ARISTOTLE ON LOGIC, LANGUAGE

AND SCIENCE

Edited by
Nikolaos Avgelis
Flhmon Peomchs
A/'isZ0Z!e U/1z'ver.sity

of T/zessa/0rzz'/ci

Offprint

SAKKOULAS

PUBLICATIONS
TIl'ESSA,I_.ONII(l
1998

ARGUING FROM A DEFINITION

ARISTOTLE ON TRUTH AND
THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE

W.

CAVINI

At the very beginning of Metaphysics F 7, in 7 Bekker lines (and 77 Greek

words), Aristotle is able to give us
(a) a statement of the Principle of Excluded Middle (PEM),
(b) a celebrated semantic denition of truth and falsity,
and
c)
an argument for the principle from the denition, the rst of seven
arguments in support of PEM to be found in the chapter.

The price paid for this impressive tour de force is the elusiveness of (c), a
piece of both textual intricacy and Aristotelian obscura brevitas. Ancient Greek
commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Asclepius of Tralles in particular, already suggested two different readings of the text and consequently two
divergent understanding of the texts line of argument; and the same holds
true, to the best of my knowledge, for all modern editors and commentators,
except the most recent ones, Barbara Cassin and Michel Narcy (1989), who

offer a third, radically different, approach.

In this paper, I would like to reopen discussion of this elusive argument
by suggesting a new interpretation of it, saving the traditional reading and
punctuation of the text, but also developing an intuition to be found in the
most recent approach. In particular, I try to explain the contextual meaning of
Aristotles semantic denition of truth and falsity, namely its being both a
semantic denition and the main premiss of a semantic argument aiming to
refute the possibility of a middle for contradictory pairs of affirmations and
negations; a premiss whose immediate consequence is the principle according
to which, of every contradictory pair of affirmation and negation, necessarily
one member is true and the other false.
1.

In both Ross and Jeagers edition, the Greek text of our passage runs

this way:
1011 b 23

14/U01 ,u17v

065:} psrafb oivrztpoiaswg vxaraz ezi/at

24 0136:-fv, cll 0cv0iym7 1? gooivaz 1? moqaoivaz 5v K016? vg tzoziv.

25 517/iov 52' rrpcbrov ,us'v pzaayvozg I0 0cl176g Kai i//8550;.
26 to ,uv yelp /lyszv 10' 5v #17 afvaz if to mi 6v 85/Oil gusti-

ti

W. Cavini

to 5:-E 10' 5v efvaz Kai rd /11) 6v pr) efiraz 6r/1176g,

Kai 6 /lycov sziaz 1? ,u 6:/127626021 1? 1//sasmr dz/ll
29 0512 to 5v /lysraz p saz 2? sfilaz 051$ rd mi 5v.
27

50g,

03012

28

The opening sentence states two things, both in modal terms, one negative, the other afrmative:
(aa) But, on the other hand, it is not even possible that there should be
anything in the middle of a contradictory pair,
(ab) but it is necessary either to afrm or to negate any one thing of one

thing.
Is PEM given by (aa), (ab), or both? Aristotles standards formulation of
the principle is actually a more concise variant of (ab), namely either adv (pdvaz
1? ucoqooivaz or miv civayrcazbv
rpdvaz 1? cimorpoivaz, with miv instead of v
rc0c0 vo'g 6rzo6v. Compare for example the following texts:

Tl

] rd: lcozvoi, ozbv 0"n nav

rpdval

I7

airroqovaz (An. Post.

ll, 77a

(An.P0st.

32, 88a

30)

T2

lyco d Kozvdzg ozbv to miv (pval

17

airrozpoivaz

37-bl)

(lya) d znodezrcrzrcricg rdzg lcozvoig 50'fag f cbv oinavrsg dszlcvzovazv)

o"rz rrdv dvaylcafov 1? (poivaz
cvroqpoivaz (Met. B 3, 996b 27-29)?

ozbv

sion

So in the standard formulation of the principle there is no explicit excluof a middle3, but (ab) is clearly logically equivalent to (aa)4, i.e.
U*tP7* x(Pxv1Px)<->1O3P3x(| Px/\|Px).

The same connection is to be found in Met. I 4, 1055b 8-10:

l. Ev Kat? v0'g: <<in alcuni casi designa una rclazione generica applicabile tanto
allaffermazione quanto alla negazione (Mignucci 1975: 32 ad An. Post. A 2, 72a 7-14): cf.
De Int. 8, 18a 12-13; SE 30, l81b 23-24; An.Pr. A 1, 24a l7.
2. Cf. also Gal. meth. med.

X 37.2-3 K.: rcaird nspz'1ravr0'g dvayrcafov

1?

1c0zm(p0imcszv

1?

&1r0(p0imcezv.

3. Der Ausdruck <<tertium non datur ist eigentlich ein Unsinn. (Von einem Dritten
ist eben in p U~p nicth die Redel) (L. Wittgenstein 1961: 57 [06.09.l915]). Aristotles
predicative version of PEM has to be distinguished from the standard sentential law of
excluded middle: *7 p (p v .p), which is never attested (pace Kirwan 1971: 117 and Mignuc-

ci 1975: 238) in Aristotle.

4.

Mignucci 1975: 237-38.

Arguing from a denition

T4

oivrupdoecog ,uv mix 5011 perafu, arepascog

ydp

mix lirov rrdv, lbov 5

dvzaov

013

5.2

rzvog 'arzv- rov pv

ndv,

where an example of Aristotles PEM is given to justify (yp) the exclusion of a middle for contradictory pairs, namely

r/x(Pxv|Px)>3x(\Px/\||Px).

What our text is actually designed to argue for in what follows is (aa), the
impossibility of a middle for contradictory pairs, namely of a joint denial of
both members of contradictory pairs of afrmations and negations, and not
(ab), the necessity of afrmining or negating the same predicate of the same
subject. But arguing for (aa) is, by the same token, tantamount to arguing for
(ab); so that the traditional interpretation of F 7 (cf., Ross title Law of excluded middle proved) has to be retained.
2. The rst argument for (aa) is then a semantic one, an argument from the
meaning of true and false, i.e. from the very denition of truth and falsity5:

b25

dlov d rrpcbrov pv

pzaoguvozg "ci to zit/l17t9g

Kai 1//2660;.

It is clear<that (aa)> rst of all if we dene what is the true and the false.
Among the interpreters, ancient and modern, there is no consensus on
how to understand argument (c):
(.1)

(2)
(3)

rd ,us'v ydzp ls)/szv to 5v ,u1j szilaz to ,u1j 5v

sfvaz Kai 10' /uj 5v /117 sziiaz 6z).176e'g,

sziwzz

1//650;

to 55 to 5v

(Ems mi 6 lycov sfvaz mi 0:/1176813081 1//eziaerar

dz/ll 0516 10' 6v /lysraz ,u1j ezilaz 1? eziraz 0516 10' ,u1j 5v.

5. A semantic argument, i.e. an argument from the meaning of a term or the denition
of a concept, is what Aristotle repeatedly recommends in arguing for the syllogistic principles of non-contradiction (PNC) and excluded middle (PEM) in Met. F. Cf. in particular

Met. F 4, 1006a18-b34;7, 1012a 21-24; 8, 1012b 5-8; see also F 7,1012a 3 and 11. The move
of arguing from a denition is a dialectical one; cf. Top. B 4, 111b 12-16; Primavesi 1996:
157-60.
6. 517/10v [...] 6pza0guv0zg.' cf. Rhet. B 7, 1385a 17 (pzaapvozg 1r'7v Xdpzv dlov 501011);
An.P0sl. A 1, 71a 2-3 (qoavspov J 10610 Bswpomv 51:1 naacbv): the true and <the> false:
Top. A 2, 123a 15-17 (511 sf vdxeraz dnolznszv to azj0r7,uv0v yvog rj rrjv dzaqoopoiv, ofov
tuvxrjv To zczvefadaz 1? dav 10' az).1]0g Kain//sdog); Met. B 2, 997a 12-15 (1ca00',100 ydp ad/lzowa
1caz'1rvrwv 0tp;(a1'r0'z dfzcpara arzv, ez"1 5011' ,u1j 106 (pl/l0a0'(p0v, rivog Ema: nspi ouircbv
dt/100 to Hswpaaz 16 013.1706; Kai 1;/s66og); the false or the true: Met. F 8, 1012b 7-8 (55

pzapo 61a/lsrctov /lavtag

11'

cmuaivsz rd I//6550;

1?

16 clng).

W. Cavini

(1)

(2)
(3)

For to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is

false, while <to say> of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is
not, is true;
so that also he who says that it is or that it is not will speak truly of
falsely;
but neither of what is it is said that it is not or that it is, nor of what
is not.

There are clearly three steps:

(1)
(2)
and
(3)

an articulated denition

of falsity and truth in terms of n0n-con-

tradictory pairs of affirmations and negations;

an immediate consequence of the denition;
a

nal assertion introduced by

M/10?.

As for the modern editors, Bekker, Schwegler and Tredennick put a comma between (1) and (2), and a full stop between (2) and (3); Bonitz, Christ,
Ross and Jaeger also put a comma between (1) and (2), but an ano stigme (a
semi-colon) between (2) and (3):
(ca)

(1), come (2). (Mid (3)

(1), ohms (2); rial/10': (3)

Besides, they all read (3) as (3a), i.e. with lyaraz following Ab, not /lyez
following EJ. Cassin and Narcy, on the contrary, put an ano stigme (a semi-

colon) between (1) and (2), and a comma between (2) and (3):
(cb)

(l);

05012

(2), /lid (3)

and read (3) as (3b), i.e. with /lysz (having the same subject, 0' /Lywv as (2))
following, as they normally do, EJ.
The main difference between (ca) and (cb) is that according to the former
(the interpretatio vulgata) a conclusion (4) has to be supplied:

(ca)

(1), chars (2); dike: (3a); <therefore (4)>

while according to Cassin and Narcy (the Parisienses for short) the argument is a self-contained one, with a protasis, (1), and an apodosis, (2)+(3),
7. Cf. also the
8.

Medieval Translatio Anonyma Media: dicitur.

Cf. also AIP AscP and Moerbekes Latin translation.

9. As Schwegler (1847:

III

182) already observed, the argument is sehr liickenhafte.

Arguing from a denition

introduced by a conclusive (bare governing both (2) and (3), and articulated by
a non-adversative but conditional 0:/l/lot:
(cb)

(1),

a")0'r.<-.:

(2), ti condition que (provided that) (3b).

According to the Parisienses, the traditional punctuation implique que,

la dmonstration tant acheve ce point [sc. b 28], les derniers mots de la phrase
(dc/ll 0618... rd ,u17 6v) ajoutent une rfutation de ceux que croient pouvoir produire un intermdiaire de la contradiction (p. 261). On the contrary, the proof
is just a proof and not an elenctic one or a proof followed by a refutation.
But, in its turn, the interpretatio vulgata divides into two interpretations
of the argument as for the import of step (2) in its understanding, correlative to
two different readings of (2) in the textual tradition. According to one reading
(Alexander [in Met. 328.23-26 H.] followed by Bonitz [l849: 212]) step (2) has
to be read as
1

(2a)

03016

Kai 6 /lycov roro

szilaz

1)

tn]

0:/117086081

1?

l//26081011

with epanalectic 106101) referring back to what is in the middle of a contradictory pair (cf. (aa)) and 6 /lycov identied with the opponent of PEM.
The argument then runs this way:
(caa)

(l),

(bars (2a);

<5:/lid:

(3a); <therefore not (2a)>

namely,

if (1), then also the opponent of PEM in saying that the middle is or is not
will speak truly or falsely (which in addition gives more force to also
[Kirwan 1971: 117]); but it is not said <by him> of what is or of what is
not that it is or is not, <but of what neither is nor is not; therefore the
opponent is not speaking either truly or falsely, but simply saying nothing
at all>.

According to the other main reading (Asclepius [in Met. 294.4-5 H.] and
EJ followed by Ross [l953: I 284] and Kirwan [l97l: 117]), step (2) has to be
read as

(2b)
10.
1?

Z0012 Kat 6 /ls)/cov

all/at

1?

mi 01217686081

1?

z//societal

Or rcszito according to the variant reading: 072012 rcezyo /lywv efiraz 1? #17 dc/117636021
A and followed by the Translatio Anonyma Media and Schwegler.

1//saerar given by

ll. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas commentary ad loc. (in Met. IV xvi 721 Spiazzi): Patet
igitur, quod quicumque dicit aliquid esse, aut dicit verum, aut dicit falsum
El similiter Si
dicit hoc non esse.

10

W. Cavini

(?)

if one says <of something> that it is or is not he will speak truly or falsely;

if (1), then also

without any reference to the middle and with a rt implied:

while step (3) must be understood in the same sense as Alexanders reading,
namely: but it is not said <by the opponent> of what is or of what is not that
it is or is not, <but of what neither is nor is not>; and then we get the same
implicit conclusion:
(cab) (1),

0301::

(2b);

0:/Md:

(3a); <therefore, from (1) and (3a), not (2a)>

where (2b) is simply an aside with no deductive import, and the opponent, also in this case, is not speaking either truly or falsely, but simply saying
nothing at all. That is one of the main drawbacks of both (caa) and (cab)2, for
according to Aristotle (cf. (aa)) the denial of PEM is not only false, but impossible, i.e. necessarily false. The other main misunderstanding to be found in
the interpretatio vulgata is its interpretation of the middle (M) as a subject of
predication (cf. (2a) and (3a)) and not as the joint denial of a contradictory
pair, i.e. as a (false) assertion, e.g.

opts on/a9ov oirce oinc imam to uiyuot (F 7,

10120:

27-28).

The Parisienses interpretation (cb) is radically different from both (caa)

and (cab). Step (2) has to be read as (2c), namely as (2b) so far as concerns the
text, but with no tz implied so far as concerns its interpretation:
(2c)

et cest pourquoi celui qui dit estou nest pas dira vrai ou dira
faux.5
-

Step (2) is not a parenthetical consequence of (l), for abate governs both
(2) and (3) (the two clauses being connected by a conditional, not an adversa12. Infecting also Syrianus (in Met. 78.22-32) and Thomas Aquinas (in Met. IV xvi
721) interpretations, which sound quite different from both (caa) and (cab) (but in Spiazzis
edition Thomas text on this point makes no sense: Et ita nec afrmans nec negans, de
neccessitate dicit (?!) verum vel falsum).
13.

I owe this point to Mario Mignucci.

'

Cf. also F 4, 1008a 1-7: ravr rs 05v avttaivsz mtg /lyovm r0'v /lyov tovtov, Kat 6'11
0z1r0(/roivaz. efyoip (il170g 6'11 0"zv49pa)n'og rcafozc 5zvt9pam0g, 517/lov 51:1
17 (pdvaz
Kai 051" vpwnog 051" mix aivpwnog o"ra|- tozjioip 500111 6:50 utotpdastg, was ,uz'a f gugooi
rceivn, Kat am ,uz'a (iv 177 olvrzxstuvn, where the joint denial of a contradictory pair is
(wrongly) taken as the contradictory (6zv1ucsz,uvr7: cf. De Int. 6, 17a 32 and 34) of the corresponding joint assertion; see Kirwan 1971: 103.
14.

013K dzvoiylcry

15. Which is, to my mind, the most important intution to be developed in this new
approach.

l1

Arguing from a denition

tive,

oil/102),

and 6 /lywv at (2c) is also the understood subject

(cb)

(1); chore (2c), provided that (3b).

But,

of

lysz at (3b):

according to the Parisienses, the resulting argument

or a proof followed by a refutation),
contrary to what Aristotle explicitly says d propos of the Principle of NonContradiction (PNC) at F 4, 1006a 5 ff., and repeats 1 propos of PEM (and
more generally) at F 8, 1012b 5-8. Besides, argument (c) has to be taken in this
interpretation as a direct proof not only of PEM but also of PNC, for
as we have seen,

is a direct proof (not a proof by refutation

(2c), provided that (3b)

actually means

[(2c)] [o]n peut bien dire vrai ou faux soit quand on dit est soit quand on
dit nest pas; mais [(3b)] cela ne veut pas dire que lalternative est ou

nest pas puisse tre dite entirement (cest-a-dire dans ses deux membres simultanment) vraie ou entirement fausse (ce qui serait lintrmediaire
de la contradiction) (p. 261)
namely, what is excluded is not only the possibility of a joint denial of
both members of a contradictory pair (que lalternative [...] puisse tre dite
entierement [...] fausse (ce qui serait lintermdiaire de la contradiction)), but also
of a joint assertion of them (que lalternative [...] puisse tre dite entierement
[...] vraie). So, both principles, PEM and PNC, would be directly proved. And
nally, the interpretation of or)t/lo: as a conditional particle (a condition que)
sounds quite strained, and the choice of /lyaz at (3b) seems very doubtful, for
/lyaz is more easily understood as a trivial falsa lectio of a compendium (lye +
oblique stroke for lyaraz).
3. Therefore all the interpretations of argument (c) propounded up to
now, namely

(caa) (1), (bars (2a); obi/1.0: (3a); <therefore not (2a)>

(cab) (1), 03012 (2b); d/Md (3a); <therefore, from (1) and (3a), not (2a)>
(cd) (1); chars (2c), provided that (3b),
have serious drawbacks. As we can see, they all converge as regards step (1), and
all diverge as regards step (2), while step (3) divides the interpretatio vulgata from
the Parisienses, together with the presence of absence of an implicit conclusion
(proof by refutation or direct proof). I would like now to suggest a new interpretation, in particular of step (2), saving the traditional reading and punctuation of the

text, but also developing an intuition

of the Parisienses.

W. Cavini

12

Beginning from the beginning, step (1) is a denition (cf. b 25) consisting
of two asyndetic clauses, antithetically balanced and strikingly symmetrical,
but with exact symmetry avoided through a variation of structure (17/rcai)":
(1)

(a)
(b)

(a)
(b)

to pv yap lyszv to 5v mi ctitozt I7 10' mi 5v ciitaz

to 6&5 10' 5v cfvott lcat'r0' mi dv. mi eziiaz on/ir76g,V

1//650;

to mfv lyctv

0:/lng

to"

at /iyszv

10'
10'

5v mi sfvaz
5v sfvaz

1//8660;,

to an 5v etitaz
an o'v an stitat

10'

As we can see, clause (a) denes falsity through a non-contradictory pair

of (false) negation and (false), afrmation: and, symmetrically, clause (b) denes truth through a non-contradictory pair of (true) afrmation and (true)
negation. But if horizontally we have two non-contradictory pairs of affirmations and negations (ro' 5v mi sfvott / 10' mi 5v ciiiott and 10' 5v slilaz / 10' mi 5v mi
siiraz), being respectively both false and both true, vertically, on the contrary,
we get two contradictory pairs of affirmations and negations (ro' ov an aziraz / to
6v aziiaz and to mi 5v eii/at / to mi 5v mi stiiaz), namely two pairs of afrmations
and negations whose members are neither both false (as in (a)) nor both true
(as in (b)), but one false and the other true.
My suggestion is that step (2) has to be read in this light, as statement of
the principle, immediately deriving from denition (1), according to which, of
every contradictory pair, necessarily one member is true and the other false, a
principle now cleverly detected by Weem Whitaker in Chapters 7-9 of De Interpretatione, where three kinds of exceptions to it are discussed, and dubbed
by him Rule of Contradictory Pairs (RCP).8 So I suggest to read step (2) as

(2d)

that also
or falsely
so

if one says that it is or that it is not he will speak truly

namely as a formulation of RCP, on a pair with other parallel formulations of

the same principle to be found in De Interpretatione, e. g.

T5

civoiymy

rv

,ua"v oi/117911

rnv d

2//0511 stiiocz

zivrigoaozv (8, 12a 26-27)

l6. Independent, but juxtaposed, and paratactically related by miv

deton (Denniston 1952: 99).
17.

Leal Carretero 1983: 54 ff.

18.

Whitaker 1996: 79-82.

19.

Futurum necessitatis:

stiiai mi), then necessarily

58'

half asyn-

if one asserts one member of a contradictory pair (6 lycov

he speaks

truly or falsely.

Arguing from a denition

T6

ozvoZy1c17

13

t1?v icatoitpaozv

1?

t1?v ot1r(oozo'zv (211791?

1?

1//051?

siilaz (9, 18a

28-29)

T7
T8

ndaa

icaroigoaozg

otvoiy1c17

1?

0c1r0'(0aozg 0:/i1101?g

1,usv51?g

1?

,uv Goirepov ,uo'pz0v 11?; oivtzlpoioewg

(9, 18a 34)

oc1i116g 211/011

1?

1,1/@550;

(9, 19a 36-37)

Now, the assumption of a middle M, i.e. of the joint denial of a contradictory pair, clearly conicts with RCP, and therefore also with denition (1),
from which RCP immediately derives. So if one assumes the very possibility of
a middle for contradictory pairs one must deny, by the same token, the standard denition of truth and falsity, and that sounds evidently like a reductio ad
absurdum of the opponent of PEM. That is also the way in which Aristotle
resumes at F 8, 1012b 5-11, the argument from denition of F 7, lucidly stating
this time (a truncated variant of) the standard formulation of RCP:

cilia 1rpo'gnoivtagrozigtozorovgloyovgaezodaz5ezI1coz6oi1rep}.;(t9n

T9

Kai v toil," noivco Zoyozg,

03015

oc).11t9s'g.

0611' efvai

11

1?

opzquozi 51a/ismov /lavrag

aide ,u170e'v oi)./lo

cmv, adovatov noivta

,u1?

sfvaz,

(3:11/lot o*17,uaz'vszv

ti o17,uaz'vez

10' &l179g gooivaz

1//.9051? sz?>az- azvy1c1]

to

1,/@550;

1?

rz,

to

<6> oinozpoivaz 2//6650;

yap rg oivriqraiaewg

0ci1apov aiiiai ,u6pi0v or}.1]0g.

But against all such arguments we must postulate, as we said above,

not that something is or is not, but that people mean something, so
that we must argue from a denition, having got What falsity or
truth means. If that which it is true to afrm is nothing other than
that which it is false to negate, it is impossible that all assertions
should be false, for necessarily, of a contradictory pair, one member
is true <and the other false>2
that

is

to say,

if (1), then -10 M,

for RCP.

The last step of our argument, namely the adversative assertion

(3)

obi/1 051.9 10' 5v

lyetaz ,u1? sfvaz

1?

siivaz 0512

to ,u1?

5v,

has then to be taken as Aristotle s objection to the opponent of PEM22,

which asserts neither one of the members of the two possible contradictory
pairs (to 5v ,u1? siirotz 1? efvotz / to /11? 5v ,u1? afvaz 1? 2111011), but denies both:
20. Unnoticed by Whitaker, Cf. also

F 7, 1012a 2-4.

21. Ross translation slightly modied.

22.

And not, pace Kirwan (1971: 117),

as the opponenfs assertion.

W Cavini

14

but neither of what is it is said that it is not or that it is, nor of what
is not, <but both contradictory pairs are denied>

(30)

thus contradicting RCP by saying that, of a contradictory pair, both members

are false.
Our semantic argument (c) is therefore a reductio ad absurdum of the opponent of PEM (more precisely of (aa)) having the following structure:
(1)
(2)
(3)
<4>
<5>
<6>

DfTF

by Assumption

RCP

from (1)
by Assumption
from (3)
from (2) & <4> by Conjunction
from (3) & <5> by RAA

M
-.RCP
RCP /\ -1 RCP

or more compactly:
(cc)

(1), bars (2d);

0zMo'c

(3c); <therefore not (2d)>.

Summing up: an immediate consequence of the standard semantic de-

nition of truth and falsity is the principle according to which asserting one
member of a contradictory pair is true and asserting the other false; but if
neither one of the members of a contradictory pair is asserted, but both are
denied, we are clearly contradicting this principle, and therefore also the denition from which it immediately derives. That is to say, we are self-contradict-

ing ourselves.*

"

References

Cassin/Nancy 1989
Barbara Cassin and Michel Nancy, La Dcision du sens: Le livre Gamma de la Mtaphysique d Arist0te, Introduction, texte, traduction et
commentaire, Paris, 1989.
.,

* This paper is the rst written version, and the last (?) metamorphosis, of an oral
presentation on the same topic I made in 1996/97 before different audiences: the Padua
Graduate Seminar in Philosophy, the Cambridge B Club, and the Thessaloniki Symposium. I am deeply indebted to all the pariticpants, and very grateful for the perceptiveness
and patience with which they all attended my confused attempts to grapple with the problem. Special thanks are due to Michel Narcy for saving me from misunderstanding his interpretation, and to David Sedley (among many other things) for improving my English.

Arguing from a denition

15

Bonitz 1849
Hermann Bonitz, Aristotelis Metaphysica: Commentarius (1849),
Darmstadt 1960.
Kirwan 1971
~
Christopher Kirwan, Aristotles Metaphysics Books, 1", A, E, Translated with Notes, Oxford, 1971.
Denniston 1960
J. D. Denniston, Greek Prose Style (1952), Oxford 19602.
Leal Carretero 1983
Fernando Miguel Leal Carretero, Der aristotelische Wahrheitsbegriff
and die Aufgabe der Semantik, Diss. Koln 1983.
Mignucci 1975
Mario Mignucci, L'argomentazione dimostrativa in Aristotele: Commento agli Analitici Secondi, vol. 1, Padova 1975.
Primavesi 1996

Oliver Primavesi, Die Aristotelische Topik: Ein Interpretationsmodell

und seine Erprobung am Beispiel von Topik B, Miinchen 1996.
Ross 1953

W. D. Ross, Aristotle s Metaphysics (1924), A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, 2 vol., Oxford 19532.
Schwegler 1847
Albert Schwegler, Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles, vol. 3 (1847),

Frankfurt am Main

1960.

Wittgenstein 1961
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916, Edited by G. H. von
Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, with an English translation by G.
E. M. Anscombe, Oxford 1961.
Whitaker 1996
C. W. A. Whitaker, Aristotle s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and
Dialectic, Oxford 1996.
6