1. Director of Lands vs.

Court of Appeals

[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA,
MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed
ABISTADO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land

registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the
failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority
to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed
this petition to set aside the Decision promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the
subsequent Resolution promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the
challenged Decision reads:
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is

hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of
applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by
their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D
located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are
hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on
this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued."

The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a
petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land
under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. The application was docketed as
Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the
Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. However, during
the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs -- Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their
guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
[5]

[6]

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed
the petition for want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants
through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:

[7]

"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the
notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and
`G'). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally
acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the
mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation."
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of
1982, which in its pertinent portion provides:
[8]

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529]
has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the
aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is
jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the
same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a
newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is
dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably
necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction
over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice
of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably
necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that
the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of

Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court
and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged
CA Resolution dated November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated
this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored
his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule
45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of
Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45,
and not for certiorari under Rule 65.
[9]

The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding
[10]

x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86
need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing
LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial
hearing shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
general circulation. According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette
is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and xxx in xxx a
newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of
due process.
[11]

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply

with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a
mere procedural defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
[12]

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals

ruled:
[13]

x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a

newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be
gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the
opportunity to explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its
disposition in this wise:
[14]

x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure
prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in
the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other
conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party
who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Courts Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five
days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the
initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety
days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. --

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice
shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved
including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may
concern.' Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a
certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be
granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms
that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the
land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent
any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration
court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.

We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the

demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the
publication requirement.
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order
setting the time for initial hearing.The said word denotes an imperative and
thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While concededly such
literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import
ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in
the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory
meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial
hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which
must be complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section
would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all
persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include
owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing
of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper
of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such
requirement in its detailed provision.
[15]

[16]

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in

rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the
land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or
interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied
with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be
adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which
they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking
the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by
satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the
identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an
action for recovery of realty. He must prove his title against the whole
world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when
all persons concerned -- nay, the whole world -- who have rights to or
interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come
to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The
elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is
taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant,
said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
[17]

[18]

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation

should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by
publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of
which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is

due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and
circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such
that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on
time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the allencompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of
default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a
mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even
if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no
excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale
clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation
or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative.
Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must
be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal
requisites shall have been duly complied with.
[19]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and

Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private
respondent for land registration isDISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.

2. Republic vs. Guinto-Aldana

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assails the March 30,
2006 Decision[1]and the November 20, 2006 Resolution,[2] both of the Court of

Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500. The assailed decision reversed and set aside
the July 10, 2003 judgment[3]of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch
199 in LRC Case No. 02-0036, one for original registration of title, whereas the
assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The facts follow.
On April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana[4] (Zenaida), Ma. Aurora
Guinto-Comiso, Ma. Luisa Guinto-Dionisio, Alfredo Guinto, Jr., Pacita R.
Guinto, Ernesto R. Guinto, Natividad R. Guinto and Alberto R. Guinto, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 199 an Application for
Registration of Title[5] over two pieces of land in Talango, Pamplona Uno, Las
Pias City. These lands, identified as Lot No. 4 and Lot No. 5 in Conversion
Consolidation Subdivision Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,[6] measure 1,509 square
meters and 4,640 square meters, respectively.[7] Respondents professed
themselves to be co-owners of these lots, having acquired them by succession
from their predecessors Sergio Guinto (Sergio) and Lucia Rivera-Guinto
(Lucia)Zenaidas parentswho, in turn, had acquired the property under a 1969
document denominated as Kasulatan sa Paghahati ng Lupa na Labas sa
Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan. Under this document, Sergio and
Lucia Guinto acquired for a consideration the respective shares on the property
of Pastor Guinto, Dionisio Guinto, Potenciana Guinto and Marcelina Bernardo
who, together with Luisa, had derived the same from Romulado
Guinto.[8] Respondents also alleged that until the time of the application, they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse,
exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the concept of owner and
that they had consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real
estate taxation.[9]
In support of their application, respondents submitted to the court the
blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,[10] as well as copies of the technical
descriptions of each lot,[11] a certification from the geodetic engineer[12] and the
pertinent tax declarations,[13] together with the receipts of payment
therefor.[14] Expressly, they averred that the propertys original tracing cloth plan
had previously been submitted to the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 255 (Las Pias
RTC) in connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128a previous
registration case involving the subject property which, however, had been
dismissed without prejudice.[15]

The trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and substance;
hence, it gave due course thereto and ordered compliance with the publication
and notification requirements of the law.[16]
Opposing the application, petitioner, through the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City, advanced that the lots sought to be registered were
inalienable lands of the public domain; that neither respondents nor their
predecessors-in-interest had been in prior possession thereof; and that the
muniment of title and the tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition or of prior possession
in the concept of owner.[17]
At the hearing, Zenaida identified her herein co-respondents to be her
siblings, nephews and nieces. She likewise identified the adjoining lot owners
named in the application and the supporting documents attached to the application
as well. She testified that the subject lots had been surveyed at the instance of her
family sometime between 1994 and 1995, and that said survey was documented
in Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and in the geodetic engineers technical description
of the lots. She implied that they did obtain the original tracing cloth plan of the
property, but it was forwarded to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) by the
Las Pias RTC in connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No. LP128. Notwithstanding this admission, and without objection from the oppositor,
the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and the technical description of the
property were provisionally marked in evidence.[18]
Furthermore, Zenaida61 years old at the time of her testimonydeclared that
she has known that the subject lots were owned by her family since she was 5
years old and from her earliest recollection, she narrated that her grandparents
had lived in the subject lots until the death of her grandmother in 1961. She
implied that aside from her predecessors there were other persons, caretakers
supposedly, who had tilled the land and who had lived until sometime between
1980 and 1990. She remembered her grandmother having constructed a house on
the property, but the same had already been destroyed. Also, sometime in 1970,
her family built an adobe fence around the perimeter of the lots and later, in the
1990s, they reinforced it with hollow blocks and concrete after an inundation
caused by the flood.[19] She claimed that she and her father, Sergio, had been
religious in the payment of real estate taxes as shown by the tax declarations and

tax receipts which she submitted to the court and which, following identification,
were forthwith marked in evidence.[20]
Zenaidas claim of prior, open, exclusive and continuous possession of the
land was corroborated by Josefina Luna (Josefina), one of the adjoining lot
owners. Josefina, then 73 years old, strongly declared that the subject lots were
owned by Zenaidas parents, Sergio Guinto and Lucia Rivera, since she reached
the age of understanding, and that she had not come to know of any instance
where a third party had placed a claim on the property. When asked whether there
was anyone residing in the property and whether there were improvements made
thereon, she said there was no one residing therein and that there was nothing
standing thereon except for a nipa hut. [21]
At the close of Josefinas testimony, respondents formally offered their exhibits
without the oppositor placing any objection thereto.[22] After weighing the
evidence, the trial court, on July 10, 2003, rendered its Decision denying the
application for registration. It found that respondents were unable to establish
with certainty the identity of the lots applied for registration, because of failure
to submit to the court the original tracing cloth plan as mandated by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. It likewise noted that the fact of adverse, continuous,
open, public and peaceful possession in the concept of owner has not been proved
by the evidence as Zenaidas and Josefinas respective testimonies did not establish
the nature of the possession of respondents predecessors.[23] The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the applicants to comply with the
requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Application for
Original Registration of Title is hereby DENIED.
ORDERED.[24]

Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on March

30, 2006, issued the assailed Decision reversing the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant appeal
is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.[25]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.[26] Hence, it filed the

instant petition which attributes error to the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial
courts July 10, 2003 decision.
Petitioner principally posits that under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the
submission in court of the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be
registered is a mandatory requirement in registration proceedings in order to
establish the exact identity of the property. While respondents admitted that the
original tracing cloth plan of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 in this case was in the custody of
the LRA as a consequence of their first attempt to have the property registered,
petitioner, invoking Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines,[27] believes that
respondents, on that score alone, are not relieved of their procedural obligation to
adduce in evidence the original copy of the plan, because they could have easily
retrieved it from the LRA and presented it in court.[28]
Furthermore, petitioner suggests that the blueprint of the subdivision plan
submitted by respondents cannot approximate substantial compliance with the
requirement of Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Again, relying on the
aforementioned Del Rosario case, petitioner observes that the blueprint in this
case, allegedly illegible and unreadable, does not even bear the certification of
the Lands Management Bureau.[29] Lastly, petitioner attacks respondents claim of
prior possession. It notes that there is no clear and convincing evidence that
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
adverse, public and exclusive possession of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 for 30 years.[30]
Commenting on the petition, respondents observe that petitioners
arguments are mere reiterative theses on the issues that have already been
addressed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed Decision and Resolution, and
that there are no new matters raised which have not yet been previously passed
upon. Accordingly, they prayed that the petition be denied.[31]
We find the petition to be unmeritorious.
Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as The Property
Registration Decree of 1978, materially provides:
Section 17. What and where to file.The application for land
registration shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file,

together with the application, all original muniments of titles or copies

thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is
shown that the applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a
copy of the application and all annexes.

The provision denotes that it is imperative in an application for original

registration that the applicant submit to the court, aside from the original or
duplicate copies of the muniments of title, a copy of a duly approved survey plan
of the land sought to be registered. The survey plan is indispensable as it provides
a reference on the exact identity of the property. This begs the question in the
instant case: Does the blueprint copy of the survey plan suffice for compliance
with the requirement? In not so many cases,[32] it was held that the nonsubmission, for any reason, of the original tracing cloth plan is fatal to the
registration application, since the same is mandatory in original registration of
title. For instance, in the Del Rosario case relied on by petitioner, the Court ruled
that the submission of the original copy of the duly approved tracing cloth plan is
a mandatory condition for land registration as it supplies the means by which to
determine the exact metes and bounds of the property. The applicant in that case
was unable to submit the original tracing cloth plan of the land he was claiming
because apparently, as in the present case, it was previously transmitted by the
clerk of court to the LRA. Yet the Court, deeming it the applicants obligation to
retrieve the plan himself and present it in evidence, denied the application, to wit:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan,
duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of
original registration of land is a mandatory requirement.The reason for
this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does
not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a
previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be
overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The
failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioners
application for registration.
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original
tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court, but the latter submitted
the same to the LRA. This claim has no merit. Petitioner is duty bound
to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to present it in
evidence in the trial court. x x x[33]

Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the

original tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means
to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the property applied for registration
and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining
lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must be denied
for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is
accompanied by pieces of evidencesuch as a duly executed blueprint of the survey
plan and a duly executed technical description of the propertywhich may likewise
substantially and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent of the
property sought to be registered.
Thus, sound is the doctrinal precept laid down in Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[34] and in the later cases of Spouses Recto v.
Republic of the Philippines[35] and Republic of the Philippines v. Hubilla,[36] that
while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the
original tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands
Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
[DENR]), blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient
identification. Pertinently, the Court in Hubilla, citing Recto, pronounced:
While the petitioner correctly asserts that the submission in
evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the
Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory requirement, this Court has
recognized instances of substantial compliance with this rule. In
previous cases, this Court ruled that blueprint copies of the original
tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other evidence could
also provide sufficient identification to identify a piece of land for
registration purposes. x x x[37]

In the case at bar, we find that the submission of the blueprint of Plan Ccs007601-000040-D, together with the technical description of the property,
operates as substantial compliance with the legal requirement of ascertaining the
identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 applied for registration. The blueprint, which is
shown to have been duly executed by Geodetic Engineer Rolando Roxas (Roxas),
attached to the application and subsequently identified, marked, and offered in
evidence, shows that it proceeded officially from the Lands Management Services
and, in fact, bears the approval of Surveys Division Chief Ernesto Erive. It also
shows on its face that the survey of the property was endorsed by the Community

Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR.[38] This, compounded

by the accompanying technical description of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 duly executed and
verified also by Roxas,[39] should substantially supply as it did the means by
which the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 may be ascertained.
Verily, no error can be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that
respondents were able to approximate compliance with Section 17 of P.D. No.
1529. Also telling is the observation made by the Court of Appeals that there was
no objection raised by the oppositor or by the LRA to the admission of the
blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D despite the fact that they were wellinformed of the present proceedings, to wit:
In the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants do not deny that only
the blueprint copy of the plan of the subject lands (Exh. J) and not the
original tracing cloth plan thereof was submitted to the court a
quo since they had previously submitted the original tracing cloth plan
to the Land Registration Authority. However, despite the failure of the
plaintiffs-appellants to present the original tracing cloth plan, neither
the Land Registration Authority nor the oppositor-appellee
question[ed] this deficiency. Likewise, when the blueprint copy of the
plan (Exh. J) was offered in evidence, the oppositor-apellee did not
raise any objection thereto. Such silence on the part of the Land
Registration [Authority] and the oppositor-appellee can be deemed as
an implied admission that the original tracing cloth plan and the
blueprint copy thereof (Exh. J) are one and the same, free from all
defects and clearly identify the lands sought to be registered. In this
regard x x x, the blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. J), together with its
technical descriptions (Exhs. K and L), is deemed tantamount to
substantial compliance with the requirements of law.[40]

We now proceed to the issue of possession. Petitioner theorizes that not only were
respondents unable to identify the lots applied for registration; it also claims that
they have no credible evidence tending to establish that for at least 30 years they
and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the property
openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[41] We do not agree.
In an original registration of title under Section 14(1)[42] P.D. No. 1529, the
applicant for registration must be able to establish by evidence that he and his
predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the lot under a bona

fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[43] He must prove that for
at least 30 years, he and his predecessor have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land. Republic v.
Alconaba[44] well explains possession and occupation of this character, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words
are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is
not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the allencompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with
the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.[45]

Proceeding from this fundamental principle, we find that indeed respondents have
been in possession and occupation of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 under a bona fide claim of
ownership for the duration required by law. This conclusion is primarily factual.
From the records, it is clear that respondents possession through their
predecessor-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937. In that year, the subject
property had already been declared for taxation by Zenaidas father, Sergio, jointly
with a certain Toribia Miranda (Toribia).[46] Yet, it also can be safely inferred that
Sergio and Toribia had declared the land for taxation even earlier because the
1937 tax declaration shows that it offsets a previous tax number. [47] The property
was again declared in 1979,[48] 1985[49] and 1994[50] by Sergio, Toribia and by
Romualdo.
Certainly, respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it not
been for the fact that, as certified by the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor,
the relevant portions of the tax records on file with it had been burned when the
assessors office was razed by fire in 1997.[51] Of equal relevance is the fact that
with these tax assessments, there came next tax payments. Respondents receipts
for tax expenditures on Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977 and 2001 are likewise
fleshed out in the records and in these documents, Sergio, Toribia and Romualdo
are the named owners of the property with Zenaida being identified as the one
who delivered the payment in the 1994 receipts.[52]

The foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments clearly show that Zenaidas
testimony in this respect is no less believable. And the unbroken chain of positive
acts exercised by respondents predecessors, as demonstrated by these pieces of
evidence, yields no other conclusion than that as early as 1937, they had already
demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the property. Not only do they show that
they had excluded all others in their claim but also, that such claim is in all good
faith.
Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax
declarations and realty tax payment are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are a good indication of possession in the concept of
owner. These documents constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property. It also announces his
adverse claim against the state and all other parties who may be in conflict with
his interest. More importantly, it signifies an unfeigned intention to contribute to
government revenuesan act that strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership.[53]
Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the
concept of owneropen, continuous, peaceful and without interference and
opposition from the government or from any private individualitself makes their
right thereto unquestionably settled and, hence, deserving of protection under the
law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 30, 2006 Decision and the
November 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
80500, areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

3. Republic vs. TAN Properties

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 21 August
2002 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court
of Appeals affirmed in totothe 16 December 1999 Decision[3] of the Regional
Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration
Case No. T-635.

The Antecedent Facts

This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed
by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares,
is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30
a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the
Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to
6794,[4] and in the 18 October 1999 issue of Peoples Journal Taliba,[5] a
newspaper of general circulation in thePhilippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing
was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal
Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the
land.[6] All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices concerned
were notified of the initial hearing.[7]
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing,
there was no oppositor other than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the
Republic of thePhilippines represented by the Director of Lands
(petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order[8] of General
Default against the whole world except as against petitioner.

During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang)

appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang until 29 November
1999 within which to file his written opposition.[9] Carandang failed to file his
written opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an
Order[10] dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of General
Default.
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent
presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondents
Operations Manager and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo
Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga
(Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the
land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was
succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960,
Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his
children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave
Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a
Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonios
children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting).[11] On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the
land to respondent.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of
respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for
registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed
that respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of an

owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession converted the land to private
property.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of
General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd04-019741,
situated
in
Barangay
of
San
Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an
area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N.
Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws with principal office at 19 th Floor, PDCP Bank
Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding
decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.[12]

Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial
court erred in granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that
the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of
possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that the
testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in nature. Considering the area
involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have been presented
to corroborate Evangelistas testimony.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial
courts Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of the possession and
occupation of the land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked there for
three years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors.
On Evangelistas failure to mention the name of his uncle who continuously
worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be
faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle when he testified. The Court of

Appeals also ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of

Fortunatos relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelistas
statement that Fortunato took over the possession and cultivation of the land after
Kabesang Puroys death. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the events
regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land became public knowledge
because San Bartolome was a small community. On the matter of additional
witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law
requiring the corroboration of the sole witness testimony.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he
was only testifying on the fact that he had caused the filing of the application for
registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.
Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision. Petitioner
raises the following grounds in its Memorandum:
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the
grant of title to applicant corporation despite the following:
1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest
had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation in the concept of an owner since 12 June
1945 or earlier; and
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the
subject tract of land.[13]

The Issues
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land
under the Public Land Act.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.
Respondent Failed to Prove
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land forms part of the public
domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer
part of the public domain.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private
dominion presumably belong to the State.[14] The onus to overturn, by
incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.[15]
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by
the
Community
Environment
and
Natural
Resources
Offices
[16]
(CENRO), Batangas City, certified that lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area
of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31
December 1925. The second certification[17] in the form of a memorandum to the
trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest
Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated that the subject area
falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas certified onDec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582.
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
20,[18] dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices
within the DENR.Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues
certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues
certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO
No. 38,[19] dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988.DAO No.
38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of

land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of
the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering
over 50 hectares.[20] In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square
meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area
of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond
the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos.
20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the
Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits
except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for
public infrastructure projects; and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and
lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits
except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and
lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity
declared areas for public infrastructure projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five
hectares for public infrastructure projects.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through

survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications
submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the
certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their
contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value
in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in

Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or
legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as
alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
publication[21] of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of

entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not

fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of
Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer, such as entries made by
the Civil Registrar[22] in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ships
logbook.[23] The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government
office. The certifications are not even records of public documents.[24] The
certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no
probative value.[25] Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not
prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by
their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.[26] Such government
certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second
sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie
evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the
testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated
therein.[27] Here, Torres, a private individual and respondents representative,
identified the certifications but the government officials who issued the
certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the
certifications cannot be given probative value.[28] The contents of the
certifications are hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on the
veracity of the contents of the certifications.[29] Torres did not prepare the
certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not
conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within the area classified
by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.

Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became
alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land
Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it
became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent
show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable
and disposable on31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that the blue
print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds
of the land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature and
classification of the land involved.[30] It is true that the notation by a surveyorgeodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the lands
classification.[31] However, respondent should have at least presented proof that
would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA
Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting
of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved
subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineers certification were faithful
reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the
discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain
why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other
certifications submitted by respondent.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista
and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelistas statement that the
possession of respondents predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous,
peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather
than factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent
failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly,
continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable
and disposable.
We agree with petitioner.

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land
before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three
years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroys
land. The Court of Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelistas
knowledge of Kabesang Puroys possession of the land stemmed not only from
the fact that he had worked thereat but more so that they were practically
neighbors.[32] The Court of Appeals observed:
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, it is not difficult to understand that people in the said
community knows each and everyone. And, because of such familiarity
with each other, news or events regarding the acquisition or disposition
for that matter, of a vast tract of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the
reason why such an event became of public knowledge to them.[33]

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However,

he admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy
and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He
did not also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact,
Evangelistas testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that
Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was
one of Antonios children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelistas
testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of
a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelistas
uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondents predecessors-ininterest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient
corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondents acquisition of
the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their
possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he
obtained his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of
claim of ownership.[34] Respondent did not present any credible explanation why
the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the

Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment
of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas
claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for
registration of the land of the public domain in this case.
We agree with petitioner.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands
of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the
uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area.Citizens of the Philippines may lease not
more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and
development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the
conditions therefor.

The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring

any kind of alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority,[35] the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public
domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private
corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the
alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly
owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of
the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition
against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.[36] The Court explained in Chavez:

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973

Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the
1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands
of the public domain only through lease. x x x x
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the
Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of
the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution
could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire
not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under
the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987
Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms,
placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective
in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in
the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would
inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the
farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands
into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional
limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of
alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban,
individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands
of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more
alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations
as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his
ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of
the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent
the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable
lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to
transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public
domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is
safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent
the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public
lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing
population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public

domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit

arising from the constitutional ban.[37]

In Director of Lands v. IAC,[38] the Court allowed the land registration proceeding
filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with
an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from
members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether the title could
be confirmed in favor of Acme when the proceeding was instituted after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease
not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land was already private
land when Acme acquired it from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired
a registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could
acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals
could acquire not more than 144 hectares.[39]
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed
possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by law created the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. The Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant
from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s)
x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title x x x. No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be
little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether
the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time;
and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize
a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert
the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already effected by operation of law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete.
x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act,

as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or

completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the
basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was
already private property at the time it was acquired from the
Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there
being at the time no prohibition against said corporations holding or
owning private land. x x x.[40] (Emphasis supplied)

Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of

Lands, the land x x x was already private property at the time it was acquired
x x x by Acme. In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from
Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have
been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for
30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from
Porting, the land was not yet private property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of
alienable and disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land when
its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the
land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the
concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad
v. Court of Appeals,[41] the Court declared:
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the
parcels of land in question had already been converted to private
ownership through acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-ininterest of TCMC when the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was
needed was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or
predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the
prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain except through lease (Article XIV,
Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no
longer alienable lands of the public domain but private property.

What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the
corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the
land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory

acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of

possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the
statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of
such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit
corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of
land under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 9176[42] (RA
9176) further amended the Public Land Act[43] and extended the period for the
filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles
to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December
2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are
hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020
within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That
this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not
exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several
periods of time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised
in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be
construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this
Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this
amendatory Act shall be treated as having been filed in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.

Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12

hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a
private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and
disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual
owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares.
Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area
of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for
land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its
predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course,

that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the
land had already become private land by operation of law. In the present case,
respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private
land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case
No. T-635. We DENY the application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.
SO ORDERED.

4. Republic vs. Sese

G.R. No. 185092

June 4, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CORAZON C. SESE and FE C. SESE, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSGJ, assailing
the November 21, 2007 Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, which
dismissed its appeal and affirmed the October 3, 2003 Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Pulilan, Bulacan (MTC), in LRC Case No. 026.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents:
Records show that on September 17, 2002, Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese (respondents) filed
with the MTC an application for original registration of land over a parcel of land with an area of
10, 792 square meters, situated in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of
Bulacan, and more particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, Pulilan Cadastre, under Plan
No. AP-03-004226.
Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a donation inter vivos from
their mother, Resurreccion L. Castro (Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they,
through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject property; and that
the property was not within a reservation.
In support of their application, respondents submitted the following documents, namely: (1) Tax
Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor,

representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; (2) Certificate of
Technical Description which was approved on December 10, 1998 by the Land Management
Service, Region III, of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); (3)
Certification in lieu of lost Surveyors Certificate issued by the same authority; (4) Official Receipt
of payment of real property tax over the subject property; (5) Certification from the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered owners of a property under Tax
Declaration No. 99-19-015-01557 were Corazon Sese and others; and (6) Survey plan of Lot
11247, CAD 345,Pulilan Cadastre, approved by the Regional Technical Director of the Land
Management Service, Region III, of the DENR, stating that the land subject of the survey was
alienable and disposable land, and as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927,
was outside of any civil or military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan, there was a note
stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject property was executed by a certain Luis
Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among others, that: "This survey is inside
the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau
of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was
approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando,
Pampanga, on December 3, 1998.
Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated
October 10, 2002, setting the case for hearing with the corresponding publication. After
compliance with all the requirements of the law regarding publication, mailing and posting,
hearing on the merits of the application followed.
During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon) testified on their claim
over the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents submitted their formal offer of evidence, after which
the evidence offered were admitted by the MTC in the Order, dated July 10, 2003, without
objection from the public prosecutor.
The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.
On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision,3 ordering the registration of the subject
property in the name of respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant application to be sufficient in form and substance and the
applicants having established their right of ownership over the subject parcel of land and are
therefore entitled to registration thereof, the Court thereby grants the petition.
Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land subject matter of this
petition which is more particularly described in Plan Ap-03-004226 Pulilan Cadastre and in their
corresponding technical descriptions in the name of Resureccion Castro.
Upon this decision becoming final, let an Order for the decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The MTC reasoned out that there was evidence to show that the subject lots had been in open,
continuous, adverse, and public possession, either by the applicants themselves or their
predecessor-in-interest. Such possession since time immemorial conferred an effective title on
the applicants, whereby the land ceased to be public and became private property. It had been
the accepted norm that open, adverse and continuous possession for at least 30 years was
sufficient. The MTC noted that evidence showed that the parcel of land involved was not covered
by land patent or a public land application as certified to by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources of Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan. Moreover, it added that the technical
descriptions of Lot 11247 were prepared and secured from the Land Management Sector,

DENR, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, and were verified and found to be correct by
Eriberto Almazan, In-Charge of the Regional Survey Division.
On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-GR. CV
No. 81439. In its brief,4 the OSG presented the following assignment of errors: a) only alienable
lands of the public domain occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a period of at least
thirty (30) years is entitled to confirmation of title; and b) respondents failed to prove specific acts
of possession.
The OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject property was already segregated from
inalienable lands of the public domain. Verily, it was only from the date of declaration of such
lands as alienable and disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of
possession would start.
Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents supposed possession of the subject
property. Save for the testimony of Corazon that "at present, the worker of (her) mother is
occupying the subject property," there was no evidence that respondents were actually
occupying the subject tract of land or that they had introduced improvement thereon.
On November 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision5 affirming the judgment of the MTC ordering
the registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision dated October 3, 2003 of the
MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 026 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The CA reasoned out, among others, that the approved survey plan of the subject property with
an annotation, stating that the subject property was alienable and disposable land, was a public
document, having been issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents were prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the
subject property was indeed alienable and disposable.
With respect to the second issue, the CA was of the view that the doctrine of constructive
possession was applicable. Respondents acquired the subject property through a donation inter
vivos executed on July 22, 1972 from their mother. The latter acquired the said property from the
Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Further, respondent Corazon
testified that a small hut was built on the said land, which was occupied by the worker of her
mother. Moreover, neither the public prosecutor nor any private individual appeared to oppose
the application for registration of the subject property.
The CA also stated that respondents claim of possession over the subject property was
buttressed by the Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe
Sese, minor, representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; the
official receipt of payment of real property tax over the subject property; and the certificate from
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered owner of a property
under Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 were respondents.
The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of property were not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they were good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner.
Hence, the OSG filed this petition.

ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE
APPROVED SURVEY PLAN IDENTIFIED BY ONE OF THE RESPONDENTS IS PROOF THAT
THE SUBJECT LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.
The OSG argues that unless a piece of land is shown to have been classified as alienable and
disposable, it remains part of the inalienable land of the public domain. In the present case, the
CA relied on the approved survey indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable
land. It is well-settled, however, that such notation does not suffice to prove that the land sought
to be registered is alienable and disposable. What respondents should have done was to show
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
fell within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, they should have adduced a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
To bolster its argument, the OSG cites the case of Republic of the Philippine v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,6 where the Court stated that the trial court should not have accepted the
contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing
that the land is alienable and disposable. Such government certifications do not, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of
their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the OSG argues that respondents failed to
present specific acts of ownership to prove open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner. Facts constituting possession must be duly established
by competent evidence. As to the tax declaration adduced by respondents, it cannot be said that
it clearly manifested their adverse claim on the property. If respondents genuinely and
consistently believed their claim of ownership, they should have regularly complied with their real
estate obligations from the start of their supposed occupation.
Position of Respondents
On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA correctly found that the subject land was
alienable and disposable. The approved survey plan of the subject property with an annotation,
stating that the subject property is alienable and disposable land, is a public document, having
been issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein and are sufficient to establish that the subject property is indeed alienable
and disposable.
Respondents cite the case of Republic v. Serrano,7 where the Court stated that a DENR
Regional Technical Directors certification, which was annotated on the subdivision plan
submitted in evidence, constituted substantial compliance with the legal requirement. The DENR
certification enjoyed the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary.

Anent the second assignment of error, respondents contend that the CA correctly applied the
doctrine of constructive possession because they acquired the subject land from their mother,
Resurreccion, through a donation inter vivos, dated July 22, 1972.Their mother, in turn, acquired
the subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale. They claim
that a small hut was built in the said land and was occupied by a worker of her mother. They
countered that although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property which is not in his actual
or constructive custody.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The vital issue to be resolved by the Court is whether respondents are entitled to the registration
of land title under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1529, or pursuant to Section
14(2) of the same statute. Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141,8 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073,9 provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of land title must establish and
prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.10 Compliance with the foregoing
requirements is indispensable for an application for registration of land title, under Section 14(1)
of P.D. No. 1529, to validly prosper. The absence of any one requisite renders the application for
registration substantially defective.
Anent the first requisite, respondents presented evidence to establish the disposable and
alienable character of the subject land through a survey plan, where on its lower portion, a note

stated, among others, as follows: "This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per
Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside
any civil or military reservation." The said plan was approved by the DENR, Land Management
Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando, Pampanga on December 3, 1998. The annotation in
the survey plan, however, fell short of the requirement of the law in proving its disposable and
alienable character.
In Republic v. Espinosa,11 citing Republic v. Sarmiento12 and Menguito v. Republic,13 the Court
reiterated the rule that that a notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property
surveyed was alienable and disposable was not the positive government act that would remove
the property from the inalienable domain and neither was it the evidence accepted as sufficient to
controvert the presumption that the property was inalienable. Thus:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the conversion and
subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyorgeodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B.
L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation to prove that the lot is
alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: This survey plan is inside
Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968, appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State..."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence,
the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E"
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not
constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely
on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question
has been declared alienable." (Citations omitted and emphases supplied)
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable. The applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; or a legislative act or a statute. The

applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.14
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.15 declared that a CENRO certification was insufficient to prove
the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must
also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released
the land in question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1)
a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.16
Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the disposable and alienable
character of the subject land was an annotation by a geodetic engineer in a survey plan.
Although this was certified by the DENR, it clearly falls short of the requirements for original
registration.
With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and occupation of a
parcel of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on
June 12, 1945 or earlier.17 A mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more,
by itself, is not sufficient.18
In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and pleadings of this case will reveal,
the earliest that respondents and their predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and
occupation of the subject land was only in the year 1950,when their mother, Resurreccion,
acquired the subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale.
Evidently, their possession of the subject property commenced roughly five (5) years beyond
June 12, 1945, the reckoning date expressly provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
Thus, their application for registration of land title was legally infirm.
The respondents cannot invoke Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 which provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws. The case of Malabanan v. Republic19 gives a definitive clarity to the applicability
and scope of original registration proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree. In the said case, the Court laid down the following rules:
1avv phi 1

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

xxxx
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the
Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that
the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin
to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired,
one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and, thus, incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.20
Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and
operate against the State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not
sufficient. The applicant must be able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification,
expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the
President that the subject land is no longer retained for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without
an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and,
hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription.21 The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as
property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. It is still insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.22
For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of P.O.
No. 1529. Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed to prove (a) that the property is alienable and
disposable; and (b) that their possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Failing to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the subject land, respondents all the more
cannot apply for registration by way of prescription pursuant to Section 14 (2) which requires
possession for 30 years to acquire or take. Not only did respondents need to prove the
classification of the subject land as alienable and disposable, but also to show that it has been
converted into patrimonial. As to whether respondents were able to prove that their possession
and occupation were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been
rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.
In fine, the Court holds that the ruling of the CA lacks sufficient factual or legal
justification. Hence, the Court is constrained to reverse the assailed CA decision and resolution
and deny the application for registration of land title of respondents.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 21, 2007 Decision and the October 8,
2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Application for Registration of Title of Respondents Corazon C. Sese
and Fe C. Sese in Land Registration Case No. 026 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

5. Republic vs. Serrano

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondent Cayetano L. Serrano (Cayetano) filed on September 21, 1988
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City an application for
registration,[2] docketed as LRC Case No. 270, over a 533-square meter parcel of
commercial land known as Lot 249 ([on Plan Psu-157485] the lot), located in
Poblacion Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte.

Cayetano claimed to have acquired the lot by inheritance from his

deceased parents, Simeon Serrano (Simeon) and Agustina Luz; by virtue of a
Deed of Exchange[3] datedFebruary 10, 1961; and by a private deed of partition
and extrajudicial settlement forged by him and his co-heirs.
Invoking the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree or, in the alternative, the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section
48(b) ofCommonwealth Act No. 141,[4] Cayetano also claimed to have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot under a claim of
ownership before 1917 by himself and through his deceased parentspredecessorsin-interest or for more than 70 years.
The Heirs of Catalino Alaan, represented by Paulita Alaan
(Paulita),[5] intervened and filed an application for registration,[6] their
predecessor-in-interest Catalino Alaan (Catalino) having purchased[7] a 217.45square meter undivided portion of the lot from Cayetano on February 27, 1989
during the pendency of Cayetanos application for registration.
The intervenor-heirs of Catalino, also invoking the provisions
of the Property Registration Decree or, alternatively, of Chapter VIII, Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, prayed that their application for
confirmation of title be considered jointly with that of Cayetanos, and that,
thereafter, original certificates of title be issued in both their names.

Cayetano raised no objection or opposition to the intervenor-Heirs of

Catalinos application for registration.[8]
Cayetanos
brother-attorney-in-fact
Leonardo
Serrano
(Leonardo) represented him at the hearings of the application. During the
pendency of the case, Cayetano passed away[9] and was substituted by his heirs.
At the trial, the following pieces of documentary evidence, inter alia, were
presented to support Cayetanos claim of ownership over the lot: original survey
plan dated January 3, 1957 and certified by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), and Bureau of Lands Director Zoilo
Castrillo,[10] technical description of the lot (Psu-157485),[11] Tax Declarations
for the years 1924 (in the name of Simeon) and 1948-1997 (in the name of either
Simeon [deceased] or Cayetano),[12] official receipts showing real estate tax
payments (from 1948-1997),[13] and Surveyors Certificate No. 157485 dated
January 1957.[14]
As Cayetanos sole witness Leonardo was already physically infirm (hard
of hearing and due to old age) at the time trial commenced, his testimony was
taken by deposition on written interrogatories.[15]
In answer to the interrogatories,[16] Leonardo declared that his family had
lived on the lot since pre-war time, his father Simeon having built a house on it
following his acquisition from Julian Ydulzura in 1923[17] who had purchased it
from Lazaro Raada in 1917;[18] that the construction of a family home in 1923
was reflected in Tax Declaration No. 18,587 in the name of Simeon for the year
1924[19]; that after his fathers death in 1931, his mother and his brother Cayetano
continued to possess the lot in the concept of owners and Cayetano in fact built
his own house and a bodega thereon; that Cayetano religiously paid real estate
taxes from 1951 up to the current year 1997;[20] that the lot was assigned to him
and Cayetano as their share of the inheritance by virtue of a private
document, Kaligonan, dated June 16, 1951,[21] which was executed by all of the
heirs, the contents of which document were subsequently confirmed in a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement dated August 24, 1988;[22] and that on February 10,
1961, Cayetano exchanged a titled lot in Butuan City for his (Leonardos) halfshare in the lot, thereby making Cayetano the sole and exclusive owner thereof.[23]

On the other hand, Paulita, wife of Catalino who represented the heirs of
Catalino, declared that in February 1989, Cayetano sold to her husband a 217.45sq. meter portion of the 533-sq. meter lot subject of the present case as embodied
in a deed of absolute sale;[24] and that Catalino religiously paid real estate taxes
therefor. And she presented an approved Subdivision Plan of Lot 249,[25] Cad866 indicating therein the respective shares of Cayetano and Catalino based on a
survey undertaken by Geodetic Engineer Armando Diola on May 9, 1997.[26]
The above-said Subdivision Plan of the lot, duly approved by Celso V.
Loriega, Jr., Regional Technical Director of the DENR, Lands Management
Services, Region Office XIII for Butuan City, carries the following annotation:
Surveyed in accordance with survey authority no. (X-2A) 77
issued by CENRO.

This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as

per project no. 5 L.C Map No. 550 certified on July 18, 1925.
Lot 249-A, Lot 9090, Lot 249-B, Lot 9091,
CAD
Cabadbaran Cadastre. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

866

Herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by Butuan

provincial prosecutor Ambrosio Gallarde, did not present any evidence to oppose
the applications.
By Decision of November 3, 2003,[27] the RTC granted respondents
applications, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, conformably with existing laws and

jurisprudence, DECISION is hereby rendered:
1. Awarding a portion of Lot 249, Psu-15(5)7485 (now
known as Lot 249-B, Csd-13-000443-D) containing an area of 316
sq. meters to applicant Cayetano L. Serrano, Sr., represented by his
heirs;

2. Awarding a portion of Lot 249, Psu-157485 (now known

as Lot 249-A, Csd-1-000443-D) containing an area of 217 sq.
meters to applicant Catalina M. Alaan, represented by Paulita P.
Alaan;
IT IS SO ORDERED.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of herein petitioner, appealed

the RTC decision before the Court of Appeals on the grounds that respondents
failed to present evidence that the property was alienable or that they possessed
the same in the manner and duration required by the provisions of the Property
Registration Decree.[28]
By Decision of May 13, 2008,[29] the appellate court affirmed the decision
of the RTC in this wise:

xxxx
. . . [F]rom the aforequoted annotation, the OSGs assertion
that there was no competent evidence that would clearly show the
subject land was released as alienable and disposable land is
unavailing. On the contrary, We HOLD that the said annotation
would suffice to comply with the requirement of certification as the
same is competent enough to show that the disputed land or the
parcels of land (now Lot Nos. 249-A, Cad-866 and 249-B Cad-866,
respectively) applied for by the applicants (Cayetano and Alaan)
were already reclassified as alienable and disposable as early as
18 July 1925, under Project No. 5, L.C. Map No. 550.
xxxx
Records show that the subject land was first owned and
possessed by Lazaro Raada and the same was sold to Julian
Ydulzura per untitled document executed on 15 May 1917. On 3
September 1923, Ydulzura sold the subject land for one hundred
fifty pesos (Php150.00) to Simeon M. Serrano per untitled
document, father of Cayetano. Simeon M. Serrano then had the
subject land tax declared in his name in 1924 per Declaration of
Real Property (Urban) No. 18,587. Upon the demise of Simeon
Serrano on 9 January 1931, his heirs, including herein applicant
Cayetano, partitioned by way of an Agreement on 16 June 1951 the
properties of their deceased father. On 24 August 1988, the heirs of
Simeon M. Serrano executed a Deed of Extrajudicial

Settlement confirming further the Agreement executed on 16 June

1954 (sic). It is worth noting that from 1955 up to the filing of
the Application for Registration in 21 June 1988 and until 1997,
Cayetano religiously paid the real estate taxes of the said subject
property. As held in a long line of cases, tax declarations or realty
tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner. Undoubtedly, applicant Cayetano, through his
predecessors-in-interest, having been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation over the subject property
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier
had met the requirements set forth in Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
In fine, We FIND and so HOLD that applicant Cayetano L.
Serrano and intervenor-appellee heirs of Catalino M. Alaan,
have registrable title to the aforesaid subject lands, Lot 249-B, Csd13-000443-D and Lot 249-A, Csd-1-000443-D, respectively, as
they were able to prove that they are qualified and had complied
with the requirements set forth by the provisions ofP.D. No.
1529 which amended Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended and Presidential Decree No. 1073, which to Our mind
merited the allowance of the application for registration of the said
property by the trial court.[30] (italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Hence, the present petition which raises the same grounds as those raised
by petitioner before the appellate court.
The petition fails.
The requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are: that the property is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof; and that
such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.[31]
The Court reiterates the doctrine which more accurately construes Section
14(1) in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Naguit,[32] viz:

. . . the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is

that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application
is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the
State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic
v. Court of Appeals. Therein, the Court noted that to prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. In that case,
the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable
and disposable in 1980, thus theCourt concluded that the
alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact
that therein respondents had occupied the land even before
1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said
property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the
subject property was released and certified as within alienable
and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.[33] (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally

attest to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the
Certification by DENRRegional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as
annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes
substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates
that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area
as early as July 18, 1925.
The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any
evidence to the contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered
by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents

applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are
inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the
benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of
respondents.
Petitioners contention that respondents failed to adduce sufficient proof of
possession and occupation as required under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decreedoes not lie.
Undeniably, respondents and/or their predecessors-in-interest must be
shown to have exercised acts of dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of
ownership sinceJune 12, 1945 or earlier. On what constitutes open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation as required by
statute, Republic v. Alconaba[34] teaches:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of
the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession
is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not
be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Leonardo clearly established the character of the possession of Cayetano

and his predecessors-in-interest over the lot. Thus he declared that the lot was
first owned byLazaro Raada who sold the same to Julian Ydulzura in 1917 who
in turn sold it to his and Cayetanos father Simeon in 1923; that Simeon built a
house thereon after its acquisition, which fact is buttressed by entries in Tax
Declaration No. 18,587 in the name of Simeon for the year 1924 indicating the
existence of a 40-sq. meter residential structure made of nipa and mixed
materials, and of coconut trees planted thereon; and that after Simeons demise in
1931, Cayetano built his own house beside the old nipa house before the war, and

a bodega after the war, which claims find support in Tax Declarations made in
1948-1958.[35]
When pressed during the request for written interrogatories if Leonardo
had any other pre-war tax declarations aside from Tax Declaration No. 18,587,
he explained that all available records may have been destroyed or lost during the
last war but that after the war, the lot was reassessed in his fathers name.[36] The
Court finds Leonardos explanation plausible and there is nothing in the records
that detracts from its probative value.
Finally, the official receipts of realty tax payments[37] religiously made by
Cayetano from 1948 to 1997 further serve as credible indicia that Cayetano, after
his fathers death in 1931, continued to exercise acts of dominion over the lot.
The totality of the evidence thus points to the unbroken chain of acts
exercised by Cayetano to demonstrate his occupation and possession of the land
in the concept of owner, to the exclusion of all others.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

6. Wee vs. Republic

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In land registration cases, the applicant has the burden to show that he or she is
the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered.[1] It is also
important to bear in mind that one who seeks registration of title must prove his or her
claim with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence.[2] In this case, petitioner miserably

failed to show that she is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land sought to
be registered.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[3] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court are the April 28, 2006 Decision[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
subsequent Resolution[5] dated April 3, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 76519. Said Decision
and Resolution reversed and set aside the April 2, 2002 Judgment[6] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 and held that petitioner was not entitled
to the requested registration of title.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
On December 22, 1994, petitioner filed an Application for Registration of
[7]
Title over a 4,870-square meter parcel of land situated in Barangay Puting Kahoy,
Silang, Cavite, designated as Lot No. 8349 (Cadastral Lot. No. 452-D).
In brief, petitioner alleged in her application that she is the owner in fee simple
of the subject property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale[8] dated February 1, 1993
executed by Julian Gonzales in her favor. Petitioner claimed the benefits of the Property
Registration Decree[9] or, should said Decree be inapplicable, the benefits of Chapter
VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936),[10] because she and her predecessor-ininterest have been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse possession of the
land since time immemorial.
On March 15, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Opposition[11] alleging that neither the petitioner nor
her predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 8349 since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The
OSG likewise averred that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts submitted
by the petitioner do not constitute competent or sufficient evidence of a bona
fide acquisition of the subject lot, or of the petitioners open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto. It asserted that Lot No. 8349 is part of the public domain and
consequently prayed for the dismissal of the application for registration.
Petitioner presented the following pieces of documentary evidence before the
trial court:

1)

Deed of Absolute Sale between Josephine Wee and Julian Gonzales

dated February 1, 1993;[12]

2)

Tax Declarations in the name of Julian Gonzales for the years 1957,
1961, 1967, 1980, and 1985;[13]

3)

Tax Declarations in the name of Josephine Wee from 1993

onwards;[14]

4)

Receipts for tax payments made by Josephine Wee from 19931999;[15]

5)

Affidavit of Seller-Transferor executed by Julian Gonzales on

February 10, 1993;[16]

6)

Affidavit of Ownership, Aggregate Land Holding and Non-Tenancy

executed by Julian Gonzales on February 10, 1993;[17]

7)

Affidavit of Non-Tenancy executed by Julian Gonzales on February

10, 1993;[18]
Salaysay executed by Juana Macatangay Gonzales, Erlinda Gonzales
Batingal and Remedios Gonzales Bayan;[19]

8)

9)

Certification dated March 2, 2000 by the Department of Environment

and Natural Resources (DENR) stating that Lot No. 8349 was shown to
be within the Alienable or Disposable Land per Land Classification Map
No. 3013 established under FAO-4-1656 on March 15, 1982;[20]

10)

Survey Plan of Lot No. 8349;[21] and

11)

Surveyors Certificate, Technical Description and Tracing Cloth.[22]

She also presented the testimonies of the following witnesses who were all crossexamined by the Republic through the public prosecutor:
1)

Josephine Wee, who testified that she purchased Lot No. 8349 from
Julian Gonzales through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 1, 1993
and immediately took possession thereof after the sale; that she did not
cultivate it because it is planted with coffee; that she paid for all the real

property taxes subsequent to the sale; that she caused the preparation of a
survey plan; that the property is not part of the public domain or any river
or military reservation; that there are no adverse claimants and no cases
were filed against her after the sale involving said lot and that she is not
doing anything with the property because it is not productive.[23]
2)

Juana Gonzales, the 75-year old widow of Julian Gonzales, who

declared that she and her husband sold Lot No. 8349 to the petitioner and
identified her husbands signature and her own thumbmark. She testified
that she and her late husband had been in possession of Lot No. 8349 prior
to the sale to Josephine Wee; that her husband inherited the property from
his parents a long time ago; that her husband already had the property
when they got married and that she and Julian Gonzales began living
together in 1946. She also identified and affirmed the due execution and
authenticity of her Salaysay, as well as the documents signed by her
husband.[24]

3)

Remedios Gonzales Bayan, the 39-year old daughter of Julian and

Juana Gonzales, who testified that she witnessed the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale between her father whose signature she identified
and the applicant in February 1993. She also identified and affirmed the
due execution and authenticity of her Salaysay.[25]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 2, 2002, the RTC promulgated in favor of the petitioner a
Judgment,[26] pertinent portions of which read:
Culled from the evidence on record, both testimonial and documentary, are
facts which satisfactorily establish applicants ownership in fee simple of the
parcel of land, subject matter of the instant proceedings, to wit: that by means
of an appropriate deed of sale, the applicant has acquired said property by
purchase from Julian Gonzales on February 1, 1993; that the same parcel
was declared for taxation purposes; that all the realty taxes due thereon have
been duly paid. Likewise, this Court could well-discern from the survey plan
covering the same property and other documents presented, more
particularly the tracing cloth plan which was presented as additional
evidence in support of the application, that the land sought to be registered
is agricultural and not within any forest zone or the public domain; that the
land is not covered by any public land application/patent, and that there is no

other adverse claimant thereof; and further, that tacking her predecessors-ininterests possession to applicants, the latter appears to be in continuous and
public possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years.
On the basis of the foregoing facts and considering that applicant is a Filipino
citizen not otherwise disqualified from owning real property, this Court finds
that she has satisfied all the conditions essential to the grant of her application
pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Law, as amended.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration
and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Ap-04-010262, Lot 8349 and containing an area of Four Thousand Eight
Hundred Seventy (4,870) Square Meters as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other
proofs adduced in the name of JOSEPHINE WEE, who is of legal age,
single and with residence at 1345 Claro M. Recto Avenue, Sta, Cruz, Manila.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree
of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Unsatisfied, the Republic, through the OSG, filed its Notice of Appeal on April
26, 2002, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application for registration
considering that petitioner failed to comply with all the legal requirements for judicial
confirmation of her alleged title. In particular, the OSG claimed that Lot No. 8349 was
classified as alienable and disposable land only on March 15, 1982, as per Certification
issued by the DENR. Thus, petitioner and her predecessor-in-interest could not have
been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The OSG also pointed
out that the tax declarations presented by petitioner are fairly recent and do not show
petitioner and her predecessor-in-interests nature of possession.Furthermore, the
original tracing cloth plan was not presented in evidence.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA reversed the RTC Judgment. It held that petitioner failed to prove that
she and her predecessor-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the
subject lot under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. Thus:

In granting the application for registration of title, the court a quo merely
relied on the deed of sale executed by Julian Gonzales, in favor of applicantappellee on February 1, 1993, the tax declarations and tax receipts. It is
interesting to note that Juana Gonzales, widow of Julian Gonzales, after
identifying the deed of sale executed by her deceased husband in favor of
applicant-appellee, merely stated that the lot subject thereof was inherited by
Julian from his parents a long time ago and that Julian was in possession of
the lot since 1946 when they started living together. For her part, applicantappellee testified that she immediately took possession of the subject lot,
which was planted with coffee, after acquiring the same and that she is not
doing anything on the lot because it is not productive. As pointed out by the
Republic, applicant-appellee and Juana Gonzales failed to specify what acts
of development, cultivation, and maintenance were done by them on the
subject lot. x x x
xxxx
In the case at bar, applicant-appellee merely claimed that the subject lot is
planted with coffee. However, no evidence was presented by her as to who
planted the coffee trees thereon. In fact, applicant-appellee admitted that she
is not doing anything on the subject lot because it is not productive, thereby
implying that she is not taking care of the coffee trees thereon. Moreover, tax
declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership but
are merely indicia of a claim of ownership, aside from the fact that the same
are of recent vintage.[27]

Hence, this petition.

Issues
Petitioners arguments
1) The testimony of Juana Gonzales proves that petitioners predecessor-in-interest,
Julian Gonzales, occupied Lot No. 8349 even prior to 1946;
2) The fact that the property is planted with coffee, a fruit bearing tree, reveals that the
lot is planted, cultivated and cared for. Thus, there was not only effective and
active possession and occupation but actual cultivation and tending of the coffee
plantation; and

3) The fact that the land was declared for tax purposes as early as 1957 shows that the
land was actively possessed and occupied by petitioner and her predecessor-ininterest.
Respondents arguments:
1)

Since Lot No. 8349 became part of the alienable and disposable land only
on March 15, 1982, petitioner could not have been considered as having been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of subject
property under a bona fide claim of ownership; and

2)

There is no proof that petitioner or Julian Gonzales undertook any clear act
of dominion or ownership over Lot No. 8349, since there are no structures,
improvements, or plantings on the property.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner failed to prove open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject property.

In Director, Land Management Bureau v. Court of Appeals,[28] we explained

that
x x x The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept
of owner," by which characteristics private respondent describes his
possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring
evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private
respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence
that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and duration
required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not amount to
preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.
Here, we find that petitioners possession of the lot has not been of the character
and length of time required by law. The relevant provision of the Property Registration
Decree relied upon by petitioner reads

SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws. x x x

Unfortunately, petitioner failed to prove that she and her predecessor-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
First, there is nothing in the records which would substantiate her claim that
Julian Gonzales was in possession of Lot No. 8349 since 1945, other than the bare
allegations of Juana Gonzales.[29] Certainly, these unsubstantiated statements do not
meet the required quantum of evidence in land registration cases. In fact, contrary to her
testimony that her late husband inherited the property from his parents a long time ago,
or even prior to 1945, the earliest tax declaration that was presented in this case is one
declared by Julian Gonzales only in 1957 long after June 1945.
It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the years
1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more
than 45 years (1945-1993). This type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged
ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation. In any event, in the absence of other competent evidence, tax declarations
do not conclusively establish either possession or declarants right to registration of
title.[30]
Petitioner failed to prove possession in
the concept of an owner.
Second, and more importantly, we agree with the CA that petitioner was unable
to demonstrate that the alleged possession was in the concept of an owner, since she
could not point to any acts of occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance over
the property. Petitioner claims that because the property is planted with coffee, a fruitbearing tree, it automatically follows that the lot is cultivated, showing actual possession
and occupation. However, petitioner failed to explain who planted the coffee, whether

these plants are maintained or harvested or if any other acts were undertaken by
petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest to cultivate the property.
Even if we were to assume that the coffee was planted by petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, mere casual cultivation of the land does not amount to exclusive
and notorious possession that would give rise to ownership.[31] The presence of an
unspecified number of coffee plants, without proof that petitioner or her predecessorin-interest actually and deliberately cultivated them is not sufficient to support a claim
of title. In fact, the five tax declarations in the name of Julian Gonzales described the lot
as unirrigated riceland. No improvements or plantings were declared or noted in any of
these tax declarations. It was only in petitioners 1993 tax declaration that the land was
described as planted with coffee. We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the
mere existence of an unspecified number of coffee plants, sans any evidence as to who
planted them, when they were planted, whether cultivation or harvesting was made or
what other acts of occupation and ownership were undertaken, is not sufficient to
demonstrate petitioners right to the registration of title in her favor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals April 28, 2006
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 76519 and its Resolution dated April 3, 2007 denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration are both AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.