Agricultural consistently comply with the requirements for annual
part of the vast public forest known as TIMBER LAND.
lands in the public domain that title could be issued… work and improvements in the located mining claims.”
These lots are not yet released as alienable agricultural
the Public Law never governs private lands. This case modifies the San Mauricio doctrine in that
lands and were even declared by the President of the
- The Public Land Law is not applicable to forest lands while a perfected location of a mining claim has the
Philippines under Proclamation No. 82 as part of the Mt.
nor to mineral lands. The confirmation of imperfect land effect of segregating said land from the body of public
Dorst Forest Reserve.
title can not be basis for registration of titles over forest domain, the area covered does not thereby become the
- Kalahi thus abandoned its former claim over Lot No.
and/or mineral lands. private property of the locator.
1851-B. it limited its claim to two land which when
- On appeal Kalahi assigned as errors the following: - Concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Gold Creek
combined, cover an area of 1,730 hectares. This land
1)the lower court erred in not considering the basis for Mining Corp. v Rodriguez and Abadilla: “… my opinion is
contained the 123 mining claims of Kalahi and where the
the registration of land in question sufficient in law that while the locator, under the circumstances, secures
alleged 500,000 coffee plants were planted. Kalahi
and in fact. the beneficial ownership or the dominum utile, the
claimed and presented evidence that it had located in
2)the lower court erred in declaring that the doctrine government retains the bare ownership or the
1934 and prior thereto 123 mineral claims in
of the Supreme Court and the opinion of the Secretary dominium directum, until the locator’s claim ripens into
Floridablanca Mountains; made annual assessments
of Justice never contemplate of a procedure that will full ownership upon full compliance with all requirements
work thereto; made declaration of location and paid
entitle the claimants to the registration of the lands in of the law for the issuance of a patent.”
annual assessment work from 1965-1966; constructed
question. - Dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion in the Gold
roads traversing the mountains and hills and planted
3)the lower court erred in denying the claim for Creek Mining Corp. case: ”To give a broader meaning
500,00 coffee trees. These however were not considered
registration of the claimant’s title over the land in and give a greater effect to the location of a mining
by the court as basis sufficient in law and in fact for the
question at last a portion thereof covered by the claim is to contend that location is all that is necessary
registration of title under act 496.
mining claims and their gaps. to acquire absolute ownership over a located mining
- Kalahi thus contended that these mineral lands were
- On the other hand the Director of Lands contended: claim. This is not the law. Location without more,confers
now segregated from government lands and its mining
“Kalahi admitted that the land in question is a mining only the right of possession… I maintain that in
claims thereon deemed property rights. These were
property consisting of mining claims located and prohibiting the alienation of natural resources, save any
based on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated
registered under the provisions of the Act of the US existing right, the Constitution does not refer to the right
August 31, 1956 which stated that “the legal effect of a
Congress of July 1, 1902. and as such, said Act requires of location or the inherent right of possession, or any
valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate
Kalahi as holder of mining claims to do no other act inchoate or contingent right which are only means to
the area from the public domain, but to grant the locator
except to proceed with the acquisition of mining patent bring about another right; it refers only to the right to
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a
in the Bureau of Mines. The Act prescribes an explicit obtain a patent.”
patent therefore upon compliance with the terms and
and definite procedure by which mining patents are to - It is not clear if Kalahi has fully complied with the
conditions prescribed by law… the area is segregated
be secured administratively…” requirements of Act of Congress of 1902. this is a factual
and becomes the property of the locator.”
- CA thus certified the following questions (issues) for SC issue which is beyond the issue of the Court.
- Citing the San Mauricio doctrine
resolution: Nonetheless, even assuming claimant to be a holder of a
“Under the Act of Congress of 1902 (Philippine Bill), a
subsisting and valid patentable mining clai8m, we hold
right or rights acquired by a holder of unpatented but
ISSUES that it can no longer proceed with the acquisition of a
valid and existing claim located and registered under its
1. WON mining claims acquired, registered perfected mining patent in view of PD No. 1214 issued in October
provisions becomes the property of the locator… the
and patentable under the Old Mining Law matured to 14, 1977, directing “holders of subsisting an valid
right of the locator to enjoy the surface ground and the
private ownership would entitle claimant-appellant to patentable mining claims located under the provisions of
minerals within the limits of his claim becomes exclusive
the ownership thereof the Act of Congress of 1902 to file a mining lease
as against the whole world, limited only by extralateral
2. who has the authority to examine process and find out application within one year of the approval of the
rights of adjoining locators. He is not required to
WON the requirements of the Act of Congress of 1902 Decree… non-filing of the application within the period
purchase the claim or secure a patent and as long as he
prescribed shall cause the forfeiture of all his rights to
the claim.
- Records show that claimant has already filed a mining
lease application.
2. Having filed a mining lease application, its mining
claims therefore, are deemed covered by PD 1214 and
the Bureau of Mines may accordingly process the same
as a lease application, in accordance with PD 463,
pursuant to PD 1214. As to whether or not the Bureau of
Mines is qualified to rule on whether there has been full
and faithful compliance with the requirements of
Philippine Bill of 1902, SC ruled that the Bureau is
empowered as a corollary function in the processing of
mining lease applications.
Decision The decision of the CFI of Pampanga is
affirmed, with the modification that Kalahi’s mining
claims may be processed as a mining lease application
by the Bureau of Mines.
TAN V DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
MAKASIAR; October 27,1983
FACTS
- Petitioner-appellant: Wenceslao Vinzons Tan
- Respondents-appellees: Sec. of Agri. And Nat.
Resources (DANR) Jose Feliciano, Director of Bureau of
Forestry (BOF) Apolonio Rivera
- Intervenors: Ravago Commercial Co., Jorge Lao
Happick, Atanacio Mallari
- April 1961 – the Bureau of Forestry issued a notice
advertising for public bidding a tract of public forest land
(6,420 hectares) in Olongapo, Zambales. It was located
within the former US Naval Reservation.
- May 5, 1962 – petitioner Wenceslao Tan submitted his
application plus nine other applicants
- Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having
the are declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to
be awarded to the most qualified bidder
- June 7, 1961 – then Pres. Carlos Garcia issued a
directive to the Dir. Of Bureau of Forestry to prepare a
draft proclaiming the said land as a watershed forest
reserve for Olongapo and to reject the bids they have
received
- Sec. Fortich (DANR) however sustained the
recommendations of the director of BOF who concluded
that it would be beneficial to the public interest of the
are is made available for exploitation. The Director said
that to the declare the forest are as a forest reserve
rather than to open it for timber exploitation under
license and regulation would do more harm than good to
the public interest since it might just become a “Free
Zone and Logging Paradise” to the problem loggers of
Dinalupihan, Bataan – an open target for timber
smugglers and kaingineros; also, rejecting the received
bids would cause the department huge embarrassment
- The area was then awarded to Wenceslao Tan by the
BOF against the other bidders, Rovago Commercial
Company and Jorge :Lao Happick
- May 30, 1963 – DANR Sec. Gozon (who succeeded
then Sec. Fortich) issued a memorandum authorizing
the grant of new ordinary timber license for areas not
more than 3,000 hectares each and the extension of
ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5000
hectares
- Dec. 19, 1963- Gozon was then replaced by acting Sec.
Jose Feliciano, who upon assumption of office he
revoked the memorandum.
- But that same day, the license of Wenceslao Tan was
signed by acting Director of (BOF), Estanislao Bernal,
without the approval of the Secretary of DANR
- Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick
then wrote a letter to the Sec. of DANR praying that the
license issued to Tan be cancelled on the ground that it
was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing
forestry laws, rules and regulations
- The license was declared void ab initio
- Petitioner Tan claims that respondents unlawfully,
illegally, whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted
w/o or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber
license without just cause, by denying petitioner Tan of
the equal protection of the laws and by depriving him of
his constitutional right to property w/o due process of
law by impairing the obligation of contracts
- His petition was dismissed because it did not
state a sufficient cause of action
ISSUE
WON the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient
cause of action
HELD
cause of action – 3 essential elements
1. legal right of the plaintiff
2. correlative obligation of the defendants
3. the act or omission of the defendant in
violation of that right
NO.
- the petition was dismissed by the trial court for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; the
timber license relied upon by the petitioner was void ab
initio
- also, court takes judicial notive that the are has been
declared a forest reserve on April 39, 1964
- what is important for the validity of a timber license is
the date of release of the license and n the sate of
signing. Before the release, not tight is acquired by the
licensee. Tan’s license was signed Dec. 9, 1963 and was
released Jan. 6, 1964 – by January 6, the Director of
Forestry no longer had any authority to release the
license
- the petitioner had not acquired any legal right under
such void license
- the petitioner also failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies. He should have appealed the order of the
DANR Secretary to the President, who has the power to
review on appeal the orders/acts of the said secretary –
where administrative appeal is available, special civil
action of certiorari cannot be availed
- moreover, not only did the petitioner fail to exhaust his
administrative remedies, he also failed to note that his
action is a suit against the state which under the
doctrine of immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless
the state gives it consent to be dued
- Next, granting that the license granted to him was
valid, still the respondents can validly revoke this license
REPUBLIC V QUASHA
REYES; August 17, 1972
FACTS
- The case involves a judicial determination of the scope
and duration of the rights acquired by American citizens
and corporations controlled by them under the Parity
Amendment appended to the Constitution as of Sept.
18, 1946
- William Quasha is an American citizen who
purchased a land in Forbes Park on Nov.26,1954. He
filed a petition on March 1968 where he averred the
acquisition of the said land; that the RP claimed that
upon expiration of the Parity Amendment (PA) on July 3,
1974, rights acquired by US citizens shall cease; that this
claim affects his right and interest and that the
uncertainty as to the status of his property after the PA
ends reduces the property’s value and precludes him
from having improvements made on it; and so he
contends that the ownership of properties during
the effectivity of the PA continues despite its
termination
- Sol.Gen. Antonio Barredo: land acquired by Quasha
is private agri. land and that the acquisition violated
Sec.5 Art.XIII of the Constitution which prohibits the
transfer of private agricultural land to non-Filipinos
except by hereditary succession; and assuming validity
of acquisition, his rights acquired through the PA will
expire on July 3, 1974
- CFI: rendered decision in favor of plaintiff, holding that
acquisition was valid and he has a right to continue in
ownership of property even beyond July 1974.
Thus, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON by virtue of the so-called PA to the Philippine
Constitution Quasha could validly acquire ownership of
the private residential land which is concededly
classified private agricultural land
2. On the assumption that Quasha’s purchase of the
private agricultural land is valid and constitutional, WON
his rights will expire on July 3, 1974
HELD
1. NO. The Parity Amendment gives Americans no right
to validly acquire ownership of private agricultural land
in the Philippines.
-examination of the PA reveals that it only establishes
an express exception to 2 provisions—Section 1 Article
XIII (disposition, exploitation, etc. of public lands) and
Section 8 Article XIV (operation of public utilities)
> no other provision was referred to, not Sections 2 &
5 of Art.XIII
-Quasha argues that since PA permitted US
citizens/entities to acquire agricultural lands of the
public domain, then such citizens/entities became
entitled to acquire private agricultural land in the
Phils., even without hereditary succession
> this argument does not rest upon the text of
the PA but upon a mere inference; if it was ever
intended to create an exception to Sec.5, it
would have bee mentioned just as Sec.1 and 8
were mentioned
-whether from the Phil. Or the American side, the
intention was to secure parity for US citizens
only in: 1)exploitation, development and
utilization of public lands and other natural
resources, and 2) the operation of public
utilities
-Quasha further contends that when the Constitution
was adopted in 1935, US citizens were already
qualified to acquire public agri land, so even without
hereditary succession transfer of private agri lands to
Americans is permitted
> such capacity could exist only during the
American sovereignty over the Islands (before
the RP is established)
2. His rights will expire. All the exceptional rights
conferred upon US citizens and business entities owned
or controlled by them, under the Parity Amendment, are
to last during the effectivity of the agreement entered
into on July 4, 1946, but in no case to extend beyond July
3, 1974.
-text of PA: “in no case to extend beyond July 3,
1974”—in conformity with Article X, Section 2 “this
agreement shall have no effect after July 3, 1974. It
may be terminated be either the US or the Phils at any
time...”
-Quasha argues that the limitative period should not
be applicable because under Art.428 of the Civil Code,
“the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established
by law”
> this limitation already existed when he purchased
the land
> The can’t complain of deprivation of due process
because PA is part of Consti, the highest law of the
land
> if the Philippine Government can not dispose of its
alienable public agricultural lands beyond that date
under PA, then, logically, the Constitution, as modified
by PA, only authorizes either of two things: a)
alienation or transfer of rights less than ownership or
b) a resoluble ownership that will be extinguished not
later than the specified period.
Discussion
Historical Background
• Article XIII Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources
Sec.1 All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain...belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corps. At
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens...
Sec.2 No private corporation...may acquire, lease, or
hold public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
hectares...
Sec.5 Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines.
• Article XIV General Provisions
Sec.8 No franchise...for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations organized under the laws of the
Philippines, 60% of the capital of which is owned by
citizens of the Philippines...
• nationalistic spirit are self-evident in these provisions
• 1945 Report of the Committee on Territories and
Insular Affairs: when the Philippines do become
independent next July, they will start on the road to
independence with a country whose commerce, trade
and political institutions have been very damaged;
internal revenue have been greatly diminished by war.
• in 1946, US enacted Philippine Trade Act authorizing
the President of the US to enter into an Exec. Agreement
with the President of the Philippines, which should
contain a provision that—“the disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization...be open to citizens of the
US and to all forms of business enterprise owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by US citizens.”; and
that “the gov’t of the Phil. Will take such steps as are
necessary to secure the amendment of the Constitution
so as to permit the taking effect as laws of the Phils. Of
such part of the provisions
• Commonwealth Act No.733- authorized the President
of the Phils. To enter into the Executive Agreement
•proposed amendment was submitted to a plebiscite
and was ratified in Nov. 1946
• Parity Amendment: “Notwithstanding the provision
of section 1, Article 13, and section 8, Article 14, of
the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the
Executive Agreement entered into...on July 4, 1946...but
in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974, the
disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization...be open to citizens of the US and to all
forms of business enterprise owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by US citizens in the same manner
as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon,
citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations
owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.”
• Laurel-Langley Agreement (revision of PA enacted
in June 1955): establishes some sort of reciprocity rights
between US and Phils.
--no direct application to the case at bar, since the
purchase by Quasha of the property in question was
made in 1954, prior to the effectivity of this agreement
LAUREL V GARCIA
GUTIERREZ; July 25, 1990
FACTS
- The subject property in this case (Roppongi) is one of
the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement
entered into with Japan in 1956, the other lots being:
Nampeidai Property , Kobe Commercial Property, and
Kobe Residential Property. The properties are part of the
indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in
life and property and their suffering during World War II.
- The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations
valued at $550 million would be payable in twenty (20)
years in accordance with annual schedules of
procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
governments. Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law,
prescribes the national policy on procurement and
utilization of reparations and development loans. The
Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese
government under the Second Year Schedule.
- On August 1986, President Aquino created a committee
to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine
government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan.
- On July 1987, the President issued Executive Order No.
296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
reparations' capital goods and services in the event of
sale, lease or disposition.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive has
been pushing its decision to sell the reparations
properties starting with the Roppongi lot. Petitioners
have filed two petitions to stop the sale of the Roppongi
property.
ISSUES
1. WON the Roppongi property and others of its kind can
be alienated by the Philippine Government
2. WON Executive Order No. 296, which entitles non-
Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital
goods and services, is constitutional. WON EO 296
violate the following constitutional provisions:
a. constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the
national patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987
Constitution
b. reservation of the ownership and acquisition of
alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens
c. there is preference for Filipino citizens in the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony
d. WON there is protection given to Filipino enterprises
against unfair competition and trade practices
e. WON there is guarantee of the right of the people to
information on all matters of public concern
f. WON there is declaration of the state policy of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest
HELD
1. NO, the Roponggi property is public domain. As
property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside
the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its
ownership is a special collective ownership for general
use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group.
2. The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional
questions unless these questions are properly raised in
appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for
the determination of the case. The Court will not pass
upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record if the case can be disposed of
on some other ground such as the application of a
statute or general law.
Decision Petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is
issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with
the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan.
RAMIREZ V VDA. DE RAMIREZ
ABAD-SANTOS; February 15, 1982
FACTS
- APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose
Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in Spain on
December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez
- widow
- French who lives in Paris
- received ½ (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over
1/3 of the free portion
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
- two grandnephews
- lives in Malate
- received the ½ (free portion)
Wanda de Wrobleski
- companion
- Austrian who lives in Spain
- received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion
- vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski
and Horacio Ramirez
- Maria Luisa Palacios - administratix
- Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because
a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widow’s
usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wanda’s usufruct is INVALID
because first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the
testator
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because
first heirs not related to the second heirs or substitutes
within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien,
Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5
d. proposed partition of the testator’’s interest in the
Santa Cruz Building between widow and appellants
violates testators express will to give this property to
them
- LC: approved partition
ISSUE
WON the partition is valid insofar as
a. widow’s legitime
b. substitutions
c. usufruct of Wanda
HELD
a. YES, appellants do not question ½ because Marcelle is
47
the widow and over which he could impose no burden,
encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
48
whatsoever
- the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of
the testator’s widow of a usufruct over 1/3 of the free
portion of the testator’s estate cannot be made where it
will run counter to the testator’s express will. The Court
erred for Marcelle who is entitled to ½ of the estate “en
pleno dominio” as her legitime and which is more than
what she is given under the will is not entitled to have
any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle
more than her legitime will run counter to the testator’s
intention for as stated above his disposition even
impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before
the testator is not the only case where a vulgar
substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC,
cases also include refusal or incapacity to accept
inheritance therefore it is VALID.
BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez are not related
to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a
fideicommissary substitution provided that such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the
47
Art 900 CC: If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall
be entitled to ½ of the hereditary estate
48
Art 904 (2) CC
heir originally instituted. Another is that there is no
absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the
usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the apellee
agrees that the testator contradicts the establishment of
the fideicommissary substitution when he permits the
properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual
agreement of the usufructuaries and naked owners.
c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
- Art XIII
49
Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
50
land of the public domain in the Philippines.
The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of
law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the
opinion that this provision does not apply to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition
will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would
circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a
Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece
of land BUT an alien may be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY
RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines.
Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a
real right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the
land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of
title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.
Decision: ½ Marcelle (as legitime), ½ Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez (free portion) in naked ownership and the
usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution
in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez
CRUZ V NCIP
PER CURIAM; December 20, 2000
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND
IMPERIUM)
LA BUGAL TRIBAL ASSOCIATION V
WESTERN MINING CORPORATION
PHILIPPINES
CARPIO-MORALES; January 29, 2004
FACTS
- Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners
- SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus
and Prohibition.
- Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 7942, otherwise
known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along
49
Art XIII (1935): Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources
50
Art XII Sec 7 (1987): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
[removed agricultural] lands shall be transferred or conveyed [1935:
assigned] except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain [removed in the Philippines].
with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued
pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40,
and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic
of the Philippines and Western Mining Corporation
(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under
Philippine laws.
- July 25, 1987 –President Aquino issued EO 279
authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and
evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
which, upon appropriate recommendation of the
Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent. In entering into such proposals, the President
shall consider the real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country that will be
realized, as well as the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources that will be promoted
by the proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress
shall determine otherwise, large-scale mining, for
purpose of this Section, shall mean those proposals for
contracts or agreements for mineral resources
exploration, development, and utilization involving a
committed capital in a single mining unit project of at
least Fifty Million Dollars in United States currency (US
$50,000,000.00).
- March 3, 1995 –President Ramos approved 7942 to
govern the exploration, development, utilization and
processing of all mineral resources. RA 7942 defines
modes of mineral agreements for mining operations,
outlines the procedure for filing and approval,
assignment/transfer, and withdrawal, and fixes their
terms. These also apply to FTAAs.
- The law also prescribes the contractor’s qualifications,
grants certain rights such as timber, water, easement
rights and right to possess explosives. Surface owners or
occupants are forbidden from preventing holders of
mining rights from entering private lands and concession
areas. A procedure for settlement of conflicts is also
provided for.
- The Act restricts conditions for exploration, quarry and
other permits. It regulates the transport, sale and
processing of minerals, and promotes the development
of mining communities, science and mining technology,
and safety and environmental protection.
- The government’s share in the agreements is spelled
out and allocated, taxes and fees are imposed,
incentives granted. Aside from penalizing certain acts,
the law likewise specifies grounds for the cancellation,
revocation and termination of agreements and permits.
- April 9, 1995 –RA 7942 took effect.
- March 30, 1995 –Shortly before RA 7942 took effect,
the President entered into and FTAA with WMCP covering
99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
- August 15, 1995 –DENR Secretary Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise
known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
7942. This was later repealed by DAO 96-40, s. 1996
which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
- January 10, 1997 –Counsels for petitioners sent letter to
DENR Secretary demanding that they stop the
implementation of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, giving them
15 days from receipt to act thereon. DENR has yet to
respond or act on petitioners’ letter.
- Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus, with
a prayer for a temporary restraining order.
- Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary without or in
excess of jurisdiction:
1)In signing and promulgating DAO 96-
40 implementing RA 7942, the latter being
unconstitutional in that:
• It allows fully foreign owned
corporations to explore, develop, utilize and
exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary
to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 4, 1987 Constitution
• It allows the taking of private
property without the determination of public
use and for just compensation
• It violates Art. III, sec. 1
• It allows enjoyment by foreign
citizens as well as fully foreign owned
corporations of the nation’s marine wealth
contrary to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 2
• It allows priority to foreign
and fully foreign owned corporations in the
exploration, development and utilization of
mineral resources contrary to Art. XII
2)In recommending approval of and
implementing the FTAA between the President
and WMCP because the same is illegal and
constitutional
- They pray that the Court issue an order permanently
enjoining the respondents from acting on any application
for an FTAA; declaring RA 7942, DAO 96-40 and all other
similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and
null and void; and, canceling the FTAA issued to WMCP
as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
- Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners’
contentions, argue that the requisites for judicial inquiry
have not been met, the petition does not comply with
the criteria for prohibition and mandamus, and there has
been a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.
- WMCP subsequently filed a Manifestation dated
September 25, 2002 alleging that on January 23, 2001
WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines,
Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation organized under
Philippine laws, 60% of the equity of which is owned by
Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations while about
40% is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian
company.
- Because of this, the DENR Secretary, by Order of
December 18, 2001, approved the transfer and
registration of the subject FTAA from WMCP to
Sagittarius. Said Order, however, was appealed by
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. (Lepanto). Because
there is no final judgment yet, the case cannot be
considered moot.
ISSUES
1. WON case is justiciable
2. WON EO 279 took effect
3. WON the WMCP FTAA is constitutional
4. WON RA 7942 is constitutional
HELD
1. Case is justiciable.
Ratio In cases involving constitutional questions, the
Court is not concerned with whether petitioners are real
parties in interest, but with whether they have legal
standing.
- Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among
them are La Bugal B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc., a
farmers and indigenous people’s cooperative organized
under Philippine laws representing a community actually
affected by the mining activities of WMCP, members of
said cooperative, as well as other residents of areas also
affected by the mining activities of WMCP. Even if they
are not the actual parties in the contract, they claim that
they will suffer “irremediable displacement” as a result
of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining activities
in their area of residence.
- And although RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 were not in force
when the subject FTAA was entered into, the question as
to their validity is ripe for adjudication. RA 7942
explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existing
arrangements. The WMCP FTAA also provides that any
term and condition favorable to FTAA contractors
resulting from a law or regulation shall be considered
part of the agreement.
- The petition for prohibition and mandamus is also the
appropriate remedy. Public respondents, in behalf of the
Government, have obligations to fulfill under said
contract. Petitioners seek to prevent them from fulfilling
such obligations on the theory that the contract is
unconstitutional and, therefore, void.
- The contention that the filing of the petition violates
the rule on hierarchy of courts does not likewise lie. The
repercussions of the issues in this case on the Philippine
mining industry, if not the national economy, as well as
the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and
compelling circumstances to justify resort to this Court in
the first instance. Indeed, when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, this Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure.
2. YES.
Ratio When the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure.
- Petitioners contend that EO 279 did not take effect
because its supposed date of effectivity came after
President Aquino had already lost her legislative powers
under the Provisional Constitution. But it was explained
that the convening of the first Congress merely
precluded the exercise of legislative powers by the
President –it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she
had previously enacted.
3. NO.
Ratio The convening of the first Congress merely
precluded the exercise of legislative powers by the
President and did not prevent the effectivity of laws she
had previously enacted.
In accordance with Art. XII, sec. 2 of the constitution,
FTAAs should be limited to “technical or financial
assistance” only. However, contrary to the language of
the Constitution, the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully
foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than
mere financial or technical assistance to the State, for it
permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of
the mining activity.
- WMCP nevertheless submits that the word “technical”
encompasses a broad number of possible services,
perhaps, scientific and/or technological in basis. It thus
posits that it may well include the area of management
and operations. The Court is not persuaded. Casus
omisus pro omisso habendus est –a person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally. Moreover, the management
or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors,
which is the primary feature of service contracts, was
precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987
Constitution sought to eradicate.
- Respondents insist that “agreements involving
technical or financial assistance” is just another term for
service contracts. The proceedings of the CONCOM
indicate that the members used the terms
interchangeably. The Court is likewise not persuaded.
While certain commissioners may have mentioned the
term “service contracts”, they may have been using the
term loosely and not in the context of the 1973
Constitution. Also, the phrase “service contracts” has
been deleted in the 1987 Constitution’s Article on
National Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM
intended to retain the concept of service contracts under
the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply adapted the
old terminology instead of employing new and unfamiliar
terms (“agreements… involving either technical or
financial assistance”).
- The UP Law Draft and Article XII, as adopted, uses the
same terminologies. And the UP Law draft proponents
viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as
grants of beneficial ownership of the country’s natural
resources to foreign owned corporations. While, in
theory, the State owns these natural resources –and
Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries –service contracts
actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose,
explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same. This
arrangement is clearly incompatible with
constitutional ideal of nationalization of natural
resources. But the proponents nevertheless
acknowledged the need for capital and technical know-
how in the large-scale exploitation, development and
utilization of natural resources. Hence, they proposed a
compromise –technical or financial agreements.
4. NO, insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts.
Ratio Financial or technical agreements as
contemplated in Art. XII, sec. 2 shall refer to financial
agreements and/or technical agreements only and not to
service contracts.
- Although the statute employs the phrase “financial and
technical agreements”, it actually treats these
agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary
fundamental law.
Decision WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The
Court hereby declares unconstitutional and void:
1)The following provision of RA 7942
a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq)
b) Section 23,
c) Section 33 to 41,
d) Section 56,
e) The second and third paragraphs
of Section 81, and
f) Section 90.
2)All provisions of DAO 96-40, s. 1996
which are not in conformity with this Decision,
and
3)The FTAA between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and WMC
Philippines, Inc.
Voting 8 concur –including ponente, 5 dissent, 1 took
no part
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG
- It could not have been the object of the framers of the
Charter to limit the contracts which the President may
enter into, to mere “agreements for financial and
technical assistance; The Constitution has not prohibited
the State from itself exploring, developing, or utilizing
the country’s natural resources, and, for this purpose, it
may, enter into the necessary agreements with
individuals or entities in the pursuit of a feasible
operation.”
PANGANIBAN
- The petition should be dismissed on the ground of
mootness. The dispute claiming the right to purchase the
foreign shares in WMCP is between two Filipino
companies (Sagittarius and Lepanto). So regardless of
the which side wins, the FTAA would still be in the hands of a
qualified Filipino company.
- The word “involving” signifies the possibility of
inclusion of other activities. If the intention of the
drafters were strictly to confine foreign corporations to
financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their
language would have been unmistakably restrictive and
stringent.
- The present Constitution still recognizes and allows
service contracts (and has not rendered them taboo),
albeit subject to several restrictions and modifications
aimed at avoiding pitfalls of the past.
- In the minds of the commissioners, the concept of
technical and financial assistance agreements did not
exist at all apart from the concept of service contracts
to duly modified to prevent abuses –“technical and
financial agreements” were understood by the delegates
to include service contracts duly modified to prevent
abuses.
- Current business practices often require borrowers
seeking huge loans to allow creditors access to financial
records and other data, and probably a seat or two on
the former’s board of directors, or at least some
participation in certain management decisions that may
have an impact on the financial health or the long-term
viability of the debtor, which of course will directly affect
the latter’s capacity to repay it’s loans.
- If the Supreme Court closes its doors to international
realities and unilaterally sets up its own concepts of
strict technical and financial assistance, then it may
unwittingly make the country a virtual hermit –an
economic isolationist –in the real world of finance.
- The commissioners fully realized that their work would
have to withstand the test of time, that the Charter,
though crafted with the wisdom born of past experiences
and lessons painfully learned, would have to be a living
document that would answer the needs of the nation
well into the future.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN; December 1, 2004
FACTS
- Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners
- SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus
and Prohibition
- Ponente: Panganiban, J. (take note: major dissenter in
part1)
- All mineral resources are owned by the State. Their
exploration, development and utilization (EDU) must
always be subject to the full control and supervision of
the State. More specifically, given the inadequacy of
Filipino capital and technology in large-scale EDU
activities, the State may secure the help of foreign
companies in all relevant matters –especially financial
and technical assistance –provided that, at all times, the
State maintains its right of full control. The foreign
assistor or contractor assumes all financial, technical
and entrepreneurial risks in the EDU activities; hence it
may be given reasonable management, operational,
marketing, audit and other prerogatives to protect its
investments and enable the business to succeed.
- The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving
strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic
growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it
should be construed to grant the President and Congress
sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable
them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as
well as to secure for our people and our posterity the
blessings of prosperity and peace.
- On the basis of this control standard, this Court upholds
the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its
Implementing Rules and Regulations –insofar as they
relate to financial and technical agreements –as well as
the subject Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA).
ISSUES
1. WON the case been rendered moot by the sale of the
WMC shares in WMCP to Sagittarius and by the
subsequent transfer and registration of the FTAA from
WMCP to Sagittarius
2. Assuming that the case has been rendered moot,
WON it would still be proper to resolve the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the Mining
Law, DAO 96-40 and the WMCP FTAA
3. What is the proper interpretation of the phrase
Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial
Assistance contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution?
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio The courts will decide a question –otherwise moot
and academic –if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.
- The dispute claiming the right to purchase the foreign
shares in WMCP is between two Filipino companies
(Sagittarius and Lepanto). So regardless of which side
wins, the FTAA would still be in the hands of a qualified
Filipino company. The plea to nullify the Mining Law has
become a virtual petition for declaratory relief, over
which this Court has no original jurisdiction.
- Petitioners argue that the sale of shares and transfer of
the FTAA is invalid. Government cannot enter into FTAA
with Filipinos.
- It does not take deep knowledge of law and logic to
understand that what the Constitution grants to
foreigners should be equally available to Filipinos.
2. Ratio FTAAs are service contracts. But unlike those
of the 1973 variety, the grant thereof is subject to
several safeguards.
- Petitioners stress the following points. First, while a
case becomes moot and academic when there is no
more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits,
what is at issue is not only the validity of the WMCP FTAA
but also the constitutionality of RA 7942 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. Second, the acts of
private respondent cannot operate to cure the law of its
alleged unconstitutionality or to divest this Court of its
jurisdiction to decide. Third, the Constitution imposes
upon the Supreme Court the duty to declare invalid any
law that offends the Constitution.
- But of equal if not greater significance is the cloud of
uncertainty hanging over the mining industry, which is
even now scaring away foreign investments. It is evident
that strong reasons of public policy demand that the
constitutionality issue be resolved now. And citing Acop
v. Guingona, the courts will decide a question –otherwise
moot and academic –if it is “capable of repetition, yet
evading review.”
3. Citing Francisco v. House of Representatives, the
ponencia reiterated the well settled principles of
constitutional construction:
• Verba legis, that is, wherever possible,
the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed.
• Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis
est anima. The words of the Constitution should
be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers.
• Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
- Petitioners claim that the phrase “agreements…
involving either technical or financial assistance” simply
means technical assistance or financial assistance
agreements, nothing more and nothing else.
- But if that was the intention, then what is the point of
requiring that they be based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country?
- It is also unclear how a verba legis approach leads to
the conclusion that “the management or operation of
mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the
primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the
evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to
eradicate. If the framers had intended to put an end to
service contracts, they would have at least left some
transitory guidelines.
- The drafters will have to be credited with enough
pragmatism and savvy to know that these foreign
entities will not enter into such “agreements involving
assistance” without requiring arrangements for the
protection of their investments, gains and benefits.
- Using ratio legis est anima, we may now examine the
CONCOM deliberations. It may be observed that the
members use the terms “financial and technical
assistance agreements” and “service contracts”
interchangeably. From their statements, it may be
concluded that FTAAs are service contracts. But unlike
those of the 1973 variety, the grant thereof is subject to
several safeguards (in accordance with law, President as
signatory, reporting to Congress…)
- With ut magis valeat quam pereat, we may notice a
contradiction between the State’s full control and
supervision and the safeguarded service contracts with
foreign contractors. It must be pointed out that the full
control and supervision cannot be taken literally to mean
that the State controls and supervises everything
involved, down to the minutest details, and makes all
decisions required in the mining operations. Control by
State may be on the macro level –establishment of
policies, guidelines, regulations, industry standards, etc.
- To further disabuse the notion of these “new service
contracts”, the government’s share in these operations
will not be limited to taxes, duties and fees to be
imposed. Those only consist of the basic government
share. The law provides for an additional government
share to be determined using formulas presented in DAO
96-40, either of which results to at least 50% of the net
benefits from the mining.
Decision WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT
the respondents’ and the intervenors’ Motions for
Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s
January 27, 2004 Decision; to DISMISS the Petition; and
to issue this new judgment declaring CONSTITUTIONAL
1) RA 7942 (Phil. Mining Law), 2) its Implementing Rules
and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 –insofar as they
relate to financial and technical assistance agreements
referred to in par. 4 of Section 2 of Art. XII of the
Constitution; and 3) the FTAA dated March 30, 1995
executed by the government and WMCP, except
Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA which are
hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary to public policy
and for being grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
Voting 10 concur –including ponente, 4 dissent, 1 took
no part
SEPARATE OPINION
CARPIO
- Provisions of RA 7942 abdicate the State’s
constitutional duty to control and supervise fully the
exploitation of mineral resources.
- The change in language in the Constitution was a clear
rejection of the old system of “license, concession or
lease.”
- The State as owner of the natural resources must
receive income from its exploitation –taxes, fees and
charges cannot substitute.
- State must receive at least 60% of the net proceeds in
FTAAs, which share is equivalent to the Filipino equity
requirement.
- The majority opinion refused to accept that the State is
entitled to what the entire mining industry is willing to
pay the State.
CARPIO-MORALES [part 1 ponente]
- The phrase “natural resources are owned by the State”
simultaneously vests the legal title to the nation’s
natural resources to the Government, and the beneficial
ownership of these resources in the sovereign Filipino
people.
- In the EDU of natural resources, Government acts as
trustee. So it cannot, without violating its sacred trust,
enter into any agreement or arrangement which
effectively deprives the Filipino people of their beneficial
ownership of these resources.
- Art. XII, sec. 2 in mentioning “based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country articulates the value which the
Constitution places on natural resources, and recognizes
their potential benefits.
- Real benefits are intergenerational benefits because
the motherland’s natural resources are the birthright not
only of the present generation of Filipinos but of future
generations as well.
- “Involving” as the majority construes it runs counter to
the restrictive spirit of the provision.
- “Either” refers to one of two items and “any” is
required when more than two items are involved.
- “Either” is not merely descriptive but restrictive.
- Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est –a person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally.
- It is understandable, however regrettable, that a
government, strapped for cash and in the midst of a self
proclaimed fiscal crisis, would be inclined to turn a blind
eye to the consequences of unconstitutional legislation
in the hope, however false or empty, of obtaining
fabulous amounts of hard currency; As always, the one
overriding the consideration of this Court should be will
of the sovereign Filipino people as embodied in their
Constitution.
- The task of reclaiming Filipino control over Philippine
natural resources now belongs to another generation.
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION V ERC
AND MERALCO
TINGA; January 15, 2004
FACTS
- Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
and Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order or a Status Quo Order
assailing the Order dated November 27, 2003 of
respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC),
provisionally authorizing respondent Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO) to increase its rates by an average
amount of 12 centavos per kilowatt hour. Freedom from
Debt Coalition (FDC) argues that the said Order of the
ERC is void for having been issued without legal basis or
statutory authority. It also contends that Rule 3, Sec. 4
of the Implementing Rules of the “Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA) is unconstitutional
for being an undue delegation of legislative power. FDC
further asserts that the Order is void for having been
issued by the ERC with grave abuse of discretion and
manifest bias. In support of its prayer for the issuance of
injunctive relief, FDC claims that the implementation by
MERALCO of the provisional rate increase will result in
irreparable prejudice to the FDC and others similarly
situated unless the court restrains such implementation.
- On Dec. 29, 2003, FDC filed with the Court an Urgent
Motion to Grant Restraining or Status Quo Order. On Jan.
9, 2004, the ERC issued an Order clarifying that the
provisional rate increase granted to MERALCO in its Nov.
27, 2003 Order should be applied beginning Jan. 1, 2004.
The Court En Banc issued on Jan. 13, 2004, a Resolution
ordering ERC and MERALCO to file their respective
Comments on the Petition. The Court also enjoined ERC
and MERALCO to observe the status quo prevailing
before the filing of the Petition and set the case for oral
arguments on Jan. 27, 2004. On Jan. 26, 2004, ERC,
MERALCO, and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed their respective Comments on the Petition.
- In its Comment, the ERC concurred with the arguments
of the OSG and insists that it is authorized to issue
provisional orders under the law. ERC argues that it must
not have been the intention of Congress to expand the
functions of the ERC, as the successor of the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB), and clip its powers at the same
time. The ERC also asserts that it is authorized to issue
provisional rate increases ex parte, and that it may base
its provisional order on the verified application and
supporting documents submitted by the application, and
it is not required to wait for the comments of consumers
or local government units (LGUs) concerned before
issuing a provisional order. The ERC also denies that the
Nov. 27, 2003 Order was issued with grave abuse of
discretion. On the contrary, it claims that the Order is
supported by substantial evidence. Finally, ERC contends
that the filing of the instant Petition is premature
because it was denied the opportunity to have a full
determination of the Application after trial on the merits,
and is violative of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
- For its part, MERALCO asserts that the Order is valid,
because it was issued by the ERC pursuant to Sec. 44 of
the EPIRA which allows the transfer of powers (not
inconsistent with the EPIRA) of the old ERB to ERC. It
also denies that the assailed Order was issued by the
ERC with grave abuse of discretion, asserting that on the
contrary, the issuance thereof was based on the
Application, affidavits and other supporting documents
which it submitted earlier.
ISSUE
1. WON ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate
adjustments under RA No. 9136, otherwise known as the
“Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA)
2. Assuming that the ERC has the authority to grant
provisional orders, WON the grant by the ERC of the
provisional rate adjustment in question constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
HELD
1. Yes. The ERC is endowed with statutory authority to
approve provisional rate adjustments under the aegis of
Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. The sections read, thus:
Sec. 44. Transfer of Powers and Functions. — The
powers and functions of the Energy Regulatory Board
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby transferred to the ERC. The foregoing transfer
of powers and functions shall include all applicable
funds and appropriations, records, equipment,
property and personnel as may be necessary.
Sec. 80. Applicability and Repealing Clause — The
applicability provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 146,
as amended, otherwise known as the “Public Services
Act,” Republic Act 6395, as amended, revising the
charter of NPC; Presidential Decree 269, as amended,
referred to as the National Electrification Decree;
Republic Act 7638, otherwise known as the
“Department of Energy Act;” Executive Order 172, as
amended, creating the ERB; Republic Act 7832
otherwise known as the “Anti-Electricity and Electric
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1004;”
shall continue to have full force and effect except
insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act. The
provisions with respect to electric power of Section
11(c) of Republic Act 7916, as amended, and Section
5(f) of Republic Act 7277 are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
- Presidential Decree No. 40 and all laws, decrees, rules
and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with
this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
(Emphasis supplied)
The principal powers of the ERB relative to electric
public utilities transferred to the ERC are the following:
1. To regulate and fix the power rates to be charged
by electric companies;
2. To issue certificates of public convenience for the
operation of electric power utilities;
3. To grant or approve provisional electric rates.
- It bears stressing that the conferment upon the ERC of
the power to grant provisional rate adjustments is not
inconsistent with any provision of the EPIRA. The powers
of the ERB transferred to the ERC under Section 44 are
in addition to the new powers conferred upon the ERC
under Section 43.
Section 80 of the EPIRA complements Section 44, as it
mandates the continued efficacy of the applicable
provisions of the laws referred to therein. The material
provisions of the Public Service Act which continue to
 be in full force and effect are contained in Section
16(c), which states thus:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon
notice and hearing.
The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice
and hearing in accordance with the rules and
provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and
exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the
contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, toll
charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well
as commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and other
special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and
followed thereafter by any public service: Provided,
That the Commission may, in its discretion, approve
rates proposed by public services provisionally and
without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a
hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon
publication and notice to the concerned parties
operating in the territory affected: Provided, further,
That in case public service equipment of an operator is
used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a
private business, the net profits of said private
business shall be considered in relation with the public
service of such operator for the purposes of fixing the
rates.
- Similarly, Sections 8 and 14 of EO No. 172 or the ERB
Charter continue to be in full force by virtue of Sections
44 and 80 of the EPIRA. Said provisions of the ERB
Charter read:
SEC. 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief. — The
Board may, upon the filing of an application, petition
or complaint or at any stage thereafter and without
prior hearing, on the basis of the supporting papers
duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief
on motion of a party in the case or on its own
initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after
hearing, should the Board find that the pleadings,
together with such affidavits, documents and other
evidence which may be submitted in support of the
motion, substantially support of the provisional order;
Provided, That the Board shall immediately schedule
and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days
thereafter, upon publication and notice to all affected
parties.
SEC. 14. Applicability Clause — The applicability
(applicable) provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 146,
as amended, otherwise known as the “Public Service
Act;” Republic Act No. 6173, as amended, otherwise
known as the “Oil Industry Commission Act;” Republic
Act No. 6395, as amended, revising the charter of the
National Power Corporation under CA 120; Presidential
Decree No. 269, as amended, also referred to as the
“National Electrification Administration Decree,” and
Presidential Decree No. 1206, as amended, creating
the Department of Energy, shall continue to have full
force and effect, except insofar as inconsistent with
this order. (Words in parenthesis supplied).
- Furthermore, under Sec. 80, only three specific laws
were expressly repealed or modified. Sec. 8 of EO No.
172 and Section 16(c) of CA No. 146 which both grant
the regulatory body concerned the authority to approve
provisional rate increases are not among the provisions
expressly repealed or modified. This clearly indicates the
law’s intent to transfer the power to ERC.
- Be it noted that implied repeals are not favored in our
jurisdiction. Thus, a statute will not be deemed to have
been impliedly repealed by another enacted subsequent
thereto unless there is a showing that a plain,
unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy exists
between the two.
- Likewise, it may not be asserted with success that the
power to grant provisional rate adjustments runs counter
to the statutory construction guide provided in Sec. 75 of
the law. This section ordains that the EPIRA shall be
construed in favor of market competition and people
power empowerment, thereby ensuring the widest
participation of the people. To the Court, the goals of
market competition and people empowerment are not
negated by the ERC’s exercise of authority to approve
provisional rate adjustments. The concerns are taken
care of by Sec. 43 of the EPIRA and its IRR. Again for
one, even if there is a ground to grant the provisional
rate increase, the ERC may do so only after the
publication requirement is met and the consumers
affected are given the opportunity to present their side.
For another, the rate increase is provisional in character
and therefore may be modified or even recalled anytime.
Finally, the ERC is mandated to prescribe a rate-setting
methodology “in the public interest” and “to promote
efficiency.” For that matter, there is a plethora of
provisions in Sec. 43 and related sections which seek to
promote public interest, market competition, and
consumer protection.
- All the foregoing undeniably lead to the conclusion that
the ERC, under Sections 43(u), 44, and 80 of the EPIRA,
in relation to Sec. 16(c) of the Public Service Act and
Sec. 8 of EO. No. 172, possesses the power to grant
provisional rate adjustments subject to the procedure
laid down in these laws as well as in the IRR.
2. Yes. It is settled that there is grave abuse of discretion
when an act is done
contrary to the Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence, or
when executed whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily
out of malice, ill will, or personal bias. What makes the
challenged Order particularly repugnant is that it
involves a blatant and inexcusable breach of the very
rule which the ERC is mandated to observe and
implement. The violated provision which is Sec. 4(e),
Rule 3 of the IRR specifies how the ERC should exercise
its power to issue provisional orders pursuant to Sec. 44
in relation to Sec. 80 of the EPIRA. First, the application
for rate increase must be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the locality where the applicant
operates; second, ERC must consider the comments or
pleadings of the customers and LGU concerned in its
action on the application or motion for provisional rate
adjustment. Since the IRR was issued pursuant to the
EPIRA, Sec. 4(e) of Rule 3 as part of the IRR has the force
and effect of law and thus should have been complied
with.
- In view of the infirmities which attended the November
27, 2003 Order, particularly: 1) the failure of MERALCO
to publish its Application or at least a summary thereof;
2) the failure of ERC to resolve the Motions for
Production of Documents filed by the oppositors to
MERALCO’s Application before acting on the motion for
provisional rate adjustment; and 3) the failure of the ERC
to consider the arguments raised by the oppositors in
their respective pleadings prior to the issuance of the
assailed Order, the Court declares void the November
27, 2003 Order of the ERC for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V
ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
PANGANIBAN; March 30, 2004
FACTS
- The petitioners, after having been granted permission
to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-
na-Bato, succeeded in discovering marble deposits in
Mount Mabio, which forms part of Biak-na-bato mountain
range. The petitioners then applied with the Bureau of
Mines for the issuance of the corresponding license to
exploit said marble deposits. License No. 33 was granted
to them. Shortly after respondent Ernesto Maceda was
appointed Minister of the Department of Energy, he
cancelled the petitioner’s license through his letter to
Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation dated
Semptember 6, 1986. Because of the cancellation, the
original petition was filed on August 21, 1991.
- The trial court granted the petition and said that the
privilege granted under the license had already ripened
into a property right, thus the cancellation of the license
without notice or hearing was against the Constitutional
right of the petitioners against deprivation of their
property rights. It was unjustified because that could be
covered by four separate application is 400 hectares.
Finally, they ruled that Proclamation No. 84, which
confirmed the cancellation of the license, was an ex post
facto law. Thus, they were allowed to continue their
operations until the expiration of their license.
- On appeal, the CA held that the grant of quary license
covering 330.3062 hectares to the respondents was
valid because it was covered by four separate
applications, each for an area of 81 hectares. Moreover,
it held that the limitation under PD 463 - that any quarry
license should not cover not more than 100 hectares in
any given province – was supplanted by RA 7942, which
increased the mining areas allowed under PD 463,
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic
2. WON the license is valid
3. WON Proclamation No. 84 is valid
HELD
1. No. With the shift of constitutional policy (Art 12 Sec
2) toward full control and supervision of the State over
natural resources the Court in Miners Association of the
Philippines vs Factoran declared the provisions of PD 463
as contrary to the Constitution.
- RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies
the new constitutional
mandate. It has repealed all laws that are inconsistent
with any of its provisions. However, it does not apply
retroactively to a license granted by the government
under the 1973 Constitution. The Court therefore needs
to determine WON the license of the respondents falls
within the type of licenses wherein the new law cannot
be applied.
2. No. The license granted to the petitioners is subject to
the terms and conditions of PD 463. Proclamation No.
2202, which awarded the license to Rosemoor, expressly
states that the grant is subject to “existing policies, laws,
rules and regulations”. The license is thus subject to
Section 69 of PD 463, which states that a license cannot
cover more than 100 hectares in any one province. The
law does not provide any exception to the number of
applications for a license. Moreover, the license was
issued solely in the name of Rosemoore Mining and
Development Corporation, rather than the four individual
stockholders.
3. Yes. Citing Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation vs. Balite Portal Mining Cooperative, Tan vs.
Director of Forestry and Ysmael vs. Executive Secretary,
the Court ruled that licenses may be revoked by
executive action when national interest so requires,
because it is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause. The license merely
evidences the privilege granted by the state and does
not vest any permanent or irrevocable right. The license
likewise contains a provision which says that the license
“may be revoked or cancelled at any time by the
Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences when in his opinion,
public interest so require”. As to the exercise of
prerogative by Maceda, suffice to say that while the
cancellation or revocation of the license is vested in the
said director, the latter is subject to the department
head.
- Moreover, granting that the license is valid, it may also
by revoked by the State in the exercise of police power.
The exercise of power through Proclamation No. 84 is
clearly in accord with jura regalia, which reserves to the
State ownership of all natural resources.
- Proc No. 84 is also not a bill of attainder since the
declaration of the license as a nullity is not a declaration
of guilt. Neither is the cancellation a punishment within
the purview of the constitutional proscription against
bills of attainder.
- Proclamation No. 84 is also not an ex post facto law. It
does not fall under the six recognized instances when a
law is considered as such. Also, an ex post facto law is
limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature.
Decision Petition granted
DIDIPIO EARTHSAVERS ASSOCIATION V
SECRETARY
CHICO-NAZARIO; March 30,2006
FACTS
- Nature Prohibition and mandamus
- Assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942
otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations
issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No.
96-40, s. 1996.
- 25 July 1987 ~ President Aquino promulgated EO No.
279 which authorized the DENR Secretary to accept,
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts of
agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent.
- 3 March 1995 ~ President Ramos signed into law Rep.
Act No. 7942 entitled, “An Act Instituting A New System
of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development,
Utilization and Conservation,” otherwise known as the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
- 15 August 1995 ~ DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos
issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series
of 1995, containing the implementing guidelines of Rep.
Act No. 7942.
- 23 January 1997 ~ DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996, which took
effect on after due publication superseded DAO No. 23,
s.1995.
- Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994,
President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a
total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the
provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this
area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
- Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining
Limited to form a single company that now goes under
the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation
(CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are
Australian nationals.
- 7 September 2001 ~ counsels for petitioners filed a
demand letter addressed to then DENR Secretary
Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA
for the primary reason that Rep. Act No. 7942 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are
unconstitutional.
- The Office of the Executive Secretary was also
furnished a copy of the said letter.
- There being no response to both letters, another letter
of the same content dated 17 June 2002 was sent to
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
- This letter was indorsed to the DENR Secretary and
eventually referred to the Panel of Arbitrators of the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional Office
No. 02, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for further action.
- 12 November 2002 ~ counsels for petitioners received
a letter from the Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB
requiring the petitioners to comply with the Rules of the
Panel of Arbitrators before the letter may be acted upon.
- Yet again, counsels for petitioners sent President
Arroyo another demand letter dated 8 November 2002.
Said letter was again forwarded to the DENR Secretary
who referred the same to the MGB, Quezon City.
- In a letter dated 19 February 2003, the MGB rejected
the demand of counsels for petitioners for the
cancellation of the CAMC FTAA.
- Petitioners thus filed the present petition for
prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order. They pray that the
Court issue an order:
1. enjoining public respondents
from acting on any application for FTAA;
2. declaring unconstitutional the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations;
3. canceling the FTAA issued to
CAMC.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the petitioners' eminent domain claim is a
justiciable issue.
Substantive
2. WON RA 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void
becausethey allow the unjust and unlawful taking of
property without payment of just compensation, in
violation of Art III Sec 9 of the Constitution
3. WON the mining act and its implementing rules and
regulations are void and unconstitutional for sanctioning
an unconstitutional administrative process of
determining just compensation
4. WON the state, through RA 7942 and the CAMC FTAA,
abdicated its primary responsibility to the full control
and supervision over natural resources
5. WON the respondents interpretation of the role of the
wholly foreign and foreign-owned corporations in their
involvement in mining enterprises, violates Art XII Sec 2
(4) of the Constitution
6. WON the 1987 Constitution prohibits service contracts
HELD
1. YES. It is a justiciable issue. Based on the following
considerations:
a.
Locus Standi~ In the case, there is a
clash of legal rights as Rep. Act No. 7942 has
been enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and
an FTAAs have been entered into. Petitioners
embrace various segments of the society, like
DESAMA representing a community actually
affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well
as other residents of areas affected by the mining
activities of CAMC. These petitioners have the
standing to raise the constitutionality of the
questioned FTAA as they allege a personal and
substantial injury. They are under imminent threat
of being displaced from their landholdings as a
result of the implementation of the questioned
FTAA.
b. Ripeness~ By the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the challenged
act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt
act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.
c. The transcendental importance of the
issues raised and the magnitude of the public
interest involved will have a bearing on the
country’s economy, which is to a greater extent
dependent upon the mining industry. Also
affected by the resolution of this case are the
proprietary rights of numerous residents in the
mining contract areas as well as the social
existence of indigenous peoples, which are
threatened.
2. On the Validity of Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and
DAO 96-40
- PETITIONERS contend that Sec. 76 of RA No. 7942 and
Sec. 107 of DAO 96-40 allow the "unlawful and unjust
"TAKING" of private property for private purpose in
contradiction with Sec. 9, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that private property shall not be taken
except for public use and the corresponding payment of
just compensation."
- They assert that public respondent DENR, through the
Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property
and allow taking of land without payment of just
compensation.
- They cited the case of Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi to
illustrate the concept of taking of property for purposes
of eminent domain to wit:
> "“taking” under the concept of eminent domain as
entering upon private property for more than a
momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of
legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously
affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof."
- Petitioners quickly add that even assuming arguendo
that there is no absolute, physical taking, at the very
least, Section 76 establishes a legal easement upon the
surface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a
mining contract area sufficient to deprive them of
enjoyment and use of the property and that such burden
imposed by the legal easement falls within the purview
of eminent domain.
(NOTE: An easement is defined to be a liberty privilege
or advantage, which one man may have in the lands of
another, without profit; it may arise by deed or
prescription)
- PUBLIC RESPONDENTS argue that Section 76 is NOT A
TAKING provision but a VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE
POWER and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety and general welfare of the
people. This government regulation involves the
adjustment of rights for the public good and that this
adjustment curtails some potential for the use or
economic exploitation of private property.
- Public respondents concluded that “to require
compensation in all such circumstances would compel
the government to regulate by purchase.”
- Public respondents are inclined to believe that by
entering private lands and concession areas, FTAA
holders do not oust the owners thereof nor deprive them
of all beneficial enjoyment of their properties as the said
entry merely establishes a legal easement upon surface
owners, occupants and concessionaires of a mining
contract area.
- Hence the distinctions below:
1. Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from
Regulation in Police Power
 The power of eminent domain is the
inherent right of the state (and of those entities to
which the power has been lawfully delegated) to
condemn private property to public use upon
payment of just compensation.
 On the other hand, police power is the
power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property.
 Although both police power and the power of
eminent domain have the general welfare for their
object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two
with the latter being used as an implement of the
former, there are still traditional distinctions
between the two.
 Property condemned under police power is usually
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; hence,
no compensation shall be paid. (NOTE: noxious=
harmful)
 Jurisprudence shows: WHERE A
PROPERTY INTEREST IS MERELY RESTRICTED
BECAUSE THE CONTINUED USE THEREOF WOULD BE
INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC WELFARE, OR WHERE
PROPERTY IS DESTROYED BECAUSE ITS CONTINUED
EXISTENCE WOULD BE INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC
INTEREST, THERE IS NO COMPENSABLE TAKING.
However, WHEN A PROPERTY INTEREST IS
APPROPRIATED AND APPLIED TO SOME PUBLIC
PURPOSE, THERE IS COMPENSABLE TAKING.
 In the exercise of its police power regulation, the
state restricts the use of private property, but none
of the property interests in the bundle of rights,
which constitute ownership, is appropriated for use
by or for the benefit of the public. (-Bernas)
 TAKING MAY INCLUDE TRESPASS
WITHOUT ACTUAL EVICTION OF THE OWNER,
MATERIAL IMPAIRMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY OR PREVENTION OF THE ORDINARY USES
FOR WHICH THE PROPERTY WAS INTENDED SUCH
AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EASEMENT.
 In Republic v. Castellvi, the Court had
the occasion to spell out the requisites of taking in
eminent domain, to wit:
1. the expropriator must enter a private property;
2. the entry must be for more than a momentary
period.
3. the entry must be under warrant or color of legal
authority;
4.the property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
5. the utilization of the property for public use must be
in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
 Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain
results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner
of the condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property
may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement right of way.
THE ENTRY REFERRED TO IN SECTION 76 IS NOT JUST A
SIMPLE RIGHT-OF-WAY WHICH IS ORDINARILY ALLOWED
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE. Here, the
holders of mining rights enter private lands for purposes
of conducting mining activities such as exploration,
extraction and processing of minerals. Mining right
holders build mine infrastructure, dig mine shafts and
connecting tunnels, prepare tailing ponds, storage areas
and vehicle depots, install their machinery, equipment
and sewer systems. On top of this, under Section 75,
easement rights are accorded to them where they may
build warehouses, port facilities, electric transmission,
railroads and other infrastructures necessary for mining
operations. All these will definitely oust the owners or
occupants of the affected areas the beneficial ownership
of their lands. WITHOUT A DOUBT, TAKING OCCURS
ONCE MINING OPERATIONS COMMENCE.
1. On Section 76 of RA No. 7942 as a Taking Provision
 Brief History of Mining Laws:
 First found in Section 27 of Commonwealth
Act No. 137
 A similar one was found in a provision of
Presidential Decree No. 463, otherwise known as
“The Mineral Resources Development Decree of
1974”
 Hampered by the difficulties and delays in
securing surface rights for the entry into private
lands for purposes of mining operations,
Presidential Decree No. 512 dated 19 July 1974
was passed into law in order to achieve full and
accelerated mineral resources development.
Thus, Presidential Decree No. 512 provides for a
new system of surface rights acquisition by
mining prospectors and claimants.
 Whereas in Commonwealth Act No. 137 and
Presidential Decree No. 463 eminent domain may
only be exercised in order that the mining
claimants can build, construct or install roads,
railroads, mills, warehouses and other facilities,
this time, the power of eminent domain may now
be invoked by mining operators for the entry,
acquisition and use of private lands.
Considering that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
512 granted the qualified mining operators the authority
to exercise eminent domain and since this grant of
authority is deemed incorporated in Section 76 of Rep.
Act No. 7942, the inescapable conclusion is that the
latter provision is a taking provision.
o The taking to be valid
must be for public use.
o Public use as a regulations
requirement for the valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain is now synonymous with public
interest, public benefit, public welfare and public
convenience.
o It includes the broader
notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
Public use as traditionally understood as “actual
use by the public” has already been abandoned.
Decision THEREFORE, the Mining Law and the CAMC
FTAA are not void because Sec. 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942
and Sec. 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of
just compensation based on the agreement entered into
by the holder of mining rights and the surface owner,
occupant or concessionaire in accordance to PD 512.
Reasoning and Held/s on the Second Substantive Issue:
3. On the Power of Courts to Determine Just
Compensation
The question on the judicial determination of just
compensation has been settled in the case of Export
Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay wherein the Court
declared that the determination of just compensation in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Even as the
executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determinations, the same cannot prevail over the
court’s findings. (NOTE: I think this is the ratio already.)
 There is nothing in the
provisions of the assailed law and its
implementing rules and regulations that exclude
the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just
compensation in expropriation proceedings
involving mining operations.
 There is nothing wrong with
the grant of primary jurisdiction by the Panel of
Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to
determine in a preliminary matter the reasonable
compensation due the affected landowners or
occupants.
 The jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts is not any less “original and
exclusive” because the question is first passed
upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are
not a continuation of the administrative
determination.
4. On the Sufficient Control by the State Over Mining
Operations
 Citing La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc.
v. Ramos: The Court held that RA 7942 provides
for the state’s control and supervision over mining
operations.
o The gamut of requirements,
regulations, restrictions and limitations imposed
upon the FTAA contractor by the statute and
easily overturns petitioners’
contention that the setup under RA 7942 and DAO
96-40 relegates the State to the role of a “passive
regulator” dependent on submitted plans and
reports.
 On the contrary, the
government agencies concerned are empowered
to approve or disapprove -- hence, to influence,
direct and change -- the various work programs
and the corresponding minimum expenditure
commitments for each of the exploration,
development and utilization phases of the mining
enterprise.
- Considering the provisions of the statute and the
regulations just discussed, the Court believes that the
State definitely possesses the means by which it can
have the ultimate word in the operation of the
enterprise, set directions and objectives, and detect
deviations and noncompliance by the contractor;
likewise, it has the capability to enforce compliance and
to impose sanctions, should the occasion therefore arise.
 In other words, the FTAA contractor is not
free to do whatever it pleases and get away with
it; on the contrary, it will have to follow the
government line if it wants to stay in the
enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO
96-40 vest in the government more than a
sufficient degree of control and supervision over
the conduct of mining operations.
5. On the Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional
Phrase "Agreements Involving Either Technical or
Financial Assistance"
 Citing La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos:
 Par. 4 of Sec. 2 Art XII allows for
the possibility that matters, other than those
explicitly mentioned, could be made part of the
agreement.
o The use of the word
“involving” implies that these agreements with
foreign corporations are not limited to mere
financial or technical assistance. The difference in
sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose
“agreements for technical or financial assistance”
against “agreements including technical or
financial assistance.” This much is unalterably
clear in a verba legis approach.
o The word “involving” as
used in this context has three connotations that
can be differentiated thus: one, the sense of
“concerning,” “having to do with,” or “affecting”;
two, “entailing,” “requiring,” “implying” or
“necessitating”; and three, “including,”
“containing” or “comprising.”
 If the real intention of the
drafters was to confine foreign corporations to
financial or technical assistance and nothing
more, their language would have certainly been
so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to
leave no doubt in anyone’s mind about their true
intent.
o For example, they would
have used the sentence foreign corporations are
absolutely prohibited from involvement in the
management or operation of mining or similar
ventures or words of similar import. A search for
such stringent wording yields negative results.
- The meaning of the phrase “agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance” must not be
construed in an exclusionary and limiting manner since
there was a conscious and deliberate decision by the
drafters to avoid the use of restrictive wording.
6. On Service Contracts Not Deconstitutionalized
 The 1987 Constitution allows
the continued use of service contracts with
foreign corporations as contractors who would
invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and
supervision of the State; this time, however,
safety measures were put in place to prevent
abuses of the past regime.
 Citing Philippine Veterans
Bank v. Court of Appeals:
a. "The phrase agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance, referred to in
paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But
unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are
between foreign corporations acting as
contractors on the one hand; and on the other,
the government as principal or “owner” of the
works."
b. "xxx..From the foregoing, we are impelled to
conclude that the phrase agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance, referred to
in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But
unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are
between foreign corporations acting as
contractors on the one hand; and on the other,
the government as principal or “owner” of the
works. "
- "As written by the framers and ratified and adopted by
the people, the Constitution allows the continued use of
service contracts with foreign corporations -- as
contractors who would invest in and operate and
manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control
and supervision of the State -- sans the abuses of the
past regime. The purpose is clear: to develop and utilize
our mineral, petroleum and other resources on a large
scale for the immediate and tangible benefit of the
Filipino people." (id.)
Decision The petition for prohibition and mandamus is
hereby DISMISSED.
Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of
DAO 96-40; Republic Act No. 7942 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 – insofar
as they relate to financial and technical assistance
agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING V
BALITE PORTAL MINING
YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 3, 2002
FACTS
- Diwalwal Gold Rush Area – rich tract of mineral land
situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. It
is located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo
and Cateek in Davao Del Norte. The land has been
embroiled in controversy since mid-80’s due to the
scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels.
- March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation was
granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over
4,491 hectares of land, which included the Diwalwal
area.
- June 27, 1991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076
or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act which established
a People’s Small-Scale Mining Program to be
implemented by the secretary of the DENR and created
the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the
DENR Secretary’s direct supervision and control. It also
authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale
mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary
and award mining contracts to small-scale miners under
certain conditions.
- December 21, 1991, then DENR Secretary Fulgencio
Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO)
No. 66 declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as
non-forest land open to small-scale mining. This was
made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR
Secretary by Proclamation No. 369 which established the
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
- Petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the
admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the
DENR Regional Executive Director (RED Mines Case)
- February 16, 1994, while RED mines case was pending,
Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turn
applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by
the permit. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional
Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and
registered SEM’s integrated MPSA application. Several
small-scale miners filed their opposition (MAC cases).
- March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act was enacted. Pursuant to this, the MAC cases
were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA)
tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining
rights. RPA took cognizance of the RED Mines cases
which was consolidated with the MAC cases.
- April 1, 1997 Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of
Davao passed Resolution No. 26, Series of 1997
authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits (OTPs)
to small-scale miners operating in the Diwalwal mines.
- May 30, 1997, petitioner SEM filed complaint for
damages against DENR Secretary and PMRB-Davao,
alleging that the illegal issuance of the OTPs allowed the
extraction and hauling of P60,000 worth of gold ore per
truckload from SEM’s mining claim.
- Meanwhile, June 13, 1997, the RPA resolved the
Consolidated Mines cases and decreed in an Omnibus
Resolution that the validity of EP No. 133 is reiterated
and all adverse claims against MPSAA No. 128 are
dismissed.
- June 24, 1997 the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 which provided among others, that:
a. DENR shall study…the option of direct state
utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal
Gold-Rush Area…
b. Study shall include… studying and weighing the
feasibility of entering into management agreements
or operating agreements…
c. Such agreements shall include provisions for profit-
sharing… including profit-sharing arrangements with
small-scale miners, as well as the payment of
royalties to indigenous cultural communities…
- July 16, 1997 petitioner SEM filed a special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the CA
for the nullification of Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on
the ground that the “direct state utilization” espoused
therein would effectively impair its vested rights under
EP No. 133, among others
- January 6, 1998, the MAB rendered a decision in the
Consolidated Mines cases, setting aside the judgment of
the RPA. This decision was then elevated to he Supreme
Court by way of consolidated petition.
- March 19, 1998, the CA dismissed petition of SEM
ruling that:
a. DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in
issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since it was
merely a directive to conduct studies on the various
options available to the government for solving the
Diwalwal conflict.
b. The assailed memorandum did not conclusively
adopt “direct state utilization” as official
government policy on the matter, but was simply a
manifestation of the DENR’s intent to consider it as
one of its options, after determining its feasibility
through studies.
c. Petitioner’s rights under EP No. 133 are not
inviolable, sacrosanct or immutable and, being in
the nature of a privilege granted by the State, the
permit can be revoked, amended or modified by the
Chief Executive when the national interest so
requires.
- Motion for reconsideration was denied, thus this
petition.
ISSUES
1. WON CA erred in upholding the questioned acts of the
DENR Secretary which petitioner allege as violative of
mining laws and in derogation of vested rights of
petitioner over the area as covered by EP No. 133.
2. WON CA erred in holding that an action on the validity
of ore transport permit (OTP) is vested in the Regional
Panel of Arbitrators (RPA).
 Senate Committee report.1998-The Philippine Daily
HELD Inquirer published reports on on-going renegotiations
CHAVEZ V PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
1. SC agreed with CA that the challenged MO 97-03 did between PEA and AMARI
not conclusively adopt “direct state utilization” as a AND AMARI COASTAL BAY - PEA Director Nestor Kalaw and PEA Chairman Arsenio
policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the CARPIO; July 9, 2002 Yulo and former navy officer Sergio Cruz were members
memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed of the negotiating panel
was merely a study of this option and nothing else. It did - Frank Chavez filed petition for Mandamus stating that
FACTS
not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the
- Nature original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for
agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI and prays
writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary
matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials that PEA publicly disclose the terms of the renegotiations
restraining order. Petition also seeks to compel the
concerned to undertake studies to determine its of JVA. He cited that the sale to AMARI is in violation of
Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on
feasibility. Article 12, Sec. 3 prohibiting sale of alienable lands of
PEA’s then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal
- Petition was premature. The MO did not impose any the public domain to private corporations and Article 2
Bay and Development Corporation to reclaim portions of
obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation Section 28 and Article 3 Sec. 7 of the Constitution on the
Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from
whatsoever between and among the parties to the right to information on matters of public concern
signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such
dispute. Petitioner can show no more than a mere - 1999-PEA and AMARI signed Amended JVA which Pres.
recalamtion.
apprehension that the State, through the DENR, would Estrada approved
- 1973-The government through the Commission of
directly take over the mines, and until the DENR actually
Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction
does so and petitioner’s fears turn into reality, no valid ISSUES
and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP)
objection can be entertained against MO 97-03 on 1. WON the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition
to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
grounds which are purely speculative and anticipatory. are moot and academic because subsequent events
Bay
2. Whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right 2. WON the petition merits dismissal for failure to
- 1977-President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts
1084 creating the PEA. And was tasked to reclaim land,
unsettled matter, as the EP’s validity is still being 3. WON the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion
including foreshore and submerged areas and to
disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. of administrative-remedies
develop, improve, acquire x x x lease and sell any and
- Whether or not respondent Balite Communal Portal 4. WON petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
all kinds of lands. On the same date, President Marcos
Mining Cooperative (BCPMC) and the other mining 5. WON the constitutional right to information includes
issued PD. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed
entities it represents are conducting illegal mining official information on on-going negotiations before a
in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under
activities is a factual matter that has yet to be finally final agreement
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
determined in the Consolidated Mines Cases. 6. WON the stipulations in the amended joint venture
(MCCRRP)
- SC also pointed out that under no circumstances may agreement for the transfer to amari of certain lands,
- 1981-Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum ordering PEA
petitioner’s rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987
to amend its contract with CDCP which stated that CDCP
and absolute, as EP No. 133 merely evidences a consitution; and
shall transfer in favor of PEA the areas reclaimed by
privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, 7. WON the court is the proper forum for raising the
CDCP in the MCCRRP
modified or rescinded when the national interest so issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement
- 1988-President Aquino issued Special Patent granting
requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, is grossly disadvantageuos to the government.
and transferring to PEA parcels of land so reclaimed
development and utilization of the country’s natural o threshold issue: whether amari, a private
under the MCCRRP. Subsequently she transferred in the
mineral resources are matters impresses with great corporation, can acquire and own under the
name of PEA the three reclaimed islands known as the
public interest. amended jva 367.5 hectares of reclaimed
“Freedom Islands”
- Looking into Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 froeshore and submerged area in manila bay in
- 1995-PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA)
Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine view of sections 2 and 3, article 12 of the 1987
with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Mining Act of 1995, the SC said that the State may constitution
Freedom Islands and this was done without public
pursue the constitutional policy of full control and
bidding
supervision of the exploration, development and HELD
- President Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben
utilization of the country’s natural mineral resources, by (1) The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA
Torres approved the JVA
either directly undertaking the same or by entering into on constitutional grounds necessarily includes
- 1996-Senate President Maceda delivered a privileged
agreements with qualified entities. The State need be preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA
speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the
guided only by the demands of public interest. and AMARI have signed one in violation of the
“grandmother of all scams”. As a result, investigations
- In the absence of any concrete evidence that the DENR Constitution and if already implemented, to annul the
were conducted by the Senate. Among the conclusions
Secretary violated the law or abused his discretion, he is effects of an unconstitutional contract
were: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
presumed to have regularly issued the memorandum (2) The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
with a lawful intent and pursuant to his official functions. to cases involving factual questions
which the government has not classified as alienable
- With regard to the second issue, the Court did not rule Reasoning the instant case raises constitutional issues
lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2)
on it as the grounds invoked by petitioner for of transcendental importance to the public
the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands
invalidating the OTPs are inextricably linked to the (3) The principle of exhaustion of administrative
are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal
issues raised in the Consolidated Mines cases. remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a
- 1997-President Ramos created the Legal Task Force to
Decision Petition was denied; CA ruling affirmed. purely legal or constitutional question
conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of the
(4) Petitioner has standing if petition is of transcendental
public importance and as such, there is the right of a
citizen to bring a taxpayer’s suit on these matters of
transcendental public importance
(5) The constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations before a
final contract and must therefore constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public order
Reasoning The State policy of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest reinforces the
people’s right to information on matters of public
concern. PEA must prepare all the data and disclose
them to the public at the start of the disposition process,
long before the consummation of the contract. While the
evaluation or review is on-going, there are no “official
acts, transactions, or decisions” on the bids or proposals
but once the committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on
the part of the government
(6) In a form of a summary:
o The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA,
are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
lease these lands to private corporations but may
not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to
private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing
laws.
o The 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain and outside the
commerce of man until classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition and declared
no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and
declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands
qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain,
which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate.
o Since the Amended JVA seeks to
transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain
o Since the Amended JVA also seeks to
transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares
of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2,
Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may
reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable, and further declare them
no longer needed for public services. Still, the
transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article 12 which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
Reasoning Commonwealth Act 141 of the Philippine
National Assembly empowers the president to classify
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable”
sec. 6. The President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time
to time classify the lands of the public domain into—(a)
Alienable of disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral
lands.-The President must first officially classify these
lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them
open to disposition or concession.
-Sec. 59 states that the lands disposable under this title
shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the
Government by dredging, filling, or other means; (b)
Foreshore; (c) Marshy lands (d) Lands not included in
any of the foregoing classes. -Sec. 61 states that the
lands comprised in classes (a), (b) and (c) of section 59
shall be disposed f to private parties by lease only and
not otherwise
-After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of
the public domain continued to be only leased and not
sold to private parties. These lands remained suis
generic as the only alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain the government could not sell to private
parties. The only way that the government can sell to
private parties government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain is for the
legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale.
-in case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public
domain, a public bidding is required
-1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
Article 12, Sec. 3 states that alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area.
-ration behind the ban on corporations from acquiring
except through lease is not well understood. If the
purpose is to equitably diffuse lands ownership then the
Consti could have simply limited the size of alienable
lands of the public domain that corporations could
acquire. If the intent was to encourage “owner-
cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm and to
prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case, then
placing the land in the name of a corporation would be
more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands.
If the farmland is registered in the name of a
corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs
would inherit shares in the corporation instead of
subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent
the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and
smaller plots from one generation to the next. In actual
practice then, this ban strengthens the consti limitation
on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area
of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the ban,
individuals who already acquired the maximum area of
alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up
corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An
individual could own as many corporations as his means
would allow him. He could even hide his ownership of a
corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of
the corporation.
J.G. SUMMIT HOLDINGS V COURT OF
APPEALS
PUNO; September 24, 2003
FACTS
- January 27, 1977 – The National Investment and
Development Corporation (NIDC), a government
corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with
Kawasaki Heavy Industry, Ltd of Kobe, Japan for the
construction, operation, management of the Subic
National Shipyard, which became the Philippine Shipyard
and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO) with 60-40%
capitalization.
- One of the features of the agreement is the grant to
the parties the right of first refusal should either of them
decide to sell, assign or transfer its interest in the joint
venture.
- November 25, 1986-- the NIDC transferred all its rights,
title and interest in PHILSECO to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). And subsequently transferred to the Nat’l
Government pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14
- December 8, 1986-- Pres Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 50 establishing the Committee on Privatization (COP)
and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to take
possession of, manage and dispose of non*performing
assets of the National Government.
- APT was named trustee in the National Gov’t share in
PHILSECO.
- COP and APT decided to sell the gov’t shares to private
entities (87.67% equity share).
- APT and KAWASAKI agreed to exhange KAWASAKI’s
right of first refusal for the right to top by 5% the highest
bid, and be entitled to name the company which could
top. KAWASAKI named Philyard Holdings, Inc. (PHI)
- JG Summit Holdings Inc submitted a bid of
2,030,000,000.00php with an acknowledgment of
KAWASAKI/PHI’s right to top. JGSHI was declared the
highest bidder.
- KAWASAKI/PHI exercised the option to top and the COP
approved. APT and PHI executed a Stock Purchase
Agreement.
- JGSHI filed a petition for mandamus to question the
legality of the right to first refusal and right to top
exercised by KAWASAKI/PHI.
- CA held that petition for mandamus was not the proper
remedy, and that JGSHI was estopped from questioning
the validity because it participated in the public bidding
with the full knowledge of KAWASAKI/PHI’s right to top.
- SC held that a) the right to top granted to
KAWASAKI/PHI was illegal. Because it allows foreign
corporations to own more than 40% equity in PHILSECO,
which is a public utility whose capitalization should be
60% Filipino-owned. It also violates the rules of
competitive bidding; b) JGSHI cannot be estopped from
questioning the unconstitutional, illegal and inequitable
provision; c) APT should accept the 2,030,000,000.00
bid of JGSHI, execute Stock Purchase Agreement, return
to PHI the amount of 2,131,500,000.00php, and cancel
the stock certificates issued to PHI.
- Respondents filed MFR with the ff. issues…
ISSUES
1. WON PHILSECO is a public utility.
2. WON under 1977 Joint Venture Agreement, KAWASAKI
can exercise its right of first refusal only up to 40% of
the total capitalization of PHILSECO
3. WON the right to top granted to KAWASAKI violates
the principles of competitive bidding.
HELD
1. No. PHILSECO is not a public utility. A shipyard is not
a public utility by nature, and there is no law declaring it
to be.
a) Public utility = a business or service
engaged in regularly supplying the public with some
commodity or service of public consequence such as
electricity, water, transportation. The facility must
be necessary for the maintenance of life and
occupation of residents.
b)Public utility implies public use and service to the
public. Determinative characteristic: service or
readiness to serve an indefinite public (not a
privileged few), which has rights to demand and
receive the services and commodities.
c) Public use is not synonymous with public interest.
The fact that a business offers services and goods
that promote public good and serve the interest of
the public does not make it a public utility.
d)True criterion to judge the character of the use:
whether the public may enjoy it by RIGHT or only by
PERMISSION
e) Shipyard = a place or enclosure
where ships are built or repaired. It has a limited
clientele whom it may choose to serve as its
discretion. It is not legally obliged to render its
services to the public. Though the industry may be
imbued with public interest, its public service is
only incidental.
f) Shipyards in the past were declared as public
utilities (by Act No 2307, Commonwealth Act No
146). Then Marcos’ PD No. 666 removed it from the
list of public utilities to free the industry from the
60% citizenship requirement under the Constitution
(he wanted to accelerate the growth of the
industry). Then BP Blg 391 repealed PD No. 666 ,
reverting back the status of shipyards as public
utilities.
g)Pres Aquino repealed BP Blg 391 with EO No. 226.
But this did not revive PD No 666 or the other
repealed laws. The status of shipyards reverts back
to non-public utility prior to the Public Service Law.
2) No. There is nothing that prevents KAWASAKI
to acquire more then 40% of PHILSECO’s total
capitalization, under the Joint Venture Agreement.
(or YES, it can own more than 40%). They
agreed that in the event that one party sells its
shares, the non-selling party have a preferential
right to buy or to refuse the selling. The partnership
is based on delectus personae. No one can become
a member of the partnership association w/o the
consent of all other associates.
3) No. The right to top did not violate the rules
of competitive bidding.
a) bidding = making an offer or an
invitation to prospective contractors whereby
the gov’t manifests its intention to make
proposals for the purpose of supplies, materials
and equipment for official business or public
use. Public bidding is the accepted method in
arriving at a fair and reasonable price, and
ensures that overpricing, favoritism, and other
anomalous practices are eliminated
minimized.
b) Principles of bidding: 1) the offer to the
public; 2) an opportunity for competition; 3) a
basis for comparison of bids. As long as the
three are complied with, the bidding is valid
and legal.
c) The highest bid may not
automatically accepted. Bidding rules may
specify other conditions or reservations.
d) In the case, 1) all interested bidders
were welcomed; 2) basis for comparing bids
were laid down; 3) all bids were accepted
sealed and were opened and read in the
presence of the COA’s official representative
and before all other bidders.
e) The bidders were placed in equal
footing. And they were made aware of the rules
that the gov’t reserved the right to reject the
highest bid should KAWASAKI/PHI decide to
exercise its right to top.
f) If the parties did not swap right to first
refusal with right to top, KAWASAKI would still
have the right to buy the shares (for the original
amount, which was lesser), so there is no basis
in the submission that the right to top unfairly
favored KAWASAKI.
Decision: MFR granted. Decision & resolution of CA
affirmed.
Voting Concur: Davide, Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Tinga
(w/ sep op)
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA
Shipyard is not a public utility. Since the enactment of
CA No. 454 shipyards have never been considered
public utilities. PD 666 merely removed any doubt as to
their non-public utility status.
BAGATSING V COMMITTEE ON
PRIVITIZATION
QUAISON; July 14, 1995
FACTS
- this is a petition to nullify the bidding conducted for the
sale of a block of shares of Petron Corporation and the
award made to Aramco Overseas Company as the
highest bidder and to stop the sale of said block of
shares to Aramco
- PETRON was originally registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission in 1966 under the corporate
name “Esso Philippines, Inc.”
- In 1973, the Philippine government acquired ESSO
through the PNOC and became a wholly-owned company
of the government under the corporate name PETRON
or
and as a subsidiary of PNOC.
- On December 8, 1986, President Aquino promulgated
Proclamation No. 50 entitled “Proclaiming and Launching
a Program for the Expeditious Disposition and
Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or
the Assets thereof and creating the Committee on
Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust” in the
be
exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution.
- Implicit in the proclamation is the need to raise
revenue for the government and the ideal of leaving
business to the private sector.
- December 2, 1991, President Ramos deemed the
privatization program to be successful and beneficial.
- September 9, 1992, the PNOC Board of Directors
approved Specific Thrust No. 6 and moved to bring the
attention of the administration to the need to privatize
Petron.
- October 21, 1992, Sec. Del Rosario, as Chairman of the
Committee on Privatization, endorsed to President
Ramos the proposal of PNOC.
- January 4, 1993, a follow-up letter was sent by
Secretary Del Rosario to President Ramos.
- January 6, 1993, Secretary Lazaro of the Dept. of
Energy endorsed for approval
- January 12, 1993, the Cabinet approved the
privatization of Petron as part of the Energy Sector
Action Plan.
- March 25, 1993, the Government Corporate Monitoring
and Coordinating Committee recommended a 100%
privatization of Petron.
- March 31, 1883, the PNOC Board of Directors passed a
resolution authorizing the company to negotiate and
conclude a contract with the consortium of Salomon
Brothers of Hongkong Limited and PCI Capital
Corporation for financial advisory services to be
rendered to Petron.
- April 1, 1993, President Ramos approved the
privatization of Petron up to a maximum of 65% of its
capital stock.
- August 10, 1993, President Ramos approved the 40%-
40%-20% privatization strategy of Petron.
- Invitation to bid was published.
- The floor price bid for the 40% block was fixed at
US$400 million.
- The bids of Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS),
ARAMCO, and WESTMONT were submitted while the floor
price was being dicussed.
- ARAMCO was declared the winning bidder at US$502
million
- December 16, 1993, Monino Jacob, President and Chief
Executive Officer of PNOC, endorsed to COP the bid of
ARAMCO for approval. And was approved on the same
day. Also on the same day, WESTMONT filed a complaint
questioning the award of shares to ARAMCO.
- February 3, 1994, PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock
Purchase Agreement
- March 4, 1994, the two companies signed the
Shareholders’ Agreement
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioner have locus standi
2. WON the inclusion of Petron in the privatization
program contravened the declared policy of the State
3. WON the bidding procedure was valid
4. WON Petron was a public utility
HELD
1. YES. Taxpayers may question contracts entered into
by the national government or government-owned or
controlled corporations alleged to be in contravention of
the law.
2. YES. The decision of PNOC to privatize Petron and the
approval of the COP of such privatization, being made in
accordance with Proclamation No. 50, cannot be
reviewed by the Court. Such acts are exercises of the
executive function as to which the Court will not pass
judgment upon or inquire into their wisdom.
3. YES. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules
should be given more weight than the interpretation by
that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.
4. NO. A public utility under the Constitution and the
Public Service Law is one organized for hire or
compensation to serve the public, which is given the
right to demand its service. Petron is not engaged in oil
refining for hire and compensation to process the oil of
other parties.
Decision Petitions dismissed
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V COURT
OF APPEALS
YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 20, 2001
FACTS
- Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals
- Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is engaged
in the business of importing crude oil, refining the same
and selling various petroleum products through a
network of service stations throughout the country
- Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation (PDSC)
owns and operates a Caltex service station at the corner
of the MIA and Domestic Roads in Pasay City
- June 30, 1983: Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of
Energy Utilization (BEU) an application for authority to
relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Paranaque to
Imelda Marcos Ave, Paranaque. The application was
initially rejected because the old site had been closed for
five years such that relocation of the same to a new site
would amount to a new construction of a gasoline outlet,
which construction was then the subject of a
moratorium. Subsequently, BEU relaxed its position and
gave due course to the application.
- PDSC filed opposition on the grounds that: (1) there are
adequate service stations attending to the motorists’
requirements in the trading area, (2) ruinous competition
will result, and (3) there is a decline not an increase in
the volume of sales in the area. Petrophil and Caltex also
opposed on the ground that Shell failed to comply with
the jurisdictional requirements.
- March 6, 1984: BEU dismissed application on
jurisdictional grounds and for lack of “full title” of the
lessor over the proposed site
- May 7, 1984: BEU reinstated application and conducted
a hearing thereon
- June 3, 1986: BEU rendered a decision denying
application because there was no necessity for an
additional petroleum products retail outlet on the site.
Shell appealed to the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA)
- May 8, 1987: EO 172 was issued creating the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) and transferring to it the
regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the BEU
- May 9, 1988: OEA denied Shell’s appeal. Shell moved
for reconsideration and prayed for new hearing or
remand of the case for further proceedings. Shell
submitted a new feasibility study to justify application.
- July 11, 1988: OEA remanded case to ERB noting the
updated survey conducted by Shell
- September 17, 1991: ERB allowed Shell to establish the
service station
- PDSC filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
by the ERB. It thus elevated the case to the CA.
- November 8, 1993: CA reversed ERB judgment
- CA denied motion for reconsideration. Shell and ERB
thus elevated matters to the Supreme Court
- While case was pending in the CA, Caltex filed a similar
application in the same area. PDSC opposed on the same
grounds but ERB also approved application. PDSC again
filed a petition with the CA. Petition was dismissed in
May 14, 1993.
- ERB arguments: evidence used as basis for ERB’s
decision is neither stale nor irrelevant and justifies
establishment of retail outlet, evidence on vehicle
volume and fuel demand supports construction of outlet,
new outlet will not lead to ruinous competition
- Shell arguments: ERB findings based on substantial
evidence, feasibility study has not become irrelevant
even if presented two years after preparation, CA erred
in passing judgment and making pronouncement of
purely economic and policy issues on petroleum
business, proposed outlet will not result to ruinous
competition, CA should have referred the new evidence
to ERB under the doctrine of prior resort to primary
jurisdiction
ISSUES
1. WON the court should set aside the ERB decision
2. WON there is substantial evidence to support ERB’s
finding of public necessity to warrant approval of Shell’s
application
3. WON the Feasibility study has become stale because
it was submitted in evidence two years after it was
prepared in 1988
4. WON the establishment of the outlet would result to
ruinous competition
HELD
Ratio The courts will not interfere with actions of an
administrative agency, except if there is an error of law,
abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.
General Rule: The courts will not interfere in matters,
which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge
and training of such agencies
- Executive officials are presumed to have familiarized
themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the
meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an
independent, conscientious and competent expert
opinion
- Exception An action by an administrative agency
may be set aside if there is an error of law, abuse of
power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
- When an administrative agency renders an opinion or
issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law and the administrative interpretation is at
best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine
what the law means.
1. No cogent reason to depart from general rule since
ERB findings conform to the governing statutes and
controlling case law on the matter
Regulatory boards were empowered to entertain
and act on applications for the establishment of
gasoline stations in the Philippines.
 There is a worldwide trend towards
economic deregulation. This trend is reflected
in our policy considerations, statutes and
jurisprudence.
- RA 8479 was enacted to implement Art XII,
Sec. 19 of the Constitution
- Government believes deregulation will
eventually prevent monopoly
- Art XII, Sec. 19 is anti-trust in history and
spirit. It espouses competition. The
objective is based upon the belief that
through competition producers will satisfy
consumer wants at the lowest price with
the sacrifice of the fewest resources.
Competition among producers allows
consumers to bid for goods and services
and thus, matches their desires with
society’s opportunity costs.
 Recent developments in the oil
industry as well as legislative enactments and
jurisprudential pronouncements have overtaken
and rendered stale the view espoused by the
appellate court in denying Shell’s petition
2. ERB Decision was based on hard economic data
 Data includes: developmental projects,
residential subdivision listings, population
count, public conveyances, commercial
establishments, traffic count, fuel demand,
growth of private cars, public utility vehicles
and commercial vehicles  increased market
potential which will benefit community and
transient motorists
 ERB is in a better position to resolve
Shell’s application being primarily the agency
possessing the necessary expertise on the
matter
 Substantial evidence is all that is
needed to support an administrative finding of
fact. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion
3. The pronouncement of Court of Appeals’ Sixteenth
Division affirming ERB Decision approving a similar
application by Caltex is more in keeping with the
policy of the State and the rationale of the statutes
enacted to govern the industry
 CA: no gasoline station along the
entire stretch; need not necessarily result in
ruinous competition, absent adequate proof to
that effect; unless petitioner is able to prove by
competent evidence that significant changes
have occurred sufficiently to invalidate that
afore-stated study, the presumption is that said
study remains valid
4. The mere possibility of reduction of earnings of a
business is not sufficient to prove ruinous
competition
 In determining the allowance or
disallowance of an application for the
construction of a service station, the CA
confined the factors thereof within the rigid
standards governing public utility regulation,
where exclusivity, upon satisfaction of certain
requirements, is allowed. However, exclusivity
is more the exception rather than the rule in
the gasoline service station business
 PDSC failed to show that its business
would not have sufficient profit to have a fair
return on investment
 Caltex, PDSC’s principal, never filed
any opposition to Shell’s application
 A climate of fear and pessimism
generated by unsubstantiated claims of ruinous
competition already rejected in the past should
not be made to retard free competition,
consistently with legislative policy of
deregulating and liberalizing the oil industry to
ensure a truly competitive market under a
regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous
supply, environmentally clean and high quality
petroleum products
Decision
(1) Challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside
(2) ERB Order granting the amended application of
Pilipinas Shell Corporation to relocate its service
station to Benigno Aquino Jr., Ave., Pque, Metro
Manila reinstated
Voting 3 Justices concurred, 1 on sick leave
ART XIII: AGRARIAN REFORM
FORTRICH V CORONA
MARTINEZ; November 17, 1998
FACTS
- Two separate motions for reconsideration seeking
reversal of the SC’s decision nullifying the win-win
resolution dated November 7, 1997 issued by the Office
of the President (OP)
- Decision struck down as void the act of the OP in
reopening the case in OP Case No. 96-C 6424 through
the issuance of November 7, 1997 win-win Resolution
which substantially modified its March 29, 1996 OP
Decision that had long become final and executory
- The March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by the
same office as final and executory after the DAR’s
motion for reconsideration of the said decision was
denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period
- Movants:
o The win-win resolution is valid as it
seeks to correct an erroneous ruling
o Proper remedy for petitioner is a
petition for review and not certiorari
o Filing of motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non before petition for
certiorari may be filed
o Petitioners are guilty of forum
shopping
- Intervenors:
o They have right to intervene
o The win-win resolution is valid as it
seeks to correct an erroneous ruling
o Win-win resolution properly addresses
the substantial issues of the case
- Both movants ask that their motions be resolved en
banc since the issues are “novel” and of “transcendental
significance” Issue here according to them is WON the
power of the local government units (LGU’s) to reclassify
lands is subject to the approval of the Dept of Agrarian
Reform (DAR)
- Other issues raised by movants described as
“substantial” (1) whether the subject land is considered
a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility; (2)
whether the land has long been covered by a Notice of
Compulsory Acquisition (NCA); (3) whether the land is
tenanted, and if not, whether the applicants for
intervention are qualified to become beneficiaries
thereof; and (4) whether the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land into
industrial/institutional use
ISSUE
WON the SC’s decision nullifying the win-win resolution
dated November 7, 1997 issued by the Office of the
President (OP) must be reversed.
HELD
- The issues presented are matters of no extraordinary
import to merit the attention of the Court en banc
 o The issue is no longer novel as having been
decided in Province of Camarines Sur, et al. v. CA
wherein it was held that LGU’s need not obtain
the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify
lands from agricultural to non agricultural use.
o Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at
by a unanimous vote of all five members of the
2nd Division.
- The order which denied the DAR’s motion for
reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was
not an erroneous ruling and it does not have to be
corrected by the November 7, 1997 win-win resolution
o In accordance with Administrative order No. 18
which mandates that decisions, orders,
resolutions of the OP shall become final after the
lapse of 15 days from receipt of copy thereof…
unless a motion for reconsideration is filed within
such period.
o Late filing of DAR is not excusable because DAR
must not disregard the reglementary period fixed
by law in referring the decision to the
departments concerned for the preparation of the
motion of consideration
o Procedural rules should be treated with utmost
respect and due regard as they are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of
rival claims in the administration of justice
- There is a grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
second motion for reconsideration and on the basis
thereof issued the win-win resolution was a flagrant
infringement of the doctrine of res judicata. These grave
breaches of the law, rules and settled jurisprudence are
clearly substantial, not of technical nature.
o When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision
was declared final and executory, vested rights
were acquired by the petitioners
- When the DAR’s order denying the petitioners’ first
application for conversion was first brought by petitioner
to the OP, the appropriate administrative rules were not
complied with. But movants cannot now question the
supposed procedural lapse for the first time before the
SC. It should have been raised and resolved at the
administrative level.
- Intervenors do not have certain right or legal interest in
the subject matter.
o Being merely seasonal farmworkers without the
right to own, application for intervention must fail
as they have no legal or actual and substantial
interest over the subject land
o even "win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997
did not recognize the latter as proper parties to
intervene in the case simply because the qualified
farmer-beneficiaries have yet to be meticulously
determined as ordered in the said resolution.
- The March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and
properly disposed of the aforementioned “substantial”
issues
o Factual findings of administrative agencies which
have acquired expertise in their field are binding
and conclusive on the Court, presuming the OP is
the most competent in matters falling within its
domain
- Our affirmation of the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision is precisely pro-poor considering that more of
the impoverised members of society will be benefited by
the agro-economic development of the disputed land
which the province of Bukidnon and the municipality of
Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake.
o The OP Decision of March 29, 1996 was for the
eventual benefit of the many, no just of the few.
This is clearly shown from the development plan
on the subject land as conceived by the
petitioners
- WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration
of the April 24, 1998 Decision of this Court, filed by the
respondents and the applicants for intervention, are
hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
SIGRE V COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; August 8, 2002
FACTS
- Private respondent Lilia Y. Gonzales, as co-
administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and
mandamus seeking to prohibit the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) from accepting the leasehold rentals
from Ernesto Sigre (predecessor of petitioner Rolando
Sigre), and for LBP to turn over to private respondent the
rentals previously remitted to it by Sigre.
- Ernesto Sigre was private respondent’s tenant in an
irrigated rice land located in Barangay Naga, Pototan,
Iloilo. He was previously paying private respondent a
lease rental of 16 cavans per crop or 32 cavans per
agricultural year. In the agricultural year of 1991-1992,
Sigre stopped paying his rentals to private respondent
and instead, remitted it to the LBP pursuant to the
Department of Agrarian Reform’s Memorandum Circular
No. 6, Series of 1978, which set the guidelines in the
payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmer-
beneficiaries under the land transfer program of P.D. No.
27.
- The pertinent provision of the DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 6 reads:
"A. Where the value of the land has already
been established.
The value of the land is established on the
date the Secretary or his authorized
representative has finally approved the
average gross production data established by
the BCLP or upon the signing of the LTPA by
landowners and tenant farmers concerned
heretofore authorized.
Payment of lease rentals to landowners
covered by OLT shall terminate on the date
the value of the land is established.
Thereafter, the tenant-farmers shall pay their
lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its
authorized agents: provided that in case
where the value of the land is established
during the month the crop is to be harvested,
the cut-off period shall take effect on the next
harvest season. With respect to cases where
lease rentals paid may exceed the value of
the land, the tenant-farmers may no longer
be bound to pay such rental, but it shall be
his duty to notify the landowner and the DAR
Team Leader concerned of such fact who
shall ascertain immediately the veracity of
the information and thereafter resolve the
matter expeditiously as possible. If the
landowner shall insist after positive
ascertainment that the tenant-farmer is to
pay rentals to him, the amount equivalent to
the rental insisted to be paid shall de
deposited by the tenant-farmer with the LBP
or its authorized agent in his name and for his
account to be withdrawn only upon proper
written authorization of the DAR District
Officer based on the result of ascertainment
or investigation."
- According to private respondent, she had no notice that
the DAR had already fixed the 3-year production prior to
October 1972 at an average of 119.32 cavans per
hectare, and the value of the land was pegged at
P13,405.67. Thus, the petition filed before the Court of
Appeals, assailing, not only the validity of MC No. 6, but
also the constitutionality of P.D. 27.
- The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition
and declared MC No. 6 null and void. The LBP was
directed to return to private respondent the lease rentals
paid by Sigre, while Sigre was directed to pay the rentals
directly to private respondent. In declaring MC No. 6 as
null and void, the appellate court ruled that there is
nothing in P.D. 27 which sanctions the contested
provision of the circular; that said circular is in conflict
with P.D. 816 which provides that payments of lease
rentals shall be made to the landowner, and the latter,
being a statute, must prevail over the circular; that P.D.
27 is unconstitutional in laying down the formula for
determining the cost of the land as it sets limitations on
the judicial prerogative of determining just
compensation; and that it is no longer applicable, with
the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUES
1. WON MC No. 6 is valid
2. WON MC No. 6 can be reconciled with PD 816
3. WON PD 27 is unconstitutional
HELD
1. YES.
- PD 27, issued on October 21, 1972 by then Pres.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, proclaimed the entire country as a
“land reform area” and decreed the emancipation of
tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to
them the ownership of the land they till. To achieve its
purpose, the decree laid down a system for the purchase
by tenant-farmers, long recognized as the backbone of
the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Owners of
rice and corn lands that exceeded the minimum
retention area were bound to sell their lands to qualified
farmers at liberal terms and subject to conditions. It was
pursuant to said decree that the DAR issued MC No. 6,
series of 1978.
- The Court of Appeals held that P.D. No. 27 does not
sanction said Circular, particularly, the provision stating
that payment of lease rentals to landowners shall
terminate on the date the value of the land is
established, after which the tenant-farmer shall pay their
lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized
agents.
- We disagree. The power of subordinate legislation
allows administrative bodies to implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details.
All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity
with the standards prescribed by the law. One such
administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum Circular
No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel,
emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom from
the bondage of the soil by transferring to the tenant-
farmers the ownership of the land they’re tilling. As
noted, however, in the whereas clauses of the Circular,
problems have been encountered in the expeditious
implementation of the land reform program, thus
necessitating its promulgation.
- The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly
recognized by the appellate court when it stated that
“(T)he main purpose of the circular is to make certain
that the lease rental payments of the tenant-farmer are
applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the
land. x x x The circular was meant to remedy the
situation where the tenant-farmer’s lease rentals to
landowner were not credited in his favor against the
determined purchase price of the land, thus making him
a perpetual obligor for said purchase price.” Since the
assailed Circular essentially sought to accomplish the
noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being
the case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great
respect.
2. YES.
- The Court cannot see any “irreconcilable conflict”
between P.D. No. 816 and DAR Memorandum Circular
No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the
tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease
rentals to the landowner until the value of the property
has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner
and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 6, implemented in 1978, mandates that the
tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the
value of the land has been determined.
- In Curso v. Court of Appeals, involving the same
Circular and P.D. 816, it was categorically ruled that
there is no incompatibility between these two.
- In other words, MC No. 6 merely provides guidelines in
the payment of lease rentals/amortizations in
implementation of P.D. 816. Under both P.D. 816 and MC
No. 6, payment of lease rentals shall terminate on the
date the value of the land is established. Thereafter, the
tenant farmers shall pay amortizations to the Land Bank.
The rentals previously paid are to be credited as partial
payment of the land transferred to tenant-farmers.
- Private respondent, however, “splits hairs,” so to
speak, and contends that the Curso case is premised on
the assumption that the Circular implements P.D. 816,
whereas it is expressly stated in the Circular that it was
issued in implementation of P.D. 27. Both MC No. 6 and
P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in implementation
of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but
rather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816,
rental payments shall be made to the landowner. After
the value of the land has been determined/established,
then the tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to
the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No. 6. Clearly, there
is no inconsistency between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816
and DAR Circular No. 6 supplement each other insofar as
it sets the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals
on the agricultural property.
3. NO.
- P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity. It is
a judicial fact that has been repeatedly emphasized by
this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in De
Chavez v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be
constitutional, and upheld as part and parcel of the law
of the land, viz.:
"There is no doubt then, as set forth
expressly therein, that the goal is
emancipation. What is more, the decree is
now part and parcel of the law of the land
according to the revised Constitution itself.
Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply
out of the question. That would be to set at
naught an express mandate of the
Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is
clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not
only so because of the cardinal postulate of
constitutionalism, the supremacy of the
fundamental law. It is also because any other
approach would run the risk of setting at
naught this basic aspiration to do away with
all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with
the promise and the hope associated with an
open society. To deprive petitioners of the
small landholdings in the face of a
presidential decree considered ratified by the
new Constitution and precisely in accordance
with its avowed objective could indeed be
contributory to perpetuating the misery that
tenancy had spawned in the past as well as
the grave social problems thereby created.
There can be no justification for any other
decision then whether predicated on a
juridical norm or on the traditional role
assigned to the judiciary of implementing and
not thwarting fundamental policy goals."
- Thereafter, in Gonzales v. Estrella, which incidentally
involves private respondent and counsel in the case at
bench, the Court emphatically declared that
"Presidential Decree No. 27 has survived the test of
constitutionality."
- Then, in 1982, P.D. 27, once again, was stamped with
judicial imprimatur in Association of Rice & Corn
Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land
Reform Council.
- Further, in Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
involving the constitutionality of P.D. 27, E.O. Nos. 228
and 229, and R.A. 6657, any other assault on the validity
of P.D. 27 was ultimately foreclosed when it was
declared therein that “R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc.
No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED
against all the constitutional objections raised in the
herein petition.”
- The objection that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional as it sets
limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just
compensation is bereft of merit. P.D. 27 provides:
"For the purpose of determining the cost of
the land to be transferred to the tenant-
farmer pursuant to this Decree, the value of
the land shall be equivalent to two and one
half (2 ½) times the average harvest of three
normal crop years immediately preceding the
promulgation of this Decree;"
- E.O. 228 supplemented such provision, viz.:
"SEC. 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and
corn lands covered by P.D. 27 shall be based
on the average gross production determined
by the Barangay Committee on Land
Production in accordance with Department
Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973
and related issuances and regulation of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The average
gross production per hectare shall be
multiplied by two and a half (2.5), the product
of which shall be multiplied by Thirty Five
Pesos (P35.00), the government support price
for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay on October
21, 1972, or Thirty One Pesos (P31.00), the
government support price for one cavan of 50
kilos of corn on October 21, 1972, and the
 amount arrived at shall be the value of the
rice and corn land, as the case may be, for
the purpose of determining its cost to the
farmer and compensation to the landowner."
- The determination of just compensation under P.D. No.
27, like in Section 16 (d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is
not final or conclusive. This is evident from the
succeeding paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228:
"x x x In the event of dispute with the
landowner regarding the amount of lease
rental paid by the farmer beneficiary, the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the
Barangay Committee on Land Production
concerned shall resolve the dispute within
thirty (30) days from its submission pursuant
to Department of Agrarian Reform
Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973,
and other pertinent issuances. In the event a
party questions in court the resolution of the
dispute, the landowner’s compensation shall
still be processed for payment and the
proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust
Department of the Land Bank in accordance
with the provisions of Section 5 hereof,
pending the resolution of the dispute before
the court."
- Clearly therefrom, unless both the landowner and the
tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the property by
the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR,
the parties may bring the dispute to court in order to
determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a
task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court.
- Finally, the Court need not belabor the fact that R.A.
6657 or the CARP Law operates distinctly from P.D. 27.
R.A. 6657 covers all public and private agricultural land
including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229; while, P.D. 27 covers rice and
corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which provides for
the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, specifically states: “(P)residential Decree No.
27, as amended, shall continue to operate with respect
to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x” It
cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that R.A. 6657 did not
repeal or supersede, in any way, P.D. 27. And whatever
provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A.
6657 shall be suppletory to the latter, and all rights
acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 are
retained even with the passage of R.A. 6657.
Decision Petitions GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
ROXAS AND CO. V COURT OF APPEALS
PUNO; December 17, 1999
FACTS
- Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
- Three haciendas (Palico, Banilad, Caylaway) in
Nasugbu, Bats is owned by Roxas and Co., a domestic
corp.
- President Aquino signed Proclamation No. 131 and EO
229 for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
- Congress passed RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law or CARL). This was signed by Pres. Aquino.
- Roxas and Co. filed w/ DAR a voluntary offer to sell
Hacienda Caylaway. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were
later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in
accordance w/ CARL.
PALICO AND BANILAD
- For Haciendas Palico and Banilad, the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) sent notices Invitation
to Parties to Roxas and Co. through Mr. Jaime Pimentel,
Hacienda Administrator. This was to discuss the results
of DAR investigation of Haciendas. The reports
recommended that the haciendas be subject to
compulsory acquisition. DAR, through its Secretary, sent
Notices of Acquisition.
- Whether they accept or reject this offer, they must
inform Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution. In
case of rejection or failure to reply, DAR conducts
administrative proceedings to determine just
compensation of the land. In case of acceptance or if
compensation has already been deposited, DAR takes
immediate possession of the land.
- Bec petitioner rejected, DAR sent to Landbank a
Request to Open Trust Account in favor of petitioner for
its compensation.
- Petitioner applied w/ DAR for conversion of Palico and
Banilad fr agricultural to non-agri lands. Despite this
application, DAR proceeded w/ acquisition of the
haciendas.
- The Landbank trust accounts for compensation were
replaced by DAR with cash and Landbank bonds.
- DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) and distributed them to farmer beneficiaries.
CAYLAWAY
- This hacienda was voluntarily offered for sale to the
gov’t. DAR accepted the petitioner’s voluntary offer and
sent Notice of Acquisition.
- However, Roxas and Co. President sent letter to DAR
withdrawing voluntary offer for sale (VOS) bec
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu reclassified Caylaway fr
agri to non-agri land.
- DAR said reclassification would not exempt the land fr
agrarian reform. It denied the withdrawal of the VOS.
- Petitioner instituted case w/ DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) for cancellation of the CLOAs bec Nasugbu is a
tourist zone and not suitable for agri production. This
petition for conversion was denied by the MARO.
- Petitioner filed w/ CA, but CA dismissed the petition.
Hence, the recourse to SC.
ISSUES
1. WON SC can take cognizance despite failure of
petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies
2. WON acquisition proceedings were valid
3. WON SC can rule on reclassification of the haciendas
HELD
1. Yes.
- Administrative remedies must be exhausted first. But
judicial action can be resorted to immediately when
- question is purely legal
- the administrative body is in estoppel
- act is patently illegal
- there’s urgent need for judicial intervention
- respondent disregarded due process
- the respondent is a department secretary
- irreparable damage will be suffered
- there’s no other speedy remedy
- strong public interest is involved
- subject of controversy is private land
- in quo warranto proceedings
- DAR issued CLOAs w/o just compensation. And the law
provides that deposit must be made only in cash or
Landbank bonds. DAR’s initial action to open trust
account deposits does not constitute payment.
2. No.
- CARL provides for 2 modes of acquisition: compulsory
and voluntary.
- In compulsory acquisition, the farmer beneficiaries and
the landowners must first be identified. However, the
law is silent on how identification must be made. To
address this, DAR issued Admin Order 12-1989. This
was amended by DAR AO 9-1990 and DAR AO 1-1993.
In these amendments, Notice of Coverage and letter of
invitation to conference meeting were expanded.
- The Notice of Coverage notifies landowner that his
property is placed under CARP, informs him that a public
hearing will be conducted and a field investigation of the
land will be conducted.
- Notices and pleadings against a corp are served on the
President, Manager, Secretary, Cashier or agent or
directors. This is to ensure prompt and proper notice.
Jaime Pimentel is not one of these parties.
- Petitioner’s principal place of business is in Makati.
Pimentel is based in Nasugbu.
- Assuming that Pimentel was an agent of the corp,
there is no showing that he was duly authorized to
attend the conference meeting.
- Assuming petitioner was duly notified, the areas
subject to CARP were not properly identified before they
were taken over by DAR. The acquisition covers only
portions, not the entire haciendas. The haciendas are
not entirely agri lands. Petitioner had no idea which
portion was subject to compulsory acquisition. This is
important bec petitioner can exercise right to retention –
choose to retain not more than 5 hectares out of the
total area subject to CARP.
- With respect to Caylaway, notices were not deemed
received by the petitioner.
3. No.
- DAR’s failure to observe due process in acquisition
does not ipso facto give SC power to adjudicate on
application for conversion from agri to non-agri land. It’s
DAR’s job.
- Guiding principle in land use conversion is to preserve
prime agri lands for food production while recognizing
need of other sectors for land. CARL promotes social
justice, industrialization, and optimum use of land.
- Land use – manner of utilization of land incl. allocation,
devt and mgmt.
- Land use conversion requires field investigation.
- Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant SC to
arrogate authority to resolve controversy jurisdiction
over w/c is initially lodged w/ an administrative body.
Here, DAR must be given chance to correct its
procedural lapses.
Decision Petition is remanded to DAR for proper
acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner’s
application for conversion.
SEPARATE OPINION
MELO [concur and dissent]
- PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Bats as tourist zone,
has force and effect of law unless repealed. It cannot be
disregarded by DAR.
YNARES-SANTIAGO [concurr and
dissent]
- If acts of DAR are patently illegal and rights of party
are violated, the wrong decisions of DAR should be
reversed and set aside.
- CLOAs do not have nature of Torrens Title and
administrative cancellation of title is sufficient to
invalidate them.
ART XIV: EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD
OF REGENTS V COURT OF APPEALS AND
ARIOKASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET
CELINE
MENDOZA; August 31, 1999
FACTS
- Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is an Indian
citizen taking her doctoral program in Anthropology at
the University of the Philippines. To complete the
doctoral program she was required to pass a dissertation
and she created one entitled, “Tamil influences in
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.” She defended
her dissertation although prior to it Dr. Medina noted
some lifted material in the dissertation without proper
acknowledgment. She got the nod of four of the five
panelist and thus was allowed to graduate because the
letter coming from Dean Paz that wanted her to be
temporarily struck off the list of candidates for
graduation to clear the problems regarding her
dissertation did not reach the Board of Regents on time.
- Prior to the graduation, Dean Paz told Celine through a
letter that she would not be granted academic clearance
without Celine substantiating her accusation of Drs.
Diokno and Medina maliciously working for the
disapproval of her dissertation. Celine answered by
saying that the unfavorable attitude was due to some
failure to include Dr. Medina in the list of panel members
and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment. Dr.
Medina answered back and wrote that Celine’s
dissertation contained plagiarized materials and that her
doctorate be withdrawn.
- An ad-hoc committee was formed to investigate the
charges and that the request for the withdrawal of the
doctorate degree was asked of the Board of Regents. In
the investigation it was found out that in at least 90
instances the dissertation included lifted materials
without proper or due acknowledgment. The College
Assembly therefore unanimously approved and
recommended the withdrawal of the doctorate degree
and forwarded it to the University Council. The University
Council approved, endorsed, and recommended the
withdrawal to the Board of Regents. UP Diliman
Chancellor Roman summoned Celine to a meeting and
that she should submit her written explanation to the
charges against her. The Chancellor informed Celine of
the charges and showed a copy of the findings of the
investigating committee. A second meeting was done as
well as a third one, however Celine did not attend the
third meeting alleging that the Board of Regents at that
time already had decided her case before she was fully
heard. Celine asked for a re-investigation and that the
jurisdiction was placed on the student disciplinary
tribunal in the case of dishonesty and that the
withdrawal of the doctorate degree is not an authorized
penalty.
- A special committee was create by Chancellor Roman
that investigated the case and they came out with the
findings through all the documents and an interview of
Celine. It was established that at least 22 counts of
documented lifting were identified that forms the 90
instances found by the College ad-hoc committee. That
Celine admits of being guilt of the allegation of
plagiarism. The Board of Regents decided to withdraw
the doctorate degree. Celine requested an audience with
the Board of Regents and a reinvestigation which was
denied.
- Thus this case, a petition for mandamus and a prayer
for a writ of mandatory injunction and damages was
filed. Trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit
while Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the
restoration of the degree.
ISSUES
1. WON the writ of Mandamus is applicable in this
situation
2. WON THE withdrawal of the doctoral degree can be
done by the University
3. WON there was a denial of due process
HELD
1. No, a writ of Mandamus is not available to restrain an
institution of higher learning from the exercise of its
academic freedom that is a constitutional right
2. Yes, because Mandamus is a writ commanding a
tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
required to be done when it or s/he unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, there being no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of a law. It could not be
invoked against the academic freedom of the school as
academic freedom as a Constitutional right (Article XIV
Section 5 (2)) gives a wide sphere of authority over the
choice of students. This entails as well that it can also
determine who would have the distinction of being a
graduate of the school. If the University discovers that
the honor and distinction was obtained through fraud it
has the right to revoke or withdraw such distinction. The
actions of the University through the Board of Regents is
to protect academic integrity by withdrawing her
academic degree that she obtained through fraud.
3. No, Due process was done as there were several
investigations done by the school starting from the
college to the Board of Regents. She was also invited in
the investigation to clear up her name. However, the
actual admission and the clear plagiarism of her sources
proved that indeed she committed the offense. Her
demand for the Student Tribunal to decide her case is
untenable, as it is obvious that such case is useless for
the penalty it gives is suspension. Celine in not in the
ambit of disciplinary powers of the UP anymore.
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION V COURT
OF APPEALS
KAPUNAN; December 15, 2000
FACTS
-PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals
-Vol. 41, No. 14, or the September-October 1994 issue of
Miriam College’s school paper “Chi-Rho” entitled “Libog
at Iba Pang Tula” was odiously received by the MCHS
community, calling it “obscene”, “indecent” and “devoid
of all moral values” among other things.
-an excerpt written by Mr. Gomez, who wrote the
foreword (‘Foreplay’) reads:
may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang—
mga putang bikay na sa gitna
‘di na puwedeng paglabhan
‘di na maaring pagbabaran…”
-several other poems and stories are contained w/ the
theme “sekswalidad at iba’t ibang karanasan nito”
-ff the publication of the paper, Dr. Sevilla, Chair of the
MC Discipline Committee wrote a letter to the editorial
board, informing them of the complaints filed against
their publication by the Miriam Community, along with
the alleged school regulations violated, and requiring the
board to submit a written statement in answer to the
charges.
-the students requested to transfer the case to DECS,
w/c under Rule 7 of DECS order no. 94, has jurisdiction
-the students’ atty., Ricardo Velmonte, contends that for
actions committed w/in their capacity as campus
journalists, what applies is RA 7079 (The Campus
Journalism Act) and not committee regulations
-the committee proceeded w/ its investigation ex parte,
suspending 5 students, expelling 3, dismissing 2 and
withholding graduation privileges of 1 student
-these students thus filed a petition for prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order before the RTC of QC, questioning the Discipline
Board’s jurisdiction
-the RTC denied the prayer for a TRO and held that
nothing in the DECS Order No. 94 excludes school Admin
from exercising jurisdiction and that it cannot delimit the
jurisdiction of schools over disciplinary cases
-the students then filed a “Supplemental Petition and
Motion for Reconsideration” after w/c the RTC granted
the writ for preliminary injunction (against expulsion and
dismissal) so as not to render the issues moot
-both parties moved for reconsideration after w/c the
RTC recalled the issues and dismissed the case
-the RTC referred the case to the CA for disposition w/c
issued a resolution requiring the respondents to show
cause why no preliminary injunction should be issued,
and issued a TRO (against the dismissals/suspensions)
-the CA granted the students’ petition, declaring the RTC
order and the dismissals/suspensions as void
-hence this present petition by Miriam College
ISSUES
1. WON the case has been rendered moot
2. WON the TC has jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for certiorari by the students
3. WON Miriam had jurisdiction over the complaints
against the students
HELD
1. NO. Petitioner asserts that the case is moot since
more than 1 year had passed since the court issued the
TRO. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of
a proceeding prior to the judgment of a final order to
preserve the status quo of things until the merits of the
case can be heard and persists until issuance of a final
injunction.
A TRO on the other hand preserves the status quo until
the hearing of the application of the preliminary
injunction. In the instant case, no such preliminary
injunction was issued, hence the TRO automatically
expired (BP 224, TRO expires after 20 days if judge takes
no action on application of preliminary injunction). The
CA erred in assuming its order was complied w/ by
Miriam; it can’t be said that the students had graduated
w/in that short span of time. Miriam also allegedly
refused the students readmission, and so actual
controversy still existed. Since the RTC had set aside all
previous orders, it allowed the dismissals and
suspensions to remain in force.
2. YES. RA 7079 includes a certain S4 which states that
the editorial board of a school publication is free to
determine its editorial policies; S7 of the same act
provides that a ..”a student shall not be expelled or
suspended solely on the basis of articles he/she has
written or…performance of his/her duties…”. S9
mandates DECS to “promulgate the rules and
regulations for the act, as embodied by DECS Order No.
94, series of 1992 which under Rule 12 provides that
…”DECS regional office shall have original jurisdiction
over cases as a result of the decisions, actions and
policies of the editorial board of a school w/in its area of
administrative responsibility.
When the Discipline Board imposed the sanctions on the
students, they filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition raising the ff grounds: (1) the Discipline
Board had no jurisdiction over the case (2) the Board did
not have the qualities of an impartial and neutral arbiter,
w/c would deny the students their right to due process.
The issues thus raised were purely legal in nature and
well within the jurisdiction of the TC to determine. The
TC had the duty to render a decision for a case w/in its
jurisdiction and should have settled the issues before
dismissing the case.
3. YES. A14 S5(2) of the Constitution guarantees all
institution of higher learning academic freedom w/c
includes the right of the school to decide for itself how
best to attain it:
(1) who may teach (2) what may be taught (3) how it
shall be taught (4) who may be admitted to study
-“how it shall be taught” certainly encompasses the right
of the school to discipline its students. “what may be
taught” embodies the Constitutional obligation to instill
discipline in students, stated in A14 S3(2)
-“who may be admitted to study” clearly provides the
school w/ the right to determine whom to expel
A14 S4(1) merely recognizes the State’s power to
regulate and supervise educational institutions, not
deprive them of their rights
-In several cases, the Court has upheld the rights of
students to free speech in school premises.
-As held in Tinker v. Des Moines School District:
petitioners have the right to peacable assembly and free
speech—they do not shed these constitutional rights at
the schoolhouse gate. A student’s rights extend beyond
class hours, and he/she may express even controversial
subjects on school grounds
-however, free speech is not absolute and students lose
immunity when “conduct by the student…disrupts class
work or involves…invasion of the rights of others.”
-provisions of RA 7079 should be construed alongside
the provisions of the Constitution. Consistent w/
jurisprudence, S7 of RA 7079 should be read to mean
that the school can’t suspend/expel a student on the
sole basis of articles he/she has written, except when
such articles materially disrupt class work or…invades
the rights of others.
- From the foregoing, it is evident that Miriam College
has jurisdiction over the complaints against the
students, as the power to investigate is an adjunct of its
power to suspend or expel students. It is a necessary
corollary to its enforcement of rules and regulations, w/c
is inherently granted by the Constitution. The court
therefore rules that MC has the authority to hear and
decide the cases filed against respondent students.
CAMACHO V CORESIS
QUISUMBING; August 22, 2002
FACTS
- The Case: Special civil action for certiorari against the
graft investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman, Atty.
Jovito Coresis Jr., in dismissing the administrative and
criminal complaints against private respondents.
- In June 1995, Petitioner Manuel Camacho, the Dean of
the College of Education of the University of
Southeastern Philippines (USP) received complaints from
several doctoral students regarding a class held by
respondent Dr. Daleon during the 1st sem. of SY 1994-
1995. The complaints were that there were “ghost
students” in Dr. Daleon’s class, namely respondents Aida
Agulo, Desiderio Alaba and Norma Tecson, who were
given grades of 1.0, 1.5, and 1.25 respectively, despite
their failure to attend regular classes.
- June 13, 1995, petitioner requested respondent Daleon
to furnish copies of exams, term papers, records of
attendance, which respondent ignored. The matter was
raised in a university council meeting and a committee
was created to investigate the complaint. Dr. Daleon
admitted that he made special arrangements with Agulo,
Alaba and Tecson regarding their course without
petitioner’s approval.
- Petitioner recommended to Dr. Prantilla (the University
Pres) that Agulo, Alaba, and Tecson be required to
attend regular classes and comply with the course
requirements. Dr. Prantilla approved the
recommendation; however, he also entertained an
appeal by Agulo to validate the grades given to them.
The BoR upheld the grades and consequently, petitioner
filed an administrative complaint against Dr. Daleon, as
well as criminal complaints against Dr. Daleon, Agulo,
Alaba, Tecson, and members of the USP BoR including
Dr. Prantilla for violating R.A. 3019 and/or such other
penal laws to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
Said office ordered respondents to desist from further
proceedings to consolidate the administrative complaint
with the criminal complaint.
- On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito
Coresis, Jr., the graft investigator of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, and approved by Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto. It dismissed both complaints upon
finding insufficient evidence to hold Dr. Daleon liable for
the administrative charges as well as finding no prima
facie violation for the criminal complaint. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration and was denied for lack of
merit. Hence, the case was brought before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE
WON public respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (in
exonerating Dr. Daleon from administrative as well as
criminal liability arising from his giving passing grades to
Agulo, Tecson, and Alaba without requiring them to
attend classes).
HELD
- Absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, the Court’s power of judicial review under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may not be invoked.
Reasoning
1. From the records, there is no valid ground nor
cogent reason to hold respondent Office of grave
abuse of discretion because the conclusions in its
assailed Resolution are based on substantial
evidence easily verifiable. Well established is the
principle that factual findings of administrative
agencies are generally accorded respect and even
finality by this Court, provided such findings are
supported by substantial evidence.
2. Public respondent anchored his decision on Art.
140 of the University Code which provides that the
rules on attendance of students shall be enforced in
all classes subject to the modification by the Dean
in the case of graduate students and other courses.
It is undisputed that Dr. Daleon had already been
designated Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Graduate
School by the President of USP and was even
entitled to emoluments inherent to the Dean of the
Grad. School. Accordingly, as OIC, performing the
functions of the Dean of the Grad. School, Dr.
Daleon had the authority to modify the rule on
attendance without seeking permission of petitioner.
3. Dr. Daleon’s teaching style had support of the
members of the Board of Regents (BoR), the body
with the authority to formulate university policies,
fully knowing the policy on attendance of students
in the graduate school. In passing its resolution,
they not only validated the grades given by Daleon,
they also gave an imprimatur on the propriety,
regularity and acceptability of Dr. Daleon’s
instructional approach.
4. Dr. Daleon’s teaching style, validated by the
USP BoR, is bolstered by the constitutional
guarantee on academic freedom. Academic freedom
is two-tiered - that of the academic institution and
the teacher’s. As was held in Miriam College v. CA,
“Institutional freedom includes the right of the
school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives and the methods on how best to attain
them, free from interference or outside coercion
except when overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It includes the freedom to determine for
itself: who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
5. It was said in Montemayor v. Araneta University
Foundation that, “Academic freedom also accords a
faculty member the right to pursue his studies in his
particular specialty.” Applied to the case at bar,
academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the
widest latitude to innovate and experiment on the
method of teaching which is most fitting to his
students, subject only to the rules and policies of
the university. Consider that the BoR, whose task is
to lay down school rules and policies, has validated
his teaching, there can be no reason for petitioner
to complain before the Court simply because he
holds a contrary opinion on the matter.
Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Resolution of Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao is
affirmed.
Voting Concurred with by JJs: Bellosillo, Mendoza, and
Corona
GARCIA V LOYOLA THEOLOGICAL
SCHOOL
FERNANDO; November 28, 1975
FACTS
- This is a mandamus proceeding to compel the
Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology
to allow petitioner to continue studying there.
- Petitioner alleged that she was admitted by respondent
in the Summer of 1975 to pursue graduate studies
leading to an MA in Theology, but was denied re-
admission in the following semester. She contended
that the reason given by respondent for such denial,
namely: that "her frequent questions and difficulties
were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing
down the progress of the class," is not valid ground for
expulsion
- Respondent, on the other hand, contended that
petitioner was admitted, not to a degree program but
merely to take some courses for credit, since admission
to a degree requires acceptance by the Assistant Dean
of the Graduate School of Ateneo de Manila University
(as opposed to, the Loyola School of Theology), and no
such acceptance was given.
- Further, that respondent, being an "institute of higher
learning" has the "academic freedom" to discretion
whether to admit or continue admitting any particular
student considering not only academic or intellectual
standards but also other factors.
- Finally that there is no "clear duty" to admit petitioner
since the School of Theology is a seminary for the
priesthood and petitioner is admittedly and obviously not
studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a
woman.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON a mandamus proceeding is proper in the case at
bar
Substantive
2. WON respondent is deemed possessed of a right to
continued admission to the Loyola School of Theology.
3. WON her expulsion was based on reasonable grounds
(therefore, not aribtrary).
HELD
1. Mandamus shall not lie absent a showing that there is
a clear legal right on her part and a clear duty on
respondent's part to so admit her.
- What a student possesses is a privilege rather than a
right. She cannot therefore satisfy the prime an
indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.
2. Autonomy recognized by the Constitution: "All
institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic
freedom."
- Although "academic freedom" is more often identified
with the right of a faculty member to publish his findings
and thoughts without fear of retribution, the reference
given by the constitution of "institutions of higher
learning," show that the school or college itself is
possessed of such a right.
- J. Frankfurter: "four essential freedoms" - determine for
itself who may teach, what may taught, how, and who
may be admitted to study
- Universities, unlike public utitlities, have discretion as
to whom to admit or reject.
3. Denied not only on general principle, but also in view
of the character of the particular educational institution
involved. It is a seminary for the priesthood. Therefore,
at most, she can lay claim to a privilege, no duty being
cast on respondent school.
- Decision for her expulsion was deemed best
considering the interest of the school as well as of the
other students and her own welfare. There was nothing
arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed
relevant.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE [concur]
- Same points as Ponencia, plus:
- A petition will be dismissed where petitioner has
admittedly failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies.
- Questions of admission to the school are matters of
technical and academic judgment that the courts will not
ordinarily interfere with. Only after exhaustion of
administrative remedies and when there is marked
arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic
judgment of the school faculty.
MAKASIAR [dissent]
- 1935 Constitution: "Universities established by the
State shall enjoy academic freedom." VS. 1973
Constitution which broadened the scope into "All
institutions of higher learning." Thus guaranteed, it is
not limited to the members of the faculty nor to
administrative authorities of the educational institution.
It must also be deemed granted in favor of the student
body because all three constitute the educational
institution, without any one of which the educational
institution can neither exist nor operate.
- An individual has a natural and inherent right to learn
and develop his faculties. The Constitution provides for
this in various provisions. The happiness and full
development of the curious intellect of the student are
protected by the narrow guarantee of academic freedom
and more so by the broader right of free expression,
which includes free speech and press, and academic
freedom.
- No private person has the inherent right to establish
and operate a school. Education is a sovereign state
function; therefore, not different in this respect from
commercial public utilities, whose right to exist and to
operate depends upon state authority. Constitutional
rights must be respected by the State and by enterprises
authorized by the state to operate.
REYES V BOARD OF REGENTS OF UP
MEDIALDEA; February 25, 1991
FACTS
- Nature Petitions for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and restraining order to review
the decision of the CA
- Respondent-students (students hereinafter) as then
applicants to the University of the Philippines College, of
Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percent
in the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which
was the cut-off score prescribed for academic year 1986-
1987 by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of January 17,
1986 as approved by the University Council (UC) on April
8,1986.
- However, their scores were lower than the 90
percentile cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty
in its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic
year 1987-88.
- Upon appeal of some concerned PreMed students, the
Board of Regents (BOR) in its 996th resolution dated
February 24, 1987 reverted to the NWAT cut-off score of
70 percentile. The BOR reiterated its 996th resolution in
its 997th resolution dated March 24, 1987.
- subsequently, the University General Counsel, pursuant
to the instruction of the Chancellor, conducted an
investigation on the student's case and recommended
inter alia the admission of all applicants obtaining a
percentile I rating ranging from 70 to 90 "as a matter of
right".
- The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the
BOR directive for them to admit the students. This
prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus
with the RTC. On June 11, 1987, the trial court issued a
writ of preliminary injunction for their admission.
- Students filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and
51
attached thereto their letter to the UPCM Faculty. In an
Order dated June 15, 1990, the RTC dismissed their case
with prejudice. In view of this development, the UPCM
Faculty held an emergency meeting on June 22, 1990
where it denied the appeal of the students on the ground
that they were not qualified for admission to the UPCM.
As a result, the students filed with the RTC a motion to
reconsider its order of dismissal. On June 27, 1990, the
RTC issued an order for the admission of the students to
the college. Whereupon, the petitioners moved to lift the
ex-parte mandatory order.
- Meanwhile, the BOR in its 1031st meeting dated June
28, 1990, invoking its plenary power under the Charter
of the University over matters affecting university
affairs, resolved to approve the admission of the
students in the interest of justice and equity and to order
the petitioners to admit them.
51
Students manifested that they never intended to question the Faculty's
right to academic freedom; that they believed the issue was simply on the
question of observance of the proper procedure in implementing admission
requirements; that they felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue
the court action; that they would leave to the Faculty the determination of
humanitarian consideration of their case; that they apologized for offending
the Faculty and that they would like to appeal for a chance to remain in the
college
- Consequently, the UP President issued a formal charge
of Grave Misconduct against them and later, issued an
Order for their Preventive Suspension. So, herein
petitioners appealed to the CA but their appeal was
dismissed. Motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WON the BOR violated the petitioners’ academic
freedom, and thus could validly direct the petitioners to
admit the students to the college of medicine.
HELD
There is no violation of academic freedom when an order
of BOR in upholding the admission requirement
approved by the University Council (in 1986) is
supportive of right of the University Council to fix or
approve admission requirements, against the UPCM
Faculty and Dean who changed the admission
requirements approved by the University Council without
following the prescribed rules and procedures of the
University.
Reasoning The method deployed was simply referring
to the UP Charter or to the University Code, and then
applying the relevant provisions or rules to the case at
bar. The ponencia cited the case of Garcia v. The Faculty
52
Admission Committee , Loyola School of Theology,
citing Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy
53
v. New Hampshire , though as obiter dicta only, to
strengthen the arguments in support of the ratio
decidendi.
First. Under the UP Charter, the power to fix the
requirements for admission to any college of the
university is vested in the University Council (See. 9).
The power to prescribe the courses of study is vested in
the University Council subject to the approval of the
Board of Regents (Sec. 9). The power to appoint the
academic staff, fix their compensation, hours of service
and other conditions is vested in the Board of Regents
[Sec. 6(e)]. The power to allocate the income among the
different categories of expenditures is vested in the
Board of Regents
54
Second. Academic freedom may be asserted by the
University Council or by the Board of Regents or both in
so far (sic) as it relates to the functions vested in them
52
The individual faculty member has the freedom to pursue his studies in
his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result
of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the
event that His conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the
powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic
establishments
53
In contrast, the University has the academic freedom to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study
54
Art. XIV Sec.5 (2) of the 1987 Constitution sates that Academic freedom
shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
by law which are essential to institutional academic
freedom
The academic freedom claimed by the faculty to have
been violated by the Board of Regents when it issued the
questioned order is related to the right of the University
to fix admission requirements. This right and power to fix
admission requirements is clearly vested by law in the
University Council. The College Faculty was merely
empowered by the Board of Regents under Article 324 of
the University Code to initially determine the admission
requirements, subject to the approval of the University
Council and the President of the University.
Third. When the Board of Regents retained the cut off
score in the NMAT at 70th percentile (p, 161, Rollo)
which was the cut off score approved by the University
Council on 8 April 1986, it did not exercise the power to
prescribe the entrance requirements. It merely upheld
the power of the University Council under the law to fix
the requirements for admission to the UPCM and
rendered ineffective the action of the UPCM Faculty,
which attempted to exercise that power to increase the
cut off score in NMAT to 90 percentile without the
approval of the University Council and the President of
the University in violation of Section 324 of the
University Code (supra) which is very explicit on this
matter.]
Fourth. The BOR only exercised its power of governance
and its duty in seeing to it that all the units abide with
the law, university rules and regulations.
Fifth. Under the Constitution, the students have the right
to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements [Article XIV, Section 5(3)]. While it may be
the UC could ratify the acts of the College regarding
admission requirements, the same should be done within
a reasonable time. It is to be recalled that the
controversy regarding the students' admission started in
1987. It is surprising that despite petitioners' insistence
on the UC's jurisdiction over admission requirements,
they did not seek recourse to it immediately. From the
records, there appears to be no physical or legal
hindrance to the calling for a UC meeting on the
students' case. To validate these resolutions at this point
in time would not be fair and equitable to the students.
In the span of three years, they have proved their mettle
by passing the academic requirements of the college
Therefore No. There was no violation of the
petitioners’ academic freedom by the BOR since the BOR
only exercised its power of governance and its duty in
seeing to it that all the units abide with the law,
university rules and regulations.
Decision Petitions DISMISSED and the decisions of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Voting 3 concur, no dissent, 2 took no part.
MORALES V UP
CHICO-NAZARIO; December 13, 2004
FACTS
- According to Art. 410 of the UP Code, students who
complete their courses with the following minimum
weighted average grade shall be graduated with honors:
Summa cum laude – 1.20
Magna cum laude – 1.45
Cum laude – 1.75
- Provided that all the grades in all subjects prescribed in
the curriculum, as well as subjects that qualify as
electives, shall be included in the computation of the
weighted average grade; provided further that in cases
where the electives taken are more than those required
in the program, the following procedure will be used in
selecting the electives to be included in the computation
of the weighted average grade:
1) For students who did not shift
programs, consider the required number of
electives in chronological order.
2) For students who shifted from one
program to another, the electives to be
considered shall be selected according to the
following order of priority:
a. Electives taken in the program where the
student is graduating will be selected in
chronological order.
b. Electives taken in the previous program and
acceptable as electives in the second
program will be selected in chronological
order.
c. Prescribed courses taken in the previous
program, but qualify as electives in the
second program will be selected in
chronological order.
- Nadine Morales transferred from UP Manila (majored in
Speech Pathology) to UP Diliman and enrolled in the
European Languages undergraduate program in SY
1997-98. She was enrolled under the Plan A curriculum
and chose French as her major and German as her
minor.
- Under Plan A, a student has to complete 141 units with
27 being electives.
- 1st semester of AY 1997-98 – Morales enrolled in
German 10 and German 11 where she obtained a grade
of 1.0 in both subjects.
- 2nd semester of AY 1997-98 – Morales changed minor to
Spanish but maintained French as her major.
- End of 1st semester of SY 1990-2000 – Morales included
in list of candidates for graduation with probable honors
based on the computation made by the College of Arts
and Letters of Morales’ GWA inclusive of her grades of
1.0 in German 10 and 11. Her GWA then was 1.725.
- 2nd semester of SY 1999-2000 – Morales’ GWA was
1.729 after obtaining an average of 1.708 in her final
semester in UP, making her eligible for cum laude
honors.
- During the assessment for graduation, she was not
granted cum laude honors because her grades in
German 10 and 11 were excluded in the computation,
bringing her GWA to 1.760.
- According to Prof. Bautista of the Dept. of European
Languages, a Plan A student is required to major in a
European language other than Spanish and minor in any
other discipline allowed in the curriculum.
o In Morales’ case, her major is French
and her minor is Spanish so German does not fit
into her curriculum.
o Plan A curriculum also does not allow
for free electives.
 Electives must be major
language electives taken from French courses
in either literature or translation.
 German 10 and 11 are basic
language courses and do not fall under
electives as contemplated in the Plan A
curriculum.
- Morales requested that her German 10 and 11 grades
be included in the computation of her GWA.
o Her letter was taken up on a no-name
basis during the University Council meeting upon
the endorsement of the Registrar. By a vote of
207-4, the Council affirmed the decision of the
CAL in not awarding honors to Morales.
o Issue was then elevated by Morales to
the UP Board of Regents and it was resolved that
the appeal be returned to the University Council
for further consideration with full disclosure of
petitioner’s identity.
o By a vote of 99 in favor-12 against-6
abstaining, the Council denied the award of cum
laude honors to Morales.
o A subsequent appeal was made to the
Board of Regents. This appeal was denied 9-2.
- Morales filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
before the RTC and assailed the decision of the UP Board
of Regents as erroneous. The RTC ruled in her favor by
saying that the UP Board of Regents greatly abused its
discretion in the improper application of its academic
discretion in interpreting Art. 410 of the UP Code. The
RTC ordered that UP recomputed Morales’ grades by
including German 10 and 11 and confer upon her cum
laude honors.
- In the Court of Appeals:
o In resolving the issue, the CA initially
determined whether only questions of law were
involved and eventually decided that an analysis
of the facts of the cases was indispensable.
o The CA ruled that the lower court
violated UP’s constitutionally protected right to
academic freedom when it substituted its own
interpretation of the internal rules and regulations
of the University for that of the UP Board of
Regents and applied the same to the case at bar.
ISSUES
1. WON the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal of the
RTC Order because the essential facts were never in
dispute, the case involving only questions of law
2. WON the RTC’s interpretation of Art. 410 of the UP
Code violated the academic freedom granted to UP as an
institution of higher learning
HELD
1. Yes, the appeal raises questions of law.
- A question of law arises when the issue does not call
for an examination of the probative value of evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted
and the doubt concerns the correct application of law
and jurisprudence on the matter. There is a question of
fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute
as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion
drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.
- Both parties admitted to the facts. Any conclusion
based on these facts would not involve a calibration of
the probative value of such pieces of evidence, but
would be limited to an inquiry of whether the law was
properly applied given the state of facts of the case.
Since the appeal raises only questions of law, the proper
mode of appeal is through a certiorari. The CA did not
have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal.
2. Yes, the RTC violated the academic freedom granted
to UP.
Ratio decidendi: Unless there is a clear showing of
arbitrary and capricious exercise of judgment,
courts may not interfere with the University’s
exclusive right to decide for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them (in this
case, to whom among its graduates it shall confer
academic recognition based on its established
standards).
- In University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, it was
said that the discretion of schools of learning to
formulate the rules and guidelines in the granting of
honors for purposes of graduation forms part of the
academic freedom. Such discretion may not be
disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless
there is a grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
- Grave abuse of discretion involves capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The power should be exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
- UP proceeded fairly in evaluating the situation of
Morales and gave her and her parents ample opportunity
to present their side on different occasions. There is no
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness.
o Deliberations were done in the
University Council.
 A member asked whether German 10 and 11
could be counted as electives for Morales and
the Registrar responded the student was
enrolled in Foreign Languages with a major in
French and a minor in Spanish and German 10
and 11 are not required in the checklist. These
can neither be considered as electives because
electives should be non-language electives.
German 10 and 11 are excess subjects.
 Even if Morales completed all the required
subjects under the curriculum so that German
10 and 11 should be included, the Dean of the
CAL said that the same rule had applied in the
past to previous students. Applying the rules to
Morales would be unfair to the other students.
o Since the rule provides for an order of
priority in the electives, there is an implication
that not all electives may be included in the GWA.
o The Advising Committee allows
students to change their majors and minors but
these shifts are not counted as part of the course
with credit in the curriculum.
- The word “program” in Art. 410 must be interpreted in
the context of a particular curriculum. In computing the
GWA, the grades of subjects prescribed in the curriculum
and the grades of subjects that qualify as electives in the
curriculum are included.
- The interpretation of the required subjects or allowable
electives in the curriculum should be taken in the
context of the entire courses. Morales’ decision to shift
caused the exclusion of her grades in German 10 and
11. Besides, German 10 and 11 were excess subjects,
her total units taken up in the University being 147,
instead of the required 141.
- Well-settled is the principle that by reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of administrative
agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction,
they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon;
thus their findings of fact in that regard are generally
accorded respect, if not finality, by the Courts.
Art. 14, Sec. 4 of the Constitution proves that academic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institution