Assume the New York Supreme Court here is our RTC.

Kesha goes to CA via Rule 65

of Rules of Court. Decide, you being the CA.
KESHA ALLEGING FAILURE TO PROMOTE HER BY KEMOSABE
sexual assault, sexual harassment and gender violence
Kesha's mother induced Kesha to blackmail Dr. Luke
Mother circulated false letters
2 arguments of kesha: likelihood of
success on the merits, to irreparable harm, to balance of
the equities (judge)
Gottwald is the president and CEO of Kemosabe Records,
THE COURT: Your argument is that she cannot
physically work with Gottwald because she has all of these
issues.
Even though you claim she has all kinds of physical
problems, trauma, nothing, nothing, under seal or
otherwise. There are no hospital records.
But the
real issue here, and throughout the case, this has been a
thread, is that she says she cannot work with Gottwald.
Now she's being given the opportunity to work without
him. I don't understand why I have to take the
extraordinary measure of issuing an injunction.
LEPERA: She's asked for a preliminary injunction essentially denuding and rewrit
ing a multitude of
contracts which Kasz Money entered into starting with her
up through RCA, all of which was assigned to a new Sony
label, Kemosabe Records.
There is absolutely no basis for the rewriting
of any contracts to terminate a relationship in a
multi-contract, commercially sound and appropriate
business relationship when the only issue is really about
production. (THIS!!!)
COURT: Would there be a problem with her
recording at Sony under the Kemosabe label and permitting
Sony to take over promotion, et cetera, with -- all under
the tent of Kemosabe?
they're asking for the
supervision of people at Sony rather than at Kemosabe.
LEPERA: without any legal basis, without any legal authority,
without any breach of contract claim, is that somehow or
another Sony, Kemosabe Records is not going to do a job in
promoting recordings that are delivered simply because they
have a CEO. Ultimately he has legal obligations to Sony to
fulfill. And there are multiple contractual relationships
that are not even part of this record which involve -which if dismantled in that fashion would create disruption
and irreparable harm to my clients and Sony.
There would be effectively breach of

contract. (THIS OMG)

LEPERA: Also by Miss Sebert, if her
recordings are basically thrown in the toilet. That's not
what's been happening and it's ludicrous to suggest it.
you can't sue for specific performance of a personal service contract in New Yor
k. (THIS) There's no election of remedy that we didn't
sue for specific performance, so, therefore, we've given
up the exclusivity obligation.
THE COURT: You can't force someone to work -MS. LEPERA: Right.
THE COURT: -- in a situation in which they don't
want to work.
MS. LEPERA: Right.
THE COURT: It's slavery. You can't. do that.
LEPERA: And we never sought that.
We simply sought that, and we continue to maintain, that
the exclusivity obligation maintained is in force and
effect from her to KMI, KMI then entered into obligations
that it has to fulfill with the Sony company and that
ultimately there were additional contracts going up to
Kemosabe Records, and he has obligations to fulfill that.
And, you know, so all of these very commercially reasonable
contracts must remain in place. There's absolutely zero
basis for any effort to rewrite a single thing here, and
it's simply a completely speculative conclusion that
something is going to go awry.
LEPERA: There's not a breach of contract claim by
Miss Sebert in the entire case in anyplace in any court.
Okay? So any time there's ever been -- and the cases
that are cited by plaintiff's counsel -- by Miss Sebert's
counsel for -- you know, challenging of exclusivity
provisions are only when there's been a breach by the
other party failing to account, refusing to want to
deliver (two cases plaintiffs cite: Milstead and Then)
the entire underpinning for likelihood of success on the merits
of this case is that we sued for damages and thereby
relinquished our exclusivity provision, which is, of
course, not true. They basically say we had to sue for
specific performance in order to have not waived that, but
you can't sue for specific performance to require someone
to go do something. So what we did is we said the contract
remains in full force and effect, we sued for damages for
breach to date, including for failure to deliver certain
royalties that are due on merchandising and performances on
an ancillary basis, for failing to deliver songs to
Prescription.
They come in and they say that we somehow
waived, you know, by failing to sue for specific
performance. The law in New York's very clear to the
contrary, we cited it extensively in our brief, they are
not inconsistent remedies, they are both, as the courts
say, in furtherance of promoting and validating the
contract.
there is no claim

underpinning this preliminary injunction on the likelihood

of success on the merits but for a declaratory judgment
that we waived something.
So once you remove likelihood of
success on the merits, now you're dealing with irreparable
harm. Irreparable harm -- the irreparable harm is that she
says she can't work with Dr. Luke, which I think is
completely unsupported by the record, but, however, that's
mooted, because ultimately there's no production required.
The recording has to be delivered to a Sony-owned label,
and he cannot be demoted or taken out of position, there's
no basis for doing so.
COURT: You're willing to allow her to produce
without him.
And it would seem to undercut the
irreparable harm argument.
LEPERA: this whole, "She's been put
on ice for two years" is solely of her own choosing. (THIS)
LEPERA: what you've got is you've got defendants being put
the equities certainly favor Sony and the contracts in this case.
MOTIONS
MOVIT (GOSSWALD): Assault and battery, two separate
they're two separate torts, but they, I believe, would
require, it's a one-year statute of limitations and clearly would be barred.
To try to avoid these statute of limitations of
one-year, instead the amended counterclaims assert the
variety of causes of action largely based on statutes
that are completely inapplicable to the alleged facts,
such as these employment discrimination claims for which
there needs to be either the plaintiff being a New York
resident the alleged acts happening in New York, which
I'll get to, or hate crime statute, even though no hate
crime is alleged here.
"Absent an
allegation that a discriminatory act was committed in
New York or that a New York resident was discriminated
against, New York courts have no subject matter
jurisdiction over the alleged wrong." And that's
Iwankow v. Mobil Corp.
Miss Sebert has already stated in her
affidavit, which we attached to our motion to dismiss
papers, that she is not a New York resident. She's a
California resident, formerly
THE COURT: And these actions all occurred in California.
MOVIT: the only acts of violence
alleged purportedly occurred in 2005 and 2008. (1 year statute of limitations; b
arred)
COURT: Even if it was five years under the CPLR statute dealing with rape or cri
minal act, it would still be barred.
MOVIT: while the New York City Council has purported to record a

seven-year statute of limitations to this claim for

gender-motivated violence, that that attempt is preempted
by the CPLR, as set forth by the New York State
legislature. And that's set forth quite cogently in the
Cordero V. Epstein case, that when the New York State
legislature has so comprehensively legislated a field
such as the statute of limitations, New York City Council
can't create their own subclass of a tort with a statute
of limitations that's seven times longer than it should
be by the judgment of the New York State legislature for
assault.
no non-conclusory allegation in Miss Sebert's pleading that
Mr. Gottwald's purported conduct was motivated by
Miss Sebert's gender.
seventh cause of action: intentional infliction
CPLR provides a one-year statute of
limitations in Section 2153 for lIED
EDELMAN: the two acts, the
alleged acts of misconduct on which Miss Sebert focuses,
one occurred in 2005, one allegedly occurred -- they both
allegedly occurred in 2005, 2008.
COURT: And neither Sony nor Kemosabe had
any -- was even in the picture then. That's your argument.
MR. EDELMAN: Not even in the picture. Kemosabe
Records wasn't even formed
THE COURT: Until 2011.
EDELMAN: when you look at the types of
allegations that are made against Kemosabe Records and
against Sony Music in these counterclaims, they're so
general, so devoid of any specific facts, so conclusory
that they can't adequately form the basis for any of
these causes of action
Kemosabe had no knowledge of acts of Gottwald, highest official there
Kemosabe Records was formed three years after the alleged 2008 incident
it -- it can't be liable under any theory.
Father Belle case
held, in the context of an employment relationship,
You have to have an employer. You know.
And -- and Kemosabe Records was not an employer during
these events
Miss Sebert did not have an
employment relationship with Kemosabe Records or Sony
that she, again, has not alleged impact within New York
City and that the claim is barred by the three-year
statute.