DJ 181-06-0002

Apr 20 1992

Mr. William B. Ingersoll

Ingersoll and Block
1401 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Ingersoll:

This letter responds to your August 21, 1991, letter on

behalf of Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. (Marriott), requesting
guidance on the application of certain provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to the timesharing resorts
operated by Marriott under its Vacation Ownership System.
Specifically, you have requested guidance as to whether
"timesharing that is sold in increments of one week or less is a
public accommodation as that term is defined in the ADA."

The ADA authorizes the Department to provide technical

assistance to entities that are subject to the Act. This letter
provides informal guidance to assist you in understanding how the
ADA may apply to your client. However, this technical assistance
does not constitute a determination by the Department of Justice
of your client's rights or responsibilities under the ADA and
does not constitute a binding determination by the Department of
Justice.

Based on our review of your letter and supporting materials,

it is our understanding that the specific question you pose is
the following: Is a vacation property owned in the form of
ownership referred to by Marriott as "timesharing," and sold by
Marriott in increments of one week or less, a "place of public
accommodation" as defined in this Department's regulation
Implementing title III of the ADA? See, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544
(July 26, 1991) to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36.

cc: Records; CRS Files; Oneglia; Friedlander; Wodatch; Pecht.

:uddl:udd:pecht:ingersoll

01-00597
-2-

To be considered a place of public accommodation under the

title III regulation, a facility must be operated by a private
entity, its operations must affect commerce, and it must fall
within one of the 12 categories listed in S 36.104 of the
regulation. Each category includes representative examples of
covered facilities. However, the examples included are meant to
be illustrative, not exhaustive. Thus, a facility does not have
to be specifically listed in order to be covered.

Therefore, in order for Marriott's timesharing resorts to be

considered places of public accommodation, they must fall within
one of the 12 categories. In this instance, the analysis turns
on whether any given resort is a "place of lodging" such as an
inn, hotel, or motel. These terms are not defined in either the
Act itself or the title III regulation. However, the preamble to
the title III regulation does note that the category "places of
lodging" would "exclude solely residential facilities because the
nature of a place of lodging contemplates the use of the facility
for short-term stays."

Thus, one factor that should be considered in determining

whether a particular facility is a place of lodging is whether
the facility is intended or used for, or permits short-term
stays. Although the regulation does not define "short-term," the
Department would consider stays of one week or less to be "short-
term" stays. While this interpretation may be consistent with
certain Federal court precedents established under title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and cited in the materials you
provided to us, you should be aware that the Department may look
to such precedents for guidance but does not consider itself
bound by them in interpreting its ADA regulations.

In addition to considering whether a given facility is

intended or used for, or permits short-term stays, in making a
determination as to whether a facility is a place of lodging,
each entity should also consider the extent to which the facility
does or does not share the characteristics of the examples listed
as places of lodging. For example, one potentially significant
difference between inns, hotels, and motels, as a group, and
facilities held in Marriott's form of timeshare ownership is
that, according to your April 23, 1991, letter to John Wodatch,
timeshare owners are deeded a fee interest in the timesharing
resort. Obviously, a deeded fee interest differs from the
interest normally conveyed to the patron of a hotel or motel.
However, if, as you point out in the April 23rd letter, the fee
interest conveyed is subject to recorded restrictive covenants
that substantially restrict the "traditional possessory rights of
ownership" and the properties are, in fact, operated in a manner
very similar to the manner in which hotels are operated,
timeshare facilities are more likely to be treated as places of
lodging covered under the ADA.

01-00598

-3-

Based on the representations made in your April 23, 1991,

letter, we believe that timeshare facilities in Marriott's
Vacation Ownership System are nonresidential places of public
accommodation. In reaching this conclusion we have considered
the following factors to be of particular significance:

1. Ownership of timesharing units is sold in intervals of

one week or less, which is consistent with the requirement that a
place of lodging be a facility that is intended or used for, or
permits short-term stays;

2. While ownership to individual units is conveyed in fee

simple, recorded restrictive covenants substantially limit rights
of ownership and owners have no right to occupy, alter, or
exercise other control over any specific unit;

3. Owners of timesharing interests are not required to

return to the same unit or project and may utilize various
exchange options to exchange their units for units at other
resorts; and

4. Marriott's timeshare accommodations are operated like

hotels (i.e., reservations, central registration, and room
assignments are required) by a company that is in the hotel
business.

We wish to stress that we have reached this conclusion based

on your description of the ownership and operation of Marriott's
Vacation Ownership System. Thus, this conclusion should not be
viewed as a general statement of the Department's position with
respect to other types of timesharing facilities; our position on
this issue may well be different given a different set of facts
concerning the ownership and operation of such facilities.

As you note in your April 23, 1991, letter, as places of

public accommodation, timeshare facilities are subject to the
title III requirements for readily achievable barrier removal;
and any new construction or alteration of such facilities must
follow the Accessibility Guidelines adopted as Appendix A to the
Department's title III regulation. We would also like to point
out that, as a public accommodation, Marriott is also subject to
other significant non-discrimination requirements under title III
of the ADA. For example, Marriott must provide auxiliary aids
and services to guests with hearing, speech, or vision
impairments, unless doing so would result in an undue burden or a
fundamental alteration in the nature of the services or
accommodations being offered.

01-00599
-4-

I hope this information has been helpful to you.

Sincerely,

John R. Dunne
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

01-00600
August 21, 1991

VIA MESSENGER

Stewart Oneglia
Chief
Coordination and Review Section
Department of Justice
320 First Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

RE: Request for Guidance

Final Rule published by the Department of Justice
("Department") in the Federal Register on July 26,
1991 with respect to Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commer-
cial Facilities (the "Final Rule")

Dear Ms. Oneglia:

On behalf of Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. ("Marriott"),

we are requesting guidance as to the meaning of the term "short-
term stay" as used in the Department's Section by Section Analysis
in the Final Rule with respect to the definition of public
accommodations. On April 23, Marriott submitted comments to the
Department with respect to the proposed rule making implementing
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA" or the
"Act"), requesting confirmation in the Final Rule of Marriott's
position that timesharing that is sold in increments of one week
or less is a public accommodation as that term is defined in the
ADA. A copy of Marriott's April 23 comments is enclosed for your
reference.

In addition, on March 14, I spoke at the public hearing

in Washington, D.C. regarding this issue. At that time, the panel
indicated that it was aware of this question and intended to
address it in the Final Rule. Although we recognize that it was
difficult for the Department to address the many individual
questions that arose in the comments to the proposed rule, we were
nevertheless disappointed to find no reference at all to timeshar-
ing or vacation ownership in the Final Rule. We were encouraged,
however, by the Department's statements in the Section-By-Section

01-00601

Stewart Oneglia
August 21, 1991
Page 2

Analysis and Response to Comments (the "Department's Analysis")

that "... the nature of a place of lodging contemplates the use of
the facility for short-term stays." (56 Fed. Reg. 35552; emphasis
added).

Although the Department's distinction between short-term

stays and long-term stays was encouraging, the absence of any
definition of a short-term stay has left Marriott, and the
timeshare industry, without the immediate guidance necessary to
know whether or not they are required to comply with the provisions
of the ADA. Given the approaching deadlines for removal of
architectural barriers, as well as plans for future projects to be
constructed, this places an undue burden on the industry. We are
therefore requesting guidance as to whether a stay of one week or
less constitutes a "short-term stay."

As discussed in the attached comments, we believe that

there is considerable legal basis to conclude that stays of one
week or less constitute a short-term stay. In particular, please
refer to our discussion of Title II public accommodations (Section
II.A. of our comments, beginning on page 7) in which we cite
several Federal court decisions interpreting the term lodging to
transient guests, as used in the definition of public accommoda-
tions in Title II, to apply to lodging for one week or less.

In its analysis, the Department repeatedly differentiates

between short-term and long-term stays. For example, in discussing
residential hotels, the Department states,

Although such hotels or portions of such hotels

may fall under the Fair Housing Act when
operated or used as long-term residences, they
are also considered "places of lodging" when
guest of such hotels are free to use them on
a short-term basis.

We wish to emphasize that it is Marriott's position that

its timeshare projects are not residential in nature, as that term
has been interpreted in the context of the Fair Housing Act.
Therefore, Marriott projects are not mixed use projects that allow
both residential and short-term stays and should not be subject to
both the ADA and the Fair Housing Act.

Based on the Department's distinction between short-term

and long-term stays and the legal precedent cited in the attached
comments, we believe that projects in which timesharing that is
sold in increments of one week or less are public accommodations
which are covered only by the ADA. Because of the necessity to
take immediate steps to remove architectural barriers and to design
01-00602

Stewart Oneglia
August 21, 1991
Page 3

new construction, we would appreciate your comments and guidance

on this issue as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

William B. Ingersoll

WBI:SLV:pc

Enclosure:
April 23 Comments

cc:w/copy of enclosure
Irene Bowen
Paul Hancock

01-00603
April 23, 1991

John L. Wodatch
Office of Americans with Disabilities Act
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Rulemaking Docket 003
Box 75087
Washington, D.C. 20013

RE: Comments of Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. with

respect to Timesharing and the Marriott Vacation
Ownership System

Dear Mr. Wodatch:

On behalf of Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., ("Marriott"),

a subsidiary of the Marriott Corporation, we are submitting the
following comments in response to the proposed rule making
implementing Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") or (the "Act") issued by the Department of Justice (the
"Department") in the February 22 Federal Register (55 Fed. Reg.
7452) (the "Proposed Rulemaking"). By separate letter, Marriott
is submitting comments on several provisions in the proposed rule
making. However, because of the importance to Marriott of
confirming that timesharing that is sold in increments of one week
or less is a public accommodation, as that term is defined in the
Act, we are submitting separate comments on this issue alone.

Since the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990 (the "ADA")1, there has been considerable confusion as
to whether the ADA or the handicapped provisions in the 1988
Amendments to Fair Housing Act (the "Fair Housing Act")2 apply to
timesharing. Historically, the timesharing industry has stressed
compliance with Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title

1 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-

336, S 104 Stat. 327, (1990).

2 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, 42

U.S.C. S 3601 et seq. (1988).

01-00604

John L. Wodatch
April 23, 1991
Page 2

II")3 because of the public accommodations nature of timesharing

facilities. Marriott, a subsidiary of the Marriott Corporation,
is a leader in the timesharing industry. Marriott's Vacation
Ownership System currently includes seven timesharing resorts
developed by Marriott and several other resorts under construction
or in the planning stage.4
 Marriott has been committed to non-discriminatory
practices in all aspects of its business, and it has been par-
ticularly concerned about complying with the new requirements
enacted by Congress regarding handicapped accessibility. It is
clear that Congress intended to provide handicapped access to all
facilities which are generally available to the public, including
both public accommodations which are occupied on a transient basis
and residential dwelling units. However, we believe that Congress
did not intend timesharing to be covered by both the ADA and the
Fair Housing Act. Further, even if some types of timesharing are
covered by the Fair Housing Act, we do not believe that all types
of timesharing, regardless of the length of stay of the owners, are
subject to the Fair Housing Act.

The Department recognized that the transitory nature of

a stay as well as the length of stay is determinative when it
stated in the Section by Section Analysis:

Places of lodging (e.g. hotels and inns,

primarily intended for transitory stays) are
designated as places of public accommodation.
Places used for longer stays (e.g. residential
hotels) are not consider "commercial facili-
ties" because they are residential facilities.
(Emphasis added.)

Based on the reasons expressed herein, we urge the

Department to clarify the confusion by clearly stating in the final
regulations that transitory timesharing facilities which are sold
in increments of one week or less, are subject to regulation as
public accommodations under the ADA.

The following memorandum will provide a background on

timesharing as it is structured today, with particular emphasis on

3 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq.

4 Marriott has developed seven timesharing resorts in three

states: Florida, South Carolina and California. New resorts are
under construction in Florida and Colorado and resorts are also
being planned in the Bahamas, Mexico and other national and
international locations.

01-00605

John L. Wodatch
April 23, 1991
Page 3

Marriott's Vacation Ownership System. This will be followed by

analysis of the legal basis for applying the ADA to timesharing,
as well as a discussion of the inapplicability of the Fair Housing
Act to timesharing which is sold in increments of one week or less.

I. INTRODUCTION

In addition to the case law and statutory interpretations

outlined herein, there is a practical reason why timesharing such
as the Marriott Vacation Ownership System should be covered by the
ADA. ADA will provide immediate accessibility to individuals with
disabilities at no personal cost. Under ADA, architectural and
communication barriers in existing projects must be removed, when
readily achievable, at no expense to the individual with a dis-
ability. Further, all alterations and renovations must meet the
standards for new construction, as well as for alterations. Under
the Fair Housing Act, a person with disabilities who wishes such
modifications must make them at his own expense. This is unrealis-
tic when a guest only spends one week a year at a resort. Similar-
ly, under the proposed Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board ("ATBCB") accessibility guidelines, a percentage
of each class of new units must be readily accessible to in-
dividuals with disabilities. The Fair Housing Act provides for
less accessible units. For example, the proposed ATBCB guidelines
require grab bars in accessible units; Fair Housing only requires
reinforcement in the walls, but the handicapped must install grab
bars at their own expense. Thus, confirming that timesharing that
is sold in increments of one week or less is subject to the ADA
will make the majority of timesharing in the United States more
accessible to the disabled at no personal cost.

Background

Although there are many types of timesharing, all

timesharing is sold as a mechanism which allows individuals to
assure the availability of transient vacation accommodations of a
short duration, typically one week intervals. There are four
essential elements in the structure of any timeshare project: the
interest, the unit, the interval and the exchange.

Interests. There are two basic types of timesharing

interests - fee and non-fee or "right to use." In fee timeshar-
ing, the purchaser receives some type of deeded interest - either
an undivided percentage interest in the entire project or in a
specific unit. Right to use timesharing is generally structured
as a club membership in which the purchaser receives the right to
use a certain type of unit at a timeshare project for a specified
number of years. All of Marriott's timesharing resorts are
structured as some type of fee timesharing.

01-00606

John L. Wodatch
April 23, 1991
Page 4

Units. Although Marriott owners are deeded an interest

in a specific unit, they waive the right to use that specific unit
under the recorded covenants and restrictions for the project.
Instead, owners may only use one of several units of the type in
which an interest was purchased, i.e., 1 bedroom, 2 bedroom, etc.
Owners have absolutely no individual control over the units and are
prohibited from altering them in any manner or from installing
furnishings or fixtures. Further, the recorded covenants and
restrictions prohibit the use of a unit as a permanent residence.
Therefore, few, if any, of the traditional possessory rights of
ownership are available to Marriott timeshare owners. The emphasis
is on the vacation experience, not on ownership.

Timeshare owners occupy standardized units similar to

hotel suites that are designed for the transient use of the public.
The units are identical both inside and outside, with floor plans
that facilitate interchangeability. Interior furnishings are
identical, from furniture to color schemes. Linens, towels,
tissues, utensils, ashtrays, etc. are provided by the timesharing
facility management group, just as in hotels.

A unique feature in Marriott's California timesharing

project are "lock-out" units, in which a second or guest bedroom
can be physically locked off from the rest of the unit to create
two usable units - a master or one-bedroom apartment and a one-
bedroom guest suite. Owners may use each of the two separate
halves of the unit in their appropriate season. Or they may rent
or exchange either half through the exchange programs described
below.

Intervals. Timesharing involves the concept of purchas-

ing the right to use accommodations for a defined time period or
"interval." Marriott timesharing intervals are sold in one week
intervals. There are two types of intervals - fixed and floating
- with variations within each type. Fixed time generally refers
to the right to use a unit during a specific week each year.
However, it may also refer to a specified season. In projects with
floating time, all owners must reserve their time, usually on a
first-come, first-served basis. Although the organizational
structure varies from resort to resort, except for a few units in
the first two resorts developed by Marriott, all of the units in
the Marriott Vacation Ownership System are subject to floating
time.

Under Marriott's floating time program, all owners are

required to reserve the use of a unit of the type in which their
interest was purchased within the season of the week they pur-
chased. For example, a purchaser of an interest in Unit 100, a 2-
bedroom unit, for the first week in August, could reserve any
available 2-bedroom unit during the summer season. Owners are

01-00607

John L. Wodatch
April 23, 1991
Page 5

requested to submit four choices in order of preference. The

management company assigns the weeks on a first-come, first-served
basis; however, the actual units are not assigned until the time
of check-in. Under this program, there is no anticipation nor
likelihood of an owner staying in the same unit each year or even
of vacationing during the same week each year.

The documentation for all of Marriott's timesharing

resorts permits two flexible features which add to the transient
nature of the occupancy - "odd-even year usage" and "split week
usage." The odd-even year program permits owners to use a unit
at a specific timesharing resort every other year rather than
annually. In addition, a split week program has been implemented
at the Desert Springs Villas Resort in California. Under this
program, an owner may divide the normal seven-day use period into
two separate use periods of three and four days during the same
season as the week they purchased. When the split-week program is
combined with the "lock-out" feature, as described above, owners
may use, rent or exchange the separate halves of their units for
a total of four periods each year - two three-day periods in one
half of the unit and two four-day periods in the other half.

Marriott timeshare accommodations are similar to hotel

accommodations in additional respects: central registration, check-
in and check-out, and room assignment is required; keys are
distributed and collected as in hotel facilities; and all main-
tenance and housekeeping functions are the responsibility of
management, not of the guests. Utilities are usually master-
metered and the expense covered out of the facility's operating
budget.

In short, Marriott timesharing purchasers are not buying

an interest in a residential unit; they are buying usage of
vacation accommodations which can be used, rented or exchanged from
one project to another. The vacation experience is reinforced by
the exchange systems, in which owners may exchange a week in their
project for a week in a project in another location.

Exchange. The nature of timesharing as transient

vacation accommodations is further underlined by the existence of
exchange systems. Virtually every timesharing project participates
in some type of exchange system, as timesharing developers have
found that people will not buy timesharing if they are limited to
returning to the same project year after year. Almost all time-
share owners utilize the exchange during their period of timeshare
ownership, with over 75% maintaining their affiliation with an
exchange system in anticipation of exchanging their vacation week
for a week at another project. Industry figures indicate that over
one-third of exchange members exchanged their unit for another in
1990, with this percentage increasing each year. Marriott's

01-00608

John L. Wodatch
April 23, 1991
Page 6

statistics are even higher, showing that owners in the Marriott

Vacation Ownership System utilize the exchange systems provided
more than 50% of the time, depending on the resort and the length
of ownership.

Marriott timesharing resorts offer two exchange options

to their owners. Marriott is affiliated with one of the two major
exchange companies, Interval International, Inc. In addition to
the external exchange program with timesharing projects around the
world, Interval International operates a special internal exchange
program for Marriott timesharing resorts under which owners at
Marriott resorts are given priority over other Interval Interna-
tional members in exchanging their time period for time in another
Marriott timesharing resort.

A final benefit currently offered to all Marriott owners

is the Honored Guest Awards program. This program substantially
broadens the bundle of rights purchased with a timeshare interest.
The Honored Guest Awards program is similar to the airline frequent
flyer programs. Originally designed for guests at Marriott hotels,
owners of timeshare interests in Marriott timesharing resorts are
currently eligible to participate in this program.5 Members may
earn points that can be accumulated and redeemed for future stays
at various Marriott hotels, free or discounted airline tickets,
rental cars, etc. Marriott timeshare owners can earn Honored Guest
Awards points by assigning the use of their unit to Marriott during
any given year instead of using it personally. In addition, points
are sometimes given as a sales incentive.

Clearly, timesharing is appropriately seen as a transient

public accommodation, which is differentiated from other public
accommodations by virtue of the concept of a pre-purchase which
assures the availability of a vacation experience in a standardized
setting. Marriott sales and owner literature emphasizes the many
ways that owners may use their floating time: personal use, the
internal Marriott exchange, the external Interval International
exchange, rental to third parties or the Honored Guest Awards
program. None of these features are characteristic of a residen-
tial unit that an owner expects to return to year after year.
Instead, the one week periods, floating time reservation system,
flexible features in some resorts such as split weeks and lock-
out units and the Honored Guest Awards program are all typical of
transient public accommodations such as hotels which are subject
to the ADA.

5 Like the hotel program, the Honored Guest Award program for
timeshare owners may be changed or eliminated at the discretion of
Marriott.

01-00609

John L. Wodatch
April 23, 1991
Page 7

II. TIMESHARING AS PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER TITLE II AND

THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT.

A. Title II

Because of the relationship between public accommodations

under Title II and public accommodations under the ADA, it is first
necessary to address the application of Title II to public accom-
modations such as Marriott timesharing. Marriott views its
timesharing facilities as public accommodations for transient
guests that are regulated by Title II. Section 2000a(b)(1) of
Title II includes as public accommodations, "any inn, hotel, motel,
or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests.-
..." The legislative history regarding the scope of Title II
differentiates lodging for transient guests from permanent residen-
tial housing:

Only public establishments furnishing lodging

to transcients [sic] would be within this
subsection. Establishments furnishing lodging
to guests of a permanent duration, or to guests
of an indefinite duration having no fixed
intent to leave, as in the case of a boarding
house, would not be included.6

Similarly, the following explanation of the transient

guest requirement, submitted by U.S. Attorney General Kennedy
during the extensive hearings on the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
emphasizes that transient guests were intended to be non-permanent
in nature:

The "transient guest" requirement exempts

establishments, like apartment houses, which
provide permanent residential housing. For
example, apartments rented on month-to-month
tenancies automatically renewed each month
unless specifically terminated, are exempted.7

Federal courts have interpreted the term "transient" to

apply to lodging for one week or less. In U.S. v Beach Associates,

6 S. Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1988

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2355, 2356.

7. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the

Judiciary, House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st Session, Part
II, Series No. 4, p. 1402.

01-00610

John L. Wodatch
April 23, 1991
Page 8
Inc.8, the court held that beach apartments which were rented by
the week were "lodging by transient guests" within the meaning of
section 2000a(b)(1)9.

Affirming the decision in Beach Associates, the court in

U.S. v. Young Men's Christ. Ass'n of Columbia, S.C.10, construed
"transient" as including "lodgers of a week or less." Although
there was disagreement between the parties as to whether the YMCA
rented accommodations for less than a week, the record established
that accommodations were rented for no more than one week.11
Citing Beach Associates and United States v. Sadler (No. 570, E.D.
N.C., January 15, 1968), the court stated:

I feel obliged to accept the construction of

"transient" adopted in these decisions. Since
the defendant concedes that it is its policy
to rent rooms in its dormitory by the week, it
follows that, under the construction adopted
in the Beach Associates Case, the defendant
does provide, as I have concluded, lodging for
"transient" guests within the meaning of 42"
U.S.C. section 2000a(b)(1).12

The one week threshold in Beach Associates and Young

Men's Chris. Assn' is analogous to the sale of timesharing in
increments of one week or less. Equally important is the non-
residential nature of the facilities, a point which is emphasized
in the ADA.

B. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA")

Title III of the ADA is entitled "Public Accommodations

and Services Operated by Private Entities." The definition of
"public accommodations" in the ADA is almost identical to the
definition in Title II - "an inn, hotel, or other place of lodg-
ing...."13 Although the term "transient guests" is not included in
the ADA definition, both the House and the Senate reports state
 8 286 F.Supp. 801 (D.C. Md. 1968).
9 Id. at 808.
10 310 F.Supp 79 (D. S.C. 1979)
11 Id. at 82.
12 Id.
13 Section 301(7)(A).

01-00611

John L. Wodatch
April 23, 1991
Page 9

that "[O]nly nonresidential facilities are covered by this tit-

le."14

A one week stay in a timesharing resort cannot be deemed

to be residential in any sense of the word. Timesharing units are
nonresidential. Even when there is an ownership interest, per-
manent residence is prohibited and owners have no possessory rights
in their units. Congress, in enacting the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, extended the protection to the handicapped afforded
in the Fair Housing Act to residential facilities to nonresidential
public accommodations such as timesharing resorts.

II. FAIR HOUSING ACT

Congress did not specifically include timesharing

facilities in the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act; however,
HUD, in its Section by Section Analysis of the Final Fair Housing
Accessibility Guidelines, stated that "... the fact of vacation
timesharing ownership of units in a building does not affect
whether the structure is subject to the Act's accessibility
requirements."15 We believe this statement is incomplete. Al-
though the fact of vacation ownership should not affect whether a
structure is subject to the Fair Housing Act, the length of stay,
based on a timeshare owner's interest, should be determinative.

The underlying policy of the Fair Housing Act is "to

provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States."16 "Housing" is not defined in the
Act, nor is the term used to any extent. Instead, the focus is on
"dwellings," which are defined as:

... any building, structure, or portion thereof

which is occupied as, or designed or intended
for occupancy as, a residence by one or more
families, and any vacant land which is offered
for sale or lease for the construction or
location thereon of any such building structure, or portion
thereof.17

14 H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, Part 2, 101st Cong., 2d Sess, at 99.

See also, S. Rep. No. 101-16, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 59.

15 Comments to Final Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines,

56 Fed. Reg. 9472 at 9482 (March 6, 1991).

16 Id. at S 3601 (emphasis added).

17 Id. at S 3602(b) (emphasis added).

01-00612

John L. Wodatch
April 23, 1991
Page 10

The application of the Act to timesharing that is sold

in increments of one week or less hinges on whether timesharing
units are "dwellings." The central concept in the definition of
"dwelling" is the term "residence." It is the consistent emphasis
on residence as opposed to transient accommodations that distin-
guishes traditional housing units from timesharing units.

Although the legislative history of the Act is meager due

to the lack of committee reports and other relevant materials, the
background events against which the Act was passed, such as the
urban riots of 1967, indicate that a major concern was segregation
in residential neighborhoods.18 Case law is equally sparse. The
few courts that have addressed the question of whether the Act
applies to a particular structure have focused on the term "resi-
dence."

In United States v. Hughes Memorial Home19, the court

held that the Act applies to a children's home in which the average
stay was four years. In its analysis, the court stated "[W]hether
the Home is within the scope of the prohibition in section 3604(a)
thus turns on whether it is "occupied as a ... residence."20

Because "residence" is not defined in the Act, the court

looked to its ordinary meaning, quoting from Webster's Third New
International Dictionary:

a temporary or permanent dwelling place, above

or habitation to which one intends to return
as distinguished from the place of temporary
sojourn or transient visit [.]21

The transient nature of accommodations has been an

essential element in deciding whether a structure is a "dwelling."

In Patel v. Holley House Motels,22 the court held that a motel was
not a "dwelling" under the Act. Citing the above definition of a
residence in Hughes Memorial, the court stated:

18 See Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp,

489, 496-97, quoting from The Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders (1968).

19 396 F.Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975)

20 Id. at 549.

21 Id.

22 483 F.Supp 374 (S.D. Ala. S.D. 1979).

01-00613
John L. Wodatch
April 23, 1991
Page 11

It is clear that the Palms Motel is an es-

tablishment which provides lodging to "tran-
sient" guests. The Palms Motel is a "public
accommodation" as distinguished from a "dwel-
ling," see Title II, Civil Rights Act of 1965
(Public Accommodations), 42 U.S.C. S 2000a(b)-
(1), and Plaintiffs, therefore, have no claim
under the Fair Housing Act.23

Using the same rationale, the district court in Baxter

v. City of Belleville, Ill.24, held that a home for AIDS victims
was subject to the Act, stating, "[A]lthough the length of the
residence may vary, the persons who will reside at [the home] will
not be living there as mere transients."25

The most recent case to address the definition of a

dwelling is U.S. v. Columbus Country Club26, which involved the
rental of summer bungalows belonging to a private club. The
Columbus Country Club was a non-profit social organization whose
"annual" members owned the land collectively, which it leased to
its annual members for a fee. However, the annual members owned
their cottages.27 Members could spend up to five months a year in
their bungalows and most returned each summer. The court quoted,
in part, from R. Schwemm, a professor of law at the University of
Kentucky:

Title VIII "would presumably cover... facili-

ties whose occupants remain for more than a
brief period of time and who view their rooms
as a residence 'to return to.'"28

To better understand the court of appeal's decision, the

full passage from which this quote was taken is reproduced below:

23 Id. at 381.

24 720 F.Supp. 720 (S.D. Ill. 1989).

25 Id at 731.

26 915 F2d 877 (3rd Cir. 1990).

 27 U.S. v. Columbus Country Club, No. 87-8164, Lexis Slip op.
14757 (E.D. Pa. 1989).

28 Id. at 881, quoting from Robert G. Schwemm, Housing

Discrimination Law, 53 (1983).

01-00614

John L. Wodatch
April 23, 1991
Page 12

Other courts have agreed with Hughes Memorial that

temporary residence cases should generally be
decided by looking to whether the occupants intend
to remain in these residences for any substantial
period of time. If occupancy is merely transient,
as would be the case with most motel and hotel
rooms, the property may be viewed as something less
than a dwelling and therefore not subject to Title
VIII. On the other hand, Title VIII has been held
to apply when a longer term occupancy is involved
as in Hughes Memorial and in the monthly rental of
a mobile home site. If this principle is followed,
the statute would presumably cover boarding houses,
dormitories, and other facilities whose occupants
remain for more than brief period of time and who
view their rooms as a residence "to return to." 29

After citing Professor Schwemm, Hughes Memorial, Holley

House Motels and City of Belleville, the third circuit held:

We agree with these cases and hold that the

central inquiry is whether the defendant's
annual members intend to remain in the bun-
galows for any significant period of time and
whether they view their bungalows as a place
 to return to.30

Timeshare units have none of the traditional attributes

of a residence, but are merely transient vacation accommodations.
Unlike the members of the Columbus Country Club, Marriott time-
share owners purchase intervals of one week, hardly a "significant
period of time." Members of the Club returned to the same bungalow
year after year. Timeshare owners of one week intervals do not
intend to return to their resorts each year, as evidenced by the
use of the exchange systems. Columbus Country Club members owned
their bungalows, which could be permanently furnished and altered
according to each owner's wishes. They were entitled to the
traditional possessory rights of ownership. Not only are many
timeshare owners denied the use of the same unit each year, but,
like hotel guests, they are never permitted to furnish a unit or
to make any type of alteration, however temporary.

29 Schwemm at 53.

30 Columbus Country Club at 881.

01-00615

John L. Wodatch
April 23, 1991
Page 13

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the above and because ADA provides more acces-

sibility at less personal cost to individuals with disabilities,
we feel that the final rule should clarify that timesharing, such
as Marriott's, which is sold in increments of one week or less, is
a public accommodation which is covered by the ADA. Such timeshar-
ing is sold and used as transient vacation accommodations that are
most analogous to hotel use; therefore, such timesharing units
should be regulated as public accommodations under the ADA. The
entire nature of timesharing is nonresidential. The emphasis is
on variety of vacation use, not on the unit itself.

The district courts in Beach Associates and Young Men's

Christ. Assn explicitly held that lodgings which are used for
periods of one week or less are covered by Title II. It follows
that timesharing interests that are sold in increments of one week
or less should also be covered by Title II. As a public accommoda-
tion, timesharing should also be subject to the ADA.

We wish to stress that Marriott does not wish to avoid

civil rights or handicapped accessibility regulation. In fact, as
stated herein, we believe that by confirming that timesharing that
is sold in increments of one week or less is subject to the ADA,
the Department will provide immediate accessibility in such
projects to individuals with disabilities at no personal cost.

Sincerely,

William B. Ingersoll

WBI:SLV:pc

01-00616