SISON, AFP, future K.

:
The Topic is Bail; Nature and Definition; persons covered or
required to post bail
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v CONRADO M. VASQUEZ,
Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special
Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MANILA
G.R. Nos. 99289-90 |January 27, 1993|EN BANC
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
An information was filed against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e),
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
An order of arrest was issued in said case against herein
petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the
Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused
fixed at P15,000.00. 1
On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte
Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in
Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," 2 which
pertinently states in part:
o 4. The accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks
leave of this Honorable Court that she be considered
as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial
and other proceedings and further seeks leave of this
Honorable Court that the recommended bail bond of
P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be accepted.
Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond
for her provisional liberty without need for her
physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest,
unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her
physical appearance before said court. Petitioner filed a
cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the
other legal fees.
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the
Sandiganbayan a manifestation "that accused Miriam
Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor
of the Old NAWASA.
In a motion, petitioner asked that her cash bond be
cancelled and that she be allowed provisional liberty
upon a recognizance. She contended that for her to

continue remaining under bail bond may imply to

other people that she has intentions of fleeing, an
intention she would like to prove as baseless.
Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the
Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against
petitioner which reads as follows:
Considering the information in media to the effect that
accused Santiago intends to leave the country soon for an
extended stay abroad for study purposes, considering the
recent decision of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition
promulgated on January 13, 1992, although the same is still
subject of a Motion for Reconsideration from the accused,
considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned,
nor that she has not (sic) even posted bail the same having
been by reason of her earlier claim of being seriously
indisposed, all of which were overtaken by a restraining
order issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and
No. 99290 dated May 24, 1991, the accused is ordered
not to leave the country and the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation is ordered not to allow the
departure of the accused unless authorized from (sic) this
Court. 10
The hold departure order was issued by reason of the
announcement made by petitioner, which was widely
publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would
be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship
supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University. Petitioner likewise
disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino communities
in the United States in line with her crusade against election
fraud and other aspects of graft and corruption.

ISSUE: whether there was a valid posting of bail bond.

HELD and RATIO:
YES.
Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired
jurisdiction over her person considering that she has neither been
arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact
that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally
appeared before said court.
-We reject her thesis for being factually and legally
untenable.

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the

court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished
either by his pleading to the merits or by filing bail. On the
matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional
liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before
custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving
for abroad to pursue further studies, there is no sufficient
justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel;
and that under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only when
so required in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as may be provided by law.
Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her
bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and
processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving
the country during the pendency of the case. This was the ruling
we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., to the
effect that:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted
to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of
a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the
security required and given for the release of a person who
is in custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in

which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail

bond or recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of
the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time,
to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he
were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance
of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the
law may require of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at
all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction on his right to travel.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be
construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to
use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in
criminal cases pending before them. When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer
(Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach
of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his
right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance
with law.
(BALI DINISCUSS LANG KUNG ANO ANG BAIL ETC ETC)