Legal Ethics

Mercado vs. Vitriolo

Rosa Mercado is seeking for the disbarment of Atty. Julito Vitriolo as he
allegedly maliciously filed a criminal case for falsification of public documents
against her thereby violating the attorney-client privilege. It appears that
Vitriolo filed a case against complainant as she apparently made false entries
in the certificate of live birth of her children. More specifically she allegedly
indicated that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in fact
her real husband is Ruben Mercado. Mercado claims that by filing the
complaint the attorney-client privilege has been violated. Mercado filed a
case for Vitriolos disbarment.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication between attorney-client when he filed the criminal case for
falsification.
Held: No. The evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants
allegations. Complainant did not even specify the alleged communication
disclosed by the respondents. All her claims were couched in general terms
and lacked specificity. Indeed the complaint failed to attend the hearings at
the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific
confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her
consent, it would be difficult if not impossible to determine if there was any
violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such information is a
crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney
client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed
upon the party asserting the privilege.

Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocentes.
The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses
Genito, owners of an apartment complex when the Genito Apartments were
placed under sequestration by the PCGG. They represented the spouses
Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases
against non-paying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments. Solatans
sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. She left the apartment to
Solatan and other members of her family. A complaint for ejectment for nonpayment of rentals was filed against her and a decision was rendered in a
judgment by default ordering her to vacate the premises. Solatan was
occupying said apartment when he learned of the judgment. He informed
Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange execution of a new lease contract by
virtue of which he would be the new lessee of the apartment. Atty. Inocentes
referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases
against tenants of the Genito Apartments. During the meeting with Atty.
Camano, a verbal agreement was made in which complainant agreed to pay
the entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded attorneys fees and
costs of suit. Complainant issued a check in the name of Atty. Camano
representing half of the attorneys fees. Complainant failed to make any other
payment. The sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano enforced the writ of
execution and levied the properties found in the subject apartment.
Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to release the levied
properties and allow complainant to remain at the apartment. Acting on Atty.
Camanos advice, complainant presented an affidavit of ownership to the
sheriff who released the levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned
to the complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito
Apartments where he was temporarily staying. Complainant filed the instant
administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Camano and Atty. Inocentes.
The IBP Board of Governors resolved to suspend Atty. Camano from the
practice of law for 1 year and to reprimand Atty. Inocentes for exercising
command responsibility.

Solatan vs. Inocentes

An attorney has no power to act as counsel or legal representative for a
person without being retained to establish the professional relation, it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney are sought and
received in any manner pertinent to his profession
An attorney giving advice to a party with an interest conflicting with that of his
client resulting in detriment to the latter may be held guilty of disloyalty.
Where the statement of a lawyer to his clients adversary is in consonance
with such lawyers foremost duty to uphold the law as an officer of the court,
that statement in such a context should not be construed as giving advice in
conflict against the interests of his client.

Issue: 1) Whether or not Atty. Camano violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility
2) Whether or not Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Held: All lawyers must observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with
their clients. An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative
for a person without being retained. No employment relation was offered or
accepted in the instant case.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires all lawyers to
observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their clients.
Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest
conflicting with that of his client may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, the

advice given by Atty. Camano in the context where the complainant was the
rightful owner of the incorrectly levied properties was in consonance with his
duty as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as being in conflict
with the interest of the spouses Genito as they have no interest over the
properties. The act of informing complainant that his properties would be
returned upon showing proof of his ownership may hint at infidelity to his
clients but lacks the essence of double-dealing and betrayal.
2. Atty. Inocentes failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters
under the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. As name
practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility
to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in
conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Inocentes
received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latters dealings with
complainant. This is the linchpin of his supervisory capacity over Atty.
Camano and liability by virtue thereof. Partners and practitioners who hold
supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in
apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by
persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting
necessary efforts to foreclose violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by persons under their charge.
PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Cojuangco for the
anomalies in the COCO LEVY FUNDS. PCGG wants petitioners divulge that
Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm, as well as other information
regarding Cojuangco.
Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name?
Held: NO. As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be
shrouded in mystery. The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client, if:
1. The court has a right to know that the client whose privileged
information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
2. The privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship
has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach
until there is a client.
3. The privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as
a general rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know
who his opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against
unknown forces, except when:
1. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that

revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is
privileged.
3. Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys
client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would
furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.
That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability
exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in
the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.
Alan Paguia vs. Office of the President
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this
original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyos nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United
Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157),
the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent
Davides age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies
him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of
RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees
of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that
Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or noncareer; thus, respondent Davides entry into the DFA ranks discriminates
against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has lack of capacity to sue and
mootness.
Held: An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains.
Petitioners suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing
"any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Certainly, preparing a
petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and
employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23
of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed
for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

Marcoleta vs. Borra

Atty. Marcoleta filed a complaint for disbarment against Comelec
Commissioners Atty. Borra and Atty. Brawner for violating Canons 1 (1.01,
1.02 and 1.03) and 3 (3.01, 3.02, 3.05 and 3.06) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct; Canons 4, 5, 6 and 17 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Additionally,
complainant charges respondents of violating Republic Act No. 6713 or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
During the 2007 National and Local Elections, the warring factions of
complainant and Diogenes S. Osabel (Osabel) each filed a separate list of
nominees for the party-list group Alagad. With Alagad winning a seat in the
House of Representatives, the two protagonists contested the right to
represent the party. By Omnibus Resolution of July 18, 2007, the dispute was
resolved by the Comelecs First Division in favor of Osabel. Commissioner
Borra wrote the ponencia while Commissioner Brawner concurred. The
dispute was elevated to the Comelec En Banc which, by Resolution of
November 6, 2007, reversed the First Division Resolution and reinstated the
certificate of nomination of complainants group. For failing to muster the
required majority voting, however, the Comelec ordered the re-hearing of the
controversy. Notwithstanding the conduct of a re-hearing, the necessary
majority vote could not still be obtained. The Comelecs First Divisions
Omnibus Resolution was eventually affirmed.
Respondent Brawner, in his Answer dated April 2, 2008, asserted in the main
that the remedy of complainant is not to file a complaint for disbarment, but
to file an appeal before [the Supreme Court] via [p]etition for [c]ertiorari, and
that being members of a constitutional body enjoying presumption
of regularity in the performance of their functions, he and co-respondent
Borra are supposed to be insulated from a disbarment complaint for being
impeachable officers.
In his Comment, respondent Borra contended that the Code of Judicial
Conduct and Canons of Judicial Ethics could be made to apply to him and
his co respondent, they not being members of the judiciary; and that since
they performed quasi-judicial functions as well as administrative duties, they
were bound by the Comelecs own set of internal rules and procedure over
and above a Code of Conduct that prescribed the norms and standards of
behavior to be observed by the officials and employees of the Comelec, a
constitutional body.
Respondent Borra further contended that present complaint was premature
as the validity and legality of the resolutions are still subject to review; and
that the complaint was meant to harass [him] and punish him for exercising
his judgment on the case filed before him. The Court took notice that
respondent Borra had retired from the Comelec on February 2, 2008 while

respondent Brawner passed away on May 29, 2008. As regards respondent

Brawner then, the present case was already moot.
Issue: Whether or not complaint for disbarment is the proper remedy and not
appeal.
Held: An impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be
disbarred without first being impeached.
At the outset, the Court, guided by its pronouncements in previous cases,
has laid down the rule that an impeachable officer who is a member of the
Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached. As an impeachable
officer who is at the same time a member of the Bar, respondent Borra must
first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment
before he may be held to answer administratively for his supposed errant
resolutions and actions.
The Court thus found respondent Borras contention that the grounds bases
of the disbarment complaint, fastened on supposed errors of judgment or
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts, were proper for an
appeal, hence, complainants remedy was judicial, not administrative.
The Court stated that the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary applied only to courts of law, of which the Comelec was not, hence,
sanctions pertaining to violations thereof were made exclusively applicable to
judges and justices in the judiciary, not to quasi-judicial officers like the
Comelec chairman and members, who have their own codes of conduct to
steer them. Even if the Court were to gauge the assailed actions of
respondent Borra under the Code of Professional Responsibility, no specific
incidents and sufficient evidence can be gathered to show that respondent
did engage in dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in his capacity as a
lawyer. It bears reiteration that the acts particularized in the complaint pertain
to respondent Borras duties as a Comelec commissioner.
As for the release of retirement benefits to respondent Borra, there was
nothing irregular therewith, the same being in line with Memorandum Circular
No. 10 (series of 1995) of the Office of the Ombudsman reading:
x x x a person retiring from the government service, whether optional or
compulsory, needs only to present a certification from this Office whether or not he
has a pending criminal or administrative case with it. In the event the certification
presented states that the prospective retiree has a pending case, the responsibility of
determining whether to release his retirement benefits, as well as the imposition of
necessary safeguards to ensure restitution thereof in the event the retiree is found
guilty, rests upon and shall be left to the sound discretion of the head of the
department, office or agency concerned.

Judge Cervantes vs. Atty. Sabio

Judge Alden V. Cervantes (complainant) was the presiding judge of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna until his optional retirement on November 23,
2005. Some of the cases lodged in his sala were ejectment cases filed by ExtraOrdinary Development Corporation (EDC) against the clients of Atty. Jude Josue L.
Sabio (respondent). It appears that respondent had filed motions for inhibition of
complainant "on the basis of the fact that EDC gave him a house and lot putting into
serious doubt his impartiality, independence and integrity." The motions were denied.
After the retirement of complainant, respondent, by Affidavit-Complaint dated April 6,
2006, sought the investigation of complainant for bribery.
In support of the charge, respondent submitted a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March
6, 2006 of Edwin P. Cardeo, a utility worker in the MTC of Cabuyao, stating that,
inter alia, orders and decisions of complainant were not generated from the typewriter
of the court but from a computer which the court did not have, it having acquired one
only on May 2, 2005; that there had been many times that a certain Alex of EDC
would go to the court bearing certain papers for the signature of complainant; that he
came to learn that a consideration of P500.00 would be given for every order or
decision released by complainant in favor of EDC; and that he also came to know that
attempts at postponing the hearings of the complaints filed by EDC were thwarted by
complainant as he wanted to expedite the disposition thereof.
By Resolution of August 30, 2006, this Court, after noting the July 20, 2006
Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) relative to respondents
complaint against complainant, approved the recommendation of the OCA to dismiss
the complaint for lack of merit, "the complaint being unsubstantiated and motivated by
plain unfounded suspicion, and for having been filed after the effectivity of his optional
retirement" (underscoring supplied).
Thus, spawned the present verified December 18, 1996 letter-complaint of
complainant against respondent, for disbarment. The complaint was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
From the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
Randall C. Tabayoyong, it is gathered that despite the January 12, 2007 Order for
respondent to file an answer to the complaint, he failed to do so, prompting the
Commissioner to declare him in default. It is further gathered that after the conduct by
the Investigating Commissioner of a mandatory conference on May 25, 2007, the
parties were ordered to file their respective position papers. In compliance with the
Order, complainant submitted his verified position paper. Respondent did not.
Defined as issues before the IBP were:
(1) Whether . . . the complaint filed by respondent against the complainant
before the Office of the Court Administrator in Admin Matter OCA IPI No. 06-1842MTJ was malicious, false and untruthful.
(2) If in the affirmative, whether . . . respondent is guilty under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
On the first issue, the IBP Commissioner did not find respondents complaint against
herein complainant false and untruthful, it noting that respondents complaint was
dismissed by this Court due to insufficiency of evidence which, to the IBP, merely
shows a "failure on the part of respondent to prove his allegations" against
complainant. Noting, however, this Courts August 30, 2006 Resolution finding

respondents complaint "unsubstantiated and motivated by plain, unfounded"

suspicion, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent "knowingly
instituted not only a groundless suit against herein complainant, but also a suit based
simply on his bare suspicion and speculation." (underscoring supplied)
On the second issue, the IBP found that by filing the groundless bribery charge
against complainant, respondent violated the proscription of the Code of Professional
Responsibility against "wittingly or willingly promot[ing] or su[ing] any groundless suit"
including baseless administrative complaints against judges and other court officers
and employees.
The Investigating Commissioner thus concluded that while the evidence on record is
sufficient to show that the allegations in respondents affidavit-complaint against
herein complainant were false, the evidence nonetheless show[s] that respondent
had knowingly and maliciously instituted a groundless suit, based simply on his
unfounded suspicions against complainant; (Underscoring supplied) and that he
violated Canons 10, 11, & 12 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility under his oath of office.
He accordingly recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P5,000, with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Notice of Resolution, informs that on
November 22, 2007, it adopted the following Resolution adopting and approving with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents
violation of Canons 10, 11 and 12 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional
responsibility for filing a groundless suit against complainant, Atty. Jude Sabio is
hereby REPRIMANDED with Stern Warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely. (Emphasis in the original)
The Court finds the action taken by the IBP Board of Governors well taken.
Respondent ought to be aware that if a court official or employee or a lawyer is to be
disciplined, the evidence against him should be substantial, competent and derived
from direct knowledge, not on mere allegations, conjectures, suppositions, or on the
basis of hearsay.
No doubt, it is this Courts duty to investigate the truth behind charges against judges
and lawyers. But it is also its duty to shield them from unfounded suits which are
intended to, among other things, harass them.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio, is FINED in the amount of Five
Thousand (P5,000) Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
questioned act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.