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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC

G.R.No.L9356February18,1915
C.S.GILCHRIST,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
E.A.CUDDY,ETAL.,defendants.
JOSEFERNANDEZESPEJOandMARIANOZALDARRIAGA,appellants.
C.Lozanoforappellants.
Bruce,Lawrence,RossandBlockforappellee.
TRENT,J.:
An appeal by the defendants, Jose Fernandez Espejo and Mariano Zaldarriaga, from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, dismissing their crosscomplaint upon the merits for damages against the plaintiff for the
allegedwrongfulissuanceofamandatoryandapreliminaryinjunction.
Upontheapplicationoftheappelleeanexpartemandatoryinjunctionwasissuedonthe22dofMay,1913,directing
the defendant, E.A. Cuddy, to send to the appellee a certain cinematograph film called "Zigomar" in compliance
with an alleged contract which had been entered into between these two parties, and at the time an ex parte
preliminaryinjunctionwasissuedrestrainingtheappellantsfromreceivingandexhibitingintheirtheatertheZigomar
untilfurtherordersofthecourt.Onthe26thofthatmonththeappellantsappearedandmovedthecourttodissolve
thepreliminaryinjunction.WhenthecasewascalledfortrialonAugust6,theappelleemovedforthedismissalof
the complaint "for the reason that there is no further necessity for the maintenance of the injunction."The motion
wasgrantedwithoutobjectionastoCuddyanddeniedastotheappellantsinordertogivethemanopportunityto
provethattheinjunctionwerewrongfullyissuedandtheamountofdamagessufferedbyreasonthereof.
Thepertinentpartofthetrialcourt'sfindingsoffactinthiscaseisasfollows:
ItappearsinthiscasethatCuddywastheownerofthefilmZigomarandthatonthe24thofAprilherentedit
toC.S.GilchristforaweekforP125,anditwastobedeliveredonthe26thofMay,theweekbeginningthat
day. A few days prior to this Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist, which he had forwarded to him in
Manila,sayingthathehadmadeotherarrangementswithhisfilm.Theotherarrangementswastherentalto
these defendants Espejo and his partner for P350 for the week and the injunction was asked by Gilchrist
againstthesepartiesfromshowingitfortheweekbeginningthe26thofMay.
Itappearsfromthetestimonyinthiscase,conclusively,thatCuddywillfullyviolatedhiscontract,hebeingthe
owner of the picture, with Gilchrist because the defendants had offered him more for the same period. Mr.
Espejoatthetrialonthepermanentinjunctiononthe26thofMayadmittedthatheknewthatCuddywasthe
ownerofthefilm.HewastryingtogetitthroughhisagentsPatheBrothersinManila.Heistheagentofthe
sameconcerninIloilo.Thereisinevidenceinthiscaseonthetrialtodayaswellasonthe26thofMay,letters
showingthatthePatheBrothersinManilaadvisedthismanontwodifferentoccasionsnottocontendforthis
filmZigomarbecausetherentalpricewasprohibitiveandassuredhimalsothathecouldnotgetthefilmfor
aboutsixweeks.Thelastoftheseletterswaswrittenonthe26thofApril,whichshowedconclusivelythathe
knewtheyhadtogetthisfilmfromCuddyandfromthisletterthattheagentinManilacouldnotgetit,buthe
madeCuddyanofferhimselfandCuddyaccepteditbecausehewaspayingaboutthreetimesasmuchashe
hadcontractedwithGilchristfor.Therefore,intheopinionofthiscourt,thedefendantsfailedsignallytoshow
theinjunctionagainstthedefendantwaswrongfullyprocured.
The appellants duly excepted to the order of the court denying their motion for new trial on the ground that the
evidencewasinsufficienttojustifythedecisionrendered.Thereislackingfromtherecordbeforeusthedeposition
of the defendant Cuddy, which apparently throws light upon a contract entered into between him and the plaintiff
Gilchrist.Thecontentsofthisdepositionarediscussedatlengthinthebriefoftheappellantsandanendeavoris
madetoshowthatnosuchcontractwasenteredinto.Thetrialcourt,whichhadthisdepositionbeforeit,foundthat
therewasacontractbetweenCuddyandGilchrist.Nothavingthedepositioninquestionbeforeus,itisimpossible
tosayhowstronglyitmilitatesagainstthisfindingsoffact.Byaseriesofdecisionswehaveconstruedsection143
and497(2)oftheCodeofCivilProceduretorequiretheproductionofalltheevidenceinthiscourt.Thisistheduty
of the appellant and, upon his failure to perform it, we decline to proceed with a review of the evidence. In such
caseswerelyentirelyuponthepleadingsandthefindingsoffactofthetrialcourtandexamineonlysuchassigned
errorsasraisequestionsoflaw.(Ferrervs.NeriAbejuela,9Phil.Rep.,324Valle vs.Galera,10Phil.Rep.,619
Salvacionvs.Salvacion,13Phil.Rep.,366Bretavs.Smith,Bell&Co.,15Phil.Rep.,446Arroyovs.Yulo,18Phil.
Rep.,236Olsen&Co.vs.Matson,Lord&BelserCo.,19Phil.Rep.,102Blumvs. Barretto, 19 Phil. Rep., 161
Cuyuganvs.Aguas,19Phil.Rep.,379Mapavs.Chaves,20Phil.Rep.,147Mansvs.Garry,20Phil.Rep.,134.)It
istruethatsomeofthemorerecentofthesecasesmakeexceptionstothegeneralrule.Thus,inOlsen&Co.vs.
Matson,Lord&BelserCo.,(19Phil.Rep.,102),thatportionoftheevidencebeforeustendedtoshowthatgrave
injusticemightresultfromastrictrelianceuponthefindingsoffactcontainedinthejudgmentappealedfrom.We,
therefore, gave the appellant an opportunity to explain the omission. But we required that such explanation must
showasatisfactoryreasonfortheomission,andthatthemissingportionoftheevidencemustbesubmittedwithin
sixty days or cause shown for failing to do so. The other cases making exceptions to the rule are based upon
peculiarcircumstanceswhichwillseldomariseinpracticeandneednotherebesetforth,forthereasonthatthey
arewhollyinapplicabletothepresentcase.Theappellantswouldbeentitledtoindulgenceonlyunderthedoctrine
of the Olsen case. But from that portion of the record before us, we are not inclined to believe that the missing
deposition would be sufficient to justify us in reversing the findings of fact of the trial court that the contract in
questionhadbeenmade.ThereisintherecordnotonlythepositiveanddetailedtestimonyofGilchristtothiseffect,
butthereisalsoaletterofapologyfromCuddytoGilchristinwhichtheformerentersintoalengthyexplanationof
hisreasonsforleasingthefilmtoanotherparty.Thelattercouldonlyhavebeencalledforthbyabrokencontract
with Gilchrist to lease the film to him. We, therefore, fail to find any reason for overlooking the omission of the
defendants to bring up the missing portion of the evidence and, adhering to the general rule above referred to,
proceedtoexaminethequestionsoflawraisedbytheappellants.

FromtheabovequotedfindingsoffactitisclearthatCuddy,aresidentofManila,wastheownerofthe"Zigomar"
thatGilchristwastheownerofacinematographtheaterinIloilothatinaccordancewiththetermsofthecontract
entered into between Cuddy and Gilchrist the former leased to the latter the "Zigomar" for exhibition in his
(Gilchrist's)theaterfortheweekbeginningMay26,1913andthatCuddywillfullyviolatehiscontractinorderthathe
mightaccepttheappellant'sofferofP350forthefilmforthesameperiod.Didtheappellantsknowthattheywere
inducingCuddytoviolatehiscontractwithathirdpartywhentheyinducedhimtoaccepttheP350?Espejoadmitted
thatheknewthatCuddywastheownerofthefilm.HereceivedaletterfromhisagentsinManiladatedApril26,
assuringhimthathecouldnotgetthefilmforaboutsixweeks.ThearrangementbetweenCuddyandtheappellants
for the exhibition of the film by the latter on the 26th of May were perfected afterApril 26, so that the six weeks
wouldincludeandextendbeyondMay26.Theappellantsmustnecessarilyhaveknownatthetimetheymadetheir
offertoCuddythatthelatterhadbookedorcontractedthefilmforsixweeksfromApril26.Therefore,theinevitable
conclusionisthattheappellantsknowinglyinducedCuddytoviolatehiscontractwithanotherperson.Butthereis
no specific finding that the appellants knew the identity of the other party. So we must assume that they did not
knowthatGilchristwasthepersonwhohadcontractedforthefilm.
Theappellantstakethepositionthatifthepreliminaryinjunctionhadnotbeenissuedagainstthemtheycouldhave
exhibitedthefilmintheirtheaterforanumberofdaysbeginningMay26,andcouldhavealsosubleasedittoother
theaterownersinthenearbytownsand,bysodoing,couldhavecleared,duringthelifeoftheircontractwithCuddy,
theamountclaimedasdamages.Takingthisviewofthecase,itwillbeunnecessaryforustoinquirewhetherthe
mandatoryinjunctionagainstCuddywasproperlyissuedornot.Noquestionisraisedwithreferencetotheissuance
ofthatinjunction.
TherightonthepartofGilchristtoenterintoacontractwithCuddyfortheleaseofthefilmmustbefullyrecognized
andadmittedbyall.ThatCuddywasliableinanactionfordamagesforthebreachofthatcontract,therecanbeno
doubt. Were the appellants likewise liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not
knowingatthetimetheidentityofoneofthecontractingparties?Theappellantsclaimthattheyhadarighttodo
whattheydid.Thegrounduponwhichtheappellantsbasethiscontentionis,thattherewasnovalidandbinding
contractbetweenCuddyandGilchristandthat,therefore,theyhadarighttocompetewithGilchristfortheleaseof
thefilm,therighttocompetebeingajustificationfortheiracts.IftherehadbeennocontractbetweenCuddyand
Gilchristthisdefensewouldbetenable,butthemererighttocompetecouldnotjustifytheappellantsinintentionally
inducingCuddytotakeawaytheappellee'scontractualrights.
Chief Justice Wells in Walker vs. Cronin (107 Mass., 555), said: "Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and
advantagesofhisownenterprise,industry,skillandcredit.Hehasnorighttobefreefrommaliciousandwanton
interference,disturbanceorannoyance.Ifdisturbanceorlosscomeasaresultofcompetition,ortheexerciseoflike
rightsbyothers,itisdamnumabsqueinjuria,unlesssomesuperiorrightbycontractorotherwiseisinterferedwith."
InReadvs.FriendlySocietyofOperativeStonemasons([1902]2K.B.,88),Darling,J.,said:"Ithinktheplaintiffhas
acauseofactionagainstthedefendants,unlessthecourtissatisfiedthat,whentheyinterferedwiththecontractual
rightsofplaintiff,thedefendantshadasufficientjustificationfortheirinterference...foritisnotajustificationthat
`theyactedbonafideinthebestinterestsofthesocietyofmasons,'i.e.,intheirowninterests.Norisitenoughthat
`theywerenotactuatedbyimpropermotives.'Ithinktheirsufficientjustificationforinterferencewithplaintiff'sright
mustbeanequalorsuperiorrightinthemselves,andthatnoonecanlegallyexcusehimselftoaman,ofwhose
contracthehasprocuredthebreach,onthegroundthatheactedonawrongunderstandingofhisownrights,or
withoutmalice,orbonafide, or in the best interests of himself, or even that he acted as an altruist, seeking only
goodofanotherandcarelessofhisownadvantage."(QuotedwithapprovalinBeekmanvs.Marsters,195Mass.,
205.)
Itissaidthatthegroundonwhichtheliabilityofathirdpartyforinterferingwithacontractbetweenothersrests,is
thattheinterferencewasmalicious.Thecontraryview,however,istakenbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates
inthecaseofAngle vs.RailwayCo.(151U.S.,1).Theonlymotiveforinterferencebythethirdpartyinthatcase
wasthedesiretomakeaprofittotheinjuryofoneofthepartiesofthecontract.Therewasnomaliceinthecase
beyondthedesiretomakeanunlawfulgaintothedetrimentofoneofthecontractingparties.
In the case at bar the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist Cuddy contract on the part of the
appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this
desirebutthisfactdoesnotrelievethemofthelegalliabilityforinterferingwiththatcontractandcausingitsbreach.
Itis,therefore,clear,undertheaboveauthorities,thattheywereliabletoGilchristforthedamagescausedbytheir
acts,unlesstheyarerelievedfromsuchliabilitybyreasonofthefactthattheydidnotknowatthetimetheidentityof
theoriginallessee(Gilchrist)ofthefilm.
Theliabilityoftheappellantsarisesfromunlawfulactsandnotfromcontractualobligations,astheywereunderno
suchobligationstoinduceCuddytoviolatehiscontractwithGilchrist.SothatiftheactionofGilchristhadbeenone
fordamages,itwouldbegovernedbychapter2,title16,book4oftheCivilCode.Article1902ofthatcodeprovides
that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be
obligedtorepairthedamagedodone.Thereisnothinginthisarticlewhichrequiresasaconditionprecedenttothe
liabilityofatortfeasorthathemustknowtheidentityofapersontowhomhecausesdamages.Infact,thechapter
wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may
recoverforthedamagesuffered.
Butthefactthattheappellants'interferencewiththeGilchristcontractwasactionabledidnotofitselfentitleGilchrist
tosueoutaninjunctionagainstthem.Theallowanceofthisremedymustbejustifiedundersection164oftheCode
ofCivilProcedure,whichspecifiesthecircumstanceunderwhichaninjunctionmayissue.Uponthegeneraldoctrine
ofinjunctionwesaidinDevesavs.Arbes(13Phil.Rep.,273):
Aninjunctionisa"specialremedy"adoptedinthatcode(ActNo.190)fromAmericanpractice,andoriginally
borrowedfromEnglishlegalprocedure,whichwasthereissuedbytheauthorityandunderthesealofacourt
of equity, and limited, as in order cases where equitable relief is sought, to cases where there is no "plain,
adequate,andcompleteremedyatlaw,"which"willnotbegrantedwhiletherightsbetweenthepartiesare
undetermined,exceptinextraordinarycaseswherematerialandirreparableinjurywillbedone,"whichcannot
becompensatedindamages,andwheretherewillbenoadequateremedy,andwhichwillnot,asarule,be
granted,totakepropertyoutofthepossessionofonepartyandputitintothatofanotherwhosetitlehasnot
beenestablishedbylaw.
WesubsequentlyaffirmedthedoctrineoftheDevesacaseinPalafoxvs.Madamba(19Phil.,Rep.,444),andwe
take this occasion of again affirming it, believing, as we do, that the indiscriminate use of injunctions should be
discouraged.
Doesthefactthattheappellantsdidnotknowatthetimetheidentityoftheoriginallesseeofthefilmmilitateagainst
Gilchrist's right to a preliminary injunction, although the appellant's incurred civil liability for damages for such
interference? In the examination of the adjudicated cases, where in injunctions have been issued to restrain
wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such contracts, we have been unable to find any case where

this precise question was involved, as in all of those cases which we have examined, the identity of both of the
contracting parties was known to the tortfeasors. We might say, however, that this fact does not seem to have a
controllingfeatureinthosecases.Thereisnothinginsection164oftheCodeofCivilProcedurewhichindicates,
evenremotely,thatbeforeaninjunctionmayissuerestrainingthewrongfulinterferencewithcontrastbystrangers,
thestrangersmustknowtheidentityofbothparties.Itwouldseemthatthisisnotessential,asinjunctionsfrequently
issue against municipal corporations, public service corporations, public officers, and others to restrain the
commissionofactswhichwouldtendtoinjuriouslyaffecttherightsofpersonwhoseidentitytherespondentscould
notpossiblyhaveknownbeforehand.Thiscourthasheldthatinapropercaseinjunctionwillissueattheinstanceof
aprivatecitizentorestrainultraviresactsofpublicofficials.(Severinovs.GovernorGeneral,16Phil.Rep.,366.)So
we proceed to the determination of the main question of whether or not the preliminary injunction ought to have
beenissuedinthiscase.
Asarule,injunctionsaredeniedtothosewhohaveanadequateremedyatlaw.Wherethechoiceisbetweenthe
ordinaryandtheextraordinaryprocessesoflaw,andtheformeraresufficient,therulewillnotpermittheuseofthe
latter. (In re Debs, 158 U. S., 564.) If the injury is irreparable, the ordinary process is inadequate. In Wahle vs.
Reinbach (76 Ill., 322), the supreme court of Illinois approved a definition of the term "irreparable injury" in the
followinglanguage:"By`irreparableinjury'isnotmeantsuchinjuryasisbeyondthepossibilityofrepair,orbeyond
possiblecompensationindamages,nornecessarilygreatinjuryorgreatdamage,butthatspeciesofinjury,whether
greatorsmall,thatoughtnottobesubmittedtoontheonehandorinflictedontheotherand,becauseitissolarge
ontheonehand,orsosmallontheother,isofsuchconstantandfrequentrecurrencethatnofairorreasonable
redresscanbehadthereforinacourtoflaw."(QuotedwithapprovalinNashvilleR.R.Co.vs.McConnell,82Fed.,
65.)
Thecaseatbarissomewhatnovel,astheonlycontractwhichwasbrokenwasthatbetweenCuddyandGilchrist,
andtheprofitsoftheappelleedependeduponthepatronageofthepublic,forwhichitisconcededtheappellants
wereatlibertytocompletebyallfairdoesnotdetertheapplicationofremarkedinthecaseofthe"ticketscalpers"
(82Fed.,65),thenoveltyofthefactsdoesnotdetertheapplicationofequitableprinciples.Thiscourttakesjudicial
noticeofthegeneralcharacterofacinematographormotionpicturetheater.Itisaquitemodernformoftheplay
house, wherein, by means of an apparatus known as a cinematograph or cinematograph, a series of views
representingcloselysuccessivephasesofamovingobject,areexhibitedinrapidsequence,givingapicturewhich,
owingtothepersistenceofvision,appearstotheobservertobeincontinuousmotion.(TheEncyclopediaBritanica,
vol. 6, p. 374.) The subjects which have lent themselves to the art of the photographer in this manner have
increasedenormouslyinrecentyears,aswellashavetheplaceswheresuchexhibitionaregiven.Theattendance,
and, consequently, the receipts, at one of these cinematograph or motionpicture theaters depends in no small
degreeupontheexcellenceofthephotographs,anditisquitecommonfortheproprietorofthetheatertosecurean
especiallyattractiveexhibitashis"featurefilm"andadvertiseitassuchinordertoattractthepublic.Thisfeature
film is depended upon to secure a larger attendance that if its place on the program were filled by other films of
mediocrequality.Itisevidentthatthefailuretoexhibitthefeaturefilmwillreducethereceiptsofthetheater.
Hence, Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the fact that the appellants
hadinducedCuddytorenttothemthefilmGilchristhadcounteduponashisfeaturefilm.Itisquiteapparentthatto
estimatewithanydecreeofaccuracythedamageswhichGilchristwouldlikelysufferfromsuchaneventwouldbe
quitedifficultifnotimpossible.IfheallowedtheappellantstoexhibitthefilminIloilo,itwouldbeuselessforhimto
exhibit it again, as the desire of the public to witness the production would have been already satisfied. In this
extremity,theappelleeappliedforandwasgranted,aswehaveindicated,amandatoryinjunctionagainstCuddy
requiringhimtodelivertheZigomartoGilchrist,andapreliminaryinjunctionagainsttheappellantsrestrainingthem
from exhibiting that film in their theater during the weeks he (Gilchrist) had a right to exhibit it. These injunction
saved the plaintiff harmless from damages due to the unwarranted interference of the defendants, as well as the
difficulttaskwhichwouldhavebeensetforthecourtofestimatingthemincasetheappellantshadbeenallowedto
carryouttheirillegalplans.Astowhetherornotthemandatoryinjunctionshouldhavebeenissued,wearenot,as
we have said, called upon to determine. So far as the preliminary injunction issued against the appellants is
concerned,whichprohibitedthemfromexhibitingtheZigomarduringtheweekwhichGilchristdesiredtoexhibitit,
weareoftheopinionthatthecircumstancesjustifiedtheissuanceofthatinjunctioninthediscretionofthecourt.
We are not lacking in authority to support our conclusion that the court was justified in issuing the preliminary
injunctionagainsttheappellants.Upontheprecisequestionastowhetherinjunctionwillissuetorestrainwrongful
interference with contracts by strangers to such contracts, it may be said that courts in the United States have
usuallygrantedsuchreliefwheretheprofitsoftheinjuredpersonarederivedfromhiscontractualrelationswitha
largeandindefinitenumberofindividuals,thusreducinghimtothenecessityofprovinginanactionagainstthetort
feasorthatthelatterwasresponsibleineachcaseforthebrokencontract,orelseobliginghimtoinstituteindividual
suits against each contracting party and so exposing him to a multiplicity of suits. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. vs.
Mechanics'ClothingCo.(128Fed.,800)Sperry&HutchinsonCo.vs.LouisWeber&Co.(161Fed.,219)Sperry&
Hutchinson Co. vs. Pommer (199 Fed., 309) were all cases wherein the respondents were inducing retail
merchantstobreaktheircontractswiththecompanyforthesaleofthelatters'tradingstamps.Injunctionissuedin
eachcaserestrainingtherespondentsfrominterferingwithsuchcontracts.
InthecaseoftheNashvilleR.R.Co.vs.McConnell(82Fed.,65),thecourt,amongotherthings,said:"Onewho
wrongfullyinterferesinacontractbetweenothers,and,forthepurposeofgaintohimselfinducesoneoftheparties
to break it, is liable to the party injured thereby and his continued interference may be ground for an injunction
wheretheinjuriesresultingwillbeirreparable."
InHamby&Toomervs.GeorgiaIron&CoalCo.(127Ga.,792),itappearsthattherespondentswereinterferingin
a contract for prison labor, and the result would be, if they were successful, the shutting down of the petitioner's
plant for an indefinite time. The court held that although there was no contention that the respondents were
insolvent,thetrialcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretioningrantingapreliminaryinjunctionagainsttherespondents.
In Beekman vs. Marsters (195 Mass., 205), the plaintiff had obtained from the Jamestown Hotel Corporation,
conductingahotelwithinthegroundsoftheJamestownExposition,acontractwherebyhewasmadetheirexclusive
agentfortheNewEnglandStatestosolicitpatronageforthehotel.Thedefendantinducedthehotelcorporationto
breaktheircontractwiththeplaintiffinordertoallowhimtoactalsoastheiragentintheNewEnglandStates.The
court held that an action for damages would not have afforded the plaintiff adequate relief, and that an injunction
waspropercompellingthedefendanttodesistfromfurtherinterferencewiththeplaintiff'sexclusivecontractwiththe
hotelcompany.
In Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. vs. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co. (171 Fed., 553), the court, while
admitting that there are some authorities to the contrary, held that the current authority in the United States and
Englandisthat:
Theviolationofalegalrightcommittedknowinglyisacauseofaction,andthatitisaviolationofalegalright
to interfere with contractual relations recognized by law, if there be no sufficient justification for the
interference.(Quinnvs.Leatham,supra,510Anglevs.Chicago,etc.,Ry.Co.,151U.S.,114Sup.Ct.,240
38L.Ed.,55Martensvs.Reilly,109Wis.,464,84N.W.,840Ricevs.Manley,66N.Y.,8223Am.Rep.,

30Bittermanvs.L.&N.R.R.Co.,207U.S.,20528Sup.Ct.,9152L.Ed.,171Beekmanvs.Marsters,
195Mass.,20580N.E.,81711L.R.A.[N.S.]201122Am.St.Rep.,232SouthWalesMiners'Fed. vs.
GlamorganCoalCo.,AppealCases,1905,p.239.)
SeealsoNimsonUnfairBusinessCompetition,pp.351371.
In3ElliotonContracts,section2511,itissaid:"Injunctionistheproperremedytopreventawrongfulinterference
with contract by strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is
irreparable.Andwherethereisamaliciousinterferencewithlawfulandvalidcontractsapermanentinjunctionwill
ordinarily issue without proof of express malice. So, an injunction may be issued where the complainant to break
their contracts with him by agreeing to indemnify who breaks his contracts of employment may be adjoined from
includingotheremployeestobreaktheircontractsandenterintonewcontractswithanewemployeroftheservant
whofirstbrokehiscontract.Buttheremedybyinjunctioncannotbeusedtorestrainalegitimatecompetition,though
suchcompetitionwouldinvolvetheviolationofacontract.Norwillequityordinarilyenjoinemployeeswhohavequit
the service of their employer from attempting by proper argument to persuade others from taking their places so
longastheydonotresorttoforceorintimidationsonobstructthepublicthoroughfares."
Beekmanvs. Marster, supra, is practically on all fours with the case at bar in that there was only one contract in
question and the profits of the injured person depended upon the patronage of the public. Hamby & Toomer vs.
GeorgiaIron&CoalCo.,supra,isalsosimilartothecaseatbarinthattherewasonlyonecontract,theinterference
ofwhichwasstoppedbyinjunction.
Fortheforegoingreasonsthejudgmentisaffirmed,withcosts,againsttheappellants.
Arellano,C.J.,Torres,CarsonandAraullo,JJ.,concur.

SeparateOpinions
MORELAND,J.,concurring:
Thecourtseemstobeoftheopinionthattheactionisoneforapermanentinjunctionwhereas,undermyviewof
thecase,itisoneforspecificperformance.Thefactsaresimple.C.S.Gilchrist,theplaintiff,proprietoroftheEagle
Theater of Iloilo, contracted with E. A. Cuddy, one of the defendants, of Manila, for a film entitled "Zigomar or
Eelskin, 3d series," to be exhibited in his theater in Iloilo during the week beginning May 26, 1913. Later, the
defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga, who were also operating a theater in Iloilo, representing Pathe Freres, also
obtainedfromCuddyacontractfortheexhibitionofthefilmaforesaidintheirtheaterinIloiloduringthesameweek.
The plaintiff commenced this action against Cuddy and the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga for the specific
performanceofthecontractwithCuddy.Thecomplaintprays"thatthecourt,byamandatoryinjunction,orderCuddy
todeliver,onthe24thofMay,1913,inaccordancewiththeaforesaidcontract,thesaidfilm'Zigomar,3dseries,or
Eelskin,'totheplaintiffGilchrist,inaccordancewiththetermsoftheagreement,sothatplaintiffcanexhibitthesame
during the last week beginning May 26, 1913, in the Eagle Theater, in Iloilo that the court issue a preliminary
injunctionagainstthedefendantsEspejoandZaldarriagaprohibitingthemfromreceiving,exhibiting,orusingsaid
filminIloiloduringthelastweekofMay,1913,oratanyothertimepriortothedeliverytotheplaintiffthat,onthe
trial, said injunction be made perpetual and that Cuddy be ordered and commanded to specifically perform his
contractwiththeplaintiff."
Onthefilingofthecomplainttheplaintiffmadeanapplicationforamandatoryinjunctioncompellingthedefendant
CuddytodelivertoplaintiffthefilminquestionbymailingittohimfromManilaonthe24thofMaysothatitwould
reach Iloilo for exhibition on the 26th and for a preliminary restraining order against the order two defendants
prohibitingthemfromreceivingorexhibitingthesaidfilmpriortoitsexhibitionbyplaintiff.
Thecourt,onthisapplication,enteredanorderwhichprovidedthatCuddyshould"notsendsaidfilm'Zigomar,3d
series,orEelskin,'tothedefendantsEspejoandZaldarriagaandthatheshouldsendittotheplaintiff,Gilchrist,on
the24thdayofMay,1913,inthemailforIloilo,"Thisorderwasdulyservedonthedefendants,includingCuddy,in
whosepossessionthefilmstillwas,and,incompliancetherewithCuddymailedthefilmtotheplaintiffatIloiloonthe
24thofMay.Thelatterdulyreceiveditandexhibiteditwithoutmolestationduringtheweekbeginningthe26thof
MayinaccordancewiththecontractwhichheclaimedtohavemadewithCuddy.
ThedefendantsEspejoandZaldarriagahavingreceivedduenoticeoftheissuanceofthemandatoryinjunctionand
restrainingorderofthe22dofMay,appearedbeforethecourtonthe26thofMayandmovedthatthecourtvacate
somuchoftheorderasprohibitedthemfromreceivingandexhibitingthefilm.Inotherwords,whiletheorderofthe
22dofMaywascomposedoftwoparts,oneamandatoryorderforimmediatespecificperformanceoftheplaintiff's
contractwiththedefendantCuddy,andtheotherapreliminaryrestrainingorderdirectedtoEspejoandZaldarriaga
prohibitingthemfromreceivingandexhibitingthefilmduringtheweekbeginningthe26thofMay,theirmotionofthe
26thofMayreferredexclusivelytotheinjunctionagainstthemandtouchedinnowaythatportionoftheorderwhich
required the immediate performance by Cuddy of his contract with Gilchrist. Indeed, the defendants Espejo and
ZaldarriagadidnotevenexcepttotheorderrequiringCuddytospecificallyperformhisagreementwiththeplaintiff
nordidtheyinanywaymakeanobjectiontoorshowtheirdisapprovalofit.Itwasnotexceptedtoorappealedfrom
andisnotbeforethiscourtforreview.
ThemotionofEspejoandZaldarriagatovacatetheinjunctionrestrainingthemfromreceivingthefilmwasdenied
onthe26thofMay.AftertheterminationoftheweekbeginningMay26th,andaftertheexhibitionofthefilmbythe
plaintiffinaccordancewiththeallegedcontractwithCuddy,theplaintiffcameintocourtandmovedthat,inviewof
thefactthathehadalreadyobtainedallthathedesiredtoobtainorcouldobtainbyhisaction,namely,theexhibition
ofthefilminquestionduringtheweekbeginningMay26th,therewasnoreasonforcontinuingitandmovedforits
dismissal. To this motion Cuddy consented and the action was dismissed as to him. But the other defendants
objectedtothedismissaloftheactiononthegroundthattheydesiredtopresenttothecourtevidenceshowingthe
damages which they had suffered by reason of the issuance of the preliminary injunction prohibiting them from
receivingandexhibitingthefilminquestionduringtheweekbeginningMay26.Thecourtsustainedtheirobjection
anddeclinedtodismisstheactionastothem,and,onthe8thofAugust,heardtheevidenceastodamages.He
denieddefendantsthereliefaskedforanddismissedtheirclaimfordamages.Theythereupontookanappealfrom
thatorder,andthatistheappealwhichwehavenowbeforeusandwhichisthesubjectoftheopinionofthecourt
withwhichIamconcurring.
Wethushavethisstrangecondition:
An action for specific performance of a contract to deliver a film for exhibition during a given time.A preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering the delivery of the film in accordance with the contract. The delivery of the film in
accordancewiththepreliminarymandatoryinjunction.Theactualexhibitionofthefilmduringthetimespecifiedin
thecontract.Noobjectiontotheissuanceofthemandatoryinjunction,tothedeliveryofthefilm,ortotheground

thattheplaintiffhadobtainedfullreliefbymeansofthesocalledpreliminaryremedybyvirtueofwhichthecontract
wasactuallyspecificallyperformedbeforetheactionwastried.Noobjectionorexceptiontotheorderrequiringthe
specificperformanceofthecontract.
UndersuchconditionsitispossibleforthedefendantEspejoandZaldarriagatosecuredamagesforthewrongful
issuance of the preliminary injunction directed against them even though it be admitted that it was erroneously
issued and that there was no ground therefor whatever? It seems to me that it is not.At the time this action was
begunthefilm,aswehaveseen,wasinthepossessionofCuddyand,whileinhispossession,hecompliedwitha
commandofthecourttodeliverittoplaintiff.Inpursuanceofthatcommandhedeliveredittoplaintiff,whousedit
duringthetimespecifiedinhiscontractwithCuddyor,inotherwords,hemadesuchuseofitashedesiredand
then returned it to Cuddy. This order and the delivery of the film under it were made in an action in which the
defendantsEspejoandZaldarriagawereparties,withoutobjectionontheirpartandwithoutobjectionorexceptionto
theorder.Thefilmhavingbeendeliveredtodefendants'competitor,theplaintiff,underadecreeofthecourttowhich
theymadenoobjectionandtooknoexceptionandfromwhichtheyhavenotappealed,whatinjurycantheyshow
by reason of the injunction restraining them from making use of the film? If they themselves, by their conduct,
permittedtheplaintifftomakeitimpossibleforthemtogainpossessionofthefilmandtouseit,thenthepreliminary
injunction produced no injury for the reason that no harm can result from restraining a party from doing a thing
which,withoutsuchrestraint,itwouldbeimpossibleforhimtodo.Moreover,theorderforthedeliveryofthefilmto
plaintiffwasacompletedeterminationoftherightsofthepartiestothefilmwhich,whilethecourthadnorightto
make, nevertheless, was valid and binding on all the parties, none of them objecting or taking exception thereto.
Beingacompletedeterminationoftherightsofthepartiestotheaction,itshouldhavebeenthefirstpointattacked
bythedefendants,asitforeclosedthemcompletelyand,ifleftinforce,eliminatingeverydefense.Thisorderwas
made on May 22d and was not excepted to or appealed from. On the 8th of August following the defendants
appealedfromtheorderdismissingtheirclaimtodamagesbuttheorderforthedeliveryofthefilmtoplaintiffwas
finalatthattimeandisnowconclusiveonthiscourt.
Section 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for appeals by bill of exceptions, provides that "upon the
renditionoffinaljudgmentdisposingoftheaction,eitherpartyshallhavetherighttoperfectabillofexceptionsfora
reviewbytheSupremeCourtofallrulings,orders,andjudgmentmadeintheaction,towhichthepartyhasduly
exceptedatthetimeofmakingsuchruling,order,orjudgment."Whiletheorderforthedeliveryofthefilmtoplaintiff
wasinonesenseapreliminaryorder,itwasinrealityafinaldeterminationoftherightsofthepartiestothefilm,asit
ordered the delivery thereof to plaintiff for his use. If it had been duly excepted to, its validity could have been
attacked in an appeal from the final judgment thereafter entered in the action. Not having been excepted to as
requiredbythesectionjustreferredto,itbecamefinalandconclusiveonallthepartiestotheaction,andwhen,on
the8thdayofAugustfollowing,thedefendantspresentedtheirclaimfordamagesbasedontheallegedwrongful
issuanceofatemporaryrestrainingorder,thewholefoundationoftheirclaimhaddisappearedbyvirtueofthefact
thattheexecutionoftheorderofthe22dofMayhadleftnothingforthemtolitigate.Thetrialcourt,onthe8thof
August, would have been fully justified in refusing to hear the defendants on their claim for damages. Their right
thereto had been adjudicated on the 22d of May and that adjudication had been duly put into execution without
protest,objectionorexception,andwas,therefore,finalandconclusiveonthemonthe8thofAugust.
Ihavepresentedthisconcurringopinioninanattempttopreventconfusion,ifany,whichmightarisefromthetheory
on which the court decides this case. It seems to me impossible that the action can be one for a permanent
injunction.The very nature of the case demonstrates that a permanent injunction is out of the question.The only
thing that plaintiff desired was to be permitted to use the film for the week beginning the 26th of May. With the
termination of that week his rights expired. After that time Cuddy was perfectly free to turn the film over to the
defendantsEspejoandZaldarriagaforexhibitionatanytime.Aninjunctionpermanentlyprohibitingthedefendants
fromexhibitingthefilminIloilowouldhavebeenunjustifiable,asitwassomethingthatplaintiffdidnotaskanddid
notwantandwouldhavebeenaninvasionoftherightsofCuddyas,aftertheterminationoftheweekbeginning
May26,hewasatliberty,underhiscontractwithplaintiff,torentthefilmtothedefendantsEspejoandZaldarriaga
andpermititsexhibitioninIloiloatanytime.Theplaintiffneveraskedtohavedefendantspermanentlyenjoinedfrom
exhibitingthefilminIloiloandnopartytotheactionhassuggestedsuchthing.
Theactionisoneforspecificperformancepurelyandwhilethecourtgrantedplaintiffrightswhichshouldhavebeen
granted only after a trial of the action, nevertheless, such right having been granted before trial and none of the
defendants having made objection or taken exception thereto, and the order granting them having become final,
suchorderbecameafinaldeterminationoftheaction,byreasonofthenatureoftheactionitself,therightsofthe
partiesbecametherebyfinallydeterminedandthedefendantsEspejoandZaldarriaga,beingpartiestotheaction,
wereprecludedfromfurtherlitigationrelativetothesubjectmatterofthecontroversy.
Nodamagesareclaimedbyreasonoftheissuanceofthemandatoryinjunctionunderwhichthefilmwasdelivered
toplaintiffandusedbyhimduringtheweekbeginningthe26thofMay.Whiletheopinionsaysinthefirstparagraph
thattheactionis"fordamagesagainsttheplaintifffortheallegedwrongfulissuanceofamandatoryandpreliminary
injunction," the opinion also says in a latter portion that "It will be unnecessary for us to inquire whether the
mandatoryinjunctionagainstCuddywasproperlyissuedornot.Noquestionisraisedwithreferencetotheissuance
of that injunction" and still later it is also stated that "as to whether or not the mandatory injunction should have
beenissued,wearenot,aswehavesaid,calledupontodetermine."Irepeatthatnoobjectionwasmadebythe
defendantstotheissuanceofthemandatoryinjunction,noexceptionwastakentotheorderonwhichitwasissued
andnoappealhasbeentakentherefrom.Thatorderisnowfinalandconclusiveandwasatthetimethisappealwas
taken.Thatbeingso,therightsofthedefendantswereforeclosedthereby.ThedefendantsEspejoandZaldarriaga
cannotnowbeheardtosaythattheyweredamagedbytheissuanceofthepreliminaryrestraininginjunctionissued
onthesamedayasthemandatoryinjunction.
Fromwhathasbeensaiditisclear,itseemstome,thatthequestionofabreachofcontractbyinducement,which
issubstantiallytheonlyquestiondiscussedanddecided,isnotinthecaseinrealityand,inmyjudgment,shouldnot
betouchedupon.Courtswillnotproceedwithalitigationanddiscussanddecidedquestionwhichmightpossiblybe
involved in the case when it clearly appears that there remains nothing about which to litigate, the whole subject
matteroftheoriginalactionhavingbeensettledandthepartieshavingnorealcontroversytopresent.Atthetime
thedefendantsEspejoandZaldarriagaofferedtheirclaimfordamagesarisingoutofthewrongfulissuanceofthe
restrainingorder,therewasnothingbetweenthemandtheplaintifftolitigate,therightfulnessofplaintiff'sdemand
havingalreadybeenfinallyadjudicatedanddeterminedinthesameaction.
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