From Cheng Spec Proc Cases Batch2

Special Proceedings Cases Batch 2
2nd Sem 2015-16
Contents
Case # 1: Barredo vs CA (G.R. No. L-17863) ..................................................... 2
Case # 2: Sikat vs. Vda. De Villaueva (G.R. No. L-35925)............................ 6
Case # 3: De Villanueva vs. PNB (G.R. No. L-18403)...................................17
Case # 4: Belama vs. Polinar (G.R. No. L-24098 ) ........................................23
Case # 5: Stronghold Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Republic-Asahi glass Corp.
(G.R. No. 147561)........................................................................................................27
Case # 6: Gabriel vs. Bilon (G.R. No. 146989) ................................................37
Case # 7: Union Bank vs. Santibaez (G.R. No. 149926)...........................56
Case # 8: Sheker vs. Sheker (G.R. No. 157912) ..............................................69
Case # 9: People vs. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007) ...........................................77
Case # 10 Hilado vs. CA (G.R. No. 164108) ......................................................95
Case # 11: Nacar vs. Nistal (G.R. No. L-33006) .......................................... 107
Case # 12: Briones vs. Henson-Cruz (G.R. No. 159130) ......................... 120
Case # 13: Saligumba vs. Palanog (G.R. No. 143365) ............................. 136
Case # 14: Sarsaba vs. De Te (G.R. No. 175910) ........................................ 148
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Case # 1: Barredo vs CA (G.R. No. L-17863)

G.R. No. L-17863
November 28, 1962
MANUEL H. BARREDO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The present appeal by the heirs of the late Fausto Barredo involves a
tardy claim to collect the face value of a promissory note for
P20,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from 21 December 1949,
the date of its maturity, plus attorney's fees and costs in the sum of
P2,000.00, from the intestate estate of the late Charles A.
McDonough, represented herein by the administrator, W. I. Douglas.
The promissory note was secured by a mortgage executed on 31
December 1940 in favor of Fausto Barredo over the leasehold rights
of McDonough on the greater portion of a parcel of registered land
located at Dongalo Paraaque, Rizal, owned by Constantino Factor,
and over four (4) houses which McDonough had constructed on the
leased land. The lease contract between Factor and McDonough
provided for a term of 10 years from 1 September 1936; but on
December 1940, the parties extended the term up to 31 August
1961. The original lease, the extension of its term, and the mortgage
were all inscribed at the back of certificate of title of the land.
Upon Fausto Barredo's death on 8 October 1942, his heirs, in a deed
of extrajudicial partition, adjudicated unto themselves the secured
credit of the deceased, and had the same recorded on the aforesaid
certificate of title.
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This annotation was, however, cancelled when one day in August

1944 Manuel H. Barredo was ordered to appeal before an officer of
the Japanese Imperial Army at the Army and Navy Club and was
commanded to bring with him all the documents pertaining to the
mortgage executed by the late McDonough whose private
properties, because of his enemy citizenship, were, in the words of
the Court of Appeals, "appropriated by the triumphant invader".
Manuel H. Barredo was paid P20,000.00 in Japanese war notes by
the occupation authorities and made to sign, as he did sign, a
certification stating "that in consideration of P20,000.00 which I
have received today, I am requested the Register of Deeds to cancel
the mortgage of these properties"; and, as requested, the
cancellation was inscribed at the back of the title.
Charles McDonough died on 15 March 1945; thereupon, Special
Proceedings No. 70173 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
captioned "In re: Intestate Estate of Charles A. McDonough", was
instituted; and pursue a court order of 17 August 1945, the
administrator caused to be published in the "Philippine Progress"
for three consecutive weeks, on 23 and 30 August 1945 and 6
September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them to their claims
with the clerk of court within 6 months reckoned from the date of its
first publication and expiring 23 February 1946.
On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated
claim against the estate of McDonough. This claim was opposed by
the administrator. After hearing the lower court allowed the claim,
but the Court of Appeals reversed the order of allowance; hence, the
Barredo heirs appealed to this Court, assigning the following alleged
errors:
1. That the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the "one
month" period referred to in Section 2 of Rule 87 of Rules of
Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of the sixmonth period fixed in the published notice to claims, and in
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further holding that the trial court had therefore committed a

reversible error in admitting and allowing the claim of herein
petitioners; and
2. That the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that
the only logical conclusion is that the P20,000.00 in Japanese
money paid by the Japanese military authorities to petitioner
Manuel H. Barredo were paid for the redemption of
promissory note secured by mortgage of the four buildings.
It is pertinent to state before discussing the argumentation of
counsel that in view of the burning and destruction of the buildings
which were the subject of the mortgage, the petitioners manifested
their wish to abandon their security and prosecute the claim against
the estate as for a simple money debt, and that when the Barredo
heirs filed their claim, no order of distribution had entered in the
proceedings.
Section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. In the notice
provided in section 1, the court shall state the time for the
filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than
twelve nor less than six months after the date of the first
publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order
of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has
failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the
court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable,
allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one
month.
The probate court previously fixed the period for filing claims at six
(6) months reckoned from the date of first publication, and the said
notice to creditors was first published on 23 August 1945. The
present claim was filed on 22 October 1947. There is no doubt,
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therefore, that the claim was filed outside of the period previously
fixed. But a tardy claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the
court, upon showing of cause for failure to present said claim on
time.
The respondent administrator, relying on the case of the Estate of
Howard J. Edmands, 87 Phil. 405, argues that the one-month period
for filing late claims mentioned in Section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of
Court should be counted from the expiration of the regular sixmonth period, but this pronouncement was but an obiter dictum that
did not resolve the issue involved in said case. The true ruling
appears in the case of Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958,
wherein the controverted one month period was clarified as follows:
The one-month period specified in this section is the time
granted claimants, and the same is to begin from the order
authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the
extension of one month starts from the expiration of the
original period fixed by the court for the presentation of
claims. (Emphasis supplied)
However, the probate court's discretion in allowing a claim after the
regular period for filing claims but before entry of an order of
distribution presupposes not only claim for apparent merit but also
that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here,
petitioners alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery
of the papers of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his
lawyer who is now deceased. This ground insufficient, due to the
availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at
the back of the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the
instant claim, as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by the
Japanese military authorities.
The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without
justification, because under Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court,
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said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for no cause or

for an insufficient cause.1
In view of the conclusions thus arrived at, it becomes unnecessary to
discuss whether the payment by the Japanese was intended as a
discharge of the promissory note. Suffice it to say that there is no
other cogent explanation for the payment made to the mortgagees,
who were not the owners of the encumbered property.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision is affirmed,
with costs against the petitioners.
Case # 2: Sikat vs. Vda. De Villaueva (G.R. No. L-35925)
G.R. No. L-35925
November 10, 1932
RICARDO SIKAT, Judicial Administrator of the intestate estate of

the deceased Mariano P. Villanueva, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
QUITERIA VIUDA DE VILLANUEVA, Judicial Administratrix of the
intestate estate of the deceased Pedro Villanueva, defendantappellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The plaintiff Ricardo Sikat, as judicial administrator of the intestate
estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, appeals to this court from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, let judgment be
entered absolving the defendant from the complaint, and, no
evidence having been adduced in support of the counterclaim,
the plaintiff is also absolved therefrom, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
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In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged

errors as committed by the court a quo in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the claim of the
administrator of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva against the
estate of Pedro Villanueva has already prescribed.
2. The lower court erred in dismissing the complaint.
The present case was commenced by virtue of a complaint filed by
Ricardo Sikat, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of
Mariano P. Villanueva, against Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva, as judicial
administratrix of the intestate estate of Pedro Villanueva, praying
that the decision of the committee on claims and appraisal in the
intestate proceedings of the aforesaid Pedro Villanueva with regard
to the credit of the late Mariano P. Villanueva be confirmed by the
court, and the defendant as judicial administratrix, be ordered to
pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,192.92, with legal interest from
July 15, 1919 until fully paid, and the costs.
In answer to the complaint, the defendant denied each and every
allegation thereof, and set up a special defense of prescription, and a
counterclaim for P15,536.69 which she alleges the estate of Mariano
P. Villanueva owes to the estate of Pedro Villanueva; and she prayed
for judgment absolving her from the complaint and sentencing the
plaintiff to pay her said amount with interest and costs.
At the hearing of the case, the parties submitted the following
agreed statement of facts to the court:
1. That plaintiff and defendant are both of age, the former are
residing in the municipality of Malinao, and the latter in the
municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, P. I.; that the
plaintiff, Ricardo Sikat, instituted the present action as judicial
administrator of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, duly
appointed in place of the former administrator, Enrique V.
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Kare, by the Court of Firts Instance of Albay; and the defendant

is the judicial administratrix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva,
duly appointed by the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila.
2. That the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano P.
Villanueva were instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Albay, and Julio V. Quijano was appointed administrator; that
the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Pedro Villanueva, were also commenced therein as civil case
No. 3011, upon application of Julio V. Quijano, for the purpose
mentioned in the order of the court, dated August 14, 1919, a
copy of which is attached and made a part of this agreed
statement of facts, as Exhibit A.
3. That by an order dated August 19, 1919, the Court of First
Instance of Albay appointed Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva
administratrix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and on
September 11, 1919 Tomas Almonte and Pablo Rocha were
appointed commissioners to compose the committee on claims
and appraisal.
4. That on September 16, 1919 the then administrator of the
estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, Julio V. Quijano, filed with said
committee a written claim for the same sums as now claimed,
according to Exhibit B, attached to and made a part of this
agreed statement of facts, and adduced evidence in support
thereof before the committee.
5. That in view of the fact that Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Albay over the intestate proceedings of the estate of Pedro
Villanueva, and upon appeal the Supreme Court decided (see
decision of October 21, 1921, a copy of which is attached to and
made a part hereof as Exhibit C) that said Court of First
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Instance had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said

intestate proceedings, at the instance of both parties, the
committee composed of Tomas Almonte and Pablo Rocha
abstained from making any report on the aforementioned
claim to the Court of First Instance of Albay.
6. That in view of this decision of the Supreme Court holding
the Court of First Instance of Albay incompetent to take
cognizance of the intestate proceedings in the estate of Pedro
Villanueva, these proceedings were instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Manila through the application of Enrique
Kare, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of
Mariano P. Villanueva in case No. 28244, filed on June 18, 1925,
upon the ground that when Pedro Villanueva died he owed the
estate of Mariano P. Villanueva the sum of P10,192.92, with
legal interest from June 15, 1919.
7. That after the Court of First Instance of Manila had
appointed Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva, administratrix of the
estate of Pedro Villanueva, and Mamerto Roxas and Nicanor
Roxas as commissioners to compose the committee on claims
and appraisal, Enrique Kare, as administrator of the estate of
Mariano P. Villanueva, filed his claim with the committee on
September 22, 1925, and that the same claim appears in the
present complaint.
8. That the said committee on claims and appraisal, composed
of Mamerto Roxas and Nicanor Roxas, admitted the claim and
decided in favor of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filing
their report with the court accordingly.
9. That the defendant administratrix, Quiteria Vda. de
Villanueva, took a timely appeal from this report, and so the
present complaint has been filed.
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10. That the evidence presented to this committee on claims

and appraisal by the parties to the present case, and the rulings
and decisions of said committee upon all the claims and
counterclaims filed with it, are contained in the record entitled
"Report of the Committee on Claims and Appraisal" of the
intestate proceedings of Pedro Villanueva, No. 28244 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
Manila, December 18, 1930.
In addition to the agreed statement of facts quoted above, there was
adduced in evidence the document dated September 22, 1909,
executed by the late Pedro Villanueva in favor of his father, the late
Mariano P. Villanueva, which literally reads as follows:
I owe my father, Mariano P. Villanueva, the following amounts:
For the balance account, three thousand five hundred thirtynine pesos and eight centavos, Philippine currency.
For the capital invested by Mariano P. Villanueva in said
bazaar, three thousand pesos, Philippine currency.
For the debt of the late Sulpicio Briznela, six hundred fortynine pesos and seventy-seven centavos, Philippine currency.
For salary accruing to me during the months of January,
February, March, and April, 1907, unduly withheld, having
worked in his office during that time, four hundred pesos,
Philippine currency.
For the entry in the book, dated October 31, 1904, but if it is
thereafter discovered to have been paid, it shall be null and
void, two thousand four hundred forty pesos and seven
centavos, Philippine currency.
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For the cost of a horse from Muoz y Cia., Manila, one hundred
sixty-four pesos, Philippine currency.
The amounts stated above are written as they appear in my
father's books.
(Sgd.) PED. VILLANUEVA.
The sole question to decide in this appeal, raised in the first
assignment of error, is whether the trial court erred in holding that
the aforesaid claim of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate against Pedro
Villanueva estate has already prescribed.
There is no question that at the time of Pedro Villanueva's death the
right of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate to collect the credit against
him by virtue of the abovequoted acknowledgment of indebtedness
had not yet prescribed.
Section 703 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 703. CERTAIN ACTIONS SURVIVE. Actions to recover
the title or possession of real estate, buildings, or any interest
therein, actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, and actions to recover the
possession of specific articles of personal property, shall
survive, and may be commenced and prosecuted by or against
the executor or administrator; but all other actions
commenced against the deceased before his death shall be
discontinued, and the claims therein involved presented before
the committee as herein provided.
If in pursuance of the legal provision just quoted, all actions
commenced against a debtor shall be discontinued upon his death,
and the claims involved filed with the committee on claims and
appraisal appointed in the testate or intestate proceedings unless
they are actions to recover the title or possession of real estate,
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buildings, or any interest therein, damages for an injury to person or

property, real or personal, or the possession of specific articles of
personal property, which actions shall survive and may be
commenced and prosecuted by or against the executor or
administrator, then with a greater reason should credits that have
not prescribed at the debtor's death, and upon which no action had
been brought, be presented before the committee on claims and
appraisal for collection.
Section 689 of the same Code provides:
SEC. 689. COURT TO LIMIT TIME FOR PRESENTING CLAIMS.
The court shall allow such time as the circumstances of the
case requires for the creditors to present their claims to the
committee for examination and allowance; but not, in the first
instance, more than twelve months, or less than six months;
and the time allowed shall be stated in the commission. The
court may extend the time as circumstances require, but not so
that the whole time shall exceed eighteen months.
The questions arises as to which of these two prescriptions should
govern the case: ordinary prescription, established in chapter III, or
extraordinary prescription, created in section 689 aforecited, both
of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is a rule of statutory construction
that when there are two different provisions upon one subject
matter, one of them general and the other specific, the latter should
prevail, if both cannot stand together. In the present case according
to the law, Mariano P. Villanueva's credit cannot be judicially
collected from Pedro Villanueva although the right of action has not
prescribed, because the latter is dead; and it cannot be collected
from his estate because the action is not one of those that survive
upon his death. To remedy this situation the law established a new
prescriptive period for such cases, which being incompatible with
the ordinary period of prescription both in commencement and in
duration, must be deemed to have superseded the latter.
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This court has so held in Santos vs. Manarang (27 Phil., 209, 213.), in
treating of the period of prescription established in section 689 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, as follows:
It cannot be questioned that this section supersedes the
ordinary limitation of actions provided for in chapter 3 of the
Code. It is strictly confined, in its application, to claims against
the estates of deceased persons, and has been almost
universally adopted as part of the probate law of the United
States. It is commonly termed the statute of non-claims, and its
purpose is to settle the affairs of the estate with dispatch, so
that the residue may be delivered to the persons entitled
thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond
in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute of
limitations, have not yet prescribed.lawphil.net
Now then, with reference to the extraordinary prescription
established for claims against deceased persons, has the claim of
Mariano P. Villanueva's estate against Pedro Villanueva's estate
prescribed?
The trial court decided the question in the affirmative, citing section
49 of the aforecited Act No. 190, which reads:
SEC. 49. SAVING IN OTHER CASES. If, in an action
commenced, or attempted to be commenced, in due time, a
judgment for the plaintiff be reversed, or if the plaintiff fail
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the
commencement of such action has, at the date of such reversal
or failure, expired, the plaintiff, or, if he die and the cause of
action survive, his representatives, may commence a new
action within one year after such date, and this provision shall
apply to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.
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This provision of law speaks of an "action", which, according to

section 1 of Act No. 190, "means an ordinary suit in a court of justice,
by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong".
According to this definition, the proceeding here in question is not
an action but a special proceeding, which, according to the same
section, is any other remedy provided by law. The very reference in
section 49 to actions brought against debtors before their death
clearly means ordinary actions and not special proceedings.
The saving clause, then, in section 49 of Act No. 190 does not
directly apply to special proceedings.
In re Estate of De Dios (24 Phil., 573), cited in the aforementioned
case of Santos vs. Manarang, this court laid down the following
doctrine:
The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims
against an estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the early
delivery of the property, to the persons entitled to receive it.
The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the
benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of
inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration
have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.
Thus section 642, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides:
SEC. 642. TO WHOM ADMINISTRATION GRANTED. If no
executor is named in the will, or if a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
xxx
xxx
xxx
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2. If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next

of kin, or the person selected by them, be unsuitable, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin neglect thirty days after the
death of the person to apply for administration, or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve. . . .
We have seen that under section 689 of the Code, the maximum
period for the presentation of claims against the estate of a deceased
person is eighteen months from the time fixed by the committee on
claims and appraisal in its notice, and this period may be extended
one month if a creditor applies for it within six months after the first
term, according to section 690. lawphil.net
It may be argued in this case that inasmuch as none of the persons
entitled to be appointed administrators or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator have taken any step in that
direction, and since no administrator or committee on claims and
appraisal has been appointed to fix the time for filing claims, the
right of the plaintiff, as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's
estate, to present the latter's claim against Pedro Villanueva's estate
could not prescribe.
If as we have stated, the object of the law in fixing short special
periods for the presentation of claims against the estate of a
deceased person is to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible in order to pay off the debts and distribute the residue; and
if a creditor having knowledge of the death of his debtor is
interested in collecting his credit as soon as possible; and if
according to law the persons entitled to the administration or to
propose another person for administrator have thirty days from the
death within which to claim that right, after which time the court
may appoint any creditor of the intestate debtor: then the plaintiff
herein as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate, was guilty
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of laches in not instituting the intestate proceedings of Pedro

Villanueva in the Court of First Instance of Manila until after the
lapse of three years after this court had set aside the intestate
proceedings begun in the Court of First Instance of Albay for lack of
jurisdiction over the place where the decedent had died, that is,
from October 21, 1921, to June 18, 1925. Wherefore, taking into
account the spirit of the law upon the settlement and partition of
estates, and the fact that the administration of Mariano P.
Villanueva's estate had knowledge of Pedro Villanueva's death, and
instituted the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the latter's
estate in the Court of First Instance of Albay and filed Mariano P.
Villanueva's claim against it, which was not allowed because this
court held those proceedings void for lack of jurisdiction, the estate
of Mariano P. Villanueva was guilty of laches in not instituting the
same proceedings in the competent court, the Court of First Instance
of Manila, until after three years had elapsed, and applying the
provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure by analogy,
we declare the claim of Mariano P. Villanueva to have prescribed. To
hold otherwise would be to permit a creditor having knowledge of
his debtor's death to keep the latter's estate in suspense indefinitely,
by not instituting either testate or intestate proceedings in order to
present his claim, to the prejudice of the heirs and legatees. Even in
the case of the summary settlement of an estate under section 598,
as amended by Act No. 2331, the Code of Civil Procedure limits the
time within which a creditor may file his claim to two years after the
settlement and distribution of the estate.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so
hold that whenever a creditor's claim presented in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of his debtor is not allowed because the
court has no jurisdiction, and such creditor permits more than three
years to elapse before instituting the same proceedings in the
competent court, the claim is barred by laches, applying the
provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by analogy.
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By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with

costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Case # 3: De Villanueva vs. PNB (G.R. No. L-18403)
G.R. No. L-18403
September 30, 1961
IN RE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF PASCUAL

VILLANUEVA. MAURICIA G. DE VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
A case certified by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
issues involved are purely of law.
For the administration of the estate of her deceased husband,
Pascual Villanueva, the widow Mauricia G. Villanueva, on December
19, 1949, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Agusan, for letters
of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 67). The petition was set for hearing
and Notice thereof was published on February 25, March 4, and 11,
1950, in the Manila Daily Bulletin. At the hearing, other heirs while
agreeing to the placing of estate under administration, opposed the
appointment the widow. The name of Atty. Teodulo R. Ricaforte,
suggested and all the parties agreed. After the taking the required
oath, Atty. Ricaforte entered upon the performance of his duties.
Under date of November 9, 1950 the Clerk of the Agusan CFI, issued
the following Notice to Creditors:
Letters of administration having been issued in the above
entitled case in favor of Teodulo R. Ricaforte for the settle of
the intestate of Pascual Villanueva, deceased;
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Notice is hereby given to all persons having claims for money

against the decedent, the said Pascual Villanueva, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due
or contingent, for funeral expenses and expenses of last
sickness of the deceased, and Judgment for money against him,
requiring them to file their claims with the clerk of court
within six but not beyond twelve months after date of the first
publication of this notice, serving copies of such claims upon
administrator, the said Teodulo R. Ricaforte.
The above notice contained the usual order for publication thereof
(once a week for three consecutive weeks) which was effected, thru
the Morning Times of City, a newspaper of general circulation, on
Nov. 16, 23 and 30, 1950, which expired on November 16, 1951.
On July 20, 1953, the defendant-appellant Philippine National Bank
filed in the administration proceedings, Creditor's Claim of the
following tenor
The Philippine National Bank, Creditor of Pascual Villanueva,
deceased, respectfully presents its claim against the estate of
the said deceased for Approval as follows:
Original amount thru Agusan Agency on Dec. 20, 1939
........................................................ P600.00
To int. at 10%: on P600.00 fr. 12-20-39 to 6-5-53
...................................................................... 747.45
Total due as of June 5, 1953 (Daily int. of P0.1644 after June 5,
1953) .......................... P1,347.45
That the said obligation has been due demandable since Dec.
20, 1940; that the same is true and just claim and that it is still
unpaid without any set-off.
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On October 12, 1954, the Philippine National Bank filed a Motion for
Admission of claim, stating
1. That the Philippine National Bank filed its claim dated July
20, 1953;
2. That the last action taken on the claim was an ordered this
Honorable Court issued on March 20, 1954, transferring the
hearing of the claim until the next calendar of the court,
without objection of the administrator;
3. That the administrator has not answered the claim nor
denied the same.1awphl.nt
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that an order be issued
admitting and approving the claim and ordering the
administrator to pay the Bank the amount of the claim.
The administrator, on November 5, 1954, opposed the alleging that
he had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations therein. As special defenses, he
interposed
That the same indebtedness, if it existed, has already been
paid;
That the caused action for the recovery of the aforesaid
amount of P1,847.45 is barred by the statute of limitations, for
more than ten (10) Years have elapsed since the cause of
action accrued up to present time;
That the said claim is barred forever on the ground that notice
to creditors having been published in the MORNING TIMES of
Cebu City, a newspaper of general circulation in on November
16, 23 and 30, 1950, ... the Philippine National Bank failed to
file its claim within the time limited in the notice, ....
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The appellant PNB, on November 14, 1958, more than four (4) Years
after the opposition of the claim presented by the administrator,
filed a pleading captioned "Petition for an Extension of time within
which to File the Claim of Philippine National Bank", alleging, among
others, that Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules, allows the filing of claims
even if the period stated in the notice to creditors elapsed, upon
cause shown and on such terms as equitable; that its failure to
present the claiming with the period stated in the notice, was its lack
of knowledge of administration proceedings, for while said
maintains a branch office in Agusan, the employees did not come to
know of the proceedings, the notice has been published in the
Morning Times, a newspaper very limited circulation.
On January 16, 1959, the CFI issued the following Order
It appearing that the claim of the Philippine National Bank
against the estate of the deceased Pascual Villanueva already
barred by the statute of limitations because the claim was due
and demandable since December 20, 1940, but filed on July 20,
1953, after the expiration of ten years, considering that said
filing was furthermore not present court within the period
fixed by Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, and no reason
having been shown to justify the tension of time for its filing,
the Court resolves to deny it as it hereby denies the petition for
an extension of time for filing of the claim by the Philippine
National Bank. The failure of the Bank to present on time the
claim was due its own fault and can hardly be considered
excusable negligence.
Appellant Bank moved to reconsider the above Order, arguing that
the statute of limitations had been suspended by the Moratorium
Law, and that the courts can extend the period limited in the notice,
under special circumstances, and on grounds of equity (Velasquez v.
Teod 46 Phil. 757). The PNB listed five incidents, which considered
special circumstances to warrant the of the extension to present the
20 | R F B
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claim, among which the lack of knowledge of the pendency of the

administration proceedings; the legitimacy of the loan secured the
deceased; that when it filed the claim, it did know that the period
stated in the notice had already expired.
In disposing the motion for reconsideration, the lower court, on
March 3,1959, said
The Court believes that the filing of money claim on July 20,
1953 in the Office of the Clerk of Court did not suspend
running of the period of prescription because said claim was
filed out of time and therefore invalid for all legal purposes. A
careful revision of the record shows that the Philippine
National Bank, contrary to the pretension of its counsel, had
knowledge of the present administration proceedings long
before July 20, 1953, because the second payment of the claim
due to the deceased Pascual Villanueva from the Philippine
War Damage Commission in the amount of P6,441.30, was
deposited in the Agusan Agency of the Bank in June, 1951. And
in the inventory filed by the new administrator Francisco S.
Conde, on February 27, 1957, the following item appears:
Money belonging to the said deceased which came into
the hands of the administrator on December 1, 1951,
appearing in the Bank A-1114, Agusan Agency deposited
by the late administrator Teodulo R. Ricaforte.
P6,897.52.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack
of merits.
The order of January 16, 1959 was the subject of the appeal to the
Court of Appeals which, as stated at the threshold of this opinion,
certified the same to this Court.
21 | R F B
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The important issue presented is whether or not the in question is

already barred. Admittedly, the claim was filed outside of the period
provided for in the Order of the lower court, within which to present
claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed on
November 16, 1951 and the claim was filed on July 20, 1953 or
about 1 year and 8 months late. This notwithstanding, appellant
contends that it did not know of such administration proceedings,
not even its employees in the Branch Office in Butuan City, Agusan.
It is to be noted that the petition for Letters of Administration and
the Notice to Creditors were duly published in the Manila Daily
Bulletin and in the Morning Times, respectively, which was a full
compliance with the requirements of the Rules. Moreover, the
supposed lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of
appellant and its employees had been belied by uncontested and
eloquent evidence, consisting of a deposit of an amount of money by
the administrator Of the estate in said Bank (Agusan Agency). The
deposit was made on December 1, 1951, inspite of which the
appellant Bank only filed its claim on July 20, 1953. It is quite true
that the Courts can extend the period within Which to present
claims against the estate, even after the period limited has elapsed;
but such extension should be granted under special circumstances.
The lower did not find any justifiable reason to give the extension
and for one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had
elapsed.
Having reached the above conclusions, We deem it necessary to
determine the question as to whether or not the Moratorium Law
had suspended the prescriptive period for filing of the claim under
consideration.
WHEREFORE, the order subject of the appeal is hereby affirmed,
with costs against appellant Philippine National Bank, in both
instances.
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Case # 4: Belama vs. Polinar (G.R. No. L-24098 )

G.R. No. L-24098
November 18, 1967
BUENAVENTURA BELAMALA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
MARCELINO POLINAR, administrator, oppositor-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bohol (Sp.
Proc. No. 369) allowing a money claim of appellee Belamala against
the estate of the deceased Mauricio Polinar, for damages caused to
the claimant. Originally taken to the Court of Appeals, the case was
certified to this Court as involving only questions of law.
Issue in the case is whether the civil liability of an accused of
physical injuries who dies before final judgment, is extinguished by
his demise, to the extent of barring any claim therefor against his
estate.
There is no dispute as to the facts, which were stipulated, in the
court of origin, to be as follows (Rec. of Appeal, pp. 41-43):
STIPULATED AGREEMENT OF FACTS
xxx
xxx
xxx
1. That the claimant Buenaventura Belamala is the same

offended party in Criminal Case No. 1922 filed before the
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL, against the same
Mauricio Polinar above mentioned and against other accused,
for Frustrated Murder;
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2. That the administrator Marcelino Polinar is one of the

legitimate children of the above mentioned Mauricio Polinar
now deceased;
3. That on May 24, 1954, the complaint for Frustrated Murder
was filed in the Justice of the Peace of Clarin, Bohol against said
Mauricio Polinar, et al, and when said case was remanded to
the Court of First Instance of Bohol, the Information on said
Criminal Case No. 1922 was filed on March 12, 1955;
4. That on May 28, 1966, the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
BOHOL rendered a decision thereof, convicting the said
Mauricio Polinar of the crime of serious physical injuries and
sentenced him to pay to the offended party Buenaventura
Belamala, now claimant herein, the amount of P990.00, plus
the amount of P35.80 as indemnity the amount of P1,000.00 as
moral damages;
5. That on June 18, 1956, the accused (the late Mauricio
Polinar) appealed to the Court of Appeals from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Bohol;
6. That on July 27, 1956, while the appeal of said Mauricio
Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals, he died; and
that there was no Notice or Notification of his death has ever
been filed in the said Court of Appeals;
7. That the decision of the Court of Appeals in said Criminal
Case No. 1922, has affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol, in toto, and said decision of the Court of
Appeals was promulgated on March 27, 1958; but said
Mauricio Polinar has already died on July 27, 1956;
8. That the late Mauricio Polinar is survived by his wife,
Balbina Bongato and his children, namely:
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1. Narcisa Polinar, Davao

2. Geronimo Polinar, Pagadian
3. Mariano Polinar, Clarin, Bohol
4. Ireneo Polinar, Clarin, Bohol
5. Marcelino Polinar, Clarin, Bohol
6. Mauro Polinar, Clarin, Bohol
7. Demetrio Polinar, Clarin, Bohol
9. That the parties have reserved to present in Court evidence
on facts not agreed to herein by the parties.
It is to be observed that the reservation of additional evidence was
waived by the parties at the trial (see Decision of trial court, Rec.
App. p. 54).
The Court a quo, overruling the contention of the Administratorappellant that the death of the accused prior to final judgment
extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the
offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
admitted the claim against the estate in the amount of P2,025.80
with legal interest from the date claim was filed (30 July 1959) until
paid. No payment was ordered pending final determination of the
sum total of claims admitted against the estate.
Not satisfied with the ruling, the Administrator has appealed,
insisting on his theory in the Court below.
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the Revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for
damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action.
25 | R F B
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Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a

civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action
for damages was to be considered instituted together with the
criminal action, still, since both proceedings were terminated
without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party
under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately. Such claim in no
way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code, that imposes the
obligation to indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs, because
the latter acquired their decedents obligations only to the extent of
the value of the inheritance (Civil Code, Art. 774). Hence, the
obligation of the offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately
becomes an obligation of the offender's estate.
The appellant, however, is correct in the contention that the claim
should have been prosecuted by separate action against the
administrator, as permitted by sections 1 and 2 of Revised Rule 87,
since the claim is patently one "to recover damages for an injury to
person or property" (Rule 87, sec. 1). Belamala's action can not be
enforced by filing a claim against the estate under Rule 86, because
section 5 of that rule explicitly limits the claims to those for funeral
expenses, expenses for last sickness, judgments for money and
"claims against the decedent, arising from contract, express or
implied;" and this last category (the other three being inapposite)
includes only "all purely personal obligations other than those which
have their source in delict or tort" (Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil.
182, 189-194) and Belamala's damages manifestly have a tortious
origin. To this effect was our ruling in Aguas vs. Llemos, L-18107,
Aug. 30, 1962.
26 | R F B
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Furthermore, it does not appear that the award of the trial Court
was based on evidence submitted to it; apparently it relied merely
on the findings in the criminal case, as embodied in decisions that
never became final because the accused died during the pendency of
said case.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby reversed and set
aside, but without prejudice to the action of appellee Belamala
against the Administrator of the Estate of Mauricio Polinar. No costs.
So ordered.
Case # 5: Stronghold Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Republic-Asahi glass
Corp. (G.R. No. 147561)
G.R. No. 147561
June 22, 2006
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
Asurety companys liability under the performance bond it issues is
solidary. The death of the principal obligor does not, as a rule,
extinguish the obligation and the solidary nature of that liability.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse the March 13, 2001 Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41630. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
27 | R F B
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"WHEREFORE, the Order dated January 28, 1993 issued by the

lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of the
instant case be REMANDED to the lower court for the reception of
evidence of all parties."3
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA in this wise:
"On May 24, 1989, [respondent] Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation
(Republic-Asahi) entered into a contract with x x x Jose D. Santos, Jr.,
the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of
roadways and a drainage system in Republic-Asahis compound in
Barrio Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City, where [respondent] was to pay x x
x JDS five million three hundred thousand pesos (P5,300,000.00)
inclusive of value added tax for said construction, which was
supposed to be completed within a period of two hundred forty
(240) days beginning May 8, 1989. In order to guarantee the faithful
and satisfactory performance of its undertakings x x x JDS, shall
post a performance bond of seven hundred ninety five thousand
pesos (P795,000.00). x x x JDS executed, jointly and severally with
[petitioner] Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI) Performance Bond
No. SICI-25849/g(13)9769.
"On May 23, 1989, [respondent] paid to x x x JDS seven hundred
ninety five thousand pesos (P795,000.00) by way of downpayment.
"Two progress billings dated August 14, 1989 and September 15,
1989, for the total amount of two hundred seventy four thousand six
hundred twenty one pesos and one centavo (P274,621.01) were
submitted by x x x JDS to [respondent], which the latter paid.
According to [respondent], these two progress billings accounted for
only 7.301% of the work supposed to be undertaken by x x x JDS
under the terms of the contract.
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"Several times prior to November of 1989, [respondents] engineers

called the attention of x x x JDS to the alleged alarmingly slow pace
of the construction, which resulted in the fear that the construction
will not be finished within the stipulated 240-day period. However,
said reminders went unheeded by x x x JDS.
"On November 24, 1989, dissatisfied with the progress of the work
undertaken by x x x JDS, [respondent] Republic-Asahi extrajudicially
rescinded the contract pursuant to Article XIII of said contract, and
wrote a letter to x x x JDS informing the latter of such rescission.
Such rescission, according to Article XV of the contract shall not be
construed as a waiver of [respondents] right to recover damages
from x x x JDS and the latters sureties.
"[Respondent] alleged that, as a result of x x x JDSs failure to comply
with the provisions of the contract, which resulted in the said
contracts rescission, it had to hire another contractor to finish the
project, for which it incurred an additional expense of three million
two hundred fifty six thousand, eight hundred seventy four pesos
(P3,256,874.00).
"On January 6, 1990, [respondent] sent a letter to [petitioner] SICI
filing its claim under the bond for not less than P795,000.00. On
March 22, 1991, [respondent] again sent another letter reiterating
its demand for payment under the aforementioned bond. Both
letters allegedly went unheeded.
"[Respondent] then filed [a] complaint against x x x JDS and SICI. It
sought from x x x JDS payment of P3,256,874.00 representing the
additional expenses incurred by [respondent] for the completion of
the project using another contractor, and from x x x JDS and SICI,
jointly and severally, payment of P750,000.00 as damages in
accordance with the performance bond; exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of at least
P100,000.00.
29 | R F B
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"According to the Sheriffs Return dated June 14, 1991, submitted to

the lower court by Deputy Sheriff Rene R. Salvador, summons were
duly served on defendant-appellee SICI. However, x x x Jose D.
Santos, Jr. died the previous year (1990), and x x x JDS Construction
was no longer at its address at 2nd Floor, Room 208-A, San Buena
Bldg. Cor. Pioneer St., Pasig, Metro Manila, and its whereabouts were
unknown.
"On July 10, 1991, [petitioner] SICI filed its answer, alleging that the
[respondents] money claims against [petitioner and JDS] have been
extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Even if this were not
the case, [petitioner] SICI had been released from its liability under
the performance bond because there was no liquidation, with the
active participation and/or involvement, pursuant to procedural
due process, of herein surety and contractor Jose D. Santos, Jr.,
hence, there was no ascertainment of the corresponding liabilities of
Santos and SICI under the performance bond. At this point in time,
said liquidation was impossible because of the death of Santos, who
as such can no longer participate in any liquidation. The unilateral
liquidation on the party (sic) of [respondent] of the work
accomplishments did not bind SICI for being violative of procedural
due process. The claim of [respondent] for the forfeiture of the
performance bond in the amount of P795,000.00 had no factual and
legal basis, as payment of said bond was conditioned on the
payment of damages which [respondent] may sustain in the event x
x x JDS failed to complete the contracted works. [Respondent] can
no longer prove its claim for damages in view of the death of Santos.
SICI was not informed by [respondent] of the death of Santos. SICI
was not informed by [respondent] of the unilateral rescission of its
contract with JDS, thus SICI was deprived of its right to protect its
interests as surety under the performance bond, and therefore it
was released from all liability. SICI was likewise denied due process
when it was not notified of plaintiff-appellants process of
determining and fixing the amount to be spent in the completion of
30 | R F B
2nd Sem 2015-16
the unfinished project. The procedure contained in Article XV of the

contract is against public policy in that it denies SICI the right to
procedural due process. Finally, SICI alleged that [respondent]
deviated from the terms and conditions of the contract without the
written consent of SICI, thus the latter was released from all liability.
SICI also prayed for the award of P59,750.00 as attorneys fees, and
P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.
"On August 16, 1991, the lower court issued an order dismissing the
complaint of [respondent] against x x x JDS and SICI, on the ground
that the claim against JDS did not survive the death of its sole
proprietor, Jose D. Santos, Jr. The dispositive portion of the [O]rder
reads as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against the defendants Jose D. Santos,
Jr., doing business under trade and style, JDS Construction and
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
"On September 4, 1991, [respondent] filed a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking reconsideration of the lower courts August
16, 1991 order dismissing its complaint. [Petitioner] SICI field its
Comment and/or Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. On
October 15, 1991, the lower court issued an Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration
is hereby given due course. The Order dated 16 August 1991 for the
dismissal of the case against Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., is
reconsidered and hereby reinstated (sic). However, the case against
defendant Jose D. Santos, Jr. (deceased) remains undisturbed.
Motion for Preliminary hearing and Manifestation with Motion filed
by [Stronghold] Insurance Company Inc., are set for hearing on
November 7, 1991 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
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SO ORDERED.
"On June 4, 1992, [petitioner] SICI filed its Memorandum for
Bondsman/Defendant SICI (Re: Effect of Death of defendant Jose D.
Santos, Jr.) reiterating its prayer for the dismissal of [respondents]
complaint.
"On January 28, 1993, the lower court issued the assailed Order
reconsidering its Order dated October 15, 1991, and ordered the
case, insofar as SICI is concerned, dismissed. [Respondent] filed its
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by [petitioner] SICI.
On April 16, 1993, the lower court denied [respondents] motion for
reconsideration. x x x."4
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that SICIs obligation under the surety agreement was
not extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Consequently,
Republic-Asahi could still go after SICI for the bond.
The appellate court also found that the lower court had erred in
pronouncing that the performance of the Contract in question had
become impossible by respondents act of rescission. The Contract
was rescinded because of the dissatisfaction of respondent with the
slow pace of work and pursuant to Article XIII of its Contract with
JDS.
The CA ruled that "[p]erformance of the [C]ontract was impossible,
not because of [respondents] fault, but because of the fault of JDS
Construction and Jose D. Santos, Jr. for failure on their part to make
satisfactory progress on the project, which amounted to nonperformance of the same. x x x [P]ursuant to the [S]urety [C]ontract,
SICI is liable for the non-performance of said [C]ontract on the part
of JDS Construction."5
Hence, this Petition.6
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Issue
Petitioner states the issue for the Courts consideration in the
following manner:
"Death is a defense of Santos heirs which Stronghold could also
adopt as its defense against obligees claim."7
More precisely, the issue is whether petitioners liability under the
performance bond was automatically extinguished by the death of
Santos, the principal.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Effect of Death on the Suretys Liability
Petitioner contends that the death of Santos, the bond principal,
extinguished his liability under the surety bond. Consequently, it
says, it is automatically released from any liability under the bond.
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does
not extinguish the obligation.8 Obligations are transmissible to the
heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the
stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation.9 Only
obligations that are personal10 or are identified with the persons
themselves are extinguished by death.11
Section 5 of Rule 8612 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the
prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the
estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually
extinguished.13 What is extinguished is only the obligees action or
suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate
court.14
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In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations

Santos had under his contracts with respondent were not
intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of
law. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those
obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate.15
Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the
obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner
as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation
under its performance bond.
The liability of petitioner is contractual in nature, because it
executed a performance bond worded as follows:
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
"That we, JDS CONSTRUCTION of 208-A San Buena Building,
contractor, of Shaw Blvd., Pasig, MM Philippines, as principal and the
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. a corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines with head office at Makati, as Surety, are held and firmly
bound unto the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION and to any
individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association supplying
the principal with labor or materials in the penal sum of SEVEN
HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND (P795,000.00), Philippine
Currency, for the payment of which sum, well and truly to be made,
we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors
and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents.
"The CONDITIONS OF THIS OBLIGATION are as follows;
"WHEREAS the above bounden principal on the ___ day of __________,
19__ entered into a contract with the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS
CORPORATION represented by _________________, to fully and
faithfully. Comply with the site preparation works road and
34 | R F B
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drainage system of Philippine Float Plant at Pinagbuhatan, Pasig,

Metro Manila.
"WHEREAS, the liability of the Surety Company under this bond
shall in no case exceed the sum of PESOS SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY
FIVE THOUSAND (P795,000.00) Philippine Currency, inclusive of
interest, attorneys fee, and other damages, and shall not be liable
for any advances of the obligee to the principal.
"WHEREAS, said contract requires the said principal to give a good
and sufficient bond in the above-stated sum to secure the full and
faithfull performance on its part of said contract, and the satisfaction
of obligations for materials used and labor employed upon the work;
"NOW THEREFORE, if the principal shall perform well and truly and
fulfill all the undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions, and
agreements of said contract during the original term of said contract
and any extension thereof that may be granted by the obligee, with
notice to the surety and during the life of any guaranty required
under the contract, and shall also perform well and truly and fulfill
all the undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements
of any and all duly authorized modifications of said contract that
may hereinafter be made, without notice to the surety except when
such modifications increase the contract price; and such principal
contractor or his or its sub-contractors shall promptly make
payment to any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or
association supplying the principal of its sub-contractors with labor
and materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in the said
contract, then, this obligation shall be null and void; otherwise it
shall remain in full force and effect. Any extension of the period of
time which may be granted by the obligee to the contractor shall be
considered as given, and any modifications of said contract shall be
considered as authorized, with the express consent of the Surety.
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"The right of any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or

association supplying the contractor with labor or materials for the
prosecution of the work hereinbefore stated, to institute action on
the penal bond, pursuant to the provision of Act No. 3688, is hereby
acknowledge and confirmed."16
As a surety, petitioner is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance
with the Civil Code, which provides as follows:
"Art. 2047. By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself
to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case
the latter should fail to do so.
"If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the
provisions of Section 4,17 Chapter 3, Title I of this Book shall be
observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship."
xxxxxxxxx
"Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made
against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has
not been fully collected."
Elucidating on these provisions, the Court in Garcia v. Court of
Appeals18 stated thus:
"x x x. The suretys obligation is not an original and direct one for
the performance of his own act, but merely accessory or collateral to
the obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless, although
the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid
principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of the
principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; in other words,
he is directly and equally bound with the principal. x x x."19
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Under the law and jurisprudence, respondent may sue, separately or

together, the principal debtor and the petitioner herein, in view of
the solidary nature of their liability. The death of the principal
debtor will not work to convert, decrease or nullify the substantive
right of the solidary creditor. Evidently, despite the death of the
principal debtor, respondent may still sue petitioner alone, in
accordance with the solidary nature of the latters liability under the
performance bond.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court
of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Case # 6: Gabriel vs. Bilon (G.R. No. 146989)
G.R. No. 146989
February 7, 2007
MELENCIO GABRIEL, represented by surviving spouse,

FLORDELIZA V. GABRIEL, Petitioner,
vs.
NELSON BILON, ANGEL BRAZIL AND ERNESTO PAGAYGAY,
Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, respectively dated August 4,
2000 and February 7, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 52001 entitled
"Nelson Bilon, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al."
The challenged decision reversed and set aside the decision2 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissing
respondents complaint for illegal dismissal and illegal deductions,
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and reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding petitioner

guilty of illegal dismissal but not of illegal deductions subject to the
modification that respondents be immediately reinstated to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges
instead of being paid separation pay.
Petitioner, represented by his surviving spouse, Flordeliza V.
Gabriel, was the owner-operator of a public transport business,
"Gabriel Jeepney," with a fleet of 54 jeepneys plying the BaclaranDivisoria-Tondo route. Petitioner had a pool of drivers, which
included respondents, operating under a "boundary system" of P400
per day.
The facts3 are as follows:
On November 15, 1995, respondents filed their separate complaints
for illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, and separation pay against
petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
These were consolidated and docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 0011-07420-95.4
On December 15, 1995, the complaint was amended, impleading as
party respondent the Bacoor Transport Service Cooperative, Inc., as
both parties are members of the cooperative.
Respondents alleged the following:
1) That they were regular drivers of Gabriel Jeepney, driving
their respective units bearing Plate Nos. PHW 553, NXU 155,
and NWW 557, under a boundary system of P400 per day,
plying Baclaran to Divisoria via Tondo, and vice versa, since
December 1990, November 1984 and November 1991,
respectively, up to April 30, 1995,5 driving five days a week,
with average daily earnings of P400;
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2) That they were required/forced to pay additional P55.00

per day for the following: a) P20.00 police protection; b)
P20.00 washing; c) P10.00 deposit; and [d)] P5.00 garage fees;
3) That there is no law providing the operator to require the
drivers to pay police protection, deposit, washing, and garage
fees.
4) That on April 30, 1995, petitioner told them not to drive
anymore, and when they went to the garage to report for work
the next day, they were not given a unit to drive; and
5) That the boundary drivers of passenger jeepneys are
considered regular employees of the jeepney operators. Being
such, they are entitled to security of tenure. Petitioner,
however, dismissed them without factual and legal basis, and
without due process.
On his part, petitioner contended that:
1) He does not remember if the respondents were ever under
his employ as drivers of his passenger jeepneys. Certain,
however, is the fact that neither the respondents nor other
drivers who worked for him were ever dismissed by him. As a
matter of fact, some of his former drivers just stopped
reporting for work, either because they found some other
employment or drove for other operators, and like the
respondents, the next time he heard from them was when they
started fabricating unfounded complaints against him;
2) He made sure that none of the jeepneys would stay idle even
for a day so he could collect his earnings; hence, it had been his
practice to establish a pool of drivers. Had respondents
manifested their desire to drive his units, it would have been
immaterial whether they were his former drivers or not. As
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long as they obtained the necessary licenses and references,

they would have been accommodated and placed on schedule;
3) While he was penalized or made to pay a certain amount in
connection with similar complaints by other drivers in a
previous case before this, it was not because his culpability
was established, but due to technicalities involving oversight
and negligence on his part by not participating in any stage of
the investigation thereof; and
4) Respondents claim that certain amounts, as enumerated in
the complaint, were deducted from their days earnings is
preposterous. Indeed, there were times when deductions were
made from the days earnings of some drivers, but such were
installment payments for the amount previously advanced to
them. Most drivers, when they got involved in accidents or
violations of traffic regulations, managed to settle them, and in
the process they had to spend some money, but most of the
time they did not have the needed amount so they secured
cash advances from him, with the understanding that the same
should be paid back by installments through deductions from
their daily earnings or boundary.
On the other hand, Bacoor Transport Service Cooperative, Inc.
(BTSCI) declared that it should not be made a party to the case
because: 1) [I]t has nothing to do with the employment of its
member-drivers. The matter is between the member-operator and
their respective member-drivers. The member-drivers tenure of
employment, compensation, work conditions, and other aspects of
employment are matters of arrangement between them and the
member-operators concerned, and the BTSCI has nothing to do with
it, as can be inferred from the Management Agreement between
BTSCI and the member-operators; and 2) [T]he amount allegedly
deducted from respondents and the purpose for which they were
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applied were matters that the cooperative was not aware of, and
much less imposed on them.
On September 17, 1996, respondents filed a motion to re-raffle the
case for the reason that the Labor Arbiter (Hon. Roberto I. Santos)
failed "to render his decision within thirty (30) calendar days,
without extension, after the submission of the case for decision."
On September 18, 1996, said Labor Arbiter inhibited himself from
further handling the case due to "personal reasons."
On November 8, 1996, Labor Arbiter Ricardo C. Nora, to whom the
case was re-raffled, ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda within ten days, after which the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.
On March 17, 1997, the Labor Arbiter (Hon. Ricardo C. Nora) handed
down his decision, the dispositive portion of which is worded as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the illegality of [respondents] dismissal and ordering
[petitioner] Melencio Gabriel to pay the [respondents] the total
amount of ONE MILLION THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND PESOS
[P1,034,000,] representing [respondents] backwages and
separation pay as follows:
1. Nelson Bilon
Backwages P 284,800
Separation Pay 26,400 P 321,200
2. Angel Brazil
Backwages P 294,800
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Separation Pay 96,800 391,600

3. Ernesto Pagaygay
Backwages P 294,800
Separation Pay 26,400 321,200
P 1,034,000
[Petitioner] Melencio Gabriel is likewise ordered to pay attorneys
fees equivalent to five percent (5%) of the judgment award or the
amount of P51,700 within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Decision.
All other issues are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
Incidentally, on April 4, 1997, petitioner passed away. On April 18,
1997, a copy of the above decision was delivered personally to
petitioners house. According to respondents, petitioners surviving
spouse, Flordeliza Gabriel, and their daughter, after reading the
contents of the decision and after they had spoken to their counsel,
refused to receive the same. Nevertheless, Bailiff Alfredo V.
Estonactoc left a copy of the decision with petitioners wife and her
daughter but they both refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of
the decision.7
The labor arbiters decision was subsequently served by registered
mail at petitioners residence and the same was received on May 28,
1997.
On May 16, 1997, counsel for petitioner filed an entry of appearance
with motion to dismiss the case for the reason that petitioner passed
away last April 4, 1997.
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On June 5, 1997, petitioner appealed the labor arbiters decision to

the National Labor Relations Commission, First Division, contending
that the labor arbiter erred:
1. In holding that [petitioner] Gabriel dismissed the
complainants, Arb. Nora committed a serious error in the
findings of fact which, if not corrected, would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to [petitioner] Gabriel;
2. In holding that strained relations already exist between the
parties, justifying an award of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, Arb. Nora not only committed a serious error in
the findings of fact, but he also abused his discretion;
3. In computing the amount of backwages allegedly due
[respondents] from 30 April 1995 to 15 March 1997, Arb. Nora
abused his discretion, considering that the case had been
submitted for decision as early as 1 March 1996 and that the
same should have been decided as early as 31 March 1996;
4. In using P400.00 and 22 days as factors in computing the
amount of backwages allegedly due [respondents], Arb. Nora
abused his discretion and committed a serious error in the
findings of fact, considering that there was no factual or
evidentiary basis therefor;
5. In using 33.5 months as factor in the computation of the
amount of backwages allegedly due [respondents], Arb. Nora
committed a serious error in the findings of fact[,] because
even if it is assumed that backwages are due from 30 April
1995 to 15 March 1997, the period between the two dates is
only 22 months, and not 33 months as stated in the
appealed decision; and
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6. In not dismissing the case[,] despite notice of the death of

[petitioner] Gabriel before final judgment, Arb. Nora abused
his discretion and committed a serious error of law.8
On July 3, 1997, respondents filed a motion to dismiss petitioners
appeal on the ground that the "surety bond is defective" and the
appeal was "filed out of time," which move was opposed by
petitioner.
Subsequently, on April 28, 1998, the NLRC promulgated its first
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby
reversed and set aside. The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed
for lack of employer-employee relationship.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. They claimed that
the decision did not discuss the issue of the timeliness of the appeal.
The lack of employer-employee relationship was mentioned in the
dispositive portion, which issue was not raised before the labor
arbiter or discussed in the body of the questioned decision. In view
of the issues raised by respondents in their motion, the NLRC
rendered its second decision on October 29, 1998. The pertinent
portions are hereby quoted thus:
In the case at bar, [petitioner] Melencio Gabriel was not
represented by counsel during the pendency of the case. A decision
was rendered by the Labor Arbiter a quo on March 17, 1997 while
Mr. Gabriel passed away on April 4, 1997 without having received a
copy thereof during his lifetime. The decision was only served on
April 18, 1997 when he was no longer around to receive the same.
His surviving spouse and daughter cannot automatically substitute
themselves as party respondents. Thus, when the bailiff tendered a
copy of the decision to them, they were not in a position to receive
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them. The requirement of leaving a copy at the partys residence is

not applicable in the instant case because this presupposes that the
party is still living and is just not available to receive the decision.
The preceding considered, the decision of the labor arbiter has not
become final because there was no proper service of copy thereof to
[petitioner] .
Undoubtedly, this case is for recovery of money which does not
survive, and considering that the decision has not become final, the
case should have been dismissed and the appeal no longer
entertained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of April 28,
1998 is set aside and vacated. Furthermore, the instant case is
dismissed and complainants are directed to pursue their claim
against the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Melencio Gabriel.
SO ORDERED.10
Aggrieved by the decision of the NLRC, respondents elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of a petition for certiorari.
On August 4, 2000, the CA reversed the decisions of the NLRC:
Article 223 of the Labor Code categorically mandates that "an appeal
by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash
bond or surety bond x x x." It is beyond peradventure then that the
non-compliance with the above conditio sine qua non, plus the fact
that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period, should
have been enough reasons to dismiss the appeal.
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In any event, even conceding ex gratia that such procedural

infirmity [were] inexistent, this petition would still be tenable based
on substantive aspects.
The public respondents decision, dated April 28, 1998, is
egregiously wrong insofar as it was anchored on the absence of an
employer-employee relationship. Well-settled is the rule that the
boundary system used in jeepney and (taxi) operations presupposes
an employer-employee relationship (National Labor Union v.
Dinglasan, 98 Phil. 649) .
The NLRC ostensibly tried to redeem itself by vacating the decision
April 28, 1998. By so doing, however, it did not actually resolve the
matter definitively. It merely relieved itself of such burden by
suggesting that the petitioners "pursue their claim against the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Melencio Gabriel."
In the instant case, the decision (dated March 17, 1997) of the Labor
Arbiter became final and executory on account of the failure of the
private respondent to perfect his appeal on time.
Thus, we disagree with the ratiocination of the NLRC that the death
of the private respondent on April 4, 1997 ipso facto negates
recovery of the money claim against the successors-in-interest .
Rather, this situation comes within the aegis of Section 3, Rule III of
the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment, which provides:
SECTION 3. Execution in Case of Death of Party. Where a party dies
after the finality of the decision/entry of judgment of order,
execution thereon may issue or one already issued may be enforced
in the following cases:
a) x x x ;
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b) In case of death of the losing party, against his successor-ininterest, executor or administrator;
c) In case of death of the losing party after execution is actually
levied upon any of his property, the same may be sold for the
satisfaction thereof, and the sheriff making the sale shall
account to his successor-in-interest, executor or administrator
for any surplus in his hands.
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition though, We are not
entirely in accord with the labor arbiters decision awarding
separation pay in favor of the petitioners. In this regard, it [is] worth
mentioning that in Kiamco v. NLRC,11 citing Globe-Mackay Cable
and Radio Corp. v. NLRC,12 the Supreme Court qualified the
application of the "strained relations" principle when it held -"If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for
the non-application of the above-cited provision (Art. 279, Labor
Code) this should be by way of exception, such as when the
reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained
relations between the employer and employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned
occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his
employer, and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of
antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect
the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned x x x
Obviously, the principle of strained relations cannot be applied
indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible
simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the
parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature.
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid legal act of
asserting ones right; otherwise[,] an employee who shall assert his
right could be easily separated from the service by merely paying
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his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his
employer had already become strained."
Anent the award of backwages, the Labor Arbiter erred in
computing the same from the date the petitioners were illegally
dismissed (i.e. April 30, 1995) up to March 15, 1997, that is two (2)
days prior to the rendition of his decision (i.e. March 17, 1997).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED,

hereby REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the assailed decisions of the
National Labor Relations Commission, dated April 28, 1998 ans
October 29, 1998. Consequently, the decision of the Labor Arbiter,
dated March 17, 1997, is hereby REINSTATED, subject to the
MODIFICATION that the private respondent is ORDERED to
immediately REINSTATE petitioners Nelson Bilon, Angel Brazil and
Ernesto Pagaygay to their former position without loss of seniority
rights and privileges, with full backwages from the date of their
dismissal until their actual reinstatement. Costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied by the CA in a resolution dated February 7, 2001.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:14
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS
APPEAL TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION WAS
FILED OUT OF TIME.
II
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THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED

DEFECTS IN PETITIONERS APPEAL BOND WERE OF SUCH
GRAVITY AS TO PREVENT THE APPEAL FROM BEING PERFECTED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME
ASSAILED A DECISION WHICH HAD BEEN VACATED IN FAVOR OF A
NEW ONE WHICH, IN TURN, HAS SOLID LEGAL BASIS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 3, RULE III,
OF THE MANUAL ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION WHICH, BY ITS OWN
EXPRESS TERMS, IS NOT APPLICABLE.
A resolution of the case requires a brief discussion of two issues
which touch upon the procedural and substantial aspects of the case
thus: a) whether petitioners appeal was filed out of time; and b)
whether the claim survives.
As regards the first issue, the Court considers the service of copy of
the decision of the labor arbiter to have been validly made on May
28, 1997 when it was received through registered mail. As correctly
pointed out by petitioners wife, service of a copy of the decision
could not have been validly effected on April 18, 1997 because
petitioner passed away on April 4, 1997.
Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
provides:
SEC. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. (a) Notices or
summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall be
served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or
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authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof
or by registered mail; Provided, That where a party is represented
by counsel or authorized representative, service shall be made on
such counsel or authorized representative; Provided further, That in
cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on
both parties and their counsel .
For the purpose of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be
counted from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders by the
counsel of record.
(b) The bailiff or officer personally serving the notice, order,
resolution or decision shall submit his return within two (2) days
from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his return, his name,
the names of the persons served and the date of receipt which
return shall be immediately attached and shall form part of the
records of the case. If no service was effected, the serving officer
shall state the reason therefore in the return.
Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which is suppletory to the
NLRC Rules of Procedure states that: "[s]ervice of the papers may be
made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or
by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having
charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not
known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the
hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the partys or
counsels residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and
discretion then residing therein."
The foregoing provisions contemplate a situation wherein the party
to the action is alive upon the delivery of a copy of the tribunals
decision. In the present case, however, petitioner died before a copy
of the labor arbiters decision was served upon him. Hence, the
above provisions do not apply. As aptly stated by the NLRC:
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In the case at bar, respondent Melencio Gabriel was not

represented by counsel during the pendency of the case. A decision
was rendered by the Labor Arbiter a quo on March 17, 1997 while
Mr. Gabriel passed away on April 4, 1997, without having received a
copy thereof during his lifetime. The decision was only served on
April 18, 1997 when he was no longer around to receive the same.
His surviving spouse and daughter cannot automatically substitute
themselves as party respondents. Thus, when the bailiff tendered a
copy of the decision to them, they were not in a position to receive
them. The requirement of leaving a copy at the partys residence is
not applicable in the instant case because this presupposes that the
party is still living and is not just available to receive the decision.
The preceding considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter has not
become final because there was no proper service of copy thereof to
party respondent.15
Thus, the appeal filed on behalf of petitioner on June 5, 1997 after
receipt of a copy of the decision via registered mail on May 28, 1997
was within the ten-day reglementary period prescribed under
Section 223 of the Labor Code.
On the question whether petitioners surety bond was defective,
Section 6, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
provides:
SEC. 6. Bond. In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves
monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the
Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award,
exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
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The employer as well as counsel shall submit a joint declaration

under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine and that
it shall be in effect until final disposition of the case.
The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the
Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. (As amended on Nov. 5,
1993).
The Court believes that petitioner was able to comply substantially
with the requirements of the above Rule. As correctly pointed out by
the NLRC:
While we agree with complainants-appellees that the posting of the
surety bond is jurisdictional, We do not believe that the "defects"
imputed to the surety bond posted for and in behalf of respondentappellant Gabriel are of such character as to affect the jurisdiction of
this Commission to entertain the instant appeal.
It matters not that, by the terms of the bond posted, the "Liability of
the surety herein shall expire on June 5, 1998 and this bond shall be
automatically cancelled ten (10) days after the expiration." After all,
the bond is accompanied by the joint declaration under oath of
respondent-appellants surviving spouse and counsel attesting that
the surety bond is genuine and shall be in effect until the final
disposition of the case.
Anent complainants-appellees contention that the surety bond
posted is defective for being in the name of BTSCI which did not
appeal and for having been entered into by Mrs. Gabriel without
BTSCIs authority, the same has been rendered moot and academic
by the certification issued by Gil CJ. San Juan, Vice-President of the
bonding company to the effect that "Eastern Assurance and Surety
Corporation Bond No. 2749 was posted for and on behalf appellant
Melencio Gabriel and/or his heirs" and that "(T)he name "Bacoor
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Transport Service Cooperative, Inc." was indicated in said bond due

merely in (sic) advertence."
At any rate, the Supreme Court has time and again ruled that while
Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended requiring a cash or surety
bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from for the appeal to be perfected, may be
considered a jurisdictional requirement, nevertheless, adhering to
the principle that substantial justice is better served by allowing the
appeal on the merits threshed out by this Honorable Commission,
the foregoing requirement of the law should be given a liberal
interpretation (Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Sison, 149 SCRA
238; C.W. Tan Mfg. v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 240; YBL v. NLRC, 190 SCRA
160; Rada v. NLRC, 205 SCRA 69; Star Angel Handicraft v. NLRC, 236
SCRA 580).16
On the other hand, with regard to the substantive aspect of the case,
the Court agrees with the CA that an employer-employee
relationship existed between petitioner and respondents. In
Martinez v. National Labor Relations Commission,17 citing National
Labor Union v. Dinglasan,18 the Court ruled that:
[T]he relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney
drivers under the boundary system is that of employer-employee
and not of lessor-lessee because in the lease of chattels the lessor
loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee
cannot be reckless in the use thereof, otherwise he would be
responsible for the damages to the lessor. In the case of jeepney
owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercises
supervision and control over the latter. The fact that the drivers do
not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called
"boundary" [that] they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to
withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and
employee. Thus, private respondents were employees because
they had been engaged to perform activities which were usually
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necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the

employer.19
The same principle was reiterated in the case of Paguio Transport
Corporation v. NLRC.20
The Court also agrees with the labor arbiter and the CA that
respondents were illegally dismissed by petitioner. Respondents
were not accorded due process.21 Moreover, petitioner failed to
show that the cause for termination falls under any of the grounds
enumerated in Article 282
(then Article 283)22 of the Labor Code.23 Consequently, respondents
are entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to their full backwages computed from the date
of dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement in
accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code.
Reinstatement is obtainable in this case because it has not been
shown that there is an ensuing "strained relations" between
petitioner and respondents. This is pursuant to the principle laid
down in Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC24 as
quoted earlier in the CA decision.
With regard to respondents monetary claim, the same shall be
governed by Section 20 (then Section 21), Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court which provides:1awphi1.net
SEC. 20. Action on contractual money claims. When the action is for
recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which
the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of
final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff
therein shall be enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. (21a)
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In relation to this, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed,
barred ; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent
arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, ... and judgment for money against the
decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth
as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator
may bring against the claimants.
Thus, in accordance with the above Rules, the money claims of
respondents must be filed against the estate of petitioner Melencio
Gabriel.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated August 4, 2000 and February 7, 2001,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 52001 are AFFIRMED but with the
MODIFICATION that the money claims of respondents should be
filed against the estate of Melencio Gabriel, within such reasonable
time from the finality of this Decision as the estate court may fix.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Case # 7: Union Bank vs. Santibaez (G.R. No. 149926)

G.R. No. 149926
February 23, 2005
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA,
respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831
affirming the dismissal2 of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case
No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC)
and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement3 in the
amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment
of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural AllPurpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the
principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of
P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up
to May 31, 1985.
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On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another
loan agreement,4 this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was
intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of
Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories,
and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim
and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said
amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they
also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated
December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic
will.6 Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced
before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs,
was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent.7 During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola,
executed a Joint Agreement8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1)
tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness
of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively
taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities9 was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the
latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February
5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint11 for sum of money against
the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the
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RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909.
Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for
Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there
was no information on his address or the date of his return to the
Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her
Answer13 and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since
she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement
signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the
probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the
petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 63.14 Consequently, trial on the merits
ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of
the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
complaint for lack of merit.15
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have
been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of
the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money being
claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial
court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by
his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a
partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement
was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate
court, and that there can be no valid partition until after the will has
been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed
to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The
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court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola

that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents
account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was
null and void, the trial court held that the petitioners cause of action
against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case
to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the
trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE
PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN
BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER
THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM
RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.16
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the
deceased had passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this
case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint
agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S.
Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said
document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in their
personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same
before the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in
the agreement was not one of those enumerated in the holographic
will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs,
particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary
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civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the

estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that
the money claim of the petitioner should have been presented
before the probate court.17
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and
held that the petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate
court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was
null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will
has been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the
holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic
terms when the deceased referred to them as "all other properties."
Moreover, the active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola
in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto.
SO ORDERED.18
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors
to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE
COURT.
II.
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THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE

NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM
SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RELITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM
SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY
AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT
UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF
P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF
P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE
RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR
OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.19
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were
transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code;
there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint
agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the
deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto. Since
respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without
any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position
contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic
will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors
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subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the
said will. The active participation and resistance of respondent
Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioners
claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in
the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who
executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of
the tractors under consideration would be equivalent to allowing
the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of
the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and
appellate courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence
S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all
establishing the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late
Efraim Santibaez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary
obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980
and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibaez,
together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the
obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The
petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of
the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes
executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable
jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the
petitioner to file its money claim before the probate court. Finally,
the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in
their respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola
maintains that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money
from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have
been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of
the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing
probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about. However,
to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of
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the obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the

said agreement.1a\^/phi1.net
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in
declaring that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that
even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her
brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval
of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in
her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the
probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that
she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not
signed any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any
document presented as evidence to show that she had caused
herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not
the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b)
whether or not the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the
deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs
liable on the obligation of the deceased.1awphi1.nt
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered.20 The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and
distribution of the estate.21
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated:
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In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs

until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of
a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated
and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch
upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the
validity of a will.22
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned
are the same properties embraced in the will.23 In the present case,
the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will 24 which
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the
proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in
favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an allencompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the
decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was
making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter.
Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any
partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The
joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning
the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the
time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the
probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said
tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already
acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased,
including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way
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without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it

with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.26 Every act intended
to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees
is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale,
an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.27 Thus, in
executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of
an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its
jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the
heirs of the decedent.28 In the instant case, there is no showing that
the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the
decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still
pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who
the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent
Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3)
tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible
heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of
the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs
assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule
in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the
heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves
and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of
them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken
as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit
Corp."29 The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the
happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession
and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they
were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier
discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It
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follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any

force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
decedent.l^vvphi1.net The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the
late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with
the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed
barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent,
arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the
decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth
as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator
may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already
commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth
by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and
mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if
final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so
determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate,
as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in
the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent,
may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the
probate court is mandatory.30 As we held in the vintage case of Py
Eng Chong v. Herrera:31
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the
deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims
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against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of
the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt
presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's
estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible,
pay off its debts and distribute the residue.32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private
respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred
by her late father. The documentary evidence presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim
Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its
money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after
Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory
notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses
Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it
unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had
not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its
assets and liabilities.33 The petitioner in its complaint alleged that
"by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed
by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank
of the Philippines"34 However, the documentary evidence35 clearly
reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption
of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc.
Nowhere can the petitioners participation therein as a party be
found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was
presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage
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Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the

trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that
plaintiff failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the
Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to take
judicial notice is to [be] exercised by the courts with caution; care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in
the negative." (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint
is wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action.
Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the
CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Case # 8: Sheker vs. Sheker (G.R. No. 157912)

G.R. No. 157912
December 13, 2007
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner,

vs.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINAAdministratrix, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the
reversal of the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order
dated April 9, 2003.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker
and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their
respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith,
petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's
commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in
the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the
estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for
expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course
of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved
for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the
grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section
7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2)
petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum
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shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation

why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing
without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced
by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari,
raising the following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding
contain a certification against non-forum shopping, failing
which such claim should be dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate
proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at
the time of its filing thereat?
(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be
dismissed because of its failure to contain a written
explanation on the service and filing by registered mail? 2
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a
probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the
payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that
Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in
ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a
suppletory manner.
The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari
although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule
41 of the Rules of Court.3
The petition is imbued with merit.
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However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that

rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special
proceedings is not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall
be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of
Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing
ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as
far as practicable.
The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform;
capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.4 This means
that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions
may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and
where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings.
Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in
ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special
proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory
pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing,
and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate
would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are
applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in
dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent
estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification
against non-forum shopping?
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The Court rules in the affirmative.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in
ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a
decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole
probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition
for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they
would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.5
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to
a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the
estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to
bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of
the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an
independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters
in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is
collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with
and dependent upon the principal remedy.7 (Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the
settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is
contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action
for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent
money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require
a certification against non-forum shopping.
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On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of

Appeals,8 that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim
(attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer
to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate
even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees
shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment
of such filing fees within a reasonable time.9 After all, the trial court
had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of
the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money
claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a
money claim against the estate.
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v.
De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay10 is squarely in point. Therein, the
Court held thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing
upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court
has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said
rule is not complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons.
Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading,
motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate,
delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail,
considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal
service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting
to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices:
(1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel offguard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for
instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon
receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail
containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party
may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel,
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or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the
disposition of such pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our
set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever
practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion
to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of
service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation
was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place.
The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability
of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause
"whenever practicable".
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule
13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is
the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal
service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had,
which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why
personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise
consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the
issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading
sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal
service, exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of
Rule 13:
"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and
filing of pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable.
The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not
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be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals

and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service
by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort
and expense. A written explanation why service was not done
personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is
so worded with the use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a
violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to
consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural
rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13
may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)1wphi1
In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez,
Quezon, while petitioner Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez,
Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance
makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written
explanation why service was not done personally "might have been
superfluous."
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of
a rule of procedure has been allowed where, among other cases, "the
injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree
of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed."11 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati
City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the
assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have
taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and
realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money
claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,12 the
failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has
not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the
RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13,
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not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of

substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of
estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts
and expenses of administration have been paid.13 The ultimate
purpose for the rule on money claims was further explained in
Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez,14 thus:
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the
probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng
Chong v. Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the
estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is
the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early
delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The
law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition
of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the
affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
distribute the residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural
rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal
service, again in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April
9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due
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course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in

accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Case # 9: People vs. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007)

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City,
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge
Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on
February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in
its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment
with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of
the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a
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result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor

General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the
appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his
conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the
view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused
while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both
his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said
counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v.
Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a
criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil
liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment
is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was
settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was
phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his
criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the
alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling
statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary
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penalties liability therefor is extinguished only

when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no
question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability
is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task
of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final
judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished
from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is
final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept
contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the
Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas
personales siempre, y respecto a las
pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no
hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term
"sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes
the ready answer: It says:
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SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere

la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse
utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso
alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y
plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one
which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is
such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is
confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in the words
of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes "una
verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die,
according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo,
ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase."
And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant
dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot
be any determination by final judgment whether or not
the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists,"
for the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator
Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal
Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly
reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of
that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the
sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to
mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which
states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final
"after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal."
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By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here

collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The
term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code
means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be
truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the
felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is
without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to
institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the
decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both
the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs.
Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See
also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal
Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge
Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely
on the felony committed and of which the offender might
be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the
civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated,
supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case:
Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is
sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability.
But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action
and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the
anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to
clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof
criminal liability does not exist. And, as was well stated
in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found
and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely
would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
proceeding."
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This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted
by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v.
Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5
and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in
view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having
been established, and considering that there is as yet no
final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the
criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant
Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised
Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717,
citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of
Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos
v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former,
the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one
accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is
extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim
therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the
administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior
to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities
resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became
operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil
Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of
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physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the

criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both
proceedings were terminated without final adjudication,
the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may
yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under
Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the
criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the
civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that
death supervenes before final judgment. The said
principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil
liability springs neither solely nor originally from the
crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale.
(Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
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In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil
liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second
vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale.
It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the
accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including
fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations
remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive,
the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims
against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final
judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred
that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on
appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI
had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the
name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case
as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the
deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to
Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil
liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources
of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil
liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it
were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10
departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case,
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accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower

court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal
of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability.
His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that
such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal
action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was
for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's
conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose
of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a
Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the
civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death
occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of
three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in
the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action in the absence of
express waiver or its reservation in a separate action
(Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for
the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal
action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287;
Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
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manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of

Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a
money judgment had been rendered against him by the
Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for
the funds improperly disbursed although he has no
criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine
National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of
the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his
possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal
acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been
instituted against him, thus making applicable, in
determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code .
. . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform
this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his
estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for
the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3,
Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained
adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a
reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil
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liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is

extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise
of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A reexamination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to
the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The
resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal
action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to
Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the
civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the
ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of
authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during
appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate
civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising
from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the
event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to
prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with
civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to
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justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the

criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil
liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action
due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is
because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex
delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his
conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear
on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed
intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to
survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no
criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil
action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which
is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely
new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even
necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard
put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It
is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the
same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as
it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person
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criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases,

extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused pending
appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil
liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the
final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent
to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending
appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil
liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable
consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and
enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from
that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which
refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw
its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of
July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental
distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate
civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more
than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the
conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that
contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply
Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it
was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the
purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the
basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be
liable. 13
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In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability,
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on
the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of
his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied
in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served
as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of
the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing
Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference
that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of
money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if
defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his
estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a
money judgment had been rendered against him by the
Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal.
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Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the

standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego
cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
drew the strained implication therefrom that where the
civil liability instituted together with the criminal
liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the
then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial
Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise
appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the
extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the
deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed
in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to
Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and
abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in
ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor
justification for its application in criminal procedure to
civil actions instituted together with and as part of
criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the
summary conversion from the latter category of an
ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal
proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be
categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in
Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased
accused.
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Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be

viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving
claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of
Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money
claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may
include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section
5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be
filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for
the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from
contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising
from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence,
there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as
an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim
therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should
be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered
by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction
of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the
same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a
separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony
previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised
determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasidelict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or
property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused
pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
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Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought

against executor or administrator. No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for
an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held
that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the
same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5,
Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or
implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely
personal obligations other than those which have their source in
delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises
from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the
estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
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solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso

strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above,
an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription. 22
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Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death
of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil
liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED
with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Case # 10 Hilado vs. CA (G.R. No. 164108)

G.R. No. 164108
May 8, 2009
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS

HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A.
REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO,
Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate
on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent
Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only
daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death,
there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the
petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
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petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second,

Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod
City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First
Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed
with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21,
presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition
acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5
Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued
an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the
estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration
in her favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an
Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and
Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.5 In the List of
Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as
among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then
being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent
stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases
as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40
for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required
private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,9 praying that they be
furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the
intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before
the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed
an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for
the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of
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the decedents estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or

motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private
respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified,
incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not
interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to
intervene in the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, a petition for
certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in
general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in
the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 12
dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in
the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the
fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact
contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in
separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the
lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.
Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their
argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other
provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.13
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were
denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be
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henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders issued" by

the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix
Benedicto with the said court.14 Second, they prayed that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix
Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate,
and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the
fair market value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission
thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the
collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.16
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective
solely informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree
with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1,
Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in
the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the
legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant."17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under
the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in
special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons
fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of
Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further
provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules
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provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,

applicable to special proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors
of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The
definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the
right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto,
the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before
us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short,
even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in
accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the
disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the
right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition
should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special
Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any
interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to
participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate
proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1)
Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any person
interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file
a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which
mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of
administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other
persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule
76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for
the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an
individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to
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the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any

asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or
interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of
the time and place of the examination and allowance of the
Administrators account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of
Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons
interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7)
Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the
estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of
the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or
provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on
contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed
their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to
creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters
of administration and published by the administrator immediately
after the issuance of such notice.19 However, it appears that the
claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his
actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal
Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class
of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under
Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of
the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the
intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator,
was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the
other civil case21 was already pending review before this Court at
the time of Benedictos death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to
be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the
intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of
petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the
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judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may
they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang
Chia,22 and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A
brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an
action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and
during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was
hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan
had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his
complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her
late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention,
manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a coadministrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be
increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the
civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the
increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case,
the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the
ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial
partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate
proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court
affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate
proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their
interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in
said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left
subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified
in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable
fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily
reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination
and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case
No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the
case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close
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interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as

having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance
the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of
the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or
authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings
until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction
has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of
the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or
personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real
or personal, may be commenced against the executor or
administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the
action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its
termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate
proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil
case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that
questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of
the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a
separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise
of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if
we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any
time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x23 (Emphasis
supplied) [Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan
conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such
pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing
Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the
effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to
protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but
not for a decision on their action."24
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Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate

interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful
that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but
also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate"
various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in
the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending
action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably
concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the
estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or
diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be
enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not
provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to
participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings,
but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may
accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no
general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court
not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there
is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be
protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers
sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes
and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as
well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There
is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners.
They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate
proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a
running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate
remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right,
under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if
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property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently

conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate
and contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the
intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission
that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all
processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody
claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would
have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how
wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent
that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings
to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims,
would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and
would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly
disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been
recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that
addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of
developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge
Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same
petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be
allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the
respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came
to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every court of
justice shall be public records and shall be available for the
inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that
petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court
records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to
monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the
preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g.,
the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission
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by the Administratrix of an annual accountingappears legitimate,

for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against
Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of
the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons"
under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of
the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than
mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them.
In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the
assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the
rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the
records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court
order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim,
will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator
and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by
which the interests of the creditors in the estate are
preserved.1awphi1
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings
do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as
"interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances
when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in:
(1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining
and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec.
7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding
the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the
estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged
in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed
by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a
deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
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submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon

submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair
market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline
for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to
them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the
court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment,
while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an
account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the
letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that
there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform
either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still
contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the
administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the
context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections
enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of
those with contingent claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the
administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the
provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of
the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent
one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the
interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of
sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence
or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such
purpose.
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All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not
be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special
Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification
that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of
Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as
provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of
Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Case # 11: Nacar vs. Nistal (G.R. No. L-33006)

G.R. No. L-33006 December 8, 1982
NICANOR NACAR, petitioner,
vs.
CLAUDIO A. NISTAL as Municipal Judge of Esperanza, Agusan del
Sur, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Agusan del Sur, ILDEFONSO
JAPITANA and ANTONIO DOLORICON, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Nicanor Nacar filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with preliminary injunction to annul an order of the
respondent judge of the municipal court of Esperanza, Agusan del
Sur directing the attachment of seven (7) carabaos, to effect the
return of four (4) carabaos seized under the questioned order, and
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to stop the respondent judge from further proceeding in Civil Case

No. 65.
Respondent Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint in Civil Case No.
65 and entitled it "Claim Against the Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar
With Preliminary Attachment:" On the basis of this complaint,
including an allegation "that defendant are (sic) about to remove
and dispose the above-named property (seven carabaos) with intent
to defraud plaintiff herein", and considering that Mr. Japitana had
given security according to the Rules of Court, Judge Nistal issued
the order commanding the provincial sheriff to attach the seven (7)
heads of cattle in the possession of petitioner Nicanor Nacar.
Actually only four (4) carabaos were attached because three (3)
carabaos had earlier been slaughtered during the rites preceding the
burial of the late Isabelo Nacar.
Nicanor Nacar filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of
preliminary attachment, and to order the return of the carabaos.
Private respondent Japitana filed an opposition to this motion while
intervenor Antonio Doloricon filed a complaint in intervention
asserting that he was the owner of the attached carabaos and that
the certificates of ownership of large cattle were in his name.
The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss prompting Mr.
Nacar to come to the Supreme Court.
In a resolution dated January 12, 1971, this Court, upon the posting
of a bond in the amount of P1,000.00, directed the issuance of a
preliminary mandatory injunction. The respondents were enjoined
from further enforcing the writ of attachment and to return the
seized carabaos. The judge was restrained from further proceeding
with Civil Case No. 65.
We find the petition meritorious.
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The pertinent portions of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana with

the municipal court read as follows:
ILDEFONSO JAPITANA Civil Case No. 65 Plaintiff,
FOR:
Versus
CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE NICANOR NACAR THE
LATE ISABELO NACAR WITH Defendant. PRELIMINARY
ATTACHMENT x ---------------------------------x
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the undersigned plaintiff and before this
Honorable Court, respectfully avers:
xxx xxx xxx
That at various dates since the year 1968, the defendant
have (sic) incurred indebtedness to the plaintiff in the
total sum of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY
ONE (P2,791.00) PESOS, which said amount had long
been overdue for payment, and which the defendant up to
this date have (sic) not been able to pay, despite repeated
demands from the plaintiff;
That the defendant Isabelo Nacar died last April, 1970
leaving among other things personal property consisting
seven (7) heads of carabaos now in the possession of the
defendant Nicanor Nacar;
That plaintiff herein file a claim against the estate of the
late Isabelo Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum of
P2,791.99;
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That defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the

above mentioned property with intent to defraud plaintiff
herein;
That plaintiff is willing to put up a bond for the issuance
of a preliminary attachment in an amount to be fixed by
the Court, not exceeding the sum of P 2,791.00 which is
the plaintiff's claim herein;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the
hearing of this case, a writ of preliminary attachment be
issued against the properties of the defendant to serve as
security for the payment or satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered herein; and that after due hearing
on the principal against the defendant for the sum of P
2,791,00 with legal interest from September 15, 1970
plus costs of this suit. (Annex "A", p. 7 rollo).
In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction and absence of a cause of action. Mr. Nacar averred that
the indebtedness mentioned in the complaint was alleged to have
been incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar and not by Nicanor Nacar.
There was, therefore, no cause of action against him. The petitioner
also stated that a municipal court has no jurisdiction to entertain an
action involving a claim filed against the estate of a deceased person.
The same grounds have been raised in this petition. Mr. Nacar
contends:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That the respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction.The municipal courts or inferior courts have
NO jurisdiction to settle the estate of deceased persons.
The proper remedy is for the creditor to file the proper
proceedings in the court of first instance and file the
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corresponding claim. But assuming without admitting

that the respondent judge had jurisdiction, it is very
patent that he committed a very grave abuse of discretion
and totally disregarded the provisions of the Rules of
Court and decisions of this honorable Court when he
issued an ex-parte writ of preliminary attachment, when
there is no showing that the plaintiff therein has a
sufficient cause of action, that there is no other security
for the claim sought to be enforced by the plaintiff; or that
the amount claimed in the action is as much as the sum
for which the order is prayed for above all legal
counterclaims; There was no bond to answer for
whatever damages that herein petitioner may suffer;
(Rollo, pp. 3- 4).
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent judge tried to avoid the consequences of the issues
raised in the motion to dismiss by stating that although the title of
the complaint styled it a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo
Nacar, the allegations showed that the nature of the action was
really for the recovery of an indebtedness in the amount of
P2,791.99.
The rule cited by the judge is correctly stated but it is hardly
relevant to the contents of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana.
It is patent from the portions of the complaint earlier cited that the
allegations are not only vague and ambiguous but downright
misleading. The second paragraph of the body of the complaint
states that the defendant (herein petitioner Nicanor Nacar) at
various dates since the year 1968 incurred debts to the plaintiff in
the sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the subsequent paragraphs, one
clearly gathers that the debts were actually incurred by the late
Isabelo Nacar, who died several months before the filing of the
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complaint. The complaint which the respondent judge reads as one

for the collection of a sum of money and all the paragraphs of which
are incidentally unnumbered, expressly states as a material
averment:
xxx xxx xxx
That plaintiff herein file (sic) a claim against the estate of the late
Isabelo Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.00;
xxx xxx xxx
Under the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no
cause of action against petitioner Nacar. Mathay v. Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company (58 SCRA 559) gives the elements of a valid
cause of action:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right of the other. Its essential
elements are, namely: (1) the existence of a legal right in
the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant,
and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of
plaintiff's right with consequential injury or damage to
the plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. ( Ma-ao
Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, et al., 79 Phil. 666, 667;
Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751,
February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 251, 255). On the other hand,
Section 3 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the
complaint must state the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action. Hence, where the complaint
states ultimate facts that constitute the three essential
elements of a cause of action, the complaint states a cause
of action; (Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs.
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Garcia, 88 Phil. 215, 218) otherwise, the complaint must

succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground.
Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to
recover an indebtedness due him, petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no
correlative legal duty to pay the debt for the simple reason that
there is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred the debt
or had anything to do with the creation of the liability. As far as the
debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the
petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with
consequential injury or damage to the latter as would create a cause
of action against the former.
It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed
the case against petitioner Nacar to recover seven (7) heads of
carabaos allegedly belonging to Isabelo Nacar which Japitana
wanted to recover from the possession of the petitioner to answer
for the outstanding debt of the late Isabelo Nacar. This matter,
however, is only ancillary to the main action. The ancillary matter
does not cure a fatal defect in the complaint for the main action is
for the recovery of an outstanding debt of the late lsabelo Nacar due
respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which petitioner Nacar
has nothing to do.
In fact the fatal defect in the complaint was noticed by the
respondent court when it advised respondent Japitana to amend his
complaint to conform with his evidence and from the court's
admission that it was inclined to dismiss the case were it not for the
complaint in intervention of respondent Doloricon. Respondent
Doloricon filed his complaint for intervention on the ground that the
four carabaos, subject of the writ of attachment, were actually his
carabaos. Thus, the respondent court in its Order denying the
petitioner's motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary
attachment and in order the return of the carabaos said:
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... Antonio Doloricon manifested before this Court that he

is filing a third-party complaint alleging that he is the true
and lawful owner of the carabaos in questions.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court for the
interest of both parties will not for the meantime dismiss
this case. Antonio Doloricon is hereby given 10 days from
receipt hereof within which to file his third-party
complaint. The plaintiff who in his opposition to
defendant's motion to dismiss pray (sic) for the custody
of the carabaos. This Court further requires plaintiff to
put up the additional bond of P I,000.00 after which the
latter may be entitled of (sic) the custody of the carabaos
subject of litigation pending final termination of this case.
(Rollo, pp. 18-19)
The respondent court's reason for not dismissing the case is
contrary to applicable precedents on the matter. We ruled in Mathay
v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, supra:
Section I, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, providing in part
that:
Within the time for pleading a motion to
dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds; ...
(g) That the complaint states no cause of
action. ...
explicitly requires that the sufficiency of the complaint must be
tested exclusively on the basis of the complaint itself and no other
should be considered when the ground for motion to dismiss is that
the complaint states no cause of action. Pursuant thereto this Court
has ruled that:
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As a rule the sufficiency of the complaint, when

challenged in a motion to dismiss, must be
determined exclusively on the basis of the facts
alleged therein' (Uy Chao vs. De La Rama
Steamship Co., Inc., L-14495, September 29,
1962, 6 SCRA 69, 72. See also De Jesus, et al. vs.
Belarmino et al., 95 Phil. 365, 371; Dalandan, et
at. vs. Julio, et al., L- 19101, February 29, 1964,
10 SCRA 400; Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda.
de Yulo, et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966, 16
SCRA 250, 254; Acuna vs. Batac Producers
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., et al.,
L-20338, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 526, 531)
Hence, it was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case
simply because respondent Doloricon filed the complaint for
intervention alleging that he owned the carabaos.
Moreover, even assuming that respondent Japitana had a legal right
to the carabaos which were in the possession of petitioner Nacar,
the proper procedure would not be to file an action for the recovery
of the outstanding debts of the late Isabelo Nacar against his
stepfather, the petitioner Nacar as defendant. As we said in Maspil v.
Romero (61 SCRA 197):
Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of
rights must be taken in accordance with procedural rules
and cannot be left to the whims or caprices of litigants. It
cannot even be left to the untrammeled discretion of the
courts of justice without sacrificing uniformity and
equality in the application and effectivity thereof.
Considering the foregoing, the respondent court's denial of the
motion to dismiss the complaint and its issuance of a writ of
attachment based on the allegations of the complaint are improper.
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With this conclusion, we find no need to discuss the other issue on

whether or not the procedural rules on the issuance of a writ of
attachment were followed by the respondent court in issuing the
subject writ of attachment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The preliminary
mandatory injunction issued on January 13, 1971 is made
permanent and the cash bond filed by the petitioner in connection
therewith is ordered returned to him.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Relova, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
VASQUEZ, J., concurring:
I concur in the result.
The fundamental error committed by the private respondents was
in pursuing their claim in an ordinary action; and that by the
respondent municipal judge in entertaining the same.
As can be seen from the caption and the body of the complaint filed
in Civil Case No. 65, the claim of the private respondents was not
against herein petitioner Nicanor Nacar but against the estate of the
deceased Isabelo Nacar. It is a claim for money arising from unpaid
indebtedness granted on various dates. Isabelo Nacar died before
the said complaint was filed. It does not appear that any proceeding
has been filed to settle his estate.
Under these facts, the filing of an ordinary action to recover said
claim is not allowed in any court. Even if settlement proceedings had
been taken to settle the estate of Isabelo Nacar, the suit to recover
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the claim of the private respondents may not be filed against the
administrator or executor of his estate. This is expressly provided
for in Section 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt
or interest thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; ... .
The claim of private respondents, being one arising from a contract,
may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration
proceedings that may be taken to settle the estate of the deceased
Isabelo Nacar. If such a proceeding is instituted and the subject
claim is not filed therein within the period prescribed, the same
shall be deemed "barred forever." (Sec. 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court).
Even if this action were commenced during the lifetime of Isabelo
Nacar, the same shall have to be dismissed, and the claim
prosecuted in the proper administration proceedings (Sec. 21, Rule
3, Ibid.).
It would seem that the main purpose of the private respondents in
filing Civil Case No. 65 was to attach the seven carabaos owned by
Isabelo Nacar. A case had to be filed in order to justify the issuance
of a writ of attachment, unfortunately, said remedy may not be
allowed. The carabaos, if really owned by Isabelo Nacar, pertained
to his estate upon his death. The claim of the private respondents
may only be satisfied by a voluntary act on the part of the heirs of
Isabelo Nacar, or pursued in the appropriate settlement
proceedings. A municipal court may not entertain such a proceeding,
it not being vested, under the law then in force, with probate
jurisdiction.
Civil Case No. 65 should accordingly be dismissed and the writ of
attachment issued therein dissolved.
Separate Opinions
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VASQUEZ, J., concurring:

I concur in the result.
The fundamental error committed by the private respondents was
in pursuing their claim in an ordinary action; and that by the
respondent municipal judge in entertaining the same.
As can be seen from the caption and the body of the complaint filed
in Civil Case No. 65, the claim of the private respondents was not
against herein petitioner Nicanor Nacar but against the estate of the
deceased Isabelo Nacar. It is a claim for money arising from unpaid
indebtedness granted on various dates. Isabelo Nacar died before
the said complaint was filed. It does not appear that any proceeding
has been filed to settle his estate.
Under these facts, the filing of an ordinary action to recover said
claim is not allowed in any court. Even if settlement proceedings had
been taken to settle the estate of Isabelo Nacar, the suit to recover
the claim of the private respondents may not be filed against the
administrator or executor of his estate. This is expressly provided
for in Section 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt
or interest thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; ... .
The claim of private respondents, being one arising from a contract,
may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration
proceedings that may be taken to settle the estate of the deceased
Isabelo Nacar. If such a proceeding is instituted and the subject
claim is not filed therein within the period prescribed, the same
shall be deemed "barred forever." (Sec. 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court).
Even if this action were commenced during the lifetime of Isabelo
Nacar, the same shall have to be dismissed, and the claim
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prosecuted in the proper administration proceedings (Sec. 21, Rule

3, Ibid.).
It would seem that the main purpose of the private respondents in
filing Civil Case No. 65 was to attach the seven carabaos owned by
Isabelo Nacar. A case had to be filed in order to justify the issuance
of a writ of attachment, unfortunately, said remedy may not be
allowed. The carabaos, if really owned by Isabelo Nacar, pertained
to his estate upon his death. The claim of the private respondents
may only be satisfied by a voluntary act on the part of the heirs of
Isabelo Nacar, or pursued in the appropriate settlement
proceedings. A municipal court may not entertain such a proceeding,
it not being vested, under the law then in force, with probate
jurisdiction.
Civil Case No. 65 should accordingly be dismissed and the writ of
attachment issued therein dissolved.
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Case # 12: Briones vs. Henson-Cruz (G.R. No. 159130)

G.R. No. 159130
August 22, 2008
ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES, petitioner,

vs.
LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSON, and ANTONIO J. HENSON
respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition1 the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(Fifteenth Division) dated February 11, 20032 in CA-G.R. SP No.
71844.
THE ANTECEDENTS
Respondent Ruby J. Henson filed on February 23, 1999 a petition for
the allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz J. Henson, with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 99-92870.
Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceased's daughters and also a
respondent in this petition, opposed Ruby's petition. She alleged
that Ruby understated the value of their late mother's estate and
acted with "unconscionable bad faith" in the management thereof.
Lilia prayed that her mother's holographic will be disallowed and
that she be appointed as the Intestate Administratrix.
Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment of an Interim Special
Administrator of the estate of her late mother, praying that the
Prudential Bank & Trust Company-Ermita Branch be appointed as
Interim Special Administrator. The trial court granted the motion
but designated Jose V. Ferro (Senior Vice-President and Trust
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Officer, Trust Banking Group of the Philippines National Bank) as

the Special Administrator. Ferro, however, declined the
appointment.
The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as
Special Administrator of the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the
appointment, took his oath of office, and started the administration
of the estate. The significant highlights of his administration are
listed below:
1. On November 22, 1999, the trial court directed the heirs of
Luz J. Henson to turn over the possession of all the properties
of the deceased to the Special Administrator.
2. On February 16, 2000, Atty. Briones moved that the trial
court approve Special Administrator's fees of P75,000.00 per
month. These fees were in addition to the commission referred
to in Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court. The trial
court granted the motion but reduced the fees to P60,000.00
per month, retroactive to the date Atty. Briones assumed office.
3. Atty. Briones filed a Special Administrator's Report No. 1
dated September 8, 2000 which contained an inventory of the
properties in his custody and a statement of the income
received and the disbursements made for the estate. The trial
court issued an Order dated March 5, 2001 approving the
report.
4. On September 17, 2001, the heirs of Luz J. Henson submitted
a project of partition of the estate for the trial court's approval.
5. On January 8, 2002, Atty. Briones submitted the Special
Administrator's Final Report for the approval of the court. He
prayed that he be paid a commission of P97,850,191.26
representing eight percent (8%) of the value of the estate
under his administration.
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6. The respondents opposed the approval of the final report

and prayed that they be granted an opportunity to examine the
documents, vouchers, and receipts mentioned in the statement
of income and disbursements. They likewise asked the trial
court to deny the Atty. Briones' claim for commission and that
he be ordered to refund the sum of P134,126.33 to the estate.
7. On February 21, 2002, the respondents filed an audit request
with the trial court. Atty. Briones filed his comment suggesting
that the audit be done by an independent auditor at the
expense of the estate.
8. In an Order dated March 12, 2002, the trial court granted the
request for audit and appointed the accounting firm Alba,
Romeo & Co. to conduct the audit.
9. The respondents moved for the reconsideration of Order
dated March 12, 2002, alleging that in view of the partition of
the estate there was no more need for a special administrator.
They also clarified that they were not asking for an external
audit; they merely wanted to be allowed to examine the
receipts, vouchers, bank statements, and other documents in
support of the Special Administrator's Final Report and to
examine the Special Administrator under oath.
10. The trial court handed down an Order dated April 13,
2002, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court hereby:
1. Reiterates its designation of the accounting
firm of Messrs. Alba, Romeo & Co. to immediately
conduct an audit of the administration by Atty.
George S. Briones of the estate of the late Luz J.
Henson, the expenses of which shall be charged
against the estate.
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2. Suspends the approval of the report of the

special administrator except the payment of his
commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the
value of the estate.
3. Directs the special administrator to deliver the
residue to the heirs in proportion to their shares.
From the shares of Lilia J. Henson-Cruz, there shall
be deducted the advances made to her.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
On April 29, 2002, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals (CA)
a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus which was
raffled to the CA's Ninth Division and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
70349. The petition assailed the Order dated March 12, 2002 which
appointed accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. as auditors and the
Order dated April 3, 2002 which reiterated the appointment.
Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari in CA G.R. SP No. 70349,
the heirs of Luz Henzon filed on April 9, 2002 a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC assailing the Order dated April 3, 2003 insofar as it
directed the payment of Atty. Briones' commission. They
subsequently filed their record on appeal.
The trial court, however, denied the appeal and disapproved the
record on appeal on May 23, 2002 on the ground of forum shopping.
Respondents' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
On July 26, 2002, the respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus
with the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71844. They
claimed that the trial court unlawfully refused to comply with its
ministerial duty to approve their seasonably-perfected appeal. They
refuted the trial court's finding of forum shopping by declaring that
the issues in their appeal and in their petition for certiorari (CA-G.R.
SP No. 70349) are not identical, although both stemmed from the
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same Order of April 3, 2002. The appeal involved the payment of the
special administrator's commission, while the petition for certiorari
assailed the appointment of an accounting firm to conduct an
external audit.
On the other hand, the petitioner insisted that the respondents
committed forum shopping when they assailed the Order of April 3,
2002 twice, i.e., through a special civil action for certiorari and by
ordinary appeal. Forum shopping took place because of the identity
of the reliefs prayed for in the two cases. The petitioner likewise
posited that the trial court's error, if any, in dismissing the appeal on
the ground of forum shopping is an error of judgment, not of
jurisdiction, and hence is not correctible by certiorari.
On February 11, 2003, the Court of Appeals decided the
respondents' petition for Mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 71844) as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent
Judge is directed to give due course to the appeal of
petitioners from the Order dated April 3, 2002 insofar as it
directed the payment of commission to private
respondent. [Emphasis supplied.]
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had neither the power
nor the authority to deny the appeal on the ground of forum
shopping. It pointed out that under Section 13, Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the authority of the trial court
to dismiss an appeal, either motu proprio or on motion, may be
exercised only if the appeal was taken out of time or if the appellate
court docket and other fees were not paid within the reglementary
period.
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Atty. Briones moved for the reconsideration of this decision. The

appellate court denied his motion in its Resolution dated July 17,
2003. Thereupon, he seasonably filed the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari on September 4, 2003 on the ground that the
CA refused to resolve the issue of forum shopping in its Decision of
February 11, 2003 and its resolution of July 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 71844 (Petition for Mandamus to give due course to the appeal).
In the interim, on August 5, 2003, the Court of Appeals (Ninth
Division) handed down its Decision3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70439
(Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus on the
appointment of the auditing firm), whose fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Orders dated March 12, 2002 and April 3, 2002
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Public respondent Judge
Artemio S. Tipon is hereby COMMANDED to allow petitionerheirs: 1) to examine all the receipts, bank statements, bank
passbook, treasury bills, and other documents in support of the
Special Administrator's Final Report, as well as the Statement
of the Income and Disbusement Made from the Estate; and 2)
to cross-examine private respondent Briones, before finally
approving the Special Administrator's Final Report. [Emphasis
supplied.]
SO ORDERED.
THE PARTIES' POSITIONS
The petitioner faults the appellate court for refusing to resolve the
forum shopping issue in its Decision of February 11, 2003 and the
Resolution of July 17, 2003, thereby deciding the case in a way not in
accord with law or with applicable decisions of this Court. On the
matter of forum shopping, the appellate court simply stated in its
decision that "In view of the fact that respondent Judge had no power
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to disallow the appeal on the ground of forum shopping, we deem it

unnecessary to discuss whether or not petitioners committed forum
shopping." Neither did the appellate court pass upon the issue of
forum shopping in its ruling on the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, stating that forum shopping should be resolved
either in the respondent's appeal or in their petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349).
As basis, the petitioner cites Section 3 of this Court's Circular No. 2891 which provides that "(a) Any violation of this Circular shall be a
cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petition or
complaint; and (b) Any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any
party and his lawyer with the filing of multiple petitions and
complaints to ensure favorable action shall constitute direct
contempt of court."
To prove that forum shopping transpired, the petitioner cites the
respondents' petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus (CAG.R. SP No. 70349) that prayed for the annulment of the assailed
Order of April 3, 2002 in its entirety. To the petitioner, the attack on
the entire Order meant that even the payment of the special
administrator's commission - which was the subject of a separate
appeal - was covered by the petition. The petitioner further alleged
that "to conceal the attempt at forum shopping, respondents
deliberately failed to mention the existence of their ordinary appeal
of the same Order of April 3, 2002 in the certification against forum
shopping attached to their petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in CA-G.R. SP No. 70349."
The petitioner cites in support of his position the cases of Silahis
International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,4 Tantoy
Sr. v. Court of Appeals,5 and First Philippine International Bank v.
Court of Appeals.6 Silahis was cited for the proposition that only one
recourse - the appeal - should have been filed because the issues
were inter-related. Tantoy, Sr. spoke of related causes or the same or
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substantially the same reliefs in considering whether there is forum

shopping. On the other hand, First Philippine International Bank was
cited to emphasize that the key to a finding of forum shopping is the
objective of the relief; though differently worded, there is violation
of the rule against forum shopping if the objective in all the actions
filed involves the same relief - in this case, the setting aside of the
Order of April 3, 2002. The petitioner noted that the respondents
had succeeded in obtaining this relief in their petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349) and the ruling in
this petition already constituted res judicata on the validity of the
Order of April 3, 2002.
The respondents, for their part, claim that "the mere failure to
specify in the decision the contentions of the appellant and the
reason for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same
contrary to the provisions of the law and the Constitution."7 In
support of the twin recourses they took, they cite Argel v. Court of
Appeals8 where this Court rejected the ground for objection similar
to present petitioner's because "the special civil action for certiorari
and the appeal did not involve the same issue." The respondents
saw as ineffective the argument that the petition for certiorari
prayed for the annulment of the entire Order of April 3, 2002 since
the petition and the appeal were very specific on the portions of the
Order that were being assailed. They pointed, too, to the decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 which only passed upon the issues specified in
the petition for certiorari, leaving untouched the issue that they
chose to raise via an appeal. As their last point, the respondents
claimed they saw no need to mention the pendency of the appeal in
their non-forum shopping certification because the appeal dealt
with an issue altogether different from the issues raised in the
petition for certiorari, citing for this purpose the specific wordings
of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court.
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THE ISSUE
The sole issue presented to us for resolution is: Did the Court of
Appeals (Fifteenth Division) err in not dismissing the
respondents' petition for mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 71844) on
the ground of forum shopping?
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit as the discussions below
will show.
The Order of April 3, 2002
An examination of the RTC Order of April 3, 2002 shows that it
resolved three matters, namely: (1) the designation of the
accounting firm of Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct an audit of the
administration of Atty. George S. Briones of the estate of Luz J.
Henson, at the expense of the estate; (2) the payment of the
petitioner's commission as the estate's Special Administrator; and
(3) the directive to the petitioner to deliver the residue of the estate
to the heirs in their proportional shares. Of these, only the first two
are relevant to the present petition as the third is the ultimate
directive that will close the settlement of estate proceedings.
The first part of the Order (the auditor's appointment) was the
subject of the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus that
the respondents filed before the appellate court (CA-G.R. SP No.
70349). Whether this part is interlocutory or one that fully settles
the case on the merits can be answered by the test that this Court
laid down in Mirada v. Court of Appeals: "The test to ascertain
whether or not an order is interlocutory or final is - Does it leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits
of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not it is final." 9
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The terms of the trial court's order with respect to the appointment
or "designation" of the accounting firm is clear: "to immediately
conduct an audit of the administration by Atty. George S. Briones of
the estate of the late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of which shall be
charged against the estate."
To audit, is "to examine and verify (as the books of account of a
company or a treasurer's accounts)." An audit is the "formal or
official examination and verification of books of account (as for
reporting on the financial condition of a business at a given date or
on the results of its operations for a given period)."10 Black's Law
Dictionary defines it no differently: "a systematic inspection of
accounting records involving analyses, tests and confirmations; a
formal or official examination and authentication of accounts, with
witnesses, vouchers, etc."11
Given that the subject matter of the audit is Atty. Briones' Final
Report in the administration of the estate of the decedent, its
preparatory character is obvious; it is a prelude to the court's final
settlement and distribution of the properties of the decedent to the
heirs. In the context of what the court's order accomplishes, the
court's designation of an auditor does not have the effect of ruling
on the pending estate proceeding on its merits (i.e., in terms of
finally determining the extent of the net estate of the deceased and
distributing it to the heirs) or on the merits of any independently
determinable aspect of the estate proceeding; it is only for purposes
of confirming the accuracy of the Special Administrator's Final
Report, particularly of the reported charges against the estate. In
other words, the designation of the auditor did not resolve Special
Proceedings No. 99-92870 or any independently determinable issue
therein, and left much to be done on the merits of the case. Thus,
the April 3, 2002 Order of the RTC is interlocutory in so far as it
designated an accounting firm to audit the petitioner's special
administration of the estate.
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In contrast with the interlocutory character of the auditor's

appointment, the second part is limited to the Special
Administrator's commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the value of
the estate. To quote from the Order: the court hereby. . . 2. Suspends
the approval of the report of the special administrator except the
payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value
of the estate." Under these terms, it is immediately apparent that this
pronouncement on an independently determinable issue - the special
administrator's commission - is the court's definite and final word
on the matter, subject only to whatever a higher body may decide if
an appeal is made from the court's ruling.
From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrator's
commission is no less a claim against the estate than a claim that
third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes
this when it provides for "Claim of Executor or Administrator
Against an Estate."12 Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of
the court on a claim against the estate "is appealable as in ordinary
cases."13 Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on
the extent of the Special Administrator's commission effectively, a claim by the special administrator against the
estate - is the lower court's last word on the matter and one
that is appealable.
Available Recourses against
the April 3, 2002 Order
We bring up the above distinctions between the first two parts of
the Order of April 3, 2002 to highlight that the directives or
determinations under the Order are not similarly final and
appealable in character. In this regard, Section 1, Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Rules of Court lays down the rules on what are or are
not subject to appeal and it provides:
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Section 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a

judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case or
of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.
No appeal shall be taken from:
xxx
(c) An interlocutory order.
xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is
not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65.
Under these terms and taking into account the previous discussion
of the nature of the various parts of the Order of April 3, 2002, the
lower court's determination of the special administrator's
commission is clearly appealable while the auditor's appointment is
not. The latter, under the express terms of the above provision, can
be the subject of an "appropriate special civil action under Rule 65."
Rulings abound on when an appeal or a petition for certiorari is the
appropriate recourse to take from a lower court ruling.14 The twist
in the present case is that the losing party took two available
recourses from the same Order of the lower court: an appeal was
made with respect to that portion of the Order that is final in
character, and a petition for certiorari was taken against the portion
that, again by its nature, is interlocutory. It was under these
circumstances that the petitioner posited that forum shopping had
been committed as the respondents should have simply appealed,
citing the interlocutory aspect as an error in the appeal of the final
aspect of the Order of April 3, 2002.
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While the petitioner's position may be legally correct as a general

rule, it is not true in the present case considering the unique nature
of the case that gave rise to the present petition. The petitioner is
the special administrator in a settlement of estate, a special
proceeding governed by Rule 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Section 1, Rule 109 in part states:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be
taken. - An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of
First Instance or a Juvenile Domestic Relations Court, where
such order or judgment:
xxxxxxxxx
(c) allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against
the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on
behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or
guardian;
(e) constitutes, in the proceedings relating to the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person x x x a final determination in
the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that
no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator.
The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same
case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a
separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be
final.15 In this multi-appeal mode, the probate court loses
jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains
jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was
taken for purposes of further remedies the parties may avail of.16
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Where multi-appeals are allowed, we see no reason why a separate

petition for certiorari cannot be allowed on an interlocutory aspect of
the case that is separate and distinct as an issue from the aspect of the
case that has been adjudged with finality by the lower court. To
reiterate, the matter appealed matter was the special
administrator's commission, a charge that is effectively a claim
against the estate under administration, while the matter covered
by the petition for certiorari was the appointment of an auditor who
would pass upon the special administrator's final account. By their
respective natures, these matters can exist independently of one
another and can proceed separately as envisioned by the Rules
under Rule 109.
The Forum Shopping Issue
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who "repetitively availed of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved
adversely by some other court to increase his chances of obtaining a
favorable decision if not in one court, then in another."17 It is
directly addressed and prohibited under Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and is signaled by the presence of the
following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties
who represent the same interests in both actions, (2) identity of the
rights asserted and the relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts, and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars
such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other.18 In simpler terms, the test to determine whether a party has
violated the rule against forum shopping is where the elements of
litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other.19
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We see no forum shopping after considering these standards as

neither litis pendentia nor res judicata would result in one case from
a ruling in the other, notwithstanding that the appeal that
subsequently became the subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 71844 and the
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 70439 both stemmed from
the trial court's Order dated April 3, 2002. The simple reason - as
already discussed above - is that the petition and the appeal involve
two different and distinct issues so that a ruling in either one will
not affect the other.
Forum shopping is further negated when the nature of, and the
developments in, the proceedings are taken into account - i.e., an
estate proceedings where the Rules expressly allow separate
appeals and where the respondents have meticulously distinguished
what aspect of the RTC's single Order could be appealed and what
could not. Thus, the petitioner cannot take comfort in the cases it
cited relating to forum shopping; these cases, correct and proper in
their own factual settings, simply do not apply to the attendant
circumstances and special nature of the present case where the
issues, although pertaining to the same settlement of estate
proceedings and although covered by the same court order, differ in
substance and in stage of finality and can be treated independently
of one another for the purposes of appellate review.
Did the Court of Appeals err in refusing to resolve the issue of forum
shopping?
Given our above discussion and conclusions, we do not see forum
shopping as an issue that would have made a difference in the
appellate court's ruling. Nor is it an issue that the appellate court
should, by law, have fully ruled upon on the merits. We agree with
the respondent that the appellate court is not required "to resolve
every contention and issue raised by a party if it believes it is not
necessary to do so to decide the case." 20
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The reality though is that the appellate court did rule on the issue
when it stated that "it becomes unnecessary to discuss whether the
latter engaged in forum shopping. Apparently, the issue on forum
shopping was also raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 and private
respondent can again raise the same in the appeal from the order
dated April 3, 2002, where the issue should be properly resolved."21 To
the appellate court - faced with the task of ruling on a petition for
mandamus to compel the trial court to allow the respondents'
appeal - forum shopping was not an issue material to whether the
trial court should or should not be compelled; what was material are
the requisite filing of a notice of appeal and record on appeal, and
the question of whether these have been satisfied. We cannot find
fault with this reasoning as the forum shopping issue - i.e., whether
there was abuse of court processes in the respondents' use of two
recourses to assail the same trial court order - has specific
pertinence and relevance in the sufficiency and merits of the
recourses the respondents took.
In sum, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in refusing to
resolve forum shopping as an issue in its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
71844.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition and, accordingly,
AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 11,
2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71844. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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Case # 13: Saligumba vs. Palanog (G.R. No. 143365)

G.R. No. 143365
December 4, 2008
GENEROSO SALIGUMBA, ERNESTO SALIGUMBA, and HEIRS OF

SPOUSES VALERIA SALIGUMBA AND ELISEO SALIGUMBA, SR.,
petitioners,
vs.
MONICA PALANOG, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 24 May 2000 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 5) in
Civil Case No. 5288 for Revival of Judgment. The case is an offshoot
of the action for Quieting of Title with Damages in Civil Case No.
2570.
The Facts
Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino Palanog (spouses
Palanogs), filed a complaint dated 28 February 1977 for Quieting of
Title with Damages against defendants, spouses Valeria Saligumba
and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses Saligumbas), before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 3, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 3). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2570. In the complaint, spouses Palanogs
alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous
possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land
located in Solido, Nabas, Aklan. The spouses Saligumbas allegedly
prevented them from entering and residing on the subject premises
and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land. Spouses
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Palanogs prayed that they be declared the true and rightful owners
of the land in question.
When the case was called for pre-trial on 22 September 1977, Atty.
Edilberto Miralles (Atty. Miralles), counsel for spouses Saligumbas,
verbally moved for the appointment of a commissioner to delimit
the land in question. Rizalino Go, Deputy Sheriff of Aklan, was
appointed commissioner and was directed to submit his report and
sketch within 30 days.1 Present during the delimitation were
spouses Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas, and Ernesto Saligumba, son
of spouses Saligumbas.2
After submission of the Commissioners Report, spouses Palanogs,
upon motion, were granted 10 days to amend their complaint to
conform with the items mentioned in the report.3
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. At the hearing on 1 June
1984, only the counsel for spouses Palanogs appeared. The trial
court issued an order resetting the hearing to 15 August 1984 and
likewise directed spouses Saligumbas to secure the services of
another counsel who should be ready on that date.4 The order sent
to Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. was returned to the court unserved with the
notation "PartyDeceased" while the order sent to defendant Valeria
Saligumba was returned with the notation "Party in Manila."5
At the hearing on 15 August 1984, spouses Palanogs direct
examination was suspended and the continuation of the hearing was
set on 25 October 1984. The trial court stated that Atty. Miralles,
who had not withdrawn as counsel for spouses Saligumbas despite
his appointment as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge, would be
held responsible for the case of spouses Saligumbas until he
formally withdrew as counsel. The trial court reminded Atty.
Miralles to secure the consent of spouses Saligumbas for his
withdrawal.6 A copy of this order was sent to Valeria Saligumba but
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the same was returned unserved with the notation "Party in

Manila."7
The hearing set on 25 October 1984 was reset to 25 January 1985
and the trial court directed that a copy of this order be sent to Eliseo
Saligumba, Jr. at COA, PNB, Manila.8
The presentation of evidence for spouses Palanogs resumed on 25
January 1985 despite the motion of Atty. Miralles for postponement
on the ground that his client was sick. The exhibits were admitted
and plaintiffs spouses Palanogs rested their case. Reception of
evidence for the defendants spouses Saligumbas was scheduled on
3, 4, and 5 June 1985.9
On 3 June 1985, only spouses Palanogs and counsel appeared. Upon
motion of the spouses Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas were deemed
to have waived the presentation of their evidence.
On 3 August 1987, after a lapse of more than two years, the trial
court considered the case submitted for decision.
On 7 August 1987, RTC-Branch 3 rendered a judgment in Civil Case
No. 2570 declaring spouses Palanogs the lawful owners of the
subject land and ordering spouses Saligumbas, their agents,
representatives and all persons acting in privity with them to vacate
the premises and restore possession to spouses Palanogs.
The trial court, in a separate Order dated 7 August 1987, directed
that a copy of the courts decision be furnished plaintiff Monica
Palanog and defendant Valeria Saligumba.
Thereafter, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
said decision was filed but the trial court, in its Order dated 8 May
1997, ruled that since more than five years had elapsed after the
date of its finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere
motion.
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Thus, on 9 May 1997, Monica Palanog (respondent), now a widow,

filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the Decision dated 7
August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 which she claimed has not been
barred by the statute of limitations. She impleaded petitioners
Generoso Saligumba and Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs and children
of the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 5288 before the RTC-Branch 5.
Petitioner Generoso Saligumba, for himself and in representation of
his brother Ernesto who was out of the country working as a
seaman, engaged the services of the Public Attorneys Office, Kalibo,
Aklan which filed a motion for time to allow them to file a
responsive pleading. Petitioner Generoso Saligumba filed his
Answer10 alleging that: (1) respondent had no cause of action; (2)
the spouses Saligumbas died while Civil Case No. 2570 was pending
and no order of substitution was issued and hence, the trial was null
and void; and (3) the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
heirs of the spouses Saligumbas and therefore, the judgment was
not binding on them.
Meanwhile, on 19 December 1997, the trial court granted
respondents motion to implead additional defendants namely,
Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba, who are also the heirs
and children of spouses Saligumbas.11 They were, however, declared
in default on 1 October 1999 for failure to file any responsive
pleading.12
The Trial Courts Ruling
On 24 May 2000, the RTC-Branch 5 rendered a decision in favor of
respondent ordering the revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 2570.
The trial court ruled that the non-substitution of the deceased
spouses did not have any legal significance. The land subject of Civil
Case No. 2570 was the exclusive property of defendant Valeria
Saligumba who inherited the same from her deceased parents. The
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death of her husband, Eliseo Saligumba, Sr., did not change the
complexion of the ownership of the property that would require his
substitution. The spouses Saligumbas children, who are the
petitioners in this case, had no right to the property while Valeria
Saligumba was still alive. The trial court further found that when
defendant Valeria Saligumba died, her lawyer, Atty. Miralles, did not
inform the court of the death of his client. The trial court thus ruled
that the non-substitution of the deceased defendant was solely due
to the negligence of counsel. Moreover, petitioner Ernesto
Saligumba could not feign ignorance of Civil Case No. 2570 as he was
present during the delimitation of the subject land. The trial court
likewise held that the decision in Civil Case No. 2570 could not be
the subject of a collateral attack. There must be a direct action for
the annulment of the said decision.
Petitioners elevated the matter directly to this Court. Hence, the
present petition.
The Courts Ruling
The instant case is an action for revival of judgment and the
judgment sought to be revived in this case is the decision in the
action for quieting of title with damages in Civil Case No. 2570. This
is not one for annulment of judgment.
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural
means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has
become dormant after the passage of five years without it being
executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to
re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtors case
nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.13 An action
for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different
and distinct from either the recovery of property case or the
reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself
and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to
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be enforced is rendered.14 Revival of judgment is premised on the

assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by
independent action, is already final and executory.15
The RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No.
2570 had been rendered final and executory by the lapse of time
with no motion for reconsideration nor appeal having been filed.
While it may be true that the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570 may be
revived and its execution may be had, the issue now before us is
whether or not execution of judgment can be issued against
petitioners who claim that they are not bound by the RTC-Branch 3
Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570.
Petitioners contend that the RTC-Branch 3 Decision of 7 August
1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 is null and void since there was no
proper substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas despite the
trial courts knowledge that the deceased spouses Saligumbas were
no longer represented by counsel. They argue that they were
deprived of due process and justice was not duly served on them.
Petitioners argue that the trial court even acknowledged the fact of
death of spouses Saligumbas but justified the validity of the decision
rendered in that case despite lack of substitution because of the
negligence or fault of their counsel. Petitioners contend that the
duty of counsel for the deceased spouses Saligumbas to inform the
court of the death of his clients and to furnish the name and address
of the executor, administrator, heir or legal representative of the
decedent under Rule 3 presupposes adequate or active
representation by counsel. However, the relation of attorney and
client was already terminated by the appointment of counsel on
record, Atty. Miralles, as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge even
before the deaths of the spouses Saligumbas were known.
Petitioners invoke the Order of 1 June 1984 directing the spouses
Saligumbas to secure the services of another lawyer to replace Atty.
Miralles. The registered mail containing that order was returned to
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the trial court with the notation that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. was
"deceased." Petitioners thus question the decision in Civil Case No.
2570 as being void and of no legal effect because their parents were
not duly represented by counsel of record. Petitioners further argue
that they have never taken part in the proceedings in Civil Case No.
2570 nor did they voluntarily appear or participate in the case. It is
unfair to bind them in a decision rendered against their deceased
parents. Therefore, being a void judgment, it has no legal nor
binding effect on petitioners.
Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages
which is an action involving real property. It is an action that
survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 8716 as the claim is not
extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies in an
action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court17 provides for the procedure, thus:
Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty
(30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by
the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges
involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs. (Emphasis supplied)
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Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party,

and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order the legal
representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the deceased. In
the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving an
informal notice of death by the mere notation in the envelopes,
failed to order the appearance of the legal representative or heir of
the deceased. There was no court order for deceaseds legal
representative or heir to appear, nor did any such legal
representative ever appear in court to be substituted for the
deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment
of such legal representative, nor did the heirs ever ask to be
substituted.
It appears that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while
Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February 1985. No motion for the
substitution of the spouses was filed nor an order issued for the
substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas in Civil Case No.
2570. Atty. Miralles and petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr., despite
notices sent to them to appear, never confirmed the death of Eliseo
Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. The record is bereft of any
evidence proving the death of the spouses, except the mere
notations in the envelopes enclosing the trial courts orders which
were returned unserved.
Section 17 is explicit that the duty of the court to order the legal
representative or heir to appear arises only "upon proper notice."
The notation "Party-Deceased" on the unserved notices could not be
the "proper notice" contemplated by the rule. As the trial court
could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of
a party without the proper manifestation from counsel, the trial
court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the
case. Moreover, there is no showing that the courts proceedings
were tainted with irregularities.18
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Likewise, the plaintiff or his attorney or representative could not be

expected to know of the death of the defendant if the attorney for
the deceased defendant did not notify the plaintiff or his attorney of
such death as required by the rules.19 The judge cannot be blamed
for sending copies of the orders and notices to defendants spouses
in the absence of proof of death or manifestation to that effect from
counsel.20
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court likewise expressly
provides:
SEC. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or
incompetency of party. - Whenever a party to a pending case
dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty
of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death,
incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and
residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other
legal representative.
It is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the
death of his client. The failure of counsel to comply with his duty
under Section 16 to
inform the court of the death of his client and the non-substitution
of such party will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment
thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The decision
rendered shall bind the partys successor-in-interest.21
The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the
deceased party is in a better position than the attorney for the
adverse party to know about the death of his client and to inform
the court of the name and address of his legal representative.22
Atty. Miralles continued to represent the deceased spouses even
after the latters demise. Acting on their behalf, Atty. Miralles even
asked for postponement of the hearings and did not even confirm
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the death of his clients nor his appointment as Municipal Circuit

Trial Court judge. These clearly negate petitioners contention that
Atty. Miralles ceased to be spouses Saligumbas counsel.
Atty. Miralles still remained the counsel of the spouses Saligumbas
despite the alleged appointment as judge. Records show that when
Civil Case No. 2570 was called for trial on 25 October 1984, Atty.
Miralles appeared and moved for a postponement. The 25 October
1984 Order reads:
ORDER
Upon petition of Judge Miralles who is still the counsel on
record of this case and who is held responsible for anything
that will happen in this case, postpone the hearing of this case
to JANUARY 25, 1985 AT 8:30 in the morning. x x x 23
The trial court issued an Order dated 1 June 1984 directing the
defendants to secure the services of another counsel. This order was
sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. by registered mail but the same was
returned with the notation "Party-Deceased" while the notice to
Valeria Saligumba was returned with the notation "Party in
Manila."24 Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984. When
Atty. Miralles appeared in court on 25 October 1984, he did not
affirm nor inform the court of the death of his client. There was no
formal substitution. The trial court issued an order resetting the
hearing to 25 January 1985 and directed that a copy of the order be
furnished petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. at COA, PNB, Manila by
registered mail.25 When the case was called on 25 January 1985,
Atty. Miralles sought for another postponement on the ground that
his client was sick and under medical treatment in Manila.26 Again,
there was no manifestation from counsel about the death of Eliseo
Saligumba, Sr. The trial court issued an Order dated 25 January 1985
setting the reception of evidence for the defendants on 3, 4, and 5
June 1985. A copy of this order was sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. by
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registered mail. Nonetheless, as the trial court in Civil Case No. 5288
declared, the non-substitution of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. did not have
any legal significance as the land subject of Civil Case No. 2570 was
the exclusive property of Valeria Saligumba who inherited it from
her deceased parents.
This notwithstanding, when Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February
1985, Atty. Miralles again did not inform the trial court of the death
of Valeria Saligumba. There was no formal substitution nor
submission of proof of death of Valeria Saligumba. Atty. Miralles was
remiss in his duty under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The counsel of record is obligated to protect his clients
interest until he is released from his professional relationship with
his client. For its part, the court could recognize no other
representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record
until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.27
An attorney must make an application to the court to withdraw as
counsel, for the relation does not terminate formally until there is a
withdrawal of record; at least, so far as the opposite party is
concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end of the
litigation.28 Unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for
the conduct of the case.29 Until his withdrawal shall have been
approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by
his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client
require. He must still appear on the date of hearing for the attorneyclient relation does not terminate formally until there is a
withdrawal of record.30
Petitioners should have questioned immediately the validity of the
proceedings absent any formal substitution. Yet, despite the courts
alleged lack of jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners,
petitioners never bothered to challenge the same, and in fact
allowed the proceedings to go on until the trial court rendered its
decision. There was no motion for reconsideration, appeal or even
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an action to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570. Petitioners

themselves could not feign ignorance of the case since during the
pendency of Civil Case No. 2570, petitioner Ernesto Saligumba, son
of the deceased spouses, was among the persons present during the
delimitation of the land in question before the Commissioner held
on 5 November 1977.31 Petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. was likewise
furnished a copy of the trial courts orders and notices. It was only
the Answer filed by petitioner Generoso Saligumba in Civil Case No.
5288 that confirmed the dates when the spouses Saligumbas died
and named the latters children. Consequently, Atty. Miralles was
responsible for the conduct of the case since he had not been
properly relieved as counsel of record. His acts bind his clients and
the latters successors-in-interest.
In the present case for revival of judgment, the other petitioners
have not shown much interest in the case. Petitioners Eliseo
Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba were declared in default for
failure to file their answer. Petitioner Ernesto Saligumba was out of
the country working as a seaman. Only petitioner Generoso
Saligumba filed an Answer to the complaint. The petition filed in this
Court was signed only by petitioner Generoso Saligumba as
someone signed on behalf of petitioner Ernesto Saligumba without
the latters authority to do so.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision
dated 24 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Kalibo,
Aklan in Civil Case No. 5288. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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Case # 14: Sarsaba vs. De Te (G.R. No. 175910)

G.R. No. 175910
July 30, 2009
ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABA, Petitioner,

vs.
FE VDA. DE TE, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, FAUSTINO
CASTAEDA, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 with prayer for
preliminary injunction assailing the Order2 dated March 22, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City, Davao del Sur,
in Civil Case No. 3488.
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
On February 14, 1995, a Decision was rendered in NLRC Case No.
RAB-11-07-00608-93 entitled, Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro
Gasing/Truck Operator, finding Sereno to have been illegally
dismissed and ordering Gasing to pay him his monetary claims in
the amount of P43,606.47. After the Writ of Execution was returned
unsatisfied, Labor Arbiter Newton R. Sancho issued an Alias Writ of
Execution3 on June 10, 1996, directing Fulgencio R. Lavarez, Sheriff
II of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), to satisfy the
judgment award. On July 23, 1996, Lavarez, accompanied by Sereno
and his counsel, petitioner Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, levied a Fuso
Truck bearing License Plate No. LBR-514, which at that time was in
the possession of Gasing. On July 30, 1996, the truck was sold at
public auction, with Sereno appearing as the highest bidder.4
Meanwhile, respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorneyin-fact, Faustino Castaeda, filed with the RTC, Branch 18, Digos,
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Davao del Sur, a Complaint5 for recovery of motor vehicle, damages

with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente lite against
petitioner, Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC of Davao City, docketed as
Civil Case No. 3488.
Respondent alleged that: (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te, the
registered owner of the truck, as evidenced by the Official Receipt6
and Certificate of Registration;7 (2) Gasing merely rented the truck
from her; (3) Lavarez erroneously assumed that Gasing owned the
truck because he was, at the time of the "taking,"8 in possession of
the same; and (4) since neither she nor her husband were parties to
the labor case between Sereno and Gasing, she should not be made
to answer for the judgment award, much less be deprived of the
truck as a consequence of the levy in execution.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss9 on the following grounds: (1)
respondent has no legal personality to sue, having no real interests
over the property subject of the instant complaint; (2) the
allegations in the complaint do not sufficiently state that the
respondent has cause of action; (3) the allegations in the complaint
do not contain sufficient cause of action as against him; and (4) the
complaint is not accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit and Bond that
would entitle the respondent to the delivery of the tuck pendente
lite.
The NLRC also filed a Motion to Dismiss10 on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
Meanwhile, Lavarez filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim
and Third-Party Complaint.11 By way of special and affirmative
defenses, he asserted that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter and that the complaint does not state a cause of
action.
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On January 21, 2000, the RTC issued an Order12 denying petitioner's

Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
In his Answer,13 petitioner denied the material allegations in the
complaint. Specifically, he cited as affirmative defenses that:
respondent had no legal personality to sue, as she had no interest
over the motor vehicle; that there was no showing that the heirs
have filed an intestate estate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Te,
or that respondent was duly authorized by her co-heirs to file the
case; and that the truck was already sold to Gasing on March 11,
1986 by one Jesus Matias, who bought the same from the Spouses
Te. Corollarily, Gasing was already the lawful owner of the truck
when it was levied on execution and, later on, sold at public auction.
Incidentally, Lavarez filed a Motion for Inhibition,14 which was
opposed15 by respondent.
On October 13, 2000, RTC Branch 18 issued an Order16 of inhibition
and directed the transfer of the records to Branch 19. RTC Branch
19, however, returned the records back to Branch 18 in view of the
appointment of a new judge in place of Judge-designate Rodolfo A.
Escovilla. Yet, Branch 19 issued another Order17 dated November
22, 2000 retaining the case in said branch.
Eventually, the RTC issued an Order18 dated May 19, 2003 denying
the separate motions to dismiss filed by the NLRC and Lavarez, and
setting the Pre-Trial Conference on July 25, 2003.
On October 17, 2005, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
the Case on the following grounds:19 (1) lack of jurisdiction over one
of the principal defendants; and (2) to discharge respondent's
attorney-in-fact for lack of legal personality to sue.
It appeared that the respondent, Fe Vda. de Te, died on April 12,
2005.20
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Respondent, through her lawyer, Atty. William G. Carpentero, filed

an Opposition,21 contending that the failure to serve summons upon
Sereno is not a ground for dismissing the complaint, because the
other defendants have already submitted their respective
responsive pleadings. He also contended that the defendants,
including herein petitioner, had previously filed separate motions to
dismiss the complaint, which the RTC denied for lack of merit.
Moreover, respondent's death did not render functus officio her
right to sue since her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaeda, had long
testified on the complaint on March 13, 1998 for and on her behalf
and, accordingly, submitted documentary exhibits in support of the
complaint.
On March 22, 2006, the RTC issued the assailed Order 22 denying
petitioner's aforesaid motion.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for
Inhibition,23 in which he claimed that the judge who issued the
Order was biased and partial. He went on to state that the judge's
husband was the defendant in a petition for judicial recognition of
which he was the counsel, docketed as Civil Case No. C-XXI-100,
before the RTC, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao del Sur. Thus, propriety
dictates that the judge should inhibit herself from the case.
Acting on the motion for inhibition, Judge Carmelita Sarno-Davin
granted the same24 and ordered that the case be re-raffled to Branch
18. Eventually, the said RTC issued an Order25 on October 16, 2006
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioner directly sought recourse from the Court via the
present petition involving pure questions of law, which he claimed
were resolved by the RTC contrary to law, rules and existing
jurisprudence.26
151 | R F B
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There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as

to what the law is on certain state of facts, and which does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of
fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact,
the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is
correct, is a question of law.27
Verily, the issues raised by herein petitioner are "questions of law,"
as their resolution rest solely on what the law provides given the set
of circumstances availing. The first issue involves the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of one of the defendants, who was not
served with summons on account of his death. The second issue, on
the other hand, pertains to the legal effect of death of the plaintiff
during the pendency of the case.
At first brush, it may appear that since pure questions of law were
raised, petitioner's resort to this Court was justified and the
resolution of the aforementioned issues will necessarily follow.
However, a perusal of the petition requires that certain procedural
issues must initially be resolved before We delve into the merits of
the case.
Notably, the petition was filed directly from the RTC which issued
the Order in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The question
before Us then is: whether or not petitioner correctly availed of the
mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Significantly, the rule on appeals is outlined below, to wit:28
(1) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to the Court of
Appeals by mere notice of appeal where the appellant raises
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law;
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(2) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its

original jurisdiction where the appellant raises only
questions of law, the appeal must be taken to the Supreme
Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
(3) All appeals from judgments rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, regardless of whether the
appellant raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law, shall be brought to the Court of
Appeals by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.
Accordingly, an appeal may be taken from the RTC which exercised
its original jurisdiction, before the Court of Appeals or directly
before this Court, provided that the subject of the same is a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of
a particular matter therein when declared by the Rules to be
appealable.29 The first mode of appeal, to be filed before the Court of
Appeals, pertains to a writ of error under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, if questions of fact or questions of fact and law are
raised or involved. On the other hand, the second mode is by way of
an appeal by certiorari before the Supreme Court under Section
2(c), Rule 41, in relation to Rule 45, where only questions of law are
raised or involved.30
An order or judgment of the RTC is deemed final when it finally
disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done with
it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the
litigation in the lower court.31 On the other hand, an order which
does not dispose of the case completely and indicates that other
things remain to be done by the court as regards the merits, is
interlocutory. Interlocutory refers to something between the
commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or
matter, but is not a final decision on the whole controversy. 32
153 | R F B
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The subject of the present petition is an Order of the RTC, which

denied petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, for lack of merit.
We have said time and again that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is interlocutory.33 Under Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable. As a remedy for the
denial, a party has to file an answer and interpose as a defense the
objections raised in the motion, and then to proceed to trial; or, a
party may immediately avail of the remedy available to the
aggrieved party by filing an appropriate special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Let it be
stressed though that a petition for certiorari is appropriate only
when an order has been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Based on the foregoing, the Order of the RTC denying petitioner's
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss is not appealable even on pure
questions of law. It is worth mentioning that the proper procedure
in this case, as enunciated by this Court, is to cite such interlocutory
order as an error in the appeal of the case -- in the event that the
RTC rules in favor of respondent -- and not to appeal such
interlocutory order. On the other hand, if the petition is to be treated
as a petition for review under Rule 45, it would likewise fail because
the proper subject would only be judgments or final orders that
completely dispose of the case.34
Not being a proper subject of an appeal, the Order of the RTC is
considered interlocutory. Petitioner should have proceeded with the
trial of the case and, should the RTC eventually render an
unfavorable verdict, petitioner should assail the said Order as part
of an appeal that may be taken from the final judgment to be
rendered in this case. Such rule is founded on considerations of
orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid
154 | R F B
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undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail

orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders
may be contested in a single appeal.
In one case,35 the Court adverted to the hazards of interlocutory
appeals:
It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by
an appeal. Thus, it has been held that "the proper remedy in such
cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits,
incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders
would result in the `sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a
counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as
often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its
interlocutory rulings. x x x.
Another recognized reason of the law in permitting appeal only
from a final order or judgment, and not from an interlocutory or
incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action,
which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the
merits of the case during the pendency of the appeal. If such appeal
were allowed, trial on the merits of the case would necessarily be
delayed for a considerable length of time and compel the adverse
party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may
interpose as many appeals as incidental questions may be raised by
him, and interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower
court.36
And, even if We treat the petition to have been filed under Rule 65,
the same is still dismissible for violating the principle on hierarchy
of courts. Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is
highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.37 This principle, as a
rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked
155 | R F B
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court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.

However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. A
strict application of the rule is not necessary when cases brought
before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal
questions.38
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law
involving the effect of non-service of summons following the death
of the person to whom it should be served, and the effect of the
death of the complainant during the pendency of the case. We deem
it best to rule on these issues, not only for the benefit of the bench
and bar, but in order to prevent further delay in the trial of the case.
Resultantly, our relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the
judicial hierarchy of courts is warranted.
Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that, since Sereno died before
summons was served on him, the RTC should have dismissed the
complaint against all the defendants and that the same should be
filed against his estate.
The Sheriff's Return of Service39 dated May 19, 1997 states that
Sereno could not be served with copy of the summons, together with
a copy of the complaint, because he was already dead.
In view of Sereno's death, petitioner asks that the complaint should
be dismissed, not only against Sereno, but as to all the defendants,
considering that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of Sereno.1avvph!1
Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the
sheriff, his deputy or other proper court officer, either personally by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant or by substituted service.40
On the other
156 | R F B
2nd Sem 2015-16
hand, summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the

action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by
which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person.41
Records show that petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of lack of legal personality of respondent; the allegations in
the complaint did not sufficiently state that respondent has a cause
of action or a cause of action against the defendants; and, the
complaint was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit and bond.
The RTC denied the motion and held therein that, on the basis of the
allegations of fact in the complaint, it can render a valid judgment.
Petitioner, subsequently, filed his answer by denying all the material
allegations of the complaint. And by way of special and affirmative
defenses, he reiterated that respondent had no legal personality to
sue as she had no real interest over the property and that while the
truck was still registered in Pedro Te's name, the same was already
sold to Gasing.
Significantly, a motion to dismiss may be filed within the time for
but before the filing of an answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim.42 Among the grounds mentioned is the court's lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party.
As a rule, all defenses and objections not pleaded, either in a motion
to dismiss or in an answer, are deemed waived.43 The exceptions to
this rule are: (1) when the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) when there is another action pending between the
parties for the same cause, or (3) when the action is barred by prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, in which cases, the court may
dismiss the claim.
In the case before Us, petitioner raises the issue of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of Sereno, not in his Motion to Dismiss
or in his Answer but only in his Omnibus Motion to Dismiss. Having
157 | R F B
2nd Sem 2015-16
failed to invoke this ground at the proper time, that is, in a motion to
dismiss, petitioner cannot raise it now for the first time on appeal.
In fine, We cannot countenance petitioner's argument that the
complaint against the other defendants should have been dismissed,
considering that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Sereno. The court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over
one's person is a defense which is personal to the person claiming it.
Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in
view of his death. Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on
behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case
dismissed against all of the defendants. Failure to serve summons on
Sereno's person will not be a cause for the dismissal of the
complaint against the other defendants, considering that they have
been served with copies of the summons and complaints and have
long submitted their respective responsive pleadings. In fact, the
other defendants in the complaint were given the chance to raise all
possible defenses and objections personal to them in their
respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent answers.
We agree with the RTC in its Order when it resolved the issue in this
wise:
As correctly pointed by defendants, the Honorable Court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Patricio Sereno since there
was indeed no valid service of summons insofar as Patricio Sereno is
concerned. Patricio Sereno died before the summons, together with
a copy of the complaint and its annexes, could be served upon him.
However, the failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio
Sereno, one of the defendants herein does not render the action
DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three (3) other defendants,
namely, Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, Fulgencio Lavares and the NLRC,
were validly served with summons and the case with respect to the
answering defendants may still proceed independently. Be it
158 | R F B
2nd Sem 2015-16
recalled that the three (3) answering defendants have previously

filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was denied by the
Court.
Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno will be DISMISSED and
the same may be filed as a claim against the estate of Patricio
Sereno, but the case with respect to the three (3) other accused will
proceed.
Anent the second issue, petitioner moves that respondent's
attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaeda, be discharged as he has no
more legal personality to sue on behalf of Fe Vda. de Te, who passed
away on April 12, 2005, during the pendency of the case before the
RTC.
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not
extinguished, the Rules of Court require a substitution of the
deceased.44 Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
actions that survived and may be filed against the decedent's
representatives as follows: (1) actions to recover real or personal
property or an interest thereon, (2) actions to enforce liens thereon,
and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a
property. In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of
the death of his client and give the name and address of the latter's
legal representative.45
The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16,46 Rule
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The rule on
substitution was crafted to protect every party's right to due
process. It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would
continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or
the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Moreover, non-
159 | R F B
2nd Sem 2015-16
compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due
process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the
proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision
rendered therein. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due
process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal
representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings
and the resulting judgment therein.47
In the case before Us, it appears that respondent's counsel did not
make any manifestation before the RTC as to her death. In fact, he
had actively participated in the proceedings. Neither had he shown
any proof that he had been retained by respondent's legal
representative or any one who succeeded her.
However, such failure of counsel would not lead Us to invalidate the
proceedings that have long taken place before the RTC. The Court
has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with
his duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such that no
substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the
judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such
party. The trial court's jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the
death of the party.48
The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due
process of every party to the litigation who may be affected by the
intervening death. The deceased litigants are themselves protected
as they continue to be properly represented in the suit through the
duly appointed legal representative of their estate.49
Anent the claim of petitioner that the special power of attorney50
dated March 4, 1997 executed by respondent in favor of Faustino
has become functus officio and that the agency constituted between
them has been extinguished upon the death of respondent,
corollarily, he had no more personality to appear and prosecute the
case on her behalf.
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Agency is extinguished by the death of the principal.51 The only

exception where the agency shall remain in full force and effect even
after the death of the principal is when if it has been constituted in
the common interest of the latter and of the agent, or in the interest
of a third person who has accepted the stipulation in his favor.52
A perusal of the special power of attorney leads us to conclude that
it was constituted for the benefit solely of the principal or for
respondent Fe Vda. de Te. Nowhere can we infer from the
stipulations therein that it was created for the common interest of
respondent and her attorney-in-fact. Neither was there any mention
that it was to benefit a third person who has accepted the
stipulation in his favor.
On this ground, We agree with petitioner. However, We do not
believe that such ground would cause the dismissal of the complaint.
For as We have said, Civil Case No. 3488, which is an action for the
recovery of a personal property, a motor vehicle, is an action that
survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. As
such, it is not extinguished by the death of a party.
In Gonzalez v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,53 We
have laid down the criteria for determining whether an action
survives the death of a plaintiff or petitioner, to wit:
x x x The question as to whether an action survives or not depends
on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. If the causes of
action which survive the wrong complained [of] affects primarily
and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which
do not survive the injury complained of is to the person the property
and rights of property affected being incidental. x x x
Thus, the RTC aptly resolved the second issue with the following
ratiocination:
161 | R F B
2nd Sem 2015-16
While it may be true as alleged by defendants that with the death of

Plaintiff, Fe Vda. de Te, the Special Power of Attorney she executed
empowering the Attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaeda to sue in her
behalf has been rendered functus officio, however, this Court
believes that the Attorney-in-fact had not lost his personality to
prosecute this case.
It bears stressing that when this case was initiated/filed by the
Attorney-in-fact, the plaintiff was still very much alive.
Records reveal that the Attorney-in-fact has testified long before in
behalf of the said plaintiff and more particularly during the state
when the plaintiff was vehemently opposing the dismissal of the
complainant. Subsequently thereto, he even offered documentary
evidence in support of the complaint, and this court admitted the
same. When this case was initiated, jurisdiction was vested upon
this Court to try and hear the same to the end. Well-settled is the
rule to the point of being elementary that once jurisdiction is
acquired by this Court, it attaches until the case is decided.
Thus, the proper remedy here is the Substitution of Heirs and not
the dismissal of this case which would work injustice to the plaintiff.
SEC. 16, RULE 3 provides for the substitution of the plaintiff who
dies pending hearing of the case by his/her legal heirs. As to
whether or not the heirs will still continue to engage the services of
the Attorney-in-fact is another matter, which lies within the sole
discretion of the heirs.
In fine, We hold that the petition should be denied as the RTC Order
is interlocutory; hence, not a proper subject of an appeal before the
Court. In the same breath, We also hold that, if the petition is to be
treated as a petition for certiorari as a relaxation of the judicial
hierarchy of courts, the same is also dismissible for being
162 | R F B
2nd Sem 2015-16
substantially insufficient to warrant the Court the nullification of the

Order of the RTC.
Let this be an occasion for Us to reiterate that the rules are there to
aid litigants in prosecuting or defending their cases before the
courts. However, these very rules should not be abused so as to
advance one's personal purposes, to the detriment of orderly
administration of justice. We can surmise from the present case
herein petitioner's manipulation in order to circumvent the rule on
modes of appeal and the hierarchy of courts so that the issues
presented herein could be settled without going through the
established procedures. In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,54 We stressed that
this should be the constant policy that must be observed strictly by
the courts and lawyers, thus:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain
if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should
not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary
writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where
serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or
other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or
another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of
the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.55
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The
Order dated March 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
163 | R F B
2nd Sem 2015-16
Digos, Davao del Sur in Civil Case No. 3488, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
164 | R F B

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Special Proceedings Cases Batch 2

2nd Sem 2015-16

Special Proceedings Cases Batch 2

2nd Sem 2015-16

Case # 1: Barredo vs CA (G.R. No. L-17863)

November 28, 1962

MANUEL H. BARREDO, ET AL., petitioners,

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

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2nd Sem 2015-16

This annotation was, however, cancelled when one day in August

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further holding that the trial court had therefore committed a

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said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for no cause or

November 10, 1932

RICARDO SIKAT, Judicial Administrator of the intestate estate of

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In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged

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Kare, by the Court of Firts Instance of Albay; and the defendant

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Instance had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said

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10. That the evidence presented to this committee on claims

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2nd Sem 2015-16

buildings, or any interest therein, damages for an injury to person or

Special Proceedings Cases Batch 2

2nd Sem 2015-16

Special Proceedings Cases Batch 2

2nd Sem 2015-16

This provision of law speaks of an "action", which, according to

Special Proceedings Cases Batch 2

2nd Sem 2015-16

2. If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next

Special Proceedings Cases Batch 2

2nd Sem 2015-16

of laches in not instituting the intestate proceedings of Pedro

Special Proceedings Cases Batch 2

2nd Sem 2015-16

By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with

September 30, 1961

IN RE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF PASCUAL

Special Proceedings Cases Batch 2

2nd Sem 2015-16

Notice is hereby given to all persons having claims for money

Special Proceedings Cases Batch 2

2nd Sem 2015-16

Special Proceedings Cases Batch 2

2nd Sem 2015-16

Special Proceedings Cases Batch 2

2nd Sem 2015-16

claim, among which the lack of knowledge of the pendency of the