Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Early Chapter 11s have the best chance of successful reorganization. Businesses typically worth more
alive than dead.
1. 541 - Debtor in Possession (DIP) of the Estate
a. Debtor remains in possession of the assets of the bankruptcy estate during bankruptcy
i. If the debtors management appears to be looting the company or committing some
other form of fraud, then the creditors may have a Trustee appointed by the court.
ii. 1104(a)(2) appointment of a trustee when necessary (ex: best interst of the
creditors, looting, etc)
a. Two mains routes to take
i. (1)MISMANAGEMENT/FRAUD
1. This could work, for all of the free spending
ii. (2) Not considering all creditors / CREDIOTR BODY JUST NOT ON
BOARD
1. Management is only negotiating with 1 creditor, and
there could be other creditors that should be considered
too
2. Loss of trustworthiness
2. 503(c) can be used to keep management from awarding themselves major
payouts as the company is flailing into chapter 11. Can put an end to lavish
spending.
iii. KEEP IN MIND, a US TRUSTEE is always there to oversee the DIPs operation, they just
are not the ones making all the decisions like a trustee would if appointed.
b. 363(c) DIP operates the business in its ordinary course.
c. First Day Orders
i. The judge will be able to exercise broad discretion in handing down first day orders so
that the DIP may run the business as necessary
ii. Typical Requests:
1. Permission to conduct business outside of the ordinary course
2. Authorization to pay employees wages
3. Use of cash collateral
4. Approval of post petition financing plans
5. Employment for the counsel for the debtor and creditors committees
6. Additional injunctive relief beyond automatic stay
7. Motion to hire new special employees: investment banker, valuation expert,
Turnaround Expert, etc
iii. Balance: Three Arguments
1. The Debtor will argue that these motions are necessary actions required or
the business will close and the Creditors will argue that they have a right to be
heard and need more time and the argument by the Trustee is that early
payment of prepetition claims is inconsistent with the provisions and policies
of the bankruptcy code.
d. In Re Colad
i. they allowed the payments to employees from past wages to just go ahead and be
paid, because this claim would have been priority anyways and thus lets just let them
go ahead and pay that as well.
1. Legal argument ^ , but practically they must consider if the employees will
quit or not if they are not paid
e. Additionally, a proposal was made as an Emergency Lending Facility on the first day of
motions (typically you must wait atleast 15 days to get post peition financing). The court
found their arrangement to be Not Acceptable because:
1. The agreement was essentially what the FINAL LOAN agreement would look
like -- not an agreement that handles the absolute needs of the DIP right now
to stay afloat, as the 4001(2) says must be the case
2. Way too complex of an arrangement
3. Agreement changed substantive and procedural rights of the parties involved
(cheifly doing away with the automatic stay, limiting reorg rights, etc)
4. Rate too high for the new 500K post petition debt (potentially a problem with
NY Usary rate)
f.
2. Automatic Stay goes into effect upon filing of the bankruptcy
a. Reasons to lift the Stay:
i. (362)(d)(1) Adequate Protection significant decrease in value immenent.
ii. (362)(d)(2) if no equity in the collateral and the collateral is not necessary for
reorganization.
iii. IN SUM: argue about the specific collateral, or argue about the total business.
1. Courts have 30 days to rule on lift stay motions
2.
b. Exceptions to the Stay:
i. Sietles Case
1. Police or Enforcement Action are allowed to break the automatic, but
otherwise, the government is not allowed to violate 362.
ii. Chateugay gave 2 tests:
1. Pecuniary Interest Test
a. Matters of public safety will be excepted from the test, but when
merely a government monetary interest, it shall be subject to the stay
2. Public Policy Test
a. When public policy interests are so strong as to warrant a breaking of
the stay
c. Automatic Stay Waivers are generally uneforcable.
d. Exceptions for Financial Contracts
i. Derivatives are excepted from the stay, meaning that if AIG files Chapter 11, and
they are on the losing end of a Credit Default Swap, the counterparty is not kept from
collecting their earnings once they come to fruition.
1. This is so that a market panic does not happen, creating systemic failure, due
to the interconnectedness of the financial derivative market.
e. Trade Creditor Special Rules
i. 546(c) Reclamation
1. when a seller, in the ordinary course of business, sells goods to the debtor,
the seller may reclaim the goods if the debtor received the goods while
insolvent, within 45 days of the commencement of the case. The only way to
execute reclamation is to give the debtor a writing within 45 days of the recipt
of the goods OR not later than 20 days after the date of the commencement
of the case. If they fail to do this, move to 503(b)(9)
ii. 503(b)(9)
1. the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days of filing in which
the goods were sold in the ordinary course of business will be considered
Administrative Expenses and are to be paid in full at the date of the effective
plan
iii. In Re KMART
1. In KMART
a. We have 4 categories of vendors (eggs & diary), and three others all
fairly narrow, which added up to 100M in debt
b. All of these vendors got 100% paid back, while the others just got 10%
back
c. The court did not allow this, saying that these were not proven to be
critical vendors. 362(b)(1).
d. To show Critical Vendorship:
i. Critical vendors would cease delivery without receiving
payments in full
1. (contractually, they had no obligation to continue
relationship)
ii. residual benefit (from continued business with critical vendors)
to the disfavored creditors not receiving the full payments on
past debts, or atleast leave them no worse off.
f. Cases:
i. In Re Burgess
1. That said licesnes can be property of the estate
2. In this case, a liquor liscense was property of the estate and subject to the
automatic stay.
1. 365(b) is getting at the fact that to assume the K you need to cure any
defaults (make the full payment on the past owed debts to this counter party
in the K).
a. Congress says look, you MUST pay your monetary defaults, but when it
comes to non-monetary defaults, it comes down to the type of the
contract:
2. Personal Property Leases are particularly problematic -- as is insurance (?)
3. 365[c] not about whether there was a default, instead about whether the
counter party can prevent an assumption going forward even if there was no
default
iii. ***If you assume a contract, then say, oh wait never mind, I dont think we can do
this anymore, then that expense is tallied as an Administrative Expense, and thus
entitled to 100% payment.
d. Assume & Assign
e. Assignment (Jamesway Case) (must meet the assumption hurdles first, then the additional
assignment hurdles)
1. Can it be assumed? (curing issues, etc)
2. Can it then be assigned?
a. There are a variety of contracts which cannot be assigned
i. Substituting a Jamesway Department Store for a Rite Aid might
not be the best for the commercial real estate owner.
ii. 365(d) is where the time restraint deadline comes into play, generally you get 60
days. Loose standards on extensions.
iii. 365(d)(4) - gives 120 days, with heightened standard for any extensions.
iv. The more the debtor controls the timing of the filing, the more they are considering
these contracts. Say they want to include Christmas sales into their window to see if
contracts are valuable, they will strategically file on a certain date.
f. Restrictions on Assumption and Rejection
i. 365's 3 most important restraints are:
1. (b) says that the DIP must cure or arrange to cure most defaults as a condition
of assumption
a. Adequate assurance of future performance" is also a requirement at
times (b)(1)[c] and (f)(2)(b)
2. The debtor may not assume a contract for a loan or financial accomidations
[c](2)
3. Section [c](1) says that you cannot assing a contract that would not have
been assignable under applicable state law. Like if Leo Dicaprio had a
contract for a movie, he can't assign that contract to me. That's against state
law under a personal services provision.
g. Cases:
i. In re Jamesway Corp (Bankr. SDNY 1996)
1. Jamesway had a lease agreement with Mass Mutual. Their agreement had a
provision that spelled out a penalty essentially for subleasing the
property/assinging the lease to others.
2. Under 365, Jamesway decided to assume and assign the lease, leasing it to
Rite-Aid.
3. 365(f)(1) -- invalidated the provisions of the contract which restricted the
assingment of the lease. As a result, the 50,000 sitting in excrow was given to
the debtor to realize the full value of the lease.
ii. Sunbeam Products Inc v Chicago American MFG, LLC (7th Cir 2012)
1. Lakewood, held a patent and trademark on box fans. It also had an
agreement with CAM that CAM would be able to use the trademark, and sell
the fans splitting the proceeds with Lakewood, and that if lakewood stopped
providing the trademark, that CAM could sell the fans on it's own without the
trademark on it.
2. Lakewood was forced into Bankruptcy, and the trustee elected to reject its
contract with CAM. CAM continued to sell the fans with the lakewoods logo.
Trustee brought an adversary suit.
3. 365(n) allows for licensees to continue to use intellectual property after a
contract has been rejected
4. Problem: IP in the code does not include TRADEMARKS
c.
d.
13. Small
a.
Facts: Debtor sought and received permission on first day of BR to pay off critical vendors
vendors who allegedly would cease doing business w/ debtor in BR, thus making other creds.
worse off. Debtor argued for order under (inter alia) 105(a) equity powers, doctrine of
necessity, and 363(b)(1). But lower court did not require debtor to establish either (1) that
vendors would cease doing business, or (2) that other creds. would at least be no worse off if
critical vendors paid immediately
2.
3.
Holding: While 363(b)(1) may authorize a critical vendor order as long as fact that (1) critical
vendors will cease doing business w/ debtor if not paid, and (2) other creds. will at least be no
worse off if critical vendors paid immediately, fact that neither of those was established means
order must be rejected. (Also, 105(a) and doctrine of necessity rationales rejected).
TM: Process problem here
2.
3.
Facts: Debtor in trouble, its best asset was large stake in another, profitable company (Dale).
Filed Chap. 11. Sale of stake approved under 363(b)(1), rather than under later Chap. 11
procedures, and turns out company requested it only b/c creds. wanted it, and (according to CEO
witness) no difference selling now under 363 or later under Chap. 11. Equity holders objected.
Only other reason offered for use was to avoid delay.
Holding: Sale rejected b/c no business justification was articulated; cred. desires and delay not
enough. BR judges discretion under 363 not unfettered.
TM:
a. Creds. want to sell now b/c who knows how long Dale will be profitable (hence, CEO witness
wrong that it made no difference). Equity wants to delay b/c willing to take risk, unlimited
upside.
b. Process problem.