M. N.

Roys New Humanism

and Materialism

Books by the same author

Why I am Not a Hindu
&
Why I do not want Ramrajya (1993, 1997)
The Ethical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell
(1993)
Is God Dead? (An Introduction to Kya Ishwar
Mar Chuka hai)[1998]

Forthcoming
Rationalism, Humanism and Atheism in
Twentieth Century Indian Thought

M. N. Roys New Humanism

and Materialism

Dr. Ramendra
Ph.D., D.Litt.
Reader, Department of Philosophy,
Patna College, Patna University

Buddhiwadi Foundation
Patna
3

This publication has been made possible by a

grant from Rationalist Foundation, Mumbai

First Edition
All rights reserved, including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in any form.

Copyright 2001 by Dr. Ramendra

Price: Rs.100

ISBN 81-86935-00-2

Published by Buddhiwadi Foundation

216-A, S. K. Puri, Patna-800 001, India

Printed at Satya Prints, Kadamkuan, Patna

Contents
Foreword
Introduction

7
9

I. M. N. Roy's New Humanism

II. Materialism
III. Roy's Materialism and Traditional
Materialism
IV. Roy's Materialism and Marxian
Materialism
V. Materialism or Physical Realism?

13
47

91
113

Appendix: Twenty-Two Thesis

Bibliography

133
141

63

Foreword
This book is a revised and updated version of
Dr.Ramendras D.Litt. Thesis titled A Critical
Study of M. N. Roys New Humanism and
Materialism. The author has taken lots of trouble
for thoroughly revising and extensively reorganizing the material as well as for greatly simplifying the presentation. His main aim in doing so has
been to make the book more readable for general
readers.
Several books have been written and published
on Roy. This scholarly book by Dr. Ramendra is
unique in the sense that it focuses on Roys materialism and its differences from traditional and
Marxian materialism. Besides, the author has also
discussed the appropriateness of the term materialism for describing M. N. Roys philosophy.
According to Dr. Ramendra, it is better to use
physical realism for describing M. N. Roys
theory of reality, a term preferred by Roy himself. In his well-researched and extensively documented book, the author, Dr. Ramendra, has also
explored the relationship between Roys materialism and new humanism. In addition to being an
authoritative exposition of M. N. Roys new hu7

manism and materialism, Dr. Ramendras book is

an authentic source of information on traditional
materialism as well as on Marxian materialism.
M. N. Roy is a leading humanist thinker of twentieth century India. We are sure that the publication of this important work on him will help in
promoting rationalism-humanism. Buddhiwadi
Foundation, which is a registered, non-profit, taxexempt trust for promoting rationalism and humanism, is proud to add this valuable work to its list
of publications.
The publication of this book has been made possible by a grant from Rationalist Foundation,
Mumbai. We thank Justice R. A. Jahagirdar
(Retd.) of Rationalist Foundation for his encouragement and co-operation without which it would
have been very difficult to publish this book.
Kawaljeet
Managing Trustee
Buddhiwadi Foundation

Introduction
M. N. Roy (1887-1954) is one of the greatest, if not
the greatest, Indian philosopher of twentieth century. Unlike some other Indian thinkers of twentieth century, Roy
has made a clear distinction between philosophy and religion in his thought. This alone, I think, entitles him to be
recognized as the foremost Indian philosopher of twentieth century. According to Roy, no philosophical advancement is possible unless we get rid of orthodox religious
ideas and theological dogmas. On the other hand, Roy has
envisaged a very close relationship between philosophy
and science.1
Secondly, Roy has given a central place to intellectual or philosophical revolution in his philosophy. According to Roy, a philosophical revolution must precede
a social revolution.
Besides, Roy has, in the tradition of eighteenth
century French materialist Holbach, revised and restated
materialism in the light of twentieth century scientific developments. If we wish to place Roys philosophy in the
context of ancient Indian philosophy, we may place Roy
in the tradition of the ancient Indian materialism, Lokayat.
However, compared to the ancient doctrines of Lokayat,
Roys physical realism is a highly developed philosophy. Roy not only takes into account the then contemporary discoveries of physics in reformulating materialism
as physical realism, but also gives an important place to
ethics in his philosophy. Moreover, Roys philosophy has
an important social and political component.
Roy started his political career as a militant national-

ist. He went on to become a communist of international

rank. Finally, he propounded his own philosophy of new
humanism or radical humanism.
The essence of Roys new humanism is contained in
the Twenty-Two Theses on Radical Democracy. In a
speech explaining new humanism to the members of
Radical Democratic Party in 1947, Roy says:
The Theses are deduced from materialist philosophy. As one of those who have formulated these
principles of the philosophy of revolution in our
time, I am firmly convinced that Materialism is
the only philosophy possible.2
However, in his Twenty-Two Theses Roy, himself a
former communist, explicitly rejects the Marxist interpretation of history, which is also known as materialistic
conception of history or historical materialism. Roy
has given in his new humanism an important place to the
freedom of will and to morality. It is obvious that the materialism which Roy is talking about in the sentences
quoted above is different from what is commonly understood by materialism. Roy himself distinguishes his materialism from Marxian materialism in the following
words:
In so far as our philosophy traces the origin of
human evolution to the background of the
physical Universe, it is Materialism. But it differentiates itself from Marxist materialistic determinism by recognizing the autonomy of the
mental world, in the context of physical nature.3
In this book, I have tried to explore the relation-

10

ship between Roys new humanism and materialism. What

exactly Roy meant when he said that the Twenty-Two
Theses are deduced from materialist philosophy? What
exactly he meant by materialism? On what specific points
Roys materialism is different from traditional materialism in general and Marxian materialism in particular? I
have tried to answer these questions in this book.
In the first chapter titled M. N. Roys New
Humanism, I have presented an exposition of Roys new
humanism. Besides, the chapter includes a brief life-sketch
of Roy and a discussion of Roys conception of philosophy. The second chapter Materialism deals with traditional materialism in general, without any reference to Marx
or M. N. Roy. The third chapter Roys Materialism and
Traditional Materialism concentrates on Roys revised
version of materialism and its differences from traditional
materialism. Besides, it briefly discusses the relationship
between materialism and new humanism, as envisaged by
Roy. The fourth chapter Roys Materialism and Marxian
Materialism discusses the differences between Roys
materialism and Marxian materialism.
In the concluding chapter Materialism or Physical
Realism? I have made some critical comments on Roys
philosophy. I have discussed the appropriateness of the
term materialism for designating Roys metaphysical
views. Could the term materialism, in the context of
Roys philosophy, be substituted with some other more
suitable term such as physical realism or monistic
naturalism? I have also discussed whether there is, in fact,
a logical relationship between Roys materialism and his
new humanism.
In this critical part of my book, I have mainly arrived at two conclusions: one, that both from the cognitive and the emotive point of view, physical realism is a

11

more appropriate name for Roys metaphysical views; and,

two, that though Roys new humanism is logically compatible with his revised and renamed version of materialism, it certainly cannot be deduced from it.
Finally, the bibliography includes the names of the
works, which have been referred to in this book. The complete version of Roys Twenty Two Theses on Radical
Democracy is to be found in the appendix. I have used
American spellings in this book.

Notes
1

See, Roys Conception of Philosophy in the first chapter.

M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism (New Delhi: Ajanta
Publications, 1981), p. 28.
3
Ibid., p. 43.
2

12

I. M. N. Roys New Humanism

New humanism or radicalism is the name given
by M. N. Roy to the new philosophy of revolution which
he developed in the later part of his life.
The philosophy of new humanism has been summarized by M.N. Roy in the Theses on the principles of
Radical Democracy or the Twenty-Two Theses of Radical Humanism. He further elaborated it in his New
Humanism - A Manifesto, first published in 1947. As Roy
himself points out in his preface to the first edition of his
book, the background material on the development of
new humanism is to be found in his books New
Orientation and Beyond Communism, first published in
1946 and 1947 respectively. However, before coming directly to a brief exposition of Roys new humanism, it
would be worthwhile to take a synoptic look at Roys biography, particularly his intellectual development, and his
conception of philosophy.

Biography
M. N. Roy was not inclined to write his autobiography. However, after much persuasion he started writing
his Memoirs in the last part of his life. Sadly, he was not
able to complete it. This incomplete autobiography covers only a period of seven years from 1915 to 1922.
The following brief life-sketch of M. N. Roy is based
mainly on V. B. Karniks M. N. Roy, Sibnarayan Rays
introduction to Selected Works of M. N. Roy (Vol. 1) and
V. M. Tarkundes Radical Humanism. I have also derived

13

some help from Essence of Royism, compiled by G. D.

Parikh, and M. N. Roy Philosopher Revolutionary, edited
by Sibnarayan Ray. Besides, I have drawn from M. N.
Roys Scientific Politics, New Orientation and Beyond
Communism for tracing his intellectual-political development.
M. N. Roy, whose original name was Narendra Nath
Bhattacharya, was born on 21 March 1887, at Arbelia, a
village in 24 Parganas district in Bengal. His father,
Dinabandhu Bhattacharya, was head pandit of a local
school. His mothers name was Basanta Kumari. From
school going age, Roy lived in Kodalia, another village in
24 Parganas.

Militant Nationalist Phase: In Search of

Arms
Roy began his political career as a militant nationalist
at the age of 14, when he was a school student. He joined
an underground organization called Anushilan Samiti, and
when it was banned, he helped in organizing Jugantar
Group under the leadership of Jatin Mukherji. In course
of his underground work, he was involved in many political dacoities and conspiracy cases. In 1915, after the beginning of the First World War, Roy left India for Java in
search of arms for organizing an armed insurrection for
overthrow of British rule in India. However, the plan failed
and Roy went a second time to Java for the same purpose.
Thereafter, he moved from country to country, with faked
passports and different names, in his attempt to secure
German arms. Finally, after wandering through Malay,
Indonesia, Indo-China, Philippines, Japan, Korea and
China, in June 1916, he landed at San Francisco in United

14

States of America.
Roys attempts to secure arms ended in a failure. In
fact, Roy concluded that Germans were not serious about
giving arms to the Indian revolutionaries. Besides, police
repression had shattered the underground organization,
which Roy had left behind. He had also come to know
about the death of his leader, Jatin Mukherji, in an encounter with police.

Towards Communism
The news of Roys arrival at San Francisco was somehow published in a local daily, forcing Roy to flee to Pao
Alto, the seat of Stanford University. It was here that
Roy, until then known as Narendra Nath Bhattacharya or
Naren, changed his name to Manbendra Nath Roy. This
change of name on the campus of Stanford University was
like a new birth for Roy. As stated by him in his Memoirs,
it enabled him to turn his back on a futile past and look
forward to a new life of adventures and achievements.
Roys host at Pao Alto introduced him to Evelyn
Trent, a graduate student at Stanford University. Evelyn
Trent, who later married Roy, became his political collaborator. She accompanied him to Mexico and Russia
and was of great help to him in his political and literary
work. The collaboration continued until they separated in
1929.
At New York, where he went from Pao Alto, Roy
met Lala Lajpat Rai, the well-known nationalist leader of
India. He developed friendships with several American
radicals, and frequented the New York Public Library. Roy
also went to public meetings with Lajpat Rai. Questions
asked by the working class audience in these meetings made

15

Roy wonder whether exploitation and poverty would cease

in India with the attainment of independence. Roy began a
systematic study of socialism, originally with the intention
of combating it, but he soon discovered that he had himself become a socialist! In the beginning, nurtured as he
was on Bankimchandra, Vivekanand and orthodox Hindu
philosophy, Roy accepted socialism except its materialist
philosophy.
Later in Mexico in 1919, Roy met Michael Borodin,
an emissary of the Communist International. Roy and
Borodin quickly became friends, and it was because of
long discussions with Borodin that Roy accepted the materialist philosophy and became a full-fledged communist.
Roy was also instrumental in converting the Socialist Party
of Mexico into the Communist Party of Mexico.
In 1920, Roy was invited to Moscow to attend the
second conference of the Communist International. Roy
had several meetings with Lenin before the conference.
He differed with Lenin on the role of the local bourgeoisie
in nationalist movements. On Lenins recommendation, the
supplementary thesis on the subject prepared by Roy was
adopted along with Lenins thesis by the second conference of the Communist International. The following years
witnessed Roys rapid rise in the international communist
hierarchy. By the end of 1926, Roy was elected member
of all the four official policy making bodies of the
Comintern the presidium, the political secretariat, the
executive committee and the world congress.
In 1927, Roy was sent to China as a representative of
the Communist International. However, Roys mission in
China ended in a failure. On his return to Moscow from
China, Roy found himself in official disfavor. In September 1929 he was expelled from the Communist Interna-

16

tional for contributing to the Brandler press and supporting the Brandler organizations. Roy felt that he was
expelled from the Comintern mainly because of his claim
to the right of independent thinking.1

Return to India: Prison Years

Roy returned to India in December 1930. He was arrested in July 1931 and tried for his role in the Kanpur
Communist Conspiracy Case. He was sentenced to six
years imprisonment.
When Roy returned to India, he was still a full-fledged
communist, though he had broken from the Comintern.
The forced confinement in jail gave him more time than
before for systematic study and reflection. His friends in
Germany, especially his future wife, Ellen Gottschalk, kept
providing him books, which he wanted. His letters to her
from jail, published subsequently as Letters from Jail
(1943), contains pointers to his reading and thinking during those years.
Roy had planned to use his prison years for writing a
systematic study of the philosophical consequences of
modern science, which would be in a way a re-examination and re-formulation of Marxism to which he had been
committed since 1919. The reflections, which Roy wrote
down in jail, grew over a period of five years into nine
thick volumes (approximately over 3000 lined foolscapsize pages). The Prison Manuscripts have not so far been
published in totality, and are currently preserved in the
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Archives in New
Delhi. However, selected portions from the manuscript
were published as separate books in the 1930s and the
1940s. Materialism (1940), Science and Superstition

17

(1940), Heresies of the 20th Century (1939), Fascism

(1938), The Historical Role of Islam (1939), Ideal Of
Indian Womanhood (1941), Science and Philosophy
(1947) and Indias Message (1950) are among the books
that were made from these handwritten notebooks.
These writings show that Roy was not satisfied with
a primarily economic explanation of historical processes.
He studied and tried to assess the role of cultural and ideational factors in traditional and contemporary India, in the
rise and expansion of Islam, and in the phenomenon of
fascism. He was particularly severe on the obscurantist
professions and practices of neo-Hindu nationalism. Roy
tried to reformulate materialism in the light of latest developments in the physical and biological sciences. He was
convinced that without the growth and development of a
materialist and rationalist outlook in India, neither a renaissance nor a democratic revolution would be possible.
In a way, seeds of the philosophy of new humanism, which
was later developed fully by Roy, were already evident in
his jail writings. M. K. Haldar, in his preface to the 1989
reprint of Roy's major work Reason, Romanticism and
Revolution goes to the extent of saying that the germs of
Roys monumental work or, even the first rough draft of it
can be discerned in these notes. However, he adds that
the ideas took a long time to crystallize as Roy was always willing to revise his ideas in the light of criticism by
others or self-criticism.2

Towards New Humanism

Immediately after his release from jail on 20 November 1936, Roy joined Indian National Congress along with
his followers. He organized his followers into a body called

18

League of Radical Congressmen. However, in December

1940, Roy and his followers left Congress owing to differences with the Congress leadership on the role of India
in the Second World War. Thereafter, Roy formed the
Radical Democratic Party of his own. This signaled the
beginning of the last phase of Roys life in which he developed his philosophy of new humanism.
After Roys release from jail in 1936, Ellen Gottschalk
joined Roy in Bombay in March 1937. They were married
in the same month. Subsequently, Ellen Roy played an
important role in Roys life, and cooperated in all his
endeavors.
In 1944, Roy published two basic documents, namely,
Peoples Plan for Economic Development of India and
Draft Constitution of Free India. According to V. M.
Tarkunde, who played a role in drafting Peoples Plan,
these documents contained Roys original contributions
to the solution of the countrys economic and political
problems.3 The Indian state, according to the draft constitution, was to be organized on the basis of countrywide
network of peoples committees having wide powers such
as initiating legislations, expressing opinion on pending
bills, recall of representatives and referendum on important national issues. According to Sibnarayan Ray, another
prominent associate of Roy, the Plan and the Constitution anticipated several of the principles which were to be
formulated and developed as Radical Humanism in 1946
and the subsequent years.4
According to M. N. Roy, his books Scientific
Politics (1942) along with New Orientation (1946) and
Beyond Communism (1947) constitute the history of the
development of radical humanism.
In fact, Roy had rejected some communist doctrines,

19

such as the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat,

as back as 1940. In his lectures delivered at a study camp
of the League of Radical Congressman in May 1940, published subsequently under the title Scientific Politics in
1942, Roy had said:
The discussion ... will show the necessity of revising or even discarding certain formulas which
are considered by orthodox Marxists to be part
and parcel, even the very essence, of Marxism. I
mean, dictatorship of the proletariat ... if the process of development of the Indian Revolution will
be as we can visualize it even to-day, there will
be no room for a dictatorship of the proletariat.5
In Scientific Politics itself Roy says, we have seen
that our social and political program is such as was associated with the philosophical Radicalism or Rationalism
of the bourgeoisie. Therefore, one need not accept Marxism in order to subscribe to our social and political program.6 He goes on to add, the analysis given previously
makes it clear that we cannot call ourselves Marxists in
the narrow sense." For these considerations, says Roy, "it
would be more correct, historically and scientifically, to
give a new name to our philosophy.7
Roys definition of revolutionary in Scientific Politics is of considerable interest, because it shows Roys
departure from the orthodox Marxian doctrine of historical materialism:
A revolutionary is one who has got the idea that
the world can be remade, made better than it is
to day, that it was not created by a supernatural

20

power, and therefore could be remade by human

efforts [emphasis mine].8
In his preface to the second edition of Scientific
Politics, written in October 1947, Roy says, whatever
difference there may be between these lectures and the
theory and practice of Radicalism as formulated after seven
years of storm and stress, is superficial, mainly of terminology. Seven years ago, I still spoke as an orthodox Marxist criticizing deviations from, or faulty understanding of
the pure creed. Nevertheless, the tendency to look beyond Communism was already there in a germinal form.9
Thus, the principles of revolutionary theory and practice concretized in The Draft Constitution of Free India
as pointed out by Roy himself, not only implied rejection
of Nationalism as an antiquated and therefore reactionary
cult; they also marked a departure from orthodox Marxism.10
As far as Marxism is concerned, Roy is much more
candid and outspoken in his lectures delivered at a study
camp of the Radical Democratic party in May 1946, published subsequently as New Orientation. Here he declares
explicitly, Marxism is not the final truth; even its fundamental principles should be from time to time re-examined in the light of empirical evidence,... 11
Our approach to the problems of political theory and
practice, says Roy, is claimed to be free from any dogmatic presupposition. Otherwise, we could not pretend to
be advocates of scientific politicsWe also proclaim that
our thinking and action know no authority Those who
regard Marxism as such a closed system of thought, cannot also pretend to subscribe to the iconoclastic principles
of Radicalism, which knows no dogma and respects no

21

authority.12
Outlining the salient points of his new philosophy,
Roy says, a philosophy, to be a guide for all forms of
human action, must have some ethics, some morals, which
must recognize certain things as permanent and abiding in
humanity.13
According to Roy, what the world needs is a philosophy of freedom Without a philosophical revolution,
no social revolution is possible. The cardinal principle
of our philosophy, adds Roy, is that man is the maker of
his destiny.14
Roy had come to the conclusion that the modern
State is too powerful to be overthrown as at the time of
the French Revolution or of the Russian Revolution; the
modern weapons and the modern technique of military
operations have rendered the old technique of revolution
seizure of power through insurrection impossible.
That is why he advocates the new way of revolution:
revolution by consent or persuasion.15
Roy also makes a distinction between Marxism, which
according to Roy, is a philosophy, and communism, which
is only a political practice. Roys critique of communism goes farther then that of Marxism. The history of
Soviet Union, says Roy, makes one doubt whether Communism will lead to the ideal of freedom.16
The radical change in Roys assessment of the Soviet
Union, as pointed out by Sibnarayan Ray, took place over
a period of time and is recorded in the substantially enlarged edition of his book The Russian Revolution (1949)
which incorporated his earlier book of the same title published in 1937 plus his writings on the Comintern and the
Soviet Union during the 1940s.17
Thus, by 1946, when he delivered these lectures, Roy

22

had come to believe that revolution can no longer take

place under the banner of Communism, and that Marxism
as vulgarized by its orthodox exponents can no longer give
us strong enough inspiration. We shall have to set up higher
ideals and find a nobler philosophy of life.18
However, even at this stage of his thinking, Roy did
not totally disown Marxism. Though he insists that Marxism and radicalism are not identical, he also added that
they are not mutually exclusive. He describes radicalism as an attempt to rescue Marxism from degeneration
into orthodoxy and as a revision of Marxism.19 He
mainly differed from Marxism in emphasizing the role of
ideas in human progress, and in stressing the fundamental importance of ethics as a basis of political action. In
words of Roy, organized thought is the condition for
planned action and we must learn to think, then only we
can work systematically. Or, to put it differently, there
can be no political revolution without a philosophical revolution.20

Beyond Communism: Twenty-Two Theses on

Radical Democracy and New Humanism
Roy prepared a draft of Basic Principles of Radical
Democracy before the All India Conference of Radical
Democratic Party held in Bombay in December 1946. The
draft, in which basic ideas were put in the form of theses,
was circulated among a small number of selected friends
and associates of Roy including Laxman Shastri Joshi,
Philip Spratt, V. M. Tarkunde, Sibnarayan Ray, G. D.
Parikh, G. R. Dalvi and Ellen Roy. The Twenty-Two
Theses or Principles of Radical Democracy, which
emerged as a result of intense discussions between Roy

23

and his circle of friends, were adopted at the Bombay

Conference of the Radical Democratic Party. Roys
speeches at the conference in connection with the TwentyTwo Theses were published later under the title Beyond
Communism.
In 1947, Roy published New Humanism A
Manifesto, which offered an elaboration of the TwentyTwo Theses. Roy prepared the draft of the manifesto, but,
as Roy himself says, in the preface of New Humanism, he
derived help from valuable suggestions of Philip Spratt,
Sikander Choudhary and V. M.Tarkunde in improving his
draft. The ideas expressed in the manifesto were, according to Roy, developed over a period of number of years by
a group of critical Marxists and former Communists.
Further discussions on the Twenty-Two Theses and
the manifesto led Roy to the conclusion that party-politics
was inconsistent with his ideal of organized democracy.
This resulted in the dissolution of the Radical Democratic
Party in December 1948 and launching of a movement
called the Radical Humanist Movement.21 At the Calcutta
Conference, itself where the party was dissolved, theses
19 and 20 were amended to delete all references to party.
The last three paragraphs of the manifesto were also modified accordingly. Thus, the revised versions of the TwentyTwo Theses and the manifesto constitute the essence of
Roys New Humanism.

Indian Renaissance Institute

In 1946, Roy established Indian Renaissance
Institute at Dehradun. Roy was the founder-director of
the Institute.22 Its main aim was to develop, organize and
conduct a movement to be called the Indian Renaissance

24

Movement.23
Since 1937, Roy was editing a new weekly named
Independent India. In 1949, Independent India weekly
changed to The Radical Humanist weekly.24 The name of
another quarterly journal The Marxian Way, which Roy
had been publishing since 1945 in collaboration with
Sudhindranath Datta, was changed to The Humanist Way
in the same year.25

Reason, Romanticism and Revolution

In 1948, Roy started working on his last major intellectual project. Roys magnum opus Reason, Romanticism and Revolution is a monumental work (638 pages).
The fully written, revised and typed press copy of the
book was ready in April 1952. It attempted to combine a
historical survey of western thought with an elaboration
of his own system of ideas. As Roy says in the preface
of the book: On the basis of a humanist interpretation
of cultural history, this work endeavors to outline a comprehensive philosophy which links up social and political practice with a scientific metaphysics of rationality
and ethics.26

International Humanist and Ethical Union

While working on Reason, Romanticism and
Revolution, Roy had established contacts with several
humanist groups in Europe and America, which had views
similar to his own. The idea gradually evolved of these
groups coming together and constituting an international
association with commonly shared aims and principles.
The inaugural congress of the International Humanist

25

and Ethical Union (IHEU) was planned to be organized

in Amsterdam in 1952, and Roys were expected to play
an influential role in the congress and in the development of the IHEU.
However, before going abroad, Roy needed some
rest. He along with Ellen Roy went up for a few days
from Dehradun to the hill station of Mussoorie. On June
11, 1952, Roy met a serious accident. He fell fifty feet
down while walking along a hill track. He was moved to
Dehradun for treatment. On 25 August, he had an attack
of cerebral thrombosis resulting in a partial paralysis of
the right side. The accident prevented the Roys from
attending the inaugural congress of the IHEU, which was
held in August 1952 in Amsterdam. The congress, however, elected M. N. Roy, in absentia, as one of its vicepresidents and made the Indian Radical Humanist Movement one of the founder members of the IHEU. On 15
August 1953, Roy had the second attack of cerebral
thrombosis, which paralyzed the left side of his body.
Roys last article dictated to Ellen Roy for the Radical
Humanist was about the nature and organization of the
Radical Humanist Movement. This article was published
in the Radical Humanist on 24 January 1954. On 25
January 1954, ten minutes before midnight, M. N. Roy
died of a heart attack. He was nearly 67 at that time.

Publications
Roy was a prolific writer. He wrote many books, edited, and contributed to several journals. The Oxford University Press has published four volumes of Selected Works
of M. N. Roy, edited by Sibnarayan Ray. We have already
mentioned some of his works related to the final humanist

26

phase of his life. Of these Materialism, Science and

Philosophy, New Humanism and Reason, Romanticism
and Revolution are of special interest to us.

Roys Conception of Philosophy

Roy has discussed the nature of philosophy and its
relationship with religion and science in his books Materialism and Science and Philosophy.
Philosophy, says Roy, quoting Pythagoras, in his book
Materialism, is contemplation, study and knowledge of
the nature. Its function is to know things as they are,
and to find the common origin of the diverse phenomena
of nature, in nature itself.27
Philosophy, according to Roy, begins when mans
spiritual needs are no longer satisfied by primitive natural
religion which imagines and worships a variety of gods as
personification of the diverse phenomena of nature. The
grown-up man discredits the nursery-tales, with which he
was impressed in his spiritual childhood ... Intellectual
growth impels and emboldens him to seek in nature itself
the causes of all natural phenomena; to find in nature a
unity behind its diversity.28
In his book Science and Philosophy Roy defines philosophy as the theory of life. The function of philosophy, in words of Roy, is to solve the riddle of the Universe.29
Elaborating on his definition of philosophy, Roy says:
Philosophy is the theory of life, because it was
born of the efforts of man to explain nature and
to understand his own being in relation to its surroundings; to solve the actual problems of life in

27

the light of past experience, so that the solution

will give him an encouraging glimpse into the
future.30

Philosophy and Metaphysics

Roy has made a distinction between philosophy and
metaphysics. According to him, metaphysics, too, begins
with the desire to discover unity behind the diversity.
But it leaves the ground of Philosophy in quest
of a noumenon above and beyond nature, something which is distinct from the phenomena.
Thus, it abandons the inquiry into what really
exists with the object of acquiring knowledge
about it, and plunges into the wilderness of speculation. It takes up the absurd task of knowing the
intangible as the condition for the knowledge of
the tangible.31
It is obvious that Roy was opposed to speculative
philosophy, which set for itself the impossible task of prying into the transcendental being above and behind the
physical universe of acquiring the knowledge of the reality behind the appearance. In words of Roy:
Speculative philosophy is the attempt to explain
the concrete realities of existence in the light of a
hypothetical absolute. It is the way not to truth,
but to dream; not to knowledge but to illusion.
Instead of trying to understand the world, the
only reality given to man, speculative philosophy ends in denying of the existence of the only

28

reality and declaring it to be a figment of mans

imagination. An inquiry, which denies the very
existence of the object to be enquired, is bound
to end in idle dreams and hopeless confusion.32

Philosophy and Religion

Roy is opposed not only to speculative philosophy
but also to the identification of philosophy with theology
and religion. As he says in Science and Philosophy:
For the average educated man, the term philosophy has a very vague meaning, but sweeping
application; it stands not only for speculative
thought, but also for poetic fancy. In India, particularly, this vague, all-embracing sense is generally prevalent. Philosophy is not distinguished
from religion and theology. Indeed, what is
believed to be the distinctive feature of Indian
philosophy is that it has not broken away from
the medieval tradition, as modern Western philosophy did in the seventeenth century.33
According to Roy, Faith in the super-natural does
not permit the search for the causes of natural phenomena
in nature itself. Therefore, rejection of orthodox religious
ideas and theological dogmas is the condition for philosophy34 [emphasis mine].
With the assumption that the phenomena of nature
are determined by the will of some supernatural being or
beings, says Roy, philosophy must make room for faith.
What is supernatural, points out Roy, must be always beyond the understanding of man, who is himself a product

29

of nature, and is, therefore, limited by the laws of nature.

In this way, according to Roy, as soon as the cause of the
phenomenal world is thus placed beyond the realm of human knowledge, the world itself becomes incomprehensible.35
Roy is of the view that, religion is bound to be liquidated by science, because scientific knowledge enables
mankind to answer questions, confronted by which in its
childhood, it was compelled to assume super-natural forces
or agencies.36
Therefore, according to Roy, in order to perform its
function, philosophy must break away from religion and
start from the reality of the physical universe.

Philosophy and Science

On the one hand, Roy regards rejection of orthodox
religious ideas and theological dogmas as the essential
condition of philosophy, and on the other, he envisages a
very intimate relationship between philosophy and science.
In fact, according to Roy, the philosophical significance
of modern scientific theory is to render the old division
of labor between science and philosophy untenable. Science is, says Roy, stepping over the old boundary line.
Digging deeper and deeper into the secrets of nature, science has come up against problems, the solution of which
was previously left to philosophy. Scientific inquiry has
pushed into what is traditionally regarded as the metaphysical realm.37
The problems of philosophy cosmological, ontological and epistemological can all be progressively
solved, according to Roy, in the light of scientific knowledge. The function of philosophy is, points out Roy, to

30

explain existence as a whole. An explanation of existence

requires knowledge of existence; knowledge about the
different phases of existence is gathered by the various
branches of science. Therefore, in words of Roy:
The function of philosophy is to coordinate the
entire body of scientific knowledge into a comprehensive theory of nature and lifeTherefore,
philosophy is called the science of sciences.38
Even in his Scientific Politics, which is more in the
nature of a popular lecture than a philosophical treatise,
Roy says, having thus yielded position to science, philosophy can now exist only as the science of sciences a
systematic coordination, a synthesis of all positive knowledge, continuously readjusting itself to the progressive enlargement of the store of human knowledge. Such a philosophy, according to Roy, has nothing in common with
what is traditionally known, particularly in this country, as
philosophy. A mystic metaphysical conception of the world
is no longer to be accorded the distinction of philosophy.39
In Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, too, Roy
repeats his conception of philosophy as a logical coordination of all the branches of positive knowledge in a
system of thought to explain the world rationally and to
serve as a reliable guide for life.40

New Humanism
New humanism, as presented in the Twenty-Two
Theses, has both a critical and a constructive part. The
critical part consists of describing the inadequacies of
communism (including the economic interpretation of his-

31

tory), and of formal parliamentary democracy. The constructive part, on the other hand, consists of giving highest value to the freedom of individuals, presenting a humanist interpretation of history, and outlining a picture of
radical or organized democracy along with the way for
achieving that ideal.

The Basic Tenets of New Humanism

In the first six theses, Roy presents the basic tenets of
new humanism. In theses seven to thirteen, he points out
the inadequacies of communism and formal parliamentary
democracy, whereas in theses fourteen to twenty two, he
outlines a picture of radical democracy and indicates the
way for achieving that ideal.41
Apart from Roys effort to trace the quest for freedom and search for truth to the biological struggle for
existence, the basic idea of the first three theses of Roy is:
individualism. According to Roy, the central idea of the
Twenty-Two Theses is that political philosophy must start
from the basic idea, that the individual is prior to society,
and that freedom can be enjoyed only by individuals.42
Collectivity, says Roy, presupposes the existence
of individuals. Except as the sum total of freedom and
well-being, actually enjoyed by individuals, social liberation and progress are imaginary ideals, which are never
attained(Thesis One).
Quest for freedom and search for truth, according to
Roy, constitute the basic urge of human progress. The
purpose of all-rational human endeavor, individual as well
as collective, is attainment of freedom in ever increasing
measure. The amount of freedom available to the individuals is the measure of social progress. Roy refers quest

32

for freedom back to human beings struggle for existence,

and he regards search for truth as a corollary to this quest.
Reason, according to Roy, is a biological property, and it
is not opposed to human will. Morality, which emanates
from the rational desire for harmonious and mutually beneficial social relations, is rooted in the innate rationality of
human beings. According to Roy, human beings are moral,
because they are rational.
How is search for truth, one may ask, a corollary to
the quest for freedom? Explaining this Roy says:
The moment an ape discovered that he could
break a branch and pluck fruits with it, the process of mechanical evolution ended; purposiveness
became the basic feature of the subsequent biological evolution. Mans struggle for the conquest
of nature began. The struggle for existence became quest for freedom. From that very modest
beginning, we have come to the twentieth century with its modern technology; powerful instruments for conquering nature, all invented by man,
no longer for mere existence, but in quest for
freedom. Science is a search for truth, and it is
the result of mans quest for freedom. Therefore
we may say that search for truth is the corollary
to the quest for freedom [emphasis mine].43
Finally, truth is defined by Roy as correspondence with objective reality, which, incidentally, is the realistic conception of truth. Thus, according to Roy, freedom, knowledge and truth can be woven harmoniously in
the texture of one philosophy explaining all the aspects of
existence material, mental, moral.44

33

Humanist Interpretation of History

In his humanist interpretation of history, presented in
theses four, five and six, Roy gives an important place to
human will as a determining factor in history, and emphasizes the role of ideas in the process of social evolution.
Formation of ideas is, according to Roy, a physiological
process but once formed, ideas exist by themselves and
their own laws govern them. The dynamics of ideas runs
parallel to the process of social evolution and both of them
influence each other. Cultural patterns and ethical values
are not mere superstructures of established economic relations. They have a history and logic of their own.
Historical determinism, according to Roy, does not
exclude freedom of the will. In fact, human will is the most
powerful determining factor in history. Otherwise, there
would be no room for revolutions in a rationally determined process of history. The rational and scientific concept of determinism, says Roy, is not to be confused with
the teleological or religious doctrine of predestination.

Inadequacies of Communism
Roys criticism of communism, contained in theses
seven to eleven is based mainly on the experience of the
former Soviet Union. According to Roy, freedom does
not necessarily follow from the capture of political power
in the name of the oppressed and the exploited classes and
abolition of private property in the means of production.
For creating a new world of freedom, says Roy, revolution must go beyond an economic reorganization of society. A political system and an economic experiment which

34

subordinate the man of flesh and blood to an imaginary

collective ego, be it the nation or class, cannot possibly
be, in Roys view, the suitable means for the attainment of
the goal of freedom. Roy is opposed to sacrificing the individual at the altar of an imaginary collective ego. Any
social philosophy or scheme of social reconstruction, which
does not recognize the individual, and dismisses the ideal
of freedom as an empty abstraction, says Roy, can have
no more than a very limited progressive and revolutionary
significance.
The Marxian doctrine of state, according to which
the state is an instrument of exploitation of one class by
another, is clearly rejected by Roy. According to Roy, the
state is the political organization of society and its withering away under Communism is a utopia which has been
exploded by experience (Thesis Nine).
Similarly, Roy rejects the communist doctrine of the
dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship of any form,
however plausible may be the pretext for it, is, asserts
Roy, excluded by the Radical-Humanist perspective of
social evolution.45
Referring to the Soviet experiment, Roy says:
In the Soviet Union, proletarian dictatorship
promises to be a permanent institution. It has
become identical with Communism. The means
have become the end. The State does not hold
out any hope of withering away. If a socialist
society has been established in the Soviet Union,
then, the period of transition has passed, and dictatorship must disappear. But so long as no other
party is allowed to exist, or the party of the proletariat does not disappear with dictatorship, it is

35

idle to say that a higher form of democracy has

been established.46

Shortcomings of Formal Parliamentary

Democracy
Roy has discussed the shortcomings of formal parliamentary democracy in his twelfth and thirteenth theses.
These flaws, according to Roy, are outcome of the delegation of power. Atomized individual citizens are, in Roys
view, powerless for all practical purposes, and for most of
the time. They have no means to exercise their sovereignty
and to wield a standing control of the state machinery.
To make democracy effective, says Roy, power
must always remain vested in the people, and there must
be ways and means for the people to wield the sovereign
power effectively, not periodically, but from day to day
(Thesis Twelve).
Roy also criticizes the doctrine of laissez faire. According to Roy:
Liberalism is falsified or parodied under formal
parliamentary democracy. The doctrine of laissez
faire only provides the legal sanction to the exploitation of man by man. The concept of economic man negativates the liberating doctrine of
individualism. The economic man is bound to be
a slave or a slave-holder. This vulgar concept
must be replaced by the reality of an instinctively
rational being who is moral because he is rational.
Morality is an appeal to conscience, and
conscience is the instinctive awareness of, and
reaction to, environments. It is a mechanistic bio-

36

logical function on the level of consciousness.

Therefore, it is rational (Thesis Thirteen).
It is worth noting that the thirteenth thesis, in
addition to tracing the defects of formal parliamentary democracy to the doctrine of laissez faire, states Roys views
on morality. In fact, Roy gives a very important place to
ethics in his new humanism. According to Roy, politics
cannot be divorced from ethics without jeopardizing the
cherished ideal of freedom. It is an empirical truth that
immoral means necessarily corrupt the end.47 Therefore,
Roy asserts that the inspiration for a new philosophy of
revolution must be drawn from the traditions of
humanism and moral radicalism. According to Roy, the
nineteenth century Radicals, actuated by the humanist
principle of individualism, realized the possibility of a secular rationalism and a rationalist ethics. Roy insists that a
moral order will result from a rationally organized society, because, viewed in the context of his rise out of the
background of a harmonious physical Universe, man is
essentially rational and therefore moral. Morality emanates
from the rational desire for harmonious and mutually beneficial social relations.48
Roy was of the view that:
Morality must be referred back to mans innate
rationality. Only then, man can be moral, spontaneously and voluntarily...The innate rationality of
man is the only guarantee of a harmonious order,
which will also be a moral order, because morality is a rational function.49

37

Radical Democracy
Roys ideal of radical democracy, as outlined in theses fourteen to twenty-two consists of a highly decentralized democracy based on a network of peoples committees through which citizens wield a standing democratic
control over the state.
According to Roy:
The alternative to parliamentary democracy is
not dictatorship; it is organized democracy in the
place of the formal democracy of powerless atomized individual citizens. The parliament should
be the apex of a pyramidal structure of the State
reared on the base of an organized democracy
composed of a countrywide network of Peoples
Committees (Thesis Fourteen).
Roy has not ignored the economic aspect of his ideal
of radical democracy. According to Roy, progressive
satisfaction of the material necessities is the pre-condition
for the individual members of society unfolding their intellectual and other finer human potentialities. According
to him, an economic reorganization, such as will
guarantee a progressively rising standard of living, is the
foundation of the Radical Democratic State. Economic
liberation of the masses is an essential condition for their
advancing towards the goal of freedom (Thesis Seventeen).
The ideal of radical democracy will be attained, according to Roy, through the collective efforts of mentally
free men united and determined for creating a world of
freedom. They will function as the guides, friends and

38

philosophers of the people rather than as their would-be

rulers. Consistent with the goal of freedom, their political
practice will be rational and, therefore, ethical. According
to Roy:
The function of a revolutionary and liberating
social philosophy is to lay emphasis on the basic
fact of history that man is the maker of his
world The brain is a means of production, and
produces the most revolutionary commodity.
Revolutions presuppose iconoclastic ideas. An
increasingly large number of men conscious of
their creative power, motivated by the indomitable will to remake the world, moved by the adventure of ideas, and fired with the ideal of a free
society of free men, can create the conditions under which democracy will be possible (Thesis
Fifteen).
Roy categorically asserts that a social renaissance
can come only through determined and widespread
endeavor to educate the people as regards the principles
of freedom and rational cooperative living. Social revolution, according to Roy, requires a rapidly increasing number
of men of the new renaissance, and a rapidly expanding
system of peoples committees and an organic combination of both. The program of revolution will similarly be
based on the principles of freedom, reason and social harmony.
The picture of radical democratic state, according
to Roy, can be visualized only approximately, leaving a
very wide margin of error and uncertainty. Thus, the picture outlined in the Twenty-Two thesis is necessarily ten-

39

tative, in the nature of a utopia. The justification, according to Roy, for outlining this picture is that human action
must be driven by an ideal or else there will be no incentive for action.
As pointed out by Roy himself in his preface to the
second edition of the New Humanism, though new humanism has been presented in the Twenty-Two theses and
the Manifesto as a political philosophy, it is meant to be a
complete system. Because of being based on the ever-expanding totality of scientific knowledge, new humanism,
according to Roy, cannot be a closed system. It will not
be, says Roy, a dogmatic system claiming finality and
infallibility. Roy also declares, the work and progress of
the Radical Humanist Movement will no longer be judged
in terms of mass following, but by the spread of the spirit
of freedom, rationality and secular morality amongst the
people, and in the increase of their influence in the State.
According to Roy:
To consolidate the intellectual basis of the movement, Radicals will continue to submit their
philosophy to constant research, examine it in
the light of modern scientific knowledge and experience, and extend its application to all the social sciences. They will, at the same time, propagate the essentials of the philosophy amongst the
people as a whole by showing its relevance to
their pressing needs. They will make the people
conscious of the urge for freedom, encourage
their self-reliance and awaken in them the sense
of individual dignity, inculcate the values of rationalism and secular morality, and spread the
spirit of cosmopolitan Humanism. By showing

40

the people the way to solve their daily problems

by popular initiative, the Radicals will combat
ignorance, fatalism, blind faith and the sense of
individual helplessness, which are the basis of authoritarianism. They will put all the social traditions and institutions to the test of the humanist
outlook [emphasis mine].50

Philosophical Revolution or Renaissance

It is obvious from the foregoing that Roy was a great
supporter of philosophical revolution or renaissance, and
he has given a central place to it in his radical humanism.
Roy was an admirer of European renaissance and drew
inspiration from it. For him, the renaissance was the revolt of man against God and his agents on this earth.51
According to Roy, the renaissance heralded the modern
civilization and the philosophy of freedom. He strongly
believed that India, too, needed a renaissance on
rationalist and humanist lines. According to him, this was
a necessary condition for democracy to function in a proper
manner. As Roy says in his Reason, Romanticism and
Revolution:
In the first place, there must be a conscious and
integrated effort to stimulate amongst the people the urge for freedom, the desire to rely upon
themselves, the spirit of free thinking and the will
never to submit to any external authority by exchanging their freedom for the security of the
slave. A new Renaissance based on rationalism
and cosmopolitan Humanism is essential for de-

41

mocracy to be realized [emphasis mine].52

As mentioned earlier, according to Roy, a philosophical revolution must precede a social revolution. He was
opposed to blind faith and superstitions of all kinds and
supported rationalism. He rejected all allegedly supernatural entities like God and soul. Similarly, he was opposed
to fatalism and the doctrine of karma. He unequivocally
rejected the religious mode of thinking and advocated a
scientific outlook and a secular morality. As noted earlier,
he was in favor of delinking philosophy with religion and
associating it closely with science. Roy believed that science would ultimately liquidate religion. He considered
the promotion of rationalism and atheism as part of his
humanist movement.
As he says in Beyond Communism:
A philosophical revolution must precede any
radical social transformationThe belief in God
and fate is the strongest link in the chain of the
slavery of the Indian peopleThe Radical
Democratic Movement will be the school to teach
the Indian people to revolt against fate and the
God or gods who preside over it.53
As mentioned earlier, according to Roy, a revolutionary is one who has got the idea that the world can be remade, made better than it is to-day, that it was not created
by a supernatural power, and therefore, could be remade
by human efforts.
Further, according to Roy, the idea of improving upon
the creation of God can never occur to the God-fearing.

42

We can conceive of the idea only when we know that all

gods are our own creation, and that we can depose
whomsoever we have enthroned.54
Roys critical approach towards religion comes out
very clearly in the preface of his book, Indias Message,
where he asserts that a criticism of religious thought,
subjection of traditional beliefs and the time-honored dogmas of religion to a searching analysis, is a condition for
the belated Renaissance of India. The spirit of inquiry
should overwhelm the respect for tradition.55
According to Roy, a critical examination of what is
cherished as Indias cultural heritage will enable the Indian people to cast off the chilly grip of a dead past. It will
embolden them to face the ugly realities of a living present
and look forward to a better, brighter and pleasanter future.56
Thus, Roy was opposed to an uncritical and vain glorification of Indias so-called spiritual heritage. However, he did not stand for a wholesale rejection of ancient
Indian thought either. He favored a rational and critical
approach towards ancient traditions and thoughts. Roy
believed that the object of European renaissance was to
rescue the positive contributions of ancient European civilization, which were lying buried in the Middle Ages owing to the dominance of the Church. Roy had something
similar in his mind about India. According to him, one of
the tasks of the renaissance movement should be to rescue the positive outcome and abiding contributions of
ancient thought contributions which just like the contributions of Greek sages are lying in ruins under the decayed structure of the brahminical society the tradition
of which is erroneously celebrated as the Indian civilization.

43

Notes
1

Sibnarayan Ray (ed.), Introduction Selected Works of M.

N. Roy, Vol. I (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 33.
2
M. N. Roy, Preface to the 1989 Reprint Reason, Romanticism and Revolution (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1989), p.
XV.
3
V. M. Tarkunde, Radical Humanism (New Delhi: Ajanta
Publications, 1983), p. 49.
4
Sibnarayan Ray (ed.), Selected Works of M. N. Roy, p. 41.
5
M. N. Roy, Scientific Politics (Calcutta: Renaissance
Publishers, 1947), pp. 210-11.
6
Ibid., p. 199.
7
Ibid., p. 196.
8
Ibid., p. 38.
9
Ibid., p. VII.
10
Ibid., p. V.
11
M. N. Roy, New Orientation (Delhi: Ajanta Publications,
1982), p. 98.
12
Ibid., p. XII.
13
Ibid., p. 19.
14
Ibid., pp. 19-20.
15
Ibid., pp. 35-38.
16
Ibid., p. 44.
17
Sibnarayan Ray (ed.), Op. Cit., p. 42.
18
M. N. Roy, New Orientation, p. 73.
19
Ibid., pp. XIII-XIV.
20
Ibid., p. 23.
21
In 1969, the movement was transformed into a membership-organization called Indian Radical Humanist Association
IRHA.
22
The Institute now functions from New Delhi.
23
Sibnarayan Ray (ed.), Op.Cit., p. 46.
24
The Indian Renaissance Institute presently publishes The

44

Radical Humanist as a monthly from Mumbai.

25
This journal has ceased publication. See R. M. Pal (ed.), Selections from The Marxian Way and The Humanist Way (Delhi:
Ajanta Publications, 2000).
26
Sibnarayan Ray (ed.), Op. Cit., p. 53.
27
M. N. Roy, Materialism (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers
Ltd., 1951), p. 1.
28
Ibid., pp. 1-2. Apparently, Roy has used the term "spiritual" in the sense of "mental-intelectual". However, the use of
term "spiritual" by Roy is misleading because Roy did not
believe in the existence of "soul" or "spirit".
29
M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1984), pp. 5-6.
30
Ibid., p. 6.
31
M. N. Roy, Materialism, p.2.
32
Ibid., p. 4.
33
M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy, p.1.
34
Ibid., p. 3.
35
M. N. Roy, Materialism, p. 5.
36
M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy, p. 9.
37
Ibid., p. 28.
38
Ibid., p. 31.
39
M. N. Roy, Scientific Politics, p. 51.
40
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution (Delhi:
Ajanta Publications, 1989), p. 493.
41
See appendix for a complete version of the Twenty-Two Theses.
42
M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism (New Delhi: Ajanta
Publications, 1981), p. 88.
43
Ibid., p. 31.
44
Ibid.
45
M. N. Roy, New Humanism A Manifesto (Delhi: Ajanta
Publications, 1981), p. 41.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid., p. 35.

45

49

Ibid., p.36.
Ibid., pp. 76-77.
51
M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism, p. 65.
52
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p. 474.
53
M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism, p. 72.
54
M. N. Roy, Scientific Politics, p. 39.
55
M. N. Roy, Indias Message, p. XIV.
56
Ibid., p. XIII.
50

46

II. Materialism
In his book Beyond Communism, M.N.Roy has stated
that his philosophy of new humanism as expressed in the
Twenty-Two Theses on Radical Democracy is deduced
from materialist philosophy. Not only this, according to
Roy, materialism is the only philosophy possible.
In what sense Roy has used the term materialism?
How is Roys materialism different from traditional
materialism in general and Marxian materialism in particular? What logical connection, if any, exists between
Roys new humanism and materialism? I will try to answer these questions in this book. However, in this chapter I am only interested in exploring the nature of materialism, and that, too, without any reference to Marx or
M. N. Roy.

Concept of Materialism
What, then is the meaning of materialism?
Perhaps I should make clear in the very beginning
that in answering this question I have no intention of inflicting my own meaning of the word materialism on
unsuspecting readers.
As pointed out by John Hospers in his An
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, a word is an arbitrary symbol which is given meaning by human beings.
According to Hospers, when we indicate what a word
means we are doing one of two things: either (1) we are
stating what we are going to mean by it, or (2) we are

47

reporting what people in general, more specifically those

who use the language we are speaking, or sometimes some
segment of those who use that language, already mean by
it. In the first case we are stipulating a meaning, and we
have a stipulative definition. In the second case we are
reporting the usage of others, and we have a reportive, or
lexical, definition.1
So, to use Hospers terminology, I am not interested
in stipulating a definition of materialism. On the contrary, I am interested in finding out the sense in which the
word is already used. In others words, I am interested in
finding out the reportive or lexical definition of the word
materialism.
Now, the easiest way to find out the lexical definition
of a term is to consult any standard dictionary. Let us find
out what the dictionaries have to say about materialism
The Oxford Paperback Dictionary gives the following meanings of materialism: "1. belief that only the
material world exists 2. excessive concern with material
possessions rather than spiritual or intellectual values.2
Similarly, Websters New World Dictionary defines
materialism as: 1. the philosophical doctrine that everything in the world, including thought, will, and feeling,
can be explained only in terms of matter. 2. the tendency
to be more concerned with material than with spiritual
values.3
These dictionary definitions of materialism, though
useful as a starting point, cannot be considered adequate
from a philosophical point of view. No doubt, the dictionaries report what meanings are actually attached to a word
by an average educated user of the language, or a section
of those who use the language. However, more often than
not, this popular sense of the term is different from even

48

if not totally unrelated to the technical sense in which

the word is used in philosophy. Though I am not interested in stipulating a definition of materialism, yet I am
more interested in the way the word is used in philosophy
than in the way it is used in common language. In other
words, what I am looking for is a reportive definition in
the technical sense. And for this we could turn more profitably to technical dictionaries, encyclopedias and standard textbooks of philosophy.
According to The Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Materialism is the name given to a family of doctrines concerning the nature of the world which
give to matter a primary position and accord to
mind (or spirit) a secondary, dependent reality
or even none at all.4
Everything that is, is material is according to the
Encyclopedia, the cardinal tenet of materialism. Further, a material thing is defined as being made up of
parts possessing many physical properties and no other
properties. The physical properties are position in space
and time, size, shape, duration, mass, velocity, solidity,
inertia, electric charge, spin, rigidity, temperature, hardness, and the like.
This list, according to the Encyclopedia, is open
ended and is composed of properties that are the object
of the science of physics.
Materialists add that there is no second class of fundamental beings possessing psychological properties like
consciousness, purposiveness, aspiration, desire, and the
ability to perceive and no other. Therefore, there are no
incorporeal souls or spirits, no spiritual principalities or

49

powers, no angels or devils, no demiurges and no gods (if

these are conceived as immaterial entities). Hence nothing that happens can be attributed to the action of such
beings.
Thus, according to the Encyclopedia, the second
major tenet of materialism is Everything that can be explained can be explained on the basis of laws involving
only the antecedent physical conditions.
Materialists, maintains the Encyclopedia, have traditionally been determinists. Thus, adding the claim that
there is a cause for every event. This claim, however, says
the Encyclopedia, is not strictly entailed by materialism;
recently, it has apparently been weakened by development
of quantum theory, and some contemporary materialists
are opponents of determinism.5
The New Encyclopaedia Britannica gives the following exposition of materialism:
Especially since the 18th century, the word Materialism has been used to refer to a family of
metaphysical theories (i.e., theories on the nature of reality) that can best be defined by saying
that a theory tends to be called materialism if it is
felt sufficiently to resemble a paradigmatic theory
that will here be called mechanical Materialism.6
The Britannica explains mechanical Materialism in
the following words:
Mechanical Materialism is the theory that the
world consists entirely of hard, massy material
objects, which, though perhaps imperceptibly
small, are otherwise like such things as stones.

50

(A slight modification is to allow the void or

empty space to exist also in its own right.) These
objects interact in the sort of way that stones do:
by impact and possibly also by gravitational attraction. The theory denies that immaterial or
apparently immaterial things (such as minds) exist or else explains them away as being material
things or motions of material things.7

History of Materialism
It is often said that materialism is as old as philosophy. In fact, materialism flourished in both ancient Indian
and ancient Greek philosophy. A brief historical survey of
materialism up to eighteenth century until before the advent of Marxism in nineteenth century will give us a greater
understanding of what materialism has been traditionally.

Ancient Indian Materialism

Lokayat or Charvaka, as the ancient school of Indian
materialism is known, is one of the three major heterodox
(nastika) schools of ancient Indian philosophy the others being Buddhism and Jainism. It did not believe in the
authority of the Vedas as the orthodox (astika) schools
do. The main work of the system the Brhaspati Sutra (600
B.C.) is not available, and we have to reconstruct the doctrines of materialism from statements of the position and
criticism of it found in polemical and other works.
In the second act of the allegorical play
Prabodhachandrodaya, Krisnapati Mishra sums up the

51

teachings of materialism in following words:

Lokayat is the only Shastra; perception is the only
authority; earth, water, fire and air are the only
elements; enjoyment is the only end of human
existence; mind is only a product of matter. There
is no other world: death means liberation.8
Thus, ancient Indian materialists denied the existence
of God, non-physical soul, heaven, hell and life after death;
and explained consciousness as a product of matter. Not
only this, they severely condemned vedic religion and its
rituals. Their ethics was hedonistic.

Ancient Greek and Roman Materialism

Ancient Greek philosophy is said to have begun with
Thales (born about 624 B.C), who is regarded as the
founder and father of all philosophy.9 And Thales, who
treated water as the primary stuff of all things, was a materialist. The other thinkers of Ionian school, Anaximander,
who considered indefinite matter as ultimate reality, and
Anaximenes, who accorded this status to air, were also
materialists.
However, though Thales and some other pre-Socratic
philosophers may be described as materialists, Western
materialism is generally traced back to Leuccipus and his
pupil Democritus, who flourished at Abdera in the late
fifth century B.C. Between them they worked out the first
clear conception of materialism in Western philosophy. The
Great Diakosmos, a lost work, written by one or the other
(or both) expounded their position.
According to Leucippus and Democritus, if matter

52

were divided far enough, we should ultimately come to

indivisible units. These indivisible units are called atoms,
and, therefore, atoms are the ultimate constituents of matter. Empedocles, another pre-Socratic philosopher, had
assumed four different kinds of matter earth, air, fire,
and water but, according to atomists like Leuccipus and
Democritus all the atoms are composed of exactly the same
kind of matter.
Insofar it can be reconstructed, their doctrines, according to The Encyclopedia of Philosophy consists of
the following theses:
1. Nothing exists but atoms and empty space.
2. Nothing happens by chance (for no reason at all); everything occurs for a reason and of necessity. This necessity is natural and mechanical; it excludes teleological
necessitation.
3. Nothing can arise out of nothing; nothing that is can be
destroyed. All changes are new combinations or separations of atoms.
4. The atoms are infinite in number and endlessly varied in
form. They are all of the same stuff. They act on one another only by pressure or collision.
5. The variety of things is a consequence of the variety in
number, size, shape, and arrangement of the atoms, which
compose them.
6. The atoms have been in confused random motion from
all eternity. This is their natural state and requires no explanation. (Some scholars dispute the attribution of random motion to the atoms and credit the Great Diakosmos
with the Epicurean doctrine of an eternal fall through infinite space.)
7. The basic mechanism whereby bodies are formed from

53

atoms is the collision of two atoms, setting up a vortex.

In the vortex, motion is communicated from the periphery
towards the center. In consequence, heavy atoms move to
the center, light ones to the periphery. The vortex continually embraces new atoms, which come near it in their
random motion, and it thus begins a world.10
Epicurus (342-270 B.C.), the most famous and
influential Greek materialist, too, adopted the position of
the Great Diakosoms but gave a modified account of the
origin of worlds. There are, according to him, indefinite
numbers of atoms falling through an infinite space. In one
construction of the Epicurean system, the heavier, faster
atoms occasionally stride the lighter, slower ones obliquely,
giving then a slight lateral velocity. In another construction, the original deviation is actuated by something like
free will. From this point onwards, the development of
vortices, etc., proceed in much the same way as in
Democritus. Thus, Epicurean materialism differed from
that of Democritus in being indeterministic. Epicurean
philosophy also contained an important ethical part, which
was a sort of enlightened, refined, egoistic hedonism.
Epicuruss philosophy was expounded by Roman philosopher Lucretius (born 99 B.C.) in his long didactic poem
De Rerum Natura (English translation, On the Nature of
Things). Lucretius, who was a powerful influence in the
propagation of Epicurean philosophy among the Romans,
adopted the second account of the fall of atoms through
void and appealed to some form of voluntary action to
explain the original deviation from vertical descent. Like
Epicurus, Lucretius, too, was motivated by wish to free
men from the burdens of religious fear. He argued at length
against the existence of any spiritual soul and for mortality of human beings. These beliefs have been explicit fea-

54

tures of materialism since then.

Modern Materialism
Seventeenth Century: From the close of the classical period until the renaissance the Church and Aristotle so dominated Western thought that materialism went into background. The revival of materialism is attributed to the work
of two seventeenth century philosophers, Gassendi and
Hobbes.
Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), a French Catholic priest,
who in the last part of his life taught astronomy at the
Royal College in Paris, tried to rehabilitate and adapt the
ancient materialism of Epicurus. However, Gassendis
materialism was not thorough going, for he admitted a
creative and providential God and an immaterial and immortal intellect in human beings.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was much more consistent and uncompromising. According to Hobbes, no part
of the universe contains no body. He held all space to be
filled by intangible material ether if nothing else. This
doctrine followed from his definition of a body as anything existing independently of our thought and having
volume. Further, according to Hobbes, all change in universe is motion of bodies, and nothing can cause a motion
but contact with another moving body. The substance of
anything is body, and incorporeal substance is only a
contradiction in terms. Hobbes, therefore, disposed of
angels, the soul, and the god of theology. However, Hobbes
departed from strict materialism in his introduction of
conatus and impetus (which are not physical properties) into his account of motion and measurement of
acceleration as well as in his account of human sensation

55

and action.
Eighteenth Century: After Gassendi and Hobbes, materialism was advocated in France by Jean Meslier (16641729), La Mettrie (1709-1751), Diderot (1713-84),
Helvetius (1715-71), Holbach (1723-89), Naigeon (17381810) and Cabanis (1757-1808).11 Probably the most famous materialist of eighteenth century was Julien de la
Mettrie (1709-1751), a doctor with a philosophical bent,
who seized upon the mechanistic side of Rene Descartess
(1596-1650) philosophy.
Rene Descartes, the well-known French philosopher,
who is often regarded as the founder of modern philosophy, was himself a dualist. He accepted a materialist and
mechanical account of the inanimate world and lower animals but insisted that human beings had immaterial, immortal spirits whose essential nature lay in conscious
thought undetermined by casual process.
In his L Homme Machine (1747, English translation,
Man is Machine) Julian de la Mettrie applied Descartess
doctrine that animals are automata to human beings themselves. He criticized all views of soul as spiritual and presented a view of man as self-moving machine.
Holbach (1723-1789), a German nobleman, who
passed his life in Paris, was another prominent materialist
of eighteenth century was. His work the Systeme de la
nature (System Of Nature) was published under a false
name in 1770. In his book, Holbach expounded a
deterministic type of materialism in the light of evidence
from then contemporary science. Holbach maintained that
nothing is outside nature. Nature is an uninterrupted and
causally determined succession of arrangements of matter
in motion. Matter, according to Holbach, has always

56

existed and always been in motion, and different worlds

are formed from different distributions of matter and
motion. Matter is of four basic types (earth, air, fire and
water), and changes in their proportions are responsible
for all changes other than spatio temporal ones.
Holbach regarded mechanical causes of impact type
as only intelligible and real ones. Since human beings are
in nature and part of nature, all human actions spring from
natural causes. As in Epicurus and Lucretius, there is a
strong antireligious motive in Holbachs work. The purity
of Holbachs materialism is marred only by his admission
of relations of sympathy, antipathy, and affinity among
material particles, in addition to the primary qualities, gravity and inert force.
So, this completes my brief historical survey of materialism up to eighteenth century. In this chapter, I am not
discussing Marxian materialism, which will be discussed
in the next chapter, or even contemporary materialism,
because right now I am more interested in materialism as
it existed before the advent of Marxism.
To sum up, materialism refers to metaphysical theories (theories about the nature of reality), which give to
matter a primary position and accord to mind (or spirit) a
secondary, dependent reality or none at all. According to
materialism, there are no incorporeal soul, gods, etc., (if
these are conceived as immaterial entities). Thus nothing
that happens can be attributed to the action of such things,
and everything that can be explained on the basis of laws
involving the antecedent physical conditions.
As pointed out in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
materialists have traditionally been determinists, though
determinism is not strictly entailed by materialism. As we
have seen in our brief historical survey of materialism, the

57

materialism of ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus was

indeterministic and he allowed for free will. In this connection, the following comment in the Britannica is worth
taking note of, it is popularly supposed that Materialism and determinism must go together. This is not so...
Even some ancient Materialists were indeterminists, and a
modern physicalist Materialism must be indeterministic because of the indeterminism that is built into modern physics.12
Another point worth nothing is that metaphysical
materialism has nothing to do with the ethical attitude,
which is popularly associated with materialism. This point
has been emphasized in both The Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Britannica. According to The Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
It should also be mentioned that metaphysical
materialism does not entail the psychological disposition to pursue money and tangible goods
despite the popular use of "materialistic" to describe this interest.13
Similarly, the Britannica says:
A quite different sense of the word Materialism should be noted in which it denotes not a
metaphysical theory but an ethical attitude. A
person is a Materialist in this sense if he is interested mainly in sensuous pleasures and bodily
comforts and hence in the material possessions
that bring these about. A man might be a Materialist in this ethical and pejorative sense without
being a metaphysical Materialist, and conversely.

58

An extreme physicalistic Materialist, for example, might prefer a Beethoven record to a comfortable mattress for his bed; and a person who
believes in immaterial spirits might opt for the
mattress.14
The interesting thing to take note of is that not only
there is no logical connection between metaphysical
materialism with the kind of attitude popularly described
as materialistic but also there is no historical relationship either. For instance, Epicurus, as we noted earlier in
this chapter, expounded a refined and enlightened kind of
egoistic hedonism. The ethical philosophy of Epicurus,
however, was much different from what is popularly understood by Epicurean.
The first meaning of Epicurean according to
Websters New World Dictionary is of Epicurus or his
philosophy, which of course, is correct. But the second
meaning fond of luxury and sensuous pleasures, esp. that
of eating and drinking, is philosophically misleading if it
makes us suppose that Epicurus was this kind of person
or that he taught this kind of ethical philosophy. Epicurus,
in fact, attached greater importance to mental pleasures
than to those of body because, according to him, mental
pleasures last longer, and because he believed that we
should not aim just at the pleasure of the moment but at
such pleasures, which endure throughout a lifetime. Contrary to the popular belief, Epicurus led and preached a
calm and contended life free from anxieties. Though he
neither opposed nor despised innocent pleasures of sense,
he stressed that we should limit and control our desires
instead of multiplying them. Epicurus himself lived a simple life, and advised his followers to do the same. Simplic-

59

ity, cheerfulness, moderation, temperance are, according

to Epicurus, the best means to happiness.
To conclude, the first meaning of materialism contained in The Oxford Paperback Dictionary and Websters
New World Dictionary, quoted in the beginning of this
chapter, is largely correct, even if not adequate, but the
second meaning, is philosophically misleading. Materialism is a doctrine about the nature of reality and not about
which part of that reality we ought to prefer or how we
ought to live. It is true that metaphysical materialism is
logically incompatible with any spiritualistic ethics involving soul, life after death, heaven and god; but, on the other
hand, it is compatible with any this-worldly ethics, which
does not involve belief in such spiritual entities. In no
case, it necessarily entails a particular kind of ethics or
ethical attitude.

60

Notes
1

John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis

(New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private Ltd., 1975), pp. 32-33.
2
Joyce M. Hawkins (compiler), The Oxford Paperback
Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 392.
3
David B. Guralnik (ed.), Websters New World Dictionary
(New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing Co., 1975), p. 462.
4
Keith Campbell, Materialism in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (ed. in chief, Paul Edwards), Vol. V (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1972), p.
179.
5
Ibid.
6
J. J. C. Smart, Materialism in The New Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Vol.11 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.,
1981), p. 611.
7
Ibid.
8
Quoted by Chandradhar Sharma in A Critical Survey of
Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1964), p.41.
9
W. T. Stace, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy
(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), p.20.
10
Keith Campbell, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 5,
p. 180.
11
Finngeir Hiorth, Introduction to Atheism (Pune: Indian
Secular Society, 1995), p. 115.
12
J. J. C. Smart, The NewEncyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.
11, p. 611.
13
Keith Campbell, Op. Cit., p. 179.
14
J. J.C. Smart, Op. Cit., p. 612.

61

62

III. Roys Materialism and

Traditional Materialism
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, according to M. N. Roy, the Twenty-Two Theses on Radical
Democracy are deduced from materialist philosophy, and
Materialism is the only philosophy possible.1
In this chapter, I will concentrate on Roys revised
version of materialism and its differences from traditional
materialism. Besides, I will briefly discuss the relationship
between materialism and new humanism as envisaged by
Roy.
In what sense Roy has used the word materialism?
How is Roys materialism different from pre-Marxian
materialism, which has been discussed in the last chapter?
(The differences between Roys materialism and Marxian
materialism will be discussed in the next chapter). What,
according to Roy, is the relationship between materialism
and new humanism? I will be discussing these questions
in this chapter.
Roy had used his prison years in writing about the
philosophical consequences of modern science. Though
his Prison Manuscripts have not been published in totality, selected portion from them were published as separate
books in the 1930s and 1940s. Among the books that were
made from Roys Prison Manuscripts, Materialism and
Science and Philosophy are most closely related to the
subject matter of this chapter. In addition to these books,
Roys Beyond Communism and Reason, Romanticism
and Revolution, also contain some valuable material.

63

Roys Conception of Materialism

In his Beyond Communism, Roy says, ... I am firmly
convinced that Materialism is the only philosophy
possible. That conviction breathes through all my other
works, philosophical and scientific, not directly related to
political theories. In those works . . . I have shown that all
systems of philosophy since the dawn of human civilization, which have received any place in history of thought,
are essentially materialist. According to Roy, any other
philosophy, in the last analysis, takes us outside the
physical Universe, into the wilderness of a mystical metaphysics over which presides God . . . 2
Defining materialism in Beyond Communism, Roy
says:
Materialism knows no elementary indefinable.
It reduces everything to the common denominator of the physical Universe, subject to its
fundamental law. The physical Universe is lawgoverned; nothing happens without a cause; it is
rational.3

Materialism
Roys conception of materialism has been discussed
in much more detail in his book Materialism. In the very
first chapter of the book, Roy says:
Strictly speaking, philosophy is materialism, and
materialism is the only possible philosophy. For,
it represents the knowledge of nature as it really

64

exists knowledge acquired through the contemplation, observation and investigation of the
phenomena of nature itself.4
According to Roy, materialism is not the monstrosity
it is generally supposed to be. It is not the cult of eat,
drink and be merry, as it has been depicted by its ignorant or malicious adversaries. It simply maintains that the
origin of everything that really exists is matter; that there
does not exist anything but matter, all other appearances
being transformations of matter, and these transformations
are governed necessarily by laws inherent in nature.5
Roy admits that, in the light of the latest discoveries
of atomic physics, the term matter can no longer be used
in the classical sense; but, according to Roy, it cannot
be abandoned until a more appropriate new term is
coined.6
The fact that matter, as classically conceived, is not
the ultimate physical reality does not prove, maintains Roy,
that the ultimate reality as known today is immaterial,
mental, or spiritual.
The Origin of Materialism: In the second chapter of the
same book titled The Origin of Materialism, Roy says,
Ancient materialism became a comprehensive system in
the hand of Democritus. Several hundred years later, it
was further developed by Epicurus. The atomist theory
propounded by the former, and perfected by the latter,
ultimately became the foundation of modern science. The
atomism of Democritus contains the skeleton of materialist philosophy.7
Similarly, in the third chapter of the book, titled Materialism in Indian Philosophy, Roy approvingly re-

65

fers to the ancient Indian materialism of Charvak or

Lokayat. According to Roy, The long process of the development of naturalist, rationalist, sceptic, agnostic and
materialist though in ancient India found culmination in
the Charvak system of philosophy, which can be compared
with Greek Epicureanism, and as such is to be appreciated as the positive outcome of the intellectual culture of
ancient India.8
Modern Materialism: According to Roy, modern materialism is the outcome of scientific thinking since the time
of Democritus. Explaining the meaning of materialism
in the sixth chapter titled Modern Materialism; Roy describes materialism as the explanation of the world without the assumption of anything supernatural.9
According to Roy, The efforts made throughout the
ages for such an explanation have established a monistic
view of the Universe, and revealed the substratum of everything body, mind, soul as a material substance, a
physical entity, largely known and progressively knowable: Existence precedes thought; things, ideas; matter,
spirit.10
Roy once again admits that the discoveries of quantum physics have made the classical notion of matter
untenable. However, according to Roy, they do not suggest that the old philosophical concept of substance has
turned out to be a metaphysical category or it can be altogether discarded. Roy insists, The substratum of the
Universe is not matter as traditionally conceived; but it is
physical as against mental or spiritual. It is a measurable
entity. Roy also suggests to obviate prejudiced criticism,
the philosophy hitherto called Materialism may be renamed
Physical Realism.11

66

The Crisis of Modern Materialism: Roy has discussed

the crisis of materialism in the seventh chapter of his
book Materialism. According to Roy, in the last analysis,
the crisis involved the conception of matter; it did not
affect the existence of matter as such. The crisis simply
exposed the inadequacy of the old atomist theory. It simply showed that the atom was not the ultimate, irreducible, state of matter. The substance of the crisis was, in
words of Roy, that it appeared to reduce matter from
mass to energy or radiation. There was nothing particularly new in the changed conception of the nature of matter, according to Roy, which could turn over all traditional
theories of physics and mechanics.12
Another result of the crisis a corollary to the supposed disappearance of matter was, according to Roy,
the alleged destruction of the old theory of mechanics. In
the absence of mass, all traditional laws of mechanics
seemed to become untenable. Physics appeared to have
abolished the mechanistic conception of the universe.
Roy, as pointed out earlier in the first chapter, had a
very scientific conception of philosophy. He believed that
metaphysical concepts must be constantly revised in the
light of empirical knowledge. If the nature of the contents of a priori metaphysical concepts, such as space,
time, substance and causality, could not be revealed a posteriori by the advance of the empirical knowledge of objective reality, they should be discarded as empty abstractions. Whenever, says Roy, any philosophical doctrine
is rendered palpably untenable by verified results of scientific research, it must go. Otherwise, philosophy could not
claim to be the science of sciences a logical system of
knowledge.13

67

According to Roy, the revolutionary significance, in

the epistemological sense, of the twentieth century
physics is that is has acquired a body of experience which
cannot be fitted into the moulds of old concepts. New
conceptual moulds must be created to suit the new experience. Therefore, Roy was ready to discard the concept
of matter if it was exploded by scientific research. As he
says, If it were true that modern physical research had
exposed the concept of matter to be a metaphysical abstraction, devoid of any empirical, physical, ontological
content, well, so much the worse for it.14
However, according to Roy, the results of modern
physical researches, instead of contradiction materialist
philosophy, further strengthen it by giving it a positive
foundation.
Referring to the conclusions of W.Waubel, author of
standard works on physical chemistry, and other scientists, Roy tries to drive home the point that, The atom
has not disappeared. The old conception of it has been
modified in the light of a greater knowledge about it. The
atom has disappeared as the basic unit of matter. It has
been discovered to be a minute solar system, composed of
a large number of infinitesimally small particles of matter.15
The sub-atomic particle electron, for example, points
out Roy, is not a mysterious entity. It has a mass of its
own. Energy, on the other hand, is not a non-material entity, but a form of matter. Thus, according to Roy, the new
theories do not destroy the mechanistic conception of the
universe.
Roy also refers to Bertrand Russells view, expressed
in the introduction to the English edition of Langes History of Materialism:

68

The theory of Relativity, by merging time into

space-time, has damaged the traditional notion
of substance more than all arguments of philosophers. Matter, for commonsense, is something
which persists in time, and moves in space. But
for modern Relativity Physics, this view is no
longer tenable. A piece of matter has become,
not a persistent thing with varying states, but a
series of inter-related events. The old solidity is
gone, and with it the characteristic that, to the
Materialist, made matter seem more real than
fleeting thoughts.16
However, according to Roy, the theory of relativity
might go against the common-sense view of matter. But,
it does not destroy the scientific basis of the materialist
philosophy.
As regards the substance and structure of the world,
there is, according to Roy, no room for any serious scientific doubt. In words of Roy, To-day the substratum of
the world has been revealed to be an all-pervasive substance. That is the philosophical implication of the wave
theory of matter. The dualist conceptions of mass and
motion, matter and energy have become untenable. The
world has been analyzed down to a unitary substance. Not
only matter can be converted into energy, but energy also
can be converted into matter. That has been demonstrated
experimentally. So, energy is a material entity. That being
the case, the fact that the substratum of the world is composed of waves of energy does not prove that the world is
made of a spiritual substance. Physics thus has vindicated
materialism, having provided it with an unshakable foun-

69

dation of positive knowledge.17

Materialism and Twentieth Century Physics: In the
eighth chapter of his book titled Materialism and Twentieth Century Physics, Roy also discusses the philosophical consequences of Heisenbergs uncertainty or indeterminacy principle. It has been discovered, points out Roy,
that deep down in the foundation of the structure of the
physical world, the classical laws of mechanics do not hold
good; that the ultimate constituents of matter have no simple location in space.18
The significance of this revolutionary discovery is,
according to Roy, that ultimately the stuff of the world is
not a granular substance; that extension in space is not the
final test of physical existence.
Heisenberg, says Roy, does not deny the objectivity
of material world. His point is that our knowledge of physical processes is largely subjective, being necessarily dependent on our intelligence; and that there is a limit to the
accuracy of measurement because in the microcosmic
world the position and velocity of entities are disturbed by
the very act measuring them.
According to Roy, the issue is evidently epistemological how far the physical theories, particularly those
dealing with sub-microcosmic processes, give a true picture of reality. But there is no doubt about the fact, says
Roy, that physics does describe processes in something
which actually exists outside the mind of the physicists.
This something is a measurable magnitude, therefore, it is
physical. Materialist philosophy, with the more appropriate name Physical Realism, is, concludes Roy, corroborated by the latest scientific knowledge19 [emphasis
mine].

70

Science and Philosophy

Roy has also discussed materialism in his Science and
Philosophy. In this book, too Roy repeats his view that
the philosophical outcome of the twentieth century science is corroboration of Materialism.20
According to Roy, the philosophical significance of
new physics lies in the fact that it brings problems, hitherto considered to be metaphysical, within the range of
physical research. Such basic concepts as space, time, matter, causality, etc., are no longer objects of speculative
thought. Exact knowledge about their intrinsic nature and
inner structure is being acquired through observation and
experiment.
For classical physics, points out Roy, matter was composed of atoms, which were supposed to have no internal
structure. New physics, on the other hand, has not only
analyzed (and actually broken up) atoms into protons and
electrons, but has ascertained the quantitative value of these
newly discovered units of the physical world. In fact, investigation is pushed still farther as regards the internal
structure of these units themselves. In consequence of the
investigation, says Roy, the old philosophical concept of
substance is shedding its metaphysical character and is
appearing as something accessible to experience; that is,
as a physical category which can be measured mathematically.21
According to Roy, it is not true that new physics, as
represented by the quantum theory, has discarded the notion of substance. In fact, Roy maintains that is completes
a task begun by the theory of relativity by abolishing the
notion of absoluteness regarding substance and causality.

71

The theory of relativity, says Roy, reduces the entire

cosmic scheme, including space, time, mass, motion, force,
energy to one single category. The ultimate units of that
fundamental reality are conceived as events, instead of
mass-points in order to lay emphasis on its dynamic character. The world is not a static being; it is a process of
becoming. Therefore, it should be interpreted in terms of
events, that is, of changes in the state of its ultimate
constituents. Because events are dynamic physical
magnitudes, intervals between them are spatial as well as
temporal.
Roy observes that as long as physics and philosophy
believed in absolute space and time, regarded these as
ultimate categories, logically antecedent to being and
becoming, the criterion for reality of matter was simple
location in space. Matter was conceived as minute particles of mass occupying discrete positions in space at given
moments of time. However, atomic physics has discovered that matter does not possess those properties
always in the absolute sense. The notion of simple location in space must be abandoned.
These developments, points out Roy, has led some
philosophically minded scientists to the conclusion that
the old concept of substance must be discarded: matter
does not exist physically because its ultimate units are not
extended in space. However, says Roy, that conclusion
follows inevitably only if we hold on to the idea that existence is extension in space. The revolution in the concept
of space, brought about by the theory of relativity, according to Roy, compels rejection of the old definition of
existence. Matter does not exist in space. On the contrary,
space is a function of matter.22
Roy insists that the concept of substance is affected

72

by the revolution in new physics only as far as it was

identified with mass. Mass is a property of matter, but it
is, says Roy, variable like all other properties. The absoluteness of mass disappears already in the theory of
relativity. Energy is a form of matter, and matter is vibratory substance. In this way, atomic physics has reduced
matter to energy. However, that does not mean a denial of
matter, because, according to Roy, no quantum physicist
would deny the existence of atom and its constituents
electrons and protons.
There cannot be any doubt about the fact, says Roy,
that atomic physics deals with material realities which
exist objectively, outside the mind of the physicist.23
Thus, concludes Roy, the revolution in the concept of matter, brought about by the discoveries of Quantum physics, does not mean that all established physical
theories are upset, with the consequent downfall of the
mechanistic-materialist philosophical notions associated
with classical physics. The impending process is towards
a higher synthesis of ideas. Matter is not an inert mass
moved by a mysterious force. Matter and energy are the
dual manifestations of substance, which enters our experience as these manifested forms.24
Science, according to Roy, has proved the self-sufficiency of matter. Matter, says Roy, is an objective
category. Self-sufficient objectivity is the ultimate reality.
Therefore matter is the only reality.25
The basic principle of Materialism, as corroborated
and reinforced by modern scientific research, is, in words
of Roy:
The world, physical as well as biological, exists
objectively, is self-contained and self-explained;

73

there is nothing beyond and outside it; its being

and becoming are governed by laws inherent in
itself; laws are neither mysterious nor metaphysical, nor merely conventional; they are coherent
relations of events; consciousness, with its manifestations and derivatives is a property of that
which, in a certain state of organization, distinguishes existence from non-existence [emphasis
mine].26
Biology, according to Roy, does show that matter has
the capacity to organize itself into complex, conscious,
knowing, thinking beings; though we do not know as yet
how exactly the capacity of matter to produce life operates. Anyhow, says Roy, it is proved beyond doubt that
consciousness and mind are functions of organic matter.
Roy is not averse, in Science and Philosophy, to designating his philosophy as objectivism, naturalism or
realism. Referring to his formulation of the basic principle of materialism, as corroborated by modern scientific
research, he says, Call this philosophical generalization
of the various branches of scientific knowledge, objectivism, naturalism or realism, or by any other name you prefer to Materialism.27
However, Roys preference for the term physical
realism, which is evident in the revised version of
Materialism, is even more apparent in Reason,
Romanticism and Revolution.

Reason, Romanticism and Revolution

Materialism, says Roy in Reason, Romanticism and
Revolution, restated with the help of the latest scientific

74

knowledge, is the only philosophy possible. Roy frankly

admits materialism must be dissociated from certain notions which have been rendered untenable by the latest
discoveries of science.28
For these considerations, according to Roy, all really scientific objections to the term Materialism should
be obviated if the new philosophy is called Physical realism.29
Even so revised and renamed, to avoid confusion,
Materialism is vindicated as the only philosophy possible,
provided that philosophy is defined as a logical coordination of all branches of positive knowledge in a system of
thought to explain the world rationally and to serve as a
reliable guide for life.30
According to Roy, ever since the dawn of civilization, materialism has been the most plausible hypothesis
for rationalist philosophical thought and fruitful scientific
investigation.31 The alternative views of life religious,
teleological, idealist, mystic are not able to prove their
assumption and verify their postulates. Materialism is the
most plausible hypothesis, says Roy, because the categories of its metaphysics are not unknowable, even if unknown yet.

Causality, Probability and Determinism

Determinism, as we have seen, is a part of Roys materialism. As he says in Beyond Communism, materialism
reduces everything to the common denominator of physical Universe, subject to its fundamental law [emphasis
mine].
Further, according to Roy, the physical universe is
law-governed; nothing happens without a cause.

75

In Materialism and Science and Philosophy, too, Roy

insists that the latest scientific theories do not destroy the
mechanistic conception of the universe.
However, Roy also considers it essential to revise the
conception of causality in the light of latest scientific
developments. In particular, he tries to show that determinism and probability are not mutually exclusive conceptions.
Roy also makes a distinction between the rational
and scientific concept of determinism and the teleological or religious doctrine of predestination, and tries to
reconcile freedom of the will with determinism.
In his article The Concept of Causality in Modern
Science,32 published in The Humanist Way in 1949-50,
Roy refers to the view held by some physicists that
Heisenbergs principle of uncertainty necessitates the rejection of the doctrine of determinism. Nevertheless, according to Roy, no such drastic conclusion follows from
Heisenbergs principle; only a modification of the traditional principle of causality is required.
Roy insists that the new conception of matter introduced by atomic physics does not raise any doubt about
the reality of causal relations in nature. The question raised
by the new conception of matter is, according to Roy, about
the exactness with which causal relations, deep down in
the structure of the physical world, can be traced.
It has been discovered, says Roy, that the law of electronic movement cannot be stated in terms of causality,
because the light used for observing it disturbs the path of
an electron. As a result, it cannot be accurately predicted
where a particular electron will be the next moment. Only
the most probable position can be predicted. Thus, the
problem raised by the new quantum theory is, in words of

76

Roy, how to reconcile the concept of causal relations with

the observed uncertainty of electronic movement.
The application of the statistical method in the researches of atomic physics, however, maintains Roy, does
not disprove causality. In his article Probability and Determinism33 published in The Humanist Way in 1950 Roy
draws our attention to Heisenbergs statement that there
exists a body of exact mathematical laws which hold good
for quantum phenomena. The only difficulty is that these
laws cannot be interpreted as expressing simple relationships between objects existing in space and time.
Roy is quick to point out, on the basis of Heisenbergs
observation, that the sub-atomic world is not chaotic. In
words of Roy:
If sub-atomic phenomena can be described by
exact mathematical laws they cannot be indeterminate. Indeterminacy and law are mutually exclusive conceptions. Uncertainty is not indeterminacy.34
In a way, Roys main point is that we must not transfer the uncertainty of our knowledge to the object of knowledge. The fact that we cannot determine with certainty
the position and the velocity of an electron at a given time
(because its position and velocity are disturbed by the very
act of measuring them) does not mean that the electron
behaves in a chaotic and indeterminate manner. Had it
been really so, it would not have been possible to predict
its behavior even on the basis of probability.
When the number of entities entering in calculations
is so great as to be incalculable, there can be no absolute
certainty about prediction. Not all the causal influences,

77

even upon a particular event can be possibly traced. In

such a situation, says Roy, determinism has to be interpreted in terms of probability. Nevertheless, according to
Roy, determinism still remains. The innumerable numbers
of possibilities of a given situation are all determined.
Even if the most improbable event happened, it would be
causally determined. There is no place for miracles in
nature. Rejection of the idea of causality that there are
invariant relations in nature will mean, according to Roy,
blasting the very foundation of science. As he says:
The point of departure of all scientific enquiry is
the belief that the universe is a law-governed
system, and that these laws can be discovered,
understood and qualitatively stated. As long as
predictions can be made, and events happen approximately as predicted, the principle of physical determinism stands.35

Roys Materialism and Traditional

Materialism
How is Roys materialism different from traditional
materialism in general? Or, to be more exact, how is Roys
materialism different from classical or ancient Greek
materialism and modern materialism? I will attempt to
answer this question in this section with particular reference to ancient Greek materialists, Democritus and
Epicurus; and modern western materialists Hobbes (17th
Century) and Holbach (18th Century).
However, before we enumerate the important differences between Roys materialism and traditional materialism, it is worthwhile to draw attention to important simi-

78

larities between them. The two basic tenets of materialism, according to Russell, are: one, sole reality of matter;
and two, the reign of law.36 Roy has accepted both these
basic principles. Therefore, broadly speaking, Roys philosophy is in the tradition of materialism. However, there
are also important differences between Roys materialism
and traditional materialism.
Roys materialism is a restatement of traditional
materialism in the light of contemporary scientific knowledge. According to Roy, materialism restated with the help
of the latest scientific knowledge is the only philosophy
possible.
Roy clearly states materialism must be dissociated
from certain notions which have been rendered untenable
by the latest discoveries of science.
Roy even renames materialism as physical realism. According to Roy:
All really scientific objections to the term materialism should be obviated if the new philosophy
is called Physical Realism .
Thus, Roys materialism is revised and renamed to
avoid confusion.
Holbach, the great modern materialist of eighteenth
century, expounded a deterministic type of materialism in
the light of evidence from then contemporary science. In
a way, Roy has tried to do the same thing in the twentieth
century. However, Roys revision and restatement of materialism affects both the basic tenets of materialism. Roy
has revised the concept of matter as well as that of physical determinism in the light of latest scientific knowledge.

79

Change in the concept of matter

According to Roy, in the light of the latest discoveries of atomic physics the term matter can no longer by
used in classical sense. The discoveries of quantum physics, says Roy, have made the classical notion of matter
untenable. But, Roy insist that though the substratum of
the universe is not matter as traditionally conceived, it is
physical as against mental or spiritual. It is a measurable
entity.
The so-called crisis of materialism, according to
Roy, involved the conception of matter, and not its existence. The crisis simply exposed the inadequacy of the
old atomist theory. The substance of the crisis was, in
words of Roy, that it appeared to reduce matter from
mass to energy and radiation.
For classical physics, matter was composed of atoms,
which were supposed to have no internal structure. New
physics, points out Roy, has not only analyzed (and broken up) atoms into protons and electrons, but has ascertained the qualitative value of these newly discovered units
of physical world. Further, energy has been discovered to
be a form of matter, and matter has been found to be a
vibratory substance. In this way, atomic physics has reduced matter into energy. However, that, says Roy, does
not mean the denial of matter. No quantum physicist would
deny the existence of atom and its constituents
electrons and protons. There cannot be any doubt about
the fact that atomic physics deals with material realities
which exist objectively, outside the mind of the physicist.
Roy is even ready to discard the term matter provided a more appropriate new term is coined. In Science
and Philosophy, Roy describes matter as the sole ex-

80

istence. According to Roy, it is not very important what

name is attached to the substratum of existence matter, energy, action, vibratory motion or field. However, he
insists that it is a physical reality. What Roy means by
calling it physical is that it exists objectively and that it is
measurable.
So, in Roys materialism, matter is not made up
of hard and massy, stone-like atoms as in traditional mechanical materialism. The whole concept of matter has
been revised in the light of new physics. The atoms of
new physics are not only different from atoms of ancient Greek atomists Democritus and Epicurus, which are
all supposed to be made of the same stuff though endlessly varied in shape and size, etc., but also different from
the indivisible atoms of Newtonian natural philosophy.
Thus, according to Roy, materialist philosophy with the
more appropriate name physical realism is corroborated
by the latest scientific knowledge.

Revision of physical determinism in the light

of Heisenbergs principle
Physical determinism, as we have seen, is a part of
Roys materialism. According to Roy, the latest scientific theories do not destroy the mechanistic conception
of universe. In fact, Roy rejects the view held by some
that Heisenbergs principle of uncertainty necessitates the
rejection of the doctrine of determinism. He asserts that
only a modification in the traditional conception of causality is required. Causality, according to Roy, is not an a
priori form of thought or an axiomatic law. It is a physical
relation inherent in the constitution of the universe.
Roy actually tries to temper a rigidly mechanical

81

view of determinism by interpreting it in terms of probability. He admits plurality of possibilities and contingency
in the world, and tries to show that determinism and probability are not mutually exclusive. According to Roy, statistical methods presuppose determinism. In midst of chaos
it is not possible to say what is most probable to happen.
The universe is a law-governed system, and existence of
law pre-supposes causality. He is emphatic that the element of uncertainty in the sub-atomic world is not to be
equated with indeterminacy. Rejection of the idea that
there are invariant relations in nature will, maintains Roy,
blast the very foundation of science.
Soft Determinism: Roy also tries to reconcile freedom of the will with determinism. In Roys view the idea
of freedom, the possibility of choice distinguishes the rationalist concept of determinism from the teleological doctrine of predestination. According to him, human beings
possess will and can choose. Roy, however, is not unique
among materialists in recognizing free will. Epicurus,
among ancient materialists, and Hobbes, among modern
materialists, allowed for freedom of the will. Thus, Roy,
to use the terminology of William James, is not a hard
determinist like Holbach, but a soft determinist like
Hobbes.37
While Epicurus attributes free will to atoms, and
Hobbes reconciles determinism and freedom by defining
freedom as absence of external constraints on human
action,38 Roy gives an altogether different explanation.
According to Roy, the vast world of biological evolution
lies between the world of human beings and the world of
inanimate matter, and, therefore, the world of human beings has its own specific laws, though these laws can be

82

referred back to the general laws of the world of dead

matter. The living matter grows out of the background of
dead matter; consciousness appears at a much later stage.
Therefore, human will, says Roy, cannot be directly related to the laws of physical universe.

Objective Reality of Ideas and the Autonomy

of the Mental World
Though Roy traces the origin of mental activities to
the physical background of the living world, yet he also
grants them an objective existence of their own. Mind and
matter, according to Roy, can be reduced to a common
denominator; but as such, they are two objective realities.
Any attempt to deny the objective reality of ideas, says
Roy, only vulgarizes monism.39
After the generation of ideas, the single basic current
of physical events bifurcates: the biological world, on the
higher levels is composed of a double process dynamics
of ideas and succession of physical events. Thus, in Roys
view, once they are formed, ideas exist by themselves,
governed by their own laws.
In this way, though Roy, like other materialists, traces
the origin of ideas to material or physical world, he
perhaps grants them much more objectivity than traditionally granted by materialists.
As we have noted in the previous chapter, materialism, according to Keith Campbell, gives to matter a
primary position and accords to mind (or spirit) a secondary, dependent reality or even none at all [emphasis
mine]. Materialism, which grants no existence to mind at
all, and asserts that the real world consists of material
things, varying in their states and relations, and nothing

83

else has been called extreme materialism by Campbell.40

Roy, we may say, is not an extreme materialist. Julian de
la Mettrie, an eighteenth century materialist had declared
man to be a self-moving machine, whereas, according to
Roy, Man is not a living machine, but a thinking animal.

Emphasis on Ethics
Roy has given a very important place to ethics in his
philosophy. In Roys view, the greatest defect of classical Materialism was that its cosmology did not seem to
have any connection with ethics.41 Roy strongly asserts
that if it is not shown that materialist philosophy can have
an ethics, then, human spirit thirsting for freedom will spurn
materialism. According to Roy, a materialist ethics is not
only possible, but materialist morality is the noblest form
of morality, because it enables human beings to be moral
without debasing themselves before imaginary super human powers. Roy links morality with human beings innate
rationality. Man is moral, says Roy, because he is rational.
In Roys ethics freedom, which Roy links with struggle
for existence, is the highest value. Search for truth is a
corollary to the quest for freedom.
Roy makes a distinction between metaphysical idealism (derived from the word idea) and ethical idealism
(derived from the word ideal) or practical idealism.
In this second sense, points out Roy, idealism is identified with the virtue of dedicating life to an ideal. Roy is at
pains to emphasize that metaphysical idealism has nothing
to do with practical idealism; and that philosophical
materialism, though opposed to metaphysical idealism, is
not opposed to practical idealism.42
Thus, we may regard the very important place given

84

to ethics by Roy in his philosophy as a special feature of

his materialism. However, it is pertinent to note that, contrary to the popular impression, some ancient and modern
materialists, too, accorded an important place to ethics in
their philosophies. Epicurus, for example, as we have seen
in the previous chapter, not only allowed for free will but
also advocated an enlightened and refined variety of egoistic hedonism.
Among modern materialists, surprisingly, the principle aim of a hard determinist like Holbach was to
construct a system of ethical and political values on materialistic grounds. According to Holbach, happiness is the
supreme natural goal of human existence. However, as no
one can be happy without services of others, ethics, in
Holbachs view, is the science of human co-operation to
promote the well being of the individual through that of
society. Ethics, therefore, is based, maintains Holbach, on
the positive knowledge of mans reciprocal social needs.
If mankind has always been morally corrupt, says Holbach,
religion has been mainly to blame. Supernatural theology,
by falsifying mans nature and linking mans salvation to
the illusory notions of god and immortality, has entirely
subverted ethical truth. Holbach, thus, concludes that atheism is the prerequisite of all valid ethical teaching.43
Therefore, Roy is not unique among materialists in
trying to give an important place to ethics in his materialism, though he does emphasize that the greatest defect of
classical materialism was that it did not seen to have any
connection with ethics. Roy rather resembles Holbach in
this respect, though he is not a hard determinist like
Holbach, and also the details of his ethical ideas are different from that of Holbach.

85

Materialim and New Humanism

What, according to Roy, is the relationship between
materialism and new humanism? As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Roy has stated in his Beyond
Communism that the Twenty-Two Theses on Radical
Democracy, are deduced from materialist philosophy.
In his preface to the second edition of New
Humanism Roy says that the principles of humanist philosophy of history and society outlined in the Theses
are deducible only from a general philosophy of nature
and life, still to be elaborated on the basis of cosmological,
ontological, epistemological and ethical concepts and
propositions which are also stated in the Theses [emphasis mine].
Further, according to Roy, Though presented here
as a political philosophy New Humanism is meant to be a
complete system. Based on the ever expanding totality of
scientific knowledge, it cannot indeed be a closed system
claiming finality and infallibility.
In his Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, Roy reiterates his view that, Except on the basis of a philosophy
embracing the totality of existence, all approaches to the
problems of individuals as well as social life are bound to
be misleading a sound social and political philosophy
must have a metaphysical foundation.44
He further adds, In so far it shows a way out of the
crisis of our time, New Humanism is a social philosophy.
But, as such, it is deduced from a general philosophy of
nature, including the world of matter and the world of
mind. Its metaphysics is physical-realist and its cosmology is mechanistic.
Thus, according to Roy, social and political philoso-

86

phy must have a metaphysical foundation, and new

humanism, which is presented in the Twenty-Two Theses,
as a political philosophy is deducible from a general philosophy of nature and life, which Roy calls materialism
in Beyond Communism and physical realism in Reason,
Romanticism and Revolution.

87

Notes
1

M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1981), p. 28.

2
Ibid., p. 38.
3
Ibid., p. 44.
4
M. N. Roy, Materialism (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers
Ltd., 1951), p. 5.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., p. 58.
8
Ibid., p.94.
9
Ibid., p. 184.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid., pp. 208-9.
13
Ibid., p. 217
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid., p. 213.
16
Ibid., pp. 213-14.
17
Ibid., pp.215-16.
18
Ibid., p. 218.
19
Ibid., p. 232.
20
M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1984), p. 18.
21
Ibid., p.63.
22
Ibid., p. 85.
23
Ibid., p. 97.
24
Ibid., pp. 88-89.
25
Ibid., p. 100.
26
Ibid., p. 189.
27
Ibid.
28
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution (Delhi:
Ajanta Publications, 1989), p. 492.
29
Ibid., p. 493.

88

30

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 492.
32
M. N. Roy, The Concept of Causality in Modern Science, The Humanist Way, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1949-50.
33
M. N. Roy, Probability and Determinism, The Humanist
Way, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1950.
34
Ibid., p. 244.
35
M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy, pp. 104-5.
36
F. A. Lange, The History of Materialism (London: Kegan
Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1925), p. xii.
37
As Paul Edwards has pointed out in A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, philosophers have mainly taken three
different positions on the question of freedom and determinism. Some philosophers have accepted determinism and
rejected freedom. Secondly, there have been philosophers
who, agreeing that determinism is not compatible with
freedom and moral responsibility, have accepted freedom and
rejected determinism. Thirdly, there have been philosophers
who have maintained that both determinism and our belief in
freedom are true, and that any appearance of conflict is
deceptive. Among pre-Marxian modern materialists, Holbach
belongs to the first category, whereas Hobbes belongs to the
third category. Roy, too, like Hobbes belongs to the third
category mentioned by Edwards. [Paul Edwards and Arthur
Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction to Philosophy (Glencoe,
Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), pp.312-314.]
38
R. S. Peters, Hobbes, Thomas in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 41.
39
M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism, p.32-33.
40
Keith Campbell, Materialism in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Vol. 5, p. 179.
41
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p.462.
42
M. N. Roy, Materialism, p. 234.
43
Aram Vartanian, Holbach, Paul-Henry Thiry, Baron D
in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 50.
44
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p.487.
31

89

90

IV. Roys Materialism and

Marxian Materialism
In the previous chapter, I have enumerated the
important differences between Roys materialism and
traditional materialism in general. In this chapter I will
concentrate on differences between Roys materialism and
Marxian materialism in particular: how is Roys materialism different from Marxian materialism? However, before
discussing the differences between Roys materialism and
Marxian materialism, I will discuss Marxian materialism
in brief.

Marxian Materialism
The word Marxism has been used in different senses.
However, in its most essential meaning it refers to the
thought of Karl Marx, sometimes extended to include that
of his friend and collaborator Friedrich Engels. In this
chapter, I am mainly interested in understanding Marxism
materialism with reference to the works of Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels.
Sometimes a distinction is made between orthodox
Marxism and Western Marxism or neo-Marxism. The
so-called Western Marxism or neo-Marxism derives
inspiration from the early writings of Marx and differs from
orthodox or traditional Marxism in emphasizing, not
historical materialism, but the description of consciousness as the central component in Marxs social analysis. It
will be worthwhile to make clear in the very beginning

91

that in this chapter I am not concerned with neo-Marxism but with orthodox Marxism based on hitherto wellknown writings of Marx and Engels.
Marxian materialism in the sense mentioned above
may further be analyzed into (a) dialectical materialism
and (b) historical materialism. The view of the world as a
whole is called dialectical materialism, a title devised
by the Russian Marxist Plekhanov. On the other hand, the
view of human society is called historical materialism,
the name given to it by Engels.

Dialectical Materialism
Marx and Engels admit only two philosophical masters Hegel and Feuerbach. Marx was born in 1818 in
Germany and he grew up at a time when the influence of
Hegel was at its height. He studied law in Bonn, and philosophy and history in Berlin where, as Marx later said,
the intellectual legacy of Hegel, dead five years earlier,
weighed heavily on the living.
Marx received a doctorate from the university of Jena
in 1841 for a thesis on ancient Greek materialists,
Democritus and Epicurus. As an undergraduate, Marx attached himself to a group called Young Hegelians,
particularly to its left wing, which was rapidly moving towards atheism and also talked vaguely of political action.
Marx was known as a militant atheist whose creed was:
Criticism of religion is the foundation of all criticism.1
In 1841 Marx, together with other Young Hegelians
was much influenced by the publication of The Essence of
Christianity in German by Ludwig Feuerbach, a young
philosopher in reaction against Hegels thoughts. Another
work of Feuerbach, which aroused the enthusiasm of

92

Marx and Engels, was his Critique of Hegelian

Philosophy (1839) in which he argued that Hegelian metaphysics is simply theology in disguise the last refuge,
the last rational support of theology. In his Essence of
Christianity Feuerbach tried to show that theology itself
is a confused, fantastic way of depicting social relationships. Man makes god, maintained Feuerbach, in his own
image.2
Ludwig Feuerbach, to Marxs mind, successfully criticized Hegel from the materialist standpoint, and destroyed
metaphysics and religion in a single blow, leaving only
nature as something to be studied by observation, not
deduced by thought. Thus, through the influence of
Feuerbach, Marx became a thorough going materialist,
and abandoned critically, what he considered the mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic. However, in reacting
against Hegel, argued Marx, Feuerbach had failed to appreciate Hegels great contribution to philosophy his
dialectic method.
So, the philosophical efforts of Marx and Engels were
towards a combination of Hegels dialectic with
Feuerbachs materialism. As Engels says in a preface to
Anti-Duhring, Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealist
philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of
nature and history.3
Approving references to materialism are prominent
in the early works of Marx and Engels such as The Holy
Family (1845) and The German Ideology (1846). In The
Holy Family, for instance, they argued that one branch of
eighteenth century French materialism developed into
natural science and the other branch into socialism and
communism. Thus, they regarded the new materialism

93

as a source of the social movement, which they believed,

was destined to revolutionize human life.4
One aspect of Marxian materialism is rejection of idealist attempts to undermine and belittle sense experience.
Hence, the Marxian view of knowledge is realist. According to H. B. Acton the author of The Illusion of the
Epoch, Marxs materialism is very wide in scope, combining empiricism, realism, belief in the use of scientific
methods pragmatically conceived, rejection of
supernaturalism, and rejection of mind-body dualism.5
According to John Passmore, on the other hand, by
materialism, the Marxists usually mean what is more
customary to call representationalism the view that the
concepts in our heads are images of real things6 [emphasis mine].
Marx, too, emphasizes the same aspect of his materialism when he distinguishes his dialectic method from
Hegels in the following words:
My dialectic method is not only different from
Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel,
the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the
Idea", he even transforms into an independent
subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and
the real world is only the external, phenomenal
form of "the Idea". With me, on the contrary,
the ideal is nothing else than the material world
reflected by the human mind, and translated into
forms of thought [emphasis mine].7

94

John Passmore summarizes the meaning of dialectical materialism in the following manner:
Dialectical materialism is the theory that things
exist independently of us and are reflected in
our minds as ideas. These objective existences,
as well as our ideas of them, are in a constant
state of flux, the flux which Engels describes as
the overcoming of contradictions, the negation
of negations.8
The three main laws of dialectics, namely, the law
of transformation of quantity into quality, the law of interpenetration of opposites and the law of the negation of
negation has been explained by Engels in his Dialectics of
Nature (written 1872-86; first published in 1925).9
According to Engels:
The world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things but as a complex of
processes, in which things apparently stable, no
less than their mind-images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of
coming into being and passing away.10
Finally, according to dialectical materialism the manifold processes taking place in the universe are in essential relation and interconnection, so that they cannot be
understood each separately all by itself but only in their
relation and interconnections.11
Thus, dialectical materialism is materialist in theory
and dialectical in its method.

95

Historical Materialism
As mentioned earlier, the Marxian view of human
society is known as historical materialism. Marx has
given a brief presentation of historical materialism in his
preface to his Critique of Political Economy (1859). Marx
and Engels had, however, already formulated it in their
The German Ideology, written in 1845-46 but not published until 1932. Marx himself gave a brief account of
historical materialism or the materialist conception of
history in his Poverty of Philosophy (1847). A vigorous
sketch of this view is found in the Communist Manifesto
(1848), authored jointly by Marx and Engels. Marxs chief
work Capital (the first volume of which was published by
Marx in 1867 and the other two by Engels after Marxs
death) is an application of the historical materialist view
to the capitalist form of society.
The word historical materialism has been used by
Engels in his Socialism: Utopian and Scientific to designate that view of the course of history which seeks the
ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct
classes, and in the struggles of these classes against one
another.12
According to historical materialism or materialist
conception of history, in order to understand society, it
is necessary to distinguish between economic base of social order from the legal, political and cultural superstructure, which rests on it. Karl Marx has formulated the doctrine in the preface to the Critique of Political Economy

96

in following words:
In the social production of their means of existence men enter into definite, necessary relations
which are independent of their will, productive
relationships which correspond to a definite stage
of development of their material productive
forces. The aggregate of these productive relationships constitutes the economic structure of
society, the real basis on which a juridicial and
political superstructure arises, and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond.
The mode of production of the material means
of existence conditions the whole process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence,
but, on the contrary, it is their social existence
that determines their consciousness.
Further,
At a certain stage of their development the material productive forces of society come into contradiction with the existing productive relationships, or, what is but a legal expression for these,
with the property relationships within which they
have moved before. From forms of development
of the productive forces these relationships are
transformed into their fetters. Then an epoch of
social revolution opens. With the change in the
economic foundation the whole vast superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.13

97

Doctrine of Class Struggle: The Marxian doctrine of class

struggle is a part of its interpretation of history, or, in other
words, historical materialism. From Marxian point of view,
a class is a social group whose members share the same
relationship to the means of production. Thus, during the
feudal epoch, there are two main classes distinguished by
their relationship to land, the major means of production:
the feudal landowner who own the land, and the landless
serfs who work on land. Similarly, in the capitalist era,
there are two main classes, the bourgeoisie or capitalist
class which owns the means of production and the proletariat whose member sell their labor power to the capitalist for wages.
According to Marxism, any society develops through
four main epochs: primitive communism, slavery or ancient society, feudal society and capitalism. Marx further
believed that class struggle was the driving force of social
change.
In the famous words of The Communist Manifesto,
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history
of class struggle. According to Marx, the basic contradictions contained in the capitalist economic systems
would lead to its eventual destruction. The proletariat
would overthrow the bourgeoisie and abolish private property. Property would be communally owned and since all
members would now share the same relationship to the
means of production, a classless society would result. This,
stage of development is called socialism. Finally, because, according to Marxism, state is an instrument of
class-rule oppression of one class by another with the
abolition of class, the coercive power of state will no longer
be needed and state itself will disappear.

98

Roys Materialism and Marxian

Materialism
Marxian materialism, as we have seen earlier may
further be analyzed into (a) dialectical materialism and (b)
historical materialism. Out of these two, historical materialism is clearly rejected by Roy in his Twenty-Two
Theses. However, in addition to this, Roy also had reservations on linking materialism with Hegelian dialectics and,
accordingly, he tries to delink dialectics from materialism.

Delinking of Dialectics and Materialism

According to Roy, there is no necessary connection
between dialectics and Materialism. Marx arbitrarily
hitched the Hegelian fever fantasy on to Materialism.14
Roy points out that the orthodox exponents of
Marxian materialism take great pains to differentiate it from
the mechanical materialism of the eighteenth century.
This practice, in Roys view, betrays a remarkable lack of
historical sense. Marx, according to Roy, learned not only
from Epicurus but also from other materialist philosophers.
Holbachs System of Nature, says Roy, still remains the
fundamental treatise of materialism, and the relation
between Diderot and Marx is closer than that between
Marx and Hegel.15
In Roys view, Marx, misguided by his Hegelian
schooling disowned the heritage of eighteenth century
mechanical materialism and he was carried away by the
essentially idealistic concept of dialectics. To quote Roy,
The Hegelian heritage, indeed, is the weak spot of Marxism. The simplicity and scientific soundness of material-

99

ism are marred by making its validity conditional upon

dialectics16 [emphasis mine].
Marx loaded his otherwise self-contained materialism with Hegelian ballast, continues Roy, because in his
earlier days his epistemology was unsound.
The ideal is nothing other than the material, when it
has been transferred and transplanted inside the human
head. This nave theory of perception, says Roy, could
not be maintained except with the help of the mysticism
of Hegelian dialectics. According to Roy, It is not true
that Marx put Hegelian logic on its head. On the contrary,
he simply took it over, and called his philosophy dialectical materialism.17
Later on, says Roy Marx corrected his epistemology. Thereafter his philosophy could be freed from the
handicap of Hegelian mysticism, called dialectics. But
that did not happen because the earlier epistemological
error of Marx somehow persisted in his philosophy.18
The supreme emphasis laid on dialectics in the Marxist theoretical system has been, according to Roy, the
source of endless confusion. All Marxist theoreticians,
says Roy, talk tirelessly and tiresomely of dialectics and
dialectical laws without themselves having any clear idea
of what they talk about. The result has been like the blind
leading the blind into the ditch.19
Eduard Bernstein, says Roy, was the first Marxist to
point out that the errors of Marx and Engels were due to
the disastrous influence of dialectics. The basic error in
the philosophical thinking of the founders of dialectical
materialism, according to Roy, was to confound logic
with ontology. In words of Roy,
In the Marxist system, dialectic is the fundamen-

100

tal law of thought, and it is also a description of

the processes of nature, biological as well as
inanimate. The subject matter of a branch of
metaphysical enquiry is confounded with the instrument for conducting that enquiry. In Marxist
philosophy logic as well as ontology bear the identical label of dialectic. Confusion, therefore, is
inevitable.20
The only serious attempt to explain Marxian dialectics in terms of rational philosophical language was made,
according to Roy, by Plekhanov. He tried to meet the criticism, not only of the revisionist Bernstein, but also of
authoritative logicians like Ueberweg and Trendelenburg.
As regard the latter two, Plekanovs contention was that
their arguments were valid for the identical dialectics of
Hegel, but had no relevancy for the Marxist brand. The
contention, says Roy, was pointless unless it could be
proved that Marxian dialectic was really different from
the Hegelian fever fantasy; and Plekhanov could not do
that.
In one short essay, Plekhanov defined dialectics as
the logic of contradiction and also the logic of movement. Thus he took, in words of Roy, the absurd position of identifying contradiction with movement, and unwittingly threw away his entire case in defense of dialectical Materialism as materialist dialectics.21
Marxian casuists, according to Roy, came to grief
because none of them ever knew what exactly they were
defending a system of logic or of metaphysics.22
However, since there is, in Roys view, no necessary
connection between dialectics and materialism, the absurdities of Marxian dialectics, according to Roy, do not affect

101

the validity of materialist philosophy. Therefore, Roy categorically asserts:

Materialism, pure and simple, stands on its own
legs, progressively reinforced by science, because
it is the only philosophy possible [emphasis
mine].23

Rejection of Historical Materialism

Roy rejects historical materialism or the economic
interpretation of history, and presents a humanist interpretation of history in the fourth, fifth and sixth theses of
his Twenty-Two Theses. Historical determinism, according to Roy does not exclude freedom of the will. In fact,
human will, in Roys view, is the most powerful determining factor in history. In Roys words, History is a
determined process; but there are more than one causative factors. Human will is one of them, and it cannot
always be referred directly to any economic incentive [emphasis mine].
Roy not only regards human will as an important determining factor in history, but also rejects the Marxian
doctrine which treats ideas as mere superstructure erected
on the economic infrastructure. As he says in his sixth
thesis, the dynamics of ideas runs parallel to the process
of social evolution, the two influencing each other mutually. However, in no particular point of the process of integral human evolution, can a direct causal relation be established between historical events and the movement of
ideas. (Idea is here used in the common philosophical
sense of ideology or system of ideas). Cultural patterns
and ethical values are not mere ideological superstructures

102

of established economic relations. They are also historically determined by the logic of the history of ideas.
In Beyond Communism, too, Roy categorically rejects the view that ethical values, cultural patterns, movement of ideas, are mere superstructures raised to justify
established economic relations. Roy points out that his
own materialism differentiates itself from Marxist materialist determinism by recognizing the autonomy of the
mental world, in the context of physical nature.24
Elaborating on his rejection of the economic interpretation of history in his New Humanism A Manifesto,
Roy says:
The economic interpretation of history has
brought Marxism to grief. A philosophy of history, which ignores other factors of human life
than the forces of production, particularly the
dynamics of ideas, and disregards moral problems, cannot be a reliable guide for constructive
social action. Marxist historicism has been put
to test and found wanting. A new, more comprehensive, philosophy of history is the crying need
of the day 25
Roy expresses his dissatisfaction with Marxian economic determinism is the following words in his Reason,
Romanticism and Revolution:
Marxist economic determinism is no less antithetical to the idea of social revolution than the
religious teleological view of nature, life and society.26

103

In trying to combine rationalism, that is, the view

that history is a determined process, with the romantic
view of life, which declares the freedom of will, Marxist
historiology, according to Roy, contradicts itself. The doctrine of Marx that man is the maker of the social world
contradicts materialist philosophy, unless the mechanistic
view of evolution is clearly differentiated from teleology;
and unless romanticism is reconciled with reason, and freedom of will is fitted into the scheme of determined evolutionary process. That can be done, in words of Roy, only
by recognizing the creative role of man, not as a mere cog
in the wheel of mechanistic process, determined by the
development of the means of production, but as a sovereign force, a thinking being who creates the means of production.27
The doctrine that social revolution is determined by
the development of the means of production, points out
Roy, begs the question: who created the first means of
production and how?
According to Roy, Man is greater than any means of
production, which are his creation.28
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Roy in his
revised version of materialism allows for the freedom of
will and the autonomy of the mental world. According to
Roy, man possesses free will and can choose. Human will,
says Roy, cannot be directly related to the laws of physical
universe. Similarly, Roy is also of the view that once they
are formed, ideas exist by themselves, governed by their
own laws. According to Roy, materialism needs to be
restated to recognize explicitly the decisive importance
of the dynamics of ideas in all the processes of human
evolution29
Both these features of Roys materialism have an im-

104

portant bearing on his philosophy of history, and his consequent rejection of historical materialism. In fact, Roy is
at pains to emphasize that there is no logical connection
between materialism and the so-called historical materialism. The economic interpretation of history, according
to Roy, is deduced from a wrong interpretation of materialism. It implies dualism, whereas materialism is a monistic
philosophy. Roy asserts:
Materialism is the only philosophy possible; economic determinism is a method of interpreting
history. There are other methods [emphasis
mine].30
Incidentally, Bertrand Russell, too, in his The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism makes the point that there
is no essential connection between philosophical materialism and historical materialism. According to Russell,
philosophical materialism does not prove that economic
causes are fundamental in politics. The view of Buckle,
for example, according to which climate is one of the decisive factors, is equally compatible with materialism. So
is the Freudian view, which traces everything to sex. There
are innumerable ways of viewing history which are materialistic in the philosophic sense without being economic
or falling within the Marxian formula. Thus the materialistic conception of history may be false even if materialism in the philosophic sense be true31 [emphasis mine].

Emphasis on Ethics
We have seen in the previous chapter that Roy gave a
very important place to ethics in his materialism. We have

105

also noted that Roy is not unique among materialists in

emphasizing the importance of ethics in his philosophy.
The same is true of Epicurus, among ancient materialists,
and Holbach, among modern materialists. Nevertheless,
this, certainly, is an important difference between Roys
materialism and Marxian materialism, which seems to give
no place at all to ethics in its scheme of things.
Marx and Engels were primarily interested in social
change, as is evident from the oft-quoted statement of
Marx: The philosophers have only interpreted the world
in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.32
In their anxiety to make their theory of social change
scientific, Marx and Engels appear to have totally neglected the ethical aspect of social change. Not only they
neglected the ethical aspect of social change, but, in fact,
they had nothing but contempt for such an approach, which
they condemned as utopian.
M. N. Roy, on the other hand, is highly critical of
such insensitive attitude towards problems of ethics. As
he says in Reason, Romanticism and Revolution:
An unbiased study of the pre-Marxian history of
socialist thought shows that some of the charges
against the Utopians were simply unfounded. As
regards the charge of appealing to morality, they
were guilty, but only from the Marxist point of
view. For rejecting that appeal, Marxism was
doomed to betray its professed ideas and ideals.
The contention that "from the scientific point of
view, this appeal to morality and justice does not
help us an inch farther", was based upon a false
notion of science.33

106

According to Roy, Marx, under the influence of

Hegelian dialectics, rejected eighteenth century materialism as mechanical, and, at the same time, disowned the
humanist tradition of the earlier advocates of social justice, ridiculing them as Utopians.34
In Roys view Feuerbach could throw off Hegelian
influence more completely than Marx, and Marx made a
mistake by beginning the formulation of his dialectical
materialism with a criticism of Feuerbach. That wrong
start, says Roy, put an indelible stamp on the entire
Marxist system.35
Marxian materialism is, according to Roy, defective
in so far it disowns Feuerbachs humanism. The defect,
says Roy, divorces materialism from ethics, and consequently opens up the possibility of its degenerating into a
carnal pragmatic view of life.36
Roy himself believed that the problems confronting
the modern world leads to the conclusion that the crisis
of our time calls for a complete reorientation of social
philosophy and political theories, so as to recognize the
supreme importance of moral values in public life.37
Further, according to Roy, the inspiration for a new
philosophy of revolution must be drawn from the traditions of humanism and moral radicalism. Roy, as we have
seen earlier, finds fault with the Marxian interpretation of
history for disregarding moral problems and treating ethical values as merely superstructures raised to justify established economic relations.
To sum up, Roys materialism is different from
Marxian materialism in three important ways. Firstly, Roy
considers the Hegelian heritage a weak spot of Marxism.
Making its validity conditional upon dialectics mars the
simplicity and scientific soundness of materialism. Accord-

107

ing to Roy, on the other hand, materialism, pure and simple, can stand on its own legs, and, therefore, he tries to
delink dialectics from materialism. The validity of materialism, maintains Roy, is in no way conditional on dialectics, as there is no logical connection between the two.
Secondly, Roy rejects historical materialism and advocates a humanist interpretation of history in which he
gives an important place to human will as determining factor in history and recognizes the autonomy of the mental
world. According to Roy, human will cannot be directly
related to the laws of physical universe. Ideas, too, have
an objective existence and their own laws govern them.
The economic interpretation of history is in Roys view,
deduced from a wrong interpretation of materialism.
Thirdly, Roys materialism is sharply different from
Marxian materialism in so far it recognizes the importance
of ethics and gives a prominent place to it. According to
Roy, Marxian materialism wrongly disowns the humanist
tradition and thereby divorces materialism from ethics. The
contention that from the scientific point of view, this appeal to morality and justice does not help us an inch farther was based, according to Roy, upon a false notion of
science.
Roy, before he formulated and expounded his own
philosophy of new humanism, was an orthodox Marxist.
In fact, Roys revision of materialism, which we have discussed in detail in the previous chapter, was carried on in
the context of Marxism.
This fact comes out very clearly in the issues of The
Marxian Way, where Roy repeatedly emphasizes the need
to revise Marxian materialism. For instance, in the JulySeptember, 1945, issue of The Marxian Way, Roy says:

108

Human knowledge has advanced considerably

since the days of Marx. The startling discoveries
of modern physics appear to have knocked off
the foundation of materialist philosophy. Some
hypotheses of nineteenth century physics have,
indeed, proved to be fallacious, and new facts
have been discovered. The Marxist materialism
must be accordingly revised, if its claim to be the
only scientific philosophy is to be vindicated.38
The convincing way out of the situation, according
to Roy, is to show that the philosophical consequences of
the post Marxian scientific research can be fitted into the
materialist view of nature and life. The fallacies of
Newtonian natural philosophy should be admitted; Materialism should be freed from those fallacies and restated in
terms which would harmonize with the latest scientific
knowledge 39
Roys physical realism, as we have seen, is precisely
such a restatement of traditional materialism. Thus, Roys
revision of traditional materialism is also applicable to
Marxian materialism to the extent Marxian materialism
resembles traditional materialism.

109

Notes
1

Neil McInnes, Marx, Karl in The Encyclopedia of

Philosophy, Vol. 5, p. 172.
2
John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Great
Britain: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978), p. 44.
3
Fredrick Engels, Prefaces to the three editions of AntiDuhring in On Dialectical Materialism (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1977), p. 58.
4
H. B. Acton, Dialectical Materialism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 389.
5
Ibid.
6
John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 46.
7
Karl Marx, Afterword to the Second German Edition of
the first Volume of Capital in On Dialectical Materialism,
56-57.
8
John Passmore, Op. Cit., p. 46.
9
In his book Dialectical Materialism, Maurice Cornforth has
explained the three main laws of dialectics, namely, the law of
transformation of quantity into quality; the law of interpenetration of opposites and the law of negation are. The first
law, according to Cornforth, can be illustrated by the fact that
if water is being heated, it does not go on getting hotter and
hotter indefinitely, at a certain critical temperature, it begins
to turn into steam undergoing a qualitative change from liquid
to gas.
According to the law of unity and struggle of opposites, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative change consists in the struggle of opposites opposite tendencies, opposite forces within the
things and process concerned. In order to understand how and
why transition takes place from an old qualitative state to a
new qualitative state. We have to understand the contradictions inherent in each thing and process we are considering,
and how a struggle of opposite tendencies arises on the
basis of these contradictions. For example, the contradic-

110

tion between socialized production and capitalist appropriation is the basic contradiction of capitalism. It is because of
this contradiction that the struggle between the classes
develops. Moreover, it is from the struggle of opposite
tendencies arising because of the contradiction inherent in the
social system, that social transformation, the leap to a
qualitatively new stage of social development, takes place.
According to the law of negation of negation, in the course
of development, because of double negation, a later stage can
repeat an earlier stage, but repeat it on a higher level of
development.[Maurice Cornforth, Dialectical Materialism
(Calcutta: National Book Agency Private Ltd., 1984), pp.7880]
10
Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, Chapter IV, quoted by
Maurice Cornforth in Dialectical Materialism, p. 35.
11
Maurice Cornforth, Dialectical Materialism, p. 44.
12
F. Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 15.
13
William Ebenstein, Modern Political Thought (New Delhi:
Oxford & IBH Publishing Company, 1970), p. 411.
14
M. N. Roy, Editorial Notes, The Marxian Way, Vol. II,
No. 4, 1946-47, p. 364.
15
M. N. Roy, Editorial Notes, The Marxian Way, Vol. I,
No. 3, 1946, p. 274.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., pp. 274-275.
18
Ibid., p. 276.
19
M. N. Roy, Editorial Notes, The Marxian Way, Vol. II,
No. 4, p. 356.
20
Ibid., pp. 356-57.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
M.N.Roy, Editorial Notes, The Marxian Way, Vol. I, No.
3, 1945, p.276.
24
M.N. Roy, Beyond Communism, p. 43.
25
M. N. Roy, New Humanism A Manifesto, p. 16.

111

26

M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p. 478.

Ibid., p.410.
28
M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism, p. 66.
29
M.N.Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p. 9.
30
M. N. Roy, Philosophy of History, The Marxian Way,
Vol.II, No. 3, 1947, p. 255.
31
Bertrand Russell, The Theory and Practice of Bolshevism
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1975), p. 59.
32
Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach in On Dialectical
Materialism, p. 32.
33
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p. 405.
34
Ibid.,p. 418.
35
Ibid., p. 388.
36
M.N.Roy, Philosophy of History, The Marxian Way,
Vol. II, No. 3, p. 244.
37
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p. 451.
38
M. N. Roy, Editorial, The Marxian Way, Vol. I, No. 1, ,
1945, p. 80.
39
M. N. Roy, Editorial Notes, The Marxian Way, Vol. II,
No. 1, 1946, p. 80. Also see M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p. 416.
27

112

V. Materialism or Physical
Realism?
In this book, I have been mainly interested in clarifying the nature of Roys materialism, and differentiating it
from traditional materialism in general and Marxian
materialism in particular. I have also been interested in
clarifying the nature of Roys new humanism, and in investigating the relationship between new humanism and
materialism. In this concluding chapter, I will make some
critical observations on Roys philosophy. In doing so, I
will concentrate on answering two questions: (a) How far
the use of the term materialism to designate Roys philosophy appropriate? and (b) Is there, in fact, any logical
connection between new humanism and materialism?

Materialism or Physical Realism?

How far is the use of term materialism for designating Roys philosophy appropriate? Could it be substituted with some other more suitable term such as physical realism or monistic naturalism?
Interestingly, Roy himself has discussed this question
in his writings. In Beyond Communism, for instance, Roy
strongly asserts: I am firmly convinced that Materialism
is the only philosophy possible. That conviction breathes
through all my other works, philosophical and scientific,
not directly related to political theories.1
However, in Beyond Communism itself Roy raises

113

the question of the appropriateness of the term materialism for designating his philosophy. To quote Roy:
Materialism has been so badly misinterpreted and
vulgarized by its protagonists that, as soon as
you say that you are a materialist, you are taken
for a man without morals, without principles, a
Jesuit and a cut-throat. From that point of view,
the apprehension regarding the declaration of
our adhesion to Materialism is quite well
founded, and if we modify the term, the apprehended reaction may be obviated. As regards the
substitution of the term Materialism by another,
I have been thinking about it for many years.
Strictly speaking, the term has lost its meaning.
It makes a wrong impression. But it has not been
possible to find a more appropriate term. Terms
like Monistic Naturalism or physical Realism
may be considered. But then we shall have to
write an essay to make people understand. In
the beginning, it may create more confusion. The
communists will say we are dishonest; that we
reject Materialism, but do not dare to say so.
Others will think that we still remain materialists, but have not the courage to say so, and are
only trying to insinuate ourselves into their favor
[emphasis mine].2
Roy has obviously made the above remarks in a political context. But this important question of terminology
has also been discussed by Roy in his more philosophical
and scholarly works, written, in Roys words, without
being haunted by disgruntled faces of party members, or,

114

one may add, the fear of unfair and prejudiced criticism by

ones political opponents.
In the second revised edition of Materialism, published in February 1951, for instance, Roy says, Although,
in light of the latest discoveries of atomic physics, the
term matter can no longer be used in the classical sense, it
cannot be abandoned until a more appropriate new term is
coined. The sense, however, remains unchanged: it is physical reality or the substance.3
In the same book, Roy says, at another place, The
substratum of the Universe is not matter as traditionally
conceived; but it is physical as against mental or spiritual.
It is a measurable entity. Therefore, to obviate prejudiced
criticism, the philosophy hitherto called Materialism may
be renamed Physical Realism 4 [emphasis mine].
Similarly, in the eighth chapter of Materialism entitled Materialism and Twentieth Century Physics, Roy
again says, There is no question about the fundamental
fact that physics does describe processes in something
which actually exists outside the mind of the physicist.
It is a measurable magnitude; therefore, it is physical.
Materialist philosophy, with the more appropriate name
Physical Realism, is corroborated by the latest scientific
knowledge5 [emphasis mine].
Roy refers to this question of terminology in Science
and Philosophy, too, where he says, Call this philosophical generalization of the various branches of scientific
knowledge, objectivism, naturalism or realism, or by any
other name you prefer to Materialism. That would make
no essential difference.6
However, Roys preference for physical realism
which is evident in the revised version of Materialism is
even more apparent in Reason, Romanticism and

115

Revolution.
In Reason, Romanticism and Revolution Roy categorically declares:
All really scientific objections to the term Materialism should be obviated if the new philosophy is called Physical realism. Even so revised
and renamed to avoid confusion, Materialism is
vindicated as the only philosophy possible7
A close analysis of preceding references from Roy
brings us to the following conclusions:
1. Roy was aware of the popular prejudices against the
word materialism, particularly regarding the ethical sense
of the term, and realized the need to avoid it in the context
of his own philosophy in which ethics has been given an
important place.
2. He also realized the inappropriateness of the term materialism from a purely scientific point of view in light of
the radical change in the conception of matter.
3. Accordingly, he felt the need to substitute the term
materialism with some other more appropriate term.
4. Initially, as the passage quoted from Beyond
Communism shows, Roy was hesitant (a) because he was
in doubt about the appropriate substitute term; (b) because
he thought that it would require an essay to explain the
meaning of the new term; and (c) because he feared that
this may create more confusion in the beginning owing to
the unfair attacks from his political opponents. (This third
consideration is irrelevant from a long-term philosophical
point of view).
5. To begin with, Roy toyed with several substitute terms

116

such as physical realism, monistic naturalism and objectivism.

6. Finally, as the references from Materialism and Reason, Romanticism and Revolution indicate, he settled down
for the term physical realism, because he thought that it
was a more appropriate term, and also because he believed
that it would prevent prejudiced criticism as well as all
really scientific objections to his philosophy.
To put all this in the technical terminology of contemporary philosophy, Roy was aware of the unfavorable
emotive meaning of the word materialism, particularly
in the popular language, and was also aware of the inappropriateness of the cognitive or literal meaning of the
term from a scientific point of view in light of the radical
change in the concept of matter in contemporary science.8
Initially, he hesitated in introducing a new term because, apart from other reasons, he believed that, to begin
with, the new term, unlike the term materialism, will
not have a definite cognitive or literal meaning in the minds
of most of the readers or listeners and, as a result, the
meaning will have to be explained to them.
Finally, he settled down for the term physical realism because it is more appropriate from cognitive point
of view, and also because the term, being emotively neutral (non-emotive), does not evoke any unfavorable attitude or emotions in others.
Let us examine whether Roy was justified in making
this change or not. First, from the point of view of cognitive meaning, as we have seen earlier, Roys materialism is different from traditional materialism as well as
Marxian materialism in many important ways. Even if

117

Roys philosophy is to be treated as a variety of materialism, it clearly differs from the paradigm of mechanical
materialism, and is closer to what J. J. C. Smart, a contemporary materialist, refers to as physicalistic materialism. To quote Smart:
In modern physics (if interpreted realistically),
however, matter is conceived as made up of such
things as electrons, protons, and mesons, which
are very unlike the hard, massy, stone like particles of mechanical Materialism. In it the distinction between matter and energy has also broken
down. It is therefore natural to extend the word
Materialist beyond the above paradigm case (of
mechanical Materialism) to cover anyone who
bases his theory on whatever it is that physics
asserts ultimately to exist. This sort may be called
physicalistic Materialism [emphasis mine].9
In the final analysis, what Roy asserts in his materialism is (1) that the world exists objectively outside our
minds (realism), and (2) that it is physical, or, in other
words, it can be measured (physicalism). Therefore, there
is not doubt that the term physical realism is more appropriate for designating his philosophy or, to be more
exact, his metaphysics (theory of reality).
As for the problem of making clear the cognitive
meaning of the term physical realism, it presents no problem from a technical point of view, because all serious
students of philosophy know the meaning of realism if
not physicalism. Even from a popular point of view, the
problem is not an insurmountable one, because it certainly
would not require an essay to explain the meaning of

118

the term. On the contrary, the above-mentioned two sentences would suffice. In any case, the trouble is worth taking, particularly because Roys philosophy, in spite of being, broadly speaking, in the tradition of materialism, is
different from traditional and Marxian materialism in some
important ways.
Labeling of Roys theory of reality as materialism,
for instance, may lead even students of philosophy to suppose (1) that like traditional mechanical materialists, Roy
considers matter to be a hard and massy substance, or
(2) that Roy subscribes to a rigid and hard variety of
materialistic determinism which rules out contingency,
probability and free will, or (3) that Roy believes in extreme form of materialism which does not recognize the
objectivity of ideas or the autonomy of the mental world.
Again, in the Marxian context, labeling of Roys metaphysics as materialism may lead the unwary to assume
(1) that Roy adheres to dialectic materialism, or (2) that
Roy accepts historical materialism, or (3) that he does
not give an important place to ethics in his philosophy. As
we have seen, the inference would be wrong in each of
the above-mentioned case.
Even from the point of view of the emotive impact of
the term materialism, the change made by Roy seems to
be justified, because, though the emotive meaning of a
term may vary from person to person, there is no denying
the fact that the word materialism has acquired, by and
large, an unfavorable emotive meaning in the popular
language, particularly in the ethical context. Much can be
said in defense of materialism on this point, but the existence of an unfavorable attitude towards materialism is a
fact, which cannot be denied. Therefore, it is better, in the
interest of clarity and objectivity, to substitute the term

119

materialism with an emotively neutral term. The emotive language has, no doubt, its many uses and abuses,
but, as pointed out by Irving M. Copi, when we are
trying to get at the facts, to follow an argument, or to
learn the truth about something, anything which distracts
us from that goal tends to frustrate us It follows that
when we are attempting to reason about facts in a cool
and objective fashion, referring to them in strongly emotive language is a hindrance rather than a help10 [emphasis mine].
Therefore, Copi rightly recommends in his
Introduction to Logic:
If our purpose is to communicate information,
and if we wish to avoid being misunderstood,
we shall find that language most useful which
has the least emotive impact. If our interest is
scientific, we shall do well to avoid emotional
language and to cultivate as emotively neutral a
set of terms as we can.11
The term physical realism, unlike the term materialism, is certainly an emotively neutral term. Thus, to
conclude, Roy was fully justified in making the transition from materialism to physical realism, because
labeling of his philosophy as materialism is not only
likely to convey a wrong impression to others regarding
his philosophy from a cognitive point of view, but also
unnecessarily prejudice many against his philosophy,
and thus become an obstacle to an unbiased and objective evaluation of his philosophy.
As far as the alternative term monistic naturalism,
a term preferred by eminent radical humanist V. M.

120

Tarkunde,12 is concerned, it certainly has the advantage

of bringing out the important monistic aspect of Roys
metaphysics, but the accompanying term naturalism is a
bit vague from ontological point of view, and it does not
bring out the essence of Roys theory of reality as clearly
as the term physical realism does.
Arthur C. Danto, for instance, has this to say about
naturalism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Naturalism, in recent usage, is a species of
philosophical monism, according to which
whatever exists or happens is natural in the sense
of being susceptible to explanation through
methods which, although paradigmatically
exemplified in the natural sciences, are continuous from domain to domain of objects and events.
Hence, naturalism is polemically defined as repudiating the view that there exists or could exist any entities or events which lie, in principle,
beyond the scope of scientific explanation. In all
other respects naturalism is ontologically neutral in that it does not prescribe what specific
kinds of entities there must be in the universe or
how many distinct kinds of events we must suppose to take place... There is thus room within
the naturalistic movement for any variety of otherwise rival ontologies, which explains the philosophical heterogeneity of the group of philosophers who identify themselves as naturalists: it
is a methodological rather than an ontological
monism to which they indifferently subscribe, a
monism leaving them free to be dualists, ideal-

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ists, materialists, atheists, or nonatheists as the

case may be [emphasis mine].13
So, while Roy can certainly be classified, broadly
speaking, as a naturalist, and his philosophy can be designated as monistic naturalism as well, his metaphysical
or ontological view can more exactly be designated as
physical realism. Indeed, if one is very keen to emphasize the monistic aspect of Roys philosophy, one may refer to it as monistic physical realism.

Materialism and New Humanism

According to Roy, the Twenty-Two Theses on Radical Democracy are deduced from materialist philosophy [emphasis mine].
In Roys view new humanism, which is presented in
the Twenty-Two Theses as social and political philosophy
is deducible from a general philosophy of nature, which
Roy calls, materialism in Beyond Communism and
physical realism is Reason, Romanticism and Revolution.
Is there, in fact, any logical connection, of the kind,
which Roy believed to exist, between new humanism and
materialism or physical realism? Are the Twenty-Two
Theses on Radical Democracy, in fact, deduced from materialist philosophy?
Before we try to answer this question, let us, first,
clarify the meaning or the nature of a logical deduction.
As pointed out by Irving M. Copi in his Symbolic Logic:
It is customary to distinguish between deductive

122

and inductive arguments. All arguments involve

the claim that their premises provide some
grounds for the truth of their conclusions, but
only a deductive argument involves the claim that
its premises provide absolutely conclusive
grounds. The technical terms valid and invalid
are used in place of correct and incorrect in
characterizing deductive arguments. A deductive
argument is valid when its premises and conclusions are so related that it is absolutely impossible for the premises to be true unless the conclusion is true also.14
Similarly, Cohen and Nagel tell us in their An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method:
We infer one proposition from another validly
only if there is an objective relation of implication between the first proposition and second
and the test as to whether there is a logical implication between one proposition and another is
the impossibility of the former being true and the
latter being false.15
To put it symbolically, in order that proposition q may
be deduced, or formally inferred from p, there must be
between p and q a relation such that q is a consequence of
p. This relation is usually called implication.
Consider, for example, the following argument:
All logicians are philosophers.
Aristotle is a logician.
Therefore, Aristotle is a philosopher.

123

This argument is valid because if its premises were

true, its conclusion would have to be true also. Therefore,
the conclusion, Aristotle is a philosopher is deduced
validly jointly from the two propositions All logicians
are philosophers and Aristotle is a logician.
Consider another argument:
All logicians are philosophers.
Therefore, some philosophers are logicians.
This, again, is a valid argument. The conclusion Some
philosophers are Logicians is validly deduced from the
proposition All logicians are philosophers because it is
absolutely impossible for All logicians are philosophers
to be true and Some philosophers are logicians to be
false.
Let us now concentrate on new humanism as expressed in the Twenty-Two Theses, and try to find out
whether they can be said to have been deduced validly
from Roys materialism or physical realism.
In the first six theses, as noted earlier, Roy presents
the basic tenets of new humanism, in theses seven to thirteen he points out the inadequacies of communism and
formal parliamentary democracy, whereas in theses fourteen to twenty-two he outlines a picture of radical democracy and indicates the way for achieving that ideal.
In our attempt to find out whether new humanism is
validly deduced from materialism or physical realism,
let us, first, concentrate on the basic tenets of new humanism as expressed in the first six theses. Out of the first six
theses, the first three theses are even more important, and,

124

as we have seen earlier, in these theses Roy regards quest

for freedom and search for truth as the basic urge of human progress and traces them to the biological struggle
for existence. Apart from this, the central idea of the first
three theses of Roy is individualism: that the individual is
prior to society, and only individuals can enjoy that freedom.
Now, is it possible to validly deduce any of these conclusions from Roys metaphysical views? For example, can
we validly deduce the proposition, (1) Collectivity presupposes the existence of individuals from the proposition (2) The external world exists objectively or the
proposition (3) The reality is physical, or from both of
them jointly?
It is obvious that we cannot. Because it is quite possible for the proposition (2) or/and proposition (3) to be
true, and the proposition (1) to be false. Whereas for the
relation of logical implication to exist between propositions (2) or/and (3) and proposition (1); and for proposition (1) to be deducible validly from propositions (2) or/
and (3), it should be absolutely impossible for (2) or/and
(3) to be true unless (1) is true also, or, in other words, it
should be impossible for (2) or/and (3) to be true and (1)
to be false.
That this is not case will become obvious if we consider the following arguments:
A.

B.

The external world exists objectively.

Therefore, collectivity presupposes the
existence of individuals.
The reality is physical.
Therefore, collectivity presupposes the

125

existence of individuals.
C.

The external world exists objectively.

The reality is physical.
Therefore, collectivity presupposes the
existence of individuals.

In the above arguments if we replace Collectivity

presupposes the existence of individuals (Theses one) with
the proposition, Quest for freedom and search for truth
constitute the basic urge of human progress (Theses two),
or the proposition The position of the individual is the
measure of the progressive and liberating significance of
any collective effort or social organization (Thesis three),
the results will be similar. In each case, the argument will
be invalid.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that when
we assert that in the above-mentioned arguments the conclusion cannot be deduced validly from the premis or the
premises, we do not assert that the propositions constituting these arguments are false. (May be they are true or
may be they are false). We only assert that the relation of
logical implication does not exist between the premises
and the conclusion. In other words, we assert that it is
quite possible for the propositions (2) The external world
exists objectively or/and the proposition (3) The reality
is physical to be true and the proposition (1) Collectivity
presupposes the existence of individuals" to be false.
It is quite possible, on the other hand, that in the abovementioned arguments both the premises and the conclusion are true. (In fact, in this particular case I believe the
conclusion to be true). However, the truth of the conclusion is not proved by the premises. Its truth will have to be

126

proved independently: it requires independent support. If

a person asserts the truth of the premises, he is not logically bound to support the truth of the conclusion, and
vice versa. The truth and falsity of the premises and the
conclusion are logically independent of one another.
Let us now turn our attention to theses four, five and
six in which Roy presents a humanist interpretation of history. Is the humanist interpretation of history deduced
validly from physical realism?
While discussing the logical relationship between
philosophical materialism and historical materialism in
the fourth chapter, we referred to Bertrand Russells observation that philosophic materialism does not prove that
economic causes are fundamental in politics. Russell has,
in fact, drawn our attention to the fact that Buckles view,
according to which climate is one of the decisive factors,
and the Freudian view, which traces everything to sex, are
equally compatible with materialism. In Russells words:
There are innumerable ways of viewing history
which are materialistic in the philosophic sense
without being economic or falling within the
Marxian formula. Thus the materialistic conception of history may be false even if materialism
in the philosophic sense should be true.16
On the other hand, continues Russell, economic
causes might be at the bottom of all political events even
if philosophic materialism were false. Economic causes
operate through mens desire for possessions, and would
be supreme, if this desire were supreme, even if desire
could not, from a philosophic point of view, be explained
in materialistic terms.

127

There is, therefore, concludes Russell, no logical

connection either way between philosophic materialism
and what is called the materialistic conception of history.
[emphasis mine]
What Russell says about the logical relationship between philosophical materialism and materialistic conception of history is equally true, I think, about the logical relationship between physical realism and the humanist interpretation of history.
We certainly cannot deduce validly the proposition,
Human will is the most powerful determining factor in
history (Theses four), or the proposition, The dynamics
of the ideas runs parallel to the process of social evolution, the two influencing each other mutually (Theses six)
from the proposition, The external world exists objectively or/and the proposition, The reality is physical;
just as we cannot deduce validly the propositions
Collectivity presupposes the existence of individuals or
the proposition Quest for freedom and search for truth
constitute the basic urge of human progress from them.
On the other hand, it is pertinent to note that Roys
humanist interpretation of history is logically compatible
with his physical realism. In other words, they can be true
together as no inconsistency is involved. Roys philosophy of history would have become incompatible with his
physical realism, if he had, for example, invoked divine
intervention of any kind in his philosophy of history, which
he certainly does not. Similarly, Roys philosophy of history would have been inconsistent with his metaphysics
had he been a hard materialist of a rigid variety denying
human will, or an extreme materialist denying the autonomy of the mental world.
What is true of the first six theses of Roy expressing

128

the basic tenets of new humanism is equally true of theses

seven to twenty-two, which are explicitly political, dealing with Roys criticism of communism and formal parliamentary democracy as well as with his ideal of radical or
organized democracy. Consider for example, the following propositions:
1. The state is the political organization of the society.
(Thesis nine)
2. Dictatorship tends to perpetuate itself. (Thesis eleven)
3. The alternative to parliamentary democracy is organized democracy. (Thesis fourteen)
4. The function of a revolutionary and liberating social
philosophy is to lay emphasis on the basic fact that man is
the maker of his world. (Thesis fifteen)
It is obvious that none of them can be deduced validly from physical realism, though all of them are compatible with it. Roys doctrine of state, for instance, would
have been in compatible with his physical realism if he had
believed that the state is a manifestation of spiritual entity
called God or of absolute idea. However, as it is, Roys
new humanism is consistent with his revised and renamed
version of materialism though certainly not deduced
from it.
It may be worthwhile to clarify once again that in saying that new humanism cannot be deduced from physical
realism, I am not saying that physical realism is true and
new humanism is false. I am only saying that it is possible
that physical realism is true and new humanism is false. In
fact, I have not entered into a critical evaluation of these
philosophies in this book.
The only question which I have tried to answer is

129

whether new humanism can be validly deduced from physical realism, and my answer is categorical: no. On the other
hand, I assert that physical realism and new humanism are
logically compatible and consistent: both of them can be
true together, but their truth (and falsity) is independent
of one another. We need independent support for new
humanism. We cannot prove the truth of new humanism
by proving the truth of physical realism. As for as the logical relationship between physical realism and new humanism is concerned, my conclusions may be summarized as
follows:
1. It is possible that physical realism is true, and new humanism is false.
2. It is possible that new humanism is true and physical
realism if false.
3. It is possible that both of them are false, and
4. It is possible that both of them are true.
That is to say, physical realism and new humanism
are not contradictory or contrary to one another, but the
relation of implication does not exist either way.

130

Notes
1

M.N. Roy, Beyond Communism (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1981), p. 28.

2
Ibid., pp. 28-29.
3
M. N. Roy, Materialism (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers
Ltd., 1951), p. 5.
4
Ibid., p. 184.
5
Ibid., p. 232.
6
M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1984), p. 189.
7
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution (Delhi:
Ajanta Publications, 1989), p. 493.
8
According to Irving M. Copi, For the sentence to formulate a proposition, its words must have literal or cognitive
meaning, referring to objects or events and their attributes or
relations. When it expresses an attitude or feeling, however,
some of its words may also have an emotional suggestiveness
or impact. A word or phrase can have both a literal meaning
and an emotional impact. It has become customary to speak
of the latter as emotive significance or emotive meaning.
[Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), p. 82.]
9
J. J. C. Smart, Materialism in The New Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Vol. 11, p. 611.
10
Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, pp. 93-94.
11
Ibid., p. 95.
12
See, V. M. Tarkunde, Radical Humanism (Delhi: Ajanta
Publications, 1983), p. 55.
13
Arthur C. Danto, Naturalism in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Vol. 5, p. 448.
14
Irving M. Copi, Symbolic Logic(New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co., Inc., 1979), p. 3.
15
Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific
Method (London: Allied Publishers, 1936), pp. 7-9.

131

16

Bertrand Russell, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism

(London: Unwin Books, 1975), pp. 59-60.

132

Appendix
Principles of Radical Democracy
Twenty-Two Theses
Thesis 1
Man is the archetype of society. Co-operative social relationships contribute to develop individual potentialities.
But the development of the individual is the measure of
social progress. Collectivity pre-supposes the existence
of individuals. Except as the sum total of freedom and
well-being, actually enjoyed by individuals, social liberation and progress are imaginary ideals, which are never
attained. Well-being, if it is actual, is enjoyed by individuals. It is wrong to ascribe a collective ego to any form of
human community (viz., nation, class, etc.), as that practice means sacrifice of the individual. Collective well-being is a function of the well-being of individuals.
Thesis 2
Quest for freedom and search for truth constitute the basic urge of human progress. The quest for freedom is the
continuation, on a higher level of intelligence and emotion of the biological struggle for existence. The search
for truth is a corollary thereof. Increasing knowledge of
nature enables man to be progressively free from the tyranny of natural phenomena, and physical and social environments. Truth is the content of knowledge.
Thesis 3
The purpose of all rational human endeavor, individual as
well as collective, is attainment of freedom, in ever in-

133

creasing measure. Freedom is progressive disappearance

of all restrictions on the unfolding of the potentialities of
individuals, as human beings, and not as cogs in the wheels
of a mechanized social organism. The position of the individual, therefore, is the measure of the progressive and
liberating significance of any collective effort or social
organization. The success of any collective endeavor is to
be measured by the actual benefit for its constituent units.
Thesis 4
Rising out of the background of the law-governed physical nature, the human being is essentially rational. Reason, being a biological property, it is not the antithesis of
will. Intelligence and emotion can be reduced to a common biological denominator. Historical determinism, therefore, does not exclude freedom of the will. As a matter of
fact, human will is the most powerful determining factor.
Otherwise, there would be no room for revolutions in a
rationally determined process of history. The rational and
scientific concept of determinism, is not to be confused
with the teleological or religious doctrine of predestination.
Thesis 5
The economic interpretation of history is deduced from a
wrong interpretation of Materialism. It implies dualism,
where as Materialism is a monistic philosophy. History is
a determined process; but there are more than one causative factors. Human will is one of them, and it cannot always be referred directly to any economic incentive.
Thesis 6
Ideation is a physiological process resulting from the
awareness of environments. But once they are formed,
ideas exist by themselves, governed by their own laws.

134

The dynamics of ideas runs parallel to the process of social evolution, the two influencing each other mutually.
But in no particular point of the process of the integral
human evolution, can a direct causal relation be established between historical events and the movements of
ideas. (Idea is here used in the common philosophical
sense of ideology or system of ideas). Cultural patterns
and ethical values are not mere ideological super-structures of established economic relations. They are also historically determined by the logic of the history of ideas.
Thesis 7
For creating a new world of freedom, revolution must go
beyond an economic reorganization of society. Freedom
does not necessarily follow from the capture of political
power in the name of the oppressed and exploited classes
and abolition of private property in the means of production.
Thesis 8
Communism or Socialism may conceivably be the means
for the attainment of the goal of freedom. How far it can
serve that purpose, must be judged by experience. A political system and an economic experiment which subordinate the man of flesh and blood to an imaginary collective
ego, be it the nation or a class, cannot possibly be the
suitable means for the attainment of the goal of freedom.
On the one hand, it is absurd to argue that negation of
freedom will lead to freedom; and, on the other hand, it is
not freedom to sacrifice the individual at the altar of an
imaginary collective ego. Any social philosophy or scheme
of social reconstruction which does not recognize the sovereignty of the individual, and dismisses the ideal of freedom as an empty abstraction, can have no more than a

135

very limited progressive and revolutionary significance.

Thesis 9
The State being the political organization of society, its
withering away under Communism is a utopia which has
been exploded by experience. Planned economy on the
basis of socialized industries presupposes a powerful political machinery. Democratic control of that machinery
alone can guarantee freedom under the new order. Planning of production for use is possible on the basis of political democracy and individual freedom.
Thesis 10
State ownership and planned economy do not by themselves end exploitation of labor; nor do they necessarily
lead to an equal distribution of wealth. Economic democracy is no more possible in the absence of political democracy than the latter is in the absence of the former.
Thesis 11
Dictatorship tends to perpetuate itself. Planned economy
under political dictatorship disregards individual freedom
on the pleas of efficiency, collective effort and social
progress. Consequently, a higher form of democracy in
the socialist society, as it is conceived at present, becomes
an impossibility. Dictatorship defeats its professed end.
Thesis 12
The defects of formal parliamentary democracy have also
been exposed in experience. They result from the delegation of power. To make democracy effective, power must
always remain vested in the people, and there must be
ways and means for the people to wield the sovereign
power effectively, not periodically, but from day to day.

136

Atomized individual citizens are powerless for all practical purposes, and most of the time. They have no means
to exercise their sovereignty and to wield a standing control of the State machinery.
Thesis 13
Liberalism is falsified or parodied under formal parliamentary democracy. The doctrine of laissez faire only provides the legal sanction to the exploitation of man by man.
The concept of economic man negativates the liberating
doctrine of individualism. The economic man is bound to
be a slave or a slave-holder. This vulgar concept must be
replaced by the reality of an instinctively rational being
who is moral because he is rational. Morality is an appeal
to conscience, and conscience is the instinctive awareness
of, and reaction to, environments. It is a mechanistic biological function on the level of consciousness. Therefore,
it is rational.
Thesis 14
The alternative to parliamentary democracy is not dictatorship; it is organized democracy in the place of the formal democracy of powerless atomized individual citizens.
The parliament should be the apex of a pyramidal structure of the State reared on the base of an organized democracy composed of a countrywide network of Peoples
Committees. The political organization of society (the
State) will be coincident with the entire society, and consequently the State will be under a standing democratic
control.
Thesis 15
The function of a revolutionary and liberating social philosophy is to lay emphasis on the basic fact of history that

137

man is the maker of his world man as a thinking being,

and he can be so only as an individual. The brain is a means
of production, and produces the most revolutionary commodity. Revolutions presuppose iconoclastic ideas. An
increasingly large number of men conscious of their creative power, motivated by the indomitable will to remake
the world, moved by the adventure of ideas, and fired with
the ideal of a free society of free men, can create the conditions under which democracy will be possible.
Thesis 16
The method and programme of social revolution must be
based on a reassertion of the basic principle of social
progress. A social renaissance can come only through determined and widespread endeavor to educate the people
as regards the principles of freedom and rational co-operative living. The people will be organized into effective
democratic bodies to build up the socio-political foundation of the post revolutionary order. Social revolution requires in rapidly increasing number men of the new renaissance, and a rapidly expanding system of Peoples Committees, and an organic co-ordination of both. The programme of revolution will similarly be based on the principles of freedom, reason and social harmony. It will mean
elimination of every form of monopoly and vested interest
in the regulation of social life.
Thesis 17
Radical democracy presupposes economic reorganization
of society so as to eliminate the possibility of exploitation
of man by man. Progressive satisfaction of material necessities is the precondition for the individual members of
society unfolding their intellectual and other finer human
potentialities. An economic reorganization, such as will

138

guarantee a progressively rising standard of living, is the

foundation of the Radical Democratic State. Economic
liberation of the masses is an essential condition for their
advancing towards the goal of freedom.
Thesis 18
The economy of the new social order will be based on
production for use and distribution with reference to human needs. Its political organization excludes delegation
of power which in practice, deprives the people of effective power; it will be based on the direct participation of
the entire adult population through the Peoples Committees. Its culture will be based on universal dissemination
of knowledge and on minimum control and maximum
scope for, and incentive to, scientific and creative activities. The new society, being founded on reason and science, will necessarily be planned. But it will be planning
with the freedom of the individual as its main purpose.
The new society will be democratic politically, economically as well as culturally. Consequently, it will be a democracy which can defend itself.
Thesis 19
The ideal of Radical Democracy will be attained through
the collective efforts of spiritually free men united in the
determination of creating a world of freedom. They will
function as the guides, friends and philosophers of the
people rather than as their would-be rulers. Consistently
with the goal of freedom, their political practice will be
rational and therefore ethical. Their effort will be reinforced by the growth of the peoples will to freedom. Ultimately, the Radical Democratic State will rise with the
support of enlightened public opinion as well as intelligent action of the people. Realizing that freedom is in-

139

consistent with concentration of power, Radical Democrats will aim at the widest diffusion of power.
Thesis 20
In the last analysis, education of the citizen is the condition for such a reorganization of society as will be conducive to common progress and prosperity without encroaching upon the freedom of the individual. The Peoples Committees will be the schools for the political and civic education of the citizen. The structure and function of the
Radical Democratic State will enable detached individuals to come to the forefront of public affairs. Manned with
such individuals, the State machinery will cease to be the
instrument in the hands of any particular class to coerce
others. Only spiritually free individuals in power can smash
all chains of slavery and usher in freedom for all.
Thesis 21
Radicalism integrates science into social organization and
reconciles individuality with collective life; it gives to freedom a moral-intellectual as well as a social content; it offers a comprehensive theory of social progress in which
both the dialectics of economic determinism and dynamics of ideas find their due recognition; and it deduces from
the same a method and a programme of social revolution
in our time.
Thesis 22
Radicalism starts from the dictum that man is the measure of everything (Protagoras) or man is the root of
mankind(Marx), and advocates reconstruction of the
world as a commonwealth and fraternity of free men, by
the collective endeavor of spiritually emancipated moral
men.

140

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Parikh, G. D, compiler. Essence of Royism (Pune:
Nav Jagriti Samaj, 1987).
Passmore, John. A Hundred Years of Philosophy
(Great Britain: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978).
Ray, Sibnarayan, ed. M.N. Roy Philosopher-Revolutionary (New Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1995).
Selected Works of M. N. Roy, Vol. I, (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1987).
Roy, M. N. Beyond Communism (Delhi: Ajanta
Publications, 1981).

Materialism (Calcutta: Renaissance

Publishers Ltd., 1951).

New Humanism - A Manifesto (Delhi:

Ajanta Publications, 1981).

New Orientation (Delhi: Ajanta Publica142

tions, 1982).

Reason, Romanticism and Revolution

(Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1989).

Science and Philosophy (Delhi: Ajanta

Publications, 1984).

Scientific Politics (Calcutta: Renaissance

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Russell, Bertrand. The Theory and Practice of
Bolshevism (London: George Allen and Unwin
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Sharma, Chandradhar. A Critical Study of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
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Stace, W. T. A Critical History of Greek Philosophy (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1962).
Tarkunde, V. M. Radical Humanism (New
Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1983).

Articles
Roy, M. N. Philosophy of History in The
Marxian Way, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1947.

Probability and Determinism in The Humanist Way, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1950.

The Concept of Causality in Modern

Science in The Humanist Way, Vol. IV, No.2,
1949-50.
Editorial in The Marxian Way, Vol. I, No.
143

1, 1945.
Editorial Notes in The Marxian Way, Vol.
I, No. 3, 1945.

Editorial Notes The Marxian Way, Vol.

II, No. I, 1946.
Editorial Notes in The Marxian Way, Vol.,
II, No. 4, 1946-47.

Encyclopedias
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vols. 2, 4, 5
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The
Free Press, 1972).
The New Encyclopedia Britannica, vol.11 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1981).

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