PATRICIA NATCHER V. HON.

COURT
OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 133000, October 02, 2001, SECOND
DIVISION, (BUENA, J.)
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana
Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in
Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951,
Graciano, together with his six children, namely:
Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and
Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Graciana's estate adjudicating and dividing among
themselves the real property. Graciano received
8/14 share while each of the six children received
1/14 share of the said property. Further, said heirs
executed and forged an "Agreement of
Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with
Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among
themselves the parcel of land into several lots.
Graciano then donated to his children, share and
share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only
447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's
name. other lots were subdivided. Eventually,
Graciano sold the first lot to a third person but
retained ownership over the second lot.
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein
petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No.
107443 to his wife. When Graciano died, he left
his second wife Patricia and his six children by his
first marriage, as heirs.
Private respondents filed a complaint and alleged
that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher,
through
the
employment
of
fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the lot by
making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed
of Sale in favor of Patricia Natcher. Similarly,
herein private respondents alleged in said
complaint that as a consequence of such
fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

In her answer, herein petitioner Natcher averred

that she was legally married to Graciano on 20
March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was
likewise considered a compulsory heir of the
latter. RTC held that the subject deed of sale is
prohibited by law because they are spouses. The
CA reversed because the probate court that has
exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of
general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
and annulment of title with damages, adjudicate
matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly in questions as to
advancement of property made by the decedent to
any of the heirs?
HELD: NO
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no
merit in the instant petition. Section 3, Rule 1 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil
action and special proceedings, in this wise:
"X X X a) A civil action is one by which a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special.
Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a
special civil action. "X X X "c) A special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies
a marked distinction between an action and a
special proceeding. An action is a formal demand
of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
method of applying legal remedies according to
definite established rules. The term "special
proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a
party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required

unless the statute expressly so provides. In special

proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon
an application or motion."
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority
in Remedial Law expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that
actions include those proceedings which are
instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at
law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings
include those proceedings which are not ordinary
in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the case of
proceedings commenced without summons and
prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions. X X X A
special proceeding must therefore be in the nature
of a distinct and independent proceeding for
particular relief, such as may be instituted
independently of a pending action, by petition or
motion upon notice."[10]
Applying these principles, an action for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages
is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such
as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the
Rules of Court. Clearly, matters which involve
settlement and distribution of the estate of the
decedent fall within the exclusive province of the
probate court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings;
and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and
on the heir. While it may be true that the Rules
used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that

the same provision[11] contemplates a probate

court when it speaks of the "court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings". Corollarily,
the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting
in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to
render an adjudication and resolve the issue of
advancement of the real property in favor of
herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case
No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper
vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover,
under the present circumstances, the RTC of
Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as
a probate court so as to validly pass upon the
question of advancement made by the decedent
Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein
petitioner Natcher.

RUFINA LUY LIM v. CA, AUTO TRUCK

TBA CORP, SPEED DISTRIBUTING INC.,
ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE
MARKETING CORP., AND ACTION CO.
INC.
G.R. No. 124715, January 24, 2000, SECOND
DIVISION (Buena, J.)
Key Doctrine: Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate,
including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases,
where the value of the personal property, estate or amount of
the demand does not exceed P100,000 or, in Metro
Manila where such personal property, estate or amount of
the demand does not exceed P200,000.(see footnote 2)
Rufina Lim is the surviving spouse of the
Pastor Lim who died intestate and whose estate is
the subject of probate proceedings. Rufina, duly
represented by her nephew George Luy, filed a
joint petition for the administration of the estate
of Pastor . Private respondent corporations,
whose properties were included in the inventory
of the estate of Pastor filed a motion for the lifting
of lis pendens and motion for exclusion of certain
properties from the estate of the decedent which

was granted by the RTC as the probate court.

Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified
amended petition stating that the respondents
engaged in business with the public as
corporations, all their capital, assets and equity
were however, personally owned by the late
Pastor, that the alleged stockholders and officers
appearing in the respective articles of
incorporation of the above business entities were
mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were
listed therein only for purposes of registration,
and that the properties are all conjugal in nature.
Hence, the RTC set aside its previous order and
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City was
directed to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens.
Rufina was appointed as special administrators
with two others.

The provisions of Republic Act 7691,

which introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, are pertinent:
"Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction:
(4) In all matters of probate, both
testate and intestate, where the gross value
of the estate exceeds One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate
matters in Metro Manila, where such gross
value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000);
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is
hereby amended to read as follows: Section
33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases.-Metropolitan
Trial
Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over
civil actions and probate proceedings,
testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where
the value of the personal property, estate or
amount of the demand does not exceed
One Hundred Thousand Pesos(P100,000)
or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate or amount of the demand
does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000),2 exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses and costs, the amount of
which must be specifically alleged,
Provided, that interest, damages of

The probate court denied anew private

respondents motion for exclusion and later issued
an order directing the parties and banks concerned
within (5) five days to submit their records in the
name of Pastor and the corporations to show all
the transactions made. Private respondent filed a
special civil action for certiorari questioning the
orders of the RTC, sitting as a probate court
which was granted by the CA.
ISSUES:
1. What is the jurisdiction of the courts over
settlement of estate?
2. May a corporation, in its universality, be
the proper subject of and be included in
the inventory of the estate of a deceased
person?1
HELD:
1. Before we delve into the merits of the
case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction over
probate proceedings is indeed in order.

According to J. De Leons book (p.10), R.A. 7691

amended B.P. Blg. 129 which increased the gross value
from 100,000 to 300, 000 or from 200,000 to 400,000 if
within Metro Manila.
2

This is the main issue in the case but not related to

the topic Jurisdiction Over Settlement of Estate under the book.
1

whatever kind, attorneys, litigation

expenses and costs shall be included in the
determination of the filing fees, Provided
further, that where there are several claims
or causes of actions between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the claims in all the causes
of action, irrespective of whether the causes
of action arose out of the same or different
transactions."
Simply put, the determination of
which court exercises jurisdiction over matters
of probate depends upon the gross value of
the estate of the decedent.
2. NO. This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, held: "As a rule, the
question of ownership is an extraneous matter
which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not
be included in the inventory of estate properties,
the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto,
but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title."
Where the parcels of land are registered in
the name of private respondent corporations, the
jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs.,
ALCID is of great essence and finds applicability,
thus: "It does not matter that respondent has
evidence purporting to support her claim of
ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners
have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the
law is endowed with incontestability until after it
has been set aside in the manner indicated in the
law itself, which, of course, does not include,
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of deceased persons." A perusal of the records
would reveal that no strong compelling evidence
was ever presented by petitioner to bolster her

bare assertions as to the title of the deceased

Pastor Y. Lim over the properties.
Inasmuch as the real properties included
in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Y.
Lim are in the possession of and are registered in
the name of private respondent corporations,
which under the law possess a personality separate
and distinct from their stockholders, and in the
absence of any cogency to shred the veil of
corporate
fiction,
the
presumption
of
conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private
respondents should stand undisturbed. It
is
settled that a corporation is clothed with
personality separate and distinct from that of the
persons composing it. It may not generally be held
liable for that of the persons composing it. It may
not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of
its stockholders or those of the entities connected
with it. Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation
is invested by law with a personality distinct and
separate from its stockholders or members. In the
same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and
convenience is an entity shielded by a protective
mantle and imbued by law with a character alien
to the persons comprising it.

HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN, namely:

LOLITA
GABATAN,
POMPEYO
GABATAN,
PEREGRINO
GABATAN,
REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN
and JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN
TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
LOURDES EVERO PACANA
G.R. No. 150206, FIRST DIVISION, 13
March 2009 (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
KEY DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence dictates that the
determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not
in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession
of property. x x x in the case of Portugal v. PortugalBeltran, the only property of the intestate estate is the

Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the

circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could
be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical.
Subject of the present controversy is
a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot
3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang,
Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for
taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the
complaint before the RTC, respondent Lourdes
Evero Pacana alleged that she is the sole owner of
Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her
deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero
(Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that
her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan
Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. She
further alleged that upon the death of Juan
Gabatan, the subject lot was entrusted to his
brother, Teofilo Gabatan and Teofilos wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed
that prior to her death, Hermogena demanded for
the return of the land to no avail. After
Hermogenas death, respondent Lourdes also did
the same but the petitioners refused to heed the
numerous demands to surrender the subject
property. According to respondent, when Teofilo
and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and
Catalino Acantilado took possession of the
disputed land despite respondents demands for
them to vacate the same.
In their Answer, petitioners denied that
respondents mother, Hermogena, was the
daughter of Juan Gabatan and Laureana Clarito
nor is the respondent the rightful heir of Juan
Gabatan.
Petitioners maintained that Juan
Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue
and that Juan was survived by one brother and
two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners
predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These
siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject
land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual,
physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of
owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed

the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the

exclusion of the whole world including
respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis
and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the
subject land; the former is merely the husband of
Teofilos daughter while the latter is just a
caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case
was previously filed by respondent against
Teofilos wife but the case was dismissed on May
3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners
contended that the complaint lacks or states no
cause of action or, if there was any, the same has
long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.
RTC rendered a decision ordering petitioners to
reconvey the OCT in favour of respondent. On
appeal, CA rendered the herein assailed decision
affirming the RTC.
ISSUE. Did the lower court erred in failing to
appreciate by preponderance of evidence in favor
of the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim
that they and the heirs of Justa and Macaria both
surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs
of Juan Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit
the land subject matter hereof.
NOTE: various errors were assigned by the
petitioners, but none was specifically related to
special proceedings. But the Court passed upon
certain preliminary matters such as the established
exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the
findings of fact by the lower courts and that court
rules recognize the broad discretionary power of
an appellate court to waive the lack of proper
assignment of errors and to consider errors not
assigned. Thus, the Court is clothed with ample
authority to review rulings even if they are not
assigned as errors in the appeal in certain
instances.
HELD.
The respondents main cause of action in the
court a quo is the recovery of ownership and
possession of property. It is undisputed that the
subject property was owned by the deceased Juan

Gabatan, during his lifetime. Before us are two

contending parties, both insisting to be the legal
heir(s) of the decedent.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination
of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and possession
of property. This must take precedence over the
action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that
the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such
a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined
as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration
of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are
seeking the establishment of a status or right.
This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of
Appeals. In the more recent case of Milagros
Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its
ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation
and heirship must be ventilated in the proper
probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such
rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this
Court held that the status of an illegitimate child
who claimed to be an heir to a decedents estate
could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action
which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.
However, we are not unmindful of our decision
in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, where the Court
relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a
proceeding for annulment of title to determine the
status of the party therein as heirs, to wit: It
appearing, however, that in the present case the

only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is

the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it,
under the circumstances of the case, to a
special proceeding which could be long,
hence, not expeditious, just to establish the
status of petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with
the costs and expenses of an administration
proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of
the fact that the parties to the civil case
subject of the present case, could and had
already in fact presented evidence before the
trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the
case upon the issues it defined during pretrial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present
case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugals estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case
filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed
to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties
during the trial and render a decision thereon
upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x.
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be
only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as their inheritance from Juan
Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense
with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of respondent as the
sole heir of Juan Gabatan, especially in light of the
fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and
already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the
RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and
consequently rendered judgment thereon.
x x x This Court finds that respondent dismally
failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible
and independently verifiable proof, her assertion
that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus,
entitled to the property under litigation. Petition
granted.

HEIRS OF ROMANA INGJUG-TIRO:

BEDESA, PEDRO, RITA ALL SURNAMED
TIRO,
AND
BARBARA
TIRO
(DECEASED), ET AL vs. SPOUSES LEON
V. CASALS AND LILIA C. CASALS,
SPOUSES CARLOS L. CLIMACO AND
LYDIA R. CLIMACO, SPOUSES JOSE L.
CLIMACO, JR. AND BLANQUITA C.
CLIMACO,
AND
CONSUELO
L.
CLIMACO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 134718, August 20, 2001,
BELLOSILLO, SECOND DIVISION

Key Doctrine: In actions for reconveyance of property

predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was
null and void ab initio, a claim of prescription of action
would be unavailing. "The action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe. "Neither could laches be invoked in the case at
bar
Facts
Mamerto Injug is the owner of a 5,354
sqm. Property located in Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu
City. Mamerto died during the Second World
leaving the property to his 5 children, namely:
Romana, Francisco, Francisca, Luisa and Maria.
Thereafter, Luisa, Maria, Eufemio Ingjug, and
Guillerma Ingjug Fuentes-Pagubo, daughter of
Francisca, sold the disputed land to the
respondents3 in July 1965, representing themselves
as the sole heirs of Mamerto. The sale was
evidenced by a Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land and
an Extrajudicial Settlement and Confirmation of Sale.
On August 1992, the Heirs of Romana,
Fransisco, and Francisca (The petitioners)
challenged respondents' ownership of the
property by filing a complaint for Partition,
Recovery of Ownership and Possession,
Declaration of Nullity: Deed of Sale of
3
The spouses Leon V. Casals and Lilia C.
Casals, the spouses Carlos L. Climaco and Lydia
R. Climaco, the spouses Jose L. Climaco, Jr. and
Blanquita C. Climaco, and Consuelo L. Climaco

Unregistered Land; Extrajudicial Settlement and

Confirmation of Sale alleging that they only
discovered that the land was sold to the
respondents in 1990. Petitioners also prayed that
the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land as well as
the Extrajudicial Settlement and Confirmation of
Sale be nullified to the extent of petitioners' shares
in the property.
The trial court dismissed the action on
the ground of prescription and laches based on
the fact that the Co-ownership of the lot in
question was already repudiated as early as 1965
when Luisa, Maria and Guillerma sold the land
claiming they are the only heirs of Mamerto
Ingjug, and when the other compulsory heir,
Francisco Ingjug confirmed said sale in 1967.
From that date, plaintiffs had only 10 years to
initiate an action for reconveyance which they
failed to do so. Accordingly, "an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years counted from the date
when an adverse title is asserted by the possessor
of the property" x x x moreover, "the rule in this
jurisdiction is that an action to enforce an implied
trust may be barred not only by prescription but
also by laches in which case repudiation is not
even required." The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue
Is the action
prescription and laches?

already

barred

by

Ruling
No, actions for reconveyance of property
predicated on the fact that the conveyance
complained of was null and void ab initio, a claim
of prescription of action would be unavailing.
"The action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe."
Neither could laches be invoked in the case at bar.
Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are
basically courts of law and not courts of equity.
Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice
outside legality," should be applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law.

A cursory reading of the complaint,

however, reveals that the action filed by
petitioners was for partition, recovery of
ownership and possession, declaration of nullity
of a deed of sale of unregistered land and
extrajudicial settlement and confirmation of sale.
Petitioners' causes of action are premised on their
claim that: (a) the Deed of Sale of Unregistered
Land is void and of no effect since their respective
shares in the inheritance were included in the sale
without their knowledge and consent, and one of
the vendor-signatories therein, Eufemio Ingjug
(Eufemio Tiro, husband of Romana Ingjug), was
not even a direct and compulsory heir of the
decedent; and (b) the Extrajudicial Settlement and
Confirmation of Sale is simulated and therefore
null and void ab initio, as it was purportedly
executed in 1967 by, among others, Eufemio Tiro
who was not an heir, and by Francisco Ingjug who
died in 1963. Also, the prayer in the same
complaint expressly asks that all those transactions
be declared null and void. In other words, it is the
nullity of the deeds of sale and the extrajudicial
settlement and confirmation of the sale whcic is
the basic hypothesis uon which the instant civil
action rests. Thus, it appears that we are
dealing here not with simple voidable
contracts tainted with fraud, but with
contracts that are altogether null and void ab
initio.

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, et. al [G.R. No.
133359. January 31, 2000, MENDOZA, J.]

Considering the foregoing, the trial court

judge should not have summarily dismissed
petitioners' complaint; instead, he should have
required the defendants to answer the complaint,
deferred action on the special defenses of
prescription and laches, and ordered the parties to
proceed with the trial on the merits. *Case
remanded to lower court.

Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTCMakati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the
petition and allowing the will. Shortly after the
probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on
February 26, 1996.

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs.

PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS,
respondent. [G.R. No. 129505. January 31,
2000, MENDOZA, J.]

KEY DOCTRINE: It is noteworthy that, although

Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for
probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does
not bar other branches of the same court from taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after
his death. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the
judges. And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction
over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to
the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or
proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge.

FACTS: On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos,

Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a
petition for probate of his will in the RTC-Makati,
Branch 61, which is docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M4223. He alleged that he had no compulsory
heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee
and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation,
Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties
with an approximate value of not less than
P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in
the custody of the named executrix, private
respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.

On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S.

Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming
that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators
sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole
full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De
Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor
of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the
reconsideration of the order allowing the will and

the issuance of letters of administration in his

name.
On the other hand, private respondent
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated
executrix of the will, filed a motion for the
issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61.
Later, however, private respondent moved to
withdraw her motion.
Private respondent, who earlier withdrew
her motion for the issuance of letters testamentary
in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same
purpose with the RTC-Makati, which was
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to
Branch 65. Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65
ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to
Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to
the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61
. . ."
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No.
M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on August 26,
1996 petitioners
motion for intervention on the ground that the
matter is for a separate case to be filed under Rule
78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be included
in this case filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court.. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court
of Appeals which upheld the denial.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an
order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the
records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on
the ground that there was a pending case
involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de
Santos pending before said court. It is already
ruled in Branch 61 that Pacitas Motion for
Issuance of Letters Testamentary already ruled
that the motion could not be admitted as the
subject matter involves a separate case under Rule
78 of the Rules of Court.
Initially, Judge Abad Santos appeared firm
in his position that " . . . it would be improper for
(Branch 65) to hear and resolve the petition (Sp.

Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate

proceedings were commenced with Branch 61.
He thus ordered the transfer of the records back
to the latter branch. However, he later recalled his
decision and took cognizance of the case "to
expedite the proceedings. In his order, he stated:
Considering the refusal
of the Hon. Fernando V.
Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to
continue hearing this case
notwithstanding the fact that
said branch began the probate
proceedings of the estate of the
deceased and must therefore
continue to exercise its
jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all others, until the entire estate
of the testator had been
partitioned and distributed as
per Order dated 23 September
1996, this branch (RTC-Makati,
Branch
65)
shall
take
cognizance of the petition if
only
to
expedite
the
proceedings, and under the
concept that the RTC-Makati is
but one court.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad
Santos
granted
petitioners
motion
for
intervention. Private respondent moved for a
reconsideration but her motion was denied by the
trial court. On appeal, CA rendered a decision
setting aside the trial courts order on the ground
that the petitioner has not shown any right or
interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: 1. Did the RTC-Makati, Branch 65

acquire jurisdiction over the petition for
issuance of letters testamentary filed by
(private) respondent?

2. Does the petitioner, being a creditor of the

late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to
intervene and oppose the petition for issuance
of letters testamentary filed by the
respondent?
3. Is the respondent guilty of forum shopping
in filing her petition for issuance of letters
testamentary with the RTC- Makati, Branch
65 while the same testate estate of the
decedent is still pending with the RTCMakati, Branch 61?

RULING:
1. YES. Petitioner argues that the proceedings
must continue until the estate is fully distributed
to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the
testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of
Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that
Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private
respondents petition for issuance of letters
testamentary. The contention has no merit. In
cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that
the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining
the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law.
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are
instituted only after the death of the testator, so
much so that, after approving and allowing the
will, the court proceeds to issue letters
testamentary and settle the estate of the testator.
The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In
fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain
a petition for probate of the will of a living
testator under the principle of ambulatory nature
of wills. However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code
authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of
the will filed by the testator himself. Rule 76
likewise provides that the testator himself may,
during his lifetime, petition in the court for the
allowance of his will. After a will has been

probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does

not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or
revoke the same before his death. Should he make
a new will, it would also be allowable on his
petition, and if he should die before he has had a
chance to present such petition, the ordinary
probate proceeding after the testators death would
be in order.
Thus, after the allowance of the will of
Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was
nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to
issue a certificate of allowance of the will
pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court.
There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of
Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTCMakati that Branch 61 of the RTC-Makati
having begun the probate proceedings of the
estate of the deceased, it continues and shall
continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all others.
Petitioner, who defends the order of
Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule
73, 1 which states: The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. It is noteworthy
that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the
venue of the petition for probate of the will of
Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar
other branches of the same court from taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
the testator after his death. As held in the
leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote: The
jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the
judges. And when a case is filed in one
branch, jurisdiction over the case does not
attach to the branch or judge alone, to the
exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be
held or proceedings continue by and before
another branch or judge.
Necessarily,
therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City
has jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

2. The petitioner has no right to intervene.

Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and
oppose the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by private respondent. He
argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor
of the testator, his interest in the matter is material
and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to
intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of
RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:
The
private
respondent herein is not an
heir or legatee under the will
of the decedent Arturo de
Santos. Neither is he a
compulsory heir of the latter.
As the only and nearest
collateral relative of the
decedent, he can inherit from
the latter only in case of
intestacy. Since the decedent
has left a will which has
already been probated and
disposes of all his properties
the private respondent can
inherit only if the said will is
annulled. His interest in the
decedents estate is, therefore,
not direct or immediate.
Applying Rule 79 (1), that it has been held
that an "interested person" is one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor, and whose interest is material and direct,
not merely incidental or contingent. Even if
petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De
Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the
testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory or
forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by
will.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is
not a compulsory heir who may have been
preterited in the testators

will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in

the settlement proceedings based on his allegation
that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the
testator instituted or named an executor in his will,
it is incumbent upon
the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent,
refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the
court appoint other persons to administer the
estate. None of these circumstances is present in
this case.

3. NO. As stated earlier, the petition for probate

was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for
the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the
allowance of his will, the proceedings were
terminated.
On the other hand, the petition for
issuance of letters testamentary was filed by
private respondent, as executor of the estate of
Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing
authority from the Court to administer the estate
and put into effect the will of the testator. The
estate settlement proceedings commenced by the
filing of the petition terminates upon the
distribution and delivery of the legacies and
devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly,
there is no identity between the two petitions, nor
was the latter filed during the pendency of the
former. There was, consequently, no forum
shopping.
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE
PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER
FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL
PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO
PALAGANAS [G.R. No. 169144, 26 January
2011;
ABAD,
J.]
FACTS:

What: This case is about the probate before

Philippine court of a will executed abroad
by a foreigner although it has not been
probated in its place of execution.

RULING:

In 2011, Ruperta Palaganas (Ruperta), a

Filipino who became a naturalized U.S.
citizen, died single and childless. She left
properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
In the last will and testament she executed
in California, she designated her brother,
Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor
of her will.
In 2013, respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas
(Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed
with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, a
petition for the probate of Rupertas' will
and for his appointment as special
administrator of her estate. However,
petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas
(Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas
(Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed
the petition on the ground that Rupertas
will should not be probated in the
Philippines but in the U.S. where she
executed it. Ernesto, they claimed, is also
not qualified to act as administrator of the
estate.
In 2014, RTC admitted to probate
Rupertas last will, appointed respondent
Ernesto as special administrator at the
request of Sergio (the U.S.- based executor)
and
issued
Letters
of
Special
Administration to Ernesto.
Petitioner
nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to
the CA, which affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
May a will executed by a foreigner abroad
be probated in the Philippines although it has not
been previously probated and allowed in the
country where it was executed?

Our laws do not prohibit the probate of

wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of
their execution. A foreign will can be given
legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816
of the Civil Code states that the will of an
alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country.
The rules do not require proof that the
foreign will has already been allowed and
probated in the country of its execution. In
this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the RTC of the province where he
has an estate may take cognizance of the
settlement of such estate.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state
that the executor, devisee, or legatee named
in the will, or any other person interested in
the estate, may, at any time after the death
of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or
not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition
for the allowance of a will must show, so
far as known to the petitioner: (a) the
jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages,
and residences of the heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the
probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the
person for whom letters are prayed; and
(e) if the will has not been delivered to the
court, the name of the person having
custody of it. (NB: Jurisdictional facts refer to

the fact of death of the decedent, his residence

at the time of his death in the province where
the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he
left in such province)

In insisting that Rupertas will should have

been first probated and allowed by the
court of California, petitioners Manuel and
Benjamin obviously have in mind the
procedure for the reprobate of will before
admitting it here. But, reprobate or reauthentication of a will already probated
and allowed in a foreign country is different
from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a
competent court. Reprobate is specifically
governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.
The latter rule applies only to reprobate of
a will, it cannot be made to apply to the
present case. In reprobate, the local court
acknowledges as binding the findings of the
foreign probate court provided its
jurisdiction over the matter can be
established.
Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with
impractically. If the instituted heirs do not
have the means to go abroad for the
probate of the will, it is as good as
depriving them outright of their
inheritance, since our law requires that no
will shall pass either real or personal
property unless the will has been proved
and allowed by the proper court.

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, et al. v.

MA. JOSEFA ECHIN
G.R. No. 178551, 11 October 2010, THIRD
DIVISION, (Carpio-Morales, J.)

Echin was hired by ATCI Overseas Corporation

in behalf of its principal, the Ministry of Public
Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical
technologist under a two-year contract,
denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00,
wherein all newly-hired employees undergo a
probationary period of 1 year and are covered by
Kuwaits Civil Service Board Employment
Contract No. 2.
Echin was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was
terminated from employment on February 11,
2001, she not having allegedly passed the
probationary period. She returned to the
Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her
own air fare.
She filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal
dismissal against ATCI as the local recruitment
agency, represented by Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and
the Ministry, as the foreign principal. The LA held
that Echin was illegally dismissed and
ordered ATCI, et al. to pay her US$3,600.00,
representing her salary for the three
months unexpired portion of her contract. The
NLRC affirmed.
ATCI, et al. appealed to the CA contending that
their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign
government agency, is immune from suit and, as
such, the immunity extended to them; and that
Echin was validly dismissed for her failure to meet
the performance rating within the one-year period
as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws. The
CA affirmed the NLRC decision.
ISSUE:
1. May Echin recover from the ATCI even
if the latter is a mere agent of the Ministry
which is immune from suit?
2. Did ATCI, et al. discharge its burden of
proving the foreign law as a basis of
Echins dismissal?
3. Is Ikdal solidarily liable with ATCI?

RULING:
1. YES. ATCI, as a private recruitment
agency, cannot evade responsibility for
the money claims of Overseas Filipino
workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad
by the mere expediency of claiming that
its foreign principal is a government
agency clothed with immunity from suit,
or that such foreign principals liability
must first be established before it, as
agent, can be held jointly and solidarily
liable.
2. NO. It is hornbook principle, however,
that the party invoking the application of
a foreign law has the burden of proving
the law, under the doctrine of processual
presumptionwhich, in this case, petitioners
failed to discharge.
The Philippines does not take judicial
notice of foreign laws, hence, they must
not only be alleged; they must be
proven. To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof
and comply with Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
The documents presented, whether taken
singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently
prove that respondent was validly
terminated as a probationary employee
under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead
of submitting a copy of the pertinent
Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and
translated by Embassy officials thereat, as
required under the Rules, what ATCI, et
al. submitted were mere certifications
attesting only to the correctness of the
translations of the MOA and the
termination letter which does not prove at
all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ
from Philippine laws and that under such
Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly
terminated.

3. YES. Respecting Ikdals joint and solidary

liability as a corporate officer, the same is
in order too following the express
provision of R.A. 8042 on money
claims, viz:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. x
x
x
x
If
the
recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical
being, the
corporate
officers and directors
and partners as the case
may be, shall themselves
be jointly and solidarily
liable
with
the
corporation
or
partnership for
the
aforesaid claims and
damages.
NOTE: The case does not relate
anything about SpecPro. Please be guided
accordingly. Thanks. -Dex

Gonzaless vs.. Aguinaldo ((1990))

G.R. No. 74769 | 1990-09-28
Subject: Appointment of an estate administrator;
Removal of an administrator requires just cause;
Disagreements and conflict between coadministrators is not a ground for removal;
Temporary absence from the country is not a
ground for disqualification or removal of an
administrator; Removal of an administrator does
not lie on the dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries
of the estate.
Facts:
Special Proceedings No. 021 is an intestate
proceeding involving the estate of the deceased
Doa Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis. Doa
Ramona is survived by her four children who are
her only heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F.
Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia FavisGomez.

In 1983, the court appointed Beatriz F. Gonzales

(petitioner) and Teresa Olbes ( private
respondent) as co-administratrices of the estate.
On 11 November 1984, while Beatriz Gonzales
was in the United States accompanying her ailing
husband who was receiving medical treatment in
that country, respondent Teresa Olbes filed a
motion to remove her sister Beatriz as
coadministratrix, on the ground that she is
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and
had committed acts and omissions detrimental to
the interest of the estate and the heirs. Copy of
said motion was served upon petitioner's then
counsel of record, Atty. Manuel Castro who, since
2 June 1984, had been suspended by the Supreme
Court from the practice of law throughout the
Philippines.
Judge Aguinaldo issued an Order which required
Beatriz Gonzales and the other parties to file their
opposition. Only Asterio Favis opposed the
removal of Beatriz as coadministratrix, as the
latter was still in the United States attending to her
ailing husband.
Judge Aguinaldo cancelled the letters of
administration granted to Beatriz Gonzales and
retained Teresa Olbes as the administratrix of the
estate of the late Ramona Gonzales.
Beatriz Gonzales moved to reconsider the Order
but the same was opposed by Teresa Olbes and
another co-heir Cecilia Gomez. The judge denied
the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the present
petition where Beatriz Gonzales contends that
Judge Aguinaldo's Order should be nullified on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her
removal was not shown by respondents to be
anchored on any of the grounds provided under
Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court.

Held:
Appointment of an estate administrator
1. The rule is that if no executor is named in the
will, or the named executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate, the court must appoint
an administrator of the estate of the deceased who
shall act as representative not only of the court
appointing him but also of the heirs and the
creditors of the estate. In the exercise of its
discretion, the probate court may appoint one,
two or more co-administrators to have the benefit
of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented.
In the appointment of the administrator of the
estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.
This is the same consideration which Section 6 of
Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the
order of preference in the appointment of
administrators for the estate. The underlying
assumption behind this rule is that those who will
reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical
administration of the estate, or, on the other hand,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence
or mismanagement, have the highest interest and
most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly.
Removal of an administrator requires just
cause
3. Administrators have such an interest in the
execution of their trust as entitle them to
protection from removal without just cause.
Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court
provides the legal and specific causes authorizing
the court to remove an administrator.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with
ample discretion in the removal of an
administrator, it however must have some fact
legally before it in order to justify a removal.
There must be evidence of an act or omission on

the part of the administrator not conformable to

or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the
court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to
warrant the removal of the administrator. In
making such a determination, the court must
exercise good judgment, guided by law and
precedents.
Disagreements and conflict between coadministrators is not a ground for removal
The court did not base the removal of the
petitioner as coadministratrix on any of the causes
specified in respondent's motion for relief of the
petitioner. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine
the validity of the charges brought against
petitioner by Teresa Olbes. The court based the
removal of the petitioner on the fact that in the
administration of the estate, conflicts and
misunderstandings
have
existed
between
petitioner and respondent Teresa Olbes which
allegedly have prejudiced the estate.
6. Certainly, it is desirable that the administration
of the deceased's estate be marked with
harmonious relations between co-administrators.
But for mere disagreements between such joint
fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's removal is
not favored. Conflicts of opinion and judgment
naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur between
persons with different interests in the same estate.
Such conflicts, if unresolved by the coadministrators, can be resolved by the probate
court to the best interest of the estate and its heirs.
The court a quo failed to find hard facts showing
that the conflict and disharmony between the two
co-administratrices were unjustly caused by
petitioner, or that petitioner was guilty of
incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or
prevented the management of the estate according
to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or
omission showing that her continuance as coadministratrix of the estate materially endangers
the interests of the estate.

Temporary absence from the country is not a

ground for disqualification or removal of an
administrator
8. Judge Aguinaldo removed petitioner Beatriz
Gonzales as coadministratrix of the estate also on
the ground that she had been absent from the
country since October 1984 and had not returned
as of 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned
order, leaving respondent Teresa Olbes alone to
administer the estate.
9. It appears that petitioner's absence from the
country was known to respondent Olbes, and that
the latter and petitioner Gonzales had continually
maintained correspondence with each other with
respect to the administration of the estate during
the petitioner's absence from the country. As a
matter of fact, petitioner, while in the United
States, sent respondent Olbes a letter addressed to
the Land Bank of the Philippines dated 14
November 1984, and duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, authorizing
her (Olbes) to receive, and collect the interests
accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to
the estate, and to use them for the payment of
accounts necessary for the operation of the
administration.
10. This shows that petitioner had never
abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the
estate nor had she been remiss in the fulfillment
of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence
in the state does not disqualify one to be an
administrator of the estate.
11. A temporary absence from the state on
account of ill health, or on account of business, or
for purposes of travel or pleasure, would not
necessarily establish the fact that an executor `has
removed' from the estate, within the intent of
the statute. (In re: Mc Knight's Will)

Removal of an administrator does not lie on

the dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the
estate
12. The court a quo seeks refuge in the fact that
two (2) of the other three (3) heirs of the estate of
the deceased (Teresa Olbes and Cecilia Favis
Gomez) have opposed the retention or reappointment of petitioner as co-administratrix of
the estate. Suffice it to state that the removal of
an administrator does not lie on the whims,
caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries
of the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it
would result in orderly and efficient
administration.
13. As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause for
her removal was shown, the court a quo gravely
abused its discretion in removing her. Stated
differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was
removed without just cause. Her removal was
therefore improper.

VICTORIA TAYAG VS FELICIDAD

TAYAG-GALLOR (2008)
Facts: In 2001, respondent Felicidad A. TayagGallor, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag.
Respondent alleged that she is one of the three
illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and
Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was married to
petitioner herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the two
allegedly did not have any children of their own.
In 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving
behind two real properties both of which are in
the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle
which the latter sold. Petitioner allegedly promised
to give respondent and her brothers P100,000.00
each as their share in the proceeds of the sale.
However, petitioner only gave each of them half
the amount she promised.

Respondent further averred that petitioner has

caused the annotation of an affidavit executed by
Ismael Tayag declaring the properties to be the
paraphernal properties of petitioner. The latter
allegedly intends to dispose of these properties to
the respondents and her brothers prejudice.
Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she
purchased the properties subject of the petition
using her own money. She claimed that she and
Ismael Tayag got married in Las Vegas, and that
they have an adopted daughter, Carmela Tayag.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the suit
because respondent failed to state a cause of
action.
In a Motion, petitioner reiterated her sole
ownership of the properties and presented the
transfer certificates of title thereof in her name.
She also averred that it is necessary to allege
that respondent was acknowledged and
recognized by Ismael Tayag as his
illegitimate child. There being no such
allegation, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the
death of the putative father.
Trial court: ruled in favor of respondent, denying
the Motion to dismiss filed by petitioner.
CA: affirmed the denial, directing the trial court to
proceed with the case. The Court of Appeals
ruled, in essence, that the allegation that
respondent is an illegitimate child suffices for a
cause of action, without need to state that she had
been recognized and acknowledged as such.
However, respondent still has to prove her
allegation and, correspondingly, petitioner
has the right to refute the allegation in the
course of the settlement proceedings.
Issue: whether respondents petition for the
issuance of letters of administration sufficiently
states a cause of action considering that
respondent merely alleged therein that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating

that she had been acknowledged or recognized as

such by the latter.
Ruling: Yes.
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a
petition for the issuance of letters of
administration must be filed by an interested
person. Court defined an interested party as one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore, must
be material and direct, not merely indirect or
contingent.
Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters
of administration is a suit for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of
respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent
on whether she is entitled to successional rights as
an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in
turn, may be established through voluntary or
compulsory recognition.
Voluntary recognition must be express such as
that in a record of birth appearing in the civil
register, a final judgment, a public instrument or
private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned. The voluntary recognition of an
illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no
further court action and is, therefore, not subject
to the limitation that the action for recognition be
brought during the lifetime of the putative parent.
Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the
other hand, may be demanded by the illegitimate
child of his parents and must be brought during
the lifetime of the presumed parents.
Respondent in this case had not been given the
opportunity to present evidence to show whether
she had been voluntarily recognized and
acknowledged by her deceased father because of
petitioners opposition to her petition and motion
for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as
yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually
one to compel recognition which had already been

foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether

indeed she has a material and direct interest to
maintain the suit by reason of the decedents
voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her
illegitimate filiation.
The appellate court was, therefore, correct in
allowing the proceedings to continue, ruling
that, "respondent still has the duty to prove
the allegation (that she is an illegitimate child
of the decedent), just as the petitioner has the
right to disprove it, in the course of the
settlement proceedings."

ANTONIETTA
GARCIA
VDA.
DE
CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(Special Eight Division), HON. JAPAL M.
GUIANI, RTC, Branch 14, 12th Judicial
Region, Cotabato City, and FLORITA A.
VALLEJO, as Administratrix of the Estate of
the late Roberto L. Chua, respondents
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998, J. Kapunan
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out
of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. The couple begot
two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson
Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.

On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in

Davao City. Florita thereafter filed with the RTC
Cotabato City a Petition for: Declaration of
heirship; guardianship over the persons and
properties of minors Robert and Rudyard; and
issuance of letters of administration. The petition
states that sometime from 1970 up to and until
late 1981 Florita lived with Chua as husband and
wife and out of said union they begot two
children; that Chua died intestate in Davao City
and left properties worth P5,000,000; and that
Chua died single and without legitimate

ascendants or descendants, hence the abovenamed minors shall succeed to the entire estate.
Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua
representing to be the surviving spouse of
Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that
at the time of the decedent's death Davao City was
his residence, hence, RTC of Davao City is the
proper forum. The trial court denied the motion
to dismiss for lack of merit ruling that Garcia had
no personality to file the motion not having
proven her status as wife of decedent. The court
did not admit the Xerox copy of the allege
marriage contract between Chua and petitioner
because the best evidence is the original or
authenticated copy which Garcia cannot produce.
Further, Florita presented a certification from the
local civil registrar concerned that no such
marriage contract was ever registered with them; a
letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized
the wedding, that he has not solemnized such
alleged marriage.
Thereafter, Garcia filed a Motion praying that the
letters of administration issued to Vallejo be
recalled and that new letters of administration be
issued to her. She, likewise, filed a Motion to
declare the proceedings a mistrial. Both motions
were denied by the trial court.
Issues:
1. Is there a need to publish the amended
petition for administration where the
amendment is due to failure to indicate
residence of decedent?
2. Does petitioner have legal standing to file
a motion to dismiss?
Held:
1. No. The original petition contains the
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the

issuance of letters of administration. Section 2,

Rule 79 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of
administration A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far
as known to the petitioner:
(a) jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the
heirs and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probative value and character of
the property of the estate;.
(d) The name of the person for whom
letters of administration are prayed;
But no defect in the petition shall render void the
issuance of letters of administration. (emphasis
ours).
The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for
issuance of letters of administration are: (1) the
death of the testator; (2) residence at the time of
death in the province where the probate court is
located; and (3) if the decedent was a nonresident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign
country and that the decedent has left an estate in
the province where the court is sitting.
While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the
above mentioned minors, died intestate
on May 28, 1992 in Davao City.
failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at
the time of his death, the omission was cured by
the amended petitions wherein the same
paragraph now reads:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the
abovementioned minors is a resident of
Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28,

1992 at Davao City (Emphasis in the

original.)
All told the original petition alleged substantially
all the facts required to be stated in the petition
for letters of administration. Consequently, there
was no need to publish the amended petition as
petitioner would insist.
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing
to file the motion to dismiss as she is not related
to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in
his estate as creditor or otherwise. The Rules are
explicit on who may do so:
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for
administration Any interested person,
may by filing a written opposition, contest
the petition on the ground of
incompetency of the person for whom
letters of administration are prayed
therein, or on the ground of the
contestant's
own
right
to
the
administration, and may pray that letters
issue to himself, or to any competent
person or persons named in the
opposition.
Only an interested person may oppose the
petition for issuance of letters of administration.
An interested person is one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor; his interest is material and direct,
and not one that is only indirect or contingent.
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the
surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof of
marriage between man and wife is a marriage
contract, which Antonietta Chua failed to
produce. The lower court correctly disregarded
the photostat copy of the marriage certificate
which she presented, this being a violation of the
best evidence rule, together with other worthless
pieces of evidence.

LUIS L. CO v. HON. RICARDO R.

ROSARIO
G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008, THIRD
DIVISION, (NACHURA, J.)
Settled is the rule that the selection or removal
of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding
the
selection
or
removal
of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than
those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long
as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse,
higher courts will not interfere with it.
On March 4, 1998, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) OF Makati City, Branch 66, in Sp.
Proc. No. M-4615, appointed petitioner and
Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special administrators of
the estate of the petitioner's father, Co Bun Chun.
However, on motion of the other heirs, the trial
court set aside petitioner's appointment as special
co-administrator.
Petitioner
consequently,
nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co for
appointment as co-administrator of the estate. The
RTC appointed Alvin as special co-administrator.
Almost four years thereafter, the RTC,
acting on a motion filed by one of the heirs, issued
its January 22, 2002 Order revoking and setting
aside the appointment of Alvin. The trial court
reasoned that Alvin had become unsuitable to
discharge the trust given to him as special coadministrator because his capacity, ability or
competence to perform the functions of coadministrator had been beclouded by the filing of
several criminal cases against him, which, even if
there was no conviction yet, had provided the
heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle
the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and
confidence. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the said Order, but this was
denied in the RTC Order. In CA, the appellate
court affirmed the revocation of the appointment
and dismissed the petition. Thus, the instant
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Did the trial court err in revoking the

appointment of Alvin as co-administrator?
HELD: NO
We affirm the appellate court's ruling that
the trial court did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in revoking Alvin's appointment as
special co-administrator. Settled is the rule that the
selection or removal of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the selection or
removal of regular administrators. Courts may
appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules,
at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is
exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will
not interfere with it. This, however, is no authority
for the judge to become partial, or to make his
personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of
such discretion must be based on reason, equity,
justice and legal principles.
Thus, even if a special administrator had
already been appointed, once the court finds the
appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is
justified in withdrawing the appointment and
giving no valid effect thereto.The special
administrator is an officer of the court who is
subject to its supervision and control and who is
expected to work for the best interest of the entire
estate, especially with respect to its smooth
administration and earliest settlement.
In this case, we find that the trial court's judgment
on the issue of Alvin's removal as special coadministrator is grounded on reason, equity,
justice and legal principle. It is not characterized
by patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim
and abuse, arbitrariness or despotism, as to be
correctible by the writ of certiorari. In fact, the
appellate court correctly observed that:

In ruling to revoke the appointment of

Alvin Milton Co, the lower court took into
consideration the fiduciary nature of the office of
a special administrator which demands a high
degree of trust and confidence in the person to be
appointed. The court a quo observed that,
burdened with the criminal charges of falsification
of commercial documents leveled against him
(sic), and the corresponding profound duty to
defend himself in these proceedings, Alvin Milton
Co's ability and qualification to act as special coadministrator of the estate of the decedent are
beclouded, and the recall of his appointment is
only proper under the attendant circumstances.
Such reasoning by the court a quo finds basis in
actual logic and probability. Without condemning
the accused man (sic) as guilty before he is found
such by the appropriate tribunal, the court merely
declared that it is more consistent with the
demands of justice and orderly processes that the
petitioner's son, who is already bidden to defend
himself against criminal charges for falsification in
other fora be relieved of his duties and functions
as special administrator, to avoid conflicts and
possible abuse.
The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion
attending such ruling, as it was reached based on
the court a quo's own fair assessment of the
circumstances attending the case below, and the
applicable laws.
As a final note, the Court observes that
this prolonged litigation on the simple issue of the
removal of a special co-administrator could have
been avoided if the trial court promptly appointed
a regular administrator. We, therefore, direct the
trial court to proceed with the appointment of a
regular administrator as soon as practicable.

ANGELA PUENTEVELLA ECHAUS v.

HON. RAMON BLANCO, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
AND AVELINA MAGNO
G.R. No. 30453, December 4, 1989
(Medialdea, J.)
Key Doctrine: The period prescribed in the notice to
creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the
estate may be allowed any time before an order of
distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court for
cause and upon such terms as are equitable. At the time
petitioner's motion to direct payment of the judgment credit
was filed, no order of distribution was issued yet.
Angelina Echaus, in her own behalf and
as Administratrix of the intestate estate of her
deceased father Luis Puentevella, assisted by her
husband, Rene Echaus, filed a complaint against
Charles Newton Hodges praying for an
accounting of the business covering the Ba-Ta
Subdivision, the recovery of her share in the
profits and remaining assets of their business and
the payment of expenses and moral and exemplary
damages. Later, the counsel for Hodges
manifested that Hodges died. No motion to
dismiss was filed by C. N. Hodges' counsel. The
trial court ordered the substitution of the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB), as administrator of the estate of deceased
Hodges, as party defendant. Thereafter, a petition
for the settlement of the estate of Hodges was
instituted. Later, a judgment was rendered by the
trial court in favor of Echaus. However, the writ
of execution was not enforced as Echaus opted to
file a motion for the payment of the judgment.
Avelina Magno, as administratrix of the estate of
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (wife of C. N.
Hodges) opposed the motion. Judge Ramon
Blanco, issued an order holding in abeyance the
resolution of the motion of Echaus for payment
of the judgment rendered in her favor until after
the resolution of the "Petition for Relief from
Judgment" filed by Magno which was later denied
since Linnie Hodges was not a party to the case.

Echaus prayed for the resolution of her

previous motion to direct payment of the
judgment credit which was held in abeyance.
Judge Ramon Blanco issued an order reiterating
his position that the motion to direct payment of
the judgment credit cannot yet be resolved and
holding in abeyance the resolution thereof in view
of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, that he is not
restrained from approving final deeds of sale
executed by the Administrator PCIB covering
properties of the respective estates and that he can
act on such other routinary administrative matters
necessary for the gathering and preservation of the
estate.
Echaus filed the instant petition for
mandamus seeking to set aside Judge Blanco's
order and to order PCIB to pay the judgment
credit in the civil case. On the other hand, PCIB
and Magno contend that the judgment is null and
void for having been rendered without
jurisdiction. Money claims against a defendant
who dies without a judgment having been
rendered in the RTC shall be dismissed and
prosecuted as a claim in the estate proceeding.
Magno further claims that the judgment sought to
be enforced is barred under the Rules of Court.
The proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of C. N. Hodges was opened in 1962 and the
notice to creditors was published in "Yuhum," a
newspaper of general circulation in its issues of
March 12, 10, and 27, 1963. Under Section 2, Rule
27 of the Rules of Court, the time provided for
filing claims against the estate shall be stated by
the court in the notice, which shall not be more
than twelve (12) months nor less than six (6)
months after the date of its first publication. Since
Echaus filed her motion to direct payment only on
February 20, 1967, which is more than four years
from the publication of the notice then, it is
already barred.
ISSUE:

Can Echaus still file her claim even after

the period set by the court in the notice to
creditors?
HELD:
YES. When PCIB as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges was ordered to he
substituted as defendant, it registered no objection
to the order. Thus, even if We admit for the sake
of argument that the trial court, after the death of
C. N. Hodges has no jurisdiction to render a
judgment therein, the argument must fail. PCIB,
participated actively in the said case. It did not
appeal the decision rendered therein, neither did it
raise the issue of jurisdiction at any stage. It has
been consistently held by this court that while lack
of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a
party's active participation in the proceedings
before the court without jurisdiction will estop
such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, the argument of Magno is not
correct. The Rules of Court allows a creditor to
file his claim after the period set by the court in
the notice to creditors, provided the conditions
stated in the rules are present. The rule provides:
"Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be
filed. ---- . . . . However, at any time before an
order of distribution is entered, on application of a
creditor who has failed to file his claim within the
time previously limited, the court may, for cause
shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow
such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding
one (1) month." (Rule 86).
It is clear from the foregoing that the
period prescribed in the notice to creditors is
not exclusive; that money claims against the
estate may be allowed any time before an
order of distribution is entered, at the
discretion of the court for cause and upon
such terms as are equitable. At the time
petitioner's motion to direct payment of the
judgment credit was filed, no order of
distribution was issued yet. Also, it is worthy to

cite herein a situation, similar to the case at bar,

which was considered by this court as a good
excuse for the late filing of a claim against the
decedent:
"Here, the claim was filed in the probate
court on February 25, 1959, while the defendants
in the civil case were still perfecting their appeal
therein. The record does not show that the
administrator objected thereto upon the ground
that it was filed out of time. The pendency of that
case, we are persuaded, to say is a good excuse for
tardiness in the filing of the claim. And the order
of the final distribution is still to be given."

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

EDMUND SANTIBANEZ and FLORENCE
SANTIBANEZ ARIOLA
G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005, Second
Division (Callejo, Sr. J.)
The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim
Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the
probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The filing of a money claim
against the decedents estate in the probate court is
mandatory.
First Countryside Credit Corporation
(FCCC) and Efraim Santibanez entered into a loan
agreement in the amount of P128,000 intended
for the payment of one Ford 6600 Agricultural
All-purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof,
Efraim and his son, Edmund executed a
promissory note in favour of the FCCC payable in
five equal annual amortizations. FCCC and
Efraim entered into another loan agreement in the
amount of P123,156 for the payment of another
tractor with accessories and a Howard Rotamotor.
Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a
promissory note as well as a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died leaving a
holographic will. Edmund was appointed as the
special administrator of the estate of the decedent.

During the pendency of the testate proceedings,

Edmund and his sister Florence Santibanez Ariola
executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed
to divide between themselves and take possession
of the three tractors: 2 for Edmund and 1 for
Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by
them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Liabilities was executed between
FCCC and Union Bank, wherein FCCC assigned
all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank. Union
Bank sent demand letters to Edmund for the
settlement of his account, but the same went
unheeded. The Bank then filed a Complaint for
sum of money against Efraims heirs. Summonses
were issued to both Edmund and Florence but
since Edmund was in the US at that time, the
complaint was narrowed down to Florence. She
filed her Answer alleging that the loan documents
do not bind her as she was not a party thereto.
Considering that the Joint Agreement signed by
her and Edmund was not approved by the probate
court, it was null and void; hence she was not
liable to petitioner.
RTC dismissed the complaint and stated that the
petitioner should have filed its claim with the
probate court. On appeal, petitioner asserted that
the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate children and heirs. The CA did not
agree with this contention and affirmed in toto the
ruling of the lower court.

1. NO. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that

there can be no valid partition among
heirs until after the will has been
probated. any partition involving the said
tractors among the heirs is not valid. The
joint agreement executed by Edmund and
Florence, partitioning the tractors among
themselves, is invalid, specially so since at
the time of its execution, there was
already a pending proceeding for the
probate of their late fathers holographic
will covering the said tractors. It must be
stressed that the probate proceeding had
already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the
three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in
any way without the probate courts
approval is tantamount to divesting it
with jurisdiction which the Court cannot
allow.
2. NO. The assumption of liability was
conditioned upon the happening of an
event, that is, that each heir shall take
possession and use of their respective
share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition,
and that they were to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
that they were each to receive. The
partition being invalid as earlier discussed,
the heirs in effect did not receive any such
tractor.
It follows then that the
assumption of liability cannot be given
any force and effect.

ISSUE.
1. Is the partition in the Agreement
executed by the heirs valid? NO.
2. Was the assumption by the heirs of the
indebtedness of the deceased valid? NO.
3. Can the petitioner hold the heirs liable on
the obligation of the deceased? NO. (Sec.
5, Rule 86).
HELD.

3. NO. The Court notes that the loan was

contracted by the decedent.
The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of
the late Efraim Santibaez, should have
thus filed its money claim with the
probate court in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The filing of a money
claim against the decedents estate in

the probate court is mandatory. As we

held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera:
This requirement is for
the
purpose
of
protecting the estate of
the
deceased
by
informing the executor
or administrator of the
claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine
each claim and to
determine whether it is a
proper one which should
be allowed. The plain
and obvious design of
the rule is the speedy
settlement of the affairs
of the deceased and the
early delivery of the
property
to
the
distributees, legatees, or
heirs. The law strictly
requires the prompt
presentation
and
disposition of the claims
against the decedent's
estate in order to settle
the affairs of the estate
as soon as possible, pay
off its debts and
distribute the residue.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing
therein could hold private respondent
Florence S. Ariola accountable for any
liability incurred by her late father. The
documentary
evidence
presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the
continuing guaranty agreement, were
executed and signed only by the late
Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund.
As the petitioner failed to file its money
claim with the probate court, at most, it
may only go after Edmund as co-maker

of the decedent under the said promissory

notes and continuing guaranty, of course,
subject to any defenses Edmund may
have as against the petitioner. As the
court had not acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Edmund, we find it
unnecessary to delve into the matter
further.
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR
CORPORATION,
FIRST
FARMERS
HOLDING
CORPORATION,
PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
AMOR A. REYES, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
BRANCH 21 AND ADMINISTRATRIX
JULITA
CAMPOS
BENEDICTO,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 164108, May 08, 2009, SECOND
DIVISION, Tinga, J.

Key Doctrine: The Rules of Special Proceedings allows

not just creditors, but also "any person interested" or
"persons interested in the estate" various specified capacities
to protect their respective interests in the estate (not
necessarily intervene). Anybody with a contingent claim
based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a
decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time
judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent
would have already been distributed, or diminished to the
extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against
it.
Facts
On 25 May 2000, Julita Campos
Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor after the death of her husband, Roberto
Benedicto. The RTC presided by Judge Amor
Reyes issued an order appointing private
respondent as administrator of the estate of her
deceased husband, and issuing letters of
administration in her favor.

In January 2001, private respondent

submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of
Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the
Estate of her deceased husband. In the List of
Liabilities attached to the inventory, private
respondent included as among the liabilities, the
two pending claims where the petitioners are
parties thereto, then being litigated before the
Bacolod City courts. Private respondent stated
that the amounts of liability corresponding to the
two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No.
95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No.
11178. Thereafter, the Manila RTC required
private respondent to submit a complete and
updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining
to the estate.
Petitioners filed a Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies
of all processes and orders pertaining to the
intestate proceedings. The Manila RTC issued an
order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties.
The petitioners thereafter elevated their prayer to
the CA claiming that they have the right to
intervene since Benedicto is the defendant in the
civil cases lodged with the RTC of Bacolod.
The CA dismissed the petition and
declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings. The
allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene, according to the appellate court, is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
The CA cited the fact that the claims of
petitioners against the decedent were in fact
contingent or expectant, as these were still
pending litigation in separate proceedings before
other courts.
Issue
Did the lower court err in not allowing
the petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings? (NO) are they entitled to notices and
rights of interested persons in settlement of
estates? (Yes)

Ruling
No, it could already be concluded that
notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention
as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to
creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim. The definition of "intervention"
under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate
contingent claims.
Had the claims of petitioners against
Benedicto been based on contract, whether
express or implied, then they should have filed
their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of
the notice to creditors to be issued by the court
immediately after granting letters of administration
and published by the administrator immediately
after the issuance of such notice. However, it
appears that the claims against Benedicto were
based on tort, as they arose from his actions in
connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders
Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict
do not fall within the class of claims to be filed
under the notice to creditors required under Rule
86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive
the death of the decedent and may be commenced
against the administrator pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the
intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its
administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil
Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case was
already pending review before this Court at the
time of Benedicto's death.
However, even if it were declared that
petitioners have no right to intervene in
accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily
mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had
sought before the RTC since the right to intervene
is not one of those reliefs. While there is no
general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain
prayers4 or reliefs from the intestate court not
4

Petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that

were denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they
be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders
issued" by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by

explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the

prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their
interest in the estate, and there is no other
modality under the Rules by which such interests
can be protected.
Petitioners' interests in the estate of
Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are
viable interests nonetheless. The Rules of Special
Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also
"any person interested" or "persons interested in
the estate" various specified capacities to protect
their respective interests in the estate. Anybody
with a contingent claim based on a pending action
for quasi-delict against a decedent may be
reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is
rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent
would have already been distributed, or
diminished to the extent that the judgment could
no longer be enforced against it.
As to the first prayer, allowing creditors,
contingent or otherwise, access to the records of
the intestate proceedings is an eminently
preferable precedent than mandating the service
of court processes and pleadings upon them. In
either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to
it that the assets are being preserved and disposed
of in accordance with the rules will be duly
satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access
the records, rather than entitling them to the
service of every court order or pleading no
matter how relevant to their individual claim, will
be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the
administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while

administratrix Benedicto with the said court. Second, they

prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified
and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission
thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market
value of the same. Third, petitioners moved that the intestate
court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator
of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof,
set the date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested
in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate

providing a viable means by which the interests of

the creditors in the estate are preserved.
As to the second prayer and third prayer,
the court must deny. There are reliefs available to
compel an administrator to perform either duty,
but a person whose claim against the estate is still
contingent is not the party entitled to do so.
ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABA v. FE VDA.
DE TE, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
FAUSTINO CASTAEDA
G.R. No. 175910, 30 July 2009, THIRD
DIVISION, (Peralta, J.)
Agency is extinguished by the death of the principal. The
only exception where the agency shall remain in full force
and effect even after the death of the principal is when if it
has been constituted in the common interest of the latter and
of the agent, or in the interest of a third person who has
accepted the stipulation in his favor.
In the case Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro Gasing/Truck
Operator, Sereno has been illegally dismissed and
ordered Gasing to pay him his monetary claims in
the amount of P43,606.47. After the Writ of
Execution was returned unsatisfied, LA Sancho
issued an Alias Writ of Execution. Accompanied
by Sereno and his counsel, Atty. Rogelio E.
Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck, which at that time
was in the possession of Gasing. The truck was
sold at public auction, with Sereno appearing as
the highest bidder.

Meanwhile, Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her

attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaeda, filed with the
RTC, a Complaint for recovery of motor vehicle,
damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck
pendente lite against Sarsaba, Sereno, Lavarez and
the NLRC alleging that: (1) she is the wife of the
late Pedro Te, the registered owner of the truck, as
evidenced by the Official Receipt and Certificate
of Registration; (2) Gasing merely rented the truck
from her; (3) Lavarez erroneously assumed that

Gasing owned the truck because he was, at the

time of the taking,in possession of the same; and
(4) since neither she nor her husband were parties
to the labor case between Sereno and Gasing, she
should not be made to answer for the judgment
award, much less be deprived of the truck as a
consequence of the levy in execution.

Sarsaba filed a Motion to Dismiss[9] on the

following grounds: (1) respondent has no legal
personality to sue, having no real interests over
the property subject of the instant complaint; (2)
the allegations in the complaint do not sufficiently
state that Vda. De Te has cause of action; (3) the
allegations in the complaint do not contain
sufficient cause of action as against him; and (4)
the complaint is not accompanied by an Affidavit
of Merit and Bond that would entitle the
respondent to the delivery of the tuck pendente
lite. The RTC denied Sarsabas Motion to Dismiss.

Sarsaba filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the

Case on the following grounds:] (1) lack of
jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants;
and (2) to discharge respondent's attorney-in-fact
for lack of legal personality to sue. It appeared
that the respondent, Fe Vda. de Te, died. The
RTC denied for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
1. Did Sarsaba avail of the proper remedy in
questioning the denial by the RTC of his
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss?
2. Since Sereno died before summons was
served on him, should the RTC dismiss the
complaint against all the defendants and that
the same should be filed against his estate?
3. Should Vda. De Tes attorney-in-fact,
Faustino Castaeda, be discharged as he has no
more legal personality to sue on behalf of Fe
Vda. de Te, who passed away during the
pendency of the case before the RTC?

RULING:
1. No. The Order of the RTC denying Sarsabas
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss is not appealable
even on pure questions of law. It is worth
mentioning that the proper procedure in this
case, as enunciated by this Court, is to cite
such interlocutory order as an error in the
appeal of the case -- in the event that the RTC
rules in favor of Vda. De Te -- and not to
appeal such interlocutory order. On the other
hand, if the petition is to be treated as a
petition for review under Rule 45, it would
likewise fail because the proper subject would
only be judgments or final orders that
completely dispose of the case.
2. No. In the case before the Court, Sarsaba
raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of Sereno, not in his Motion to
Dismiss or in his Answer but only in his
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss. Having failed to
invoke this ground at the proper time, that is,
in a motion to dismiss, Sarsaba cannot raise it
now for the first time on appeal.
The court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over
one's person is a defense which is personal to
the person claiming it. Failure to serve
summons on Sereno's person will not be a
cause for the dismissal of the complaint
against the other defendants, considering that
they have been served with copies of the
summons and complaints and have long
submitted their respective responsive
pleadings.
The failure to effect service of summons unto
Patricio Sereno, one of the defendants herein does
not render the action DISMISSIBLE, considering
that the three (3) other defendants, namely, Atty.
Rogelio E. Sarsaba, Fulgencio Lavares and the
NLRC, were validly served with summons and the

case with respect to the answering defendants may

still proceed independently. Be it recalled that the
three (3) answering defendants have previously
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which
was denied by the Court.

3. No. When a party to a pending action dies

and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of
Court require a substitution of the deceased.
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the actions that survived and
may be filed against the decedent's
representatives as follows: (1) actions to
recover real or personal property or an
interest thereon, (2) actions to enforce liens
thereon, and (3) actions to recover damages
for an injury to a person or a property. In
such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the
court of the death of his client and give the
name and address of the latter's legal
representative. The rule on substitution of
parties is governed by Section 16,[46] Rule 3
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
In the case before the Court, it appears that
Vda. De Tes counsel did not make any
manifestation before the RTC as to her death.
In fact, he had actively participated in the
proceedings. Neither had he shown any proof
that he had been retained by respondent's
legal representative or any one who succeeded
her.
However, such failure of counsel would not
lead the Court to invalidate the proceedings
that have long taken place before the RTC.
The Court has repeatedly declared that failure
of the counsel to comply with his duty to
inform the court of the death of his client,
such that no substitution is effected, will not
invalidate the proceedings and the judgment
rendered thereon if the action survives the
death of such party. The trial court's

jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the

death of the party.
A perusal of the special power of attorney
leads the Court to conclude that it was
constituted for the benefit solely of the
principal or for Fe Vda. de Te. Nowhere
can we infer from the stipulations therein that
it was created for the common interest of
Vda. De Te and her attorney-in-fact. Neither
was there any mention that it was to benefit a
third person who has accepted the stipulation
in his favor. However, the Court does not
believe that such ground would cause the
dismissal of the complaint. An action for the
recovery of a personal property, a motor
vehicle, is an action that survives pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.
As such, it is not extinguished by the
death of a party.
While it may be true as alleged by defendants
that with the death of Plaintiff, Fe Vda. de Te,
the Special Power of Attorney she executed
empowering the Attorney-in-fact, Faustino
Castaeda to sue in her behalf has been
rendered functus officio, however, this Court
believes that the Attorney-in-fact had not lost
his personality to prosecute this case.
Records reveal that the Attorney-in-fact has
testified long before in behalf of the said plaintiff
and more particularly during the state when the
plaintiff was vehemently opposing the dismissal of
the complainant. Subsequently thereto, he even
offered documentary evidence in support of the
complaint, and this court admitted the same.
When this case was initiated, jurisdiction was
vested upon this Court to try and hear the same to
the end. Well-settled is the rule to the point of
being elementary that once jurisdiction is acquired
by this Court, it attaches until the case is decided.

Thus, the proper remedy here is the

Substitution of Heirs and not the

dismissal of this case which would work

injustice to the plaintiff.
PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING,
G.R. No. 134100, September 29, 2000,
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee
of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Bataan for a period
of five years ending on September 12, 1990. On
June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the
remaining period of his lease, to the spouses
Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses
Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated
amount of rent was P485,600.00, payable in two
installments of P300,000.00 and P185,600.00, with
the second installment falling due on June 30,
1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the
contract.
The first installment was duly paid, but of
the second installment, the sublessees only
satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid
balance of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the
sublessees failed to comply with their obligation.
On October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the
Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of
the said amount before the RTC Branch 5,
Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the alternative, he prayed
for the rescission of the sublease contract should
the defendants fail to pay the balance.
Petitioner Alipio moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that her husband, Placido
Alipio, had passed away
on December 1, 1988. She based her action on
Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which
then provided that "when the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and
the defendant dies before final judgment in the
Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
these rules." This provision has been amended so
that now Rule 3, Sec. 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that it shall not be dismissed

but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry
of final judgment and that a favorable judgment
obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced
against the estate of a deceased.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion
on the ground that being a party to the sublease
contract, she could be independently impleaded in
the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that
the death of her husband merely resulted in his
exclusion from the case. The Manuel spouses were
declared in default for failure to file an answer.
RTC rendered decision ordering Alipio and
Manuel spouses to pay the unpaid balance.
Petitioner appealed to the CA but such appeal was
dismissed. It held:
The rule that an action for recovery
of money, debt or interest thereon
must be dismissed when the
defendant dies before final judgment
in the regional trial court, does not
apply where there are other
defendants against whom the action
should be maintained.
In citing Climaco v Siy Uy and Imperial Insurance, Inc.
v. David, it ruled that when a case includes more
than one defendant, the remaining defendants
cannot avoid the action by claiming that the death
of one of the parties to the contract has totally
extinguished their obligation. Also, when the
obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring
his action in toto against any of the debtors
obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife
bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of
his death, her liability is independent of and
separate from her husband's; she may be sued for
the whole debt and it would be error to hold that
the claim against her as well as the claim against
her husband should be made in the decedent's
estate.
ISSUE: Can the creditor sue the surviving spouse
of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the

collection of a sum of money chargeable against

the conjugal partnership?
RULING: NO. We hold that a creditor cannot
sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an
ordinary proceeding for the collection of a
sum of money chargeable against the conjugal
partnership and that the proper remedy is for
him to file a claim in the settlement of estate
of the decedent.
First, it should be noted that since the
case was filed more than ten months after the
husband died, the case thus falls outside of the
ambit of Rule 3, Sec. 21 which deals with
dismissals of collection suits because of the death
of the defendant during the pendency of the case.
As already noted, Rule 3, Sec. 20 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the
case will be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the
manner especially provided in the Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
person.
Under the law, the Alipios' obligation
(and also that of the Manuels) is one which is
chargeable against their conjugal partnership.
When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal
partnership was automatically dissolved and debts
chargeable against it are to be paid in the
settlement of estate proceedings in accordance
with Rule 73, Sec. 2.
As held in al a v. Tanedo, after the death
of either of the spouses, no complaint for the
collection of indebtedness chargeable against the
conjugal partnership can be brought against the
surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made
in the proceedings for the liquidation and
settlement of the conjugal property. The reason
for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the
powers of administration of the surviving spouse
ceases and is passed to the administrator
appointed by the court having jurisdiction over

the settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the

surviving spouse is not even a de facto
administrator such that conveyances made by him
of any property belonging to the partnership prior
to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal
partnership property is void. In the recent case of
Ventura v. Militant, it was held that where a
complaint is brought against the surviving spouse
for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable
against said conjugal [partnership], any judgment
obtained thereby is void. The proper action
should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even
after the death of one of the spouses, there is no
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does
not mean, however, that the conjugal partnership
continues. And private respondent cannot be said
to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the
Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for
letters of administration in his capacity as a
principal creditor of the deceased . . . if after thirty
(30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply
for administration or request that administration
be granted to some other person.14 The cases
relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of
its ruling, namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy and Imperial
Insurance, Inc. v. David, are based on different sets
of facts. In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos Siy Uy
and Manuel Co, were sued for damages for
malicious prosecution. Thus, apart from the fact
the claim was not against any conjugal partnership,
it was one which does not survive the death of
defendant Uy, which merely resulted in the
dismissal of the case as to him but not as to the
remaining defendant Manuel Co.
With regard to the case of Imperial, the
spouses therein jointly and severally executed an
indemnity agreement which became the basis of a
collection suit filed against the wife after her
husband had died. For this reason, the Court ruled
that since the spouses' liability was solidary, the

surviving spouse could be independently sued in

an ordinary action for the enforcement of the
entire obligation. It must be noted that for
marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by
the husband and wife is chargeable against their
conjugal partnership and it is the partnership
which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus,
when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of
an obligation entered into by them, they are being
impleaded in their capacity as representatives of
the conjugal partnership and not as independent
debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary
liability, as between them, does not apply.
However, since the nature of the obligation
involved in this case, as will be discussed later, is
not solidary but rather merely joint, making
Imperial still inapplicable to this case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that private
respondent cannot maintain the present suit
against petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a
claim against the Alipios in the proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of petitioner's husband or,
if none has been commenced, he can file a
petition either for the issuance of letters of
administration or for the allowance of will,
depending on whether petitioner's husband died
intestate or testate. Private respondent cannot
short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim
against the Alipios with those against the Manuels
considering that, aside from petitioner's lack of
authority to represent their conjugal estate, the
inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is
necessary before any claim chargeable against it
can be paid. Needless to say, such power
exclusively pertains to the court having
jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedents
estate and not to any other court.
The trial court ordered petitioner and the
Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the
unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount
of P50,600.00 without specifying whether the
amount is to be paid by them jointly or solidarily.

The Civil Code provides that if from the law or

the nature or the wording of the obligation the
contrary does not appear, an obligation is
presumed to be only joint. Private respondent
does not cite any provision of law which provides
that when there are two or more lessees, or in this
case, sublessees, the latter's obligation to pay the
rent is solidary, except when the lessees or
sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property
after the expiration of the lease period and despite
due demands by the lessor. In the latter case, they
can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for
the use of the property. The basis of their solidary
liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but
the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors. In
the case at bar, there is no allegation that the
sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the
expiration of the term of the sublease. Indeed, the
unpaid balance sought to be collected by private
respondent in his collection suit became due on
June 30, 1989, long before the sublease expired on
September 12, 1990. Neither does petitioner
contend that it is the nature of lease that when
there are more than two lessees or sublessees their
liability is solidary. Clearly, the liability of the
sublessees is merely joint.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y

CORDOVA, accused-appellant. [G.R. No.
102007 | 1994-09-02; ROMERO, J.]
KEY DOCTRINE.
If the accused dies pending appeal of his
conviction, the civil liability based SOLELY on
the criminal liability is extinguished. But if the
civil liability is based on law, contract, quasicontract and quasi-delict, it survives the death of
the accused. A separate civil action may be
enforced: (1) against the ESTATE of the accused
in case of a contract; or (2) against the
EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR in case of
law, quasi-contract and quasi-delict.

FACTS.
The RTC of Roxas City convicted
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova with Rape. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February
4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to
cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hepato-carcinoma
gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal,
and required the Solicitor General to file its
comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability
arising from his commission of the offense
charged.
ISSUE.
Is the civil liability
extinguished by his death?

of

Bayotas

RULING.
Yes, if the civil liability is based solely on
his criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that the death of the convict:
(1) criminal liability is TOTALLY extinguished as
to his PERSONAL liabilities; (2) as to his
PECUNIARY penalties, his liability is
extinguished ONLY when the death of the
offended occurs before final judgment. In the
instant case, Bayotas died before final judgment.
Ordinary money claims under Section 21,
Rule III must be viewed in the light of Section 5,
Rule 86 involving claims against the estate. The
latter
provides
an
EXCLUSIVE
ENUMERATION of what claims can be filed
against the estate, to wit: (1) funeral expenses; (2)
expenses for the last illness; (3) judgments for
money; and (4) claims arising from contracts,
express or implied. If the obligation arose from
other sourceslaw, quasi-contract and quasidelictit is Section, Rule 87 that applies where
the
action
is
brought
against
the
Executor/Administrator.

18. DORONIO v. HEIRS OF DORONIO

(pdf)

RICARDO SILVERIO, JR. v. CA and NELIA

SILVERIO-DEE
Doctrine:
It must be borne in mind that until the estate is
partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the
properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on
a particular property. Once an action for the settlement of
an estate is filed with the court, the properties included
therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not
even the administrator may take possession of any property
that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the
Court.
Facts:
The instant controversy stemmed from the
settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz
Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse,
Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding
for the settlement of her estate. Ricardo Silverio,
Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio,
Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate.
Edmundo
S.
Silverio
also
filed
a
comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo
C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and
for the appointment of a new administrator.
RTC issued an Order granting the petition and
removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of
the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as
the new administrator.
Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order.
Then, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion
for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to
Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties
Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late
Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this
Honorable Court.
RTC issued an Omnibus Order denying private
respondents motion for reconsideration. The
Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-

Dee to vacate the property at No. 3,

Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the order.
Notably, the RTC in its Order also recalled its
previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with
letters of administration over the intestate estate
of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio,
Sr. as the administrator.
However, RTC further issued a writ of execution
for the enforcement of the Order against private
respondent to vacate the premises of the property
located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City.
The writ of execution was later issued and a
Notice to Vacate was issued ordering private
respondent to leave the premises of the subject
property within ten (10) days.
Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) with the
CA.
CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the
prayer for the issuance of a TRO and eventually
annulled the RTC's writ of execution and notice to
vacate.
Issue: whether CA seriously erred in annulling the
Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate against
private respondent?
Held:
Court ruled in the affirmative.
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed
the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the
ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises
of the property located at No. 3 Intsia
Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect
the order is not a final determination of the case
or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the
heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must
be borne in mind that until the estate is
partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to
the properties of the estate, such that no heir may

lay claim on a particular property. In Alejandrino v.

Court of Appeals, we succinctly ruled:
Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides
that where there are two or more heirs,
the whole estate of the decedent is,
before partition, owned in common by
such heirs, subject to the payment of
the debts of the deceased. Under a coownership, the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons. Each co-owner of
property which is held pro indiviso
exercises his rights over the whole
property and may use and enjoy the
same with no other limitation than that
he shall not injure the interests of his
co-owners. The underlying rationale
is that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be
determined and every co-owner
exercises, together with his coparticipants, joint ownership over
the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment
of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the
property of the decedent is inchoate as
long as the estate has not been fully
settled and partitioned, the law allows a
co-owner to exercise rights of
ownership over such inchoate right.
Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the
full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination

of
the
supplied.)

co-ownership.

(Emphasis

Additionally, the above provision must be viewed

in the context that the subject property is part of
an estate and subject to intestate proceedings
before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note
that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court,
the administrator may only deliver properties
of the estate to the heirs upon order of the
Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the
Rules of Court, the properties of the estate
shall only be distributed after the payment of
the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses
against the estate, except when authorized by
the Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an
estate is filed with the court, the properties
included therein are under the control of the
intestate court. And not even the
administrator may take possession of any
property that is part of the estate without the
prior authority of the Court.
In the instant case, the purported authority of
Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured
from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by
the probate court. She, therefore, never had any
real interest in the specific property located at No.
3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such,
the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be
considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not
subject to an appeal.
Thus, private respondent employed the wrong
mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with
the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper
mode of appeal, the case should have been
dismissed.
The implication of such improper appeal is that
the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary
period for the filing of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant
case. This means that private respondent has now

lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005

Order of the RTC.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF PASAY CITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD
DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO,
assisted
by
her
husband
ROMEO
SOLANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 143483, January 31, 2002, J. Bellosillo
For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to
1985) Amada Solano served as the all-around
personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth
Hankins, a widow and a French national. During
Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during
the waning years of her life, respondent Solano
was her faithful girl Friday and a constant
companion since no close relative was available to
tend to her needs.
In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated
service, Ms. Hankins executed in her favor two (2)
deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of
land. Private respondent alleged that she
misplaced the deeds of donation and were
nowhere to be found. While the deeds of donation
were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the
escheat of the estate of Hankins before the RTC
of Pasay City. During the proceedings, a motion
for intervention was filed by Romeo Solano,
spouse of Amada, and one Gaudencio Regosa, but
the motion was denied for the reason that "they
miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the
properties in question." Since it was established
that there were no known heirs and persons
entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the
lower court escheated the estate of the decedent in
favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
In the meantime, private respondent claimed that
she accidentally found the deeds of donation she
had been looking for a long time. Amada Solano

filed on 28 January 1997 a petition before the

Court of Appeals for the annulment of the lower
court's decision alleging, among others, that-

included as part of the estate of the said decedent

as she is the owner thereof by virtue of the deeds
of donation in her favor.

13.1. The deceased Elizabeth Hankins

having donated the subject properties to
the petitioner in 1983 and 1984, these
properties did not and could not form
part of her estate when she died on
September 20, 1985. Consequently, they
could not validly be escheated to the
Pasay City Government;

Issue:
Did RTC have jurisdiction when it escheated the
properties in favor of Pasay City government and
did the 5-year statute of limitations within which
to file claims as set forth in Rule 91 set in.

13.2. Even assuming arguendo that the

properties could be subject of escheat
proceedings, the decision is still legally
infirm for escheating the properties to an
entity, the Pasay City Government, which
is not authorized by law to be the
recipient thereof. The property should
have been escheated in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines under Rule
91, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court
The CA gave due course to the petition for
annulment of judgment. In upholding the theory
of Solano, the Appeals Court ruled that - Thus
whether or not the properties in question are no
longer part of the estate of the deceased Hankins
at the time of her death; and, whether or not the
alleged donations are valid are issues in the
present petition for annulment which can be
resolved only after a full blown trial x x x x
It is for the same reason that respondents
espousal of the statute of limitations against herein
petition for annulment cannot prosper at this
stage of the proceedings. Indeed, Section 4, Rule
91 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly
provides that a person entitled to the estate must
file his claim with the court a quo within five (5)
years from the date of said judgment. However, it
is clear to this Court that herein petitioner is not
claiming anything from the estate of the deceased
at the time of her death; rather she is claiming that
the subject parcels of land should not have been

Held:
Yes. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of
succession or assignment, whereby the state, by
virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the
real or personal property of a person who dies
intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful
owner, a property is claimed by the state to
forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the
first comers." Since escheat is one of the incidents
of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does,
prescribe the conditions and limits the time within
which a claim to such property may be made. The
procedure by which the escheated property may
be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and
a time limit is imposed within which such action
must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated
property must file his claim "within five (5) years
from the date of such judgment, such person shall
have possession of and title to the same, or if sold,
the municipality or city shall be accountable to
him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate;
but a claim not made shall be barred forever." The
5-year period is not a device capriciously
conjured by the state to defraud any claimant;
on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to
encourage would-be claimants to be
punctilious in asserting their claims,
otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
judgment.
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was
handed down by the lower court as early as 27

June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997,

more or less seven (7) years after, when private
respondent decided to contest the escheat
judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment
of judgment before the Court of Appeals.
Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion
of her right over the escheated properties militates
against recovery.
In the mind of this Court the subject properties
were owned by the decedent during the time that
the escheat proceedings were being conducted and
the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction
to escheat them in favor of Pasay City
notwithstanding an allegation that they had been
previously donated. Where a person comes into an
escheat proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on
such intervenor to establish his title to the
property and his right to intervene. A fortiori, the
certificates of title covering the subject properties
were in the name of the decedent indicating that
no transfer of ownership involving the disputed
properties was ever made by the deceased during
her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear
and convincing proof showing that the subject
lands had been conveyed by Hankins to private
respondent Solano, the same still remained, at
least before the escheat, part of the estate of the
decedent and the lower court was right not to
assume otherwise. The CA therefore cannot
perfunctorily presuppose that the subject
properties were no longer part of the decedent's
estate at the time the lower court handed down its
decision on the strength of a belated allegation
that the same had previously been disposed of by
the owner.
The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
RTC Pasay City, dated 27 June 1989,
is REINSTATED.