Schellens & Jong - Argumentation Schemes in Persuasive Brochures

Argumentation Schemes in Persuasive Brochures
PETER JAN SCHELLENS and MENNO DE JONG

University of Twente
Faculty of Behavioural Sciences
Department of Communication Studies
P.O. Box 217
7500 AE Enschede
The Netherlands
E-mail: p.j.m.c.schellens@utwente.nl
m.d.t.dejong@utwente.nl
ABSTRACT: Many public information documents attempt to persuade the recipients that
they should engage in or refrain from specific behaviour. This is based on the assumption
that the recipient will decide about his or her behaviour on the basis of the information
given and a rational evaluation of the pros and cons. An analysis of 20 public information
brochures shows that the argumentation in persuasive brochures is often not marked as such.
Argumentation is presented as factual information, and in many instances the task of making
argumentational links and drawing conclusions is left to the reader. However, since the information offered does follow familiar argumentational schemes, readers can, in principle, reconstruct the argument. All the brochures make use of pragmatic argumentation (argumentation
from consequences), i.e., they formulate at least certain benefits of the desirable behaviour
or disadvantages of the undesirable behaviour. In addition, they make regular use of argumentation from cause to effect and argumentation from example. Argumentation from rules
and argumentation from authority are less frequently used. This empirical analysis of the
use of argumentation schemes is a solid base for interesting and rich hypotheses about the
cognitive processing of persuasive brochures. Central processing requires the reader to be
able to reconstruct argumentation from informational texts and to identify and evaluate
various types of argumentation.
KEY WORDS: appeal to expert opinion, argumentation from analogy, argumentation from
authority, argumentation from cause to effect, argumentation from consequences, argumentation from example, argumentation from rules, argument schemes, causal reasoning, central
route, persuasion, public information
1. INTRODUCTION
Public information documents often attempt to persuade recipients that they

should engage in or refrain from some specific behaviour. That behaviour
may be in the direct interests of the recipient (e.g., in the case of health
education documents), in the interests of society as a whole (e.g., in campaigns promoting environmentally friendly behaviour), or in the interests
of others (e.g., campaigns for charities).
In public information, it is assumed that recipients take decisions about
their behaviour freely and independently, and that they do so on the basis
of relevant information and argumentation. Unlike commercial advertiseArgumentation 18: 295323, 2004.
2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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PETER JAN SCHELLENS AND MENNO DE JONG
ments, persuasive brochures used for public information purposes normally

provide the arguments on the basis of which the source believes recipients
should decide to perform the desirable behaviour.
In this paper we ask two questions. First, what types of argumentation
are used in persuasive brochures? And second, what does that mean for
the assumed processing of persuasive messages by recipients? In answering
the first question, we make use of the typology of argumentation schemes
developed by Schellens (1985). In answering the second question, we make
use of theoretical insights provided by Petty and Cacioppo (1984, 1986)
about the central route in the processing of persuasive texts. We discuss
these questions below, starting with the second question.
Central processing of persuasive messages
In socio-psychological literature, a distinction is made between two ways
in which the recipients of persuasive communication can process the information they are offered: peripherally or centrally (Petty and Cacioppo,
1984, 1986). In peripheral processing, recipients put little or no effort into
the processing and evaluation of the information offered. They reach their
decision either on the basis of the source, or by applying a single rule of
thumb to non-content-based characteristics (the peripheral cues) of the
message, for instance the attractive style of a message or the number of
arguments given. In central processing, they process the information offered
to them carefully, relate it to their previous knowledge and on that basis
arrive at a well-considered conclusion. The route chosen by recipients
depends on their motivation and capacities. If the subject matter is
personally relevant to them and they are able and capable of investing time
and effort into it, they will be more inclined to process the message centrally.
Most readers process public information brochures and leaflets only
peripherally. Nonetheless, the content of such brochures and leaflets does
usually require central processing: in public information documents, as far
as possible, the target group is presented with information specially
designed to point them in the desired direction when making a rational
choice. There is good reason for such an approach: according to Petty and
Cacioppo, attitude change via the peripheral route is less stable and provides
less certainty about the performance of the eventual behaviour than attitude
change via the central route (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986, p. 21; Petty et al.,
1995).
Although the theory of Petty and Cacioppo, known as the Elaboration
Likelihood Model, is well grounded in experimental research into many
types of persuasion, its cognitive aspect has not been worked out in detail.
The theory has little to say about the mental operations involved in peripheral processing and even less about those involved in central processing.
The following description of central processing is illustrative:
ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES IN PERSUASIVE BROCHURES
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The first, or central route to persuasion involves effortful cognitive activity whereby
the person draws upon prior experience and knowledge in order to carefully scrutinize
all of the information relevant to determining the central merits of the position advocated.
(. . .) the message recipient under the central route is actively generating favorable and/or
unfavorable thoughts in response to the persuasive communication. The goal of this
cognitive effort is to determine if the position advocated by the source has any merit
(Petty and Priester, 1994, pp. 9899).
Petty and Cacioppo (1984) explain the role of argumentation in central

processing in slightly more detail. With respect to the outcome of central
processing, they write as follows:
According to this view, if under scrutiny the message arguments are found to be cogent
and compelling, favorable thoughts will be elicited that will result in attitude change in
the direction of the advocacy. If the arguments are found to be weak and specious, they
will be counter argued and the message will be resisted or boomerang (change opposite
to that intended) may even occur (Petty and Cacioppo, 1984, p. 70).
In their description of the peripheral route (particularly in what it does not

entail) the role of argumentation emerges:
Attitude changes that occur via the second or peripheral route do not occur because the
person diligently considered the pros and cons of the issue; they occur because the person
associates the attitude issue or object with favorable or unfavorable cues or makes a simple
inference about the merits of the advocated position based on various simple cues in the
persuasion context. For example, rather than carefully evaluating the issue-relevant arguments, a person may accept an advocacy simply because it is presented during a pleasant
lunch or because the message source is an expert (Petty and Cacioppo, 1984, p. 70).
Central processing thus involves checking whether arguments are cogent

and convincing or weak and specious, considering the pros and cons of a
position, and evaluating the relevant arguments carefully. Although the
terminology fluctuates somewhat, it is clear that central processing requires
careful evaluation of arguments on the basis of earlier experience and prior
knowledge possessed by the recipient. However, the theory of Petty and
Cacioppo does not say anything about what such an evaluation might
involve.
In this article we try to formulate a hypothetical answer to the question
how central processing of persuasive messages takes place. Our answer will
be based on an empirical analysis of argument schemes in persuasive
brochures on the one hand and the assumption that argument schemes are
the crucial units of evaluation in central processing on the other hand.
Argumentation analysis of persuasive messages
We believe that argumentation analysis can help to further our understanding of the notion of central processing in two ways. First, by analysis
of persuasive texts, we can gain insight into the types of argumentation that
appear in them and thus arrive at a more precise definition of what it is
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that is subjected to central processing. For example, text analysis can reveal
whether the argumentation in persuasive communication is only concerned
with the consequences of the behaviour being advocated or discouraged.
Second, normative theories on the quality of argumentation enable us to
formulate hypotheses about the central processing of persuasive texts. The
ideal central processor of argumentation in persuasive texts operates in
accordance with what normative theories about the quality of arguments
prescribe. In this way, we hope to be able to productively bridge research
in argumentation theory and socio-psychological research.
In order to gain insight into the argumentation in persuasive messages,
this study investigates which types of argumentation (as distinguished by
Schellens, 1985) are used in persuasive brochures (see also Schellens, 1987
and Kienpointner, 1992, pp. 201214). Schellens typology of argumentation schemes builds on the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969)
and Hastings (1962) and on manuals for academic debate, such as those
of Freeley (1976). (See Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, and Garssen,
1997, 2001, for a comparable approach from a pragma-dialectical perspective.) We will use the typology of Schellens because of the systematic
link he claims between argument schemes and evaluation criteria: different
schemes are distinguished if and only if they require different evaluation
criteria in the form of critical questions.
Schellens typology, first of all, differentiates between restricted (or
bound) and unrestricted (or unbound) argumentation schemes. Restricted
argumentation schemes are those whose application is limited to a certain
type of position or conclusion: some schemes lead to a conclusion of a
descriptive kind, others to a conclusion of a normative kind. Within the
group of restricted argumentation schemes, a distinction is made between
regularity-based argumentation (used in support of a descriptive statement
about the present, the past or the future), rule-based argumentation (used
in support of a normative statement about the value of a situation or process)
and pragmatic argumentation (leading to a statement about the desirability
of intended behaviour). By contrast, unrestricted argumentation schemes,
including argument from example, analogy and authority, are not used
specifically in support of descriptive or normative statements, but may be
used for either category of position.
In regularity-based argumentation (Schellens, 1985, pp. 77102), argumentation is given for a proposition of a factual or descriptive nature on
the basis of a regularly recurring empirical link. In many cases, such a
regularly recurring link is causal in nature, but that is not necessarily the
case: the link may also be correlative, or a sign link (argument from sign).
A causal link may be used to support predictions or explanations. In argumentation from cause to effect, a prediction that a phenomenon will occur
is derived from a recurring relationship. In argumentation from effect (or
sign) to cause, a diagnosis is made: the regularity of a causal link makes
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it possible to make an assertion with some degree of probability about its

cause, on the basis of observed consequences (or symptoms).
In rule-based argumentation (Schellens, 1985, pp. 115151; see also
Gottlieb, 1968 on rule-guided reasoning), arguments are given for a statement of a normative (evaluative or prescriptive) nature. In argumentation
from evaluation rules (e.g., evaluation standards or evaluation criteria),
arguments are given for evaluating a situation favourably or unfavourably.
In argumentation on the basis of rules of conduct, arguments are given for
a decision about the appropriateness or acceptability of certain behaviour.
In pragmatic argumentation or argumentation from consequences, a
position on the desirability of a given action, behaviour or measure is advocated on the basis of its advantages and/or disadvantages (Schellens, 1985,
pp. 153178; see also Walton, 1996, pp. 7577). In the simplest case, the
argumentation is limited to mentioning one positive or negative effect. More
extensive forms of argumentation from consequences provide a detailed
consideration of the various advantages and disadvantages of a number of
alternatives, in which the feasibility, acceptability and cost of an action
are taken into account.
In addition to these restricted argumentation schemes, Schellens also
distinguishes three unrestricted forms: argumentation from authority, argumentation from example and argumentation from analogy (Schellens, 1985,
pp. 179205). These schemes are not limited to a position or conclusion
of one particular type, but have a wider application. (See also Hastings,
1962 on free-floating arguments.) Argumentation from authority can, for
instance, be used in support of a statement that something is factually true,
or to argue for the desirability or undesirability of behaviour on the basis
of the judgment of an authority.
Given the nature of the central claim or conclusion of a persuasive message,
we may expect a particular pattern of argumentation to appear: a configuration of various argumentation schemes that is typical of the field of argumentation in question (cf. the fields of reasoning described by Toulmin
et al., 1979, pp. 195ff.)
In persuasive brochures, which aim to convince their recipients that they
should do something or refrain from doing something, the following pattern
is to be expected:
1. Since the position taken in persuasive communication relates to the
desirability of behaviour, we expect a dominant role to be taken by
pragmatic argumentation, in which the desirability or undesirability of
behaviour is argued on the basis of the probability and desirability of
its consequences.
2. Statements about the probability of a consequence occurring may be
supported by sub-argumentation in the form of argumentation from cause
to effect, in which it is argued on the basis of one or more causal links
that the predicted effect is likely to occur.
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3. Statements about the desirability of a consequence can be supported by

sub-argumentation in the form of rule-based argumentation in which it
is argued, on the basis of an evaluation rule, that the desirability of a
consequence is plausible.
4. The position relating to the desirability of behaviour, considered separately from its consequences, can be advocated on the basis of an appeal
to rule-based argumentation in which the conduct is judged on the basis
of one or more relevant rules of conduct.
5. Argumentation from authority, example or analogy can be used both to
support the position about the desirability of behaviour and to support
statements about the probability or desirability of consequences.
In sum, the goal of our empirical analysis of persuasive brochures is threefold: to identify the argument schemes used, to see if the expected pattern
of argumentation is found and to formulate hypotheses about the central
processing of persuasive messages.
2. ANALYSIS OF 20 PUBLIC INFORMATION BROCHURES
2.1. Method
We analysed a total of 20 public information brochures and leaflets to determine which schemes of argumentation are used in them. The purpose of
all the brochures and leaflets was to persuade the reader of the desirability
or undesirability of an action or behaviour. The purpose of nine of the 20
brochures was to discourage undesirable behaviour, varying from obvious
topics such as smoking and gambling to importing souvenirs made with or
of endangered plants or animals. Eleven brochures were designed to
promote desirable behaviour (e.g., the use of sun care products, and support
for Amnesty International). The brochures and leaflets were produced by
government agencies and non-profit organisations. Brochures produced by
for-profit organisations were excluded from consideration.
The brochures and leaflets varied in length from a gatefold leaflet (an
A4 folded into three), with text on five of the six pages, to a brochure
of 17 pages. The number of words varied from approximately 400 to
3,100.
Passages in the brochures that contained clearly marked argumentation
were identified and analysed; the argumentation was also reconstructed topdown from the desirable or undesirable conduct. Other passages, which
were not clearly argumentative in nature, were only included in the analysis
if argumentation or sub-argumentation for the position in question could
be extracted from them. The arguments identified in this way were classified in terms of the argumentation schemes defined by Schellens (1985)
(whereby the two types distinguished above, argumentation from an evaluation rule and argumentation from a rule of conduct, were included under
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argumentation from rules). The following argumentation schemes were

distinguished:
Argumentation from cause to effect
Argumentation from effect to cause
Argumentation from rules
Argumentation from consequences
Argumentation from authority
Argumentation from example
Argumentation from analogy
For each brochure, we identified which argumentation schemes are used
in it. In this way we can answer the question in how many brochures an
argumentation scheme is used. The total number of arguments has not been
counted to avoid problems of counting argumentation from consequences
and argumentation from example: in many cases it is difficult to decide
whether a number of consequences or examples form part of a single
argument or must be considered as separate argumentations.
2.2. Overall results
An overview of the results is given in Table 1. All 20 brochures use argumentation from consequences (pragmatic argumentation) to persuade the
reader of the desirability or undesirability of a particular action. This
confirms one of the expectations that we based on the restricted character
of argumentation. Pragmatic argumentation is a scheme that is specifically
bound to claims or standpoints about the desirability or undesirability of
actions, measures or behaviours.
In addition, most of the investigated brochures used argumentation from
cause to effect and argumentation from example. The former type of argumentation is expected where additional arguments are given for the predicted effects of desirable or undesirable behaviour. In principle, as an
unrestricted scheme of argumentation, argumentation from example lends
itself for use in support of various sorts of positions. Argumentation from
rules and argumentation from authority were used less frequently. In what
Table 1. Argumentation schemes in persuasive brochures
Argumentation schemes
Argumentation
Argumentation
Argumentation
Argumentation
Argumentation
Argumentation
Argumentation
from
from
from
from
from
from
from
consequences
cause to effect
example
rules
authority
effect to cause
analogy
Number of brochures in which

the argumentation scheme is used
20
15
14
08
06
03
02
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follows, we will discuss at what points in the argument those sorts of arguments occur and in what forms. Argumentation from effect to cause and
argumentation from analogy occurred only incidentally and we therefore
leave them out of account.
The sources of the excerpts discussed below are identified by the
italicised title of the brochure or leaflet in question (see the list given
after the endnotes). The original excerpts in Dutch are presented here in
translation.
2.3. Argumentation from consequences
In argumentation from consequences,1 in its simplest form, an action or
behaviour is advocated or opposed on the basis of a single desirable consequence (a pro) or undesirable consequence (a con):
Action A leads to B
B is desirable
Therefore, action A is desirable
Action A leads to B
B is undesirable
Therefore, action A is undesirable
In textual form, one of the premises and/or the conclusion are usually left
implicit in such schemes.2 In the following excerpt, both argumentation
schemes are used simultaneously:
(1)
It has been shown that sunburn in childhood increases the risk

of developing skin cancer later in life. (. . .) It is therefore very
important to protect children well against the sun. (Watch out
for your skin)
Schematically:
(1a)
Sunburn in childhood increases the risk of skin cancer

[Increased risk of skin cancer is undesirable]
[Therefore, sunburn in childhood is undesirable]
(1b)
[Sun protection prevents sunburn in children]

[Preventing sunburn is desirable conclusion 1a]
Therefore, sun protection for children is desirable ( important)
In the first step, the argumentation is on the basis of an undesirable consequence. In the second, it is on the basis of a desirable consequence.
It is highly unusual for the argumentation in a brochure to focus on
only one single desirable or undesirable effect. In most cases, the argumentation takes account of several favourable and unfavourable effects. For
example, in a brochure about amphetamines (speed), a total of seven
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(short-term) advantages and more than 25 (long- and short-term) disadvantages are mentioned. The following passage is illustrative:
(2)
What does the amphetamine (speed) user feel?

(. . .) the mental effect: for a time, speed makes users feel active,
happy, alert and self-confident. Self-criticism disappears and its
easier to talk fluently. But speed can also have a quite different
effect: users can become irritable, restless and fearful, particularly when the effect begins to wear off. They can suddenly
become overtired. Regular users often complain of chronic tiredness, lethargy and despondency. (Speed: The answers)
We find comparable forms of argumentation, in which several desirable and

undesirable effects are reviewed, in connection with topics such as drinking,
smoking and sleeping tablets and sedatives.
Excerpt (2) also serves to illustrate other characteristics often exhibited
by pragmatic argumentation. First, the desirability or undesirability of the
consequences is often left unexpressed. The facts that happiness and selfconfidence are desirable and tiredness and lethargy are undesirable are left
to speak for themselves (as they do, of course). Whether the suppression
of self-criticism is a desirable or undesirable effect is open to question,
but given its place in the favourable set of effects and its position before
the oppositional conjunction but, the author seems to assume that it is.
(An alternative interpretation, for which the text offers no direct evidence,
is that the disappearance of self-criticism is the cause of the user being able
to talk more easily and more animatedly.)
Second, in line with the fact that the premise about the desirability or
undesirability of effects is left implicit, the position or conclusion is also
left implicit. There is no mention of a position about the undesirability of
the use of amphetamines, neither in this excerpt nor anywhere in the whole
brochure. The obvious conclusion is left entirely for the reader to draw.
When such an approach is maintained consistently, the brochure takes on
an informative form. No explicit argumentation is given, but the information on which readers can build their own argumentation mounts up. The
question-and-answer form chosen in Speed. The answers reinforces the
informative look of the brochure. The same sort of approach is taken in
brochures about sleeping pills and sedatives, and partly also those about
eating habits during pregnancy.
Argumentation from consequences is by no means limited to mentioning
favourable and unfavourable effects of a single action or behaviour. In a
more extensive form of pragmatic argumentation, the positive and negative
consequences of alternative actions are presented and weighed against each
other (see the extended standard scheme for pragmatic argumentation in
Schellens, 1985, p. 177). In a number of brochures, we find an explicit
comparison of the effects of alternatives; for example, in the following
excerpt from the Exercise book for all age groups:
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(3)
If you dont take much exercise . . .

. . . your muscles, lungs, heart and arteries are not used to working. So when they do need to work, they will find it difficult.
And you will feel it. Youre soon out of breath and tire quickly.
As a result, youre soon discouraged from exercising again.
If you take enough exercise . . .
. . . your muscles, lungs, heart and arteries are used to working.
And that feels a lot better. You feel fitter and more energetic
energetic enough to do lots of enjoyable things, for example.
(Thirty minutes exercise a day works wonders: Exercise book
for all age groups)
Here, too, it is left to the reader to work out that the effects of enough
exercise are preferable to those of taking too little exercise, and that taking
enough exercise is therefore preferable. Since mention is made only of the
disadvantages of one of the alternatives (not taking much exercise), and
only of the advantages of the other (taking enough exercise), the decision
process is presented as a very simple one.
A consideration of the advantages and disadvantages is usually left to
the reader. Occasionally, the reader is expressly invited to make such a
deliberation.
(4)
The advantages and disadvantages

Make your own list of the pros and cons. What advantages and
disadvantages does drinking alcohol have for you? The advantages might include a sociable atmosphere, the pleasant taste
of the drink, the pleasant sensation alcohol gives you, or the fact
that you can talk more easily when youve had a glass or two.
The disadvantages might include the fact that alcohol is expensive, that it cause stomach trouble, or that your partner or other
people make denigrating remarks about your drinking.
Weigh up the balance. Are there only advantages? Or are there
also some disadvantages? If some of the aspects of drinking
alcohol are less pleasant in your case, perhaps you would prefer
to get rid of them. (What sort of drinker am I?)
Underneath this text, on the same page, there is a column headed

Advantages and a column headed Disadvantages. There are 15 blank lines,
with three bullet points to suggest that at least three advantages and three
disadvantages should be filled in.
The most concealed form of argumentation from consequences is to be
found in brochures in which the reader is invited to take a test. The abovementioned Exercise book starts with such a test:
(5)
How do you want to feel?

(. . .) Choose from the following list what you would like. They
are all possible, so tick all of them if you wish:
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Id like to feel more energetic

Id like to have more stamina
Id like to cut down the chances of developing heart
problems
Id like to keep my bones as strong as possible
Id like to sleep better
Id like to stop being so tired
Id like to avoid weight problems
Id like to feel more relaxed
Id like to be less prone to getting ill
Id like to feel a good bit younger
It sounds almost too good to be true, but it is: thirty minutes
exercise a day can give you all this . . . (Thirty minutes exercise
a day works wonders)
Here the reader is explicitly invited to agree that certain effects are
desirable. In this way, the reader is forced (in argumentation-theoretic
terms) to make a number of concessions, i.e., to agree in advance with a
number of statements (potential arguments). As a result, the information
given later about causal links between exercise and the effects the reader
has ticked as desirable, can no longer be dismissed as irrelevant.
2.4. Argumentation from cause to effect
In its prototypical form, argumentation from cause to effect predicts that
a specific effect (Bi) will occur if phenomenon (Ai) occurs, on the basis
that phenomenon (A) generally leads to effect (B).3 Schematically:
A (generally) leads to B
Ai is the case
Therefore, Bi is (probably) the case
In a frequently occurring hypothetical variant, Ai is not a fact but is precisely the behaviour being advocated or opposed, e.g., to quit smoking, or
start smoking. The conclusion is therefore a conditional: If Ai is the case,
Bi will probably occur.4
In persuasive brochures, such individual predictions appear to be omitted:
they are often left to the reader to make. The argumentation remains limited
to generalised causal links between the behaviour advocated or opposed
and the generally occurring effects. Argumentation can be given for such
generalised causal links in the form of a chain of more easily understandable or plausible causal links. As we will see, argumentation from cause
to effect is then found in the form of a hypothetical
syllogism (often with one of the premises remaining implicit).
A (generally) leads to B
(B (generally) leads to C)
Therefore, A (probably) leads to C
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Table 1 shows that argumentation from cause to effect is found in 15 of

the brochures analysed. However, it is certainly not the case that such a
form of argumentation supports all the effects of desirable or undesirable
behaviour in those brochures. In general, authors of informational brochures
make assertions about the effects without offering further argumentation
(cf. Excerpt 2). They seem to assume that readers normally accept such
assertions on the basis of their previous knowledge or on the basis of the
authority of the source.
In the 15 brochures in which argumentation is used to make predictions, one to five of the predictions are supported by argumentation from
cause to effect. In the excerpt cited above about skin cancer, for example,
we find it as follows:
(1c)
(a) Sunburn in childhood has been shown to lead to an increased

chance of developing skin cancer in later life, because (b) the
earlier skin cells are damaged, the longer they have to develop
into skin cancer. (c) The more UV rays a person is subjected to
when young, the greater the chance of getting skin cancer later
on. (d) It is therefore very important to protect children against
the sun. (Watch out for your skin)
The prediction that sunburn in childhood can lead to an increased risk of

skin cancer is supported by two causal assertions in conditional form in the
two subsequent sentences. Schematically:
(1d)
(If skin is subjected to more UV rays in childhood, more cells

are damaged)
The earlier cells are damaged, the more chance they have of
developing into skin cancer (b)
Therefore, if skin is subjected to more UV rays in childhood,
then the chance of skin cancer in later life is greater (c)
(If skin is sunburned in childhood, the skin is subjected to more
UV rays)
If the skin is subjected to more UV rays in childhood, then the
chance of skin cancer in later life is greater (c)
Therefore, sunburn in childhood leads to an increased risk of
developing skin cancer in later life (a)
Here we see a relatively complex process that is intended to make plausible a link between behaviour and effect that is relevant to the reader. It
is possibly the complexity of such links that generally keeps authors of
informational brochures from including such argumentation.
Argumentation from cause to effect can also be used to support social
and psychological links that are somewhat easier to envisage. For example,
in the following excerpt, it is predicted that caring for a foster child will
require extra attention:
(6)
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Foster children arent model children: they have their moods,

like every other child. They require your attention, perhaps
more, or in a different way, than other children. It is not easy
for them to live apart from their parents. They have often already
gone through a lot. They are still wrestling with their past experiences and that calls for understanding on your part. (Im
looking for a house where I need to be home before dark)
From the fact that, just like other children, foster children are not model
children, the deduction is made that they need attention. From the fact that
they live apart from their parents, that they have often already been through
a lot and are wrestling with that, the deduction is made that they need more
attention, or attention of a different kind. All this leads to the conclusion
(not explicitly drawn here) that if someone wants to become a foster parent,
(s)he will need to be able to give the child this extra attention. That is one
of the disadvantages or costs of foster parenthood.
In all the above examples, there is a direct link between the action being
advocated (applying sun protection to childrens skin, becoming a foster
parent) and the desirable or undesirable effects of that action (no skin
cancer, giving a foster child extra attention). In some cases, the predictions involved are rather more distant from the position being advocated.
(7)
In the coming years, there will be an increasing need for care

for people with brain disorders. Thanks to great advances in
medicine, people who have brain damage, have had a stroke, or
have meningitis or a brain tumour are living longer. (Thinking
about brains, brain damage and recovery)
On the basis of the fact that people with brain disorders are living longer,
the prediction is made that the need for care will increase. Only a number
of links further on does it become clear that this prediction is important in
connection with an action being advocated: support for the Dutch Brain
Foundation. In short: an increased need for care requires more medical
research and more information: by supporting the Foundation you will
ensure that that is possible.
2.5. Argumentation from example
As an unrestricted scheme of argumentation, argumentation from example
can be used in support of various sorts of claims. The propositions being
supported are of a general nature: a case is made for the fact that something is always, often or sometimes the case. The proposition being supported may be descriptive or normative in nature: it may relate to something
that is always, often or sometimes true, or something that is always, often
or sometimes good, justified, beautiful or appropriate. We use the following
scheme for argumentation from example:5
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In example A1, B is the case/appropriate

(In example A2 etc., B is the case/appropriate)
Therefore, in cases of A, B is the case/appropriate
With respect to argumentation from consequences, we expected that
examples would be used to support statements about the desirable or undesirable effects of behaviour. In such cases, examples can in principle serve
to argue for the actual occurrence of an effect, or to argue in favour of the
desirability or undesirability of an effect. In addition, we expected that argumentation from example would be used to support the desirability of the
behaviour being advocated.6
These expectations were largely satisfied in the analysis, although there
also were interesting deviations and additions.
First, in none of the brochures did we find examples supporting statements about a desirable effect. An author claiming that thirty minutes
exercise a day leads to a fitter body might cite examples to support the
fact that is a very desirable effect. But such argumentation from example
was not attested. By contrast, it is undesirable effects that are supported
by examples. The following excerpt deals with the use of sleeping tablets
and sedatives:
(8)
Unpleasant side effects may occur, such as headache, tiredness,

irritability or a feeling of emptiness, dizziness and despondency.
Interest in sex may also be reduced. (Sleeping tablets and
sedatives)
Both the existence of side effects (many side effects may occur) and their
undesirable nature (generally, side effects are unpleasant) are supported
here by the examples given. A brochure about vivisection, which largely
takes an informative approach, gives the following examples in a factual
explanation of the use of laboratory animals for various purposes:
(9)
Many laboratory animals are used to test whether materials are

toxic or not. For example, laboratory animals are forced to eat
soap powder. They have to keep eating it until they become ill
or even die. That way, researchers can work out how much soap
powder people can eat before they become ill (but who would
think of eating soap powder?). Almost all new products are
tested on animals, including shampoo, lipstick, party nibbles,
paint and tobacco. (If animals could talk . . .)
In the first place, of course, these examples (soap powder, shampoo, lipstick
etc.) serve to support the general assertion made in the first sentence. But,
at the same time, the first example serves to support another position
expressed later on in the text, namely, that the use of laboratory animals
for research purposes leads to a lot of undesirable and unnecessary suffering for the laboratory animals.
309
Against our expectations, argumentation from example is not used to

support the desirability of behaviour, but rather to argue for the feasibility
of desirable behaviour, or, in other words, to show that the alternative
behaviour is practicable. Example 10 comes from the same brochure about
vivisection:
(10)
As you know, large numbers of laboratory animals undergo

unpleasant tests. There is another way. Alternatives can be used.
Here are a few examples:
Dead eyes
In order to see whether a shampoo stings when it gets in your
eyes, shampoo is put into the eye of a rabbit. The rabbit is put
in a small cage so that it cant rub the shampoo out of its eyes.
Researchers leave the shampoo in the eyes for hours, sometimes
days. This is of course a terrible time for the rabbit. Fortunately,
this is no longer necessary. Researchers have discovered that
they can just as well use the eyes of dead rabbits. Then theres
no need for any pain (If animals could talk . . .).
This is followed by a number of examples of alternatives involving computers, robots and tissue cultures. In these examples, too, the animal suffering is described in more detail and more graphically than is required
given the claim as formulated (Alternatives are possible). And here too,
we can only consider the description as argumentation from example to
argue for the undesirable nature of vivisection.
The feasibility of the behaviour being advocated is argued at length
with examples in the Exercise book for all ages. The examples here do not
serve to support the claim that thirty minutes exercise a day is desirable,
but that the desirable behaviour is quite possible and practicable for
everyone.
(11)
In addition, there are also possibilities of combining pleasure

with something useful. The possibilities for taking exercise are
all around us in the home.
(. . .)
In and around the home
Maybe there are regular jobs that you get other people to do
for you, even though you could easily do them yourself
cleaning windows, for example.
There are more and more appliances that save you work (and
also exercise). Use a hand-propelled mower. Use a brush or
hoe instead of a power blower. Use a sponge and wash-leather
instead of a high-pressure hose.
No dog has ever complained about being taken for a walk
more often than is necessary whether its your own dog or
your neighbours.
310
You can probably think of many other examples . . .

(Thirty minutes exercise a day works wonders)
Examples of activities and exercises designed to show that the desirable
behaviour, thirty minutes exercise a day, can be quite easily done, are given
under the headings Getting from A to B, Working and Shopping and
Sporting activities.
In addition to our expectations, in two of the 20 brochures, argumentation from example is made the structuring principle of the brochure as a
whole. In one leaflet, intended to keep returning travellers from unintentionally engaging in the traffic in endangered plant and animal species by
bringing back prohibited souvenirs, the headings of seven sections are as
follows:
(12)
ARE YOU TRAVELLING ABROAD? THEN THINK TWICE

BEFORE BUYING SOUVENIRS SUCH AS . . . (. . .)
. . . IVORY: (. . .)
. . . TURTLES: (. . .)
. . . CORAL: (. . .)
. . . PLANTS: (. . .)
. . . WILD ANIMALS: (. . .)
. . . BECAUSE YOU WILL BE RUNNING THE RISK OF A
HEAVY FINE FOR DESTROYING LIFE ON EARTH. (. . .) (You
wouldnt be the first one to be inadvertently guilty of smuggling endangered animals and plants)
Beneath each of the headings there is a short piece of argumentation as to

why bringing back souvenirs made of ivory, etc. is both unwise and risky.
The text under the final heading contains the following information, which
makes it clear that the above are only examples:
(12b)
These are only a few examples. International trade in more than

800 animal and plant species is prohibited. Within the EU, strict
rules are now in force covering more than 20,000 other species
(. . .) (You wouldnt be the first one to be inadvertently guilty
of smuggling endangered animals and plants).
Finally, we also find cases of argumentation from example that cannot be

linked directly to the premises about effects and the conclusion about desirable behaviour in pragmatic argumentation. In a number of cases, there is
an indirect link:
(13)
Hard or soft PVC can be found everywhere: in foils, credit cards,

rubber boots, pipes, window frames and cables. PVC may also
be present in imitation leather, floor coverings, wallpaper and
Venetian blinds (Stop poisonous toys).
311
Here, the examples serve to demonstrate that PVC is to be found in more

products than consumers think (sentence 1). In this and several other cases,
argumentation from example forms part of a passage in which the seriousness or extent of a problem (the undesirable situation) is advocated.
2.6. Argumentation from rules
Argumentation from rules is used to justify an evaluation of a situation
or process by appealing to an evaluation rule (an evaluation standard or
evaluation criterion) or a rule of conduct (a moral, legal or conventional
rule). These can be combined in a single scheme as follows:7
If A is the case, then an evaluation E is justified/conduct C is
required
A is the case
Therefore, evaluation E is justified/conduct C is required
In relation to pragmatic argumentation, we would, first, expect that evaluation rules will be used to justify the desirability or undesirability of the
consequences of an action or behaviour. In that case, rule-based argumentation is subordinate to argumentation from consequences. Secondly, rules
of conduct (whether laid down in law or not) can provide argumentation
that directly argues for or against the desirable or undesirable behaviour.
In that case, rule-based argumentation is convergent with argumentation
from consequences.
Although only eight of the 20 brochures made use of argumentation from
rules, those eight largely meet our expectations.
When arguments are given for the desirability or undesirability of certain
effects, they are made on the basis of an appeal to an explicit or implicit
rule or norm, as in the following example.
(14)
People with a brain disorder also ought to be able to lead as

comfortable a life as possible. Scientific brain research can contribute to this: greater knowledge of disorders leads to more
practical methods of treatment and better customised care
(Thinking about brains, brain damage and recovery).
Customised care in itself is already a possible desirable effect of healthcare research, but its desirability for people with a brain disorder is reinforced by the norm that they also have a right to as comfortable a life as
possible. (The causal links between customised care and a comfortable
life are left implicit.)
Sometimes, the norms to which appeal is made remain implicit. The
following excerpt argues that extra understanding for people with a brain
disorder is desirable by referring to their relatively high degree of vulnerability. Here, the norm that greater understanding for socially vulnerable
groups is desirable is used implicitly.
312
(15)
(. . .) As a result, people with brain damage form a separate

group of patients within rehabilitation: they are more vulnerable
when it comes to reintegration into the community than physically handicapped people. The Dutch Brain Foundation would
like to tackle this problem, too. By informing people about the
brain and brain disorders, they aim to create greater understanding amongst the public for people with a brain disorder.
(Thinking about brains, brain damage and recovery)
We believe it is no coincidence that an explicit or implicit appeal to norms

in public information brochures appears precisely in the case of argumentation in favour of humanitarian goals. When the desirability of behaviour
and its effects is directly in the readers own interest, further argumentation is usually unnecessary. Without any problem, readers can be left to
decide for themselves just how desirable the effects of the behaviour are.
Argumentation from rules of conduct may be used directly to argue for
the desirability or undesirability of conduct. We find only an occasional
example of that, and only in the case of a rule of conduct that has been
legally laid down, including penalties. In fact, reference to penalties transforms argumentation from rule (in this case, prohibition) into argumentation from consequences. For the reader, the argumentation may come
down to the prediction of an undesirable effect: getting caught and being
punished.
(16)
Coral reefs are vulnerable biotopes on which numerous sea creatures depend for their survival. Many countries have established
a ban on diving for, selling and exporting coral. Before you
return to the EU with your treasures from the sea, you should
find out whether you need an import licence . . . otherwise the
fine may end up being greater than the cost of your whole
holiday (You wouldnt be the first one to be inadvertently guilty
of smuggling endangered animals and plants).
The undesirable effect of coral souvenirs (i.e., the destruction of vulnerable biotopes) is made worse here by the possibility of another undesirable effect: a heavy fine, resulting in a multiple argument structure. Readers
can choose: am I going to be persuaded by the danger to vulnerable biotopes
or am I going to be deterred by the fine?
2.7. Argumentation from authority
Argumentation from authority is an unrestricted scheme of argumentation,
and can in principle be used to support any sort of position. Schematically,8
this can be represented as follows:
A says P
Therefore, (I) P
313
where P may be an assertion of fact or a value judgement, and where I

stands for interpretation of (to take account of argumentation in which
the conclusion is a paraphrase of the quotation).
Whenever argumentation from authority is used in connection with argumentation from consequences, it can therefore be expected to be used as
an argument for the probability of one or more of the consequences, or as
an argument for their desirability or undesirability. Argumentation from
authority can also be used to support the desirability of behaviour directly.
In that case argumentation from authority is convergent with argumentation from consequences.
Argumentation from authority occurs in only six of the 20 brochures. It
should be noted, however, that we did not consider the sources of the
brochures to be argumentation from authority, although readers may of
course construct for themselves argumentation from authority (e.g., If
authoritative institutions such as the National Institute for the Advancement
of Health (NIGZ) and the Netherlands Institute of Mental Health and
Addiction jointly issue a brochure, then it will be reliable.) Our analysis
therefore only takes into account those cases in which the text refers to
sources other than the issuer of the brochure to strengthen the message.
Most of the arguments from authority occur in a Greenpeace folder about
soft PVC toys.
(17)
In order to make PVC soft and flexible, phthalates (softening

agents) are used. Laboratory research shows that these substances are linked with liver and kidney damage. Phthalates also
appear on the list of substances suspected to be carcinogenic
issued by the International Agency for Research on Cancer
(IARC). Moreover, scientists believe that these substances
disturb the hormonal systems of humans and animals, which can
result, amongst other things, in reduced fertility and stunted
growth in young children. The Dutch Health Protection
Inspectorate (IGB) has shown that children can ingest these
dangerous substances when playing with toys made of soft PVC
(e.g., teething rings) sometimes in unacceptable quantities.
(Stop poisonous toys)
Laboratory research, the IARC and unnamed scientists are used in

support of the statement that there may be risks attached to phthalates.
Subsequently, the IGB is introduced to back up the statement that children
can ingest phthalates by playing with PVC toys. Apparently, Greenpeace
assumes that if they were to make such statements on their own authority,
these arguments would be less convincing to the target group.
All the above arguments from authority are used to back up statements
about the effects of behaviour. In the following cases, argumentation from
authority is used directly to support statements about the desirability of
behaviour:
314
(18)
It is better not to give babies or small children soft PVC toys.

Consumers Guide, September 1997 (Stop poisonous toys).
(19)
In July 1997, health minister Erica Terpstra wrote to the baby

toy trade: (. . .) I appeal to your reputation and sense of responsibility to take your own voluntary measures to prevent this
unnecessary and undesirable exposure of babies to phthalates
from baby toys (Stop poisonous toys).
In (18), the position Dont buy any soft PVC toys is directly supported
by a quotation from the Dutch Consumers Guide. In (19), the following
premise remains implicit: If the Minister of Health calls on the trade to
stop selling soft PVC, then for me, as a consumer, it would be wise not to
buy anything containing it.
In the above cases, argumentation from authority involves an appeal to
the expertise of an identifiable source or an anonymous group. Two other
forms of argumentation from authority were found in our analysis. First,
appeal is occasionally made to the opinion of a collective with which the
reader has some connection to back up a position.
(20)
More and more people are choosing to follow the working

methods of Solidaridad (Towards a new pattern in the Central
American clothing industry).
(21)
Many people are touched by the sight of naked children enjoying

water and sand. But more and more parents know that their
children need to be well protected against the sun, not only to
prevent suffering from sunburn, but also to save them from skin
problems (Watch out for your skin).
Second, in a number of brochures, use is made of testimonials from

representatives of the target group to back up positions relating to desirable behaviour and their effects. In the Exercise book for all ages, quoted
earlier, four such testimonials (anonymous but with photograph) are used.
The following excerpt particularly seeks to make the point that thirty
minutes exercise a day can have a beneficial effect on weight.
(22)
I exercise instead of dieting

I get desperate from dieting. Every kilogram I lose by dieting
comes back in no time. I didnt feel that my weekly aerobic club
helped me much. I still go, but at home I also do fifteen minutes
every morning before taking a shower. After work I dont drive
to the supermarket, but do my shopping on my bike. Besides
that, I also think up as many possible little walks I could take
in between. Ive stopped dieting and keep a closer eye on what
I eat. Maybe I could do with losing another couple of kilograms,
but at least my weight is stable now (Thirty minutes exercise
a day works wonders).
315
Although this argumentation could be seen as a special form of argumentation from example, we prefer to treat such cases as arguments from
authority: the testimonial providers membership of the target group and
the readers possibility of identification with him or her, gives the testimonial provider the authority of someone who speaks from experience.
Finally, the use of a celebrity as authority is found only once in the
brochures we analysed: in a quotation and with a photograph, Dutch actress
Monique van der Ven endorses the work of the Dutch Brain Foundation
(Thinking about brains).
3. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this study, our purpose was to discover which sorts of argumentation

are used in persuasive public information documents. Due to the fact that
different evaluation norms are systematically linked to the various argumentation schemes identified, we can now speculate, on the basis of the
pattern of argumentation found, about the tasks that readers take upon themselves in centrally processing a public information document.
If we look at the frequency with which the various argumentation
schemes are used in public information texts, then we see that argumentation from consequences, argumentation from cause to effect and argumentation from example are the most preferred. These argumentation
schemes were used in three quarters or more of the material investigated.
These preferences are in line with what was found earlier in newspaper
texts. In an analysis of ten contributions to readers columns, these
three types were also found to be the most frequent, together with argumentation for explanation (Schellens, 1985, p. 71). This similarity between
public information documents and newspaper opinion pages can be
explained on the basis of the sort of final position being argued for: in
both cases, it concerns the desirability or undesirability of behaviour. In
public information documents, it is usually a question of individual behaviour, whereas in contributions to opinion pages it is usually a question
of the behaviour or policy of governmental and other institutions. The
main difference lies in the fact that opinion articles more often present
arguments relating to positions about the causes of problems; whereas
this aspect is virtually absent in public information documents. In an
analysis of 50 newspaper texts (leader articles, reviews, advertisements
and reports), argumentation from rules of evaluation was among the most
frequently used argumentation schemes (alongside argumentation from
cause to effect, argumentation from effect to cause and argumentation from
consequences). This is mainly due to the nature of leader articles and
reviews, which tend to focus on the evaluation of a situation (in politics or
the arts).
In describing the pattern of argumentation that we found in public infor-
316
mation documents, we follow the pattern of expectations that we formulated at the end of the Introduction.
1. In line with our expectations, the most frequently used argumentation
scheme in persuasive brochures is argumentation from consequences. It
was used in all the brochures analysed. It is striking that in many cases
the argumentation is often hardly marked as such, if at all. The desirability or undesirability of consequences is left implicit and the conclusion (often obvious) is not expressed. Readers often have to construct
their own argumentation from a quasi-informative text.
2. The probability of the consequences is often (in 15 of the 20 brochures)
supported by argumentation from cause to effect, in which a consequence
of the desirable or undesirable behaviour is derived from one or more
causal links.
3. The desirability of consequences is argued for in only a few cases on
the basis of an explicit or implicit rule of evaluation.
4. The desirability of behaviour is argued for in only a few cases directly
on the basis of an implicit or explicit rule of conduct. In cases where
that rule of conduct is a legal prohibition and violation entails a penalty,
the argumentation automatically takes on a pragmatic character, since
incurring the penalty can be seen as an undesirable consequence of the
prohibited behaviour.
5. Argumentation from example and argumentation from authority are used
regularly, whereas argumentation from analogy is hardly used at all.
Argumentation from example is used (in 14 of the 20 brochures) to
support the plausibility of undesirable effects of undesirable behaviour,
or the practicability of the desirable behaviour. Argumentation from
authority is mostly used (in six of the 20 brochures) to argue for the
probability of effects and the desirability of behaviour.
The average persuasive public information brochure provides information,
by means of a text that is not overtly argumentative, about the consequences
of desirable or undesirable behaviour. The desirability or undesirability of
the consequences themselves is considered to be self-evident. The probability of the predicted consequences actually occurring is supported in a
number of cases through the use of argumentation from cause to effect,
argumentation from example or argumentation from authority. The practicability of the conduct being advocated is sometimes directly supported
by argumentation from example or argumentation from authority.
What implications does this sort of structuring have for the central processing of persuasive texts? First, it is important to observe that, at first
sight, many persuasive texts are hardly (if at all) argumentative in nature:
arguments are not given explicitly and the construction of an argumentation structure is left to the reader. Readers processing texts centrally must
therefore be able and willing to construct their own argumentation on the
basis of an ostensibly informative text. It is perhaps not too difficult to
construct (or reconstruct) an argument on the basis of an informative text
317
about the effects of smoking which leads to the conclusion that it is better
not to smoke. In that case, the putative argument follows well-trodden paths.
But in the case of sleeping tablets and sedatives, for instance,
constructing or reconstructing an argument is a rather more complex matter
and any conclusion will also be considerably more subtle.
Second, the predominantly pragmatic nature of the argumentation means
that readers processing the text centrally will at least test the argumentation they have constructed (or reconstructed) against evaluation criteria
for that type of argumentation. Schellens and Verhoeven (1994, p. 114)
formulate nine evaluation questions applicable to the standard scheme for
argumentation from consequences. It would be going too far to set all the
evaluation questions as potential heuristics used by central processors in
evaluating arguments. (Hastings, 1962, pp. 7677, for instance, formulates
only three). Nonetheless, the careful evaluation of arguments assumed by
Petty and Cacioppos Elaboration Likelihood Model must at least involve
the central processors asking themselves, in one form or another, the following questions:
How desirable or undesirable are the consequences presented as pros or
cons of the behaviour being advocated?
How likely is it that the consequences mentioned will occur?
Have all relevant advantages and disadvantages (including costs) of the
advocated behaviour been taken into account?
Is the advocated behaviour feasible or practicable?
Do the advantages of the advocated behaviour weigh more heavily than
the disadvantages and the costs?
Having weighed up the advantages and disadvantages of the behaviour
being advocated, is it preferable to alternatives for that behaviour,
similarly considered?
Third, people who process texts centrally may be expected to consider other
sorts of argumentation used to support the standpoint directly or indirectly.
That means that they must also be able to evaluate, on their various merits,
argumentation from cause to effect, argumentation from rule, argumentation from example and argumentation from authority. In some form or other,
they will also have to be able to ask and answer relevant evaluation questions related to those types of argumentation. Here, too, a number of crucial
questions can be distilled from the evaluation questions relating to the argumentation schemes in question. For example, in the case of argumentation
from cause to effect:
Are the causal links being referred to plausible?
Do the causal links presented make the predicted consequence plausible?
In the case of argumentation from rules:
Are the evaluation criteria used or the rule of conduct used relevant in
this case?
Are other evaluation criteria or rules of conduct relevant?
In the case of argumentation from example:
318
Are the examples mentioned plausible and typical of the class to which
the conclusion relates?
Are there any counterexamples that undermine the conclusion?
And in the case of argumentation from authority:
Is the cited authority sufficiently expert to justify acceptance of the
statement solely on his authority?
Is the cited authority disinterested and impartial?
Are there any other authoritative sources who assert the contrary?
In reasoning along these lines, we may be giving the impression that
we are equating a normative theory about the quality of argumentation (in
this case the argumentation schemes and evaluation questions of Schellens)
with an explanatory theory about the cognitive processing of persuasive
texts, namely the central route in Petty and Cacioppos Elaboration
Likelihood Model. Such an equation would go much too far, but we certainly believe a comparison of the two approaches can yield a number of
useful hypotheses. On the one hand, the explanatory theory of Petty and
Cacioppo has a clearly normative element in that it describes central processing as a process of careful judgment, with a consequent distinction
between strong and weak arguments. However, what is important for the
further specification of the concept of central processing is not so much a
question of what, ideally, should happen in the process of evaluating carefully the strength of argumentation, but rather a question of what cognitive operations recipients of persuasive messages actually perform in
processing a persuasive message and evaluating it. On the other hand, the
argumentation schemes and evaluation questions formulated by Hastings
(1962), Schellens (1985) and Walton (1996) also have clear empirical pretensions: the argumentation schemes are based on the forms of argumentation found in argumentative texts and (unlike formal logical evaluation
criteria) the evaluation questions are intended for use by ordinary language
users. In this way, in one form or another, normative schemes constitute
potential hypotheses concerning the cognitive schemes used by language
users when they produce their own argumentation or process that of others.
In the same way, the evaluation questions per scheme can be seen as potential hypotheses concerning the heuristics used by language users to retrieve
relevant prior knowledge and possible counterarguments. It is then an
empirical question as to what extent schemes and evaluation questions (in
whole or in part, and of a greater or lesser degree of abstraction) also
actually form part of the language users cognitive mechanism.
Precisely how research into this topic should be carried out is still largely
an open question. Earlier research by Hastings (1962), Schellens (1985)
and Garssen (1997), however, may throw some light on the matter. Hastings
found that argumentation from authority and argumentation from figurative analogy were identified with very high frequencies (100%), nonfigurative analogy and argumentation from cause to effect scored about
70%, whereas the other types he distinguished all scored less than 50%.
319
Schellens, who asked subjects to identify various forms of argumentation

after receiving brief instructions, found that the types most frequently
correctly identified were argumentation from consequences (in this case
from goal to means), argumentation from example and argumentation from
cause to effect (identified correctly in 6070% of the cases); whereas
argumentation from effect to cause and argumentation from rules of
evaluation (in this case from characteristics to value judgment) were
correctly identified in 4050% of cases. Although the results of Hastings
and Schellens were achieved after instruction, a high score possibly means
that the argument scheme appeals to an already available cognitive scheme.
Garssen (1997, pp. 155ff) asked subjects to classify and group three types
of argumentation verbally, with no prior instruction about argumentation
schemes. He found that subjects correctly classified and grouped argumentation from comparison but scored only very moderately on argumentation from causal links and argumentation from sign relation. Similarly,
it emerged in a critical response test that only in the case of argumentation from comparison do subjects express their criticism of argumentation
in a way that makes it possible to derive any insight into the argumentation scheme used. One possible explanation of this is that the three sorts
of argumentation distinguished by Garssen, following pragma-dialectical
theory, are defined rather abstractly. As a result, quite different subtypes
are subsumed under the sign and causal link. Nonetheless, the methods
developed by Garssen provide a good starting point for further research
into the argumentative notions used by language users.
One of the Netherlands authorities in the field of sports, footballer Johan
Cruijff once famously said: Every advantage has its disadvantage. This
suggests that his cognitive mechanisms include at least a partial scheme for
argumentation from consequences. We believe it would be useful to analyse
the evaluations of subjects who are asked to evaluate persuasive texts while
thinking aloud to find indications of argumentation schemes and evaluation criteria. Subsequently, in line with Petty and Cacioppos research,
experiments could be carried out to see whether such heuristics are used
less in the case of peripheral processing than in the case of central processing.
NOTES
1
We consider pragmatic argumentation and argumentation from consequences to be two

terms denoting the same type of argumentation. The more usual term (pragmatic argumentation) is found, for example, in the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, pp.
266270) and Kienpointner (1992, pp. 340342). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca give the
following description: We call that argument pragmatic which permits the evaluation of an
act or an event in terms of its favorable or unfavorable consequences (p. 266). The term
argumentation from consequences is borrowed from Walton (1996, pp. 7577). He uses
the term for a species of practical reasoning where a contemplated policy or course of action
320
is favorably supporting by citing the good consequences of it. In the negative form, a contemplated action is rejected on the grounds that it will have bad consequences (p. 75). We
prefer Waltons terminology because it allows a clear parallelism in the naming of various
argumentation schemes.
Walton also uses the term argument from consequences later in his book (pp. 168ff.)
for a different sort of argumentation, namely accepting the truth (or falsehood) of a proposition by citing the consequences of accepting (or rejecting) that proposition (p. 168). (See
Blair, 1999, who correctly points out this inconsistency on Waltons part.) The usual name
for this fallacy is argument ad consequentiam.
2
This scheme is taken from Schellens (1985, pp. 174175). A more abstract but comparable scheme for argument from consequences is given by Kienpointner (1992):
Wenn die Folgen einer Handlung eine Bewertung X rechtfertigen, ist auch
die Handlung selbst mit X zo bewerten / (nicht) zu vollziehen
Die Folgen der Handlung sind mit X zu bewerten
Also: Die Handlung is mit X zu bewerten / (nicht) zu vollziehen (p. 341)
Walton (1996) gives the following scheme:
If A is brought about, then good (bad) consequences will (may plausibly) occur
Therefore, A should (not) be brought about (p. 76).
The notation for argumentation schemes varies considerably; no clear-cut conventions have
yet been developed for them.
3
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) deal with this type in passing as one of the forms
of argumentation in which a causal link is used: argumentation which relies on the intervention of the causal link to try, with a given event as starting point, to increase or decrease
the belief in the existence of a cause which would explain it, or of an effect which would
result from it (p. 263). In the latter case, we speak of argumentation from cause to effect.
Kienpointner (1992) following Schellens (1985) also makes a distinction between explanatory and predictive causal argumentation schemes. Schellens (1985, p. 100), Schellens and
Verhoeven (1988, p. 82), Kienpointner (1992, p. 336) and Walton (1996, p. 73) formulate
almost identical argumentation schemes.
4
Hastings (1962, pp. 6577) and Walton (1996, pp. 7475) also mention this hypothetical
variant of argumentation from cause to effect. Hastings: Cause to effect reasoning may
take two forms. The first is a prediction on the basis of existing conditions, saying that certain
events will occur in the future. The second form is that of a conditional or hypothetical structure, in which the results of hypothetical conditions are predicted (p. 65). Moreover, Hastings
makes no distinction between argumentation from consequences and argumentation from
cause to effect. He subsumes non-argued predictions that a proposed measure will have a
certain effect under argumentation from cause to effect. We, with Walton, reserve the term
for hypothetical or non-hypothetical predictions argued for on the basis of a causal link.
5
This scheme is borrowed from Schellens and Verhoeven (1988, p. 108). Kienpointner
(1992, p. 368) makes a distinction between a descriptive and a normative variant. In the
first scheme, the examples take the form: In Beispiel 1 kommt X die Eigenschaft Y zu
and the conclusion is: Nicht wenigen/zahlreichen/vielen/den meisten X kommt Y zu. In the
normative variant, the examples take the following form: In Beispiel 1 ist die Bewertung
Y von X gerechtfertigt and the conclusion is as follows: In nicht wenigen/zahlreichen/
vielen/den meisten Fllen ist die Bewertung Y von X gerechtfertigt.
Walton (1996, pp. 5053) seems to only consider the descriptive variant. His scheme is
as follows:
In this particular case, the individual a has property F and also property G.
a is typical of things that have F, and may or may not also have G.
Therefore, generally, if x has property F, then x also has property G (p. 52).
321
Hastings (1962, pp. 2535) also attaches only descriptive generalizations as conclusions to
argumentation from example: In this process of reasoning, the essential characteristic is
the verbal formulation of a description of an aspect of reality from the presentation of typical
instances, examples, or samples of reality (p. 25). However, it appears from his examples
that those descriptive generalisations often contain normative elements, for instance in supporting conclusions about inadequate policies or misadministration.
6
Various authors point to the problematic distinction between an argument from example
and an illustration. In the former case, an example is used to make a statement plausible; in
the latter case, an example is used to illustrate or clarify a well-known or accepted statement (cf. e.g., Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 357). That distinction, however,
can rarely be used on text-analytic grounds: the linguistic form of the example does not reveal
how the author intended his example to function, nor is it possible to ascertain whether a
reader accepts a statement in advance. We here apply a maximally argumentative interpretation of examples. (Cf. the strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation of Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 49.)
7
In this scheme, we take together argumentation from evaluation rules and argumentation
from rules of conduct. Specific schemes for these have been formulated in Schellens (1985,
pp. 139140, 150) and Schellens and Verhoeven (1988, pp. 7374, 78). The basis for these
lies in the analysis of evaluation rules of Hare (1953) and the structure for reasoning with
rules of Gottlieb (1968). The literature on argumentation types shows a somewhat fragmentary picture. In Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), we do not find any separate treatment of argumentation from rules or norms; although, the authors do treat the rule of justice
and arguments of reciprocity under quasi-logical arguments (pp. 218226), which we view
as subcategories of argumentation from rule. Hastings (1962) includes argumentation in
support of value judgements in the category Argument from criteria to a verbal classification (pp. 3645). He thus makes no distinction between verbal classifications of a descriptive nature and those of a normative nature. Windes and Hastings (1969), however, do make
a distinction between reasoning from characteristics to a description (by criteria of definition) and reasoning from characteristics to a value judgment (by criteria of value) (pp.
159168). Kienpointner (1992) classifies argumentation from rule among the normative
variants of the Definitionsschemata (p. 251), Genus-Spezies-Schemata (p. 265) and GanzesTeil-Schemata (pp. 275276), all leading to the conclusion Wertung Z ist bezglich X
gerechtfertigt or Handlung Z ist angebracht. Finally, Walton (1996) deals only with
argument from an established rule (pp. 9193). There he is concerned only with rules of
conduct laid down in laws, contracts or agreements.
8
The scheme presented here is taken from Schellens (1985, p. 186). Kienpointner (1992,
p. 395) formulates more detailed schemes. He distinguishes between a descriptive and a
normative variant:
Wenn die Autoritt X sagt, dass P wahr/wahrscheinlich ist, ist P wahr/
wahrscheinlich
X sagt, dass die proposition P wahr/wahrscheinlich ist
Also: P ist wahr/wahrscheinlich
Wenn die Autoritt X die Bewertung Y (= die normative Proposition P) fr
richtig erklrt / die Ausfhrung der Handlung Z fr angebracht erklrt, ist Y
richtig / die Ausfhrung von Z angebracht.
X erklrt Y fr richtig / erklrt die Ausfhrung von Z angebracht
Also: Y ist richtig / die Ausfhrung von Z ist angebracht
In Waltons scheme (1996, p. 65), only the descriptive variant is taken account of:
E is an expert in domain D
E asserts that A is known to be true
A is within D
Therefore, A may (plausibly) be taken to be true
322
He also treats separately the strongly related forms of argument from position to know
(pp. 6163) and ethotic argument (pp. 8587). Like Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969,
pp. 305310) and Kienpointner, we subsume all sorts of authorities here under one heading.
Like Hastings (1962, p. 139), we treat argumentation from authority as a free-floating
argument or unrestricted argument, which can be employed both for descriptive and normative claims. We do not discuss here the relationship between argumentation from authority
and the ad verecundiam fallacy. See Woods and Walton (1982, pp. 8691) and Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, pp. 305307).
LIST OF CITED BROCHURES EN FOLDERS

Als dieren konden praten . . . (If animals could talk . . .), Anti-Vivisectie-Stichting, The
Hague, n.d.
Denk eens na over hersenen . . . hersenschade en herstel? (Thinking about brains, brain
damage and recovery), Hersenstichting Nederland, The Hague, n.d.
Een half uur per dag bewegen doet wonderen. Beweegboekje voor alle leeftijden (Thirty
minutes exercise a day works wonders: Exercise book for all age groups), Nederlandse
Hartstichting, The Hague, n.d.
Ik zoek een huis waar ik voor donker binnen moet zijn (Im looking for a house where I
need to be home before dark), Federatie Pleegzorg, n.p., 1998.
Kijk uit voor je huid (Watch out for your skin), Nederlandse Kankerbestrijding, n.p., n.d.
Naar een nieuw patroon in de Middenamerikaanse kledingindustrie (Towards a new pattern
in the Central American clothing industry), Solidaridad, Utrecht, n.d.
Slaap- en kalmeringsmiddelen. De Antwoorden (Sleeping tablets and sedatives: The answers),
Trimbosinstituut, Utrecht, 1997.
Speed. De antwoorden (Speed: The answers), Trimbosinstituut, Utrecht, 1997.
Stop giftig speelgoed (Stop poisonous toys), Greenpeace, Amsterdam, 1997.
U zou de eerste niet zijn die zich onbewust schuldig maakt aan smokkel van bedreigde dieren
en planten (You wouldnt be the first one to be inadvertently guilty of smuggling endangered animals and plants), Cites-Bureau, Dordrecht, n.d.
Wat ben ik voor drinker? (What sort of drinker am I?) Nationaal Instituut voor
Gezondheidsbevordering en Ziektepreventie, Woerden, 1998.
REFERENCES
Blair, J. A.: 1999, [Book Review of] D.N. Walton, Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive
Reasoning, Argumentation 13, 338343.
Eemeren, F. H. van and R. Grootendorst: 1992, Argumentation, Communication, and
Fallacies. A Pragma-dialectical Perspective, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
Freeley, A. J.: 1976, Argumentation and Debate. Rational Decision Making (4th edition),
Wadsworth, Belmont, Calif.
Garssen, B.: 1997, Argumentatieschemas in pragma-dialectisch perspectief. Een theoretisch
en empirisch onderzoek (Argumentschemes from a pragma-dialectical perspective. A
theoretical and empirical study). Ph.D. Dissertation. Universiteit van Amsterdam, IFOTT.
Garssen, B.: 2001, Argument Schemes, in F. H. van Eemeren (ed.), Crucial Concepts in
Argumentation Theory, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 8199.
Gottlieb, G.: 1968, The Logic of Choice. An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule and
Rationality, Allen and Unwin, London.
Hare, R. M.: 1952, The Language of Morals, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Hastings, A. C.: 1962, A Reformulation of the Modes of Reasoning in Argumentation. Ph.D.
Dissertation. Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
323
Hoeken, H.: 1995, The Design of Persuasive Texts: Effects of Content, Structure, and Style.
Ph.D. Dissertation. Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, Tilburg.
Kienpointner, M.: 1992, Alltagslogik. Struktur und Funktion von Argumentationsmustern,
Fromann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Constatt.
Perelman, Ch. and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca: 1969, The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on
Argumentation, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame/London.
Petty, R. E. and J. T. Cacioppo: 1986, Communication and Persuasion. Central and
Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change, Springer, New York.
Petty, R. E. and J. T. Cacioppo: 1984, The Effects of Involvement on Responses to Argument
Quantity an Quality: Central and Peripheral Routes to Persuasion, Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 46, 6981.
Petty, R. E., C. P. Haugtvedt and S. M. Smith: 1995, Elaboration as a Determinant of Attitude
Strength: Creating Attitudes that are Persistent, Resistant, and Predictive of Behavior,
in R. E. Petty and J. A. Krosknick (eds.), Attitude Strength. Antecedents and
Consequences, Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 93130.
Petty, R. E. and J. R. Priester: 1994, Mass Media Attitude Change: Implications of the
Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, in J. Bryant and D. Zillmann (eds.), Media
Effects. Advances in Theory and Research, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale NJ, 91122.
Schellens, P. J.: 1985, Redelijke argumenten. Een onderzoek naar normen voor kritische
lezers (Reasonable arguments. A study in criteria for critical reading). Ph.D. Dissertation.
Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, Foris, Dordrecht.
Schellens, P. J.: 1987, Types of Argument and the Critical Reader, in F. H. van Eemeren,
R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair and Ch. A. Willard (eds.), Argumentation: Analysis and
Practices, Foris, Dordrecht, 3441.
Schellens, P. J. and G. Verhoeven: 1994, Argument en tegenargument (Argument and
Counterargument), Martinus Nijhoff, Groningen.
Toulmin, S., R. Rieke and A. Janik: 1979, An Introduction to Reasoning, Macmillan, New
York.
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Mahwah, NJ.
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Schellens & Jong - Argumentation Schemes in Persuasive Brochures

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Argumentation Schemes in Persuasive Brochures

PETER JAN SCHELLENS and MENNO DE JONG

Public information documents often attempt to persuade recipients that they

PETER JAN SCHELLENS AND MENNO DE JONG

ments, persuasive brochures used for public information purposes normally

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES IN PERSUASIVE BROCHURES

Petty and Cacioppo (1984) explain the role of argumentation in central

In their description of the peripheral route (particularly in what it does not

Central processing thus involves checking whether arguments are cogent

PETER JAN SCHELLENS AND MENNO DE JONG

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES IN PERSUASIVE BROCHURES

it possible to make an assertion with some degree of probability about its

PETER JAN SCHELLENS AND MENNO DE JONG

3. Statements about the desirability of a consequence can be supported by

2. ANALYSIS OF 20 PUBLIC INFORMATION BROCHURES

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES IN PERSUASIVE BROCHURES

argumentation from rules). The following argumentation schemes were

Number of brochures in which

PETER JAN SCHELLENS AND MENNO DE JONG

It has been shown that sunburn in childhood increases the risk

Sunburn in childhood increases the risk of skin cancer

[Sun protection prevents sunburn in children]

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES IN PERSUASIVE BROCHURES

What does the amphetamine (speed) user feel?

We find comparable forms of argumentation, in which several desirable and

PETER JAN SCHELLENS AND MENNO DE JONG

If you dont take much exercise . . .

The advantages and disadvantages

Underneath this text, on the same page, there is a column headed

How do you want to feel?

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES IN PERSUASIVE BROCHURES

Id like to feel more energetic

PETER JAN SCHELLENS AND MENNO DE JONG

Table 1 shows that argumentation from cause to effect is found in 15 of

(a) Sunburn in childhood has been shown to lead to an increased

The prediction that sunburn in childhood can lead to an increased risk of

(If skin is subjected to more UV rays in childhood, more cells

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES IN PERSUASIVE BROCHURES

Foster children arent model children: they have their moods,

In the coming years, there will be an increasing need for care

PETER JAN SCHELLENS AND MENNO DE JONG

In example A1, B is the case/appropriate

Unpleasant side effects may occur, such as headache, tiredness,

Many laboratory animals are used to test whether materials are

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES IN PERSUASIVE BROCHURES

Against our expectations, argumentation from example is not used to

As you know, large numbers of laboratory animals undergo

In addition, there are also possibilities of combining pleasure

PETER JAN SCHELLENS AND MENNO DE JONG

You can probably think of many other examples . . .

ARE YOU TRAVELLING ABROAD? THEN THINK TWICE

Beneath each of the headings there is a short piece of argumentation as to

These are only a few examples. International trade in more than

Finally, we also find cases of argumentation from example that cannot be

Hard or soft PVC can be found everywhere: in foils, credit cards,

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES IN PERSUASIVE BROCHURES

Here, the examples serve to demonstrate that PVC is to be found in more

People with a brain disorder also ought to be able to lead as

PETER JAN SCHELLENS AND MENNO DE JONG

(. . .) As a result, people with brain damage form a separate

We believe it is no coincidence that an explicit or implicit appeal to norms

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES IN PERSUASIVE BROCHURES

where P may be an assertion of fact or a value judgement, and where I