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Israel Affairs
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A paradigm in crisis? Israel's

doctrine of military decision
Avi Kober

Lecturer in International Relations , Hebrew

University , Jerusalem
Published online: 11 Apr 2007.

To cite this article: Avi Kober (1995) A paradigm in crisis? Israel's doctrine of
military decision, Israel Affairs, 2:1, 188-211, DOI: 10.1080/13537129508719370
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537129508719370

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A Paradigm in Crisis? Israel's

Doctrine of Military Decision
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AVI KOBER

The Middle East peace process and the emphasis on the security
arrangements attending the expected accords have somewhat diverted
attention from both the changing nature of Israel's security problems
during recent years and the dilemmas to which this change has given
rise.
One of the most evident dilemmas is the crisis threatening the
Israeli military-decision paradigm (to use Thomas Kuhn's
terminology).1 From a substantive point of view, it appears that a
battlefield decision no longer provides an adequate solution to the
main strategic challenges that Israel now faces; from the "sociological"
standpoint it seems that the longstanding consensus among Israel's
military-strategic policy-makers regarding the merits of battlefield
decision has been recently eroded.
The aim of this article is to present the main elements of the
traditional Israeli military-decision doctrine within the framework of
its wider security concept, and to examine the challenges confronting
it now.
DEFINING A MILITARY/BATTLEFIELD DECISION
What then is the essence of a military, or battlefield decision? In the
professional literature, decision is defined as denying one's enemy the
ability to continue fighting - in terms of both its will (the psychological
aspect) and its capability (the material aspect);2 this can be considered
a more objective definition than another concept - victory, generally
used to express a similar phenomenon. I have elsewhere distinguished
between the two concepts and recommended that victory be defined in
terms of the correlation between what each adversary aspires to,
militarily or politically, before and during a war, and what it actually
succeeds in achieving during that war;3 moreover, while victory sets its
sights on a post-war horizon, decision focuses on the dimensions of the
war itself. By virtue of the subjective nature of victory, conflicts will
often produce more than one belligerent proclaiming itself the victor,
but only a single party will have actually achieved a military decision.

Avi Kober is Lecturer in International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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THE DETERRENCE - EARLY WARNING - STRATEGIC DECISION

TRIANGLE

Israel's security doctrine has for many years been predicated on the
deterrence - early warning - military decision triangle, whose
components complement each other and mutually interact. The first
element is aimed at preventing war from erupting in the first place; the
second - at alerting policy-makers to the possibility that deterrence is
in effect failing and that war might be in the offing; the third - at
winning a swift battlefield victory, should war break out. The
assumption is that since deterrence is bound to fail sooner or later,
there will eventually be a need to recourse to military decision.4 In
turn, the ability to achieve a battlefield decision is supposed to help
rehabilitate Israel's failed deterrence; to significantly prolong the lulls
between wars; to underscore the enemy's inability to destroy Israel or
to "reduce it to size"; and, over the long term, even to bring about
peace with the Arabs. From these points of view, military decision in a
sense demonstrates Israel's ability to stand firm: the Arabs will launch
one war after the other, only to be defeated time and again until such
time as they lose the taste for initiating further wars.5
THE EMPHASIS ON BATTLEFIELD DECISION IN ISRAELI
MILITARY THINKING
There is fundamental asymmetry between Israel and the Arabs in
everything associated with the place of military decision in their
respective security doctrines. Following the decisive battlefield decision
achieved by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War, military weakness drove
the Arabs to adopt a strategic doctrine based on the following main
elements: the attempt to achieve strategic decision would be postponed
for an indefinite period of time and replaced by efforts to reap political
gains from the very launching of wars and/or from producing limited
military achievements in that endeavour. The Arabs would thus engage
Israel in a series of limited wars whose gains would be essentially
political in nature; these wars would exercise the effect of attrition and
would gradually weaken Israel by confronting it time and again with a
force having a greater staying power than itself; although none of the
above wars would be decisive, their cumulative impact would
eventually be in the Arabs' favour.6
By contrast, Israel considers battlefield decision a central
component of its security doctrine and does whatever it can to
constantly improve the ability of the IDF to achieve such a decision.
Although military decision is a multi-dimensional and multi-variable
concept that exists at all levels of analysis, from grand strategy down
to tactics, in Israel it has traditionally been perceived in the context of
the battlefield - that is to say, as relating to the strategic, operational

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and tactical levels, and not to that of the grand strategy. Israel has
attached little thought in the past to employing its military power
against the enemy's society: its population, economic or industrial
centres. The main reason for this has been the general feeling that, in
everything related to war on the battlefield, Israel enjoys a marked
advantage over the Arab side. Other reasons have been the thought
that military decision may possibly contribute to strengthening Israeli
deterrent posture, and the belief that achieving such a decision can act
to create conditions for easier negotiations following a war and
thereafter. These notions have persisted despite the growing evidence
that Israel finds it far harder than the Arabs to establish a clear link
between military decision and deterrence, or directly to translate
military gains to political achievements.7
By contrast, there has always been a school of thought, though one
that has never gained preeminence in Israel, which does not accept as
a given, at least not completely, the asymmetry in the balance of
achievements in war, realized respectively by Israel and the Arabs; in
its view, there is a significant room for translating military successes to
political achievements, notwithstanding Israel's geo-political and geostrategic constraints, particularly the involvement of the world's
superpowers in the conflict.8 But even members of this school generally
restrict themselves to circumstances of opportunities that are created at
the outbreak of a war or during its course, and in fact call more for the
exploitation of opportunities than for the initiation of war for the
purpose of promoting political goals by way of a military decision.
The need to achieve a battlefield decision, in of itself, by virtue of
its centrality, is sometimes considered as a war objective, and as
standing at the very base of the country's strategic and operational
planning. From Israel's standpoint, therefore, military decision
becomes, at one and the same time, both an end and a means to that
end.
BASIC STRATEGIC CIRCUMSTANCES

Israel's military-decision doctrine has been crystallized in an informal,

semi-explicit and incremental manner over the course of many years.
It has been designed first and foremost to contend with two main
challenges, traditionally perceived by those responsible for shaping
Israel's security doctrine as being extremely threatening: Israel's
inferiority in the quantitative balance of forces, and the superpower
involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts.'
Israel's Perennial Numerical Inferiority
Inferiority in the quantitative balance of forces has been perceived as
Israel's primary chronic problem.10 Although the military/population
ratio in Israel is among the highest in the world, this is still insufficient

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191

to alter the fundamental circumstances: constant numerical inferiority

and a small regular army (about one quarter of the country's total
ground forces) confronting large Arab armies, most of which - usually
more than half of their total size - consist of regular forces. Over the
course of time, a constant deterioration, from Israel's point of view, has
occurred in the overall quantitative balance of forces with the Arabs."
Furthermore, the Arab armies have been capable of switching quickly,
within no more than a few hours, from a defensive to an offensive
deployment and take advantage of the small size of the Israeli army
facing them, which requires 48 hours to mobilize its reserve forces.
Superpower Involvement in Arab-Israeli Wars
As Shimon Peres has said: "The shadow of superpower intervention
has hovered, directly or indirectly over all of Israel's wars, so as to
prevent strategic decision".12 This superpower involvement was
nourished by the global competition between the United States and the
Soviet Union until the end of the 1980s and simultaneously reflected
it. Both superpowers were constantly on guard lest their clients' local
conflicts escalated to direct superpower confrontation; hence they
sought to maintain a measure of control over the development of
Middle Eastern wars.
Already upon the termination of the 1956 Sinai War Israel
concluded that the superpowers, which were heavily involved in the
region, would never allow either party to achieve absolute decision on
the battlefield, but would intervene at a certain stage and bring about
a ceasefire.13 Israeli decision-makers fashioned the view that, on the
verge of any Arab military collapse, the superpowers would always take
steps to freeze the war and that superpower intervention was a
function, on the one hand, of Israel's gains on the battlefield (the more
extensive such gains the greater the chances of involvement) and, on
the other, of the time required for the superpowers to organize
themselves to react and act, discuss the matter amongst themselves,
confer with the warring sides and reach decisions.
To examine the extent to which numerical inferiority and
superpower involvement really constitute severe constraints, it is worth
looking into the impact they actually exerted on the decision process.
Notwithstanding its overall numerical inferiority, Israel has not always
suffered from inferiority as far as the actual balance of forces on the
battlefield is concerned: in 1948 there was more or less equality; in
1956 Israel enjoyed a slight superiority; in 1982 Israel had a clear
superiority. Only in 1967 and 1973 did Israel suffer numerical
inferiority on the battlefield, but this was significant mainly in 1973
because in 1967 it was dealt with successfully by means of graduated
decision, which created a situation in which Israel did not suffer from
quantitative inferiority to any of its three adversaries.14 Similarly, there
is a gap between the real and the perceived constraints imposed by

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15

superpower intervention: an empirical examination of superpower

intervention in Arab-Israeli wars reveals that, despite Israel's early
fears, such intervention has in most cases actually been an asset to
Israel. The Soviet military and political aid in the 1948-49 War proved
vital to Israel's war effort, while the Western powers placed an
embargo on the Arab states and the Anglo-American ultimatum in
reaction to Israel's military gains in northeastern Sinai was, to a large
extent, stillborn.* In the 1956 War Israel collaborated with the two
declining powers, France and Britain, though the fruits of this
collaboration were denied by an angry US-Soviet response. In 1967
Israel received a green light from the United States to launch an attack
on the Arabs and benefitted from the American deterrence against the
Soviet Union, which consequently remained passive.** In 1973,
though Israel decided to refrain from a preemptive strike on account
of the likely American response to such a move, its decision derived
first and foremost from self-restraint, emanating from the view that
even at the last minute it might be possible to prevent the outbreak of
war and that, in the circumstances that had arisen, the only option for
a first blow would be a preemptive air strike against Syria, whose
effectiveness was likely to be limited. Moreover, during that war it was
Kissinger that granted Israel the required amount of time to envelop
the Egyptian Third Army, which led to the achievement of military
decision over Egypt.*** Finally, in 1982 Israel launched the Peace for
* EDITOR'S NOTE: While there is little doubt that the (indirect) Soviet military aid was
indispensable for Israel in the 1948-49 War, for the simple reason that the latter began the
war in a state of marked material inferiority to the invading Arab forces, Britain was no
innocent bystander but rather helped the Arab war effort in several important respects,
both prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 and in its aftermath. This
included, inter alia, the illegal detention of some 9,000 "able-bodied Jews" in
concentration camps in Cyprus for nine months after the establishment of Israel to prevent
their participation in the ongoing war; the supply of weapons and military equipment to
the Jordanian and Egyptian armies; the participation of British officers deployed in the
Jordanian legion in the fighting; and the dispatch of forces to Transjordan to forestall
further Israeli advances.
** EDITOR'S NOTE: There is no evidence that Israel ever received an American "green
light" to start the Six Day War. Even William Quandt, by no stretch of imagination a friend
of Israel, has failed to find such evidence and was grudgingly forced to conclude that "the
red light turned yellow - but not quite green". See William Quandt, "Lyndon Johnson and
the June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?", Middle East Journal, Vol.46, No.2
(Spring 1992), p.228.
Also, the Soviets did intervene on behalf of their Arab allies by way of a naval show of
force, and it was their threat to dispatch ground forces to the battle zone if Israel did not
halt its advance on the Golan Heights that enticed the Americans into applying heavy
pressure on Israel, thus leading to the end of hostilities without it achieving a decisive
military decision.
*** EDITOR'S NOTE: Contrary to the author's claim, it was Kissinger who prevented
Israel from starving the Third Army into surrender, thus allowing Egypt to retain a firm
foothold on the Western bank of the Suez Canal and denying Israel the desired military
decision. Moreover, while the Soviets supplied their Arab clients with large quantities of
weapons and war material from the very outbreak of the war, the Americans withheld arms
supplies to Israel for over a week, despite its desperate position on the battlefield.

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Galilee War knowing that it had the tacit consent of the US

Administration (or, at least, of Secretary of State Alexander Haig), and
its decision to end the war was less influenced by American pressures
than by its assumption that it could achieve most of its war aims before
the imminent ceasefire took hold.16
All this means that Israel's doctrine of military decision has also
been affected by two additional factors, which also reflect its basic
strategic circumstances: the territorial imperative and the cost of war.
The Territorial Imperative
Lack of strategic depth:" Apart from the Egyptian front, Israel enjoys
no strategic depth. This in turn makes the attainment of military
decision rather problematic in the event of an Arab-initiated war. In
such circumstances Israel has to mobilize its reserve forces and to move
them to the front before the enemy has made significant territorial
gains, and then achieve a battlefield decision in enemy territory, thus
creating artificial strategic depth and distancing the war from its own
vital areas.
Geo-political vulnerability: Since its establishment in 1948, Israel
has been surrounded by enemies, actual or potential, on three sides.
Indeed, the historical record indicates that the Arabs were inclined to
wage war on the Jewish State only when they succeeded in putting
together a coalition enabling them to obtain numerical superiority on
the battlefield and to create more than one centre of gravity, by
exploiting the advantages of combat on external lines. As a result,
Israel has had to accept that, in the worst case scenario, it may have to
"confront every combination of forces (...) without the help of a
foreign army";18 to think in terms of splitting its war effort between
several simultaneous fronts without the ability to achieve decision in all
of them at one and the same time requires clear priorities regarding the
concentration of effort on the different fronts.
The Cost of War
If the cost of war is reckoned in terms of casualties, on the one hand,
and injury to the economy resulting from prolonged mass conscription,
on the other, then Israel's ability to withstand damage is clearly much
lower than that of its enemies. This of course gives the Arabs an
additional dimension of stamina and resilience for conducting a costly
war and, certainly, one that is prolonged.19 Former Egyptian President,
Gamal Abdel Nasser, is attributed with the quip that a state whose
newspapers publish on their front pages the photograph and biography
of each of its fallen soldiers is unlikely to be able to cope with a war of
attrition.20

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THE MILITARY DECISION DOCTRINE

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Israel's doctrine of military decision consists of the following components:

Rapid decision
The need to achieve a swift battlefield decision is a corollary of Israel's
inability to sustain a prolonged war. This stems from the necessity to
return as quickly as possible to routine; to minimize military and
civilian casualties; to diminish the likelihood of superpower
intervention; to weaken the possibility that Arab expeditionary forces
will be dispatched to fight alongside those armies already involved in
hostilities; and, in the event of a war by choice, to ensure that the
national consensus is as widespread as possible with regard to
everything associated with the war's justification and public
legitimation for the manner in which it is being conducted.21
Sensitivity to the necessity of a swift decision dates back to the War
of Independence, during whose latter stages Israel experienced the first
instance of international intervention, though this did not deprive it of
the military decision it had already achieved. Since then, "the
recognition has mounted that, in war, we must take the time factor
seriously and understand that we actually have very little time to
achieve decision over the enemy. It is for this reason, perhaps, that the
wars that have come thereafter... have been designated mainly in terms
of time, such as: 'the 100 hours' war' or 'the Six Day war'".22
Destruction of Force and Occupation of Territory
Military decision has traditionally been perceived in terms of
destroying enemy forces, on the one hand, and occupying territory not
previously in Israel's possession, on the other. But destruction of forces
has been regarded as having greater value for the purposes of achieving
decision.23 During recent years, Israel has begun to sober up from the
illusion that it is possible, in modern war in general and in the
Arab-Israeli context in particular, to annihilate an army. The manner
in which the concept of annihilation is addressed has changed; and if
in the past it was linked first and foremost with the enemy's physical
strength it has assumed a more qualitative connotation, referring more
to the enemy's ability to continue hostilities, both by virtue of the
physical harm occasioned on it and as a result of a collapse in its will
and the structure and organization of its forces.24
This process of disillusionment has been reinforced by gradual
awareness of the fact that not only did Israel fail to destroy the Arab
armies, but the Arab war losses were rapidly replaced following every
war and their order of battle significantly increased.
Decision via "Force Multipliers"

The hard core of Israel's military decision doctrine consists of its

patterns of action which, having the common denominator of creating

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195

"force multipliers", have enabled the Israel Defence Forces to

compensate for their overall quantitative inferiority and, wherever
possible, to convert it into superiority, at least on part of the battlefield.
The traditional "force multipliers" are as follows:
Offence: Ever since the second truce in the War of Independence,
offence has always been regarded as the only form of war by which it
is possible to obtain decision, in general, and the only one which makes
sense in Israel's unique strategic circumstances in particular. Broadly
speaking, it is arguable that at the strategic and operational levels
offence affords a better compensation than defence for quantitative
inferiority, by allowing the weaker party to choose the most convenient
time and place for the military confrontation.25 Offence also grants
artificial strategic depth through shifting the war to enemy territory;
may facilitate a rapid battlefield decision over more than one enemy,
on more than one front, in a graduated fashion; its price is often less
expensive than that of defence - if not necessarily in terms of casualties
then at least in more general national terms, because it makes
prolonged battles of attrition less likely; it suits the ethos of the IDF
and goes along with its high self-esteem and that of the Israeli society,
as well as the IDF's image in the eyes of the enemy; and, by promoting
the objective of rapid military achievements, it at least opens up
possibilities for the realization of political gains."
The offensive approach in Israel has become so akin to a "second
nature" that it has taken on the essence of a nearly intrinsic value - so
that the country's generals have clung to it almost reflexively, in a
manner redolent of the pre-First World War military powers in Europe.
It was bluntly expressed during the Yom Kippur War, in which Israel's
generals found it difficult to digest a relatively prolonged defensive
posture, with no switch to offence in the immediate sight.
In recent years, the voices calling for the introduction of more
defensive elements into the Israeli security doctrine have increased
considerably. The point of departure of most adherents to the
defensive approach is the assumption that the future battlefield moves
towards a dramatic growth in the range and accuracy of weapons. In
such circumstances, the casualties ratio becomes no less significant than
the balance of forces, and the task of breaking through the enemy's
strongholds becomes far more difficult and expensive. Proponents of
the defensive approach believe that Israel must exploit these
developments to its advantage, even at the price of introducing changes
into its security model. This, in their view, will entail the adoption of a
decision doctrine, predicated on the concentration of accurate
firepower on enemy forces that are attacking or moving to the front,
and destroying these forces on a scale so large as to compel the enemy
to terminate hostilities. In this thinking, the terms defence and offence
assume a new significance: attack does not necessarily require
manoeuvre or physical contact with the enemy and no need for

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transferring the war to its territory. A model like this, they claim, is also
cheaper from an economic standpoint because it enables Israel to do
without expensive weapons platforms and is less likely to arouse
international disapproval.27
Advocates of the offensive approach can of course dismiss the
assumption that the technological developments on the battlefield
represent a revolution. They can claim that what is at hand is an
incremental change, which neither alters the fundamental strategic
circumstances within which the IDF operates, nor affects Israel's need
and/or ability to maintain its offensive approach.
Shifting the war to enemy territory has always been seen in Israel in
terms of manoeuvre;28 but this pattern has never been seriously
considered in terms of firepower, though this has been effected by
other armies. NATO, for example, adopted the FOFA doctrine, which
was founded on a combination of defence, counter-attack launched
from the territory being defended, and the shift of the war in terms of
firepower (mainly through precision-guided munitions) to enemy
territory. At the centre of this doctrine is the idea of wearing down the
second and third echelons of the attacker, with a view of blunting the
pace of its advance and exact an unbearable cost for the continuation
of hostilities.2'
Although ideas in this direction have been mooted in Israel, they
have never been adopted.30 A prominent reason for this state of affair,
which proponents of defence often bring up, is of course the
traditional psychological commitment to the manoeuvre and the
dismissal, or underestimation, of the value of firepower. However,
beyond intellectual conservatism, one of the more serious reasons for
clinging to the notion of physically transferring the war to enemy
territory is the perceived vitality of occupying territory for the
attainment of military decision.31
Basically, no change occurred in the Israeli offensive approach even
when Israel's territorial situation altered after 1967. Its new boundaries
were perceived as security borders that removed the need for a first
strike and, indeed, suddenly made it possible to absorb one,32 thereby
opening up possibilities for a change in the country's strategic doctrine.
The circumstances in which the 1973 Yom Kippur War began had the
effect of exposing, in all their severity, superpower constraints on
Israeli offensive initiative. On the other hand, the manner in which that
war developed strengthened the feeling, among both political and
military leaders, that a defensive approach impaired the chances of
achieving a battlefield decision.33 Even after the Yom Kippur War,
where Israel found it difficult to implement its traditional offensive
doctrine, its military leaders still failed to retreat from their adherence
to this approach,34 although they understood that Israel would have to
strengthen its defensive ability and even took steps in that direction.35
Israel's need for a swift victory over a coalition of enemies through

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197

an offensive approach has produced several conclusions. These, in

turn, have been transformed into important additional complementary
principles, some of them natural and some of them problematic, as will
be specified below.
Concentration of force on the "principal effort" method: At least in
those wars where it found itself facing an Arab coalition, Israel was
forced to choose a priori (either prior to the outbreak of war or during
its course) where to make its main thrust; in other words - where to
concentrate its forces in order to gain a quantitative superiority, at least
locally, and thus create the centre of gravity for the entire war and for
each theatre therein that would eventually allow the achievement of a
military decision.36 This is a crippling constraint both on Israel's
freedom of action and on its freedom of choice, hence an incentive for
an offensive approach.
Concentration of the force, in Israeli military decision doctrine,
contains yet another principle: a graduated decision in accordance with
an order of priorities, namely, decision through an offensive on one
front while conducting "holding operations" on other front(s), only to
shift the effort to them once decision has been reached on the first
front.37
The disadvantages of the graduated decision approach are fairly
clear: it is likely to prolong the war and to result in the loss of the
opportunity for a strategic decision in the event of either a failure to
achieve decision on one of the fronts in the chain of graduation, or an
adverse political constellation that "freezes" the situation on the
battlefield. This, in turn, raises the following dilemma: should the
centre of gravity be the weakest front (as advocated by Liddell-Hart)
or the strongest one (as Clausewitz recommended)?38 The Eastern
Front is undoubtedly Israel's most vulnerable flank: it lacks strategic
depth; lies in close proximity to the country's main population centres
and economic/industrial infrastructure ("counter value" targets);
involves the danger of Israel being cut in half, and contains the seeds
of a multilateral war coalition - Syria, Jordan and Iraq. However,
despite these geo-political vulnerabilities, until the 1979 peace accords
it was Egypt that was considered the main military threat to Israel, due
to its leading position in the Arab World. Consequently, Israel has
opted for a battlefield decision against its strongest Arab adversary,
namely, Egypt, before moving to secure its most vulnerable flank.
Since in the Yom Kippur War Israel was unable to achieve a military
decision in one theatre that would enable it to shift its forces to the
second front - both because enemy numerical superiority did not allow
this and because of the length of interior lines and the shortage of time
with which Israel had to contend in the war's early stages - it was
subsequently decided, during the tenure of Chief of the General Staff
Mordechai Gur (1974-78) to expand the size of the IDF. This growth
was intended to narrow the quantitative gap between the IDF and the

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Arab armies, so as to allow it to move from a strategy of a graduated

battlefield decision to one of a simultaneous decision in two separate
theatres; this in turn would reduce the need for a quick transfer of
large forces from one front to another in the event Israel were to be
caught by a surprise attack again.3' Following the signing of peace
accords between Israel and its Arab neighbours, a contraction in the
size of the army can be expected which, in turn, will restore the need
for a graduated decision.
The Strategy of an indirect approach: It has been a commonplace to
view the indirect approach as an integral part of Israel's military
thinking,40 hence of its perception of a battlefield decision. Many
Israeli generals have attributed their victories to their use of this
strategy.41
Indeed, the indirect approach, both physical and psychological, at
both the strategic and operational levels, was first implemented by the
IDF in the War of Independence and was since employed in almost
every subsequent war - specifically in the 1956 Sinai Campaign, the Six
Day War, and the 1982 Lebanon War.42 It has become an
"institutionalized" principle of the Israeli security doctrine, as if
formulated by Liddell-Hart himself, though its physical aspects has
received greater emphasis than its psychological dimensions.43
In the Yom Kippur war and thereafter, Israel has failed in its
attempts to physically implement the indirect approach at the strategic
level. The crossing of the Suez Canal during the Yom Kippur War,
exploiting a gap between the Second and the Third Egyptian Armies,
was admittedly a brilliant gambit. However, not merely did it
constitute an operational success that was not translated to complete
victory in the entire war, but it was executed against the main
concentration of the Egyptian army, partly because the IDF did not
have at its disposal a force powerful enough to physically outflank the
Egyptian formations. In 1982 the IDF failed in its attempt to envelop
the Syrian forces in Lebanon because of operational difficulties in the
mountainous terrain. It would seem that since the 1980s, the IDF has
been operating on the assumption that a battlefield decision
necessitates a direct confrontation with the enemy, and has hoped that
such an encounter would not be too difficult.44
It is arguable of course, by way of challenging this approach, that
the need for an indirect approach has not diminished; quite the reverse
in fact, it has even increased due to the far greater difficulties in the
future battlefield in breaking through dense, fortified formations, rife
with forces equipped with advanced weaponry; in such circumstances,
there is no alternative to building up the capacity for an indirect
approach, by air and by sea, including the development of a sizeable air
and sea transportation capabilities, even at an exorbitant cost.
Fighting on interior lines: Surrounded by enemies of vast numerical
superiority, Israel has naturally assumed that it would be likely to be

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required to fight on interior lines. This strategy enables surrounded

states to transfer forces from one front to another at a relatively rapid
pace, and to do this through reliance on strategic mobility and a mobile
logistical system. It affords relative flexibility in moving and
concentrating forces and is supposed to facilitate a rapid strategic
decision even in circumstances where one is forced to rely on a
graduated decision.45 Nevertheless, Israeli decision doctrine has never
ruled out fighting on exterior lines, should conditions make this
possible. Moreover, an empirical examination would even reveal a
strategic preference for war-fighting on exterior lines when the
hostilities involve one enemy only (as was the case in the Sinai
Campaign and the Lebanon War); this implies the tacit preference of
fighting on interior lines against a multi-front coalition and on exterior
lines against a single enemy. Even when Israel was forced to fight on
interior lines at the strategic level (in 1948, 1967 and 1973), it
preferred to fight on exterior lines at the operational level.
The concept of the first strike: The idea of a first strike has never
been developed as a permanent binding principle but rather as an
option whose implementation depends on the relevant politicostrategic circumstances. It is true that David Ben-Gurion, who
recognized the merits of strategic initiative, toyed with the idea of a
preemptive air strike "which, upon the outbreak of war, will be able to
destroy the enemy's air force";46 and that the IDF trained for such an
eventuality.47 But the idea began to take full shape only in 1955, on the
eve of the Sinai Campaign, at the inspiration of the then Chief of the
General Staff, Lieutenant General Moshe Dayan.48 Following that war,
in which first strikes were dealt out to the enemy both on the ground
and in the air (though the latter by Israel's allies), the concept of a first
strike as a means to throw enemy forces off balance, thereby allowing
for a battlefield decision, began to strike roots in Israeli military
thinking. It also came to be seen as a factor capable of considerably
shortening the war by creating the necessary conditions for a rapid
decision.4' Then came the astounding victory of 1967, with its brilliant
air gambit, and elevated the concept of a first strike to a semi-principle.
This in itself can be counterproductive in preparing an army for a
future war, for the IDF has since then been inclined to plan its next war
on the assumption, which can never really be more than a hope, that it
will have the opportunity to initiate that war, and that its air force will
be able to destroy the enemy's air force while it is still on the ground.50
Moreover, this elevation of the first-strike concept has been, and still
is, at odds with an important principle of Israel's national security
doctrine pursuant to which the military will allow the politicians
whatever room they require for deciding on the manner in which a war
should commence. What is at issue here are two types of first strike: a
preventive war, designed to forestall a medium- or long-term
deterioration of the military situation, and a preemptive war, aimed at

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51

deflecting an imminent threat.

The idea of a preventive war was implemented in the Sinai
Campaign before being theoretically developed. Only after this war did
it become an established article of faith of Israeli strategic thinking and
crystallized in people's minds as "a war whose motives are rooted in
the assumption that time operates in the Arabs' favour, namely, that the
expected balance of forces is likely to generate a future confrontation
on conditions more favourable to the Arabs... at a time when the
present balance of forces makes it possible to at least disrupt the
growth in Arab power.... A preventive war [thus] is possible without
the existence of an immediate threat to the political or territorial status
quo".52
Before long the concept of a preventive war gave rise to the idea of
a preventive strike, namely, a military operation short of a fully-fledged
war which aims to forestall a medium- or long-term threat: the
destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 being a prominent
example.
A related strategic concept, that of the preemptive war (or strike),
which was most vividly demonstrated by the Six Day War, was defined
by Yigal Allon as "an operational initiative... against concentrations of
enemy forces and the capture of vital strategic targets on enemy
territory, at a time that such enemy is preparing to attack you, before
he has succeeded in actually launching such an attack". Such a
preemptive strike seeks to disrupt the deployment and movement of
enemy forces from the rear to the front, and to inflict damage on its
frontal and rear installations such as airports, air defence systems,
surface-to-surface missile bases, and command and control centres; it
also aims at seizing vital portions of enemy territory, both in order to
disrupt its ability to wage war and to serve as bargaining chips in future
political negotiations.53
Following the capture of vast territories in the 1967 War, Israeli
political and military leaders began to question the necessity of a first
strike - at both the preemptive and preventive levels - and to entertain
the notion of absorbing an Arab first strike. Similarly, it was
increasingly believed that a first strike would be less amenable to the
great powers than before. After 1973, Prime Minister Rabin, Foreign
Minister Allon and Defence Minister Peres publicly ruled out the
possibility that Israel would readopt a first-strike policy. This pledge
was an offspring of the general war wariness within the Israeli public
following the Yom Kippur War; but no less did it reflect Israel's delicate
international position: its growing dependence on the United States
and its greater awareness of the weighty political constraints attending
a first strike, deriving from the difficulty of knowing with certainty, or
of being able to prove to that the enemy was about to attack in the
short or long term.54 Such constraints will only become weightier in the
wake of the present peace process and the anticipated peace accords.

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But there have always been further reasons for precluding the
possibility of first strikes, such as recognition of the need for prior
coordination of any initiated war with a friendly superpower (the
United States) in order to secure a political umbrella and military aid.55
In actual fact, neither after 1967 nor after 1973 did Israel give up its
predilection for a first strike, as part of its offensive approach, though
in practice it refrained from doing so in 1973.
The reasons that had originally produced the idea of a first strike primarily the lack of strategic depth and numerical inferiority - were
later augmented by the growing constraints posed by the battlefield on
manoeuvre. Political and military leaders are likely to conclude that one
of the most effective ways to contend with the impasse created by a dense
and heavily fortified battlefield in certain theatres is to launch a first
strike at the enemy's surface-to-air missile system and its air force, in
order to achieve air superiority over the battlefield and enemy territory,
so as to enable one's own ground forces to achieve a military decision.
Whether decision of this sort has much chance of being implemented on
the future battlefield is still subjected to a heated debate.
Striking force: Basing one's strategy on striking force is equally
perceived in Israel as the optimal expression and implementation of the
offensive approach. Assumptions regarding Israel's inability to conduct
long and exhausting wars were reinforced following the War of
Attrition with Egypt (1969-70), and never since then has Israel been
prepared to revert to that kind of war.56 Israel's security and battlefield
decision doctrines have therefore come to accommodate the need to
build up the IDF as a striking force, capable - in contrast with a
resisting force - of producing significant achievements within a short
time. These include assistance in the implementation of a rapid
decision before political constraints have had time to affect operations
on the battlefield; exploitation of the advantages of strategic initiative
to effect the enemy's collapse; implementation of the indirect
approach; and the facilitation of strategic mobility between the
theatres of war should the need for a graduated decision arise.
Additional perceived advantages of a striking force, deriving from the
above, are its relatively low cost in terms of manpower losses and
economics, and the possibilities that it opens up for exploiting the
quality of the Israeli soldier and the Israel Defence Forces as a whole.57
The striking force approach gained momentum prior to the Sinai
Campaign, under the leadership of Chief of the General Staff Moshe
Dayan.58 Since then, it has remained virtually unchanged, despite the
recent criticism that exclusive reliance on striking forces has been
inappropriate because it has been based on unduly optimistic
assumptions about the circumstances of war, and that it is also
important to develop the capacity for resistance lest the war failed to
unfold in accordance with Israeli planning.59
In line with this striking-force approach, the IDF was built as a

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mobile army, based on armour and capable of operating not only

rapidly but also continuously. During the first half of the 1960s, a
logistical setup was established to lend support to the striking forces by
providing them with fuel, ammunition and other supplies during their
rapid advance, thus ensuring the continuity of the war operations. It is
built on the "push" system (in contrast with that of "pull", in which
maintenance is transferred to the front only following a specific
request or need).60
It is worth noting in this context that the 1982 Lebanon War
represented in certain circumstances (for example, in actions against
irregular forces) a preference to rely on firepower at the expense of
striking force - doing so mainly to reduce casualties; a similar approach
was already adopted four years earlier in the Litani Operation (1978),
as well as a decade later in the Operation Accountability (1993).
The executors of battlefield decision - the tank and the fighting
aircraft: In most countries, including Israel, the ground forces are those
that provide the main impetus for a battlefield decision. This is so for
the following reasons: the main bulk of the belligerents' armies is made
up of ground forces, and their main military targets are territorial; and
the capture of territory, apart from its contribution to the achievement
of a military decision, makes it considerably easier to hang on to
battlefield gains during the course of the war and, perhaps also,
thereafter.
The weapon systems which, according to Israeli doctrine, bear the
main brunt of the effort to achieve battlefield decision, are the tank and
the fighting aircraft. Their dominance derives from the fact that they
combine high mobility and firepower; and indeed, during the decade
between the Sinai Campaign and the Six Day War a combined air/land
doctrine for achieving a military decision was crystallized within the
IDF.61
The central position assigned to the tank in the IDF is due to its
several prominent advantages: it constitutes a multi-purpose and
versatile weapons system, usable for breaching enemy formations and
fortifications; it is usable for both defence and offence, for armour
battles, and for exploitation of success and pursuit; it possesses
firepower and considerable mobility capabilities and, relative to its
performance, it requires only limited manpower; it provides adequate
protection to its team and thereby reduces the number of war
casualties; it is fast and thereby aids in achieving rapid decision and
shortening the course of hostilities; it facilitates the shifting of war far
from Israel's territory; and it has operational stamina that makes it
possible to effect continuous advances and strikes - largely by virtue of
its ability to traverse hundreds of kilometres (about 200) without
refuelling and with relatively high autarky as regards ammunition,
water and food (for about 48 hours).62
By virtue of these qualities, the "all tank" concept, made

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203

fashionable by Fuller, was at one time dominant in the IDF, which

based itself on armoured and/or mechanized divisions composed
largely of heavy tanks, largely at the expense of other elements of the
ground forces, such as the infantry, artillery and engineering corps. In
the Yom Kippur War, the combat weaknesses of the tank and latent
flaws of the tank-based force structure were exposed. Following the
war, a greater balance was introduced between the various components
of the ground forces, and the structural and organizational lessons of
this conflict found their expression in the establishment of the Field
Forces Command.
As for the air arm, its missions diverge from the defence of the
state's skies, to strategic bombings deep in enemy territory. But it has
also a key role in everything related to a battlefield decision. Since the
early 1950s, the air force has been built as an arm capable not only of
providing close air support to the ground forces but also of creating the
conditions for a battlefield decision. It is supposed to do this by
establishing air superiority that will grant the ground forces "clean
skies" from enemy aircraft, thus affording them relative freedom of
action as they are being mobilized, moved to the front and deployed
there, and ensuring a free flow of war materiel from the rear to the
front.
The 1960s witnessed the evolution of the concept whereby the
attainment of air superiority would not be effected through air
confrontations with attacking enemy aircraft but rather by destroying
the enemy's air force on the ground, and/or destroying its anti-aircraft
systems immediately upon the outbreak of war, so as to prevent them
from disrupting the freedom of action of the Israeli air force. From the
point of view of the Israeli air force, a strike necessitates the use of
most of its fighting aircraft, which are mainly versatile fighter bombers;
this, in turn, relegates missions of close air support into a secondary
role, at least during the initial stages of the war.
In the view of senior IDF officers, the freedom of action of armies
both on the ground and in the air will become limited in the future
battlefield. In September 1991, the commander of the IDF Engineering
Corps assessed that "if, until now, some 70-80 per cent of the battle
have been conducted in open spaces... the future battle is bound to
change so that about 80 per cent of the fighting will be conducted
between obstacles".63 Similarly, the then commander of the Israeli Air
Force pointed to the fairly clear trend of greater constraints on air
manoeuvrability, resulting from the increase in anti-aircraft weapons
and their growing sophistication.64 However, many senior IDF officers
still believe otherwise, whether out of intellectual conservatism or due
to typical organizational thinking.65 On the other hand, a growing
number of experts are talking about the expected revolution on the
battlefield, augured by the appearance of the combat helicopter which surpasses the tank in its operational and strategic

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manoeuvrability and firepower." With the appearance of airborne

multi-corps divisions in the future, the tank will continue to play a role
on the battlefield, but that role is likely to be reduced to missions of a
tactical and frontal nature.

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THE BATTLEFIELD-DECISION DOCTRINE IN THE WAKE OF

THE 1991 GULF WAR
Up to the 1991 Gulf War, Israeli military thinking focused on decision
in the context of the direct battlefield. In other words, it did not think
very much in terms of denying the enemy the ability to continue
fighting by striking at its society, morale, and strategic-industrial
infrastructure, or by targeting its high command so as to force it to
cease hostilities. While there were occasional manifestations of this
strategic thinking (for example, the shelling of the Suez Canal towns
and the deep air raids during the War of Attrition), these were the
exception that proved the rule. There was certainly a measure of
complacency or, perhaps, indifference, regarding the possibility that
the Arabs might in the future attempt to develop the means of avoiding
a battlefield confrontation and striking directly at Israel's society, let
alone that they might use these means, if ever available. The responses
to these potential threats, adopted during the years preceding the Gulf
War, were both inadequate and impractical. They were based on the
assumption that, in the words of Yitzhak Rabin, it would be possible
"without any fuss to move the entire population remaining in the large
cities into shelters, until the achievement of military decision".67 The
firing of Iraqi missiles at Israel's rear during the Gulf War did much to
dispel this complacency. It demonstrated, first of all, how widely the
concept of decision has expanded in the Middle Eastern context, from
the tactical, operational and strategic spheres all the way up to the
grand-strategy level; and, secondly, it has precipitated renewed
retrospection - more critical now, and extremely vital - of the
traditional Israeli doctrine of battlefield decision.
Granted, the firing of missiles does not constitute a full military
confrontation, and it is of course impossible to achieve a battlefield
decision through the use of missiles alone, or to place the continued
existence of an enemy state in jeopardy. But the fact that the Arabs
possess the ability to fire long-range missiles indicates that, in the
Middle East, there is no longer any sense in continuing to think in
terms of narrow and relatively insulated battlefields, and that there is
no choice but to accept that the country's society - its population and
economy - is now an integral part of the confrontation, and that the
importance of the link between the front and the rear has grown.
Technological developments have not only expanded the scope of the
battlefield: they have created a real connection between the civilian
rear and the military front, and have made the rear more exposed than

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205

ever before. Liddell Hart and Fuller, the military thinkers who more
than anyone else epitomize the strategic thinking of the twentieth
century, emphasized the matter of avoiding direct military
confrontation. In their view, this could be achieved both at the
battlefield level - by striking at the enemy's command and control (the
"brain) and maintenance (the "belly") centres - and at the national
level: by striking at its society - its industrial infrastructure and its
morale.68
In his famous book The Command of the Air, written after the First
World War (and inflating the value of air power as a factor capable,
quite by itself, of achieving decision in war), Giulio Douhet looked far
into the future by positing strikes at the enemy rear as the means for
deciding a war. He described the demoralizing effects of air attacks on
a country's rear, and urged that wars ought to be decided in that
manner.69 The steadfastness and stamina of the rear have an impact on
developments at the front: on the ability to transfer human and
material resources to the front, on troops' morale, and on the
cost/benefit calculations of the high command. Important Arab
strategists, such as Haitham al-Ayyubi, recommended as early as 1967,
when Arab inability to defeat the IDF on the battlefield became
apparent, that the Arabs adopt a more sober strategy, based on an
effort to weaken the morale of Israel's society.70 The Gulf War has
proven that the Arabs, more than ever before, are making certain
strides towards that goal. It has shown that the next Arab-Israeli war,
should it ever erupt, may possibly engulf the entire area between the
military front and Israel's rear.
Indeed, the prevailing working assumption in the IDF in the wake
of the Gulf War is that while one need not exaggerate the significance
of the missile threat (for the real threat is still posed by the overall Arab
attack forces),71 it is perfectly possible that, if the peace process were
for any reason impaired, the next confrontation with the Arabs will
feature two wars taking place simultaneously, in the rear and at the
front.72 It is even conceivable that in a future war, one or more Arab
states will operate against Israel on the ground while another, or
others, perhaps those that are more peripheral, will launch missiles at
its territory - which will mean that Israel's response will become far
more complicated than in the past and will entail restrictive political
considerations. It may well be the case that Israel will have no
alternative, if it wishes to punish a remote state that strikes it with
surface-to-surface missiles, but to make do with an air strike and by
way of doing this violate the sovereignty of states that border on Israel,
are not involved in hostilities, and maintain correct relations with it perhaps even peace - and thus possibly widen the confrontation and
endanger that very peace; or, even worse, Israel may give up the notion
of achieving a military decision over the state (s) launching the missiles.
Also, Israel cannot conceive of ever achieving a battlefield decision

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over a remote state like Iraq, similar to that achieved by the allies in 42
days during the Gulf War; she lacks the military, operational, logistical,
material and human infrastructure for such a task, and is unlikely to
have the necessary time frame to recruit for the required war effort.
Irrespective of whether or not the achievement of military decision
remains a realistic war objective, Israel will have to ensure in any future
war that it not only enjoys air superiority over its enemies, but also the
ability to destroy their fixed and mobile ballistic missile launchers, so
as to liberate its rear from that threat and to limit hostilities to the
narrow, traditional battlefield. At the same time, there will be no
escape from acquiring an effective capability for intercepting and
destroying incoming ballistic missiles in the event of failure to destroy
them on their launchers; not least, there will be a need to improve
methods of passive protection from whichever Arab missiles that
manage to evade the various measures taken against them.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Israel's battlefield-decision doctrine has been primarily influenced by
two overriding assumptions: that Israel will be in a position of overall
numerical inferiority in future wars against a coalition of Arab
adversaries, and that superpower intervention will continue to
preclude the attainment of an Israeli battlefield decision. While the
former assumption represents a genuine reality, the latter reflects, in
the main, a perceived reality. Further assumptions that lie at the root of
Israel's decision doctrine include: the lack of strategic depth on most
of the theatres of war; the plethora of different potential enemies and
fronts; the difficulty, from the economic and the social standpoints, of
coping with a prolonged war; and the existential significance entailed
in any Israeli defeat in war.
A combination of "force multipliers" has been used to manipulate
this adverse balance of forces - a cardinal condition for achieving a
battlefield decision. The traditional assumption was that an additional
vital condition for a military decision - the ratio between firepower
and manoeuvre on the battlefield would tilt in favour of manoeuvre.
However, after the 1967 Six Day War the element of firepower began
strengthening on the Middle Eastern battlefields by way of reaction to
the crushing Arab defeat during that war. The more prominent the role
of firepower became, the more it disrupted the implementation of the
force multipliers and made a military decision still harder. An
expansion in the size of forces and the intensity of firepower at the
front; natural and artificial obstacles that hamper mobility; growing
constraints on the operation of the dominant weapons systems on the
ground and in the air (the tank and the aircraft); hardships
encountered by the logistical system in supporting the manoeuvre
effort - all these, or at least some of them, found their expression

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207

during the more recent Arab-Israeli wars - in 1973 and 1982 - and
contributed to the IDF's failures to achieve strategic decision; this was
in contrast to the earlier wars - in 1948, 1956 and 1967, in which
strategic decision was attained.73
A number of factors clearly indicate that the Israeli battlefield
decision paradigm is undergoing a crisis. These include: the trend that
has recently been evinced in the development of battlefield decision in
Arab-Israeli wars; the fact that Israel is likely to find itself increasingly
preoccupied with security threats different from the traditional armyto-army battlefield confrontations (threats to its rear, on the one hand,
and from low-intensity conflicts, on the other); and, last but not least,
the controversies that have been raging among the most senior IDF
officers.
"Sociologically", the Gulf War exercised a very powerful impact
indeed, for no other reason than that it introduced doubts into the
hearts of the many who had insisted on cleaving to the paradigm in its
outmoded form. The apparent fact, so vividly demonstrated by the
Gulf War, that enemy states, however remote from Israel, are now able
to threaten its security without ever having to try to invade it only
compounds the dilemmas already posed by the newly discovered
difficulties on the battlefield of breaching fortified, dense and deep
enemy dispositions. These two challenges make it imperative for the
IDF to equip itself with the ability to wage effective strategic hostilities
at longer ranges than those to which it has been previously
accustomed, and to overcome the constraints on manoeuvre by, inter
alia, making greater use than in the past of the second dimension - sea
- and the third dimension - air. This will entail a considerable expense,
which it is doubtful whether Israel can afford. On the other hand, if
Israel were to decide to relate to the problem of restricted manoeuvre
as given, but nevertheless try to retain the goal of a military decision,
it could, for example, adopt a sort of an Israeli FOFA.
Notwithstanding the rhetoric that still clutches on to formulae of
the past, it seems that the Arab-Israeli wars since the Yom Kippur War,
as well as the Gulf War and the currently progressing peace process,
have all reinforced the feeling in Israel that, in the future, it may
become necessary to place a smaller emphasis on achieving a battlefield
decision and/or the war's other military and political objectives, and
more on finding ways and means to avoid war altogether. Indeed, it
would seem that Israel's war objectives are assuming a more "negative"
character, aimed first and foremost at denying the enemy any military
or political achievements.74 Should this be the case, there will probably
be a greater emphasis than before on defensive measures - of both
passive and active nature. By virtue of budgetary constraints, this
emphasis is likely to come at the expense of developing and
modernizing the IDF's offensive capabilities and its ability to achieve a
battlefield decision. It appears, in other words, that at the end of the

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day, because of the developments indicated above, Israel will adopt a

far more balanced doctrine than hitherto possessed, and one that will
contain more defensive elements than in the past.75

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NOTES
1. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1970.
2. See, for example: Carl von Clausewitz On War, Princeton, 1976, p.90; B.H. Liddell
Hart, Strategy, New York, 1968, p.25; Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender, Stanford,
1958, p.5.
3. Avi Kober, Military Decision in War: The Arab Israeli Wars 1948-1982, Tel-Aviv,
Ma'arachot, forthcoming.
4. Yitzhak Rabin's lecture in memory of Yitzhak Sadeh, 21 September 1967; see also, Ezer
Weizman, Leha Shamaim Leha Aretz (On Eagle's Wings), Tel-Aviv, 1975, pp. 185-6.
For an expansion on the subject of the link between deterrence and decision, see: Yoav
Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, Israel's Strategic Doctrine, Santa Monica, September
1981, pp.18-21.
5. Moshe Arens, "Ending Wars", Ma'arachot, 292-3 (March-April 1984), p.3; Avner
Yaniv, "Deterrence and Defence in Israel's Strategy", Medinah, Mimshal Ve-yehasim
Benle'umiyim, 24 (Summer 1985), pp.53^t; Zvi Lanir, "Political Objectives and
Military Aims in the Wars of Israel", in Joseph Alpher (ed.) Milhemet Breira (War By
Choice), Tel-Aviv, 1985, p. 129.
6. Yehoshafat Harkaby, a lecture, 1978.
7. For a keen early awareness of the asymmetry between Israel and the Arabs in the
sphere of military decision see: David Ben-Gurion, Yichud Ve-yeud (Uniqueness and
Destiny), Tel-Aviv, 1971, p.219.
8. See, for example, Yigal Allon, Kelim Shluvim (Communicating Vessels: Essays), TelAviv, 1980, p . l l l . Ezer Weizman, Ha-krav al Ha-shalom: Tazpit Ishit (The Battle for
Peace: a Personal Perspective), Jerusalem, 1981, p.37.
9. See, for example: Chief of the General Staff (Reserves) Haim Barlev, as quoted in
Immanuel Wald, Kilelat Ha-kelim Ha-shvurim (Curse of the Broken Vessels), Tel-Aviv,
1987, p.198.
10. David Ben-Gurion, Be-hilahem Israel (When Israel Goes to War), Tel-Aviv, 1975,
pp.301-2; Ben-Gurion, Yichud Ve-yeud, p.161; Yigal Allon, Masach Shel Hoi (A
Curtain of Sand), Tel-Aviv, 1968, p.63; Israel Tal "Israel's Security Doctrine",
Ma'arachot, 253 (December 1976), p.2.
11. If one examines, for example, the ratio of manpower between Israel, on the one hand,
and Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq, on the other, it emerges that, whereas the ratio was
2:1 in the Arabs' favour in the Six Day War, it declined to 3:1 in the Yom Kippur War
and deteriorated still further to 5:1 in 1989. Only at the beginning of the 1990s has
this trend been checked and even improved somewhat. Avraham Adan, "Quality and
Quantity in the Yom Kippur War", in Zvi Ofer and Avi Kober (eds.), Echut Ve-kamut
(Quality and Quantity in Military Buildup), Tel-Aviv, p.275; Aharon Levran et al (eds.),
The Middle East Military Balance 1978-1988, Tel-Aviv, 1988, pp.428, 429; The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1993-1994, London,
1993.
12. Shimon Peres, Mahar Ahshav (Tomorrow is Now), Jerusalem, 1978, p.249.
13. Haim Barlev, "The War and its Aims", Ma'arachot, 266 (October-November) 1978,
p.2.
14. See Kober, Military Decision in War.
15. See, for example, Michael Brecher et ah, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy
Behaviour", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.13, No.l (March 1969).
16. See, Kober, Military Decision in War.
17. Strategic depth is defined as territory which, even if penetrated by the enemy, keeps
the state's vital interests and particularly its population and economic centres out of a
critical danger. See, Aharon Yariv, "Strategic Depth: an Israeli View", Ma'arachot,
270-1 (October 1979).
18. Yigal Allon, "Defensible Borders", Molad, October 1976; see also Yigal Allon, "Israel:

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The Case for Defensible Borders", Foreign Affairs, 55 (October 1976), pp.38-53.
19. Amos Gilboa, Interview with Lieutenant-General Dan Shomron, Ma'ariv, 18 August
1989.
20. Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army, London, 1975, pp.205-6.
21. Ben-Gurion, Be-hilahem Israel, pp.14, 127, 132, 244, 289; Peres, Mahar Ahshav,
pp.249-50; Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security, New York, 1987, p.103; Israel Tal,
"Offence and Defence in the Wars of Israel", Ma'arachot, 311 (March 1988), p.6;
Moshe Bar-Kochba, "Changes and Trends in the IDF's Structure", Skirah Hodshit,
1988, Nos.3-4, p.24.
22. Peled, "How Israel Failed to Prepare for War", p.24. For the considerable sensitivity of
the policy-makers to this matter, see: Moshe Dayan, "Sinai: 10 Years After",
Ma'arachot 306-7 (December 1986-January 1987), pp.27-28. In this matter, see also:
Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life, Jerusalem, 1976, p.343,356 (Hebrew); Allon, Masach
Shel Hoi, pp.76-7; Tal, "Israel's Security Doctrine.", p.7.
23. Allon, Masach Shel Hoi, pp.66, 69, 173; Yitzhak Rabin, "The Test of Deterrence",
Safra Ve-saifa, 4 (November 1981), p.29; Ben-Gurion, Be-hilahem Israel, p.189; Peres,
Mahar Ahshav, p.249.
24. Israel Tal, a lecture, 1978. Aharon Yariv, "Strategic Depth", a lecture, 1979. The last
two Chiefs of the IDF General Staff have expressed themselves in this vein. See, for
example: Gilboa, interview with Dan Shomron, 1989.
25. On this matter see, for example, George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the
International System, New York, 1977, pp.3-4. For reference to Israel see, for
example, Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, Ithaca, 1984; Ben-Horin
and Posen, Israel's Strategic Doctrine, pp.29-34.
26. Tal, "Israel's Security Doctrine"; Tal, "Offence and Defence"; Mordechai Gur, as
quoted in Louis Williams (ed.), Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict, Tel-Aviv,
1975, p.199; Dov Tamari, "Does the IDF Think in a Conservative Manner?",
Ma'arachot 317 (October-November 1989); Yariv, "Strategic Depth", 1979; Ariel
Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine, Tel-Aviv, 1988, p.67. Little
wonder that Ben-Gurion saw offence as a "strategy that promises victory" (BenGurion, Be-hilahem Israel, p.399).
27. For the view of Ariel Sharon on this matter see: Uri Dan, Rosh Gesher (Bridgehead),
Tel-Aviv, 1975, p.13; for the approach of the then Chief of the General Staff David
Elazar see: Williams, Military Aspects, p.50.
28. Amnon Yogev, "Israel's Security in the 1990s and Beyond", Alpaim, 1 (June 1989).
29. On NATO's strategy of Follow-ON Forces Attack, see for example: Boyd Sutton et al.,
"Strategic and Doctrinal Implications of the Deep Attack: Concepts for the Defense of
Central Europe", in Keith A, Dunn and William O. Staudemaier (eds.), Military
Strategy in Transition: Defense and Deterrence in the 1980s, Boulder, 1984, pp.60-83.
30. See, for example, Dov Tamari, "Thoughts on Tactics", Ma'arachot, 273-4 (May-June
1980), p.4.
31. See, for example, Haim Yaabetz, "Israel's Security Doctrine", a lecture in Yad Tabenkin,
1984; Levite, Offense and Defense, p.66.
32. See the definition given by Abba Eban to security borders, quoted in: Dan Horowitz,
"The Permanent and the Dynamic in Israel's Security Doctrine", in War by Choice,
p.72.
33. Efraim Inbar, "Israel's Strategy since the Yom Kippur War", Ma'arachot, 289-90
(October 1983); Dan Shomron, an interview with Davar, 11 September 1988.
34. See the words of Chief of the General Staff Mordechai Gur in Williams, The Military
Aspects, p.199, and also his ideas and statements in Ma'ariv as quoted in Inbar, "Israel's
Strategy", p.17. See also: Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, Cambridge MA,
1978, p.315; Steven Rosen and Martin Indyk, "The Temptation to Preempt in a Fifth
Arab-Israeli War", Orbis, Vol.20, No.2 (Summer 1976).
35. Inbar, "Israel's Strategy", p.18. By contrast, the political echelon tried to reduce Israel's
offensive profile (Ibid.).
36. Allon, Masach Shel Hoi, p.66.
37. Ibid., p.60.
38. B.H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War, London, 1943, p.179; Clausewitz, On War,
p.248. Michael Handel attributes to Israel the preference for the strongest front.
Michael I. Handel, Israel's Political Military Doctrine, Cambridge MA, Occasional
Papers in International Affairs, No.30 (July 1973), p.67.

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39. Inbar, "Israel's Strategy", p.19.

40. See, for example, Handel, Israel's Political Military Doctrine, p.67.
41. See, for example, Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study in his Military Thought, London,
1977, pp.238-73.
42. Meir Pa'il, "The Indirect Approach is Preferable", Ma'arachot Shirion 28 (January
1973); Avraham Ayalon, "The War of Independence, the Sinai War, the Six Day War:
Comparative Traits", Ma'arachot, 191-2 (June 1968).
43. Allon, Masach Shel Hoi, p.69.
44. Tamari, "Does the IDF think in a Conservative Manner?", p.24; Menachem Eynan,
"The Importance of Quantity in Light of the Constraints on Quality", in Ofer &
Kober, Echut Ve-kamut, p.481.
45. Allon, Masach Shel Hoi, p.159; see also, Israel Tal, "The Tank at Present and in the
Future", Ma'arachot, 281 (November 1981), p.3; Peled "How Israel Failed to Prepare
for War", p.25.
46. Ben-Gurion, Be-hilahem Israel, p.87; and his Yichud Ve-yeud, p.141. See also: Michael
Bar Zohar, Ben-Gurion, New York, pp.906-7.
47. Shabtai Teveth, Moshe Dayan, Tel-Aviv, p.355.
48. Dayan, Story of My Life, pp.149, 176-8, 210; Horowitz, "The Permanent and the
Dynamic", p.69; Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security, pp.50-1; Handel, Israel's Political
Military Doctrine, pp.13, 19, 24-7, 35, 50-1.
49. Tal, "The Tank at Present", p.3.
50. Dan Horowitz, "The Permanent and the Dynamic", p.69; Allon, Masach Shel Hoi,
p.68; Yitzhak Rabin, Pinkas Sherut (The Rabin Memoirs), Tel-Aviv, 1979, pp.165-6.
51. Dan Horowitz, Tfisat Ha-bitakhon Ha-leumi shel Israel (Israel's National Security
Doctrine), Jerusalem, 1973, p.35.
52. Ibid., p.35.
53. Allon, Masach Shel Hoi, pp.68, 70, 73. See also Tal, "The Tank", p.5; Horowitz,
Israel's National Security Doctrine, p.35.
54. Inbar, "Israel's Strategy".
55. Yitzhak Rabin, "The Lessons of Sinai", Skirah Hodshit, 1968, Nos.10-11.
56. On the War of Attrition as a red line from Israel's standpoint, see: Micha Bar, Kavim
Adumim Be-estrategiyat Ha-harta'a Ha-Israelit (Red Lines in Israel's Deterrence
Strategy), Te-Aviv, 1990, pp.108-9.
57. On the predilection for a striking force, including its perceived low costs, see, for
example: David Ben-Gurion, Zava U-vitahon (Army and Security), Tel-Aviv, 1955,
pp.14, 244; Israel Tal, "Israel's Security Doctrine", p.3; Tal, "The Tank", p.3.
58. John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, Ithaca, 1983, pp.135-6. One of the most
prominent Israeli strategists to express this approach has been Israel Tal. See: Tal,
"Offence and Defence in the Arab-Israeli Wars", p.6.
59. One of the early critics in this vein was Yigal Allon. See Masach Shel Hoi, p.79.
60. See, Richard A Gabriel, "Lessons of War: The IDF in Lebanon", Military Review, Vol
LXiy No.8 (August 1984), p.62.
61. See, for example, Haim Laskov, "The Lessons of Kadesh", Ma'arachot Shirion, 21
(October 1970); Haim Laskov and Meir Zorea, "Once You Wage War", Ma'ariv, 10
October 1965.
62. See: Moshe Bar Kochba, Merkavot Ha-plada (Chariots of Steel), Tel-Aviv, 1989,
pp.574-5; Hanoch Bar-Tov, Dado, Tel-Aviv, 1979, pp.83-105 (Hebrew); Tal, "The
Tank", p.3; Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, pp.126-32; Handel, Israel's
Political Military Doctrine pp.24-8.
63. Ba-mahane, 19 September 1991.
64. Ibid..
65. For the opinions of the Head of the Operations Department at the IDF GHQ and the
Commander of the Armoured Corps in this respect see Ibid.
66. Both Israel's "Mr. Armour", General (Res.) Tal and a former Air Force Commander
have estimated that the combat helicopter will supersede the tank on the future
battlefield. Tal, "The Tank", pp.2-7; Ba-mahane, 19 September 1991.
67. Quoted by Reuven Pedatzur, Ha-aretz, 25 February 1991.
68. Liddel Hart, Thoughts on War, p.54; John Mearsheimer, Liddel Hart and the Weight of
History, Ithaca, 1988, pp.88-9. For Fuller's attitude see his "Plan for 1919" Q.Y.C.
Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, London, 1936.
69. Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air, London, 1943, pp.252-3.

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70. Haitham al-Ayyubi, "Revolutionary Characteristics of the Fourth Arab-Israeli War",

Ma'arachot, 234-5 (January-February 1974), pp.15-21.
71. This view was expressed by the then Chief of the General Staff Dan Shomron, Haaretz, 19 March, 1991.
72. Interview with Major General Ze'ev Livne, OC Home Front Command, Ba-mahane,
15 January 1992; interview with Colonel Benny Michelson, Head of the IDF's History
Department, Ba-mahane, 19 September 1991.
73. See Kober, Military Decision in War.
74. For Rabin's attitude in this vein see: Ha-aretz Supplement, 29 September 1989.
75. On this matter, see, for example: Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military
Doctrine.