1.

1qAgadan v. Kilaan, A.C. No. 9385, 11 November 2013

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9385
November 11, 2013
MARIANO AGADAN, EDEN MOLLEJON, ARSENIO IGME, JOSE NUMBAR, CECILIA LANGAWAN, PABLO
PALMA, JOSELITO CLAVERIA, MIGUEL FLORES, and ALBERT GAYDOWEN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RICHARD BALTAZAR KILAAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On September 12, 2005, complainants Mariano Agadan, Eden Mollejon, Arsenio Igme, Jose Numbar, Cecilia Langawan,
Pablo Palma, Joselito Claveria, Miguel Flores and Albert Gaydowen filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Baguio Benguet Chapter (IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter) a Complaint1 against respondent Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan
(Atty. Kilaan) for falsification of documents, dishonesty and deceit. They alleged that Atty. Kilaan intercalated certain
entries in the application for issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate public utility jeepney filed
before the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board Cordillera Administrative Region (LTFRB-CAR) and
docketed as Case No. 2003-CAR-688 by substituting the name of the applicant from Gary Adasing (Adasing)2 to that of
Joseph Batingwed (Batingwed);3 that Atty. Kilaan submitted false and/or insufficient documentary requirements in
support of Batingwed s application for CPC; that Atty. Kilaan prepared a Decision based on the Resolution of the LTFRB
Central Office which dismissed the Opposition filed by the complainants; and that the said Decision granted the
application of Batingwed which was adopted by the LTFRB-CAR.
On February 27, 2006, the IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter formally endorsed the Complaint to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) for appropriate action.4 Acting on the Complaint, the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Kilaan to submit his
Answer.5
In his Answer6 dated April 8, 2006, Atty. Kilaan denied violating the Lawyer s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He disclaimed any pat1icipation in the preparation of the Decision with respect to the application of
Batingwed for CPC. He explained that it is the Regional Director of the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC)-CAR who approves the application and who drafts the Decision after the LTFRB-CAR signifies
its favorable recommendation. He denied exercising any influence over the DOTC-CAR or the LTFRB. He claimed that
Batingwed had decided to abandon his application hence he no longer submitted the necessary requirements therefor. He
also disavowed any knowledge that Batingwed s application had been forwarded to the LTFRB Central Office for
approval. Atty. Kilaan claimed that he knew about the favorable Decision only when Batingwed showed him the same.
He narratted that considering the incomplete documents, the LTFRB mistakenly approved Batingwed s application. Thus,
when it discovered its error, the LTFRB immediately revoked the grant of CPC to Batingwed.
He denied intercalating the entries in the application for CPC of Batingwed. He averred that once an application has been
filed, the application and all accompanying records remain with the LTFRB and could no longer be retrieved by the
applicant or his counsel; as such, it is highly improbable for him to intercalate the entries therein. Atty. Kilaan further
explained that it was Adasing who paid the filing fee in behalf of Batingwed but the cashier erroneously indicated
Adasing instead of Batingwed as payor. Atty. Kilaan lamented that Adasing who is not in the Philippines could not
corroborate his explanation. Finaliy, Atty. Kilaan noted that complainants filed the instant suit in retaliation for the
dismissal of their Opposition to the application for CPCs which he filed on behalf of his other clients.
The case was set for mandatory conference7 after which the parties submitted their respective Position Papers.8 In their
Position Paper, complainants further alleged that the Verification in Batingwed's application for CPC was notarized by
Atty. Kilaan as Doc. No: 253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, upon verification of Atty. Kilaan's
Notarial Registry submitted to the Regional Trial Court Clerk of Court in Baguio City, the said notarial entry actually
refers to a Deed of Sale and not the Verification of Batingwed's application. Also, complainants belied Atty. Kilaan's
allegation that Adasing is 'presently abroad by presenting the Affidavit of Adasing claiming that he never left the country.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner9 found complainants to have miserably failed to
prove that Atty. Kilaan intercalated the entries in the application for CPC of Batingwed. Their allegation was based on
mere suspicion devoid of any credible proof, viz:

At the onset, it is very difficult to prove that it was respondent himself who was responsible for any intercalation,
particularly the substitution of Joseph Batingwed's application folder in lieu of Gary Odasing's. Indeed, that is a grave
charge, and based on the evidence presented by complainants, all that they can muster is a suspicion that cannot be
confirmed. Of course, this has to be pointed out - anyone who had access to the case folder could have possibly been
responsible for whatever intercalation that may have occurred. That being said, this Office is not prepared to make that
leap into conjecture and conclude that it was respondent's doing.
Besides, the Certification of the Receiving Clerk of the DOTC CAR dated 18 October 2006 -which notably was
submitted by complainants -stated that the application of Gary Odasing was continued by Joseph Batingwed.
Complainants have not alleged that the same constitutes a violation of the rules and procedures of LTFRB. Thus, it may
be presumed to have been done in the regular course of business.10
However, the Investigating Commissioner did not totally absolve Atty. Kilaan as he found him liable for violating the
Notarial Law considering that the Verification of Batingwed's application which he notarized and denominated as Doc.
No. 253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003 was actually recorded as a Deed of Sale in his Notarial Register. In
addition, the Investigating Commissioner noted that Atty. Kilaan lied under oath when he alleged that Adasing was abroad
as this was squarely belied by Adasing in his Affidavit. The Investigating Commissioner held thus:
Respondent must be punished for making it appear that he notarized a document the Verification-when in truth and in
fact, the entry in his Notatial Registry shows a different document. Thus, it is but proper to suspend respondent s privilege
of being commissioned as a Notary Public.
Not only that. Despite knowing that the Verification was not properly notarized, respondent, as counsel for the applicant,
proceeded to file the defectively verified Petition with the LTFRB-Baguio City. Clearly, there was falsehood committed
by him, as there can be no other conclusion except that respondent antedated the Verification.
xxxx
Lastly, this cannot end without this being said. Respondent made matters worse by alleging in his Answer to the instant
administrative complaint that Gary Odasing was abroad -which seemingly was drawn up more out of convenience than
for truth. Now, that allegation had been completely rebuffed and found to be untrue by the execution of an Affidavit by
Gary Odasing himself. x x x It is therefore an affront to this Office that respondent would attempt to defend himself by
pleading allegations, which were seemingly made deliberately, and which were later found to be untrue. Clearly,
respondent tried, albeit vainly, to deceive even this Office.11
The Investigating Commissioner recommended, viz:
WHEREFORE, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that respondent s notarial commission, if still existing, be
REVOKED immediately and that he be further PROHIBITED from being commissioned as a notary public for TWO (2)
YEARS.
Moreover, it is likewise recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of TWO (2)
MONTHS.12
In its September 19, 2007 Resolution No. XVIII-2007-82, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Kilaans Notarial Commission be
revoked and that he be disqualified from being appointed as Notary Public for two years, thereby deleting the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law. Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XX-2012-41 dated January 15, 2012.
After a careful review of the records, we find that Atty. Kilaan committed the following infractions: 1) violation of the
Notarial Law; 2) violation of the Lawyer s Oath; and 3) violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his Motion for Reconsideration tiled before the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Kilaan passed on the blame to his
secretary for the inaccuracies in the entries in his Notarial Register. He asserted that being a private practitioner, he is
burdened with cases thus he delegated to his secretary the job of recording the documents which he notarized in his
Notarial Register. He argued that the revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification for two years is too harsh.
a penalty considering that he is a first-time offender; he prayed for leniency considering that his family depended on his
income for their collective needs.
It is settled that it is the notary public who is personally accountable for the accuracy of the entries in his Notarial
Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondent s explanation that he is burdened with cases thus he was constrained
to delegate the recording of his notarial acts in his Notarial Register to his secretary. In tact, this argument has already
been rebuffed by this Court in Lingan v. Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga,13 viz:
Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:

SEC. 245. Notarial Register.--Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the notarial register, wherein
record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a ce1tified copy of such record, or any part
thereof: to any person applying for it and paying the legal fees therefore. (emphasis supplied)
xxx
xxx
xxx
SEC. 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature
of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to or acknowledging
the instrument, the witnesses, if any to the signature, the date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument,
the fees collected by him for his services as notary in connection therewith, and, when the instrument is a contract, he
shall keep a connect copy thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of the
substance thereof and shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar year.
The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the
one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded.
No blank line shall be left between entries.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:
SEC. 249. Grounds fix revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public
shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notatial acts in the
manner required by law.
xxx
xxx
xxx
From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally accountable for all entries
in his notarial register. Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by
passing the buck to their secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our open condemnation.
Respondents. especially Calubaquib. a self-proclaimed "prominent legal practitioner should have known better than to
give us such a simple-minded excuse.
We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act but one invested with
substantive public interest such that only those who are qualified or authorized to do so may act as notaries public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
inflicting themselves upon the public the courts and the administrative offices in general.
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. Notaries public must therefore observe utmost care with respect to the basic
requirements of their duties.
In Gemina v. Atty. Madamba,14 we have also ruled that
x x x The inaccuracies in his Notarial Register entitles and his failure to enter the documents that he admittedly notarized
constitute dereliction of duty as a notary public. He cannot escape liability by putting the blame on his secretary. The
lawyer himself, not merely his secretary, should be held accountable for these misdeeds.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgement and
affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of
the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public
instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due
execution.1wphi1 Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary public
exercises duties calling for caretl1lness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to;
most importantly, they should not take pmt or allow themselves to be pmt of illegal transactions.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, moreover, require a duly commissioned notary public to make
the proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from committing any dereliction or any act which may serve as
cause for the revocation of his commission or the imposition of administrative sanctions.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondent s failure to make the proper entry or entries in his Notarial
Register of his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial acts, and his failure

to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge by competent evidence are grounds for the revocation of a
lawyer s commission as a notary public.
Indeed, Rule VI, Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary public to keep and maintain a
Notarial Register wherein he will record his every notarial act. His failure to make the proper entry or entries in his
notarial register concerning his notarial acts is a ground for revocation of his notarial commission. 15 As mentioned,
respondent failed to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register; as such, his notarial commission may be properly
revoked.
Aside from violating the Notarial Law, respondent also violated his Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing falsehood in the pleadings he submitted before the IBP. His claim that Adasing was abroad
hence could not corroborate the explanation made by Batingwed was proved to be untruthful when complainants
submitted the Affidavit of Adasing insisting that he never left the country. Canon 10,
Rule 10.0 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. In the same
vein, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 mandates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent failed to observe these Rules and hence must be sanctioned.
Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Kilaan s suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months and the
revocation and disqualification of his notarial commission for a period of one (1) year appropriate.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED,
and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period of one (1) year. He is also
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition
of a similar violation will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this
Resolution to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 3-8.
2 Also referred as Odasing and Agasing in some parts of the records.
3 Atty. Kilaan also allegedly used Adasing s case folder assessment slip verification page and intercalated the number of
units applied from one unit to five units.
4 Rollo, p. 1.
5 Id. at 33.
6 Id. at 40-46.
7 Id. at 106.
8 Id. at 115-133; 163-175.
9 Commissioner Jose Roderick F. Fernando.
10 Report and Recommendation. p. 5.
11 Report and Recommendation, pp. 8-10.
12 Id. at 10.
13 524 Phil. 60, 68-70 (2006). Citations omitted.

14 A.C. No. 6689, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 34, 41-43. Citations omitted.
15 See Section 11(b)(2), Rule XI, 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice.
2.

Pea v. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191, 10 June 2013

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4191
June 10, 2013
ANITA C. PENA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno for acts violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.
On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Pea, former head of the Records Department of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno. Complainant
alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 7-C, Psd-74200, located in Bayanbayanan, Parang,
Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244,2Register of Deeds of Marikina,
with an eight-door apartment constructed thereon. She personally knew respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno, as
respondent was her lawyer in a legal separation case, which she filed against her husband in 1974, and the
aforementioned property was her share in their property settlement. Complainant stated that she also knew personally one
Estrella D. Kraus, as she was respondent's trusted employee who did secretarial work for respondent. Estrella Kraus was
always there whenever she visited respondent in connection with her cases.
Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in 1986, respondent suggested that she (complainant) apply for a loan from
a bank to construct townhouses on her property for sale to interested buyers, and that her property be offered as collateral.
Respondent assured complainant that she would work out the speedy processing and release of the loan. Complainant
agreed, but since she had a balance on her loan with the GSIS, respondent lent her the sum ofP27,000.00, without any
interest, to pay the said loan. When her title was released by the GSIS, complainant entrusted it to respondent who would
handle the preparation of documents for the loan and follow-up the same, and complainant gave respondent the authority
for this purpose. From time to time, complainant inquired about the application for the loan, but respondent always
assured her that she was still preparing the documents required by the bank. Because of her assurances, complainant did
not bother to check on her property, relying on respondent's words that she would handle speedily the preparation of her
application.
Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her property, she discovered that her apartment was already
demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were constructed on her property, which she later learned was already
owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who bought her property from Estrella D. Kraus. Complainant immediately confronted
respondent about what she discovered, but respondent just brushed her aside and ignored her. After verification,
complainant learned that her property was sold on November 11, 1986 to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and
respondent was the Notary Public before whom the sale was acknowledged.3 Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., through
its Managing Partner, Estrella D. Kraus, sold the same to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April 13, 1989.4
Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not sell her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and that she
neither signed any deed of sale in its favor nor appeared before respondent to acknowledge the sale. She alleged that
respondent manipulated the sale of her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. using her trusted employee, Estrella
D. Kraus, as the instrument in the sale, and that her signature was forged, as she did not sign any deed selling her property
to anyone.
In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D. Kraus never worked in any capacity in her law office, and that Estrella
and her husband, Karl Kraus (Spouses Kraus), were her clients. Respondent denied that she suggested that complainant
should apply for a loan from a bank to construct townhouses. She said that it was the complainant, on the contrary, who
requested her (respondent) to look for somebody who could help her raise the money she needed to complete the

amortization of her property, which was mortgaged with the GSIS and was about to be foreclosed. Respondent stated that
she was the one who introduced complainant to the Spouses Kraus when they were both in her office. In the course of
their conversation, complainant offered the property, subject matter of this case, to the Spouses Kraus. The Spouses Kraus
were interested, and got the telephone number of complainant. Thereafter, complainant told respondent that she
accompanied the Spouses Kraus to the site of her property and the Office of the Register of Deeds. After about three
weeks, the Spouses Kraus called up respondent to tell her that they had reached an agreement with complainant, and they
requested respondent to prepare the deed of sale in favor of their company, Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. Thereafter,
complainant and the Spouses Kraus went to respondent's office where complainant signed the Deed of Sale after she
received Sixty-Seven Thousand Pesos (P67,000.00) from the Spouses Kraus. Respondent alleged that complainant took
hold of the Deed of Sale, as the understanding was that the complainant would, in the meantime, work for the release of
the mortgage, and, thereafter, she would deliver her certificate of title, together with the Deed of Sale, to the Spouses
Kraus who would then pay complainant the balance of the agreed price. Complainant allegedly told respondent that she
would inform respondent when the transaction was completed so that the Deed of Sale could be recorded in the Notarial
Book. Thereafter, respondent claimed that she had no knowledge of what transpired between complainant and the
Spouses Kraus. Respondent stated that she was never entrusted with complainant's certificate of title to her property in
Marikina (TCT No. N-61244). Moreover, it was only complainant who negotiated the sale of her property in favor of
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. According to respondent, complainant's inaction for eight years to verify what happened
to her property only meant that she had actually sold the same, and that she concocted her story when she saw the
prospect of her property had she held on to it. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case.
On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a Reply,6 belying respondent's allegations and affirming the veracity of her
complaint.
On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and
recommendation.7 On April 18, 1996, complainant moved that hearings be scheduled by the Commission on Bar
Discipline. On November 8, 1999, the case was set for its initial hearing, and hearings were conducted from March 21,
2000 to July 19, 2000.
On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Thereafter, hearings for the reception of respondent's
evidence were set, but supervening events caused their postponement.
On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence,8 which was opposed by complainant. The Investigating
Commissioner denied respondent's prayer for the outright dismissal of the complaint, and directed respondent to present
her evidence on October 24, 2001.9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was subpoenaed to testify and bring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November
11, 1986, which caused the cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in the name of complainant and the issuance of a new title to
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. However, the Register of Deeds failed to appear on March 1, 2002. During the hearing
held on July 29, 2003, respondent's counsel presented a certification10 from Records Officer Ma. Corazon Gaspar of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina City, which certification stated that a copy of the Deed of Sale executed by Anita C. Pea
in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., covering a parcel of land in Marikina, could not be located from the general
file of the registry and that the same may be considered lost. Hearings continued until 2005. On February 17, 2005,
respondent was directed by the Investigating Commissioner to formally offer her evidence and to submit her
memorandum.
Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss before the IBP on the ground that the
criminal case of estafa filed against her before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36, which estafa case was anchored on the
same facts as the administrative case, had been dismissed in a Decision11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal Case No.
94-138567. The RTC held that the case for estafa could not prosper against the accused Atty. Christina C. Paterno,
respondent herein, for insufficiency of evidence to secure conviction beyond reasonable doubt, considering the absence of
the Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof that would show that Anita Pea's signature therein was forged and the
transfer of the land was made through fraudulent documents.
The issue resolved by the Investigating Commissioner was whether or not there was clear and preponderant evidence
showing that respondent violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility by (a) deceiving complainant Anita C. Pea;
(b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and Engr. Ernesto Lampa to enable the latter to register the subject property in his
name; and (c) knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale.
On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, submitted his Report and
Recommendation finding that respondent betrayed the trust reposed upon her by complainant by executing a bogus deed

of sale while she was entrusted with complainant's certificate of title, and that respondent also notarized the spurious deed
of sale. Commissioner Sordan stated that there was no evidence showing that respondent actively conspired with any
party or actively participated in the forgery of the signature of complainant. Nevertheless, Commissioner Sordan stated
that complainant's evidence supports the conclusion that her signature on the said Deed of Sale dated November 11, 1986
was forged.
Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be produced notwithstanding diligent search in the National Archives
and the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Commissioner Sordan stated that the interlocking
testimonies of the complainant and her witness, Maura Orosco, proved that the original copy of the owner's duplicate
certificate of title was delivered to respondent.12 Commissioner Sordan did not give credence to respondent's denial that
complainant handed to her the owner's duplicate of TCT No. N-61244 in November 1986 at the GSIS, as Maura Orosco,
respondent's former client who worked as Records Processor at the GSIS, testified that she saw complainant give the said
title to respondent.
Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the testimony of complainant that she gave respondent her owner's duplicate copy
of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the same as collateral in constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in
the safekeeping of respondent for seven years.13 Despite repeated demands by complainant, respondent refused to return
it.14 Yet, respondent assured complainant that she was still the owner.15Later, complainant discovered that a new
building was erected on her property in January 1994, eight years after she gave the title to respondent. Respondent
argued that it was unfathomable that after eight years, complainant never took any step to verify the status of her loan
application nor visited her property, if it is untrue that she sold the said property. Complainant explained that respondent
kept on assuring her that the bank required the submission of her title in order to process her loan application.16
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Kraus to sell complainant's land to Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244 with respect to the sale of the property
described therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. for P200,000.00.18 Respondent alleged that complainant signed the
Deed of Sale in her presence inside her office.19 However, respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny if, indeed,
she notarized the instrument in her direct examination,20 but on cross-examination, she stated that she was not denying
that she was the one who notarized the Deed of Sale.21 Estrella Kraus' affidavit22 supported respondent's defense.
Respondent presented her former employee Basilio T. Depaudhon to prove the alleged signing by complainant of the
purported Deed of Absolute Sale, and the notarization by respondent of the said Deed. However, Commissioner Sordan
doubted the credibility of Depaudhon, as he affirmed that his participation in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale was mere
recording, but he later affirmed that he saw the parties sign the Deed of Absolute Sale.23
Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken chain of circumstances, like respondent's testimony that she saw
complainant sign the Deed of Sale before her is proof of respondent's deception. Respondent's notarization of the disputed
deed of sale showed her active role to perpetuate a fraud to prejudice a party. Commissioner Sordan declared that
respondent failed to exercise the required diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the alleged party, Anita Pea,
appeared before her and signed the deed when in truth and in fact the said person did not participate in the execution
thereof. Moreover, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the deed of
sale in her notarial register.
According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross violations of the law made respondent liable for violation of her oath as a
lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a),24 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 125and Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Sordan recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and her name stricken-off the
Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that the notarial commission of respondent, if still existing,
be revoked, and that respondent be perpetually disqualified from reappointment as a notary public.
On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XIX-20-464, adopting and approving the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and finding Respondent guilty of her oath as a lawyer, Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Christina C. Paterno is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law and her name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Furthermore, respondent's notarial commission if still existing
is Revoked with Perpetual Disqualification from reappointment as a Notary Public.

The Court adopts the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP insofar as respondent has violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, and agrees with the sanction imposed.
The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, is
different from this administrative case, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each
case.26 Section 5,27 in relation to Sections 128 and 2,29 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as
in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.30
Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a separate and
independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to establish the culpability is merely
substantial evidence. An administrative case can proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein,
based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the ground
either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was
committed.32
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to
ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.33 The burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.34
In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan gave credence to complainant's testimony that she gave respondent her
owner's copy of the certificate of title to her property as respondent would apply for a bank loan in complainant's behalf,
using the subject property as collateral.
Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura Orosco, a former records processor in complainant's office at the
GSIS and also a client of respondent, who stated that she saw complainant give her title to respondent. 35Respondent
admitted in her Answer36 that she executed the Deed of Sale per the request of the Spouses Kraus. The said Deed of Sale
was notarized by respondent as evidenced by Entry No. 15032237 in complainant's title, TCT No. N-61244. As the Deed
of Sale could not be presented in evidence, through no fault of the complainant, nonetheless, the consequence thereof is
failure of complainant to prove her allegation that her signature therein was forged and that respondent defrauded
complainant by facilitating the sale of the property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without complainant's approval.
However, complainant proved that respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila, National
Capital Region her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed.
The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, states that every notary public shall keep a notarial register,38 and he shall
enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, among others, and, when the
instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and he shall likewise enter in said
records a brief description of the substance thereof.39
A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to send the copy of the entries to the
proper clerk of the Court of First Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of the month next following or the failure of the
notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to the proper clerk of court.40
In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification,41 dated February 22, 1994, stating that
respondent was duly appointed as a Notary Public for the City of Manila for the year 1986, and that respondent has not
yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale
was executed and notarized by her. Hence, a copy of the Notarial Report/Record and the said Deed of Sale could not also
be found in the National Archives per the certification42 of the Archives Division Chief Teresita R. Ignacio for Director
Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of respondent to fulfill her duty as notary public to submit her notarial register for the month
of November 1986 and a copy of the said Deed of Sale that was notarized by her on the same month is cause for
revocation of her commission under Section 249 of the Notarial Law.43 Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are
mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest.44
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended for any deceit or
dishonest act, thus:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in possession of complainant's copy of the certificate of title (TCT
No. N-61244) to the property in Marikina, and it was respondent who admittedly prepared the Deed of Sale, which
complainant denied having executed or signed, the important evidence of the alleged forgery of complainant's signature
on the Deed of Sale and the validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However, a copy of the Deed of Sale could not
be produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, as it could not be located in the general files of the registry, and a
certification was issued stating that the Deed of Sale may be considered lost. 45 Moreover, respondent did not submit to
the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, 46 including the said Deed
of Sale, which was executed on November 11, 1986. Hence, Investigating Commissioner Sordan opined that it appears
that efforts were exerted to get rid of the copies of the said Deed of Sale to prevent complainant from getting hold of the
document for the purpose of handwriting verification from an expert to prove that her alleged signature on the Deed of
Sale was forged. The failure of respondent to submit to the proper RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial Register/Report for
the month of November 1986 and a copy of the Deed of Sale, which was notarized by her within that month, has farreaching implications and grave consequences, as it in effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of the said Deed of Sale
and showed the deceitful conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its authenticity. During her testimony, it was
observed by the Investigating Commissioner and reflected in the transcript of records that respondent would neither
directly confirm nor deny that she notarized the said Deed of Sale.
For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. As a member of the bar,
respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the
following Canons:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities
of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law, pursuant to Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and the notarial
commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still existing, is perpetually REVOKED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record.
Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out the name of Christina C. Paterno from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
3.

Mahilum v. Lezama, A.C. No. 10450, 30 July 2014

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10450
July 30, 2014

EMERITA B. MAHILUM, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SAMUEL SM. LEZAMA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This administrative complaint1 filed by Emerita B. Mahilum (complainant) seeks the disbarment of Atty. Samuel SM.
Lezama (respondent), a commissioned notary public and practicing lawyer in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, for
notarizing a 'Deed of Donation' in the absence of or Le of the affiants.
The complainant averred that on May 24, 2006, the respondent notarized a Deed of Donation executed by her estranged
husband, Rodolfo (Rodolfo) Mahilum as donor, and their common daughter, Jennifer Mahilum-Sorenson (Jennifer) as
donee, pertaining to the donor's share of one-half portion over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-710712 of the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City.
Attached to the complaint is a copy of the deed of donation dated February 7, 2006 bearing the signatures of Rodolfo and
Jennifer, as well as the notarial seal and signature ofthe respondent on the acknowledgment portion attesting to the
personal appearance of Rodolfo and Jennifer before him when the same was notarized on May 24, 2006.3
According to the complainant,she has personal knowledge that Jennifer could not have personally appeared before the
respondent on May 24, 2006 or even on February 7, 2006 because during those dates, she was in the United States of
America (USA) working at the State Fund Office in California.
In his Answer,4 the respondent asserted that the donor, donee and instrumental witnesses to the donation were all
physically present when the document was signed. He stated thathe is personally acquainted with Rodolfo and he had no
reason to cast doubts upon him when he introduced his daughter Jennifer who came all the way from the USA to visit her
father.
The respondent further averred that the complainant has a long-running feud with Rodolfo and she and some of their
common children are using this complaint as part ofher personal vendettaagainst Rodolfo who happens to be friendswith
the respondent.
The parties were summoned for mandatory conference before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Negros
Occidental Chapter, whereby both of them undertook to present documentary evidence showing the actual whereabouts of
Jennifer during the dates in question.
The complainant submitted a Certification5 from the Bureau of Immigration showing the arrival and departure records of
Jennifer in the Philippines. Based thereon,Jennifer did not enter the Philippines in the year 2006 . Her travel records
closest to thatyear showed that she arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 2004 but departed a month later or on July 22,
2004. She again arrived in the Philippines onJune 24, 2007 and left on July 20, 2007. There were other various dates of
her arrival in the country but the records did not reflect that she came to the Philippines in 2006. Despite opportunity to
submitevidence rebutting the foregoing certification, the respondent failed to file any.6 The only supporting evidence he
proffered were the documents attached to his Answer showing the present marital status of the complainant that she is
actually married to a certain George W. Cooper, a British Canadian; that on July 14, 1986 she filed for the dissolution of
her marriage with Rodolfo before the Superior Court of California, County of Orangeand the same was granted on
October 23, 1986. Likewise attached to his Answer is an Affidavit executed by Rodolfo attesting that Jennifer was
physically present when she signed the deed of donation.7
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In its Resolution transmitted to the IBP national office on March 12, 2009,8 the Grievance Committee of IBP Negros
Occidental Chapter found that the respondent failed to exercise diligence in ascertaining the identity of the person who
appeared before him as donee considering that based on official records, Jennifer never set foot in the Philippine soil at
any time in the year 2006. The respondent failed to require competent proof of identification from the parties to the deed
of donation as mandated by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
On December 1, 2009, the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline adopted the foregoing findings and
accordingly,recommended that the respondents notarial commission be revoked and that he be prohibited from being
commissioned as a Notary Public for a period of two years.9
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the above recommendation in a Resolution10 dated May 15, 2011.
The respondent moved for reconsideration11 pleading for the modification of the penalty meted upon him on the ground
that various factors does not render it commensurate with the offense charged. He stressed that the complainant never
became his client neither was she involved in the execution of the deed of donation. There was also no claim whatsoever

that Jennifers signature inthe deed of donation was forged or falsified. The respondent, further, asserted that he did not
benefit financially from the notarization of the deed of donation and that the same did not cause any damage or injury to
the complainant.
The respondent also asserted that there was no need for him to require any proof of identity from Rodolfo since he was
personally known to him having been his partner before the latter retired from law practice.
He appealed for humanitarian consideration and cited that he has been a notary public for 35 years and this isthe first
administrative case filed against him. He also rendered free notarial services to the members of the local Philippine
National Police in San Carlos City as well as the personnel of the Regional Trial Courts and Municipal Courts of
Calatrava in Negros Occidental. In the same motion, the respondent expressed remorse over his negligence and pledged
to exercise diligence in discharging his duties as a notary public.
In a Resolution12 dated February 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the respondentsmotion for
reconsideration.
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with and sustains the IBPs finding that the official record from the Bureau ofImmigration showing that
Jennifer never traveled to the Philippines in the year 2006 substantially established that indeed she could not have
personally appeared before the respondent when he notarized the deed of donation on May 24, 2006. Certainly, the
conclusive import of the contents of such certification cannot be overcome by the respondents mere counter-allegations
unsupported by any corroborative proof.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, or the Notarial Law mandates that affiants must personally appear to the notary public,
viz:
Sec. 1. (a) The acknowledgement shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to
take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and
that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be
made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Corollary, under Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, a commissioned notary public is
enjoined from performing a notarial act unless the affiant is: (1) in his presence at the time of the notarization; and(2)
personally known to him or otherwise identified by him through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
The purpose of the rule was emphasized in Angeles v. Ibaez,13 thus:
The physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signatures of the
acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties free act and deed.
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended toa private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine;
to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing
those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and
administrative offices generally.14 (Citations omitted)
The respondent is, without doubt, familiar with the above rules and duties, having been a notary public for 35 years. But
he, nonetheless, failed to observe them.
Contrary to the IBPs findingsthat such failure was due to carelessness, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent
deliberately disregarded the Rules on Notarial Practice and the Notarial Law.
A holistic examination of the records illustrates that the respondent has actually met Jennifer when she went home to visit
the ailing Rodolfo. But this was before and definitely notduring the notarization of deed of donation because based on her
travel records, she did not come to the Philippines in 2006. The respondent accommodated the notarization of the deed
sansJennifers physical appearance before him on May 24, 2006 since he was personally acquainted with Rodolfo. Hence,
he took the latters representation that Jennifer voluntarilyexecuted the deed as reliable and faithful. Even if we were to
uphold such representation, however, the truth remains that Jennifer was not personally present to attest to the
truthfulness of her acceptance of the donation as donee during notarization.
Carelessness implies that the affiant was actually personally present and the notary public just forgot to verify her identity
or that she was not personally known to her. Here, however, the affiant was not physically present during the notarization

but the notary public nevertheless affixed his seal and signature attesting that the affiant "personally appeared" before him
when in truth and in fact, she did not.
To stress, "[a] notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness ofthe signature of the
affiant."15
An act which contravenes the foregoing guidelines is in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 116 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Notarial Law,17 which the respondent culpablycommitted when he notarized the Deed of
Donation in the absence of one of the affiants.
It must be emphasized that the public and the courts accord conclusiveness of due execution in notarized
documents.1wphi1 By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent misled the public that
Jennifer personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the deed when in fact she
did not. Such misconduct can also usher in precariouslegal consequences should the deed of donation later on spawn
court intervention.18
Certainly, the respondent was remiss in performing his functions as a notary public for which the penalties imposed in
Wilberto C. Talisic v. Atty. Primo R. Rinen19 are appropriate.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, his incumbent notarial commission is REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED
from being commissioned as a notary public for ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the respondents personal
record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished tothe Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 2-4.
2 Id. at 7.
3 Id. at 5-6.
4 Id. at 14-16.
5 Id. at 56-57.
6 Id. at 55.
7 Id. at 17-20.
8 Id. at 46-47, 53.
9 Id. at 62-65.
10 Id. at 61.
11 Id. at 66-68.
12 Id. at 90.
13 A.C. No. 7860, January 15, 2009, 576 SCRA 90.
14 Id. at 100.
15 Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe, 517 Phil. 236, 240 (2006).
16 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

17 Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe, supra note 15.

18 Id.
19 A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014.
4.

Zaulda v. Zaulda, G.R. No. 201234, 17 March 2014

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 201234
March 17, 2014
HEIRS OF AMADA A. ZAULDA, namely: ELESEO A. ZAULDA and RODOLFO A. ZAULDA, Petitioners,
vs.
ISAAC Z. ZAULDA, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the February 11, 2011
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. SP No. 05379, dismissing the petition for review of the petitioners,
and its March 6, 2012 Resolution,2 denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The February 11, 2011 CA
Resolution reads:
A perusal of the Petition revealed there were impediments to the Court's subsequent action thereon:
1. the Petition was not filed in the nick of time inasmuch as the Court could not have pursued action on or before
September 9, 2010 which was supposedly the last day specified on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review dated August 23, 2010, postmarked August 24, 2010, and received by this Court on September 13, 2010 for the
simple reason that this Division apparently received a copy of the Motion only on September 14, 2010, and the Rollo was
forwarded to the Office of the ponente only on January 5, 2011. Certainly, parties and counsel should not assume that
Courts are bound to grant the time they pray for. By parity of reasoning, a motion that is not acted upon in due time is
deemed denied.
2. there was no competent evidence regarding petitioners identity on the attached Verification and Certification Against
Forum Shopping as required by Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which now requires a
photocopy of petitioners competent evidence of identity.
Accordingly, petitioners Petition for Review dated September 9, 2010 is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.3
[Emphases supplied]
The Antecedents:
The controversy stemmed from a complaint for recovery of possession and declaration of ownership filed by the heirs of
Amada Aguila-Zaulda, namely, Eleseo A. Zaulda and Rodolfo A. Zaulda (petitioners), against respondent Isaac Z. Zaulda
(respondent), before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Banga-Libacao-Madalag, Banga, Aklan (MCTC).
The complaint4 alleged, among others, that petitioners were the legal heirs of the late Amada Aguila Zaulda; that the
latter was one of the children and legal heirs of the late Teodulo Aguila and Dorotea Zolina (Spouses Aguila); that they
were co-owners of a parcel of land, Lot 917-M, with an area of 4,263 square meters, situated in Barangay Guadalupe,
Libacao, Aklan; that they acquired the subject property by inheritance from the Spouses Aguila per Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition of Realty, dated November 2, 1993; that they have been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the
subject property since time immemorial as evidenced by tax declarations for the years 1945, 1953, 1957, 1980, 1985, and
1990; that sometime in March 2000, respondent, through force and intimidation, forcibly entered the subject property
and, there and then, cut and took with him bamboos and other forest/agricultural products; that on March 29, 2000,
respondent, together with two (2) other unidentified persons, forcibly entered the subject property and, with threat and
intimidation, constructed and built a house made of light material; and that petitioners demanded respondent to vacate and
turn over the subject property to them but the latter refused to do so.
In his Answer,5 respondent averred that Erene Aguila Zaula (Erene), his predecessor-in-interest, was the actual and
physical possessor of the subject land; that the property which the petitioners were claiming was donated to the
Municipality of Libacao, Aklan, for school site purposes; that after the donation, Tax Declaration No. 6636 covering the
said land was cancelled, and a new Tax Declaration No. 8619 in the name of the Municipality of Libacao was issued and

Tax Declaration No. 8618 for the remaining portion of 3,805 square meters was issued to Spouses Aguila; that in Tax
Declaration No. 8618, it was erroneously entered therein that it contained 14,500 square meters when it should be only
3,805 square meters; that petitioners caused the survey of the land and instead of confining themselves to the remaining
area of 3,805 square meters, they included part and portion of the property including the subject land which was owned
by Erene; and that when the heirs of Erene found out that part of their land was included in the tax declaration issued to
spouses Aguila, they filed a protest before the DENR.
On December 29, 2008, the MCTC rendered judgment,6 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds preponderance of evidence in favor of plaintiffs (as regards Lots 1, 3
and 6) by:
1. Declaring plaintiffs the lawful owners entitled to possession of the Lots 1, 3 and 6 described in the Commissioners
Report and Sketches being part and parcel of plaintiffs inherited Lot 917;
2. Declaring Lot 1 as the portion owned by the heirs of Amada Zaulda and Lot 3 as the portion owned by the heirs of
Coronacion A. Vidad by virtue of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition executed by the heirs of spouses Teodulo and
Dorotea Aguila; Lot 6 (portion of the barangay road) as included in plaintiffs inherited Lot 917;
3. Ordering the defendant Isaac Zaulda and intervenors Celedonia Aguila-Villorente and Danny A. Villorente, their
assigns and privies to peacefully deliver possession of the above-mentioned lots to plaintiffs and/or their representatives;
4. Ordering the defendant Isaac Zaulda to remove the nipa houses he built found on Lot 3 at his expense.
Further, (with respect to Lots A and B):
5. Declaring Lots A and B described in the Commissioners Sketch found on page 164 of the record, as the combined area
of Lot F-39 owned by parties predecessor Estanislao Aguila covered by tax declaration no. 011-0458 and are therefore
co-owned by his heirs: plaintiffs, defendant, and intervenors included along with the rest of the children and descendants
of Teodulo Aguila, Erene Aguila Zaulda and Jaime Aguila;
6. Ordering all parties to respect the co-ownership among them over Lots A and B until they execute an agreement of
partition into three (3) equal parts representing the shares of Teodulo, Erene and Jaime.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC), partly modified the decision of the MCTC and
declared respondent as the owner and possessor of lots 1 and 3, the dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Defendant Isaac Zaulda is declared, as reflected in the Commissioners Sketches and Reports, dated July 11, 2002 and
March 4, 2004, the lawful owner and possessor of Lot No. 916 (shaded blue) and parts of Lot 1 and 3 (shaded green) as
against the plaintiffs;
2) Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from is affirmed.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner Eleseo Zaulda, the lone surviving heir of Amada Aguila-Zaulda, after his co-heir Rodolfo Zaulda passed away,
filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA. In the assailed resolution,
dated February 11, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time and for lack of competent evidence on
affiants identity on the attached verification and certification against forum shopping.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the assailed resolution, dated March 6, 2012.
Hence, petitioners filed this petition, raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time despite the motion for extension of
time having been timely filed; and
2. Whether or not the CA erred in not passing upon the issue of whether or not the RTC erred in reversing the decision of
the MCTC based on erroneous findings of facts and on mere suppositions and presumptions absent any evidence on the
same.
On January 17, 2013, respondent filed his Comment,9 reiterating that no special and important reason exists to warrant
the Courts review of the assailed CA resolutions, the same having been issued in accord with law and supported by
jurisprudence.
On June 6, 2013, petitioners filed their Reply,10 invoking the relaxation of the strict application of procedural rules in the
interest of substantial justice. They submit that the petition should not have been dismissed based on technicalities
because the appeal was instituted in accordance with the rules. They pray that the petition be given due course as they

were deprived of their property without due process of law considering that the case was not properly ventilated upon,
more so that the findings of fact of MCTC and RTC were different.
The Courts Ruling:
Petition for review from the RTC to the CA is governed by Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, x x x. The petition shall
be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x. Upon proper motion x x x, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. [Emphasis supplied]
In this case, the petitioners complied with the requirements laid down in the above quoted provision.
Records show that on March 10, 2010, petitioners timely filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial11 of the RTC
decision (dated January 20, 2010, received by petitioners on February 25, 2010), but the same was denied in the RTC
Order,12 dated August 4, 2010, copy of which was received by petitioners on August 10, 2010. Thus, they had until
August 25, 2010 within which to file a petition for review pursuant to said Section 1, Rule 42.
On August 24, 2010, petitioners filed their Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review before the CA,
paying the docket and other lawful fees and deposit for costs and prayed for an additional period of fifteen (15) days from
August 25, 2010 or until September 9, 2010, within which to file the said petition.
On September 9, 2010, they filed the Petition for Review.13
The Court notes that the petition for review before the CA was filed within the additional fifteen (15) day period prayed
for in their motion for extension of time to file it, which was filed on time by registered mail. To repeat, the petition was
filed on September 9, 2010, within the fifteen (15) day period requested in their motion for extension of time to file the
petition.
As earlier stated, the Motion For Extension Of Time To File Petition For Review, which was filed through registered mail
on August 24, 2010, was filed on time. It was physically in the appellate courts possession long before the CA issued its
Resolution on February 11, 2011, dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time. The record shows that 1]
the CA received the motion for extension of time to file petition for review on September 13, 2010; 2] the CA Division
received the motion on September 14, 2010; and 3] the ponentes office received it on January 5, 2011.
Indeed, there was a delay, but it was a delay that cannot be attributed at all to the petitioners. The almost four (4) months
that lapsed before the records reached the ponentes office was caused by the gross incompetence and inefficiency of the
division personnel at the CA. It was the height of injustice for the CA to dismiss a petition just because the motion for
extension reached the ponentes office beyond the last date prayed for. Clearly, the petitioners were unreasonably
deprived of their right to be heard on the merits because of the CAs unreasonable obsession to reduce its load. In
allowing the petitioners to be fatally prejudiced by the delay in the transmittal attributable to its inept or irresponsible
personnel, the CA committed an unfortunate injustice.
The petitioners could not also be faulted that the motion for extension of time was received by the CA on September 13,
2010. The rules allow parties to file a pleading by registered mail.14 They are not required to ensure that it would be
received by the court on or before the last day of the extended period prayed for. Though no party can assume that its
motion for extension would be granted, any denial thereof should be reasonable.
Granting that the petition was filed late, substantial justice begs that it be allowed and be given due course. Indeed, the
merits of petitioners cause deserve to be passed upon considering that the findings of the RTC were in complete contrast
to the findings of the MCTC which declared petitioners as the lawful owners entitled to possession of the lots in question.
In Montajes v. People of the Philippines,15 petitioner therein, due to erroneous computation, filed his petition for review
before the CA two (2) days after the expiration of the requested 15-day extension period. The Court held in that case that
being a few days late in the filing of the petition for review did not automatically warrant its dismissal and where strong
considerations of substantial justice were manifest in the petition, the stringent application of technical rules could be
relaxed in the exercise of equity jurisdiction. It found that the circumstances obtaining in that case merited the liberal
application of the rule absent any intention to cause delay.
As regards the competent identity of the affiant in the Verification and Certification, records16 show that he proved his
identity before the notary public through the presentation of his Office of the Senior Citizen (OSCA) identification card.

Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence of
identity. Sec. 12, as amended, provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of an
individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the
individual, such as but not limited to, passport, drivers license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National
Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voters ID, Barangay certification, Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, PhilHealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant
certificate of registration, government office ID, certificate from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons
(NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development certification [as amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated
February 19, 2008]; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is personally
known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is
privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public
documentary identification.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that a senior citizen card is one of the competent identification cards recognized
in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. For said reason, there was compliance with the requirement. Contrary to the
perception of the CA, attachment of a photocopy of the identification card in the document is not required by the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. Even A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, amending Section 12 thereof, is silent on it. Thus, the CAs
dismissal of the petition for lack of competent evidence on the affiants identity on the attached verification and
certification against forum shopping was without clear basis.
Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required, non-attachment thereof would
not render the petition fatally defective. It has been consistently held17 that verification is merely a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement, affecting merely the form of the pleading such that non-compliance therewith does not render
the pleading fatally defective. It is simply intended to provide an assurance that the allegations are true and correct and
not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may in
fact order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or it may act on the pleading although it may not have
been verified, where it is made evident that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed so that the ends of justice
may be served. The Court, in Altres v. Empleo,18 issued guidelines based on previous jurisprudential pronouncements
respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of a defective, verification as well as on certification
against forum shopping, as follows:
xxx
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such
that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
x x x.19
Again, granting arguendo that there was non-compliance with the verification requirement, the rule is that courts should
not be so strict about procedural lapses which do not really impair the proper administration of justice. After all, the
higher objective of procedural rule is to ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should,
as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.20
In Coca-Cola Bottlers v. De la Cruz,21 where the verification was marred only by a glitch in the evidence of the identity
of the affiant, the Court was of the considered view that, in the interest of justice, the minor defect can be overlooked and
should not defeat the petition.
The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained by precipitate, if not preposterous,
application of technicalities, justice would not be served. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice.
The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal rather than dispose of the case on technicality and
cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in
more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."22 [Italicization supplied]

What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on technicalities. The
rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed.23 At this juncture, the Court reminds all members of the bench and bar of the admonition in the often-cited
case of Alonso v. Villamor:24
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.1wphi1 Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an
aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be
no vested rights in technicalities.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 11, 2011 and March 6, 2012 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05379 are SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS petitioners' Motion For Extension Of Time To File Petition For Review filed with the
Cou1i of Appeals and gives due course to their Petition for Review. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
decision on the merits of the petition.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo. pp. 42-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta. Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Eclgarclo
L. Delos Santos and Agnes Reyes Carpio.
2 Id. at 30-32.
3 Id. at 43-44.
4 Id. at 88-91.
5 Id. at 99-103.
6 Id. at 147-162.
7 Id. at 161-162.
8 Id. at 83.
9 Id. at 192-201.
10 Id. at 226-228.
11 Id. at 84-85.
12 Id. at 87.

13 Id. at 44.
14 Rule 13. Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers.
x x x.
Section 5. Modes of service. Service of pleadings motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers shall be made
either personally or by mail. (3a)
x x x.
Section 7. Service by mail. Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the post office in a
sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known,
with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if
undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either the senders or the addressee, service may be done
by ordinary mail. (5a; Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)
15 G.R. No. 183449, March 12, 2012, 667 SCRA 770.
16 Rollo, p. 39.
17 Pagadora v. Ilao, G.R. No. 165769, December 12, 2011, 662 SCRA 14, 25, citing Millennium Erectors Corp. v.
Magallanes, G.R. No. 18432, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 708 and also Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824,
December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 615and Robern Development Corporation v. Judge Quitain, 373 Phil. 773, 786 (1999).
18 G.R. No. 180986, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 583, 596-597.
19 Pagadora v. Ilao, supra note 17, at 25-26.
20 Montajes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183449, March 12, 2012, 667 SCRA 770, 781.
21 G.R. No. 184977, December 7, 2009, 608 SCRA 16.
22 Aguam v. Court of Appeals. 388 Phil. 587. 594 (2000).
23 De Los Santos v. Court of Appeals, 594 Phil. 361, 376 (2008), citing Alberto v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 253, 272
(2000).
24 16 Phil. 315, 322, (1910).
5.

Heirs of Sarili v. Lagrosa, G.R. No. 193517, 15 January 2014

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 193517
January 15, 2014
THE HEIRS OF VICTORINO SARILI, NAMELY: ISABEL A. SARILI,* MELENCIA** S. MAXIMO, ALBERTO A.
SARILI, IMELDA S. HIDALGO, all herein represented by CELSO A. SARILI, Petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO F. LAGROSA, represented in this act by his Attorney-in-Fact LOURDES LABIOS MOJICA,Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on Certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 20, 2010 and Resolution3 dated August
26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76258 which: (a) set aside the Decision 4 dated May 27, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131 (RTC) in Civil Case No. C-19152; (b) cancelled Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2622185 in the name of Victorino Sarili (Victorino) married to Isabel Amparo (Sps. Sarili);
(c) reinstated TCT No. 559796 in the name of respondent Pedro F. Lagrosa (respondent); and (d) awarded respondent
moral damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
The Facts
On February 17, 2000, respondent, represented by his attorney-in-fact Lourdes Labios Mojica (Lourdes) via a special
power of attorney dated November 25, 19997 (November 25, 1999 SPA), filed a complaint8 against Sps. Sarili and the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City (RD) before the RTC, alleging, among others, that he is the owner of a certain parcel
of land situated in Caloocan City covered by TCT No. 55979 (subject property) and has been religiously paying the real
estate taxes therefor since its acquisition on November 29, 1974. Respondent claimed that he is a resident of California,
USA, and that during his vacation in the Philippines, he discovered that a new certificate of title to the subject property
was issued by the RD in the name of Victorino married to Isabel Amparo (Isabel), i.e., TCT No. 262218, by virtue of a

falsified Deed of Absolute Sale9 dated February 16, 1978 (February 16, 1978 deed of sale) purportedly executed by him
and his wife, Amelia U. Lagrosa (Amelia). He averred that the falsification of the said deed of sale was a result of the
fraudulent, illegal, and malicious acts committed by Sps. Sarili and the RD in order to acquire the subject property and, as
such, prayed for the annulment of TCT No. 262218, and that Sps. Sarili deliver to him the possession of the subject
property, or, in the alternative, that Sps. Sarili and the RD jointly and severally pay him the amount of P1,000,000.00,
including moral damages as well as attorneys fees.10
In their answer,11 Sps. Sarili maintained that they are innocent purchasers for value, having purchased the subject
property from Ramon B. Rodriguez (Ramon), who possessed and presented a Special Power of Attorney12 (subject SPA)
to sell/dispose of the same, and, in such capacity, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale13 dated November 20, 1992
(November 20, 1992 deed of sale) conveying the said property in their favor. In this relation, they denied any
participation in the preparation of the February 16, 1978 deed of sale, which may have been merely devised by the "fixer"
they hired to facilitate the issuance of the title in their names.14 Further, they interposed a counterclaim for moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, for the filing of the baseless suit.15
During the pendency of the proceedings, Victorino passed away16 and was substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners.17
The RTC Ruling
On May 27, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision18 finding respondents signature on the subject SPA as "the same and
exact replica"19 of his signature in the November 25, 1999 SPA in favor of Lourdes.20 Thus, with Ramons authority
having been established, it declared the November 20, 1992 deed of sale 21 executed by the latter as "valid, genuine,
lawful and binding"22 and, as such, had validly conveyed the subject property in favor of Sps. Sarili. It further found that
respondent "acted with evident bad faith and malice" and was, therefore, held liable for moral and exemplary damages. 23
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated May 20, 2010, the CA granted respondents appeal and held that the RTC erred in its ruling since
the November 20, 1992 deed of sale, which the RTC found "as valid and genuine," was not the source document for the
transfer of the subject property and the issuance of TCT No. 262218 in the name of Sps. Sarili25but rather the February
16, 1978 deed of sale, the fact of which may be gleaned from the Affidavit of Late Registration 26 executed by Isabel
(affidavit of Isabel). Further, it found that respondent w as "not only able to preponderate his claim over the subject
property, but [has] likewise proved that his and his wifes signatures in the [February 16, 1978 deed of sale] x x x were
forged."27 "[A] comparison by the naked eye of the genuine signature of [respondent] found in his [November 25, 1999
SPA] in favor of [Lourdes], and those of his falsified signatures in [the February 16, 1978 deed of sale] and [the subject
SPA] shows that they are not similar."28 It also observed that "[t]he testimony of [respondent] denying the authenticity of
his purported signature with respect to the [February 16, 1978 deed of sale] was not rebutted x x x." 29 In fine, the CA
declared the deeds of sale dated February 16, 1978 and November 20, 1992, as well as the subject SPA as void, and
consequently ordered the RD to cancel TCT No. 262218 in the name of Victorino married to Isabel, and consequently
reinstate TCT No. 55979 in respondents name. Respondents claims for moral damages and attorneys fees/litigation
expenses were also granted by the CA.30
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution31 dated August 26, 2010,
hence, the instant petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The main issue in this case is whether or not there was a valid conveyance of the subject property to Sps. Sarili. The
resolution of said issue would then determine, among others, whether or not: (a) TCT No. 262218 in the name of
Victorino married to Isabel should be annulled; and (b) TCT No. 55979 in respondents name should be reinstated.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners essentially argue that regardless of the fictitious February 16, 1978 deed of sale, there was still a valid
conveyance of the subject property to Sps. Sarili who relied on the authority of Ramos (as per the subject SPA) to sell the
same. They posit that the due execution of the subject SPA between respondent and Ramon and, subsequently, the
November 20, 1992 deed of sale between Victorino and Ramon were duly established facts and that from the authenticity
and genuineness of these documents, a valid conveyance of the subject land from respondent to Victorino had leaned
upon.32
The Court is not persuaded.

It is well-settled that even if the procurement of a certificate of title was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation, such
defective title may be the source of a completely legal and valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an
outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property
registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the title has been regularly or
irregularly issued. This is contrary to the evident purpose of the law.33
The general rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property. Where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or
any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face
indicates in quest for any hidden defects or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.34
However, a higher degree of prudence is required from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner,
although the land object of the transaction is registered. In such a case, the buyer is expected to examine not only the
certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the
transferor.35 The buyer also has the duty to ascertain the identity of the person with whom he is dealing with and the
latters legal authority to convey the property.36
The strength of the buyers inquiry on the sellers capacity or legal authority to sell depends on the proof of capacity of
the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a special power of attorney duly notarized, mere inspection of the face of
such public document already constitutes sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or there is
one but there appears to be flaws in its notarial acknowledgment, mere inspection of the document will not do; the buyer
must show that his investigation went beyond the document and into the circumstances of its execution.37
In the present case, it is undisputed that Sps. Sarili purchased the subject property from Ramos on the strength of the
latters ostensible authority to sell under the subject SPA. The said document, however, readily indicates flaws in its
notarial acknowledgment since the respondents community tax certificate (CTC) number was not indicated thereon .
Under the governing rule on notarial acknowledgments at that time,38 i.e., Section 163(a) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991," when an individual subject to the community tax
acknowledges any document before a notary public, it shall be the duty of the administering officer to require such
individual to exhibit the community tax certificate.39 Despite this irregularity, however, Sps. Sarili failed to show that
they conducted an investigation beyond the subject SPA and into the circumstances of its execution as required by
prevailing jurisprudence. Hence, Sps. Sarili cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for value.
The defective notarization of the subject SPA also means that the said document should be treated as a private document
and thus examined under the parameters of Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that "before any
private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker x x x." Settled is the rule that a defective notarization will strip the document of its public
character and reduce it to a private instrument, and the evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on
preponderance of evidence.40
The due execution and authenticity of the subject SPA are of great significance in determining the validity of the sale
entered into by Victorino and Ramon since the latter only claims to be the agent of the purported seller (i.e., respondent).
Article 1874 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hen a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent,
the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void." In other words, if the subject SPA was not
proven to be duly executed and authentic, then it cannot be said that the foregoing requirement had been complied with;
hence, the sale would be void.
After a judicious review of the case, taking into consideration the divergent findings of the RTC and the CA on the
matter,41 the Court holds that the due execution and authenticity of the subject SPA were not sufficiently established
under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as above-cited.
While Ramon identified the signature of respondent on the subject SPA based on his alleged familiarity with the latters
signature,42 he, however, stated no basis for his identification of the signatures of respondents wife Amelia and the
witness, Evangeline F. Murral,43 and even failed to identify the other witness,44 who were also signatories to the said
document. In other words, no evidence was presented to authenticate the signatures of the other signatories of the subject
SPA outside from respondent.45

Besides, as the CA correctly observed, respondents signature appearing on the subject SPA is not similar46 to his genuine
signature appearing in the November 25, 1999 SPA in favor of Lourdes,47 especially the signature appearing on the left
margin of the first page.48
Unrebutted too is the testimony of respondent who, during trial, attested to the fact that he and his wife, Amelia, had
immigrated to the USA since 1968 and therefore could not have signed the subject SPA due to their absence.49
Further, records show that the notary public, Atty. Ramon S. Untalan, failed to justify why he did not require the
presentation of respondents CTC or any other competent proof of the identity of the person who appeared before him to
acknowledge the subject SPA as respondents free and voluntary act and deed despite the fact that he did not personally
know the latter and that he met him for the first time during the notarization.50 He merely relied on the representations of
the person before him51 and the bank officer who accompanied the latter to his office,52 and further explained that the
reason for the omission of the CTC was "because in [a] prior document, [respondent] has probably given us already his
residence certificate."53 This "prior document," was not, however, presented during the proceedings below, nor the CTC
number ever identified.
Thus, in light of the totality of evidence at hand, the Court agrees with the CAs conclusion that respondent was able to
preponderate his claims of forgery against the subject SPA.54 In view of its invalidity, the November 20, 1992 sale relied
on by Sps. Sarili to prove their title to the subject property is therefore void.1wphi1
At this juncture, it is well to note that it was, in fact, the February 16, 1978 deed of sale which as the CA found was
actually the source of the issuance of TCT No. 262218. Nonetheless, this document was admitted to be also a forgery.55
Since Sps. Sarilis claim over the subject property is based on forged documents, no valid title had been transferred to
them (and, in turn, to petitioners). Verily, when the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owners
duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged
deed acquire any right or title to the property.56 Accordingly, TCT No. 262218 in the name of Victorino married to Isabel
should be annulled, while TCT No. 55979 in the name of respondent should be reinstated.
Anent the award of moral damages, suffice it to say that the dispute over the subject property had caused respondent
serious anxiety, mental anguish and sleepless nights, thereby justifying the aforesaid award.57 Likewise, since respondent
was constrained to engage the services of counsel to file this suit and defend his interests, the awards of attorneys fees
and litigation expenses are also sustained.58
The Court, however, finds a need to remand the case to the court a quo in order to determine the rights and obligations of
the parties with respect to the house Sps. Sarili had built59 on the subject property in bad faith in accordance with Article
449 in relation to Articles 450, 451, 452, and the first paragraph of Article 546 of the Civil Code which respectively read
as follows:
ART. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without
right to indemnity.
ART. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the
demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at
the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the
land, and the sower the proper rent.
ART. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or
sower.
ART. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses of
preservation of the land.
xxxx
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the
thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e. , that he
be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it.60 Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition,
and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to
seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put the holder upon inquiry.61 As for Sps. Sarili, they knew or at the very least, should have known from the
very beginning that they were dealing with a person who possibly had no authority to sell the subject property considering

the palpable irregularity in the subject SPAs acknowledgment. Yet, relying solely on said document and without any
further investigation on Ramoss capacity to sell Sps. Sarili still chose to proceed with its purchase and even built a house
thereon. Based on the foregoing it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Sarili were actually aware of a flaw or defect in
their title or mode of acquisition and have consequently built the house on the subject property in bad faith under legal
contemplation. The case is therefore remanded to the court a quo for the proper application of the above-cited Civil Code
provisions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 20, 2010 and Resolution dated August 26, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76258 are AFFIRMED. However the case is REMANDED to the court a quo for
the proper application of Article 449 in relation to Articles 450 451 452 and the first paragraph of Article 546 of the Civil
Code with respect to the house Spouses Victorino Sarili and Isabel Amparo had built on the subject property as herein
discussed.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
6.
Almazan v. Suerte-Felipe, A.C. No. 7184, 17 September 2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 7184
September 17, 2014
FELIPE B. ALMAZAN, SR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARCELO B. SUERTE-FELIPE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe (respondent) for malpractice as a notary
public, among others.
The Facts
In a Complaint1 dated April 27, 2006, complainant Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. (complainant) charged respondent, previously
of the Public Attorney's Office,2 for malpractice and gross negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public
and/or lawyer, alleging that the latter, despite not having been registered as a notary public for the City of Marikina,
notarized the acknowledgment of the document entitled "Extra judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P.
Vda. De Nieva"3 dated "25th day of 1999" (subject document), stating that he is a "notary public for and in the City of
Marikina."4 Said document was one of the attachments to the Amended Complaint5dated August 14, 2003 filed in Civil
Case No. 03-849-MK entitled "Esperanza Nieva Dela Cruz[(as represented by respondent)] v. Brita T. Llantada[(as
represented by complainant)]." To prove his claim, complainant attached a Certification6 dated May 26, 2005 issued by
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, certifying that per the courts record,
respondent is not a commissioned notary public for the Cityof Marikina from March 30, 1994 to the date of issuance. In a
Resolution7 dated July 5, 2006, the Court required respondent to file his Comment8 which he eventually submitted on
February 13, 2007 after proper service. In said pleading, respondent admitted that he indeed notarized the
acknowledgment of the subject document but denied that he was not commissioned as a notary public at that time. 9 To
prove his defense, he attached a Certification10dated August 23, 2006 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
RTC of Pasig City, certifying the fact of his appointment as notary public for the City of Pasigand in the Municipalities of
Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999 under Appointment No. 98.11 Further, respondent,
thru the comment, incorporated his own administrative complaint against complainant for malpractice and harassment of
a fellow lawyer in view of the filing of the instant administrative case against him.12
In response, complainant filed a Reply13 dated April 26, 2007 asserting that he has the legitimate rightto file the
administrative complaint against respondent for his unlawful act of notarization, which is not an act of harassment as
respondent claims. He alsodraws attention to the fact that the subject document was incompletely dated and yet notarized
by respondent.14 In a Resolution15 dated July 11, 2007, the Court,inter alia, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Eventually, both parties appeared during the mandatory
conference held on April 30, 2008.16

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 22, 2008, the IBP Investigating Commissioner foundrespondent
guilty for violating the Notarial Law and the lawyers oath, reasoning that he could not notarize the acknowledgment of
the subject document inMarikina City as it was outside the territorial limits of his jurisdiction. To this end, the
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that in the acknowledgment of the subject document, it was categorically stated
that respondent is a notary public for and in the City of Marikina, Province ofRizal, of which he was not, hence, violating
the Notarial Law. Moreover,respondent likewise violated the lawyers oath, specifically its mandate for lawyers, to obey
the laws and do no falsehood.18
In view of the foregoing, it was thus recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the
practice of law. However, since it does not appear that he was still commissioned as a notary public, the Investigating
Commissioner did not recommend that he be disqualified as such.19
In a Resolution20 dated October 9, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification, decreasing the penalty of suspension to one (1)
year, with immediate revocation of notarial commission if presently commissioned, and disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years.
On reconsideration,21 the IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution22 dated March 8, 2014, modifiedthe penalty stated in
its previous resolution, imposing, instead, the penalty ofreprimand with warning, and disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for the decreased period of one (1) year.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
The Courts Ruling
The Court concurs with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty.
As the Investigating Commissioner correctly observed, respondent, who himself admitted that he was commissioned as
notary public only in the City of Pasig and the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the
years 1998-1999, could not notarize the subject documents acknowledgment in the City ofMarikina, as said notarial act
is beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e.,the RTC of Pasig. The territorial limitation of a notary publics
jurisdiction is crystal clear from Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:23 Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and
Term A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the commissioning courtfor a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the
commissioning court is made, unless either revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of
Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, as amended,24 of which Section 240, Article II states:
Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the
province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall
possess authority to doany notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied)
For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in the City of Marikina, when it is
apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, respondent further committed a form of falsehood which is
undoubtedly anathemato the lawyers oath. Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
In the case of Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Gonzales,25 citing Nunga v. Atty. Viray,26 the Court instructively expounded on
infractions similar to that of respondent:
While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondents act of notarizing documents in a place outside of or
beyond the authority granted by his notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. While perhaps
not on all fours because of the slight dissimilarity inthe violation involved, what the Court said in Nunga v. Virayis very
much apropos: Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
authorization or commission todo so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial
[act] without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law.
Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes,
indulging in deliberate false hood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the

prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization isnot an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Far from it.1wphi1
Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. Hence, the requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a formality
definitely more than casual.27 (Emphases supplied)
With respondents liability herein established, and considering further the attendant circumstances of this case, take for
instance, that he is a first time offender and that he had already acknowledged his wrongdoings,28 the Court finds that
suspension for a period of six (6) months29 from the practice of law would suffice as a penalty. In addition, he is
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year and, his notarial commission, if
currently existing, is hereby revoked.30
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe is found GUILTY of malpractice as a notary public,and
violating the lawyers oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same orsimilar acts will be dealt with more severely. He is likewise
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year and his notarial commission, if
currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record
as attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
7.

De Jesus v. Sanchez-Malit, A.C. No. 6470, 8 July 2014

EN BANC
A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell
Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness
to become an officer of the Court.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged
that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely
named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for
collection of sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan,
Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned.
Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and financial problems . One
contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999 without the signature of the lessees.
However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and
she asked for another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property covered by a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on
17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was
still covered by the period within which it could not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted three Special Powers of
Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainants
secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named
attorney-in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentinos Affidavit corroborated complainants allegations against
respondent.2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to submit her
comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.3
In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of complainant and that
the latter had read it before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the
contract was hastily done. It was only copied from a similar file in respondents computer, and the phrase absolute and
registered owner was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action, because
complainant constructed the subject public market stall under a Build Operate and Transfer contract with the local
government unit and, technically, she could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract
over the same property in which complainant was represented as the propertys absolute owner, but she did not complain.
Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against complainant was not the representation of herself as owner of the
mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and encumbrances. The perjury charge was even
dismissed, because the prosecutor found that complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the
previous mortgage contract over the same market stall.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was
actually new. She gave the courts copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the latters request for an extra
copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainants assurance that the lessees would sign
it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that complainant was an
experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the
purchase agreement was notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing
about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case pending before the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of the subject property.
Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by complainant as additional evidence were properly notarized. It
can be easily gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent; hence, the
notarization was limited to the formers participation in the execution of the document. Moreover, the acknowledgment
clearly stated that the document must be notarized in the principals place of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder, complainant filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of Additional Evidence.5 Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized
by respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming
Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3)
two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease contract
that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual
Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank
Certification; and (10) an unsigned Consent to Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position Papers.6Notably, respondents
Position Paper did not tackle the additional documents attached to complainants Urgent Ex Parte Motion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate

revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two years for her
violation of her oath as such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who had purportedly appeared
before her. He accepted respondents explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs
pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract was a
sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of Canon 187 and Rule 18.038 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for six months.9
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year.10
Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for Reconsideration.12 She maintained that
the additional documents submitted by complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the
procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).13 Moreover,
the Urgent Ex Parte Motion of complainant was actually a supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under the rules
of procedure of the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to question those documents.
Hence, the investigating commissioner should have expunged the documents from the records, instead of giving them due
course. Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following: absence of prior
disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal and emotional problems; timely good-faith effort to
make restitution or to rectify the consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, denied respondents motion for
reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the IBPs findings.14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago through a letter
addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment
Complaint against respondent.15
THE COURTS RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the parties submissions in this case, the
Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall first dispose of some procedural matters
raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible for having been
obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised in
Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate
children as evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are
relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said
birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the
rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule
would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for

the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however,
that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the
government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill
of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained
of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's office, can
hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence
against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the
exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should
be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.18
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in
violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant
as additional evidence.
Respondents argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of complainant constitutes a supplemental pleading must fail as
well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary pleading.
Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject
matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion filed by complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her charges against respondent is that the latter
notarized incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint.
Complainant is not legally barred from submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she committed misconduct and
grievously violated her oath as a notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a
notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise,
the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.20
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the
instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary
public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization
process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished. 21 I n this case, respondent fully
knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions
of the real estate mortgage contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latters
liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondents conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123
and 1.0224 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondents explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant sometime in September 199925 is
incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees signatures, she could have given complainant a
certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a rarity in respondents practice as a notary
public. Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were
either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground for disciplinary action,

for it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his or her presence.26
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones who executed it
and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.27
Thus, in acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.0128
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood.29
Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several instances, the Court did
not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as notaries public.30
Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice
to accomplish the desired end.31 The blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a notary public warrants the
less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a
notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY
REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the bar and furnished to
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the
country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
8.

Tupal v. Rojo, A.M. MTJ-14-1842, 24 February 2014

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842
February 24, 2014
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]
REX M. TUPAL, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, Negros Occidental,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating
the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law.1
Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. Judge Rojo
allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation2
and issued them to the contracting parties.3 He notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties marriage.4 These
"package marriages" are allegedly common in Bacolod City.5
Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All affidavits were
notarized on the day of the contracting parties marriages.6 The affidavits contained the following jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod City, Philippines.

(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge7
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular
No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990.8 Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex
officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of
cohabitation are not connected with a judges official functions and duties as solemnizing officer.9 Thus, Judge Rojo
cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized.
Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized
affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did not require the parties to present
their competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by law.
These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x simple and elementary to
ignore."10
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.11 He argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the father of Frialyn
Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making false statements in her affidavit of
cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to delay Frialyns case.12
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was
connected with his official functions and duties as a judge.13 The Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary14 does not prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage
they will solemnize.15 Thus, Judge Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a notary public.
Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized.16
Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their competent pieces of
evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their affidavits, he personally knew them to be
the same persons who executed the affidavit.17 The parties identities are "unquestionable."18
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties
whose marriage they solemnized.19 He pleaded "not to make him [complainant Tupals] doormat, punching bag and
chopping block"20 since other judges also notarized affidavits of cohabitation.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be fined P9,000.00 and sternly warned that
repeating the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with municipal
trial court judges official functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members
of the Judiciary,21 a judges duty is to personally examine the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before
performing the marriage ceremony.22 Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of cohabitation, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended a fine of P1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation notarized.23
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the
law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in
their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of their
official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990 provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the function of
notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of
1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications
on the scope of this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents connected only with the
exercise of their official functions and duties x x x. They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation
and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the

performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their
extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from
engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts territorial
jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when notarizing documents ex officio:
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have neither lawyers nor
notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries
public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act within the competency of a regular notary
public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal
treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be
made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit.24
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official
functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or
notaries public were lacking in his courts territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting parties and examine the
requirements they submitted.25 The parties must have complied with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
Among these formal requisites is a marriage license.26
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and none of the legal
disqualifications to contract marriage.27 Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine
the marriage license presented.28
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment to
marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement.29 Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of
cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must
personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other.31 The judge must also execute a sworn statement
that he personally ascertained the parties qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage.32
Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary also provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the marriage in legal ratification of cohabitation.
In the case of a marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing officer shall (a) personally
interview the contracting parties to determine their qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the
contracting parties as to the fact of having lived together as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of
any legal impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a sworn statement showing compliance with (a) and (b) and
that the solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who
notarizes the contracting parties affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties
have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the
judge can notarize the parties affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judges official function and duty to solemnize
marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties requirements for
marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the
affidavits statements before performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the
affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage despite the
irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits
of cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function and duty to solemnize marriages.

Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he solemnized their
marriages]."33 He notarized documents not connected with his official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Thus,
Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not
expressly prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he cannot be prohibited from notarizing
affidavits of cohabitation.
To accept Judge Rojos argument will render the solemnizing officers duties to examine the affidavit of cohabitation and
to issue a sworn statement that the requirements have been complied with redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot
objectively examine a document he himself notarized. Article 34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary assume that "the person authorized by law to administer
oaths" who notarizes the affidavit of cohabitation and the "solemnizing officer" who performs the marriage ceremony are
two different persons.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal trial court judges from notarizing "private documents
x x x [bearing] no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges."34 Since a marriage license is a public
document, its "counterpart," the affidavit of cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit
of cohabitation, he notarizes a public document. He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a private document into a
public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity."35 The affidavit
of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public purpose," remains a private document until notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents. As discussed,
affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judges official duty to solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo violated
Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90s purpose is to "eliminate competition between judges and private lawyers in
transacting legal conveyancing business."36 He cited Borre v. Judge Moya37 where this court found City Judge Arcilla
guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90 for notarizing a deed of sale. Judge Rojo argued that when he notarized the affidavits
of cohabitation, he did "not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing
business."38 Thus, he did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the context in which this court stated that "[judges] should not
compete with private [lawyers] or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business."39
At any rate, Circular No. 1-90s purpose is not limited to documents used to transact "legal conveyancing business." So
long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with his official functions and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-90.
Thus, in Mayor Quiones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,40 this court fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a certificate of candidacy. In
Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr.,41 this court fined Judge Galapon for notarizing the verification page of an answer filed with
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The documents involved in these cases were not used to transact
"legal conveyancing business." Nevertheless, this court found Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty of violating
Circular No. 1-90.
Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were not connected with his official function and duty to
solemnize marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in
Bacolod City. Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in the municipality or circuit of the judges
court constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-90.42
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they solemnized does not make the
practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to the contrary.43
All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is not personally known to him.
Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence
of identity as defined by these Rules.

A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before the notary public is the signatory to the
instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public does not personally know the signatory, he must require the
signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their
affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were personally known to him or that the parties presented
their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the affidavits of cohabitation. They personally appeared before
him to subscribe to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also interviewed them on their qualifications to contract marriage.
Thus, the parties to the affidavit of cohabitation need not present their competent pieces of evidence of identity.44
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the parties personally known to
him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their affidavits. To personally know the parties, the
notary public must at least be acquainted with them.45 Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties
personally known to the notary public.
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos v. Judge How46where
this court held that "[g]ood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations x x x"47were
defenses against gross ignorance of the law charges. His good faith in notarizing affidavits of cohabitation should not
hold him administratively liable.
However, this court also held in Santos that "good faith in situations of fallible discretion [inheres] only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment x x x."48 Good faith "does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable
legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error."49
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts territorial
jurisdiction before notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires notaries public to personally know
the signatory to the document they will notarize or require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
These are basic legal principles and procedure Judge Rojo violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements nine
times is not good faith.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity,50 "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer."51 If the law involved is basic, ignorance
constitutes "lack of integrity."52 Violating basic legal principles and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.
This court may impose the following sanctions for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it being a serious charge:53
a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations;54
b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months;55 or
c. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.56
This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been dismissed from the service for gross ignorance of the
law. However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges practice of notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in
Bacolod City and Talisay City. Thus, this court finds suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six (6)
months sufficient sanction.
Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the requirements of the law.1wphi1 They should act with caution
with respect to affidavits of cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical requirements as in this case will be dealt with
strictly.
WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS. His
suspension is effective upon service on him of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in Bacolod City and Talisay City.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: