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Ting Dumali vs Torres

Complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita
Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her parents died intestate and left several parcels of
land
According to Isidra, Atty. Rolando Torres took advantage of his relationship with her
and her siblings and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due
them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act
* He participated in or failed to advise against the perjury committed by
his wife, Felicisima and his ister-in-law, Marcelina when they
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate wherein the
two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of Isidras
parents, knowing fully well that the same was false. The lot was later
sold to Antel Holdings Inc.
* forged of her signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as
an overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified
document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over
the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina.
The forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603
to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated
by Felicisima and Marcelina.
* respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false
testimony to the effect that his wife and sister-in-law are the only
children and legal heirs of the Isidras parents for the purpose of
obtaining a new title in their names
* respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the
purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer
through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot
1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be
released within a month when he knew that it would be impossible
because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12
August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the
stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an
employee
- Respondent
* His wife and sister-in-law no motive
* No part in the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
* Believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed
on how to dispose of the lot
* Admits that he was a counsel of Marcelina in reconstitution case of a
lot
* The false testimony of Marcelina in that case that she and
Felicisima were the only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita
Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a clear
oversight
* Sale of lot to Antel Holdings was decision of Marcelina and

Felicisima
* respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in
bombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative
case; Civil Case for "Annulment of Documents, Titles, and
Reconveyance plus Damages"; and a criminal case for Estafa and
Falsification of Public Documents.
thee complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her
mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the
following circumstances:
- (1) her mother met a sudden death in 1967; and partition of the properties
in total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latter
was still alive;
- (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still minors including
respondent's wife herself;
- (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to the
previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence
of a toka. She further states that the respondent was not merely a passive
onlooker but, as he admitted, the administrator of the properties of the
Ting spouses.
IBP found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law
SC
- Violated lawyers oath, Canon 1, RUle 1.01, RUle 1.02, Canon 7, Rule 7.03,
Canon 10, Rule 10.01
- When the respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he
made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant,
respondent miserably failed.
- There was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to
the estate of the deceased.
- As a husband of one of the TIng siblings, he should know his wifes brothers
and sisters. In fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while
she was in the Philippines
* Yet, respondent presented that document to the Register of Deeds of
General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in
question in the name of his wife and his sister-in-law Miriam.
- Marcelina admitted that she signed Isidras name on the waiver of her right
over the property
- Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of
attorney and against committing falsification, he presented such
document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in
favor of Marcelina and his wife.
Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts
which are contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost
duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land.

For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which
society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of
justice.
under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes
candor, fairness, and good faith to the court.
violated Canon 10 when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had
no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the
petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.
Ruling: Disbarred and removed from rolls. guilty of gross misconduct and violation
of the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

Masinsin vs Albano

The case emerged from an ejectment suit filed by Vicente Caeda against Sps.
Masinsin and Sps. Roldan wherein the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila
ordered the Spouses to vacate the premises, to remove their house / apartment and
to surrender possession of the subject land to Caeda. No appeal was taken from
this case, thus the judgment became final and executory.
After sometime, a complaint for Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract and
Damages was filed by Sps. Masinsin and Sps. Roldan before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Manila, seeking the annulment of the decision in the ejectment case
and to set aside an order of its execution. The petition was in due time dismissed.
Again, no appeal was taken.
Yet again they filed another complaint for "Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract
and Damages" before another branch of the RTC Manila. The complaint was
dismissed on the ground of res judicata. This time, they appealed the dismissal to
the Court of Appeals (CA). Meanwhile, a writ of execution was issued by the MTC
for the enforcement of its decision. The writ however was held in abeyance when
the spouses deposited with the CA a sum of money. The CA affirmend the order of
dismissal of the lower court. They sought the recourse of the Supreme Court but to
no avail as the case was denied and the judgment was rendered.
Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC for execution. When they
refused to remove their house on the premises, an order of demolition was issued.
Before its completion, a restraining order was issued by the RTC Manila following a
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction filed by the spouses. The trial court
dismissed the said petition.
Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their complaints, Sps. Masinsin and Sps.
Roldan assailed anew the MTC decision before the RTC, which again issued a
restraining order. Caeda filed a motuon for an alias writ of execution with the MTC.
An ex parte motion for the issuance of restraining order was this time denied.
In the present petition, the spouses contend that the MTC Manila has lost
jurisdiction to enforce its decision when the property in question was proclaimed an
area of priority development by the National Housing Authority (NHA).
SC
- The lawyer's oath to which lawyers have all subscribed in solemn agreement

in dedicating themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of

words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep
inviolable. In no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an
officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and
degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for both an
exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt
power.
In this case, the court noticed that the spouses, through different counsels,
filed pleadings one after the other. The utter lack of merit of the complaints
and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and
delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long become final and
executory. Four times did they, with the assistance of counsel, try to nullify
the same MTC decision before different branches of the court, trifling with
judicial processes. Never, again, should this practice be countenanced.
Because of this, the court warned their counsel of record that a similar
infraction of the lawyers oath will be dealt with most severely.

In settling the present case, the property, according to the report of the NHA,
is outside its projects under the Zonal Improvement Project. Thus, NHA is not
acquiring the said lot for its program, as raised by the Spouses.
Ruling: Petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly
CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer's oath in the future
will be dealt with most severely. Double costs against petitioners.

Young Vs Batuegas

Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against

Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q.
Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the
lawyer's oath
Young is a private prosecutor in Murder case (People vs Crisanto Arana Jr.)
pending before RTC Manila
On dec 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused,
filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the "accused has
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under
detention."
Upon verification with NBI, where he allegedly surrendered, Young learned
that he surendered only on Dec 4, 2000 as shown by the Certificate of
detention execute by Atty Mamauag, Chief of the Security Management
Division of the NBI.
Respondent Susa, Branch clerk of Court of RTC Manila calendared the motion on
December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects,
namely,
- the lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant,
- violation of the three-day notice rule,
- failure to attach the Certificate of Detention

Respondents
- On dec 13, upon hearing warrant of arrest was issued against their client,
they filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the trial court
- immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to
voluntarily surrender.
- due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence,
the certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered on
December 14, 2000.
- Susa: he was no longer in court when his co-respondents filed the
Manifestation with Motion for Bail
IBP Ruling: suspended for 6 months
SC
- Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that
it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed
the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in
authority and was under detention.
- such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby
contribute to injustice.
- To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn.
- That they were able to show that their client was already under the custody
of the NBI at the hearing held on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate
them. The fact remains that the allegation that the accused was in the
custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000 was false.
Comia vs Antona
- no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police
authorities on the same date "tentatively" scheduled for the hearing of
the application for bail
- does not absolve respondent judge from administrative liability
considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the
application for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were
devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the
court.
prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days
prior to the scheduled date
respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of
the three-day notice rule
as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Ruling: Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty
of committing deliberate falsehood.
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Insular Life Employees co vs Insular life Association

The following UNIONS (Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd, Employees AssnNATU; FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Assn-NATU; Insular
Life Bldg Employees Assn-NATU) while still members of the Federation of
Free Workers, entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with
these COMPANIES (Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd; FGU Insurance Group)
- Lawyers of the Unions include Enaje and Garcia (Sec-treasurer of FFW).
When they left FFW, the Companies then hired them and Garcia became Asst.
Corporate Sec and Legal Asst in the Legal Dept, and Enaje became personnel
manager of the Companies. He was also made chairman of the negotiating
panel for the Co. in the CBA with the Unions.
- Sept 16, 1957 Unions jointly submitted proposals for a modified renewal of
their respective CBA contracts w/c were due to expire on 9/30
- Sept/Oct 1957 - negotiations were conducted but snagged by deadlock on
issue of union shop; Unions then filed on 01/27/1958 notice of strike for
deadlock on collective bargaining
- April 15, 1958 Unions dropped their demands regarding security but the
Companies still refused to negotiate
- Apr 25 to May 6 They tried negotiating but with no satisfactory results
- May 15, 1958 Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they
considered as unfair labor practices
- May 20, 1958 Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of Insular Life
Bldg
- May 21, 1958 Companies through the Acting Manager Olbes sent to each
of the strikers a letter specifying incentives should they decide to go back to
work
- Garcia and Abella (Chief of Personnel Records Section) tried to penetrate the
picket lines. When Garcia approached the picket line, he engaged into a fight
with one of the strikers and both of them suffered injuries.
- Companies organized 3 bus-loads of employees, including a photographer
who succeeded in penetrating the picket lines causing injuries to picketers.
- Alleging that some non-strikers were injured, the Companies filed criminal
charges against strikers and they also filed a petition for injunction.
- May 31, 1958 CFI Mla granted injunction. Companies sent individually to
the strikers another letter which states If you are still interested in continuing
in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges
against you, we are giving you until June 2 to report for work at the home
office. Otherwise, we may be forced to obtain your replacement.
- All of the more than 120 crim charges, except for 3, were dismissed. But
employees decided to call of the strike and to report back to work on June 2.
- Before readmitting, Companies required them to secure clearances from the
City Fiscals Office and to be screened by a management committee
- July 29, 1958 CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
- Aug 17, 1965 CIR dismissed the complaint
Relevant to the assigned topic (read pages 277-280!)
- Martinez, the Presiding Judge of the CIR, misquoted a SC decision in the
case of Lopez Sr v. Chronicle Publication Employees Assn:
(1) 60 words of the paragraph quoted by Martinez do NOT appear in the
original;
(2) Martinez used For it is settled that...; the original reads, For it must be
remembered...
(3) Last sentence in the quoted paragraph of Martinez is actually part of the
immediately succeeding paragraph in the SC decision.
- In the respondents brief, counsels for respondents quoted the CIRs decision

ISSUES
1. WON the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice a In sending out letters individually directed to the strikers
b For discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the
matter of readmitting employees after the strike
c For dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving them
the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side
2. WON the officials and members of the Unions are to be reinstated with full
back wages, from June 2, 1958 to date of actual reinstatement
3. WON Presiding Judge Martinez and counsels of respondents are to be
cited for contempt for misquoting a Supreme Court decision
HELD
1.a) YES.
Ratio It is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective
bargaining agreement to negotiate with his employees individually, in
connection with the changes in the agreement. Although the union is on strike,
the employer is still under the obligation to bargain with the union as the
employees bargaining representative.
Reasoning It is an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all
employees notifying them to return to work at a specific time, otherwise new
employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. The first letter contains
promises of benefits to employees; the second letter contains threats to obtain
replacements. Free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable
where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a
promise of benefit, or threats or reprisal.
- The circumstance that strikers later decided to return to work on account of
injunction cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters which tended to
interfere with the employees right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the
form of strike.
- Totality of Conduct Doctrine: Expressions of opinion by an employer, though
innocent in themselves, were held to be culpable because of the
circumstances under which they were uttered. (1) Before Unions submission
of proposals for renewal of CBAs, respondents hired former legal counsels of
petitioners; (2) After notice to strike was served on the Companies, they
reclassified 87 employees as supervisors, compelling them to resign from
unions; (3) During negotiations in Dept of Labor, they refused to answer the
Unions demands en toto; (4) Strikers were individually sent letters inducing
them to return to work with promises of special privileges; (5) Three truckloads
of non-strikers crashed through the picket line, which resulted in injuries on the
part of picketers; (6) Criminal charges were brought upon picketers; (7) An
injunction was obtained from CFI; (8) Another letter was sent individually and
by registered special delivery mail threatening them with dismissal if they
didnt report for work on June 2; (9) When they did report for work, a screening
committee refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on ground of pending
criminal charges; (10) When almost all were cleared by fiscals office, they
were still refused admission; but all non-strikers were readmitted immediately.
It is clear that the main reason for the strike was when it became clear that
management will not negotiate in good faith.
1.b) YES.
Ratio The companies are guilty of discrimination in their process of rehiring.
They refused to readmit strikers with pending criminal charges, even after

these employees have secured the required clearances. At the same time, the
Companies readily readmitted non-strikers who also had criminal charges,
without requiring clearances. They even separated active from the less active
unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines.
Reasoning There are 3 conditions for readmission of the strikers: (1) he must
be interested in continuing his work with the companies; (2) no criminal
charges against him; (3) report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would
be replaced. All employees are considered to have complied with first and third
condition.
- In an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of
discrimination in rehiring, they even delegated the power to readmit to a
committee composed of Abella and Garcia. Both were involved in unpleasant
incidents with the picketers during the strike, and the mere act of placing the
power of reinstatement in their hands is a form of discrimination.
1.c) YES.
Ratio The Companies refused to take the employees back on account of their
acts of misconduct even if all, except three, were able to secure the required
clearances. Record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the
opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges.
2. YES.
Ratio The members and officials of the Unions went on strike because of the
unfair labor practices committed by the Companies. They are now entitled to
reinstatement with back pay because when they reported back for work, upon
the invitation of their employers, they were discriminatorily dismissed.
3. NO.
Ratio The misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate
attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. Counsels of
respondents have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in
the Judges decision, to copy it verbatim and to incorporate it in their brief.
Import of sentences in the quotation is substantially the same as the cited
decision.
-in this case import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the
respondent Judge's decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully
reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the
acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the
employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon
which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity
inimical to the employer's interest."
Impt: In citing SCs decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts,
judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and
punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. This is because only the decisions of
this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction.
(Miiranda v. Imperial)
- Ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the
decisions and rulings of SC may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the
detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled.
Also, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, and be
saved precious time in finding out whether citations are correct.
Disposition Decision of the CIR is reversed and set aside. Respondents are
ordered to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their
former or comparatively similar positions with back wages.
- Hipos Sr. Vs Bay

two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of
acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee
Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two others RTC Quezon City, acting as a Family
Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay
Private complainants AAA and BBB file motion for reinvestigation asking
Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper
Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused
Granted
Hipos Sr. and others filed for dismissal of cases because there was no
probably cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged
Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation
affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused in
Criminal Cases signed by y Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and
approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint
Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004
Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there
was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a
Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay
Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even
date.
The petitioners appealed under rule 65 mandamus saying that
the judge should follow the recommendation of the prosecutor to
drop the case.
The petitioners cited several cases mostly importantlly the
montesa and the Ledesma case. They made it seem like the
quotated passages were directly lifted from the decisions when
they were altered to help the petitioners case.
* Petitioners counsel tried to convince the court that a
judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw
Informations from the prosecution only when there is
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors
moving for such withdrawal
* And that where there is no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to
Withdraw Informations is void.
SC
* even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person
against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient
evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The
courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a rule
have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him
* Montesa decision
- petitioners took specific statements from our
Decision, carefully cutting off the portions which
would expose the real import of our
pronouncements.
- The Petition for Certiorari in Montesa, Jr. was
directed against a judge who, after granting the
Petition for Reinvestigation filed by the accused,
proceeded nonetheless to arraign the accused;

and, shortly thereafter, the judge decided to dismiss

the case on the basis of a Resolution of the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor recommending the
dismissal of the case.
- The dismissal of the case in Montesa, Jr. was done
despite the disapproval of the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor's Resolution by the Provincial
Prosecutor (annotated in the same Resolution),
and despite the fact that the reinvestigation the
latter ordered was still ongoing, since the
Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
had not yet attained finality. We held that the judge
should have waited for the conclusion of the
Petition for Reinvestigation he ordered, before
acting on whether or not the case should be
dismissed for lack of probable cause, and before
proceeding with the arraignment
* Counsel's use of block quotation and quotation marks
signifies that he intends to make it appear that the
passages are the exact words of the Court
* putting the words "Underscoring ours" after the text
implies that, except for the underscoring, the text is a
faithful reproduction of the original.
* SC never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to
deny a Motion to Withdraw Information from the
prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal.
* Neither did they rule therein that where there is no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the
denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information is void
* Actual ruling was trial judge commits grave abuse of
discretion if he denies a Motion to Withdraw Information
without an independent and complete assessment of the
issues presented in such Motion
* petitioners claim that since even the respondent judge
himself found no probable cause against them, the Motion
to Withdraw Informations by the Office of the City
Prosecutor should be granted
clearly shows that the insertion of the word "no" in
the dispositive portion was a mere clerical error
clearly shown in the body of the decision that the
court found probable cause
Mandamus can only apply to a judge when he does not act on
his duties. It cannot compel a judge to do his duties in a specific
way.
Ruling:
* instant Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED. Let the
records of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for the resumption of the
proceedings therein. The Regional Trial Court is directed
to act on the case with dispatch.

Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. is ORDERED to SHOW

CAUSE why he should not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for his disquieting conduct as herein discussed.

In Re Letter of the UP Faculty

On April 28, 2010, the decision in Vinuya, et al. vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No.
162230) was promulgated with Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo as ponencia.
Attys. Roque and Bagares, counsels for Vinuya et al. (Malaya Lolas), sought for
reconsideration.
Subsequently, they filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where they
raised for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. The works allegedly plagiarized in the
Vinuya decision were namely:
- (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent's article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens;"
- (2) Christian J. Tams' book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
International Law; and
- (3) Mark Ellis' article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International
Crime."
Counsels further assert that the plagiarized works were twisted as they were used
as basis for the assailed judgment when in truth the works actually support the case
of the Malaya Lolas. After the filing of the Supplemental MR, an article entitled "SC
justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," was posted on the Newsbreak
website.
The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website. Atty. Roque also wrote
an article entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted" in his column in the Manila Standard
Today wherein he claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle confirmed that his work had been
plagiarized.
Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of
plagiarism. The letter was referred to the Ethics Committee formed by the court to
investigate the matter.
The Supreme Court received a letter from Dr. Mark Ellis who wrote to to raise his
concern on the use of his work to support a conclusion in opposition to the intention
of his arguments.
On August 9, 2010, a statement entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement) was
posted in several online sites. The statement was also posted at the UP College of
Law's bulletin board and at said college website
UP College of Law Dean Marvic Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement to the
SC, through Chief Justice Corona. The cover letter signed by him stated that the
statement was signed by 38 members of the UP College of Law faculty. The copy of
the Statement (Restoring Integrity II) attached to the cover letter did not contain the
actual signatures but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the
notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name
In fact, when the original signed Statement (Restoring Integrity I) was required to be
presented, the Ethics Committee noted that only 37 of the 81 UP faculty members
actually signed the same. In particular, the signature of former SC Justice Mendoza

did not appear as falsely represented in the previous copies of the Statement
submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. Also, Atty. Armovit signed the
Statement although his name was not included among the signatories in the copies
submitted to the Court.
The Court en banc issued a Resolution directing the UP law faculty members to
show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation
of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and
10.03 for submitting a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP
Law Faculty Statement.
35 of the respondent UP Law professors (excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof.
Raul Vasquez) filed a Common Compliance alleging that they acted with noble
intentions when they signed the Statement. They assert that their action was in
exercise of their constitutionally protected freedom of expression and academic
freedom.
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendozas name as among the signatories
in Restoring Integrity II (copy) when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I
(original), Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a miscommunication involving his
administrative officer.
Prof. Owen Lynch, a visiting professor at the UP College of Law, manifests that he
is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota
SC
- Violation of Canon 10
* Dean Leonens predicament is the fact that he did not from the
beginning submit the signed copy (Restoring Integrity I) to this Court
and, instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or
"reformatted" signature pages. Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that
other professors had only authorized him to indicate them as
signatories and had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around
the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to
this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not actually
signed the same. That is precisely tantamount to making it appear to
this Court that a person or persons participated in an act when such
person or persons did not.
* Nevertheless, in due consideration of Dean Leonens professed good
intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for
failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the
Court as required under Canon 10.
- Violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 (Good Faith Not A Defense )
* No matter how firm a lawyers conviction in the righteousness of his
cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and
engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal
profession into disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly
upheld in previous cases , should be applied in this case with more
reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case,
denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a

public statement using contumacious language, which with temerity

they subsequently submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."
* Whether or not respondents views regarding the plagiarism issue in
the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability
for contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate
matters to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The
ethics case of Justice Del Castillo was still pending at the time of the
filing of respondents submissions in this administrative case. As
respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels
in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. It is not proper
procedure for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here
especially when it has no bearing on their own administrative case.
* With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common
Compliance, the Court is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt
that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the issuance of the
Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the
excessive and contumacious language used is plain and undeniable,
then good intent can only be mitigating. Where the matter is abusive
or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts
is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should
always be observed and enforced. Said lack or want of intention
constitutes at most an extenuation of liability. Thus, the 35
respondents named in the Common Compliance should,
notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly
duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and
to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to
influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts and
the administration of justice.
Freedom of Expression
* Freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases
against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in
court submissions. The same applies to the respondents' invocation
of academic freedom.
* Freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms,
is not absolute and needs on occasion to be balanced with the equally
important public interest in the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. The right to criticize, which
is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every
right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility.
* A lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment
upon actuations of public officers, including judicial authority. However,
such criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it,
must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. (citing In Re
Almacen) In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members
of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this

Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the

courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have
exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.
* The accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the
Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed
as protected free speech. To be clear, It was not the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the Court, but the manner of
the criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents,
who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed
their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case that
gave rise to the Show Cause Resolution.
* The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
essential to the orderly administration of justice. In his relations with
the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.Thus, statements
made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in
the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as
to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may
subject the attorney to disciplinary action. (citing In Re Almacen)
Criticism of a Case Sub Judice
* What the courts found objectionable was not the circumstance that
respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of
plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an
established fact, but a truth when it was "of public knowledge that
there was an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of
such allegations."
* The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending
cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as
misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and
subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a
constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor.(citing
In re: Vicente Sotto)
* The Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity
and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully
well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits
of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statements issuance,
were still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court.
Academic Freedom
* There is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of
academic freedom for the Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with
undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity
as teachers.

* Academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in

this case. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be
so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the
academic freedom of law professors. In view of the broad definition
in Cayetano v. Monsod, lawyers when they teach law are
considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in
other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law,
respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of
the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be
measured against the same canons of professional responsibility
applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law
professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
As for Prof. Lynch, since he is a member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota
and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be
excused from these proceedings.
Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Liability Imposed without
Need of a Hearing )
* This is not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which
requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly
ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as
anadministrative matter.
* The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section
13, on disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme
Court. Under the said provision, it cannot be denied that a formal
investigation, through a referral to the specified officers, is
merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is
only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary that the
procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be followed.
* In general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type
hearing.The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute
absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign
denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to
present his side.
* Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment,
it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in

view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
* The absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation
of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately
exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or
judge has been given the opportunity to be heard.
* Thus, respondents requests for a hearing and for access to the
records of, and evidence presented in [the plagiarism case against
Justice Del Castillo] should be denied for lack of merit.
In the Matter of charges of Plagiarism against Assoc Justice Mariano Del
Castillo
In the landmark decision of Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary, G.R.No.
162230, promulgated last April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court
DISMISSED the petition filed by a group of Filipino comfort women during
the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines. The Court, speaking
through Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, held that the petition seeking to
compel the Executive Department to espouse the petitioners claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice and other international tribunals has NO
MERIT because: (1) the prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners claims against Japan belongs exclusively to the Executive
Department; and (2) the Philippines is not under any international obligation
to espouse the petitioners claims.
Discontented with the foregoing decision, Vinuya, et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration. Subsequently, they also filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration,
this
time
accusing
the Justice
del
Castillo of plagiarizing(copying without attribution) passages from three
foreign legal articles:
(1) A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Professors Evan J. Criddle
(Associate Professor of Syracuse University College of Law) and Evan
Fox-Descent (Assistant Professor of McGill University Faculty of Law)
published in the Yale Journal of International Law in 2009;
(2) Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis
(Executive Director of the International Bar Association), published in
the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006; and
(3) Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law by
Professor Christian J. Tams (Chair of International Law ofUniversity of
Glasgow School of Law), published in Cambridge University Press
(2005).

The petitioners also claimed that Justice del Castillo twisted the works
of these authors to make it appear that such works supported the
Courts position in the Vinuya decision.
On July 27, 2010, the Court En Banc referred the charges
againstJustice Del Castillo to its Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards, chaired by Chief Justice Renato Corona, for investigation
and recommendation. After the proceedings before it, the Committee
submitted its findings and recommendations to the Court en banc,
which then treated and decided the controversy as an administrative
matter.
The issues
The issues resolved by the Court en banc in this administrative case
are as follows:
1. Did Justice Del Castillo, in writing the opinion for the Court in
the Vinuya case, plagiarize the published works of authors Tams,
Criddle-Descent, and Ellis?
2. Did Justice Del Castillo twist the works of these authors to make it
appear that such works supported the Courts position in
the Vinuya decision?
3. Was Justice del Castillo guilty of misconduct/gross inexcusable
negligence?
The October 12, 2010 per curiam decision
[By a 10-2 vote, with three Justices including Justice del Castillo taking
no part, the Court DISMISSED the charges for lack of merit and held
that Justice del Castillo was NOT guilty of plagiarizing and twisting the
cited materials and hence did NOT commit gross negligence.]
1. NO, Justice Del Castillo did NOT plagiarize the published works
of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.
.
According to the Court, at its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of
another persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To plagiarize, as it is
commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings,
etc.) from (another) and pass them off as ones own. The passing off
of the work of another as ones own is thus an indispensable element of
plagiarism.
As regards that one passage from Professor Tams, the Court
believed that whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to
satisfy the footnoting standards of counsel for petitioners is not an
ethical matter but one concerning clarity of writing. The statement

See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law

(2005) in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought
that it gave him somewhat less credit than he deserved. Such
attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed
off the challenged passages as his own.
-

That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the
introductory phrase cited in rather than the phrase See would make
a case of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case
of manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism. If the Justices
citations were imprecise, it would just be a case of bad footnoting rather
than one of theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many would be target of
abuse for every editorial error, for every mistake in citing pagination,
and for every technical detail of form.
As regards the passages from Ellis, the Court noted that the lengthy
passages in Footnote 65 of Vinuya came almost verbatim from Ellis
article but did not contain an acknowledgment or introduction that
they are from that article. Moreover, as regards the passages from the
work of Professors Criddle and Descent, it was also observed that
the Vinuya decision lifted the portions, including their footnotes, from
Criddle-Descents article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens as
footnotes in theVinuya decision without any attributions made to the two
authors. According to the Court, unless amply explained, these
unattributed lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be
construed as plagiarism.
The explanation, said the Court, came from one of Justice Del Castillos
researchers, a court-employed attorney. She explained how she
accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the beginning
drafts of her report to him, which report eventually became the working
draft of the decision. She said that, for most parts, she did her
research electronically. For international materials, she sourced these
mainly from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and lawrelated materials to which the Court subscribes. Justice Del Castillos
researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in
the Vinuya case and these included the passages lifted from the
separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of Ellis with proper attributions
to these authors. But, as it happened, in the course of editing and
cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the
attributions.
For the Court, it was notable that neither Justice Del Castillo nor his
researcher had a motive or reason for omitting attribution for the lifted
passages to Criddle-Descent or to Ellis. The latter authors are highly
respected professors of international law. The law journals that
published their works have exceptional reputations. It did not make
sense to intentionally omit attribution to these authors when the
decision cites an abundance of other sources. Citing these authors as

the sources of the lifted passages would enhance rather than diminish
their informative value. Both Justice Del Castillo and his researcher
gain nothing from the omission. Thus, the failure to mention the works
of Criddle-Decent and Ellis was unquestionably due to inadvertence
or pure oversight.
-

The Court adopted the Committees finding that the omission of

attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis did not bring about an
impression that Justice Del Castillo himself created the passages that
he lifted from their published articles. That he merely got those
passages from others remains self-evident, despite the accidental
deletion. The fact is that he still imputed the passages to the sources
from which Criddle-Descent and Ellis borrowed them in the first place.
2. NO, Justice Del Castillo did NOT twist the works of authors
Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis to make it appear that such
works supported the Courts position in the Vinuya decision.
The Court adopted the Committees finding that the decision did NOT
twist the passages from Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. For the
Court, this allegation of twisting or misrepresentation remained a
mystery. To twist means to distort or pervert the meaning of. For
example, if one lifts the lyrics of the National Anthem, uses it in his
work, and declares that Jose Palma who wrote it did not love his
country, then there is twisting or misrepresentation of what the
anthems lyrics said. Here, nothing in the Vinuya decision said or
implied that, based on the lifted passages, authors Tams, CriddleDescent, and Ellis supported the Courts conclusion that the Philippines
is not under any obligation in international law to espouse Vinuya et
al.s claims.
3. NO, Justice del Castillo is NOT guilty of misconduct/gross
inexcusable negligence.
The Court concluded that Justice del Castillo is NOT guilty of
misconduct. On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited
the wrong sources, failed to use quotation marks, inadvertently omitted
necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in
every case, amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with
fraud, corruption, or malice are subject of disciplinary action. This is not
the case here. Justice Del Castillos acts or omissions were not shown
to have been impelled by any of such disreputable motives. If the rule
were otherwise, no judge or justice, however competent, honest, or
dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an
unblemished record.
The Court also concluded that Justice del Castillo is NOT guilty of
gross inexcusable negligence. According to the Court, the contention
thatJustice Del Castillo is guilty of gross inexcusable negligence since

he has full control and supervision over his researcher and should not
have surrendered the writing of the decision to the latter, is erroneous.
The assertion assumes that Justice Del Castillo abdicated the writing of
the Vinuya decision to his researcher, which is contrary to the evidence
adduced during the hearing. As his researcher testified, the Justice set
the direction that the research and study were to take by discussing the
issues with her, setting forth his position on those issues, and reviewing
and commenting on the study that she was putting together until he was
completely satisfied with it. In every sense,Justice Del Castillo was in
control of the writing of the report to the Court, which report eventually
became the basis for the decision, and determined its final outcome.
For the Court, what is important is that, in this case, Justice Del
Castillo retained control over the writing of the decision in
the Vinuya case without, however, having to look over his researchers
shoulder as she cleaned up her draft report to ensure that she hit the
right computer keys. The Justices researcher was after all competent
in the field of assignment given her. She finished law from a leading
law school, graduated third in her class, served as Editor-in Chief of her
schools Law Journal, and placed fourth in the bar examinations when
she took it. She earned a masters degree in International Law and
Human Rights from a prestigious university in the United States under
the Global-Hauser program, which counsel for petitioners concedes to
be one of the top post graduate programs on International Law in the
world. Justice Del Castillo did not exercise bad judgment in assigning
the research work in the Vinuya case to her.
-

The dissent of Justice Sereno

In her Dissenting Opinion, Justice Sereno opened with a
scathing remark on the import of the per curiam decision: What is
black can be called white but it cannot turn white by the mere calling.
According to Justice Sereno, the unfortunate ruling of the majority
Decision that no plagiarism was committed stems from its failure to
distinguish between the determination of the objective, factual
existence of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the determination
of the liability that results from a finding of plagiarism. Specifically,
it made malicious intent, which heretofore had not been relevant to a
finding of plagiarism, an essential element.
Justice Sereno made
the Vinuya decision.

a painstaking

part-by-part

analysis

of

As regards that one passage from Professor Tams, she argued that
the attribution to Tams is wholly insufficient because without quotation
marks, there is nothing to alert the reader that [a] paragraph [in Vinuya]
was lifted verbatim from Tams. The footnote [in Vinuya] leaves the
reader with the impression that the said paragraph is the authors own
analysis of erga omnes. The See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga

omnes in International Law (2005) line in footnote 69 of

the Vinuya decision does not clearly indicate that the statement on
Simmas observation was lifted directly from Tamss work; it only directs
the reader to Tamss work should the reader wish to read further
discussions on the matter.
-

As regards the passages from the work of Professors Criddle and

Descent that were used either in the body or in the discursive footnotes
ofVinuya, Justice Sereno noted seventeen (17) instances when Justice
del Castillo failed to use quotation marks to indicate that the passages
were not his but were lifted from Criddle & Fox-Decents work published
in Yale Law Journal of International Law. Some of the passages were
absolutely without any attribution to the authors.
As regards the passages from Ellis, the Vinuya decision failed to use
quotation marks and the right citations to indicate that half of the long
discursive footnote 65, including the sources cited therein, was actually
comprised of the rearrangement, and in some parts, rephrasing of 18
sentences found on pages 227-228 of Mr. Elliss work in Case Western
Law Reserve Journal of International Law.
Thus, to Justice Sereno, the text of the Decision itself reveals the
evidence of plagiarism. The tearful apology of the legal researcher to
the family of the ponente and her acknowledgment of the gravity of the
act of omitting attributions is an admission that something wrong was
committed. Her admission that the correct attributions went missing in
the process of her work is an admission of plagiarism. The evidence in
the text of the Vinuya Decision and the acknowledgment by the legal
researcher are sufficient for the determination of plagiarism.

Justice Sereno then explained why the narration and explanation in the
majority decision [of the accidental deletion of the attributions from the
draft of the Vinuya decision] is not a fair presentation of what happens
in electronically generated writings aided by electronic research, thus:
First, for a decision to make full attribution for lifted passages, one
starts with block quote formatting or the keying-in of quotation marks
at the beginning and at the end of the lifted passages. These keyed-in
computer commands are not easily accidentally deleted, but should
be deliberately inputted where there is an intention to quote and
attribute.
Second, a beginning acknowledgment or similar introduction to a
lengthy passage copied verbatim should not be accidentally deleted; it
must be deliberately placed.
Third, the [majoritys] explanation regarding the lines [quoted from the
work of Professor Tams] may touch upon what happened in [this
particular incident of non-attribution], but it does not relate to what

happened in [all all the other 23 incidents of non-attribution], which are

wholesale lifting of excerpts from both the body and the footnotes of the
referenced works, without any attribution, specifically to the works of
Criddle & Fox-Decent and of Ellis. While mention was made of Tamss
work, no mention was made at all of the works of Criddle & Fox-Decent
and of Ellis even though the discussions and analyses in their
discursive footnotes were used wholesale.
-

Fourth, the researchers explanation regarding the accidental deletion

of 2 footnotes out of 119 does not plausibly account for the extensive
amount of text used with little to no modifications from the works of
Criddle & Fox-Decent and Ellis. As was presented in Tables B and C,
copied text occurs in 22 instances in pages 27, 31, and 32 of
theVinuya decision. All these instances of non-attribution cannot be
remedied by the reinstatement of 2 footnotes.

Fifth, the mention of Tams in See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga

omnes in International Law (2005) in footnote 69 of the Vinuya decision
was not a mere insufficiency in clarity of writing, but a case of
plagiarism under the rule prohibiting the use of misleading citations.

Sixth, the analogy that was chosen that of a carpenter who discards
materials that do not fit into his carpentry work is completely
inappropriate. In the scheme of cutting and pasting that the researcher
did during her work, it is standard practice for the original sources of the
downloaded and copied materials to be regarded as integral parts of
the excerpts, not extraneous or ill-fitting. A computer-generated
document can accommodate as many quotation marks, explanatory
notes, citations and attributions as the writer desires and in multiple
places. The limits of most desktop computer drives, even those used in
the Supreme Court, are in magnitudes of gigabytes and megabytes,
capable of accommodating 200 to 400 books per gigabyte (with each
book just consuming roughly 3 to 5 megabytes). The addition of a
footnote to the amount of file space taken up by an electronic document
is practically negligible. It is not as if the researcher lacked any
electronic space; there was simply no attribution.
Seventh, contrary to what is implied in the statement on Microsoft
Words lack of an alarm and in paragraph 4 of the decretal portion of the
majority Decision, no software exists that will automatically type in
quotation marks at the beginning and end of a passage that was lifted
verbatim; these attribution marks must be made with deliberate effort by
the human researcher. Nor can a software program generate the
necessary citations without input from the human researcher. Neither is
there a built-in software alarm that sounds every time attribution marks
or citations are deleted. The best guarantee for works of high
intellectual integrity is consistent, ethical practice in the writing habits of
court researchers and judges. All lawyers are supposed to be
knowledgeable on the standard of ethical practice, if they took their
legal research courses in law school and their undergraduate research
courses seriously. This knowledge can be easily picked up and

updated by browsing many free online sources on the subject of writing

standards. In addition, available on the market are software programs
that can detect some, but not all, similarities in the phraseology of a
work-in-progress with those in selected published materials; however,
these programs cannot supply the citations on their own. Technology
can help diminish instances of plagiarism by allowing supervisors of
researchers to make partial audits of their work, but it is still the human
writer who must decide to give the proper attribution and act on this
decision. [Emphasis in the original.]
-

To Justice Sereno, while indeed the notion of having committed judicial

plagiarism may be unsettling to contemplate, as it may raise in the mind
of a judge the question of his or her own culpability, it is a grievous
mistake to overlook the possibility of the commission of judicial
plagiarism or the fact that judicial plagiarism is categorized by its very
definition as a subset of plagiarism. That a judge, in lifting words from a
source and failing to attribute said words to said source in the writing of
a decision, committed specifically judicial plagiarism does not derogate
from the nature of the act as a plagiarist act. Nor does any claim of
inadvertence or lack of intent in the commission of a plagiarist act
change the characterization of the act as plagiarism.

In the case of judicial plagiarism, it is entirely possible for judges to

have violated the rules against plagiarism out of ignorance or from the
sheer fact that in order to cope with their caseloads, they have to rely
on researchers for part of the work. That would have been a very
interesting argument to consider. But ignorance is not pleaded here, nor
is the inability to supervise a legal researcher pleaded to escape liability
on the part of the ponente. Rather, the defense was that no plagiarism
existed. This conclusion however is unacceptable for the reasons stated
above.
The dissent closed with the statement on the unfortunate result of the
majority decision, thus:
Unless reconsidered, this Court would unfortunately be remembered as
the Court that made malicious intent an indispensable element of
plagiarism and that made computer-keying errors an exculpatory fact in
charges of plagiarism, without clarifying whether its ruling applies only
to situations of judicial decision-making or to other written intellectual
activity. It will also weaken this Courts disciplinary authority the
essence of which proceeds from its moral authority over the bench
and bar. In a real sense, this Court has rendered tenuous its ability to
positively educate and influence the future of intellectual and academic
discourse.
2011

In its Per Curiam Resolution promulgated last February 8, 2011 inA.M.

No. 10-7-17-SC, the Supreme Court en banc DENIED the petitioners
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Court first reiterated the definition of plagiarism that it used in the
October 12, 2010 decision, thus:
Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or common
definition. To plagiarize, says Webster, is to steal and pass off as ones
own the ideas or words of another. Stealing implies malicious
taking. Blacks Law Dictionary, the worlds leading English law
dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision, defines plagiarism as
the deliberate and knowing presentation of another person's original
ideas or creative expressions as ones own. The presentation of
another persons ideas as ones own must be deliberate or
premeditateda
taking
with
ill
intent.

[To read a digest of the per curiam resolution, please clickhere. To

read a digest of the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno, please
click here. Atty. Ed.]
Then, in response to the reaction from Justice Serenos comment that
the majority decision has created unimaginable problems for
Philippine academia, the Court explained that it is not actually setting
aside the norms adopted by academic institutions in treating plagiarism,
thus:
[T]he Courts decision in the present case does not set aside [the
different norms assumed by educational institutions in treating
plagiarism]. The decision makes this clear, thus:
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing
model is based on the originality of the writers thesis, the judicial
system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which
encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and
related studies in their decisions. The judge is not expected to
produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a
decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the
precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from.
For the majority, it is in the substance of the decisions of magistrates
like Justice del Castillo that their genius, originality, and honest labor
can be found. Thus, as regards the Vinuya decision, the Court
explained why it is an original and honest work of Justice del Castillo:
In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as
seen by the opposing sides in a way that no one has ever done. He
identified and formulated the core of the issues that the parties
raised. And when he had done this, he discussed the state of the law

relevant to their resolution. It was here that he drew materials from

various sources, including the three foreign authors cited in the charges
against him. He compared the divergent views these present as they
developed in history. He then explained why the Court must reject
some views in light of the peculiar facts of the case and applied those
that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his discussions of the facts
and the law the right solution to the dispute in the case. On the whole,
his work was original. He had but done an honest work.
-

The Court explained why it entertained the charges of plagiarism

against Justice Del Castillo, and why it found that the non-attribution did
NOT amount to plagiarism:
The Court probably should not have entertained at all the charges of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, coming from the losing
party. But it is a case of first impression and petitioners, joined by some
faculty members of the University of the Philippines school of law, have
unfairly maligned him with the charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited
materials, and gross neglect for failing to attribute lifted passages from
three foreign authors. These charges as already stated are false,
applying the meaning of plagiarism as the world in general knows it.
True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors
materials that he lifted from their works and used in writing the decision
for the Court in the Vinuya case. But, as the Court said, the evidence as
found by its Ethics Committee shows thatthe attribution to these authors
appeared in the beginning drafts of the decision. Unfortunately, as
testified to by a highly qualified and experienced court-employed
researcher, she accidentally deleted the same at the time she was
cleaning up the final draft. The Court believed her since, among other
reasons, she had no motive for omitting the attribution. The foreign
authors concerned, like the dozens of other sources she cited in her
research, had high reputations in international law.
Notably, those foreign authors expressly attributed the controversial
passages found in their works to earlier writings by others. The authors
concerned
were
not
themselves
the
originators. As
it
happened, although the ponencia of Justice Del Castillo accidentally
deleted the attribution to them, there remained in the final draft of the
decision attributions of the same passages to the earlier writings from
which those authors borrowed their ideas in the first place. In
short, with the remaining attributions after the erroneous clean-up, the
passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed on
their face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo but
to others. He did not pass them off as his own.

The separate concurring opinion of Justice Brion

Justice Brion fully supported the conclusions of the Ethics Committee

[as adopted by the per curiam decision and resolution] and disagreed
withJustice Carpios position that the Court has no jurisdiction to
discipline its Members as the only means to discipline them is through
impeachment proceedings that the Congress has the sole prerogative
to undertake. He discussed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
discipline its own members in the following wise:
A given in the discipline of Members of the Supreme Court is that they
can only be removed from office through impeachment, as provided
under Article XI of the Constitution, on the specified grounds of culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of the public trust. The purpose of impeachment
and the constitutional interest sought is to protect the people and the
State from official delinquencies and other malfeasances. The
Constitution, however, is not a single-purpose document that focuses
on one interest alone to the exclusion of related interests; impeachment
was never intended by the Constitution to be the totality of the
administrative actions or remedies that the public or the Court may take
against an erring Justice of the Court. Other related constitutional
interests exist touching on other facets of the Judiciary and public
accountability. They are, by themselves, equally compelling and
demanding of recognition.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[Other] considerations [judicial independence; need for judicial integrity;

and the insufficiency of impeachment to protect the people and foster
the public accountability that the Constitution speaks of], taken together,
dictate against the position of Justice Carpio that the Congress alone,
through impeachment and to the exclusion of this Court, can proceed
against the Members of the Court.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Thus, when the conduct of a member of the Supreme Court

is improper but is not of such gravity to be considered as an
impeachable offense, the Court to protect its integrity may address
the misconduct through an administrative disciplinary case against the
erring member.
Justice Brion concluded that the Supreme Court can hear the case
against Justice del Castillo as an administrative matter, thus:
What the impeachment provisions of the Constitution guarantee is
simply the right to be removed from office only through the process
of impeachment and not by any other means; it does not preclude
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions short of removal on the
impeachable official. Impeachment is the sole means of

removal, but it is certainly not the sole means of disciplining

Members of the Supreme Court or, for that matter, public officials
removable by impeachment.
-

Accordingly, I believe that the Court has the authority to hear the
present administrative disciplinary case against Associate Justice
Mariano del Castillo; in case of a finding of misconduct, it can impose
penalties that are not the functional equivalent of removal or dismissal
from service. If, in the exercise of its prerogative as interpreter of the
Constitution, it determines that an act complained of falls within the
defined grounds for impeachment, then the Court should say so and
forthwith forward its recommendations to Congress as the body
constitutionally mandated to act in impeachment cases.
To Justice Brion, the Courts interpretation of plagiarism in this
controversy is only limited to its concept as an ethical violation of
members of the judiciary. He noted that [t]he dissatisfaction with the
Courts October 12, 2010 Decision (resolving the plagiarism charge
against Justice del Castillo or the plagiarism Decision) primarily lies
with the Courts declaration that malicious intent is a necessary
element in committing plagiarism.He discussed:
Separately from [the] distinctions [between plagiarism and copyright
infringement], the matter before the Court is Justice del Castillos
alleged plagiarism or failure to make attributions as an ethical violation,
not a copyright violation under the Intellectual Property Code. Given
these distinctions, I see no reason to quibble over the definition of
plagiarism a term that, in the absence of any statutory limitation, the
Court can define and interpret for purposes of its administrative
authority over all courts and the personnel thereof.
From the point of view of ethical rules, what are important are the intent
in undertaking an act and the concepts of integrity, propriety, honesty
and impartiality for purposes of dispensing justice by an independent
Judiciary. It is in this sense, and in light of the nature of the present
case as an administrative disciplinary charge against a Member of this
Court, that the pronouncement of this Court on plagiarism and on the
merits of the ethical charge should be understood.

xxx

xxx

xxx
-

When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges under its
supervision and control, it acts as an administrator imposing discipline
and not as a court passing upon justiciable controversies. It is precisely
for this reason that disciplinary cases are docketed as Administrative
Matters or A.M. Hence, any interpretation by the Court of plagiarism
is limited to this context and cannot be held to bind the academe in
undertaking its educational functions, particularly its own power to

define plagiarism in the educational context. It likewise cannot bind

Congress in its role as the sole authority to determine what constitutes
an impeachable offense, subject to what I stated above on the
established scope of impeachable offenses and the power of the Court
to act in grave abuse of discretion situations under the Constitution.
Specifically, a finding by this Court that plagiarism was or was not
committed cannot preclude Congress from determining whether the
failure or omission to make an attribution, intentionally or
unintentionally, amounts to a betrayal of public trust.
-

Justice Abads separate concurring opinion

Interestingly, Justice Abad went beyond the usual nature of a
concurring opinion in his treatment of the present controversy. [A
concurring opinion is an opinion that agrees with the ponencia or main
opinion, but expresses other reasons for such agreement. Atty.
Ed.] Aside from fully concur[ring] in the majority opinion, he also
react[ed] to the separate dissenting opinions of Justices Antonio T.
Carpio and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno.
As regards the view of Justice Carpio that the Court has no
authority over this controversy, Justice Abad argued:
Certainly . . . the Supreme Court has the administrative authority
to investigate and discipline its members for official infractions that do
not constitute impeachable offenses. This is a consequence of the
Courts Constitutional power of administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof. When the Court decided earlier the
plagiarism charge filed against Justice Mariano Del Castillo by the
petitioners in Vinuya, it was under a belief that plagiarism, which is not
even a statutory offense, is an administrative infraction. The petitioners
in that case did not themselves object to the proceedings conducted by
the Courts Ethics Committee.
After writing a rather toned down and respectful disagreement
withJustice Carpio, he then unleashed the brunt of his pen on Justice
Sereno:
Justice Sereno castigates the majority in the Court for lowering the
standards for judicial scholarship, negating the educative and moral
directional value in the writing and publishing of decisions, bending over
backwards to deny the objective existence of gross plagiarism, and
condoning dishonesty in the exercise of a function central to the role of
the courts.
But our courts are in the business, not of judicial scholarship, but of
deciding fairly and honestly the disputes before them, using precedents
and legal literature that, according to American scholars, belong to the

public domain. If this is not honest work for a judge, I do not know what
is.
-

And Justice Sereno has no right to preach at the expense of the

majority about educative and moral directional value in writing
published articles. For one thing, her standards are obviously for work
done in the academe, not for the judge plodding at his desk to perform
government work. For another, I note that on occasions she has
breached those very standards, lifting from works of others without
proper attribution.
Justice Abad then enumerated the instances when Justice
Sereno ostensibly did not properly attribute her sources: First, in
her article Toward the Formulation of a Philippine Position in Resolving
Trade and Investment Disputes in APEC, Justice Sereno allegedly lifted
verbatim portions from Annex 2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) 1994 entitledUnderstanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes without introduction
or preamble, without citing this specific source and [without using]
quotation marks to identify the copied portions. According to Justice
Abad, Justice Sereno thus made ordinary readers like him believe that
she also crafted those portions. Justice Abadwent on:
Justice Serenos explanation is that, since she was drawing from the
rules embodied in GATTs Understanding on Dispute Settlement, she
did not have to make attributions to those rules at each turn of her
writing. She may be correct if she in fact properly cited those rules the
first time she copied from it and, further, indicated a clear intent to do
further copying down the line. But she did not. xxx.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Further, she did not identify the portions she copied verbatim in order to
set them apart from her own writing. Under the rule that she foists on
Justice Del Castillo, quotation marks must be used whenever verbatim
quotes are made. This requirement is all the more important since,
unlike domestic rules, the rules of GATT are unfamiliar terrain to most
readers. Thus, at the next turn, she could have at least enclosed in
quotation marks the other portions she copied verbatim from her source
xxx.
In the same article, Justice Abad also noted that Justice Serenocopied
significant lines from Oppenheims Treatise without making an
attribution to that work. On Justice Sereno explanation that trite,
common, standard statement[s] like the ones she copied from
Oppenheim has nothing original at all about [them] and need no
citation or quotation marks,Justice Abad responded:

This is true. Indeed, the Court acknowledged in its October 12, 2010
decision that no plagiarism could be committed respecting common
definitions and terms, abridged history of certain principles of law, and
similar frequently repeated phrases that, in the world of legal literature,
already belong to the public realm. But I cite the above because
Justice Sereno would not grant to Justice Del Castillo the liberty to use
common definitions and terms in his ponencia without the correct
attribution.
Second, Justice Abad also mentioned about another omission of
attribution in an article entitled Justice and the Cost of Doing Business,
which was published in 2007 by Justice Sereno and two co-authors.
According toJustice Abad, a portion of this article appeared to have
been reproduced without attribution from a 2005 publication, the Asian
Development Bank Country Governance Assessment (Philippines)
2005. And although Justice Sereno has since explained to [Justice
Abads] satisfaction that such portion came from the three co-authors
earlier 2001 report submitted to the World Bank (WB), he nevertheless
commented:
Parenthetically, however, in the academic model, dual and overlapping
submissions is a thesis writers sin. It simply means that the same
academic work is submitted to gain credit for more than one academic
course. In the publishing world, while not prohibited across the board,
law journals and reviews frown upon authors who submit manuscripts
which have been previously published elsewhere, since the purpose of
publication is the circulation and distribution of original scholarship and
the practice would permit the author to be credited twice for the same
work.
Third, Justice Abad alleged that Justice Sereno lifted a famous phrase
from the United States case of Baker v. Carr without making attribution
in her memorandum for petitioners-intervenors in the case of Province
of North Cotabato, et al. v. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace and Panel on Ancestral Domain, et al. On Justice
Serenos explanation that, since she earlier cited Baker v. Carr in her
memorandum, it would be utterly pointless to require her to repeat her
citation as often as excerpts from the case appear down the
line, Justice Abad responded:
xxx. It is not quite pointless because one who copies from the work of
another has an obligation, she insists in her dissent, to make an
attribution to his source. Otherwise, a writer can simply say at the start
of his article that he is copying from a list of named cases and it would
be up to the reader to guess where the copied portions are located in
that article. An explanation like this from an academician is
disheartening.

After
his
counter-attack
against Justice
Abad thenclosed with the following lines:

Sereno, Justice

Using the severe standards she sets for Justice Del Castillo in Vinuya,
i.e., objective existence of plagiarism, I am afraid that any explanation
of good faith or lack of malicious intent on Justice Serenos part in
copying without proper attribution from the work of Judge Posner would
not be acceptable.
Still I can concede that Justice Sereno may not have intended to
plagiarize the work of others even if she copied verbatim from them
without proper attribution or quotation marks. Her above articles were,
taken as whole, essentially hers. I regret, however, that since she
wrote them as an academician bound by the high standards that she
and the University of the Philippines where she taught espouse, she
may have failed, borrowing her own phrase, to set the correct
educative and moral directional value for the young.
Justice Del Castillo, who did not write as an academician but as a
judge, is at least entitled to the liberties granted judges in writing
decisions.
Cf Vinuya vs Executive Secretary

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, nonprofit organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose
of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.

Since 1998, petitioners have approached the Executive Department

through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim
against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines.
However, these departments declined to assist the petitioners, and took
the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance
with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

The comfort women system was a legacy from the Rape of Nanking
back in December 1937 wherein the Japanese military forces raped
and murdered 20k-80k Chinese women, including young girls, pregnant
mother and elderly women. Because of the international condemnation,
the Japanese established this system so their military could
simultaneously appease their soldiers sexual appetites and contain
their activities within a regulated environment. The women were forced
into tiny cubicles in barracks-style stations and are forced to have sex
with around 30 soldiers per day, and each soldier is allotted 30 minutes.

Many countries and international organizations have acted on this issue

and they mainly wanted Japan to take responsibility for it by formally
acknowledging this historical fact and apologize for their soldiers
actions.

In response, many Japanese officials also issued public statements

regarding the comfort women system and apologized profusely for it
(since the 1993 public statement of Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono
to those of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe). They also established in 1995
the Asian Womens Fund (AWF) as their concrete attempt to address
their moral responsibility by offering monetary compensation to the
victims of the comfort women system (in South Korea, Taiwan, PH,
Indonesia, Netherlands). They had 3 programs:
- (1) atonement fund paying 2M to each woman,
- (2) medical and welfare support programs, and
- (3) letter of apology from the Japanese Prime Minister to each
woman.
- ISSUE
- W/N the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in
not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan? NO.
The Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
It is a political question and the President (as the sole representative in
foreign relations) has the sole discretion on the matter.
Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure."
"The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by
the Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'-departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done
in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision."
In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to
the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom
of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could
petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive
Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
Furthermore, by signing the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the PH
government has in effect agreed to terminate any recourse under
domestic law on the private claims of its citizens on the issues
concerned in the treaty. The treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the
war, and that after peace is concluded, neither the matter in dispute, nor
the conduct of either party, during the war, can ever be revived, or
brought into contest again. All violence, injuries, or damages sustained
by the government, or people of either, during the war, are buried in
oblivion; and all those things are implied by the very treaty of peace;
and therefore not necessary to be expressed.

 Also, the Philippines is not under any international obligation to

espouse petitioners claims.
The right of diplomatic protection (when the State would take up a case
on behalf of its subject/s before an international tribunal) belongs to the
State alone and is discretionary in nature. It is neither a duty nor an
obligation of the State to the subject; maybe there is a moral duty, but
not a legal one, and has therefore no means of enforcing its fulfillment.
Still depends on the State.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations
will not alter this analysis.
o Jus cogens = compelling law = norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and
custom; norms that are considered peremptory in the sense that
they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent
authority
o Erga omnes = in relation to everyone = obligations owed by
States towards the community of states as a whole.
Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive Department
to take up the petitioners cause. Ours is only the power to urge and
exhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners cause.
- Ruling: Petition dismissed
- In Re Sotto
- On December 7, 1948, Respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto was required by this
Court to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court for
having issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this
Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as
published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality,
reads as follows:
* As author of the Press Freedom Law (RA 53), interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily,
who has now to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge
the souce of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our
High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it
is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow
mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many
blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years,
I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to
change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce
that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming
congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the
Supreme Court of today constituted a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf
may hear: the Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano

Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who
were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.
- Respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat and
intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme
Court. But he contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, this Court has no power to
impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court
can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and a law has to
be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive.
- He also alleges in his answer that in the exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the
press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the
majority of the members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion,
erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, nor intended
to attack the honesty or integrity of anyone.
ISSUES
WON the Supreme Court may hold respondent guilty for contempt of court.
Ratio Any publication; pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties,
the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or
tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and
is punishable. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. The
summary power to commit and punish for contempt tending to obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the
execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority is a part
of the law of the land. (In re Kelly)
Reasoning In re Kelly lays down the doctrine of the power of courts to hold
contempt proceedings.
- Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good
faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court. But
in his above-quoted statement, he not only intends to intimidate the members
of this Court with a presentation of a bill in the next congressional session,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from
eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided
the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and
narrow-minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this
Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into the disrepute and
degrading the administration of justice.
- The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last
bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if
the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members
of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they

might be driven to take the law in their own hands, and disorder and perhaps
chaos may be the result.
- - As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like
any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney,
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
- - As Justice Holmes very appropriately said in U.S. v Sullens: The
administration of justice and freedom of the press, though separate and
distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The
press and courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to
uphold the constitution and laws, form which the former receives its
prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction This Court must be permitted to
proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from
outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will
be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an
individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its
existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.
- Disposition In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente
Sotto guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted
publication, and he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen
days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine P1000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
- The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period,
and show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred from practicing
as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication
and the following statements made by him during the pendency of the case
against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.
- The respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge against
him for contempt of court. He says that the cause for criticizing the decision
of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press,
when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere and
influence the final disposition of said case through intimidation and false
accusations against this Supreme Court.
Guerrero vs VIllamor
- Consequent to the dismissal of five criminal cases for qualified theft against
Naval by respondent Judge Villamor, the offended party, petitioner Carlos,
through his lawyer and co-petitioner Guerrero filed before the RTC Br. 21 of
Cebu City an action for damages against respondent Judge for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment in the aforesaid consolidated criminal cases.
Consequently, respondent Judge issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-09890993 an Order of Direct Contempt of Court against petitioners, finding them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct contempt and sentencing them both
to imprisonment of five days and a fine of P500 for degrading the respect and
dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous
language before the court.

- The derogatory and contemptuous language adverted to by respondent

judge are the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6478
reading:
* "12. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 0989, 0990, 0991, 0992
and 0993 for qualified theft was arrived at certainly without
circumspection-without any moral or legal basis-a case of knowingly
rendering unjust judgment since the dismissal was tantamount to
acquittal of the accused Gloria P. Naval who is now beyond the reach
of criminal and civil liability-all because the defendant Hon. Adriano R.
Villamor was bent backwards with his eyes and mind wilfully closed
under these circumstances which demanded the scrutiny of the
judicial mind and discretion free from bias x x x;"
*

"14. By the standard of a public official and a private person the

conduct of defendant Honorable Judge-not only shocking, but
appalling-in giving the plaintiff before his court the run-around is at the
very least distasteful, distressing and mortifying and moral damages
therefore would warrant on this kind of reprehensible behaviour x x x
* "15. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations, defendant
judge should also visit upon him x x x for reducing plaintiff his
agonizing victim of his disdain and contempt for the former who not
only torn asunder and spurned but also humiliated and spitefully
scorned.
- Petitioners assert that no direct contempt could have been committed
against respondent Judge in the complaint for damages in Civil Case No.
6478 because whatever was mentioned therein was not made "before"
respondent Judge while in session or in recess from judicial proceedings or
in any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the Court while it is
at work on a case before it. Furthermore, petitioners contend that the words
used in the subject complaint were
ISSUE
WON petitioners committed direct contempt of court through the use of
derogatory and contemptuous language before the court justifying the award
of damages being sought NO
HELD
Direct contempt could not have been committed against respondent Judge in
the complaint for damages because whatever was mentioned therein was
not made before respondent judge while in session or in recess from judicial
proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the
court while it is at work on a case before it. Furthermore, the words they used
In the subject complaint were merely words descriptive of the plaintiffs cause
of action based on his reaction and remorse and the willful infliction of injury
on him and that the same are all privileged communications made in the
course of judicial proceedings because they are relevant to the issue and
therefore cannot be contemptuous.
Strong words were used to lay stress on the gravity and degree of moral
anguish suffered by petitioner as a result of the dismissal of the subject
criminal merely words descriptive of plaintiffs cause of action based on his

reaction and remorse and the wilfull infliction of the injury on him and that the
same are all privileged communications made in the course of judicial
proceedings because they are relevant to the issue and therefore cannot be
contemptuous.
- In his Comment, respondent Judge maintains that petitioners harp too much
on the fact that the five criminal cases are closed cases and therefore the
language or words employed to describe, opine, criticize or condemn the
dismissal of said criminal cases in no way obstruct or hamper, ruin or disturb
the dignity and authority of the court presided over by respondent judge, as
said court was no longer functioning as such in the dispensation of justice.
This, according to respondent Judge, is a very dangerous perception for then
the court becomes vulnerable to all forms of verbal assaults, which would
shake the foundation of judicial authority and even of democratic stability, so
that the absence of such proceedings should not be made a shield to sully
the court's prestige.
- The Court sustains petitioners contention that the alleged derogatory
language employed in the complaint in the civil case did not constitute direct
contempt but may only, if at all, constitute indirect contempt subject to
defenses that may be raised by said petitioners in the proper proceedings.
Stress must be placed on the fact that the subject pleading was not
submitted to respondent Judge nor in the criminal cases from which the
contempt order was issued but was filed in another court presided by another
judge and involving a separate action: the civil case for damages against
respondent Judge. Although the allegations in the complaint for damages
criticized the wisdom of respondent Judges act of dismissing the criminal
cases, such criticism was directed to him when he was no longer in the
process of performing judicial functions in connection with the subject
criminal cases so as to constitute such criticisms as direct contempt of court.
- - The power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, so much so
that judges should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish
for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, the
power being intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for
the functions that they exercise. Any abuse of the contempt citation powers
will therefore be curtailed and corrected.
- - Be that as it may, lawyers, on the other hand, should bear in mind their
basic duty "to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers and x x x (to) insist on similar conduct by others." This
respectful attitude towards the court is to be observed, "not for the sake of
the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance." And it is "through a scrupulous preference for
respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance of the
respect due to the courts and judicial officers x x x."
- Ruling: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
assailed Order of Direct Contempt of Court dated December 11, 1987 is
declared NULL and VOID. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on
March 22, 1988 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Bueno vs Raneses

In her complaint, Bueno related that she hired Atty. Raneses to represent her
in Civil Case. Buenopaid Atty. Raneses a retainer fee of P3,000.00
She also agreed to pay him P300.00 for every hearing he attended. No
receipt was issued for the retainer fee paid.
Atty. Raneses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended
hearings. On several occasions, Atty. Raneses would either be absent or
late.
Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Raneses asked for
P10,000.00. This amount would allegedly be divided between him and Judge
Nidea, the judge hearing Civil Case so that they would not lose the case
Atty. Raneses told Bueno not to tell anyone about the matter. She
immediately sold a pig and a refrigerator to raise the demanded amount, and
gave it to Atty. Raneses
Atty. Raneses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in December 1988,
because the amount she had previously givenwas inadequate. > sold her
sala set and TV to raise amount
Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Raneses to
comment on the adverse party's offer of evidence and to submit their
memorandum on the case, but Atty. Raneses failed to comply with the court's
directive.
Atty. Raneses said there was no decision yet when it fact there already is a
decision. When confronted, he denied everything
Atty. Raneses also asked his client for money
* Atty. Raneses allegedly asked her to deliver a telegram from Justice
Buena of the Court of Appeals to her aunt, Socorro Bello. He told her
to tell Bello to prepare P5,000.00, an amount that Justice Buena
purportedly asked for in relation to Criminal Case that was then on
appeal with the Court of Appeals.
* Atty. Raneses went to Bello's residence two weeks later. In her
(Bueno's) presence, Bello paid Atty. Raneses P5,000.00. Bello
demanded a receipt but Atty. Raneses refused to issue one, telling her
that none of his clients ever dared to demand a receipt for sums
received from them
Atty. Raneses never filed an answer against Bueno's complaint. He
repeatedly failed to attend the hearings scheduled by Commissioner
Gonzaga. Commissioner declared him in default
IBP: indefinite suspension from practice of law
SC
* Negligence
- In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a
counsel's failure to file an appellant's brief amounts to
inexcusable negligence
- In this case, Atty. Raneses' alleged failure to file a comment on
the adverse party's offer of evidence and to submit the required
memorandum would have amounted to negligence
- Bueno did not support her allegations with court documents
that she could have easily procured
* Soliciting money

Court found that the respondent lawyer therein violated Canon

13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility - the rule that
instructs lawyers to refrain from any impropriety tending to
influence, or from any act giving the appearance of influencing,
the court.
- In this case, Atty. Raneses committed an even graver offense.
As explained below, he committed a fraudulent exaction, and at
the same time maligned both the judge and the Judiciary.
These are exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP
during the investigation of his case; he practically disregarded
its processes and even lied to one of the Investigating
Commissioners regarding the notices given him about the case.
- Buenos allegation was enough as evidence because the
nature of the act would necessarily take place in secrecy with
only respondent Atty. Raneses and complainant Bueno privy to
it
- false claim made by Atty. Raneses to the investigating
commissioners reveals his propensity for lying. It confirms, to
some extent, the kind of lawyer that Bueno's affidavits depict
him to be.
* He should be disbarred
- extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false
and fraudulent. It is false because no bribery apparently took
place as Atty. Raneses in fact lost the case
- fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was
the crime of bribery
- maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression
that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through
deceitful means - a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary.
- Atty. Raneses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier
attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.
Ruling: premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Raneses is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. Costs against the respondent.

In Re Almacen
- Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant in the civil case entitled Virginia
Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero. The trial court tendered judgment
against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the
decision, and on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served
on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of
the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966,
the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on
the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen

filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he

attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August
30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, on August 22,
1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no
objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals.
- CA, citing Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co.
dismissed the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration
dated July 5, 1966 does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing
thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co. Inc. vs. Bain Construction At Co.), which did not interrupt the running of
the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of
time."
- Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety
& Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled
"Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration.
- Atty. Almacen then appealed to the SC by certiorari. SC refused to take the
case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter
was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the said date was ordered expunged from
the records.
- Atty. Almacen then filed his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of
Title," a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks, against the
Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented
as it is unprofessional. The petition was filed on September 25, 1967, in
protest against what he asserts is "a great injustice committed against his
client by this Supreme Court." He indicts the Court, in his own phrase, as a
tribunal "people by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violation of the Constitution with impunity." His client, he continues, who was
deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the' altar of hypocrisy.'' In the same breath that he
alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of the
Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members, of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may
know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be
repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that ". . . . a resolution issue
ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned

attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in

the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession."
- Sept 28, 1967, SC resolved to withhold action on his petition until he shall
have actually surrendered his certificate. When nothing came from him, Atty.
Almacen was reminded to turn over his certificate so that the Court could act
on his petition.
- To said reminder Atty. Almacen manifested "that he has no pending petition
in connection with Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and
executory"; that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require
him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not
accepted, he "chose to 'pursue the negative act."
- Nov 17, 1967 SC resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges
contained in the Nov 17 resolution, Atty. Almacen asked for permission to
give reasons and cause in an open and public hearing. The Court required
Atty. Almacen to state his reasons for such request, to which he manifested
that since the Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred
to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public
hearing" so that the Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also
asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no,
time to hear him in person." He was allowed to file a written explanation and
thereafter was heard in oral argument.
- Atty. Almacens written answer offered no apology. Far from being contrite,
Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeated his jeremiad of lamentations, abundant
with sarcasm and innuendo[ Refer to the case for Atty. Almacens written
answer. The way he addressed the Court and how he laid down his points
should be a matter of interest. As the court said, this is a matter
unprecedented and unprofessional. One paragraph reads: Now that your
respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding
the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the
reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on
your respondent for acts he said in good faith.].
ISSUE
WON the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are
properly the object of disciplinary sanctions
HELD
- Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the
courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not,
which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate
criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public
confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice,
constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted
guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

- CA had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of Atty. Almacens

appeal in light of the law and applicable decisions of the SC. As a law
practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen
knew - or ought to have known - that for a motion for reconsideration to stay
the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of
the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse
party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). Atty.
Almacens own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal,
which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. There is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
- Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is
aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is
especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,
because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.
- As citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings
and indiscretions of courts and judges. It is his right to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.
- By constitutional mandate, it is the SCs solemn duty, amongst others, to
determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the
practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued
membership in the Bar.
- A critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its
high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy
criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment
and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant
striving to attain them. The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's
petition, answer and oral argumentation far transcend the permissible
bounds of legitimate criticism.
- NOTE: disciplinary proceedings like the present are Sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in
no sense a criminal prosecution. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proptio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as
an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney.

Disposition Accordingly, it is the sense of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further
orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Baculi vs Battung

There was a civil case before Municipal Trial Court Judge Baculi with
Atty. Battung as counsel who filed for Motion for Reconsideration of
the civil case decision.

The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) reveal that Judge Baculi

was normally in a high pitch even during the mandatory conference for
this current case.

Battung began shouting when he responded to the question: Did

you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure?

Batung said that he shouted because the Judge was shouting.

The Judge warned him not to shout and explained that Judge
Baculis voice has always been that way and that if Atty. Battung did not
like it, he should have his case elsewhere.

Instead of following the Court, Battung continued shouting until both

of them were shouting.

Judge Baculi warned that he would be cited for contempt and Battung
responded: Then cite me!

Judge Baculi cited him for contempt of court to pay 100php.

However, Atty. Battung warned that he will file the necessary action
against court for gross ignorance of the law.

Atty. Battung went out and the hearing for the next case began.

He then returned and tried to speak to the judge while another

case was being heard. He was thrown out of room by the sheriff.

Judge Baculi also claims that Atty. Battung was out at the courthouse
hall when he went out after the hearings and the Attorney shouted
again I am not afraid of you! I will file gross ignorance against you!
and even challenged the judge to a fight but he was escorted out of the
building by staff and lawyers.

IBP Investigating Commissioner De la Rama found out that Battung

was the one who shouted first as evidenced by the TSN and the
tape.
Issue: Was there a violation of Canon 11 - YES
- Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the
courtroom during proceedings in presence of litigants and their
counsels, and court personnel.
-

He continued to act in such a disrespectful way even after being cited

for contempt.

He even returned and disrupted the ongoing proceedings.

As such, his actions were not only against the person and position of
Judge Baculi but against the court as well whose proceedings were
flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute.

As Canon 11 provides, litigants and counsels, particularly the latter

because of their position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be
allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and
the court that he represents.

Roxas vs. De Zuzuarregui, Jr. it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of

the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for
the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this
guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations

When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge

Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against
the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to
erode the public confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in
his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if
true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided
under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot
act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice
system into disrepute.
Ruling: GUILTY violated Rule 11.03;
SUSPENDED 1 year
STERN WARNING

Lacurom vs Jacoba
- Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R.
Veneracion ("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against
defendant Federico Barrientos
- MTC Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but
Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to
Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge
- Judge Lacurom issued a Resoluton reversing the earlier judgments rendered
in favor of Veneracion.
- Veneracion's counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration
* This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it
is entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal
MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform
ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE!
The mistakes are very patent and glaring
- Motion prayed that
* (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff a fighting
chance" and
* (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside. Atty. Olivia VelascoJacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the JacobaVelasco-Jacoba Law Firm.
- Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and
explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very
disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion
- Defense of Velasco-Jacoba
* records will show that the she did not actually or actively participate in
this case.

* They were just articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and

disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good fortune, not driven by
any desire to just cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge.
They must believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big
adjectives, no more no less.
* Willing to apologize
Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her
with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration
* on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis
Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi
last day na, baka mahuli. She signed the pleading handed to her
without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her husband of 35 years
with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future. This pleading
turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but
could not sign because of his then suspension from the practice of
law.
* Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without conducting
any hearing.
Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
IBP: recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law
for six months.
SC
* By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified
that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for
the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion
with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to
that of a court document.
* It was the habit of the spouses to sign each others pleadings. By
Velasco-Jacoba's own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of
Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in
itself is a ground for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent
of any other ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001
motion
* USE OF LANGUAGE
- We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent
nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error,
boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the
judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the
words created "a cacophonic picture of total and utter
disrespect."
- Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity
of the legal profession
- The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to
promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial
administration.

* Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative

cases before this Court
- Jacoba
> suspended for 6 months because of "his failure to file an
action for the recovery of possession of property despite
the lapse of two and a half years from receipt by him of
P550 which his client gave him as filing and sheriff's
fees."
> 1 year suspension because he failed to file the
appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal of his client's
appeal
- Velasco-Jacoba
> Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in barangay
conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing
fully well the prohibition contained in Section 415 of the
Local Government Code.
* Ruling: SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two
(2) years effective upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND
Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months
effective upon finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN
respondents that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall
merit a more severe sanction
Embido vs Pe

Complaint for disbarment against Attorney Salvador N. Pe, Jr. for

allegedly falsifying an inexistent decision of branch 64 of the RTC
stationed in Bugasong, Antique. Instituted by the NBI represented by
attorney Embido

July 7, 2004 1st letter received by clerk of court from Mr, Hunt in
England inquiring about the declaration of presumptive death of Rey
Laserna (decision by Judge Rafael Penuela on February 12, 1997,
where Shirley Quioyo was petitioner)

September 9, 2004 2nd Letter received by clerk of court from Mr. Hunt
reiterating request for copy of the decision

Judge Penuelta asked clerk fo court to retrieve copy of proceedings,

was found that court had no copy of such proceedings

Court informed Mr. Hunt that requested proceedings doesnt exist. Mr.
Hunt replied with a copy of the supposed decision which was
presented by Shirley Quioyo in a court proceeding in the UK

Court determined that sent document was a forgery, Judge Penuela

notified Mr. Hunt of the situation

Dy Quioyo, brother of Shirley, executed an affidavit testifying that it was

Attorney Pe who facilitated the issuance of the falisified decision.
Allegations were corroborated by Shirley

NBI invtited Attorney Pe to explain his side but he invoked his right to
remain silent. NBI issued subpoenas to both Quioyo but only Dy
showed up to explain his side.

NBI recommended for the facilitation of disbarment proceedings against

Atty Pe

Atty Pe filed a counter-affidavit, denying anything to do with falsification,

states that he only gave the Quioyos an opinion on the pertinent laws
and and the different grounds for annulment of marriage. Dy came back
with a copy of what appeared to be a court decision

IBP Investigating Commissioner came back with the finding that

Attorney Pe was guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the
Attorneys Oath of Office and Code of Professional Responsibility. She
concluded that the respondent had forged the purported decision of
Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084
concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey
Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact
the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of presumptive
death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner; 18
and that the respondent had received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for
the falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions thusly:

Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends

that it was one Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance
and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of the widow of
Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first
place, if the decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an
almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge
Penuelas branch except for the names and dates? Respondent failed
to explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI
investigation and merely invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of
the story were true, he should have made this known in the
investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere
afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and
his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this incident.
Issue: W/N Falsifying a court proceeding constitutes a violation of rule 11.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility? YES
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of
grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in
a non-existent court proceeding.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all
lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal
Profession.
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Ruling: Attorney Pe was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule
7.03 of Canon 7. He is hereby disbarred as well as removed from the role of
attorneys
-

Maceda vs Vasquez
- Respondent Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office filed an affidavit-complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman.
- He alleged that petitioner Maceda, a Presiding Judge in RTC Antique, had
falsified his Certificate of Service by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90
days have been determined and decided" on or before a certain date, when
in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in 5
civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
- Respondent further alleged that Maceda similarly falsified his certificates of
service for several months in 1989 and 1990, for a total of 17 months.
- On the other hand, Maceda contends that he had been granted by this Court
an extension of 90 days to decide the aforementioned cases.
- Maceda also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said
case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense
charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is
under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
- Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision
over all inferior courts.
- ISSUES
- 1. WON Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case despite the Courts ruling
in Orap v. Sandiganbayan
- 2. WON the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment
into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all the inferior courts
- HELD
- 1. NO. There is nothing in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses
committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his
certificate of Service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and inefficiency. And criminally liable to the state under the RPC
for his felonious act.
- 2. YES.
- The Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates
of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates
reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the
necessary records to make such a determination. In fine, where a
criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint
and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court
employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
- the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the investigation of the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
- ART VIII, sec 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests on the SC administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel. The Ombudsman cannot
justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the

Constitution for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific
mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the SC.
- he Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioners certificates of
service to the SC for determination of whether said certificates reflected the
true status of his pending case load. (SO admin case first before criminal.)
- The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of
government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this
matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having
been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before
him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had
not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the
Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the
resolution of said question?
- Disposition Petition granted. Ombudsman is directed to dismiss the
complaint filed by the public respondent.
Malonzo vs Principe
- Disbarment complaint filed before the IBP claiming that Atty Principe, without
authority entered his appearance as Malonsos counsel in an expropriation
proceeding initiated by the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR)
- Malonso further complained that after being illegally represented, Atty
Principe claimed 40% of the selling price of the disputed land to the
NAPOCOR as attorneys fees and even claimed to be a co-owner of said
property.
- Respondent argues that the services of the Principe, Villano, Villacorte and
Clemente Law Offices were engaged by the Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at
Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR, Inc (SANDAMA) in a contract of legal services.
Malonso is a member of SANDAMA and had executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA)in favor of SANDAMAs president, Danilo Elfa, to act on behalf
of Malonso.
- The investigating committee found out that more than 2 years after the
expropriation cases were instituted, respondent filed a motion to separate his
legal fees and filed his notice of entry of appearance, claiming that he is the
legal counsel of complainant. 69 lot owners wrote to NAPOCOR, stating that
they had never authorized Elfa to hire the services of respondents law firm.
The report showed that SANDAMA is not a party in the expropriation
proceedings and that the SPA was in favor of Elfa and not SANDAMA.
- The report also noted that the right of legal representation could not be
derived from the documents. A contract for legal services is personal in
nature. IBP Board of Governors found Atty Principe guilty of
misrepresentation.
- Issue: W/N Atty Principe is liable for violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Canon
10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12, Code of Professional
Responsibility NO
- R/H:
- It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer accounts for his
behavior towards the court, his client, his peers in the profession and the

public. However, the duty of the Court is not limited to disciplining those guilty
of misconduct, but also to protecting the reputation of those wrongfully
charged, much more, those wrongfully found guilty.
- IBP, even as it aims to the elevation and improvement of the standards of law
profession, is not exempt in promoting respect to the law and to abstain from
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening the confidence in the
legal system. Respect for law is eroded when lawyers themselves engage in
unlawful activities.
- The Resolution released by IBP regarding Malonso v Atty Principe was
reached not through a formal voting but through a mere consensus. Rules of
Court provides that before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of
law by the IBP, there should be
* (1) a review of the investigators report;
* (2) a formal voting; and
* (3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board.
- This is to show that it was an official decision of the Board as a body and not
merely the collective view of the members.
- The Court believes that Atty. Principe instituted the claim out of his honest
belief that it was the best way to protect his interests. After all, SANDAMA
procured his firms services and was led to believe that he would be paid for
the same. There is evidence which tend to show that respondent and his firm
rendered legal and even extra-legal services in order to assist the
landowners get a favorable valuation of their properties. Respondent is not
proscribed in seeking recovery of attorneys fees he had rendered.
- CASE IS DISMISSED. IBP enjoined to comply with the procedure outlined in
Rule 139-B in all cases involving disbarment and disciplining of lawyers.
Saa vs IBP-CBD
- Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent
Atty. Freddie A. Venida because Venidas act of filing 2 cases against him
was oppressive and constituted unethical practice
- Atty. Venida was required to comment on the complaint against him
- Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint, Atty. Venida still did not file his
complete comment within 10 days as required in the February 17, 1992
resolution
- Consequently, we issued the June 14, 1995 resolution requiring Atty. Venida
to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for failure to comply with the February 17, 1992 resolution.
- Venida filed his comment which was a mere reiteration of his partial
comment. Atty. Venida also added that he was merely performing his duty as
counsel of Saa's adversaries
- matter was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
- Commissioner George S. Briones recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit. no evidence that the two cases filed by Atty.
Venida against Saa were acts of oppression or unethical practice.
- Board of governors of IBP adopted this and dismissed complaint. Saa filed
motion for reconsideration but was denied
- Saa filed petition for certiorari because there was grave abuse of

SC
-

discretion to the IBP when it adopted and affirmed the report of the
investigating commissioner dismissing his complaint
* investigating commissioner's report did not at all mention the dismissal
of OMB 1-90-1118 and A.C. P-90-513, even if the existence of both
cases was admitted by the parties
* investigating commissioner's report did not at all mention the dismissal
of OMB 1-90-1118 and A.C. P-90-513, even if the existence of both
cases was admitted by the parties

Grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or

despotic exercise of judgment by reason of passion or personal hostility as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
* It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
* A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply
because a party affected disagrees with it.
- Court disapprovs of Atty Venidas blatant refusal to complywith various court
directives. As a lawyer, he had the responsibility to follow legal orders and
processes
- He ony filed a partial comment 11 months after he was asked to do so
- He filed complete comment 3 years after he was told to do so
- He delayed the resolution of the case in both instances
- Atty. Venida failed to file a memorandum within the period required in our
May 17, 2004 resolution despite the 30-day deadline
- Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial and full
comments. But tried to exculpate himself by saying
* he inadvertently misplaced the complaint and had a heavy workload
(for his partial comment).
* blamed a strong typhoon for the loss of all his files, the complaint
included (for his full comment).
- a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
- Ruling: petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The charge of oppressive or
unethical behavior against respondent is dismissed. However, for violation of
Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as the lawyer's oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective immediately
from receipt of this resolution. He is further STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Plus Builders vs Revilla
- decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) in
favor of herein complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the
tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido de Guzman,
Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco, Serafin
Santarin, Benigno Alvarez and Maria Esguerra, who were the clients of
respondent, Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.
- PARAD found that respondent's clients were mere tenants and not rightful
possessors/owners of the subject land.
- SC sustained complainants rights over the land

Continuing to pursue his clients' lost cause, respondent was found to have
committed intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with the
intention to delay the execution of the decision through the filing of several
motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to
quiet title despite the finality of the decision
he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and is
SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Revilla filed for motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period
appealing to the Court to take a second look at his case and praying that the
penalty of suspension of two years be reduced to mere reprimand or
admonition for the sake of his family and the poor clients he was defending
* He did not commit the acts complained of
* courses of action he took were not meant to unduly delay the
execution of the DARAB Decision dated November 19, 1999, but were
based on his serious study, research and experience as a litigation
lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to him by his
clients in the DARAB case
* He was not the original lawyer in the case
- The lawyer-client relationship with the former lawyer was
terminated because Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. felt that their
former counsel did not explain/argue their position very well,
refused to listen to them and even criticized them
- As a new counsel, he candidly relied on what the
tenants/farmers told him in the course of his interview and they
said that they had been in open, adverse, continuous and
notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for
more than 50 years
* filing of the action to quiet title was resorted to in order to determine
the rights of his clients respecting the subject property
* he merely exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to which his
clients were entitled under the law, considering that his clients were
subjected to harassment and threats of physical harm and summary
eviction by the complainant
* he was only being protective of the interest of his clients as a good
father would be protective of his own family
* his services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro bono.
he submits that if he is indeed guilty of violating the rules in the courses of
action he took in behalf of his clients, he apologizes and supplicates the
Court for kind consideration, pardon and forgiveness
* complaint fails to show him wanting in character, honesty, and probity
* he has been a member of the bar for more than 20 years, served as
former president of the IBP Marinduque Chapter, a legal aide lawyer of
IBP Quezon City handling detention prisoners and pro bono cases

SC
-

* he is also a member of the Couples for Christ, and has had strict
training in the law school he graduated from and the law offices he
worked with
* sole breadwinner in the family with a wife who is jobless, four (4)
children who are in school, a mother who is bedridden and a sick
sister to support.
* The family's only source of income is respondent's private practice of
law, a work he has been engaged in for more than twenty-five (25)
years up to the present
Office of the Bar Confidant received a letter from respondent, requesting that
he be issued a clearance for the renewal of his notarial commission.
Respondent stated therein that he was aware of the pendency of the
administrative cases against him, but pointed out that said cases had not yet
been resolved with finality. Respondent sought consideration and
compassion for the issuance of the clearance -- considering present
economic/financial difficulties -- and reiterating the fact that he was the sole
breadwinner in the family

rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
- A lawyer's devotion to his client's cause not only requires but also entitles
him to deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly
due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter's
cause to succeed
- respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent
that the respondent's acts complained of were committed out of his overzealousness and misguided desire to protect the interests of his clients who
were poor and uneducated.
Ruling: letter-request dated August 15, 2008 is NOTED. Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13,
2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
Respondent is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of said
Resolution within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
PNB vs Uy Teng Piao
- Appeal by PNB from decision of CFI Manila absolving Teng Piao
- CFI rendered judgement in favour of PNB and against Teng Piao in a Civil
Case for the sum of P17.2K plus 7% interest per annum
- Court ordered Teng Piao to deposit said amount with the clerk of court within
3 months from the date of judgement and failure to do so would mortgaged
property would be sold in a public auction
- Teng Piao failed to comply so the Sheriff of Manila sold the 2 parcels of land
to PNB in a public auction
- PNB secured from Teng Piao waiver of right to redeem property on one of the
properties and sold it to Mariano Santos for P8.6K
- Other parcel of land was sold by PNB for P2.7K

* Bank credited Teng Piao wth the full amount realized by it when it
resold the properties
- bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of
P11,574.38, with interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930
- Teng Piao said that he waived his right to redeem because he thought that
the Bank would no longer collect from him the balance of the judgement
- SC
* Teng Piao failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank
not to collect the balance
* One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant
renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo,
Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying
it.
* With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should
like to observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be
a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts
prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is
necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active
management of the case
* If Pecson had made any such agreement as the defendant claims, it is
reasonable to suppose that he would have required the defendant to
waive his right to redeem both parcels of land, and that the defendant,
a Chinese business man, would have insisted upon some evidence of
the agreement in writing.
* It appears to us that the defendant waived his right to redeem the land
in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished to purchase it and
was willing to pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the
defendant with the full amount of the sale
* Assuming there was an agreement, it is not shown that Pecson was
authorized to make any such agreement for the bank.
* Only the board of directors or the persons empowered by the board of
directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. There is no merit
in the contention that since the bank accepted the benefit of the
waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged agreement.
* The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold it
at the instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant
with the full amount of the resale was a sufficient consideration for the
execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem.
Ruling: decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is condemned to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per
annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of both instances

Nestle Phil vs Sanchez

-

From July 8-10, union members of Union of Filipro Employees or the

Kimberly Independent Labor Union, who filed a case in court intensified
their pickets that they had been conducting since June 17 in front of the
Padre Faura gate of the SC

Despite of the warning given by the court to their leaders and counsel,
the picketing continued
The union members are obstructing the access to and egress from the
courts premises. They have also constructed provisional shelters
along the sidewalks, set up kitchens and littered the place. they took
turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers
ISSUE:
W/N the rallyists must be held with contempt
HELD:
The contempt charges were dismissed
The Counsel of the union members apologized to the court and
promised that the incident will not be repeated again
The picketing was actually done by the members of the PAMANTIK
(Pagkakaisa ng MAnggagawa sa Timog Katalugan), an unregistered
loose allegiance of about 75 unions in the Southern Tagalog and not by
either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent
Labor Union.
But the court will not hesitate in future similar incidents to apply the full
force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure
the court to acting one way or the other in any case pending before it.
Infuence
* the right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the
citizen under all free governments.
* However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has
never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety
entertained for the conduct of courts.
* "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that
courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should
be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be
decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies
* "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly
in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or
public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in
the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice
administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law
free from outside coercion or interference."
* The court is entitled to proceed to the disposition of its business
in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive
of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice.
* Any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the
exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof and is no
longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, and that any
such efforts to influence the court constitutes contempt of court.

Individuals cited by the court are non-lawyers who are not

knowledgeable of the courts processes and rights of free speech and of
assembly
Did not know that what they were doing constitutes contempt of court
duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and
heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C.
Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to
demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture.
Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the
legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly
apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward
courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing
educational program for their members
Ruling: contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED.
Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or
influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending
cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any
and all courts
In re de Vera
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors was set on April 26,
2003, a month prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May
22-24, 2003 in compliance with IBP by laws.
Later on, the outgoing IBP Board reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or
after the IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the
Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P.
Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a letter
requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its Resolution.
Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz.
> (1) IBP By Laws require the holding of the election of Regional
Governors at least one month prior to the national convention of
the IBP to prevent it from being politicized since post-convention
elections may otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in
unacceptable political practices, and;
> (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible
for the outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests in the election
for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in the
IBP By Laws. Motion was denied.
After the IBP national convention had been adjourned, Attys. Oliver
Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez filed a Petition
before the IBP Board seeking
> (1) the postponement of the election for Regional Governors to
the second or third week of June 2003; and
> (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being
elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region.
IBP denied petition stating that there was no compelling justification for
the postponement of the elections and that the petition for
disqualification was premature.

Petitioners filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same
reliefs as those sought in their Petition before the IBP.
The SC issued a TRO, directing the IBP Board, its agents,
representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to cease and
desist from proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional Governor
in Eastern Mindanao.
Petitioners Claim
De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay,
Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del
Sur Chapter because he coveted the IBP presidency. [Following the
rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern
Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will
automatically become the EVP. The EVP will automatically succeed the
President in the next term]
De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude.
> He was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly
attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations
on the constitutionality of the plunder law.
> He also could have been disbarred in the United States for
misappropriating his clients funds had he not surrendered his
California license to practice law.
De Vera actively campaigned for the position of Eastern Mindanao
Governor during the IBP National Convention, a prohibited act under
the IBP By-Laws
Respondents Comments
Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy: the election of
the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of
those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter
Petitioners have no legal standing because there is no disqualification
in the by laws. Only election protests are provided for but only qualified
nominees can file protest. Petitioners are not among qualified
nominees.
An IBP member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter
membership. It was upon the invitation of the officers and members of
the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter that he transferred his IBP
membership. It is unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his
membership transfer was done for convenience and as a mere
subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship
He denies exhibiting disrespect to the Court or to any of its members
during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law
As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his
clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn
compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he
maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral
qualification to run for the position as there is no final judgment finding
him guilty of the administrative charge
On the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National
Convention, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was

campaigning simply because he declared that he had 10 votes to

support his candidacy for governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region
and that the petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate
their claim that he or his handlers had billeted the delegates from his
region at the Century Park Hotel
ISSUES
1. WON this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy
2. WON petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera,
the determination of which in turn requires the resolution of two subissues, namely:
a. WON the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper
remedy under the IBP By-Laws
b. WON the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;
3. WON the present Petition is premature
4. Assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present
petition is not premature, WON respondent De Vera is qualified to run
for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region
HELD
1. Ratio As there exists a clear constitutional grant of power to the SC
to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, the SC has jurisdiction over the
present controversy.
Reasoning Sec. 5, Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution confers power to SC
to supervise all activities of the IBP. The IBP by-laws also recognize the
full range of the power of supervision of the SC over the IBP.
2A. Ratio Since the IBP By-laws do not provide for disqualification of
candidates for IBP governor, petition to disqualify is not the proper
remedy.
Reasoning Petition has no firm ground to stand on. Changes
previously adopted by the Court simplified the election process and
made it less controversial. The grounds for disqualification were thus
removed in the present by-laws.
2B. Ratio With the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the
present petition, petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit.
Reasoning As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file
with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds
therefore. only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del
Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the election for the
16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the
rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the
IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the
other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental
IBP Chapter. Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be
nominated at the forthcoming election.
3. Ratio Petition to seek disqualification of a person is premature when
the person has not yet even been nominated.
Reasoning Before a member is elected governor, he has to be
nominated first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not
been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has

been made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from

Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera
gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.
4. Ratio As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements
provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred.
Reasoning The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected
governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good
standing of the IBP, 2) he is included in the voters list of his chapter or
he is not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs,
(3) he does not belong to a chapter from which a regional governor has
already been elected, unless the election is the start of a new season or
cycle, and (4) he is not in the government service. With regards to his
transfer of membership the same is valid having been made 17 months
prior election, The only condition required under the rules is that the
transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election
of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer. There is
nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be
morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so
because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the
individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. For
another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of
moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an
offense which involves moral turpitude. The contempt ruling cannot
serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for
which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral
turpitude (an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals.) On the administrative complaint in California, no final
judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him
guilty of the charge. On the allegation that respondent de Vera or his
handlers had housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the
Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again
petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must
be emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court
Disposition Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to
run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th
election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30 May 2003
which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional
Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED

Perez vs Estrada

KBP, an association representing duly franchised and authorized

television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter
requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated
trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to
assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history."
- The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter to the
Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney
Ricardo Romulo.
- The Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the
instant petition; public interest, the petition further averred, should be
evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital information
affecting the nation.
- In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991
resolution of this Court in a case for libel filed by then President
Corazon C. Aquino: Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to
due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the
proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the
Court resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall
be limited and restricted as above indicated."
ISSUE
WON live radio and television coverage of the trial of the plunder and
other criminal cases filed against Pres. Estrada should be allowed
HELD
- NO. The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve
the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the
constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a
fair and impartial trial.
- Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence
until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual
settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the
conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or
influence10 but only by evidence and argument given in open court,
where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
- An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to
him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held
critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt
with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago.
- A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that
the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the

available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process.
- The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the
press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's
exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means
of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public
with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse,
the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused
to due process17 which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its
constitutional proportions.
- The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 Apri1
2001, expressed its own concern on the live television and radio
coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase:
Live television and radio coverage can negate the rule on
exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a
fair trial;
at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the
accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice
system, and
live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the
"hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging
the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the court will be
acceptable only if popular;
and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not
subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for
publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
- Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal
courts do not allow live television and radio coverage of their
proceedings.
- The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of
great dimensions so involving as they do a former President of the
Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice become the
nation's focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and
EDSA III where the magnitude of the events has left a still divided
nation.
- The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to turn a blind
eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action being
allowed to now creep into even the business of the courts in the
dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in
the standing rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October
1991 may not appear to be propitious.
Ruling:
audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada
before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the
account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions:
(a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such
portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine

should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the

Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be
regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings;
(c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for
documentary purposes only and shall be made without
comment except such annotations of scenes depicted
therein as may be necessary to explain them;
(d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the
Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the
cases against the former President shall be prohibited
under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in
case of violations of the prohibition;
(e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audiovisual recording of the proceedings shall be made under
the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its
Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules
promulgated by it; and
(f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual
recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall
be deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation and
exhibition in accordance with law.
Vitug Separate opinion
Due Process is timeless.
It is a precious fundamental right that secures and
protects, under a rule of law, the life, and liberty of a
person from the oppression of power. A cherished fixture
in our bill of rights, its encompassing guarantee will not be
diminished by advances in science and technology. I fail
to perceive it to be otherwise.
The right of the public to information, in any event, is not
here really being sacrified.
The right to know can very well be achieved via other
media coverage; the windows of information through
which the public might observe and learn are not closed.
I still find it hard to believe that the presence of the cameras
inside the courtroom will not have an untoward impact on
the court proceedings
No empirical data has been shown to suggest otherwise.
To the contrary, experience attests to the intimidating
effect of cameras and electronic devices in courtrooms on
the litigants, witnesses and jurors.

 natural reticence of witnesses at the stand can even easily

be exacerbated by placing them on camera in
contravention of normal experience
demeanor of the witnesses can also have an abstruse
effect on the ability of the judge to accurately assess the
credibility of such witnesses
it does not seem right to single out and make a spectacle of
the cases against Mr. Estrada.
Dignity is a precious part of personability innate in ever
human being, and there can be no cogent excuse for
impinging it even to the slightest degree.
It is not the problem of privacy that can cause concern
more than the erosion of reality that cameras tend to cast.
Cruz vs Salva
A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de Jesus,
Bonifacio, Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder. They all appealed and
Castelo sought new trial. Castelo was again found guilty.
Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation.
Philippine Constabulary
questioned people and got confessions pointing to persons other than those
convicted.
- Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new
confessions. Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the Justice Sec decided to have
the results of investigation made available to counsel for appellants.
- Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and
confessions.
Salva organized a committee for reinvestigation and
subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was implicated as instigator and mastermind
in the new affidavits and confessions. Cruz counsel questioned jurisdiction of
the committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation bec the case
was pending appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition.
- Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz oral and personal request to
allow him to appear at the investigation.
- SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the prelim investigation.
ISSUES
1. WON Salva and his committee can push through with the investigation
2. WON Cruz can be compelled to appear and testify before Salva
3. WON Salva conducted the investigation property
HELD
1. Yes.
- SC believed Salva that it was Cruz who personally reqested to allow him to
appear at the investigation.
- Normally, when a criminal case handled by fiscal is tried and decided and
appealed to a higher court, functions of fiscal have terminated. However,
Salva has justified his reinvestigation bec in the orig case, one of the
defendants (Salvador Realista y de Guzman) was not included in the trial.
- The duty of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure
conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
- Writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. Investigation may continue.
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted in part, denied in part.

2. No
- Under the law, Cruz had right to be present at the investigation but he need
not be present. His presence is more of a right than a legal obligation.
3. No
- Salva should have done investigation privately in his office and not publicly
in the session hall of Municipal Court of Pasay where microphones were
installed and media people were present. He should also not have made the
media people ask questions. SC was disturbed and annoyed by such
publicity.
- Salva is publicly reprehended and censured.

Foodsphere Inc vs Mauricio

Disbarment case against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr.,
writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS,
Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!,
host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast
over UNTV
host of aradio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over
DZBB
certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in
Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. As
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread,
they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of
worms inside the can. This was complained before the BFAD.
After conciliation meetings between Cordero and the petitioner, the
Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN seeking the withdrawal of
their complaint before the BFAD.
The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint.
Respondent, Atty. Mauricio, Jr., who affixed his signature to the
KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in
a tabloid that he prepared the document.
Complainant filed criminal complaints against respondent and several
others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and
356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at
the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint. Despite the
pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo
order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and
broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO,
respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its
products.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Yes
HELD
YES.
RATIO

 The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03

of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: A lawyer shall
not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
The language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions
on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the
Prosecutors connected with said Office.
Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said
Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design to submit
any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations.
The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings
is manifestly violative of Canon 11 and the fundamental Canon 1 also of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.
Respondent defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents)
oath as a member of the legal profession to obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandate, and by failing to live up to
his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal
profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all times
uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.
Ruling: Respondent suspended for three (3) years from the practice of
law

Maglasang vs People
a petition for certiorari entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of
the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City
Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the SC.
Due to noncompliance with the requirements the SC dismissed the
petition.
nonpayment of the legal fees
non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true
copies of the questioned decision and orders of the respondent
judge
-On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of
the petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing
the petition.
This time, the amount of P316.50 was remitted and the Court was
furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and
also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership
dues.

 The motion for reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or
certified true copies of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated
October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied with
finality.
- On January 22, 1990 the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy
of a strongly-worded complaint filed with the Office of the President of
the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer,
Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices of the
Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or
knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution."
- Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper
conduct by reason of the strong and intemperate language of the
complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which
has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the
Supreme Court.
-On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed his "Opposition."
Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive
criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very
strict practices of the Justices concerned.
Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction of
the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause
inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this particular case and
no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction
to give such order."
Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the
mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the
complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be punished in
accordance with the law just like a common tao."

ISSUE
WON Atty Castellano is guilty of improper conduct and be punished for
contempt

HELD
YES.
Outside interference
filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second
Division, even the most basic tenet of our government system
the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive,
and the legislative branches has been lost on Atty. Castellano.
"the Supreme Court is supreme the third great department of
government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to
adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private.
No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or
declare them 'unjust.'" Consequently, and owing to the

foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief

Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.
-Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive
criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict
practices of the Justices" is but an effort to sanitize his clearly
unfounded and irresponsible accusation.
The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no
jurisdiction to question his act of having complained before the Office of
the President, and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a
weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however,
reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism.
Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of
the Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an impeachment of
their capacity to render justice according to law.
Disposition Atty. Castellano found guilty of improper conduct and
contempt of court and fined P1,000.00 and suspended from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months