Aquino Vs Morato

FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and

Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer
requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting
slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and
television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or
classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato
on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their
decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience
votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal On February 27,
1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among
others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the
board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which
rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman.
Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips.
However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued
Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision
of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.
ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid
HELD : The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual
person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or
affecting a nation, state, or community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD
1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very
existence is public is character. it is an office created to serve public interest. It being
the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to
the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers
tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board and
the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made
pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in
nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which
is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
Taada vs. Tuvera
FACTS:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters
of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders is necessary before its enforcement.
RULING:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then
the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT VS. COMELEC, MAY 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1
Facts: On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804
prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of
intent
to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list
system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections.
Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary
manifestations. Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by
the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups,
namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA;
(5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9)ANAD;
(10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG;
(12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14)AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941
and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.

Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an
Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the
nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to
have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still
asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA
Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals
behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should,
actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in
G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter dated March 29, 2007 to Director
Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that
groups nominees. Another letter of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007
followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the
particular urgency of the subject request.
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to
petitioner Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila
Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WONT
BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", with the following sub-heading:
"Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented."
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga,
in their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales,
forwarded a letter to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive
decision on Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the names of
several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionallyguaranteed right to
information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew
attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the
and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request.
Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either
confirming or denying the banner headline and the alleged statement
of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms.
Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724
under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential
and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request.
Issues: (1)Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of
the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to

information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution;

and (2) Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to
disclose to the public the names of said nominees.
Held: The petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly denied insofar as it seeks to
nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However,
insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of
the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition
in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby
ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of
the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate
in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to
submit to the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from
notice hereof
Note:The petitioner requested the COMELEC to publish the individual
nominees of all the party-list groups in order that they will be guided on what
party-list group shall be supported by them. The COMELEC held that under
the Party-list Act, such list of nominees is confidential and should not be
published.
Held: The COMELEC should publish the list of nominees of all the party-list
groups. This is in accordance with the right to information on matters
of public concern which shall be accorded to every citizen
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO
ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. No. 16977, April 20, 2006
The Facts: In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the
Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of
officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole
issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to

appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on

the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the
China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing
and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail
Project.
On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued E.O. 464,
ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION
OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND
RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient
provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In
accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to
implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers
between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of
the
Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in
executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No.
95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides
that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential
or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and
not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order:

1. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the

department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
2. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by
the executive privilege;
1. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent
or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
2. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National
Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and
3. Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
I S S U E S: 1. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern; and
H E L D: E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right
to information on matters of public concern. There are clear
distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the
power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither
does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to
an individual citizen.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted
in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit
disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the
people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is
presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied
access to information which they can use in formulating their own
opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then
communicate to their representatives and other government officials through
the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds
Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion
be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be

responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only
to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion
are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto
can such bear fruit.
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of
E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its
violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.
Baldoza vs. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14
FACTS: In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal
Secretary of Taal, Batangas,charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B.
Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to
allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket
records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their
contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said
municipality.
Respondent, in answer to the complaint,stated that there has never been an
intention to refuse access to official court records; that
although court records are among public documents open to inspection not
only by the parties directly involved but also by other persons who
have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to
reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be
inspected. court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or
inspection of its records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may be
refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and
legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to
gratify
private spite or to promote public scandal. Under the circumstances, to allow
an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free access,
might do more harm than good to the citizenry of Taal. Disorder and chaos
might result defeating the very essence of their request. The undersigned
is just as interested as Mr. Baldoza in the welfare of the community and the
preservation of our democratic principles. The case was thereupon
referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At the
preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A.
Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and
(cooperation among officers in the same municipality. This motion

was denied by the Investigating Judge, but after formal investigation, he

recommended the exoneration of respondent.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the case against respondent is hereby
dismissed.information which the records contain is not flaunted before public
gaze, or
that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the
records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof
which is called upon to devise a remedy. The publication is made subject to
the consequences of the law.Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed
the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent certain
conditions and under his control and supervision. it has not been shown that
the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable.The
access to public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the
public has a legitimate interest in matters of social
and political significancethe Court finds that the respondent has not
committed any abuse of authority. there is no showing of abuse of authority
on
the part of the respondent.The respondent allowed the complainant to open
and view the docket books of the respondent under certain conditions and
under his control and supervision.Complainant admitted that he was aware
of the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent when he went to his
office to view his docket books for the purpose mentioned in his
communication

Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383

FACTS: Petitioner was the editor of the Manila Post, who sought the
inspection of real estates sold to aliens and registered with the RD. He was
denied to do so which prompted him to file a petition for mandamus.
HELD: Except when it is clear that the purpose of the inspection is unlawful,
it is not the duty of the registration officers to concern themselves with
the motives, purposes, and objects of the person seeking to inspect the
records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which
the records contain is not flaunted before the public gaze.
Gonzales vs. Narvasa 337 SCRA 733
FACTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for
information with respect to the names of executive officials holding

multiple positions, copies of their appointments, and a list of recipients of

luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned
over to the Office of the President. Petitioner filed this petition to compel the
Executive Secretary to answer his letter.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case
HELD: It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the
petitioner. The letter deals with matters of public concern, appointments to
public offices and utilization of public property. The Executive Secretary is
obliged to allow the inspection and copying of appointment papers.

Case Digest on Gonzales v. Narvasa Right to Information

FACTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for information with
respect to the names of executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of their
appointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau of
Customs and turned over to the Office of the President. Petitioner filed this petition to compel
the Executive Secretary to answer his letter.
HELD: It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner. The letter
deals with matters of public concern, appointments to public offices and utilization of public
property. The Executive Secretary is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of appointment
papers
Gonzales vs. Narvasa,
G.R. NO. 140835, August 14, 2000
Facts
: On November 26, 1998, by virtue of Executive Order (EO) No. 43,President
Joseph Estrada created the Philippine Commission on Constitutional
Reform(PCCR), in order to study and recommend proposed amendments
and/or revisions tothe 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing
the same. Under Section 7 of EO 43, the amount of P3,000,000 is
appropriated for its operational expenses to besourced from the funds of the
Office of the President. Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, inhis capacity as a
taxpayer and a citizen, assailed the constitutionality of the creation of PCCR
and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants.Petitioner asked the court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential
consultants, advisersand assistants from acting as such. Petitioner also
sought to enjoin the Commission
on Audit (COA) from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presi
dentialconsultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner anchored his petition
on two grounds:(1)he contended that PCCR is a public office which only the
legislature can create by wayof law;and (2) he asserted that by creating the
PCCR, the President is intervening in aprocess from which he is totally

excluded by the Constitution, which is the amendmentof the fundamental

charter.
Issue
: Whether petitioner has a legal standing to question the constitutionality of
EO 43in his capacity as a citizen and as a taxpayer?
Ruling :NO.The Court ruled that petitioner failed to establish his
locus standi
so as toenable him to seek judicial redress
as a citizen and as a
taxpayer. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suff
ered someactual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government.The injury must be fairly traceable to
the
challenged action and is likely to be redressedby a favorable action. In the
case at bar, petitioner
has not shown that he has sustainedor is in danger
of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the
PCCR.Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even indirect, injury. Only
Congress, not petitioner,can claim any injury in this case since,
since
according to the latter, the President hasencroached upon the legislative
power to create a public office and to
proposeamendments to the Charter
by forming the PCCR. A taxpayer is deemed to have standing
to raise
a constitutional issue when it is shownthat public funds have been disbursed
in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution. A taxpayers action is properly brought only when
there is an exercise
by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the instant case, it is apparent
that there isno exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The
appropriation of P3,000.000 for the PCCR were authorized by the President,
not by Congress. In fact,there was no appropriation at all because in its strict
sense, appropriation has beendefined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitutionthat money may be paid out of
the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers tothe act of the
legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum tobe
used in the payment of debts or dues from the State to its creditors.The
funds usedfor the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the
President, in the
exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Section 25 (5) of
Article VI of the Constitution. While the court retains the power to decide
whether or not
it will allow a taxpayers suit, petitioner failed to show that he is a real party in interest
that he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he is
entitled to the avails of the suit.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATON

In re: ATTY. EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554

Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney
in the Philippines.On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governorsunanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay hismembership dues"
to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.The
core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute
an invasion of hisconstitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining hisstatus as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
correspondingdues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization towhich he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
andproperty guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the aboveprovisions of the Court Rule and
of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to
strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is
not among the justiciable cases triable by the Courtbut is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
Issues: Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to
pay his membership dues?
Held: It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A.
Edillon should be as he ishereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Ratio Decidendi: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is
not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he isnot already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar examinations.
All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization
for the well-definedb u t u n o r g a n i z e d

and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a

r e a d y a m e m b e r. B a r integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or notattend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as hechooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment
of annual dues. TheSupreme Court, in order
to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashionbe shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program - the lawyers. Moreover,there is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional power and duty
topromulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law and the integration of thePhilippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution), from requiring members of
aprivileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeedimposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out
the objectives andpurposes of integration. Also, it clear that under the police
power of the State, and under thenecessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's
right to practise law before the courts of this country should
be and is a matter subject to regulation andinquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penaltydesigned
to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is notvoid as unreasonable or arbitrary.
NOTE: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished
from bar associations that are organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official
national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are
subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which
includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its
objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The
provisions assailed does not infringethe constitutional rights of the
respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate
its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon

wasstricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of
the bar.
Tarnate vs. Noriel, 100 SCRA 93
The crux of the matter in this proceeding for certiorari with preliminary
injunction is whether or not probationary employees are entitled to vote in
the election of officers and board members of a labor union. Respondent
Director Carmelo C. Noriel
1
at first ruled that they could not, apparently
relying on the applicable provision of the Labor Code, which reads thus: "Any
employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, with at least
one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee for purposes of membership in any labor
union.,
2
When, however, a motion for reconsideration was filed, he granted it and
allowed the votes to be counted. Hence this suit for certiorari.
In the election of union officers on October 23, 1977, there were two strong
contenders, petitioner Arthur Ternate and respondent Lucerio Fajardo.
Petitioner received 308 votes and respondent 285 votes. Forty (40) ballots
cast by employees who classified as second helpers were challenged. They
were included in the list of qualified voters upon the motion of the Fajardo
faction and over the opposition of the Ternate group. It was imposed as a
condition that the challenged ballots would be segregated and would be
counted only after passing upon the question of membership of the such
second helpers. The Ternate group finally agreed to allow them to participate
in the election. On October 27, 1977, after the decision, the Fajardo
group moved to have the challenged votes opened. The Med-Arbiter granted
the prayer. Respondent Director Noriel in the order now challenged in
this petition, as noted earlier, decided otherwise in a motion for
reconsideration.
The Solicitor General
3
when asked to comment, after stressing the constitutional right to form
associations, a corollary of which in the case of labor

is the right to self-organization, pointed to Article 3 of the New Labor Code in

sustaining the power of respondent Director to issue the assailed order.
Thus: "These constitutional mandates are recognized in Article 3 of the New
Labor Code. Further, Article 244 thereof is of the same tenor: ... All
persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises,
including religious, medical or educational institutions operating for profit,
shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor
organizations for purposes of collective bargain.
4
Reference to the
constitutional right to freedom of association is not without relevance. The
more decisive question, however, is the force and effect of the Labor
Code provision as to when a probationary employee could in the language
thereof "be considered a regular employee for purposes of membership in
any labor union."
The answer arrived at by this Court after due consideration of all factors
bearing on such issue, is that the condition thus imposed in the Labor Code
requiring "at least one year of service" calls for application. Petitioner,
therefore, must prevail.
1. The reliance of petitioner on the applicable Labor Code provision is not in
vain. It is definite and clear. At least one year of service is required for
an employee to enjoy the benefits "of membership in any labor union." There
is no ambiguity. Its validity has not been challenged. It, therefore, calls
for application in the precise terms it was enacted. As was pointed out in
Gonzaga Court of Appeals:
5
"It has been repeated time and time again that
where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally there is nothing for the
courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of
its
operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently been to that
effect.
6
There is thus no statutory support for the challenged order of
respondent Noriel.

2. In reaching such a conclusion, this Court is not unaware of the implication

for freedom of association.
7
There is plausibility on its face to the
contention of the Solicitor General that to bar the probationary employees
from voting for union officials would run counter to such constitutional
right. Nor should it be forgotten that in U.E. Automotive Employees and
Workers Union vs. Noriel,
8
it was stressed that "freedom of association is
explicitly ordained; it is not merely derivative, peripheral or penumbral, as is
the case in the United States. It can trace its origin to the Malolos
Constitution.
9
A more realistic appraisal, however, of the labor situation would serve to
clarify matters. (The right to join a labor union remains undisputed. In the
meanwhile however, for purposes of electing the union officers, assuming it
would be chosen as the sole bargaining unit in the negotiation for a
collective bargaining contract, the right of probationary employees could be
thus restricted as provided for in the Labor Code. The justification lies in the
fact that management could, by the simple device of appointing
probationary employees in the labor union expected to prevail in the choice
of the sole collective bargaining agent, attain the result that would serve
best its interests, not necessarily that of labor). It must have been such a
purpose that inspired a provision on this character. At any rate, there being
no attack on its validity, it must be given full force and effect.
3. The delay in the decision of this case is due to the fact that the required
number of votes for this conclusion could not be obtained until the last
deliberation. Precisely to some of its members the argument based on
freedom of association weighed heavily. At any rate, before the next election
takes place, matters hopefully have been clarified by this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the election of
petitioner Arthur Ternate is upheld. The restraining order issued on
November 27, 1978 is lifted.
Villar vs. Inciong, April 20,l983
Facts:Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a duly
registeredlabor organization which, was the

existing bargaining agent of the employees inprivate respondent Amigo

Manufacturing, Inc. (Company). The Company and
theAmigo Employees Union-PAFLU had a CBA governing their labor relations,
which agreement was then about to expire on
February 28, 1977. Within the last 60 daysof the CBA, upon written authority
of at least 30% of the employees in the company,including the
petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR) filed a petition
forc e r t i f i c a t i o n e l e c t i o n w i t h M O L E . T h e p e t i t i o n
w a s o p p o s e d b y t h e P h i l i p p i n e Association of
Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) with whom the Amigo Employees Unionwas at
that time affiliated. The same employees who
had signed the petition filedby FUR signed a joint resolution disaffiliating
from PAFLU.
Petitioner Dolores Villar,representing herself to be the authorized
representative of the Amigo
EmployeesU n i o n , f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n e
l e c t i o n i n t h e C o m p a n y . T h e A m i g o Employees
Union-PAFLU intervened and moved for the dismissal of the petition
forc e r t i f i c a t i o n e l e c t i o n f i l e d b y D o l o r e s V i l l a r ,
on the ground, among others thatDolores Villar
had no
legal personality to sign the petition since she
w a s n o t a n officer of the union nor is there factual or legal basis for her
claim
that she was theauthorized representative of the local union. Med-Arbiter
dismissed the petition
filedb y V i l l a r , w h i c h d i s m i s s a l i s s t i l l p e n d i n g a p
p e a l b e f o r e B L R . A m i g o E m p l o y e e s Union-PAFLU called a
special
meeting of its general membership. A Resolution
wast h e r e b y u n a n i m o u s l y a p p r o v e d w h i c h c a l l e d f
or the investigation by the PAFLUnational presi
dent,
of all of the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapa
o , f o r continuously maligning the union spreading false
propaganda that the union officerswere merely appointees of the
management; and for causing divisiveness in the u n i o n . P A F L U

formed a Trial Committee to investigate the loc

a l u n i o n ' s c h a r g e s against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty.
PAFLU and the Company concluded
an e w C B A w h i c h a l s o r e i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e s a m e p r
o v i s i o n s o f t h e e x i s t i n g C B A , including the union
security clause. PAFLU President rendered a decision finding thepetitioners
guilty of the charges. PAFLU demanded the Company to
terminate theemployment of the petitioners pursuant to the security clause
of the CBA. Acting
onP A F L U ' s d e m a n d , t h e C o m p a n y i n f o r m e d P A F L U
t h a t i t w i l l f i r s t s e c u r e t h e necessar
y clearances to terminate petitioners. PAFLU requested the Company
top u t p e t i t i o n e r s u n d e r p r e v e n t i v e s u s p e n s i o n p
ending the application for saidclearances to ter
minate t
he petitioners. The Company filed the request f
orclearance to terminate the petitioners before
DOL
E w h i c h w a s g r a n t e d. D O L E Secretary Inciong denied the
appeal, hence, this petition for review.Issue: WON DOLE Secretary erred in
affirming the grant of clearance of terminationof petitioners.Ruling:It is true
that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal
objection. It isimplicit in the freedom of association ordained by the
Constitution. But the Courthas laid down the ruling
that
a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision in a
collective bargaining agreement is not a restrictionof the
right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.
In the case at bench, the Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU
enteredinto a CBA with a union security clause which is a
reiteration of the old CBA. Thequoted stipulation for closed-shop is clear and
unequivocal.
Petitioners theory
thatt h e i r e x p u l s i o n w a s n o t v a l i d u p o n t h e g r o u n
d s i s u n t e n a b l e . P A F L U h a d t h e authority to investigate

petitioners on the charges filed by their co-employees in thelocal union and

after finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from
the roll of membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU is clear under
the constitution of t h e P A F L U t o w h i c h t h e l o c a l
union was affiliated. And pursuant to the securi
tyclause of the new CBA, reiterating the same c
lause in
t h e o l d C B A , P A F L U w a s justified in applying said security
clause. Recognized and salutary is the principlethat when a
labor union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by thelaws and
regulations of the parent organization. It is
undisputable that oppositorswere members of the Amigo Employees Union at
the time that said union affiliatedw i t h P A F L U ; h e n c e,
oppositors are bound by the laws and regulation
s o f P A F L U . Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that
matter, is the right of self preservation. When members of a labor union se
e k t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n a n d destruction of the very union to
which they belong; they thereby forfeit their rightst o r e m a i n a s m e
mbers of the union which they seek to destroy.
P r u d e n c e a n d equity, as well as the dictates of law and justice,
therefore, compelling mandate theadoption by the labor union of such
corrective and remedial measures, in keepingwith its laws and regulations,
for its preservation and continued existence; lest
byits folly and inaction, the labor union crumble and fall.Decision appealed
from is affirmed

People vs. Ferrer, 56 SCRA 793 (Read the dissenting opinion of

Justice FERNANDO in both cases)
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared
RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus,
dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano
Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo

Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting,

instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government.
Attended
by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The
trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the
judge 2.)Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP
without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a
presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless
of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to
outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membershiptherein,
and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a
political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion
and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present
danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation
with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5
states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of
Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides
for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses
in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8
allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under
oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid
exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.
Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. (2)
Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of
the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative
determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of
attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies
persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past
conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of

SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other
organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts
focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that
membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the
organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIPwith
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a members
direct participation. Why is membership punished.Membership renders aid
and encouragement to the organization.Membership makes himself party
to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts
committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive
organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape
liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The
statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary
changes having been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration
is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL
justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom of
Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of the
statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the
Congress
were done. The court further stressesthat whatever interest in freedom of
speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the
CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of
DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under
RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the
following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the
organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the
Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER.Membership is
willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive
purpose.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under
the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL
COURT.
Inherent Power of imminent Domain
THE CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE LEGASPI, RTC 22, ILOILO CITY, 444 SCRA 269
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Iloilo on March 7, 2001
enacted regulation ordinance granting umbrella authority to then
Mayor Mansueto A. Malabor to institute expropriation proceedings on Lot No.
935, registered in the name of Manuela Yusay, located at barangay
Sto. Nio Norte, Arevalo, Iloilo City.
On March 14, 2001, Mayor Malabor wrote Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del Rosario,
administration of the estate, making formal offer to purchase the
property for the purpose of converting the same as an on-site relocation for
the poor and landless resident of the city. With apparent refusal to sell the
property, the city represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treas filed an expropriation
case based on the Power of State on Eminent Domain. Upon the strict
compliance to the governing rules on expropriation, the city of Iloilo argued
that it is entitled to an immediate issuance of a writ of possession.
ISSUES:1. When does a court order become final and executory? 2. What is
the legal basis of the Local Government Unit to exercise power of
eminent domain? 3. What are the requisites in issuance of Writ of
Possession?
RULING:
A. Time-honored and of constant observance is the principle that noorder
dictated in open court had no juridical existence before it is set in writing,
signed, promulgated and served on the parties. Since the order orally
pronounced in court had no juridical existence yet, the period within which to
file a motion for reconsideration cannot be reckoned therefrom, but from the
time the same was received in writing. Petitioner had fifteen (15) days
from its receipt of the written order within which to file a motion for
reconsideration.
B. Petitioner has the irrefutable right to exercise its power of eminent
domain. It being a local government unit, the basis for its exercise is granted
under Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160, to wit:

Sec. 19 Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
C. For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the
sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint and the required
provisional deposit. Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 provides that the local
government unit may take immediate possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit of at least
fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on
its current tax declaration. As long as the expropriation proceedings have
been commenced and the deposit has been made, the local government unit
cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ of possession.
Petition is hereby GRANTED
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE GINGOYON, 478 SCRA 474
Facts: In 2003, the Supreme Court held in AGAN VS. PIATCO, 402 SCRA 612
that the CONCESSION AGREEMENT FOR THE BUILD
OPERATE TRANSFER ARRANGEMENT OF THE NINOY AQUINO INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT PASSENGER TERMINAL II between the
Philippine Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
(PIATCO) as well as the amendments thereto is void for being
contrary to law and public policy. On Motion for Reconsideration (420 SCRA
420), the Supreme Court held that:
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures
comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds
have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take
over the said facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT
PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID STRUCTURES. THE COMPENSATION MUST
BE JUST AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
AND EQUITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT CAN NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICH ITSELF AT
THE EXPENSE OF PIATCO AND ITS
INVESTORS.

On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation

with the RTC of Pasay City seeking a writ of possession authorizing to
take immediate possession and control over NAIA 3 facilities and deposited
the amount of P3.0B in cash with Land Bank of the Philippines
representing the assessed value of the terminals assessed value for taxation
purposes.
On the same day, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order directing the issuance of a
writ of possession to the government to take or enter upon the
possession of the NAIA 3 facilities. It held that it is the ministerial duty of
the government to issue writ of possession upon deposit of the assessed
value of the property subject of expropriation.
However, on January 4, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued another Order
supplementing the December 21, 2004 Order. It pointed out that the earlier
orders to the amount to be deposited by the government was based on
Section 2, Rule 67 when what should be applicable is RA 8974 and therefore
ordered that the amount of US$62,343,175.77 be released to PIATCO instead
of the amount in the December 21, 2004 Order.
On January 7, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued another Order directing the
appointment of three (3) Commissioners to determine just compensation for
the NAIA 3 Complex.
Both Orders were questioned by the government as having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUES: 1. What law is applicable in this expropriation case: Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court or RA 8974? 2. If RA 8974 will be used, may the court
used the provision of Rule 67 on the 3 commissioners to determine just
compensation.
HELD: 1. Application of Rule 67 would violate the AGAN Doctrine which
provides that for the government to take over the said NAIA 3 facility,
IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID
STRUCTURES. If Section 2, Rule 67 will be applied,
PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving the just compensation even if the
government takes over the NAIA 3 facility. It is sufficient that the
government deposits the amount equal to the assessed value of the
facilities. It would violate the proscription in the AGAN Decision that the
government must pay first the just compensation before taking over the
facilities.

So when shall Rule 67 be used in expropriation cases and when shall RA

8974 be used?
In all National government projects or national infrastructure projects,
like those covered by the Build-Operate-Transfer, RA 8974 shall
be followed. The rest, Rule 67 shall apply.
Differences between the two laws on expropriation:
a. Under Rule 67, the government merely deposits the assessed value of
the property subject of expropriation and can have a writ of possession
over the same while under RA 8974, the scheme of immediate payment
(100%) shall be followed.
b. Under Rule 67, there can be writ of possession even if the owner of the
property has not received a single centavo while under RA 8974, as in this
case, Writ of Possession may not be issued in favor of the government UNTIL
ACTUAL RECEIPT by PIATCO of the preferred value of just
compensation.
Upon issuance of the writ in favor of the government, however, it could
already exercise acts of ownership over the NAIA 3 facilities.
The just compensation to be paid by the government shall be determined
within 60 days from the finality of the decision based on Section 4, RA
8974.
2. Rule 67 on the appointment of three (3) commissioners to determine just
compensation may be used since RA 8974 does not provide for such
procedure.
Just Compensation; Amount to be deposited in court before a Writ of
Possession may be issued by the court in favor of the government; When to
apply Rule 67 and when to apply RA No. 8974; Who owns the interest of the
initial amount deposited for the purpose of issuing writ of possession.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 172410, April 14, 2008
THE FACTS: On 29 December 2000, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed with the RTC a
Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners whose
properties would be affected by the construction, rehabilitation and
expansion of the North Luzon Expressway. The suit was docketed as Civil
Case No. 869-M-2000 and raffled to Branch 85, Malolos, Bulacan.
Respondent

Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one of the
affected landowners.
On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a
Writ of Possession, manifesting that it deposited a sufficient amount
to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties,
in the total amount of P28,406,700.00, with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, South Harbor Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized
government depository. TRB maintained that since it had already complied
with the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974
in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of the
writ of
possession becomes ministerial on the part of the RTC.
The RTC issued, on 19 March 2002, an Order for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession.
On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit,
praying that the respondent or its duly authorized representative be
allowed to withdraw the amount of P22,968,000.00, out of TRBs advance
deposit of P28,406,700.00 with LBP-South Harbor, including the
interest which accrued thereon.
Thereafter, the RTC allowed the release of the principal amount together with
the interest to the respondent but on Motion for Reconsideration of the
TRB, it disallowed the withdrawal of the interest reasoning out that the said
issue will be included in the second stage of expropriation, that is, the
determination of just compensation.
The private respondent elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals which
ruled that the respondent is entitled to the interest by way of accession.
Hence, this petition of the government before the Supreme Court.
I S S U E: Who has the right over the interest of the amount deposited
representing the zonal value of the property sought to be expropriated? The
expropriator or the landowner?
HELD: The petition is without merit.
The TRB claims that there are two stages

in expropriation proceedings, the determination of the authority to exercise

eminent domain and the
determination of just compensation. The TRB argues that it is only during
the second stage when the court will appoint commissioners and
determine claims for entitlement to interest, citing Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Wycoco
and National Power Corporation v. Angas.
The TRB further points out that the expropriation account with LBP-South
Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC, but of DPWH. Thus, the said
expropriation account includes the compensation for the other landowners
named defendants in Civil Case No. 869-M-2000, and does not
exclusively belong to respondent.
The said argument is without merit because it failed to distinguish between
the expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67
of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court speak of different procedures, with the former specifically governing
expropriation proceedings for national government infrastructure projects.
Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon, we held:
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures
under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the
Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner
upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of
possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an
initial deposit with an authorized government depositary.
Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No.
8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the
market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current
relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever
is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the
replacement cost method.
xxxx
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be
exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as
the

solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property.
For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to
the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain
through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which
covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government
infrastructure projects.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable
to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances
when the national government expropriates property for national
government infrastructure projects. Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by
the
national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects,
the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67
continues to apply.
There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the
expropriation of properties intended for a national government infrastructure
project. Therefore, the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in
Republic Act No. 8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to
100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be expropriated before
the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Republic.
The controversy, though, arises not from the amount of the deposit, but as to
the ownership of the interest that had since accrued on the deposited
amount.
Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the interest earned
by the deposited amount in the expropriation account would accrue to
HRTDC by virtue of accession, hinges on the determination of who actually
owns the deposited amount, since, under Article 440 of the Civil Code,
the right of accession is conferred by ownership of the principal property:
Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to
everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially.
The principal property in the case at bar is part of the deposited amount in
the expropriation account of DPWH which pertains particularly to
HTRDC. Such amount, determined to be P22,968,000.00 of the
P28,406,700.00 total deposit, was already ordered by the RTC to be released
to

HTRDC or its authorized representative. The Court of Appeals further

recognized that the deposit of the amount was already deemed a
constructive
delivery thereof to HTRDC:
When the [herein petitioner] TRB deposited the money as advance payment
for the expropriated property with an authorized government depositary
bank for purposes of obtaining a writ of possession, it is deemed to be a
constructive delivery of the amount corresponding to the 100% zonal
valuation of the expropriated property. Since [HTRDC] is entitled thereto and
indisputably the owner of the principal amount deposited by [herein
petitioner] TRB, conversely, the interest yield, as accession, in a bank
deposit should likewise pertain to the owner of the money deposited.
Since the Court of Appeals found that the HTRDC is the owner of the
deposited amount, then the latter should also be entitled to the interest
which

accrued thereon.

The deposit was made in order to comply with Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8974, which requires nothing less than the immediate payment of 100%
of the value of the property, based on the current zonal valuation of the BIR,
to the property owner. Thus, going back to our ruling in Republic v.
Gingoyon
:
It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit
under Rule 67 with the scheme of immediate payment in
cases involving national government infrastructure projects.
The critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery which gives
legal effect to the act is the actual intention to deliver on the part of the
party making such delivery. The intention of the TRB in depositing such
amount through DPWH was clearly to comply with the requirement of
immediate payment in Republic Act No. 8974, so that it could already secure
a writ of possession over the properties subject of the expropriation and
commence implementation of the project. In fact, TRB did not object to
HTRDCs Motion to Withdraw Deposit with the RTC, for as long as
HTRDC shows (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and
(2) that respondent is the absolute owner thereof.
A close scrutiny of TRBs arguments would further reveal that it does not
directly challenge the Court of Appeals determinative pronouncement
that the interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation
account accrues to HTRDC by virtue of accession. TRB only asserts that
HTRDC is entitled only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the
expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less.
We agree in TRBs statement since it is exactly how the amount of the
immediate payment shall be determined in accordance with Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8974, i.e., an amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value
of the expropriated properties. However, TRB already complied
therewith by depositing the required amount in the expropriation account of
DPWH with LBP-South Harbor. By depositing the said amount, TRB is
already considered to have paid the same to HTRDC, and HTRDC became the
owner thereof. The amount earned interest after the deposit; hence,
the interest should pertain to the owner of the principal who is already
determined as HTRDC. The interest is paid by LBP-South Harbor on the
deposit, and the TRB cannot claim that it paid an amount more than what it
is required to do so by law.

Since the respondent is the owner of P22,968,000.00, it is entitled by right

of accession to the interest that had accrued to the said amount only.
We are not persuaded by TRBs citation of National Power Corporation v.
Angas and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, in support of its
argument that the issue on interest is merely part and parcel of the
determination of just compensation which should be determined in the
second
stage of the proceedings only. We find that neither case is applicable herein.
The issue in Angas is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of
interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the applicable law is
Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate, or
Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal rate at 12% per
annum. We ruled in Angas that since the kind of interest involved therein is
interest by way of damages for delay in the payment thereof, and not as
earnings from loans or forbearances of money, Article 2209 of the Civil Code
prescribing the 6% interest shall apply. In Wycoco, on the other hand,
we clarified that interests in the form of damages cannot be applied where
there is prompt and valid payment of just compensation.
The case at bar, however, does not involve interest as damages for delay in
payment of just compensation. It concerns interest earned by the amount
deposited in the expropriation account.
Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency of the
government pays just compensation twice: (1) immediately upon the
filing of the complaint, where the amount to be paid is 100% of the value of
the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR
(initial payment); and (2) when the decision of the court in the determination
of just compensation becomes final and executory, where the
implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the
amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court
(final
payment)
As a final note, TRB does not object to HTRDCs withdrawal of the amount of
P22,968,000.00 from the expropriation account, provided that it is
able to show (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and
(2) that it is the absolute owner thereof. The said conditions do not put in

abeyance the constructive delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the
latters compliance therewith. Article 1187 of the Civil Code provides
that the effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition has
been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the
obligation. Hence, when HTRDC complied with the given conditions, as
determined by the RTC in its Orderdated 21 April 2003, the effects of the
constructive delivery retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the
amount in the expropriation account of DPWH.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 441 SCRA 637
FACTS: Private respondents Eastern Plywood Corporation and Benigno Lim as
officer of the corporation, had an AND/OR joint account with
Commercial Bank and Trust Co (CBTC), the predecessor-in-interest of
petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands. Lim withdraw funds from such
account and used it to open a joint checking account (an AND account)
with Mariano Velasco. When Velasco died in 1977, said joint checking
account had P662,522.87. By virtue of an Indemnity Undertaking executed
by Lim and as President and General Manager of Eastern withdrew one
half of this amount and deposited it to one of the accounts of Eastern with
CBTC.
Eastern obtained a loan of P73,000.00 from CBTC which was not secured.
However, Eastern and CBTC executed a Holdout Agreement providing
that the loan was secured by the Holdout of the C/A No. 2310-001-42
referring to the joint checking account of Velasco and Lim.
Meanwhile, a judicial settlement of the estate of Velasco ordered the
withdrawal of the balance of the account of Velasco and Lim.
Asserting that the Holdout Agreement provides for the security of the loan
obtained by Eastern and that it is the duty of CBTC to debit the account of
respondents to set off the amount of P73,000 covered by the promissory
note, BPI filed the instant petition for recovery. Private respondents Eastern
and Lim, however, assert that the amount deposited in the joint account of
Velasco and Lim came from Eastern and therefore rightfully belong to
Eastern and/or Lim. Since the Holdout Agreement covers the loan of P73,000,
then petitioner can only hold that amount against the joint checking
account and must return the rest.

ISSUE: Whether BPI can demand the payment of the loan despite the
existence of the Holdout Agreement and whether BPI is still liable to the
private respondents on the account subject of the withdrawal by the heirs of
Velasco.
RULING: Yes, for both issues. Regarding the first, the Holdout Agreement
conferred on CBTC the power, not the duty, to set off the loan from the
account subject of the Agreement. When BPI demanded payment of the loan
from Eastern, it exercised its right to collect payment based on the
promissory note, and disregarded its option under the Holdout Agreement.
Therefore, its demand was in the correct order.
Regarding the second issue, BPI was the debtor and Eastern was the creditor
with respect to the joint checking account. Therefore, BPI was obliged
to return the amount of the said account only to the creditor. When it allowed
the withdrawal of the balance of the account by the heirs of Velasco, it
made the payment to the wrong party. The law provides that payment made
by the debtor to the wrong party does not extinguish its obligation to the
creditor who is without fault or negligence. Therefore, BPI was still liable to
the true creditor, Eastern.

GABATIN VS. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, 444 SCRA 176

What is the basis of the just compensation for expropriation proceedings in
connection with the agrarian reform program of the government.
Held: The taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program of the
government partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceedings. As
such, in computing the just compensation, it is the value of the land at the
time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of the judgment, which
should be taken into consideration

Hacienda Luisita vs. Presidential Agrarrian Reform Council, GR no. 171101,

April 24, 2012
I.
THE FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted
unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and
AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock
Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in
Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the
Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and
which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the
revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle,
give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries
(FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or
[choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296
FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical
implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to
manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures
or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed
names.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
Court decision.
II. THE ISSUES: (1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case? (2)
Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional? (3) Cant the Court order
that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac

Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares

covered by HLIs SDP? (4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of
determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989,
when PARC approved HLIs SDP? (5) Has the 10-year period prohibition
on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999
(since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the
SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be
allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties,
whether they have fully paid for the lands or not? (6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE:
Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified
FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
III. THE RULIN: [The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for
reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option
granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of
Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the
Court
thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that
the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution
to the qualified FWBs.]
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is
applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the
doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies
to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that
have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said
decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be
respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be
applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of
the
PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the
application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011
decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they
allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock
distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2.

NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at
the
earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the
case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since
SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The
majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of
the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there
was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the
resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of
Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75
hectares covered by HLIs SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation
of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and
not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the
4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the
DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently
subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by
Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly
covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011
Decision appears too restrictive considering that there are roads,
irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered
commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the
decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB the Court
reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the
area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified
FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and
enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it
is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified
FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to
industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation

(LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the

government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC
resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the
proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.

4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved
HLIs SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is
November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this
is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the
agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became
subject
of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only
upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such
approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory
acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the
date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is,
January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is
entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to
justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said
cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only
preliminary
and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The
landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special
agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to
review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly
a judicial function.]
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands
under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified
FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda
Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or
conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the
emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA).
Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the
qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not
even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or
CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage.
Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or
convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform
would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will
just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be
given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be
reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be
given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these
qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the
present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share
of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the
holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI
stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the
FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of
the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI
stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is
295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus
one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP
approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed
by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.

NPC vs. Jocson, February 25, 1992

Facts: The NPC filed for the acquisition of a right-of-way easementover
portions of the parcels of land described in the complaints forits NegrosPanay Interconnection Project, particularly
the Bacolod- Tomonton Transmission Line. Provisional values were fixed on
thebasis of the market value and the daily opportunity profit petitionermay
derive.
Respondents sought a re-evaluation. Judge increasedvalue without hearing
and directing the defendants to manifestwithin twenty-four (24) hours
whether or not they are accepting and
withdrawing the amounts, representing the provisional values,deposited by
the plaintiff for each of them as "final and fullsatisfaction of the value of their
respective property (sic); "
Judgedeclared the provisional values as the final values and directing
therelease of the amounts deposited, in full satisfaction thereof, to
thedefendants even if not all of them made the
manifestation; andsuspended the issuance of the writ of possession until
after thesuspending the amounts shall have been released to and receivedby
defendants.Issue: WON Judge Jocson
committed grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction. YES.

? Municipality of Bian vs. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al: thereare two (2)
stages in every action of expropriation: The firstis concerned with the
determination of the authority of theplaintiff
to exercise the power of eminent domain and thepropriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts involvedin the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of theaction,
"of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has alawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned,for the public use or purpose described in
the complaint,upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined asof the date of the filing of the complaint."
An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course,
since it finally disposes
of the action and leavesnothing more to be done by the Court on the merits.
So, too,would an order of condemnation be a final one, forthereafter as the
Rules expressly state, in the
proceedingsbefore the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of theright of
condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall befiled or heard." The second
phase of the eminent domainaction
is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just compensation
for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not morethan three (3)
commissioners. The order fixing the justcompensation on the basis of the
evidence before, andfindings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It
wouldfinally dispose
of the second stage of the suit, and leavenothing more to be done by the
Court regarding theissue. . . .
? However, upon the filing of the complaint or at any timethereafter, the
petitioner has the right to take or enter uponthe possession of the property
involved upon compliancewith P.D. No.
42 which requires the petitioner, after duenotice to the defendant, to deposit
with the PhilippineNational Bank in its main office or any of its branches
oragencies, "an amount equivalent to
the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation." This assessed
valueis that indicated in the tax declaration.
? P.D. No. 42 repealed the "provisions of Rule 67 of the Rulesof Court and of
any other existing law contrary to orinconsistent" with it. Accordingly, it
repealed Section 2 of Rule 67

insofar as the determination of the provisionalvalue, the form of payment

and the agency with which thedeposit shall be made, are concerned. Said
section reads infull as follows: Sec. 2.
Entry of plaintiff upon depositingvalue with National or Provisional Treasurer.
Upon thefiling of the complaint or at any time thereafter the plaintiff shall
have the right to take or enter
upon the possession of the real or personal property involved if he deposits
with theNational or Provincial Treasurer its value, as provisionallyand
promptly ascertained and fixed by the
court having jurisdiction of the proceedings, to be held by such
treasurersubject to the orders and final disposition of the court. Suchdeposit
shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a
certificate of deposit of a depository of the Republic of the Philippines
payable on demand to the National or Provincial Treasurer, as the case may
be, in the amount directed by the court to be deposited. After such deposit is
made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith
place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved.

? It will be noted that under the aforequoted section, the courthas the
discretion to determine the provisional value whichmust be deposited by the
plaintiff to enable it "to take orenter upon
the possession of the property." Notice to theparties is not indispensable. In
interpreting a similarprovision of Act No. 1592, this Court, in the 1915 case of
Manila Railroad
Company, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 45 held: The statute directs that, at the
very outset, "whencondemnation proceedings are brought by any
railwaycorporation" the amount of the deposit is
to be"provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by thecourt." It is
very clear that it was not the intention of the legislator that before the order
fixing the amount of thedeposit could
lawfully be entered the court should finallyand definitely determine who are
the true owners of theland; and after doing so, give them a hearing as to its
value,and assess the true value of the
land accordingly. In effect,that would amount to a denial of the right of
possession of the lands involved until the conclusion of the
proceedings,when there would no need
for the filing of the deposit. Of course, there is nothing in the statute which
denies the rightof the judge to hear all persons claiming an interest in
theland, and courts should ordinarily give all
such persons anopportunity to be heard if that be practicable, and will
causeno delay in the prompt and provisional ascertainment of thevalue of
the land. But the scope and extent of the
inquiry isleft wholly in the discretion of the court, and a failure tohear the
owners and claimants of the land, who may or maynot be known at the time
of the entry of the order, in nowise
effects the validity of the order. . . .
? P.D. No. 42, however, effectively removes the discretion of the court in
determining the provisional value. What is to bedeposited is an amount
equivalent to the assessed
value fortaxation purpose. No hearing is required for that purpose.All that is
needed is notice to the owner of the propertysought to be condemned.
? Clearly, therefore, respondent Judge either deliberatelydisregarded P.D. No.
42 or was totally unaware of itsexistence and the cases applying the same.
? In any event, petitioner deposited the provisional value fixedby the court.
As a matter of right, it was entitled to beplaced in possession of the property
involved in thecomplaints at once,

pursuant to both Section 2 of Rule 67and P.D. No. 42. Respondent Court had
the correspondingduty to order the sheriff or any other proper officer
toforthwith place the petitioner in such
possession. Instead of complying with the clear mandate of the law,
respondent Judge chose to ignore and overlook it. Moreover, uponseparate
motions for reconsideration filed by the
defendantsin Civil Cases Nos. 5938 and 5939, he issued a new
Orderincreasing the provisional values of the properties involvedtherein. No
hearing was held on the motions. As a matter
of fact, as the records show, the motion for reconsiderationfiled by
defendants Jesus Gonzaga, et al. in Civil Case No.5938 is dated 11 July 1990
while the Order granting bothmotions was
issued the next day, 12 July 1990. The motionfor reconsideration in Civil Case
No. 5938 does not evencontain a notice of hearing. It is then a mere scrap of
paper;it presents no question
which merits the attention andconsideration of the court. It is not even a
mere motion for itdoes not comply with the rules, more particularly Sections
4and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court;
the Clerk of Court thenhad no right to receive it. 50
? There was, moreover, a much stronger reason why therespondent Court
should not have issued the 12 July 1990Order increasing the provisional
values of the Gonzaga lotsin Civil
Cases Nos. 5938 and 5939. After having fixed theseprovisional values, albeit
erroneously, and upon deposit bypetitioner of the said amounts, respondent
Judge lost, aswas held in Manila
Railroad Company vs. Paredes, "plenarycontrol over the order fixing the
amount of the deposit, andhas no power to annul, amend or modify it in
matters of substance pending the course
of the condemnationproceedings." The reason for this is that a contrary
rulingwould defeat the very purpose of the law which is to providea speedy
and summary procedure whereby the
peaceablepossession of the property subject of the expropriationproceedings
"may be secured without the delays incident toprolonged and vexatious
litigation touching the ownershipand
value of such lands, which should not be permitted todelay the progress of
the work."
? Compounding the above error and the capriciousness withwhich it was
committed is respondent Judge's refusal toplace the petitioner in possession
of the property or issuethe writ of

possession despite the fact that the latter hadlikewise deposited the
additional amount called for by the12 July 1990 Order. Instead, respondent
Judge issued the 16 July 1990 Order directing
the defendants to state in writingwithin twenty-four (24) hours whether or
not they wouldaccept and withdraw the amounts deposited by thepetitioner
for each of them " as final and full
satisfaction of the value of their respective property (sic) affected by
theexpropriation" and stating at the same time that the writ willbe issued
after such manifestation and acceptance
andreceipt of the amounts. The above Order has absolutely nolegal basis
even as it also unjustly, oppressively and capriciously compels the petitioner
to accept the respondent Judge's
determination of the provisional value as the justcompensation after the
defendants shall have manifestedtheir conformity thereto. He thus
subordinated his own judgment to that of the
defendants' because he made thelatter the final authority to determine such
justcompensation. This Court ruled in Export Processing ZoneAuthority vs.
Dulay, et al. 52 that the
determination of justcompensation in eminent domain cases is a
judicialfunction; accordingly, We declared as unconstitutional andvoid, for
being, inter alia, impermissible encroachment
on judicial prerogatives which tends to render the Court inutilein a matter
which, under the Constitution, is reserved to itfor final determination, the
method of ascertaining justcompensation
prescribed in P.D. Nos. 76 464, 794 and 1533,to wit: the market value as
declared by the owner oradministrator or such market value as determined
by theassessor, whichever is lower in
the first three (3) decrees,and the value declared by the owner or
administrator oranyone having legal interest in the property or the value
asdetermined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real
Property Tax Code, whichever is lower, prior to the recommendationor
decision of the appropriate Government office to acquirethe property, in the
last mentioned decree. If the
legislatureor the executive department cannot even impose upon thecourt
how just compensation should be determined, it wouldbe far more
objectionable and impermissible for
respondent Judge to grant the defendants in an eminent domain casesuch
power and authority.

? Without perhaps intending it to be so, there is not only aclear case of

abdication of judicial prerogative, but also acomplete disregard by
respondent Judge of the provisions of Rule 67 as
to the procedure to be followed after thepetitioner has deposited the
provisional value of theproperty. It must be recalled that three (3) sets of
defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to
Section 3,Rule 67 of the Rules of Court; Section 4 of the same ruleprovides
that the court must rule on them and in the eventthat it overrules the
motions or, when any party fails topresent a
defense as required in Section 3, it should enteran order of condemnation
declaring that the petitioner has alawful right to take the property sought to
be condemned.
? As may be gleaned from the 25 June 1990 Order, therespondent Judge
found that the petitioner has that rightand that "there will be a (sic)
paramount public interest tobe served by the
expropriation of the defendants'properties." Accordingly, considering that the
partiessubmitted neither a compromise agreement as to the
justcompensation nor a stipulation to dispense with
theappointment of commissioners and to leave thedetermination of just
compensation to the court on the basisof certain criteria, respondent Judge
was duty bound to setin motion Section 5
of Rule 67; said section directs the courtto appoint not more than three (3)
competent anddisinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain
andreport to it regarding the just compensation
for the propertysought to be taken. Such commissioners shall perform
theirduties in the manner provided for in Section 6; upon thefiling of their
report, the court may, after
a period of ten (10)days which it must grant to the parties in order that
thelatter may file their objections to such report, and afterhearing pursuant
to Section 8, accept and render
judgmentin accordance therewith or, for cause shown, recommit thesame to
the commissioners for further report of facts. Thecourt may also set aside
the report and appoint
newcommissioners, or it may accept the report in part andreject it in part;
and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the
petitioner the propertyessential to the
exercise of its right of condemnation, and tothe defendant just compensation
for the property so taken.

? Not satisfied with the foregoing violations of law andinsisting upon his own
procedure, respondent Judgedeclared in his Order of 18 July 1990 that the
provisionalamounts he fixed, later
increased with respect to theproperties of the Gonzagas, shall be considered
as the fullpayment of the value of the properties after the defendantsin Civil
Cases Nos. 5938, 5939, 5940, 5942
and 5943 shallhave filed their manifestations; he also ruled that the writ of
possession will be issued only after the latter shall havereceived the said
amounts. This Order and the
recordsbefore this Court do not disclose that the defendants in CivilCases
Nos. 5941 and 5944 filed any manifestation; yet, inthe Order, respondent
Judge whimsically and
arbitrarilyconsidered the so-called provisional values fixed therein as the
final values. By such Order, the case was in factterminated and the writ of
execution then became a mereincident
of an execution of a judgment. The right of thepetitioner to take or enter into
possession of the propertyupon the filing of the complaint granted by Section
2 of Rule67 and P.D. No. 42 was
totally negated despite compliancewith the deposit requirement under the
latter law.
? City Government of Toledo City vs. Fernandos, et al: doesnot apply to the
instant petition because at the pre-trialconference held therein, the
petitioner submitted to thediscretion of the
court as to the correct valuation, privaterespondents stated that they have
no objections and are inconformity with the price of P30.00 per square meter
asreasonable compensation for their
land and the CityAssessor informed the court of the current market
andappraisal values of the properties in the area and the factorsto be
considered in the determination of such. The
partiespresented their documentary exhibits. In effect, therefore,the parties
themselves agreed to submit to a judicialdetermination on the matter of just

compensation and that judgment be

rendered based thereon. In the instant case,no pre-trial was conducted; the
proceedings were still atthat state where the provisional value was yet to
bedetermined; and the parties made no
agreement on just compensation.
Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, Aug. 3, 1990
NATURE: Petition to review Commission on Audit decision
FACTS: - Petitioners, Spouses Ansaldo, owned two parcels of land which were
taken by thegovernment and used to widen what is now
Ramon Magsaysay Avenue in 1947.However, it was only in 1973 or 26 years
later that the spouses claimed for compensation.
The Secretary of Justice in due course rendered an opinion that
justcompensation be paid in accordance with PD No. 76. This decree
provided that
basisfor the payment should be the current and fair market value as declared
by the owner or such value as determined by the
assessor, whichever was lower. (It shouldbe noted however that at the time
the decision was made by the SC, this provisionon payment was already
declared unconstitutional in 1988 in the Export Processingvs Dulay case
where said mode was said to be an impermissible encroachment
onthe judicial prerogative to resolve the compensation issue in an
appropriateproceeding of eminent domain)- Pursuant to the opinion
of the Justice Secretary, the auditor of the Bureau of PublicHighways
recommended to the auditor General that payment be made on the basisof
the
current and fair market value and not on the fair market value at the time
theproperty was in fact expropriated. The Commission on Audit
declined the saidrecommendation and instead ruled that the amount of
compensation should bed e t e r m i n e d a s o f t h e t i m e
of taking of the parcels of land. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the spouses Arsaldo was denied.- Hence this appeal
to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the fixing of compensation should be at the time of the taking of
the property

HELD: Yes. Normally, of course, where the institution of an expropriation

action precedesthe taking of the property subject thereof, the just
compensation is fixed as of thetime of the filing of the complaint. This is so
provided by the Rules of Court, theassumption
of possession by the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on itsdeposits
with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of
the property asprovisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of
the proceedings. Thereare instances, however, where the expropriating
agency takes over the propertyprior to the expropriation suit, as in this case
although, to repeat, the case at bar isquite extraordinary in that possession
was taken by the expropriator more than 40y e a r s p r i o r t o s u i t . I
n these instances, this Court has ruled that the
j u s t compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of
the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.- The
reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara,16 is that"x x (W)here
property is taken ahead of the filing of the
condemnationproceedings,the value thereof may be enchanced by the public
purpose for which it
istaken;the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated
itsvalue thereby;or, there may have been a natural increase in the value
of theproperty from the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic
conditions. The owner of private property should
be compensated only for what heactually loses; it is not intended that his
compensation shall extend beyondhisloss or injury. And what he loses is
only the actual value of his propertyat the time it is taken. This is the only
way that compensation to be paidcan be truly just; i.e., 'just not
only to the individual whose property istaken,but to the public, which is to
pay for it.'"- Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos' property must
be ascertained as of theyear 1947, when it was actually taken, and not at the
time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by the
way, still has to be done. It is as of that time thatthe real measure of their
loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shallearn interest at the
legal rate until full payment is effected, conformably with otherprinciples laid
down by case law.
Disposition:Petition DENIED

Mun. of Makati vs. CA, Oct. 1, 1990

Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned
by private respondents, Admiral Finance
Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined
the cost of the said land which the petitioner
must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the
advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued
the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment
of funds of the petitioner which was deposited
in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for
reconsideration, contending that its funds at
the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so
would result in the disbursement of public
funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the
case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The
RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the
latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner
now filed this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from
garnishment and levy upon execution.
Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC
judge involved the net amount of
P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in
excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and
thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation
required under the law. There is merit in this
contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are
not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes,
licenses and market fees, and which are
intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the
municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the
municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance

appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB
account, no levy under execution may be

validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land
which has been in their use already. This
Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation
arising from expropriation of land they are
already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised
within the bounds of fair play and justice.
BERKENKOTTER, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, December 14, 1992 Cruz, J.
Facts: 1. On June 18, 1982, Vicente Viray, then President of Apolinario
Apacible School of Fisheries, a government institution in Nasugbu,
Batangas, sent the petitioner a written offer to buy the property of the latter
with an area of 10,640 square meters for its 5-year expansion program;
2. That the petitioner expressed willingness to sell at P50.00 per square
meter in its reply;
3. Viray then requested the Office of the Provincial Assessor of the Province
of Batangas to appraise the land and the latter fixed its market value at
P32.00 per square meter;
4. Viray then wrote the petitioner and expressed willingness to buy the
latter's property at P32.00 per square meter. The petitioner, however, stuck
to
its original valuation. Later on, it said that its property had in fact
appreciated to as much as P100.00 per square meter;
5. On October 28, 1983, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for
the expropriation of the petitioner's property and invoked the
assessment made by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of the Provincial
Assessor of Batangas in the amount of P32.00. The government likewise
sought immediate possession of the property upon deposit of 10% of the
total assessment in accordance with PD 48;
6. Berkenkotter originally questioned the purpose of the expropriation but
later abandoned this objection and concentrated only on what it called the
"underappraisal" of the subject land;
7. The RTC then appointed a panel of commissioners in accordance with Rule
67, ection 5, of the Rules of Court, to determine the just
compensation to be paid for the land;

8. On September 23, 1985, the panel of commissioners submitted its report

to the trial court and pegged the market value at P85.00 per square
meter;
9. The Republic of the Philippines objected and pointed to three (3)
contracts of sale executed by the petitioner in 1985 whereby it sold three
(3)
tracts of land similar in topography and adjacent to the property in question
for the unit price of only P19.18 per square meter;
10. The court directed the commissioners to convene anew and to receive
additional evidence. However, in its second report dated April 1, 1987,
the panel reiterated its original recommendation of P85.00/sq. m. or a total
of P904,400.00 for the entire area sought to be expropriated. The trial
court acting on this recommendation rendered judgment requiring the
Republic to pay the petitioner the amount of P904,400.00 for the entire area
sought to be expropriated;
11. The government appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of
Appeals which rendered a decision REVERSING THE LOWER
COURT'S DECISION and declaring that the fair market value which should be
the basis in computing the amount to be paid by the
government to the petitioner shall be P19.18, the market value according
set by the petitioner if we follow the three (3) deeds of sale it
executed in favor of three (3) different individuals;
12. The petitioner was therefore constrained to file this instant petition
claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that P19.18 per square
meter should be the basis of the computation for the just compensation of
its property because:
a. Viray even offered the amount of P32.00 per squaremeter as the fair
market value;
b. that P32.00 per square meter was the appraised value made by the
Office of the Provincial Assessor of Batangas; and
c. the complaint itself prays that the market value be pegged at P32.00 per
square meter.
Issue: WHAT SHOULD BE THE BASIS IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE JUST
COMPENSATION: P32.00/SQ. M. IN ACCORANCE
WITH THE APPRAISAL OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR; P100.00/SQ.M. AS
CLAIMED BY THE OWNER; P85.00/SQ. M. AS

RECOMMENDED BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY THE

COURT TO EVALUATE THE SAME, OR P19.18 PER
SQUARE METER WHICH WAS THE SELLING PRICE IN AN ADJACENT LOT
SOLD BY THE PETITIONER TO THREE PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS.
Held. The basis in the computation of just compensation shall be P19.18
per square meter or the price which the petitioner sold its other lots to
other individuals.
This is so because there is no showing that the petitioner had any special
reason for granting each of the individual vendees the extraordinary
discount amounting to as much as 75% of its claimed real value of the
land. To all appearances, they were ordinary buyers who bought the land
for their own private purposes only and not for the public purpose
invoked by the government.
The petitioner's claim that the value as appearing in the deeds of sale in
the three other parcels is not a reliable index of just compensation
"because owners usually undervalue the selling price of the property to lower
the expenses they would have to pay for capital gains tax and
documentary stamps tax" is practically an admission that it did not indicate
the actual consideration in the three transactions where it was made to
appear that the price per square meter was only P19.18. If this was the
purpose of the petitioner when it executed the 3 deeds of sale, then IT IS
SURELY HOIST NOW BY ITS OWN PETARD. AND RIGHTLY SO, FOR IT CANNOT
BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM ITS OWN
DECEPTION AND CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY SHOULD BE ASSESSED
AT THE HIGHER RATE IT CLANDESTINELY
AGREED UPON WITH THE BUYERS.
The Court is disappointed that the petitioner should demand a higher price
from the republic, which needs the land for a public purpose, when it was
willing to accept less from the three individual buyers who had only their
private interests to serve.
The fact that the petitioner sold the 3 other parcels of land at P19.18 per
square meter which are admittedly of the same topography as that subject
of

this case, it impliedly admitted that the price for the latter should be the
same as the former. This rule of consistency is best expressed in the familiar
saying, surely not unknown to the petitioner, THAT WHAT IS SAUCE FOR THE
GOOSE IS ALSO SAUCE FOR THE GANDER.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the proerty
sought to be expropriated (Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 378). The measure is not the taker's gain but
the owner's loss. he compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the
owner but also to the taker.
To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the
market value of the property, to which should be added the consequential
benefits which may arise from the expropriation.
The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon
by the parties willing but not compelled to enter into a contract of sale.
Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value are:
1. cost of acquisition; 2. the current value of like proerties;
3. its actual or potential uses; 4. particular case of lands; 5. their size,
shape, location; and 6. the tax declarations thereon.
Finally, note that as held in the case of Republic vs. Santos, 141 SCRA 30,
the market value as recommended by the board of commissioners
appointed by the court were at best only ADVISORY AND PERSUASIVE
AND BY NO MEANS FINAL OR BINDING

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF

APPEALS, G.R. NO. 87335, February 12, 1989
Expropriation: Gancayco, J.
Facts: 1. On February 20, 1979, the Rep. of the Philippines initiated an
expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses standing along
Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets, among them Cristina de Knecht together with
Concepcion Cabarrus, and some other fifteen defendants in Civil Case
No. 7001-P;
2. In June, 1979, the Republic of the Philippines prayed for the issuance of a
writ of possession of the property to be expropriated on the ground that
it had already deposited with the PNB 10% of the amount of compensation
stated in the complaint; that on June 14, 1979, the Lower Court issued a

writ of possession authorizing the Republic to enter into the properties

condemned and created a committee to determine just compensation;
3. On July 16, 1979, De Knecht went to the Supreme Court on a petition for
certiorari and prohibition directed against the June 14, 1979 order of the
lower court;
4. On October 30, 1980, the Supreme Court rendered its decision granting
the petition for certiorari and prohibition and directing that the Order of the
respondent Judge dated June 14, 1979 be SET ASIDE and the respondent
Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case
No. 7001-P 5. On August 8, 1981, the defendants in Civil Case No. 7001moved for the dismissal of said case since the decision of the Supreme Court
is already
final;
6. On September 2, 1983, the Republic moved for the dismissal of the case
due to the enactment of BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the
same purpose. On the same date, the Court dismissed the case. The
defendants moved for a reconsideration which the Court denied;
7. De Knecht appealed the Order dismissing the case to the Court of Appeals
who on December 28, 1988 issued its decision setting aside the Order
appealed from and dismissing the expropriation proceedings before the
lower court on the ground that the choice of the above-mentioned streets as
the line through which the EDSA should be extended is arbitrary and should
not receive judicial approval;
8. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether or not the legislature could still pass a law expropriating the
lots of the private respondents despite the existence of a final decision of
the Supreme Court which held that choice of their lot to be used as an
extension of EDSA is arbitrary?
Held: It is true that there is already a final decision of the Supreme Court to
the effect that the choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets is
arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. However, it is equally true
that the Constitution and our laws may expropriate private properties
after the payment of just compensation. When on February 17, 1983, the
Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the

same purpose, IT APPEARS THAT THE SAME WAS BASED ON SUPERVENING

EVENTS THAT OCCURRED after the decision of the SC in
De Knecht vs. Bautista in 1980. The social impact factor which persuaded the
Court to consider this extension has disappeared because of the fact
that the residents of the area have been relocated and duly compensated
and only DE KNECHT now is left while her property is only about 5% of the
area to be expropriated. The Republic could continue it expropriation
proceedings considering the supervening events after the decision was
rendered.
BP Bilang 340 THEREFORE EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDED THE AFORESAID FINAL
AND EXECUTORY DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT. X x x THE COURT AGREES IN THE WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF
ENACTING BP 340. THUS THE ANTERIOR DECISION OF
THIS COURT MUST YIELD TO THIS SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE FIAT.
Cruz, J., concurring
Supervening events have changed the factual basis of the SC's decision to
justify the subsequent enactment of the statute. If we are sustaining the
legislation, it is not because we concede that the lawmakers can nullify the
findings of the Court in the exercise of its discretion. It is simply because
we ourselves have found that under the changed situation, the present
expropriation is no longer arbitrary.
I MUST ADD THAT THIS DECISION IS NOT A REVERSAL OF THE ORIGINAL DE
KNECHT CASE, WHICH WAS DECIDED UNDER A
DIFFERENT SET OF FACTS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CRISTINA DE
KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
NO. 87335, February 12, 1989