CONTRACT CLAUSE

RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN [93 PHIL 68; NO.L-3708; 18 MAY

1953]
Facts: On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two
parcels of land situated in the Manila for P9,600 of
which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was
made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August
7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943,
with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. To
secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first
mortgage has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff.
Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed
upon, as well as the interest that had accrued and so
Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due,
the interest due and the attorney's fees. The complaint
also contains a prayer for sale of the properties
mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that
this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a
war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine
War Damage Commission for the losses he had
suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that
under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment
of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the
lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A
motion for recon was made which assails the
constitutionality of RA 342.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on nonimpairment clause grounds.
Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of
fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through
the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its
essence is the application of police power. The
economic interests of the State may justify the

exercise of its continuing and dominant protective

power notwithstanding interference with contracts.
The question is not whether the legislative action
affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly,
but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate
end and the measures taken are reasonable and
appropriate to that end.
However based on the Presidents general SONA and
consistent with what the Court believes to be as the
only course dictated by justice, fairness and
righteousness, declared that the continued operation
and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is
unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
prolonged should be declared null and void and
without effect. This holds true as regards Executive
Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason
considering that said Orders contain no limitation
whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension
of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary
obligations.
Philippine Veterans Bank no digest
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO.,vs.
WMC RESOURCES INTL. PTY. LTD., WMC
PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS MINES, INC.,
FACTS:
Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the
local wholly-owned subsidiary of WMC Resources
International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) executed a
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement,
denominated as the Columbio FTAA No. 02-95-XI
(Columbio FTAA) for the purpose of large scale
1

exploration, development, and commercial exploration

of possible mineral resources in an initial contract area
of 99,387 hectares located in the provinces of South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North
Cotabato in accordance with Executive Order No. 279
and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of
1991.
The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156
mining claims held under various Mineral Production
Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining
Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and
Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (collectively called the
Tampakan Companies), in accordance with the
Tampakan Option Agreement entered into by WMC
Philippines and the Tampakan Companies on 25 April
1991, as amended by Amendatory Agreement dated
15 July 1994, for purposes of exploration of the mining
claims in Tampakan, South Cotabato.
The Option
Agreement, among other things, provides for the grant
of the right of first refusal to the Tampakan Companies
in case WMC Philippines desires to dispose of its rights
and interests in the mining claims covering the area
subject of the agreement.
WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of
its rights and interests in the ColumbioFTAA, and on 12
July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement
with petitioner Lepanto over its entire shareholdings in
WMC Philippines, subject to the exercise of the
Tampakan Companies exercise of their right of first
refusal to purchase the subject shares. On 28 August
2000, petitioner sought the approval of the 12 July
2000 Agreement from the DENR Secretary.
In the interim, on 10 January 2001, contending that the
12 July Agreement between petitioner and WMC

Philippines had expired due to failure to meet the

necessary preconditions for its validity, WMC
Resources and the Tampakan Companies executed
another Sale and Purchase Agreement, where
Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and
corporate
vehicle
which
would
acquire
the
shareholdings and undertake the Columbio FTAA
activities. On 15 January 2001, Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
increased its authorized capitalization to P250 million.
Subsequently, WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines,
Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Shares of
Stocks on 23 January 2001.
After due consideration and evaluation of the
financial and technical qualifications of Sagittarius
Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary approved the transfer
of the Columbio FTAA from WMC Philippines to
Sagittarius Mines, Inc. in the assailed Order. According
to said Order, pursuant to Section 66 of Department
Administrative Order No. 96-40, as amended,
Sagittarius Mines, Inc. meets the qualification
requirements as Contractor-Transferee of FTAA No. 0295-XI, and that the application for transfer of said FTAA
went thru the procedure and other requirements set
forth under the law.
Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA
in favor of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., petitioner filed a
Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR Secretary
with the Office of the President. Petitioner assails the
validity of the 18 December 2001 Order
of the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) approving the application
for and the consequent registration of FTAA No. 02-95XI from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc.on
the ground that: 1) it violates the constitutional right of
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Lepanto to due process; 2) it preempts the resolution

of very crucial legal issues pending with the regular
courts; and 3) it blatantly violates Section 40 of the
Mining Act.
In a Decision dated 23 July 2002, the Office of
the President dismissed the petition
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the Philippine Mining Act of
1995, particularly Section 40 thereof requiring the
approval of the President of the assignment or transfer
of financial or technical assistance agreements should
have a retroactive application to the Columbio FTAA.
HELD:
NO. Applying the above-cited law retroactively
would contradict the established legal doctrine that
statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the contrary is expressly
stated or necessarily implied from the language used
in the law.
In the case at bar, there is an absence of either
an express declaration or an implication in the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of
said law shall be made to apply retroactively,
therefore, any section of said law must be made to
apply only prospectively, in view of the rule that a
statute ought not to receive a construction making it
act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear,
strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be
annexed to them, or unless the intention of the
legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied.

Poverty and Legal Protection

People vs Rio - no digest
Augusto Benedicto Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines
G.R. No. 101538 June 23, 1992
Facts
The petitioner, a minor and a resident of the Philippines,
purchased from private respondent Northwest Orient Airlines
(NOA), a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota,
U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in
the Philippines, a round-trip ticket in San Francisco. U.S.A., for his
flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The
scheduled departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986 and no
date was specified for his return to San Francisco.
Petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San
Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. However,
despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was
informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to
Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.
Petitioner then sued NOA for damages in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction invoking Article 28 (1) of the
Warsaw Convention.
Art. 28. (1) An action for damage
must be brought at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties, either
before the court of the domicile of the
carrier or of his principal place of
business, or where he has a place of
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business through which the contract

has been made, or before the court at
the place of destination.
Respondent contended that the Philippines was not its
domicile nor was this its principal place of business. Neither was the
petitioner's ticket issued in this country nor was his destination
Manila but San Francisco in the United States.
The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
However, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the lower court. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioner then came to
Supreme Court, raising the same issues it submitted in the Court of
Appeals.
Issue
Whether or not Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is
constitutional?
Held
Yes, Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is
constitutional
The Warsaw Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily
assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force
and effect of law in this country.
According to the Supreme Court, The treaty which is the subject
matter of this petition was a joint legislative-executive act. The
presumption is that it was first carefully studied and determined

to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of

law in this country.
The petitioner's allegations are not convincing enough to
overcome this presumption. Apparently, the Convention considered
the four places designated in Article 28 the most convenient forums
for the litigation of any claim that may arise between the airline and
its passenger, as distinguished from all other places. At any rate, we
agree with the respondent court that this case can be decided on
other grounds without the necessity of resolving the
constitutional issue.
More over, It is well-settled that courts will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving
a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination; the
constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party; and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.
Courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional
question. This attitude is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers, which enjoins upon the departments of the government a
becoming respect for each other's acts.
RE: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from
Legal and Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc.
A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC, Aug. 19, 2009
Facts:
Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote to the Chief Justice
asking the court to grant to their Foundation, who
works for indigent and underprivileged people, the
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same option granted to indigent people which is the

exemption from payment of docket fees.
Issue:
Should an incorporated foundation (serving indigent
litigants) be exempted from payment of docket fees?
Ruling: No.
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees
is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III
of the1987 Constitution. The clear intent and precise
language of the provisions of the Rules of Court
indicate that only a natural party litigant may be
regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., a juridical cannot be accorded the
exemption from legal and filing fees granted to
indigent litigants.
RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS
Escobedo vs Illinois
Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner Danny Escobedo
asked to speak with his lawyer while in police custody
but before being formally charged and was denied.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Not allowing someone to
speak with an attorney, and not advising them of their
right to remain silent after they have been arrested
and before they have been interrogated is a denial of
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
Facts. After being arrested and taken into police
custody as a suspect in the murder of his brother-inlaw, the petitioner asked to speak to his attorney. His
attorney arrived at police headquarters soon after the

petitioner did and was not allowed to speak to his

client as the officers said they had not completed
questioning. The petitioner also was not warned of his
right to remain silent before the interrogation. He was
convicted of murder and the Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed. He was then granted certiorari.
Issue. If a suspect has been taken into police custody
and interrogated by police without their request to see
an attorney being honored, nor being advised of their
right to remain silent, have they been denied effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment?
Held. Yes. Reverse the petitioners conviction and
remand the case.
The Sixth Amendment protects the right to effective
assistance of counsel. Here, because the police
investigation focused on the accused as a suspect
rather than a less specific investigation, refusing to
allow an accused to speak with his attorney is a denial
of this Sixth Amendment right. The incriminating
statements he made must thus not be admitted into
evidence.
A law enforcement system that relies too much on the
confession is more subject to abuses than one that
depends on evidence obtained through skillful
investigation. The result here recognizes this idea.
Dissent. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented on
grounds that this result will place obstacles in the way
of legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement.
Also, he thought Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958)
demanded a different result.
Justice Potter Stewart believed that the right to
assistance of counsel should not arise until indictment
or arraignment, and that this contrary result would
5

cause problems for fair administration of criminal

justice.
Justice Byron White expressed the opinion that this
result would make statements made to police
inadmissible without the accused waiving their right to
counsel. He believed this would effectively render the
voluntariness test of the Fourteenth Amendment
useless, and make law enforcement more difficult.
Discussion. This case caused a lot of confusion for
scholars, as some believed it had widespread
application, and others thought it only applied to the
specific facts here. There is a great deal of language
within it that is very hostile to confessions, but at other
points it says that proper investigative efforts are
appropriate. It mentions that a subject asserting their
rights should not be something the system is afraid of,
but that it would render interrogation much less
effective. This case is really best understood as the
precursor to the warnings that would arise from
Miranda vs Arizona
Brief Fact Summary. The defendants offered incriminating
evidence during police interrogations without prior notification
of their rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (the Constitution).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Government authorities need to
inform individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights
prior to an interrogation following an arrest.
Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court) consolidated four separate cases with issues regarding
the admissibility of evidence obtained during police

interrogations.
The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (Mr. Miranda), was
arrested for kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was an
immigrant, and although the officers did not notify Mr. Miranda
of his rights, he signed a confession after two hours of
investigation. The signed statement included a statement that
Mr. Miranda was aware of his rights.
The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (Mr. Vignera), was
arrested for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to the robbery
to the first officer after the arrest, and he was held in detention
for eight hours before he made an admission to an assistant
district attorney. There was no evidence that he was notified of
his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.
The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (Mr. Westover),
was arrested for two robberies. Mr. Westover was questioned
over fourteen hours by local police, and then was handed to
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, who were able
to get signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities
did not notify Mr. Westover of his Fifth Amendment
constitutional rights.
The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (Mr. Stewart), was
arrested, along with members of his family (although there was
no evidence of any wrongdoing by his family) for a series of
purse snatches. There was no evidence that Mr. Stewart was
notified of his rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart
admitted to the crimes.
Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the
arrested defendants of their Fifth Amendment constitutional
rights against self-incrimination before they interrogate the
defendants?

Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of

their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, specifically: their
right to remain silent; an explanation that anything they say
could be used against them in court; their right to counsel; and
their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if
necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted by an
arrestee in an interrogation will not be admissible in court.
Dissent. Justice Tom Clark (J. Clark) argued that the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the Constitution would apply to interrogations. There is not
enough evidence to demonstrate a need to apply a new rule
as the majority finds here.
The second dissent written by Justice John Harlan (J.
Harlan) also argues that the Due Process Clauses should
apply. J. Harlan further argues that the Fifth Amendment rule
against self-incrimination was never intended to forbid any and
all pressures against self-incrimination.
Justice Byron White (J. White) argued that there is no
historical support for broadening the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution to include the rights that the majority extends in
their decision. The majority is making new law with their
holding.
Dickerson vs United States
Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Charles Thomas
Dickerson (the petitioner), made a statement regarding a
bank robbery to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
without receiving his Miranda rights. A federal law was in place
that allowed the admission of statements if they were
voluntarily made.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress cannot overrule the

Miranda v. Arizona decision because it was a decision based
on the United States Constitution (Constitution) rather than
simply court-made law.
Facts. The petitioner made a statement at the FBI field office
concerning a bank robbery wherein he was a suspect. The
government agents did not notify the petitioner of his rights
outlined in Miranda. The state relied on a federal law, 18
U.S.C. Section: 3501, that allowed the admission of
statements as long as the suspect was making them
voluntarily. The District Court suppressed the statement, but
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (the
Fourth Circuit) allowed the statements into evidence.
Issue. The issue is whether Congress can overrule the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional protections outlined
in Miranda.
Held. The protections outlined in Miranda, are protections
mandated by the Constitution. Therefore Congress, through a
federal law, cannot overrule Miranda. The United States
Supreme Court is not willing to overrule Miranda, and
therefore the statements should be suppressed.
Dissent. The dissent believes that the Congressional law is
not unconstitutional, and that Miranda should not be
interpreted as a constitutional decision.
Discussion. The decision clearly affirms Miranda, elevating it
to a status of a constitutional requirement that cannot be
overturned by simple Congressional law.
PEOPLE v. JOSE [37 SCRA 450 (1971)]
Facts:
7

June 26, 1967 Magdalena de la Riva was abducted

outside her own by Jaime Jose, Edgardo Aquino, Basilio
Pineda and Rogelio Canal. They brought Maggie to
Swanky Hotel. Jose, Aquino, Pineda and Canal took
turns raping Maggie.
They decided to leave her on a spot in front of the Free
Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to
them, that the complainant had just come from the
studio.

there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow

her. He admitted that his group followed her car and
snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He
would make it appear, however, that the complainant
voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with
him.
Jose, Aquino, Canal pleaded not guilty while Pineda
pleaded guilty.
Issues

They threatened that she would be doused with acid if

she would inform anyone of the incident.

WON the accused were motivated by lewd designs.

YES

When she was inside the cab and alone with the driver,
Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept
asking the driver if a car was following them; and each
time the driver answered her in the negative

YES. Jose, Aquino and Caal deny having had anything

to do with the abduction of Miss De la Riva. They point
to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole
author thereof, but they generously contend that even
as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality
by the complainants subsequent consent to perform a
striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is
claimed, negated the existence of the element of lewd
design.

When she reached home she informed her mother of

the incident
Appellant Canal and Pineda executed swore to
separate statements on the day of their arrest
1.
Caal confirmed the information previously
given by Jose that the four of them waited for Miss De
la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that
they had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant
Caal admitted that all four of them participated in the
commission of the crime, but he would make it appear
that insofar as he was concerned the complainant
yielded her body to him on condition that he would
release her
2.
Pineda executed a statement stating that he
and his other three companions wept to the ABS
Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was

This testimony of Ms. De la Riva, whose evidentiary

weight has not in the least been overthrown by the
defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes
charged in the amended complaint. The claims of the
accused that they were not motivated by lewd designs
must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.
WON the accused rape Ms. de la Riva.
YES. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence
of semen in the complainants vagina disproves the
fact of rape.

Dr. Brion stated that semen is not usually found in the

vagina after three days from the last intercourse,
especially if the subject has douched herself within
that period
The absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the
consummation of rape, the important consideration
being, not the emission of semen, but penetration.
When the victim got home she immediately told her
mother that the four raped her. The statement was
made by the complainant to her mother who, in cases
of this nature was the most logical person in whom a
daughter would confide the truth.
WON the extrajudicial statements is admissible.
YES. The accused contends that secured from them
by force and intimidation, and that the incriminating
details therein were supplied by the police
investigators.
The statements were given in the presence of several
people & subscribed & sworn to before the City Fiscal
of QC, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants
intimated the use of inordinate methods by the police.
They are replete w/ details which could hardly be
known to the police; & although it is suggested that
the authorities could have secured such details from
their various informers, no evidence at all was
presented to establish the truth of such allegation.

NO. Pineda contends that there was a mistrial

resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. He contends
that because the charge against him and his coappellants is a capital offense & the amended
complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if
proved, would raise the penalty to death, it was the
duty of the court to insist on his presence during all
stages of the trial.
The court held that plea of guilty is mitigating, at the
same time it constitutes an admission of all the
material facts alleged in the information, including the
aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the
offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty)
covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances
qualifying and/or aggravating the crime it was not
incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence,
much less to require his presence in court. It would be
different had appellant Pineda requested the court to
allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then
it would be the better part of discretion on the part of
the trial court to grant his request.
5.
WON the enormous publicity of the case
affected the decision of the trial court.
NO. The appellants took notice of the enormous
publicity that attended the case from the start of
investigation to the trial.

Even disregarding the in-custody statements of Jose

and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the
prosecution on record will suffice to secure the
conviction of the two.

Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge

had not been influenced by adverse and unfair
comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of the
accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair
trial.

4.

6.

WON there was a mistrial for Pineda.

WON aggravating circumstances were present.

YES. Nighttime, appellants having purposely sought

such circumstance to facilitate the commission of
these crimes
Abuse of superior strength, the crime having been
committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with
one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil.,
105, 113)
Ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the
complainant to exhibit to them her complete
nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her,
brought about a circumstance which tended to make
the effects of the crime more humiliating
use of a motor vehicle.
7.
valid.

WON the imposition of four death penalty is

YES. The Supreme Court held that in view of the

existence of conspiracy among the accused and of its
finding regards the nature and number of crimes
committed, as well as the presence of aggravating
circumstances, four death penalties can be imposed.
Magtoto vs. Manguera [GR L-37201-02, 3 March 1975];
also Simeon vs. Villaluz [GR L-37424] and People vs.
Isnani [GR L-38929] En Banc, Fernandez (J): 6 concur
Facts: No preliminary facts are available in the body of
the case. Judge Miguel M. Manguera of the Court of
First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro (in GR
L-37201-02) and Judge Judge Onoftre A. Villaluz of the
Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal (in GR L-37424)
declarede admissible the confessions of the accused in
said cases (Clemente Magtoto in GR L-37201-02; and
Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt, Inocentes De Luna,

Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros, Rudolfo Suarez,

Manuel Manalo, Alberto Gabion, and Rafael Brill in GR
L-37424). District Judge Asaali S. Isnani of Court of First
Instance (Branch II) of Zamboanga de Sur (in GR L38928), on the other hand, declared inadmissible the
confessions of the accused in said case (Vicente
Longakit and Jaime Dalion), although they have not
been informed of their right to remain silent and to
counsel before they gave the confessions, because
they were given before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. Petitions for certiorari were filed with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the right to counsel and to be informed
in such right, incorporated in Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution, applies prospectively or
retroactively.
Held: Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
granted, for the first time, to a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense, the
right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And
the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that
any confession obtained in violation of this right shall
be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given
effect only when the right already existed and had
been violated. Consequently, because the confessions
of the accused in GRs L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929
were taken before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force,
no right had been violated as to render them
inadmissible in evidence although they were not
informed of "their right to remain silent and to
counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because,
10

no such right existed at the time. The argument that

the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, which was added by Republic Act 1083
enacted in 1954, which reads that "In every case, the
person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to
communicate and confer at anytime with his attorney
or counsel," impliedly granted to a detained person the
right to counsel and to be informed of such right, is
untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to
a detained person was to be informed of the cause of
his detention. But he must make a request for him to
be able to claim the right to communicate and confer
with counsel at any time. The historical background of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution shows
that the new right granted therein to a detained
person to counsel and to be informed of such right
under pain of his confession being declared
inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a
prospective and not a retroactive effect. Furthermore,
to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional
guarantee to counsel would have a great unsettling
effect on the administration of justice in this country. It
may lead to the acquittal of guilty individuals and thus
cause injustice to the People and the offended parties
in many criminal cases where confessions were
obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
and in accordance with the rules then in force although
without assistance of counsel. The Constitutional
Convention could not have intended such a disastrous
consequence in the administration of justice. For if the
cause of justice suffers when an innocent person is

convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is

acquitted
Morales Jr. vs Enrile
In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while
driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC. They were
charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion punishable under the RPC.
Morales alleged that they were arrested without any warrant of
arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among
them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to
a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. Respondents
countered that the group of Morales were already under
surveillance for some time before they were arrested and that
the warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same time the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was already suspended.
ISSUE: Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.
HELD: Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is
bailable. But because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
remains suspended with respect to persons at present
detained as well as other who may hereafter be similarly
detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on
the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith, the natural consequence is that the right to bail for
the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also
suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose
of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the
detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has
no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court. The
crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
11

commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in

furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct
attacks on the life of the State. Just as an individual has right
to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the State.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the
State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation
and trial those persons who plot against it and commit acts
that endanger the States very existence. For this measure of
self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be
deemed suspended with respect to these offenses. However,
there is a difference between preventive and punitive
imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial
of such charges already filed becomes protracted without any
justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character
and the detainee regains his right to freedom. Quite notable in
this case however is that the 2nd division of the SC reiterated
the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what they ruled in
the Garcia-Padilla Case.

People vs. Galit [GR 51770, 20 March 1985] En Banc,

Concepcion (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: In the morning of 23 August 1917, Mrs.
Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the
bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo,
Montalban, Rizal, as a result of 7 wounded inflicted
upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument.
More than 2 weeks thereafter, police authorities of
Montalban picked up Francisco Galit, an ordinary
construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, or
suspicion of the murder. On the following day,
however, 8 September 1977, the case was referred to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further
investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of

the Montalban police station. Accordingly, Galit was

brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a
team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. NBI Agent
Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the
suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his
questions. But the following day, 9 September 1977,
Francisco Galit allegedly voluntarily executed a
Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of
the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling
Dulay as his companions in the crime. Actually, Galit
had
been
obtained
and
interrogated
almost
continuously for 5 days, to no avail as he consistently
maintained his innocence. The investigating officers
began to maul him and to torture him physically. They
covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a
toilet bowl full of human waste. With Galit's will having
been broken, he admitted what the investigating
officers wanted him to admit and he signed the
confession they prepared. Galit was charged with the
Crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an information
filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal.
Trial was held, and on 11 August 1978, immediately
after the accused had terminated the presentation of
his evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision on
the case in open court, finding Galit guilty as charged
and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the
automatic review.
Issue: Whether a monosyllabic answer to a long
question suffices as a voluntary admission that may be
used against the accused.
Held: As held in Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, "At the time
a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the
12

arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if

any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it
be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may
be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence." Herein, there were
no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the
accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints
of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only
evidence against Galit is his alleged confession. A long
question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not
satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be
informed of his rights under the Constitution and our
laws. Instead there should be several short and clear
questions and every right explained in simple words in
a dialect or language known to the person under
investigation. Galit is from Samar and there is no
showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the
time of his arrest, Galit was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In
fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that
he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it
was only about two weeks after he had executed the

salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him.

His statement does not even contain any waiver of
right to counsel and yet during the investigation he
was not assisted by one. At the supposed
reenactment, again Galit was not assisted by counsel
of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his
rights. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into
the circumstances surrounding the taking of any
confession, especially where the prisoner claims
having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is
any doubt as to the voluntariness, the same must be
rejected in toto.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SAMUEL MARRA, ET.
AL.
Rights of Suspects under Custodial Investigation
When rights available
FACTS:
Jimmy Din and Nelson Tandoc were conversing with
each other in front of the hotel owned by Dins father
when a man passed by on the opposite side of the
street waving a dirty sign with his finger. Din and
Tandoc followed until they caught up with the man and
demanded an explanation but they were not given any.
They were joined by two other men and a brawl
ensued when Tandoc slapped one of them. The fight
ended when their opponents ran away.
When Din and Tando were on their way to the hotel,
they men with whom they just had a fight ran after
them which pressed them to hide in the annex of the
hotel. After a few minutes, thinking that there was no
longer any danger, Tandoc decided to go home.
However, he was shot by a revolver by a man wearing
13

a security guards uniform when he opened the door.

Din witnessed the shooting and was able to take a
good look at the man who fatally shot Tandoc.
Samuel Marra was identified as the man who shot
Tandoc and was approached by responding policemen
while he was eating at an eatery shortly after the
incident. A series of questions were asked, particularly
his tour of duty and where his issued firearm might be.
He brought the policemen to his house and showed
them his revolver with five live bullets and an empty
shell. Marra denied shooting Tandoc at first but
admitted to the crime and said that he did so in selfdefense. He was then taken to the police station where
he was positively identified by Din and was
consequentially detained.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was violation of rights of
suspects under custodial investigation when policemen
asked the appellant questions prior to his arrest.
RULING:
In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial
investigation when he made the admission. There was
no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such
as statement. He could have refused to answer
questions from the very start. The police inquiry had
not yet reached a level wherein they considered him
as a particular suspect. Thus, there was no violation of
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution or the
constitutional procedure on custodial investigation.
In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged or of any offense necessarily included therein

may be given in evidence against him and, in certain

circumstances, this admission may be considered as
part of the res gestae or the facts that may be
admitted as evidence.
The judgment finding accused-appellant Samuel Marra
guilty of the crime of murder was affirmed.
People vs Ting Lan Uy digest
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, Acquitted, ROMULO
VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and
DOMINADOR SORELA,
G.R. No. 71092
September 30, 1987
Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and
coerced confessions come within the ban against selfincrimination. Evidence based on such re-enactment is
a violation of the Constitution and hence, incompetent
evidence. Here, accused is not merely required to
exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large, he
is likewise made to admit criminal responsibility
against his will. It is a police procedure just as
condemnable as an uncounselled confession.
The lack of counsel makes statement in
contemplation of law, 'involuntary' even if it were
otherwise voluntary.
FACTS: On September 9, 1975, authorities from the
Integrated National Police station of Barrio Polanco, in
Zamboanga del Norte, received a report that a certain
Deosdedit Bagon is missing.
14

Bagon had been in fact missing since two days before.

He was last seen by his wife in the afternoon of
September 7, 1975, on his way home to Sitio Sebaca
where they resided.
A search party was conducted by the authorities to
mount an inquiry. As a matter of police procedure, the
team headed off to Sitio Sebaca to question possible
witnesses. There, they chanced upon an unnamed
volunteer, who informed them that Deosdedit Bagon
was last seen together with Dominador Sorela, one of
the accused herein.
The authorities then thereafter picked up Sorela for
interrogation. Sorela bore several scratches on his
face, neck and arms when the police found him.
According to him, he sustained those wounds while
clearing his ricefield. Apparently unconvinced, the
police had Sorela take them to the ricefield where he
sustained his injuries. But half way there, Sorela
illegally broke down, and, in what would apparently
crack the case for the police, admitted having
participated in the killing of the missing Bagon. Sorela
allegedly confessed having been with Deosdedit
Bagon, a friend of his, in the evening of September 7,
1976 in Sitio Sebaca. They were met by Romulo
Villarojo and Leonardo Cademas, Sorela's co-accused
herein and likewise friends of the deceased, who led
them to a secluded place in the ricefields.

According to their confessions Villarojo attacked Bagon

with a bolo, hacking him at several parts of the body
until he, Bagon, was dead. Moments later, Sorela fled,
running into thick cogon grasses where he suffered
facial and bodily scratches.
The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas.
Together with Sorela, they were turned over to the
custody of Captain Encabo the Polanco Station
Commander.
The police thereafter made the three re-enact the
crime. Sorela was directed to lead them to the grounds
where Discredit Bagon was supposed to have been
buried. But it was Villarojo who escorted them to a
watery spot somewhere in the ricefields, where the
sack-covered, decomposing cadaver of Bagon lay in a
shallow grave.
The necropsy report prepared by the provincial health
officer disclosed that the deceased suffered twelve
stab and hack wounds, six of which were determined
to be fatal.
In the re-enactment, the suspects, the three accused
herein, demonstrated how the victim was boloed to
death. A photograph, shows the appellant Villarojo in
the posture of raising a bolo as if to strike another,
while Solero and Cademas look on. Another
photograph, portrays Villarojo in the act of concealing
the murder weapon behind a banana tree, apparently
after having done the victim in.

15

Initial findings of investigators disclosed that the

threesome of Solero, Villarojo, and Cademas executed
Discredit Bagon on orders of Anacleto Olvis, then
Polanco municipal mayor, for a reward of P3,000.00
each.
While in custody, the three executed five separate
written confessions each. The first confessions were
taken on September 9, 1975 in the local Philippine
Constabulary headquarters. The second were made
before the Polanco police. On September 18, 1975, the
three accused reiterated the same confessions before
the National Bureau of Investigation Dipolog City suboffice. On September 21, 1975 and September 25,
1975, they executed two confessions more, again
before the Philippine Constabulary and the police of
Polanco.
In their confessions of September 9, 1975, September
14, 1975, September 21, 1975, and September 25,
1975, the said accused again pointed to the then
accused Anacleto Olvis as principal by inducement,
who allegedly promised them a reward of P3,000.00
each.

In their confessions of September 18, 1975, sworn

before agents of the National Bureau of Investigation,
however, they categorically denied Olvis' involvement
in the knowing. We note that the three were
transported to the Dipolog City NBI sub-office following
a request on September 10, 1975 by Mrs. Diolinda O.
Adaro daughter of Olvis, and upon complaint by her of
harassment against her father by his supposed
political enemies.
The court a quo rendered separate verdicts on the
three accused on the one hand, and Anacleto Olvis on
the other. However Olvis was acquitted, while the
three were all sentenced to die for the crime of
murder.
In acquitting Olvis, the trial court rejected the three
accused's earlier confessions pointing to him as the
mastermind, and denied the admissibility thereof
insofar as far as he was concerned. It rejected claims
of witnesses that the three accused-appellants would
carry out Olvis' alleged order to kill Bagon upon an
offer of a reward when in fact no money changed
hands.
With the acquittal of Olvis, however the remaining
accused-appellants subsequently repudiated their
alleged confessions in open court despite prior
confessions, and now were alleging that there were
threats by the Polanco investigators of physical harm if
they refused to "cooperate" in the solution of the case.
They likewise alleged that they were instructed by the

16

Polanco police investigators to implicate Anacieto Olvis

in the case. They insisted on their innocence.
The accused Romulo Villarojo averred, specifically, that
it was the deceased who had sought to kill him, for
which he acted in self-defense. For the defense, the
accused Romulo Villarojo admitted hacking the victim
to death with a bolo. He stressed, however, that he did
so in self- defense. He completely absolved his coaccused Dominador Sorela and Leonardo Cademas
from any liability.
The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no
other person. The police of Polanco had but the three
accused-appellants' statements to support its claiming.

Issues:
(1.)

Whether these statements, as any of the

extrajudicial confession can stand up in
court.

(2.)

Whether
tenable?

Villarojos

claim

of

self-defense

Ruling:
(1.)

No.
The
three
accused-appellants'
extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in
evidence. Prior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does

make may be used as evidence against him,

and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be
subjected to interrogation, he must first be
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that
he has the right to remain silent. For those
unaware of the privilege, the warning is
needed simply to make them aware of the
threshold requirement for an intelligent
decision as to its exercise. More important,
such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in
overcoming the inherent pressures of the
interrogation atmosphere.
The confessions in the case at bar suffer
from a Constitutional infirmity In their
supposed statements dated September 9,
14, and 21, 1975, the accused-appellants
were not assisted by counsel when they
"waived" their rights to counsel. The lack of
counsel makes statement in contemplation
of law, 'involuntary' even if it were otherwise
voluntary, technically.
Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and
coerced confessions come within the ban
against self- incrimination. The 1973
Constitution, the Charter prevailing at the
time of the proceedings below, says:

17

No person shall be compelled to be a witness

against himself.
This should be distinguished, parenthetically,
from mechanical acts the accused is made to
execute not meant to unearth undisclosed
facts but to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation. This
includes requiring the accused to submit to a
test to extract virus from his body, or
compelling him to expectorate morphine
from his mouth, or making her submit to a
pregnancy test, or a foot printing test or
requiring him to take part in a police lineup
in certain cases." In each case, the accused
does not speak his guilt. It is not a
prerequisite therefore that he be provided
with the guiding hand of counsel. But a
forced re-enactment is quite another thing.
Here, the accused is not merely required to
exhibit some physical characteristics; by and
large, he is made to admit criminal
responsibility against his will. It is a police
procedure just as condemnable as an
uncounselled confession. It should be
furthermore observed that the three
accused-appellants were in police custody
when they took part in the re-enactment in
question. It is under such circumstances that
the Constitution holds a strict application.

Any statement he might have made

thereafter is therefore subject to the
Constitutional guaranty. In such a case, he
should have been provided with counsel.
(2.)

The records will disclose that the deceased

suffered twelve assorted wounds caused by a
sharp instrument. The assault severed his
right hand and left his head almost
separated from his body. This indicates a
serious intent to kill, rather than self-defense.
In finding that Villarojo did take the life of the
victim, superior strength or nocturnity is
unfound. In the absence of any other proof,
the severity and number of wounds
sustained by the deceased are not, by
themselves, sufficient proof to warrant the
appreciation of the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Hence, Villarojo should be liable for plain
homicide, and accused-appellants Leonardo
Cademas
and
Dominador
Sorela
are
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division) [GR

109242, 26 January 1999] Second Division, Mendoza
(J): 4 concur
Facts: On 10 February 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter
carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to
his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group
responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post
office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold
18

Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag

opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor
Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office.
Merete likewise described the modus operandi of the
group. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in apprehending
the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati
Post Office. On 17 February 1989, NBI Director
Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi
Village following a report that the group would stage a
theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan
accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of
Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a
private car. They arrived at Legaspi Village at about
1:00 p.m. They stayed at the corner of Adelantado and
Gamboa Streets, while two other teams of NBI agents
waited at Amorsolo Street, near the Esquerra Building.
At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one
Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra
Building on Adelantado Street. The passengers of the
postal delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto
Merete, and the driver, Henry Orindai. Pasicolan
alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag.
Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan then passed
through an alley between Esguerra and Montepino
Buildings going towards Amorsolo St. Upon reaching
Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two
persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero
and Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of
the mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a travelling
bag. The two then secured the bag to the back of their
motorcycle. Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent
Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo
St., moved their car and started towards Amorsolo St.
They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over
the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point,

Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested Marcelo and

Romero. Unaware of the arrest of Romero and Marcelo,
Pasicolan went back to the postal delivery jeep and
proceeded toward Pasay Road. The NBI agents
followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and
arrested Pasicolan. The NBI agents brought Pasicolan,
Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. They also
brought along with them the motorcycle of Romero
and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail found in
their possession. On their way to the NBI
headquarters, they passed by the Makati Central Post
Office, intending to arrest another suspect, Redentor
Aguinaldo. However, they were not able to find him
there. The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and
Romero consisted of 622 letters. The names of the
addressees were listed. They were subsequently
notified by the Bureau of Posts to claim their letters.
Many of them, after proper identification, were able to
claim their letters. Some letters contained money.
Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix
their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They
did so in the presence of the members of the NBI
Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people
transacting business with the NBI at that time.
According to Director Ranin, they required the accused
to do this in order to identify the letters as the very
same letters confiscated from them. Arnold Pasicolan y
Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos, and Lito Marcelo y
Cruz were charged with infidelity in the custody of
documents. The case was later withdrawn and another
information for qualified theft was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. On 8 March 1993, the Sandiganbayan
found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principals of the crime of qualified theft. The
Sandiganbayan sentenced Pasiclon the penalty
ranging from 8 years, 8 months, and 1 day of Prision
19

mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, 1 month, and 11

days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; Romero and
Marcelo, the penalty ranging from 7 YEARS, 4 months,
and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 11 years,
6 months, and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum,
each. Marcelo filed the petition for review on certiorari
with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the exclusion of the admission, made
through the signatures on the envelopes, extend to the
exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves.
Held: The purpose for securing the signature of
Marcelo, et. al. on the envelopes was to authenticate
the envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie
Romero. This purpose and their signatures on the
envelope, when coupled with the testimony of
prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from
Marcelo were those given to him and Romero,
undoubtedly help establish the guilt of Marcelo. Since
these signatures are actually evidence of admission
obtained from Marcelo and his co-accused under
circumstances contemplated in Art. III. 12(1) and 17
of the Constitution, they should be excluded. For
indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused signed following
their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under
custodial investigation, defined as questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in a significant way. Under the
Constitution, among the rights of a person under
custodial investigation is the right to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice
and if the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
that he must be provided with one. However, the
letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence.
The letters were validly seized from Marcelo and

Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that

Marcelo's admission that the letters in question were
those seized from him and his companion on 17
February 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not
extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters
themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being
the fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful
arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the
possession of Marcelo and his companion and seized
from them was shown by the testimonies of Vela and
Tumagan. Indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused were not
convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found
on the letters but on other evidence, notably the
testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution
witnesses

20

21