Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Mapua
G.R. No. 164060
June 15, 2007
Digest by: Angelo Lopez
----------------------------------------------Topic: Bargaining Procedure Duty to Bargain
Ponente: J. Quisimbing
Ruling:
Facts:
1. Private respondent Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT) hired
Arthur Andersen to develop a faculty ranking and
compensation system. On January 29, 2001, in the 5th CBA
negotiation meeting, MIT presented the new faculty ranking
instrument to petitioner Faculty Association of Mapua Institute
of Technology (FAMIT). The latter agreed to the adoption and
implementation of the instrument, with the reservation that
there should be no diminution in rank and pay of the faculty
members. On April 17, 2001, FAMIT and MIT entered into a
new CBA effective June 1, 2001.4 It incorporated the new
ranking for the college faculty in Section 8 of Article V of
CBA.
2. When the CBA took effect, the Vice President for Academic
Affairs issued a memorandum to all deans and subject chairs to
evaluate and re-rank the faculty under their supervision using
the new ranking instrument. Eight factors were to be
considered and given their corresponding weights/points
according to levels attained per factor. Among these were: (1)
educational attainment; (2) professional honors received; (3)
relevant training, etc.
3. After a month, MIT called FAMITs attention to what it
perceived to be flaws or omissions in the CBA signed by the
parties. MIT requested for an amendment of CBA annexes.
4. FAMIT rejected the proposal. It said that these changes would
constitute a violation of the ratified 2001 CBA and result in the
diminution of rank and benefits of FAMIT college faculty. It
argued that the proposed amendment in the ranking system for
the college faculty revised the point ranges earlier agreed upon
the profits in agreement. In the computation of said ten per cent (10%)
to [be] distributed as a bonus among the employees and laborers of the
[Company] in proportion to their salaries or wages, only the income
derived by the [Company] from the direct operation of its shipyard and
shop in Lapulapu City, as stated herein-above-commencing from the
earnings during the year 1964, shall be included. Said profit-sharing
bonus shall be paid by the [Company] to [Associated Labor Union] to
be delivered by the latter to the employees and laborers concerned and
it shall be the duty of the Associated Labor Union to furnish and
deliver to the [Company] the corresponding receipts duly signed by the
laborers and employees entitled to receive the profit-sharing bonus
within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of receipt by [it] from
the [Company] of the profit-sharing bonus
2.In compliance with the said CBA 1965 the defendant Cebu Shipyard
& Engineering Works, Inc. delivered to the ALU for distribution to the
laborers or employees working with the defendant corporation to the
profit-sharing bonus corresponding to the first installment for the year
1965. Again in June 1965 the defendant corporation delivered to the
ALU in the profit-sharing bonus corresponding to the second
installment for 1965. The members of the Mactan Workers Union
failed to receive their shares in the second installment of bonus
because they did not like to go to the office of the ALU to collect
their shares. In accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining
after 60 days, the uncollected shares of the plaintiff union members
was returned by the ALU to the defendant corporation. At the
same time the defendant corporation was advised by the ALU not to
deliver the said amount to the members of the Mactan Workers Union
unless ordered by the Court, otherwise the ALU will take such step to
protect the interest of its members. Because this warning given by the
intervenor union the defendant corporation did not pay to the plaintiffs
the sum of P4,035.82 which was returned by the Associated Labor
Union, but instead, deposited the said amount with the Labor
Administrator. For the recovery of this amount this case was filed with
the lower court.
CFI- ordering the defendants to deliver to the Associated Labor Union
the sum of P4,035.82 for distribution to the employees of the
defendant corporation who are members of the Mactan Workers
Union.
DOCTRINE: The labor union who won as sole bargaining agent of
the employees does not act for its members alone. It represents all the
employees in such a bargaining unit. Furthermore, what is entitled to
protection is labor, not the labor organization. The latter are merely
instrumentalities through which their welfare may be promoted and
fostered.
HELD: No. The employees are not entitled to the claimed salary
increase, simply because they are not within the coverage of the Wage
Order, as they were already receiving salaries greater than the
minimum fixed by the Order.
We cannot sustain petitioner, even if we assume that its contention is
right and that the implementation of any government-decreed increase
under the CBA is absolute.
The CBA is no ordinary contract, but one impressed with public
interest. Therefore, it is subject to special orders on wages, such as
those issued by the RTWPB. the implementation of a wage increase
for respondents employees should be controlled by the stipulations of
Wage Order No. ROVII-06.
Concededly, there is an increase necessarily resulting from raising the
minimum wage level, but not across-the-board. Indeed, a double
burden cannot be imposed upon an employer except by clear
provision of law. It would be unjust, therefore, to interpret Wage Order
No. ROVII-06 to mean that respondent should grant an across-theboard increase. Such interpretation of the Order is not sustained by its
text
DOCTRINE: The CBA is no ordinary contract, but one impressed
with public interest. Therefore, it is subject to special orders on wages,
such as those issued by the RTWPB
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the
assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Petitioner:
- like the VA, the appellate court erred in interpreting the
questioned provision of the abovequoted Sec. 3, Art. VIIII of
the CBA, since Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 6728 only mandates that 70%
of the TIP of academic institutions is to be set aside for
employees salaries, allowances and other benefits, while at
least 20% thereof is to go to the improvement, modernization
of buildings, equipment, libraries and other school facilities.
- the interpretation of the provision that 80% of the TIP should
go to salary increases alone, to the exclusion of other benefits,
is contrary to R.A. 6728
The CBA does not speak of any other benefits or increases which
would be covered by the employees share in the TIP, except salary
increases. The CBA reflects the incorporation of different provisions to
cover other benefits such as Christmas bonus (Art. VIII, Sec. 1),
service award (Art. VIII, Sec. 5), leaves (Article IX), educational
benefits (Sec. 2, Art. X), medical and hospitalization benefits (Secs. 3,
4 and 5, Art. 10), bereavement assistance (Sec. 6, Art. X), and signing
bonus (Sec. 8, Art. VIII), without mentioning that these will likewise
be sourced from the TIP. Thus, petitioners belated claim that the 80%
TIP should be taken to mean as covering ALL increases and not
merely the salary increases as categorically stated in Sec. 3, Art. VIII
of the CBA does not lie.
Respondent:
- petitioner never claimed that its consent to the CBA was
vitiated with fraud, mistake or intimidation, and that petitioner
has always been aware of the provisions of R.A. 6728 and was
even assisted by its accountants, internal and external legal
counsels during the CBA negotiations, hence, it can not now
renege on its commitment under Sec. 3. Art. VIII of the CBA.
The records are thus bereft of any showing that petitioner had made it
clear during the CBA negotiations that it intended to source not only
the salary increases but also the increases in other employee benefits
from the 80% of the TIP. Absent any proof that petitioners consent
was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, it is presumed that it entered
into the CBA voluntarily, had full knowledge of the contents thereof,
and was aware of its commitments under the contract.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Petitioner WON.
DOCTRINE: It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law
that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to
comply with its provisions. If the terms of a contract, in this case the
CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
Article XI, Section 1 (e) (5) of the May 2, 1989 Collective Bargaining
Agreement 8between petitioner company and the union states:
Section 1. The COMPANY shall formulate a retirement plan with the
following main features:
(e) The COMPANY agrees to grant the retirement benefits herein
provided to regular employees who may be separated from the
COMPANY for any of the following reasons:
(5) Upon reaching the age of sixty
(60) years or upon completing
twenty-five (25) years of service to the COMPANY, whichever comes
first, and the employee shall be compulsory retired and paid the
retirement benefits herein provided."
The said Code provides: Art. 287. Retirement . Any employee may
be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement or other applicable employment
contract. In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to
receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing
laws and any collective bargaining or other agreement."
The Court agrees with petitioner and the Solicitor General. Art. 287 of
the Labor Code as worded permits employers and employees to fix the
applicable retirement age at below60 years. Moreover, providing for
early
retirement
does
not
constitute
diminution
of benefits. In almost all countries today, early retirement, i.e., before a
ge 60, isconsidered a reward for services rendered since it enables an
employee to reap the fruits of his labor particularly retirement
benefits, whether lump-sum or otherwise at an earlier age, when
said employee, in presumably better physical and mental condition,
can enjoy them better and longer.
As a matter of fact, one of the advantages of early retirement is that the
corresponding retirement benefits, usually consisting of a substantial
cash windfall, can early on be put to productive and profitable uses by
way of income-generating investments, thereby affording a more
significant measure of financial security and independence for the
retiree who, up till then, had to contend with life's vicissitudes within
(1) Whether or not free meals should be granted after exactly 3 hrs of
work
(2) Whether or not the petitioner has the right to determine when to
grant free meals and its conditions
RULING:
(1) YES. The same meal allowance provision is found in their
previous CBAs, the 1985-1988 CBA and the 1990-1995 CBA.
However, it was amended in the 1993-1995 CBA, by changing the
phrase after 3 hrs of overtime work to after more than 3 hrs of
overtime work. In the 1996-2001 CBA, the parties had to negotiate
the deletion of the said phrase in order to revert to the old provision.
Clearly, both parties had intended that free meals should be given after
exactly 3 hrs of overtime work.
FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent executed a CBA for the period
starting February 1996 to February 2001. Under the bonuses and
allowances section of the said CBA, a P10 meal allowance shall be
given to employees who render at least 2 hrs of overtime work and
free meals shall be given after 3 hours of actual overtime work.
Pursuant to this provision, some departments of granted free meals
after exactly 3 ours of work. However, other departments granted free
meals only after more than 3 hours of overtime work.
The respondent filed a complaint against Dole, saying that free meals
should be granted after exactly 3 hrs of overtime work, not after more
than 3 hrs. The parties agreed to settle the dispute to voluntary
arbitration. It was decided in favor of the respondent, directing the
petitioner to grant free meals after exactly 3 hrs of overtime work. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
-------------------------------------------------097 USAEU-FFW V. CA
GR NO. 169632
March 28, 2006
Digest by: Metha Dawn H. Orolfo
-------------------------------------------------Petitioner: University Of San Agustin Employees Union-Ffw
(USAEU-FFW), And Individual Union Officers Theodore Neil Lasola,
Merlyn Jara, Julius Mario, Flaviano Manalo, Rene Cabalum,
Herminigildo Calzado, Ma. Luz Calzado, Ray Anthony Zuiga,
Rizalene Villanueva, Rudante Dolar, Rover John Tavarro, Rena Lete,
Alfredo Goriona, Ramon Vacante And Maximo Montero,
Respondent: CA and And University Of San Agustin
Ponente: Garcia
Topic: Interpretation, Administration and Enforcement of CBA
7. The Union staged a strike. At 6:45 a.m. of the same day, Sheriffs
Francisco L. Reyes and Rocky M. Francisco had arrived at San
Agustin University to serve the AJO on the Union. At the main
entrance of the University, the sheriffs saw some elements of the
Union at the early stages of the strike. There they met Merlyn Jara,
the Unions vice president, upon whom the sheriffs tried to serve
the AJO, but who, after reading it, refused to receive the same,
citing Union Board Resolution No. 3 naming the union president
as the only person authorized to do so. The sheriffs explained to
Ms. Jara that even if she refused to acknowledge receipt of the
AJO, the same would be considered served. Sheriff Reyes further
informed the Union that once the sheriffs post the AJO, it would be
considered received by the Union.
FACTS:
Thus, we see no reversible error in the CAs finding that the strike of
September 19, 2003 was illegal. Consequently, the Union officers were
deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly
participated in said illegal act.
We likewise find logic in the CAs directive for the herein parties to
proceed with voluntary arbitration as provided in their CBA. As we see
it, the issue as to the economic benefits, which included the issue on
the formula in computing the TIP share of the employees, is one that
arises from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA. To be
sure, the parties CBA provides for a grievance machinery to resolve
any "complaint or dissatisfaction arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies." Moreover, the same
CBA provides that should the grievance machinery fail to resolve the
grievance or dispute, the same shall be "referred to a Voluntary
Arbitrator for arbitration and final resolution."
However, through no fault of the University these processes were not
exhausted. It must be recalled that while undergoing preventive
mediation proceedings before the NCMB, the Union declared a
bargaining deadlock, filed a notice of strike and thereafter, went on
strike. The University filed a Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and
to Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration but the motion was not
acted upon by the NCMB. As borne by the records, the University has
been consistent in its position that the Union must exhaust the
grievance machinery provisions of the CBA which ends in voluntary
arbitration.
The Universitys stance is consistent with Articles 261 and 262 of the
Labor Code, as amended.
DISPOSITIVE: University of San Agustin won.
DOCTRINE: The University filed a Motion to Strike Out Notice of
Strike and Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration precisely to call
the attention of the NCMB and the Union to the fact that the CBA
provides for a grievance machinery and the parties obligation to
exhaust and honor said mechanism. Accordingly, the NCMB should
have directed the Union to honor its agreement with the University to
exhaust administrative grievance measures and bring the alleged
deadlock to voluntary arbitration. Unfortunately, the NCMB did not
resolve the Universitys motion thus paving the way for the strike on
September 19, 2003 and the deliberate circumvention of the CBAs
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provisions.
As we see it, the failure or refusal of the NCMB and thereafter the
SOLE to recognize, honor and enforce the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration provisions of the parties CBA unwittingly
rendered said provisions, as well as, Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor
Code, useless and inoperative. As here, a union can easily circumvent
the grievance machinery and a previous agreement to resolve
differences or conflicts through voluntary arbitration through the
simple expedient of filing a notice of strike. On the other hand,
management can avoid the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration provisions of its CBA by simply filing a notice of lockout.
6.
7.
8.
9.
ISSUE: Whether or not the labor arbiter and the NLRC had
jurisdiction to decide complaints for illegal dismissal
RULING: YES. Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that labor
arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination
disputes. A possible exception is provided in Article 261 of the Labor
Code, which provides that
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
In the case of Maneja vs. NLRC, we held that the dismissal case does
not fall within the phrase grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies.
DISPOSITIVE: Respondents won
DOCTRINE: Where the dispute is just in the interpretation,
implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the
grievance machinery set up in the CBA, or brought to voluntary
arbitration. But, where there was already actual termination, with
alleged violation of the
10. Before she left for Japan, she asked respondent union KAMPI to
submit to the Grievance Committee petitioners refusal to grant her
claim for grant-in aid, but the same was not settled.
11. Respondent filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB), Regional Office No. XI, Davao City, a complaint
for payment of grant-in aid against petitioner.
12. NCMB: the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a Decision ordering
petitioner to pay respondents member, Jean A. Legaspi, her grantin aid benefits.
13. Petitioner filed an MR but was denied.
14. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review
under Rule 43.
15. CA: affirmed the voluntary arbitrators decision.
16. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jean Legaspi is entitled to grant-in aid benefits
in light of the CBA between the parties.
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in its assailed Decision and
Resolution.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated June 5, 2002 and Resolution dated October 18,
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65507 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
DOCTRINE: Any doubt or ambiguity in the contract (CBA) between
management and the union members should be resolved in favor of the
latter. This is pursuant to Article 1702 of the Civil Code which
provides: "(I)n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for
the laborer."
Contracts which are not ambiguous are to be interpreted according to
their literal meaning and not beyond their obvious intendment
In Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz, we held that "the terms and
conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law
between the parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can
invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed
is not fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to court for
redress."
4) NLRC: declaring that the 186 excluded employees form part and
parcel of the then existing rank-and-file bargaining unit and were,
therefore, entitled to the benefits under the CBA.
5) Petitioner: According to petitioner, the provision on wage increase
in the 1981 to 1984 CBA between petitioner Company and NFL
provided for yearly wage increases. Logically, these provisions
ended in the year 1984 the last year that the economic provisions
of the CBA were, pursuant to contract and law, effective. Petitioner
claims that there is no contractual basis for the grant of CBA
benefits such as wage increases in 1985 and subsequent years,
since the CBA stipulates only the increases for the years 1981 to
1984.
1st ISSUE: WON the term of an existing CBA, particularly as to its
economic provisions, can be extended beyond the period stipulated
therein, and even beyond the three-year period prescribed by law, in
the absence of a new agreement.
RULING:
YES. The CBA between petitioner Company and NFL remained in
full force and effect even beyond the stipulated term, in the
absence of a new agreement; and, therefore, that the economic
provisions such as wage increases continued to have legal effect.
Article 253 of the Labor Code explicitly provides:
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a
collective bargaining agreement. When there is a collective
bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also
mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such
agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a
written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty
(60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both
parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and
effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during
the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the
parties.
It is clear from the above provision of law that until a new Collective
Bargaining Agreement has been executed by and between the parties,
they are duty-bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full force
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. The law
does not provide for any exception nor qualification as to which of the
economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain force and
effect; therefore, it must be understood as encompassing all the terms
and conditions in the said agreement.
In the case at bar, no new agreement was entered into by and between
petitioner Company and NFL pending appeal of the decision in NLRC
Case No. RAB-IX-0334-82; nor were any of the economic provisions
and/or terms and conditions pertaining to monetary benefits in the
existing agreement modified or altered. Therefore, the existing CBA in
its entirety, continues to have legal effect.
In a recent case, the Court had ccasion to rule that Articles 253 and
253-A mandate the parties to keep the status quo and to continue in
full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement
during the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the old CBA and/or
until a new agreement is reached by the parties. Consequently, the
automatic renewal clause provided for by the law, which is deemed
incorporated in all CBAs, provides the reason why the new CBA can
only be given a prospective effect.
To rule otherwise, i.e., that the economic provisions of the existing
CBA in the instant case ceased to have force and effect in the year
1984, would be to create a gap during which no agreement would
govern, from the time the old contract expired to the time a new
agreement shall have been entered into. For if, as contended by the
petitioner, the economic provisions of the existing CBA were to have
no legal effect, what agreement as to wage increases and other
monetary benefits would govern at all? None, it would seem, if we are
to follow the logic of petitioner Company. Consequently, the
employees from the year 1985 onwards would be deprived of a
substantial amount of monetary benefits which they could have
enjoyed had the terms and conditions of the CBA remained in force
and effect. Such a situation runs contrary to the very intent and
purpose of Articles 253 and 253-A of the Labor Code which is to curb
labor unrest and to promote industrial peace.
2nd ISSUE: Are employees hired after the stipulated term of a CBA
entitled to the benefits provided thereunder?
RULING:
YES. The benefits under the CBA in the instant case should be
extended to those employees who only became such after the year
1984. To exclude them would constitute undue discrimination and
deprive them of monetary benefits they would otherwise be entitled to
under a new collective bargaining contract to which they would have
been parties. Since in this particular case, no new agreement had been
entered into after the CBAs stipulated term, it is only fair and just that
the employees hired thereafter be included in the existing CBA. This is
in consonance with our ruling that the terms and conditions of a
collective bargaining agreement continue to have force and effect
beyond the stipulated term when no new agreement is executed by and
between the parties to avoid or prevent the situation where no
collective bargaining agreement at all would govern between the
employer company and its employees.
Dispositive: Respondent won.
Doctrine: Lopez Sugar Corporation vs. Federation of Free Workers,
et.al: Although a CBA has expired, it continues to have legal effects as
between the parties until a new CBA has been entered into. It is the
duty of both parties to the CBA to keep the status quo, and to continue
in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is
reached by the parties
3.
ISSUE/S: For how long will the CBA be effective and from when
should it retroact?
RULING: The Court in the January 27, 1999 Decision, stated that the
CBA shall be "effective for a period of 2 years counted from
December 28, 1996 up to December 27, 1999." Parenthetically, this
actually covers a three-year period. Labor laws are silent as to when an
arbitral award in a labor dispute where the Secretary had assumed
jurisdiction by virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code shall
locals into the national union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the
same end. These associations are consensual entities capable of
entering into such legal relations with their members. The essential
purpose was the affiliation of the local unions into a common
enterprise to increase by collective action the common bargaining
power in respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals
remained the basic units of association, free to serve their own and the
common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by the
Constitution and ByLaws of the Association, and free also to renounce
the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the
agreement which brought it into existence.
Corollarily, the substitutionary doctrine likewise fully supports
petitioners stand. Petitioner union to whom the employees owe their
allegiance has from the beginning expressly avowed that it does not
intend to change and/or amend the provisions of the present collective
bargaining agreement but only to be given the chance to enforce the
same since there is a shift of allegiance in the majority of the
employees at respondent company.
It need only be mentioned finally that the Secretary of Labor in his
decision of April 23, 1976 and order of January 10, 1977 denying
reconsideration in the sister unfair labor practice case and ordering
respondent corporation to immediately lift the suspension and reinstate
the complainant officers and board members of petitioner union has
likewise adhered to the foregoing basic principles and settled
jurisprudence in contrast to respondent director (as well as therein
respondent NLRC which similarly adhered to the archaic and illogical
view that the officers and board members of petitioner local union
committed an act of disloyalty in disaffiliating from the mother
union when practically all its members had so voted to disaffiliate and
the mother union [as mere agent] no longer had any local union or
members to represent), ruling that (G)ranting arguendo that the
disaffiliation from the NAFLU is a legal cause for expulsion and
dismissal, it could not detract from the fact that only 13 individual
complainants out of almost 700 members who disaffiliated, were
singled out for expulsion and recommended for dismissal. The
actuation of NAFLU conclusively constitutes discrimination. Since the
LAETPI GUILTY OF
(AFFIRMED BY NLRC)
ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL
AND
ULP
ISSUE/S:
WON the petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice?
RULING: NO.
In the case of Royal Interocean Lines, et al. vs. CIR, as respondent sol
was merely an employee and was not connected woth any labor union,
the company cannot be cpnsidered as having committed acts
constitution unfair labor practice as defined in the Industrial peace act.
The term ULP has been defined as any of those acts listed in SEC. 4 of
the act. The respondent has never been found to commit any of the acts
mentioned in par. A of sec. 4. Respondent sol was not connected with
any labor organization or to assist, or contribute to labor organization.
The company, therefore cannot be considered as having committed an
unfair labor practice.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitioner won.
DOCTRINE: Section 4 of the Industrial Peace Act.
The Court affirms the factual finding of the labor arbiter and the
NLRC that" there was no strikeable issue to support respondent's (the
Union) subject strike." The evidence show that the union anchored its
position on alleged unfair labor practices in order to evade not only the
grievance machinery but also the no strike clause in their collective
bargaining agreement with RBS.
RBS did not issue its implementing guidelines dated 24 June 1991
concerning the availment of leaves and rendering of overtime services
in an arbitrary manner. The union was promptly informed that RBS'
decision was based on its management prerogative to regulate all
aspects of employment, subject of course to well-defined limitations
imposed by law or by contract.
Even assuming arguendo that in the issuance of said guidelines RBS
may have violated some provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement, there was no palpable showing that the same was
a flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with its economic
provisions. (Book V Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, Rule
XIII, Section 1) Hence, the law mandates that said violation "shall not
be considered unfair labor practice and shall not be strikeable."
The bottom line is that the union should have immediately resorted to
the grievance machinery established in their agreement with RBS. In
disregarding said procedure the union leaders who knowingly
participated in the illegal strike "have acted unreasonably, and, as such,
the law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the
consequences of their behavior" (National labor Union v. Philippine
Match Factory, 70 Phil. 300; United Seamen's Union v. Davao
Shipowner's Association, 20 SCRA 1226)
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED, there being no substantial evidence of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the NLRC.
DOCTRINE: In the case at bar, the facts and the evidence did not
establish even at least a rational basis why the union would wield a
strike based on alleged unfair labor practices it did not even bother to
substantiate during the conciliation proceedings. It is not enough that
the union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor
practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie
showing to warrant such a belief.
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
3)
4)
faith had been rebutted and that bad faith was extant in
petitioners actions. To recall, these circumstances are: (a) the
execution of a supposed CBA with another labor union,
CABELA; and (b) CABs sending of the letter to NCMB seeking
to call off the collective bargaining negotiations. These, however,
are not enough to ascribe the very serious offense of ULP upon
petitioner.
ISSUE: WON CAB was guilty of acts constituting unfair labor
practice by refusing to bargain collectively. NO
RULING:
NO. CABEU-NFL, in simply relying on the said letter-response,
failed to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice to rebut the
presumption of good faith.
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown
that CAB was motivated by ill will, bad faith, or fraud, or was
oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation,
wounded feelings or grave anxiety resulted x x x in suspending
negotiations with CABEU-NFL. Notably, CAB believed that CABEUNFL was no longer the representative of the workers. It just wanted to
foster industrial peace by bowing to the wishes of the overwhelming
majority of its rank and file workers and by negotiating and
concluding in good faith a CBA with CABELA. Such actions of CAB
are nowhere tantamount to anti-unionism, the evil sought to be
punished in cases of unfair labor practices.
Burden of Proof
Furthermore, basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. By imputing bad
faith to the actuations of CAB, CABEU-NFL has the burden of
proof to present substantial evidence to support the allegation of
unfair labor practice. Apparently, CABEU-NFL refers only to the
circumstances mentioned in the letter-response, namely, the execution
of the supposed CBA between CAB and CABELA and the request to
suspend the negotiations, to conclude that bad faith attended CABs
actions. The Court is of the view that CABEU-NFL, in simply relying
Basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges
bad faith has the duty to prove the same. By imputing bad faith unto
the actuations of Nestl, it was UFE-DFA-KMU, therefore, who had the
burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the
allegation of unfair labor practice.
RULING: No.
To begin with, we view the return-to-work agreement of May 30, 1965
as in the nature of a partial compromise between the parties and, more
important, a labor contract; consequently, in the latter aspect the same
"must yield to the common good" (Art. 1700, Civil Code of the
Philippines) and "(I)n case of doubt ... shall be construed in favor of
the safety and decent living for the laborer" (Art. 1702, ibid). To our
mind when the Company unqualifiedly bound itself in the return-towork agreement that all employees will be taken back "with the same
employee status prior to April 22, 1965," the Company thereby made
manifest its intention and conformity not to proceed with Case No.
1484-MC, (c) relating the illegality of the strike incident. For while it
is true that there is a reservation in the return-to-work agreement as
follows:
6. The parties agree that all Court cases now pending shall continue,
including CIR Case No. 1484-MC.
we think the same is to be construed bearing in mind the conduct and
intention of the parties. The failure to mention Case No. 1484-MC(1)
while specifically mentioning Case No. 1484-MC, in our opinion, bars
the Company from proceeding with the former especially in the light
of the additional specific stipulation that the strikers would be taken
back with the same employee status prior to the strike on April 22,
1965. The records disclose further that, according to Atty. Domingo E.
de Lara when he testified on October 9, 1965, and this is not seriously
disputed by private respondents, the purpose of Paragraph 10 of the
return-to-work agreement was, to quote in part from this witness, "to
secure the tenure of employees after the return-to-work agreement
considering that as I understand there were demotions and suspensions
of one or two employees during the strike and, moreover, there was
this incident Case No. 1484-MC(1)" (see Brief for the Petition pp. 4142). To borrow the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Citizens Labor
Union Pandacan Chapter vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company (G.R.
No. L-7478, May 6, 1955), in so far as the illegality of the strike is
concerned in this proceeding and in the light of the records.
... the matter had become moot. The parties had both abandoned their
original positions and come to a virtual compromise and agreed to
resume unconditionally their former relations. To proceed with the
declaration of illegality would not only breach this understanding,
freely arrived at, but to unnecessarily revive animosities to the
prejudice of industrial peace. (Emphasis supplied)
Conceding arguendo that the illegality incident had not become moot
and academic, we find ourselves unable to agree with respondent court
to the effect that the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965
was unjustified, unreasonable and unwarranted that it was declared in
open defiance of an order in Case No. 1484-MC not to strike; and that
the Association resorted to means beyond the pale of the law in the
prosecution of the strike. As adverted to above, the Association filed
its notice to strike on March 8, 1965, giving reasons therefor any one
of which is a valid ground for a strike.
In addition, from the voluminous evidence presented by the
Association, it is clear that the strike of the Association was declared
not just for the purpose of gaining recognition as concluded by
respondent court, but also for bargaining in bad faith on the part of the
Company and by reason of unfair labor practices committed by its
officials. But even if the strike were really declared for the purpose of
recognition, the concerted activities of the officers and members of the
Association in this regard cannot be said to be unlawful nor the
purpose thereof be regarded as trivial. Significantly, in the voluntary
return-to-work agreement entered into between the Company and the
Association, thereby ending the strike, the Company agreed to
recognize for membership in the Association the position titles
mentioned in Annex "B" of said agreement. 3 This goes to show that
striking for recognition is productive of good result in so far as a union
is concerned.
Besides, one of the important rights recognized by the Magna Carta of
Labor is the right to self-organization and we do not hesitate to say
that is the cornerstone of this monumental piece of labor legislation.
Indeed, because of occasional delays incident to a certification
proceeding usually attributable to dilatory tactics employed by the
employer, to a certain extent a union may be justified in resorting to a
FACTS:
1. Republic Savings Bank (now Republic Bank or RB) terminated
respondents Resuello, Jola et al, for having written and
published "a patently libelous letter, tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt not only of officers and
employees and employer bank itself."
2. Respondents had written to the bank president, Ramon Racelis,
a letter-charge, demanding his resignation on the grounds of
immorality, nepotism in the appointment andfavoritism as well
as discrimination in the promotion of RBemployees. CIR ruled
that RBs act of dismissing the 8 respondent employees
constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and
intendment of the Industrial Peace Act (RA 875).RB appealed.
It still maintains that the discharge was for cause.
3. RB argued that CIR should have dismissed the complaint
because the discharge of the respondents had nothing to do
with their union activities as the latter in fact admitted at the
hearing that the writing of the letter-charge was not a "union
action" but merely their "individual" act.
ISSUE/S: WON the dismissal of the 8 employees by RB constituted
unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of the
Industrial Peace Act?
Where there is no showing of clear, valid and legal cause for the
termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of
illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the
termination was for a valid and authorized cause. In the case at bar,
petitioners failed to prove any such cause for the dismissal of
respondents who are regular employees.
The NLRC also found herein petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice.
It ruled as follows:
Indeed, from respondents refusal to bargain, to their acts of
economic inducements resulting in the promotion of those who
withdrew from the union, the use of armed guards to prevent the
organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and
members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did not want a
union in their haciendaa clear interference in the right of the
workers to self-organization.
We uphold the CAs affirmation of the above findings.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Respondent WON.
DOCTRINE: The Court finds no reason to disturb the CAs dismissal
of what petitioners claim was their valid exercise of a management
prerogative. The sudden changes in work assignments reeked of bad
faith. These changes were implemented immediately after respondents
had organized themselves into a union and started demanding
collective bargaining. Those who were union members were
effectively deprived of their jobs. Petitioners move actually amounted
to unjustified dismissal of respondents, in violation of the Labor Code.
but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for
union security, promising money benefits if this was done.
3. From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor
demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the
matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions
demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their
economic demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of
giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958
presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a
workable formula which would justify their own proposals,
taking into account the financial position of the former.
Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against
what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.
4. On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the
offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners
from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for
redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor
practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in
concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1)
regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged
by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their
mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of
which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees
to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against
such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the
respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift
should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting
speech."
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves
at least equal protection as the concerted action of employees in giving
publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with
immorality, nepotism, favoritism and discrimination in the
appointment and promotion of ban employees.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitioners won
4. In due course, its Presiding Judge issued the order appealed from,
which was affirmed by the CIR sitting en banc.
5. CIR: Petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice as charged, directs
them to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice and to
reinstate the complainants, with back wages from the date they
were laid off until reinstated.
6. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari.
Transportation
Company
ISSUES:
2. Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship
between the Company and the Complainants
3. Whether or not the Company has been guilty of unfair labor
practice
4. Whether or not the order of reinstatement of Complainants,
with backpay, is a reversible error.
RULING: 1. Yes there is employer-employee relationship.
Yes, because in the performance of their duties, Complainants worked,
however, under the direction and control of the officers of the
Company, whose paymaster, or disbursing officer paid the
corresponding compensation directly to said Complainants, who, in
turn, acknowledged receipt in payrolls of the Company. We have
already held that laborers working under these conditions are
employees of the Company in the same manner as watchmen or
security guards furnished, under similar circumstances, by watchmen
or security agencies, inasmuch as the agencies and/or labor
organizations involved therein merely performed the role of a
representative or agent of the employer in the recruitment of men
needed for the operation of the latter's business.
2. Yes, the company is guilty of unfair labor practice.
Yes, because referring to the unfair labor practice charge against the
Company, the Court finds, with the CIR, that said charge is
substantially borne out by the evidence of record, it appearing that the
workers not admitted to work beginning from November, 1955, were
precisely those belonging to the UWFA and the Xaudaro, the Company
members. For said reason, Bankard contended that the issue of bad
faith in bargaining had become moot and academic.
4) Union alleged that contractualization started in Bankard in 1995 in
the Records Communications Management Division, particularly
in the mailing unit, which was composed of two (2) employees and
fourteen (14) messengers. They were hired as contractual workers
to perform the functions of the regular employees who had earlier
resigned and availed of the MRP. According to the Union, there
were other departments in Bankard utilizing messengers to perform
work load considered for regular employees, like the Marketing
Department, Voice Authorizational Department, Computer
Services Department, and Records Retention Department. The
Union contended that the number of regular employees had been
reduced substantially through the management scheme of freezehiring policy on positions vacated by regular employees on the
basis of cost-cutting measures and the introduction of a more
drastic formula of streamlining its regular employees through the
MRP.
5) Union averred that Bankards proposals were way below their
demands, showing that the management had no intention of
reaching an agreement. It was a scheme calculated to force the
Union to declare a bargaining deadlock.
6) NLRC: declared that the management committed acts considered
as ULP. It ruled that the act of management of reducing its number
of employees thru application of the Manpower Rationalization
Program and subsequently contracting the same to other
contractual employees defeats the purpose or reason for
streamlining the employees. The ultimate effect is to reduce the
number of union members and increasing the number of
contractual employees who could never be members of the union
for lack of qualification. Consequently, the union was effectively
restrained in their movements as a union on their rights to selforganization. Management had successfully limited and prevented
the growth of the Union and the acts are clear violation of the
provisions of the Labor Code and could be considered as Unfair
The general principle is that the one who makes an allegation has the
burden of proving it. While there are exceptions to this general rule, in
ULP cases, the alleging party has the burden of proving the ULP; and
in order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor
Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Such
principle finds justification in the fact that ULP is punishable with both
civil and/or criminal sanctions.
Aside from the bare allegations of the Union, nothing in the records
strongly proves that Bankard intended its program, the MRP, as a tool
to drastically and deliberately reduce union membership. Contrary to
the findings and conclusions of both the NLRC and the CA, there was
no proof that the program was meant to encourage the employees to
disassociate themselves from the Union or to restrain them from
joining any union or organization. There was no showing that it was
intentionally implemented to stunt the growth of the Union or that
Bankard discriminated, or in any way singled out the union members
who had availed of the retirement package under the MRP. True, the
program might have affected the number of union membership
because of the employees voluntary resignation and availment of the
package, but it does not necessarily follow that Bankard indeed
purposely sought such result. It must be recalled that the MRP was
implemented as a valid cost-cutting measure, well within the ambit
of the so-called management prerogatives. Bankard contracted an
independent agency to meet business exigencies. In the absence of any
showing that Bankard was motivated by ill will, bad faith or malice, or
that it was aimed at interfering with its employees right to selforganize, it cannot be said to have committed an act of unfair labor
practice.
Unfortunately, the Union, which had the burden of adducing
substantial evidence to support its allegations of ULP, failed to
discharge such burden.
The law on unfair labor practices is not intended to deprive employers
of their fundamental right to prescribe and enforce such rules as they