QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER

JUDICIAL REVIEW
GSIS vs CA
GR No. 87146
FACTS: According to Asuncion Salazars service record filed with the CSC, she was
employed by the GSIS as a casual laborer. She became permanent with a designation
of stenographer. Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant Aide.
Salazars GSIS Service Record however, revealed that she was appointed to the
position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS President and
General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. She was then promoted to
Technical Assistant III, the position she held when her services were terminated by the
newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her
position was co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority.
Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, but
reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, she filed a petition for reconsideration of the
denial with the Review Committee, which referred the same to the Merit System
Promotion and the CSC.
In a resolution, the CSC directed the immediate reinstatement of Salazar with back
salaries. The Board however affirmed her termination. Salazar filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Boards order and manifested that the Commissions prior
resolution of the case. The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by
the Board and stated that the CSC is higher administrative appellate body on matters
concerning the removal of officers and employees from the service. Hence the Board
cannot in any manner modify of alter the determinations and actions of the CSC. The
GSIS appealed but the CSC denied the motion for consideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the CSC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. P.D. No. 1409, creating the Merit Systems Board provides that the Merit
Systems Board (Board) has the function to Hear and decide cases brought before it by
officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the determination of appointing
authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment and other
personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officers in the government arising
from abuses arising from personnel actions of the these officers or from violations of the
merit system.

When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive
unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in
which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Presidential
Decree No. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of
appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel
action. The Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases
specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, except in the case specified under Section 9 (j)
of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such power, to wit:
SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall
administer the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and
functions:
j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in
accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;
In the case at bar, the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review Committee to
both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission. In the absence of a
decision from the Merit System Board, the Commission cannot legally assume
jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, its decision in favor of Salazar and all subsequent
resolutions of the Commission in the case are void. Likewise, the Order of the Board
setting aside its previous order upholding the termination of Salazar in deference to the
Commissions final appellate jurisdiction over the matter, is null and void. Jurisdiction s
vested by law and is not lost nor legally transferred by voluntary surrender in favor of a
body not vested by law with such jurisdiction.

PAAT VS CA

GR NO. 111107 January 10, 1997

FACTS: The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR
personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the
required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner
Laguyan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO)
issued an Order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner the opportunity to
explain why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to
submit the required explanation. Regional Executive Director Baggayan of DENR
sustained the said Order. Private respondents then filed a letter of recommendation but
was denied. The case was brought to the Secretary of DENR for appeal.
Pending resolution of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by private respondents
against Laguyan and Baggayan for the return of the truck confiscated. Petitioners
contend that private respondents had no cause of action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The trial court and CA ruled in favor of private respondents.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should apply?
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all
the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction
then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought,
The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of
dismissal for lack of cause of action.
However, this doctrine is not without exceptions, to wit: (1) when there is violation of due
process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4)
when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when
there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the
latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention.

Theres no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR
when it was forwarded to Public Respondent. Private respondents, thru their letter for
consideration, looked up to the Secretary of DENR for review therefore it is perceived
that former acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available
and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without
violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's intervention
by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an
administrative proceedings

VALMONTE VS BELMONTE
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989

FACTS: In a letter addressed to Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., then GSIS General Manager,
petitioner Belmonte requested the list of names of the defunct interim and regular
Batasang Pambansa including the 10 opposition members who were able to secure a
clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos and also documents
evidencing their loans. Such concern of Valmonte was reffered by Belmonte to the
Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS Tiro. In Tiros letter to Valmonte, he is in his
opinion that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who
borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to
preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be; that the GSIS has a duty to its
customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS
to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
Apparently not having received the Letter of Tiro, Valmonte wrote another letter to
Belmonte saying that for failure to receive to reply, they are now considering themelves
free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue their desired
objective in pursuance of public interest.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injuction invoking
their right to information over the documents mentioned. GSIS however contends that
the actions of GSIS General Manager is reviewable only by the Board of Trustees of the
GSIS. Petitioners however did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees thus
have failed to exhaust administrative remedies and have no cause of action.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners should avail administrative remedies before seeking relief
from the court?
HELD: No. Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can
be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of
administrative redress available under the law. However the issue raised by the
petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently
than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question.
Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies is warranted.