303820138S

THE STORY OF THOSE WHO STAYED

(Lessons to be drawn from the application of
Articles 1 and especially 2 of the 1923 Exchange)
Baskin ORAN*

INTRODUCTION
Historical Context of the 1923 Exchange of Populations
The compulsory exchange of populations of 1923 between Greece
and Turkey1 is a component part of the Lausanne Peace Conference that took place at the
end of the Turkish war of independence (1919-22), itself a result of the Allied-supported
Greek occupation at the end of the World War I.
The "Convention and Protocol on the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations"2, as

Professor of international relations at the School of Political Science, Ankara

oran@politics.ankara.edu.tr
This will be abbreviated in this paper as "The Exchange".
This title will be abbreviated in this paper as "The Convention".

University.

Here, I would like to make a note on the terminology I'll use while treating the subject matter of this paper, the
respective etablis resulting from Art. 2 of the Convention:
A
tr . 2/a of the Convention used the term "Greeks"
o t express the etablis of Istanbul (and of the two islands
eventually) because no other alternative exists in western languages. Instead of this term, " Rums" will be
preferred to denote the [almost exclusively] Orthodox population of Byzantine descent of the Ottoman Empire
and Turkey, speaking a dialect of Greek language. (Since 1820s, Rum is used in Turkish for any Hellen living
outside of Greece and who is not a citizen of that country).
This will be done, firstly, to differentiate the "Rum" from the "Greek" (in Turkish: Yunanii, "from Ionian"), a
citizen of Greece. Secondly and more importantly , this preference is made because this minority denotes itself
not as "Yunanii" but "Rum" (Romios/ Romioi, "from [eastern] Rome") because, although it strongly feels that
Greece is its kin-state, it believes it directly descends from Romano-Byzantine Constantinopolis (also see
Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-1974, second
edition, Athens, Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992, p. 17). Preference of "Rum" instead of " Rum Orthodox "
relies not on the fact that the said article 2/a does not mention "Orthodox", but on the fact that, although there
exists Catholic or Protestant Rums also -this handful "minority in the minority" will not be taken into
consideration here- " Rum" has always been synonymous with " Rum Orthodox".
On the other hand, Art . 2/b of the Convention used the expression "Muslims" to express the Western Thrace
(WT) etablis, because at the time of the Exchange ethnicity meant far less than the concept of religion or
confession, and probably because the Allies and also Greece wanted all the Muslims beside the Turks to
leave Greece [hence, this expression in Art . 1]; just as Turkey wanted all the Muslims beside the Turks to stay
in WT). But in this paper the expression "Turks/Turkish" will be preferred to "Muslims", always for the same
reasoning. Firstly, in the Balkans especially, "Turk/Turkish" has always been (and, to a certain degree, still
is) synonymous with "Muslim" probably because Turks were the founders and the main element of the
fr
t /or/, of its Millet System which considered all Muslims as one single community.
Ottoman Empire, and a o
(The Empire itself was usually marked "Turkey/Turquie" in numerous maps drawn by the Europeans of the
period. The French expression "se faire Turc" [to make oneself a Turk] means: To become Muslim. The Arabs
and Palestinians who immigrated to Chile at the beginning of the century are still called "Turkos"). Secondly
and more importantly , this preference is made because this minority of 110.000-odd souls now (composed,
beside some 70.000 ethnic Turks, of some 35.000 Muslims of Pomak ethnic origin and of some 5.000
Muslims of Roman ethnic origin), although being profoundly religious, feels very strongly about denoting itself

it is officially called in French/English, is one of the eighteen instruments done at the

" Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Questions, 1922-23".
Sixteen of these instruments including the all-important Lausanne Peace Treaty itself were
signed at the end of the Conference on 24 July 1923. The remaining two were done on 30
January 1923, about two months and ten days after the start of the Conference and about
six months earlier than the other sixteen.
The subject matters of these two instruments, the Convention itself and the "Turkish-Greek
Agreement on the Extradition of Civil Hostages and on the Exchange of War Prisoners",
"had nothing to do with the peace treaty" but had
o t be "dealt with at the earliest possible"3.
In other words, the Convention was a prerequisite of the Peace Treaty as shown by its
early signature.
The Convention and especially its compulsory nature have a particular importance in the
particular conjuncture of 1990s. But for this historical experience to shed some light on
today's minority, exchange, and refugee issues, a question ought to be settled beforehand:
Who wanted the Exchange, who wanted it to be compulsory, and why?
1) To start with, the Exchange and its compulsory nature were proposed by the Allies,
especially England4.
Lord Curzon thought the Exchange should be compulsory because, he said, it would
otherwise take months to implement the agreement, the exchanged Turks should start
tilling Thrace at the earliest, Greece had to make place for the ever-coming refugees, and
it would also be easier to compensate the exchanged people for the property they would
be leaving behind5.
The real reason behind all this, however, was the fact that the Allies thought a radical
solution to the question of minorities would sensibly alleviate their job in the "new world
order".
2) The second element that desired the Exchange was Greece, above all because she
needed a lot of space to settle the Asia Minor refugees (one million-odd people, one fourth
of Greece's population at that time) that fled Turkey along with the withdrawing Greek
armies.
As for the compulsory nature of the Exchange, Greek Prime Minister Veniselos declared
that it should be voluntary but added he was ready to discuss the issue anyway,
as "Turkish" and fully considers Turkey its kin-state. The reasons for this behaviour will be treated in footnote
31.
As expressed by Mr. Montagna, President of the Sub-Commission on Minorities (and on the Exchange) on
10 January 1923. (Professor Seha L. Meray, integral Turkish translation in eight volumes of the Lausanne
Peace Conference, Minutes and Documents, Series 1, Volume 1, Book 1, p. 321. From here on, references
will be made to this Turkish translation as "Meray, Lausanne", but dates of sessions and numbers of minutes
taken will be also given to enable the non Turkish-speaking reader to follow in other language editions).
After discussing the territorial questions and the Straits, the Conference convened on 1 December 1922 to
discuss an exchange of war prisoners. But Lord Curzon, British Foreign Minister and President of the
Conference announced that Dr. Nansen, the renowned High Commissar on Refugees of the Le^^ue of
Nations, would be reading 's report on the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, an item that did not
figure on the agenda. According
o t Dr. Nansen, the question was of real importance for peace and economic
stability in Near East, as well as for peace in Europe. He had been invited by the representatives of four
Principal Allied and Associated Powers in Istanbul to prepare a treaty for the exchange of minorities to be
implemented immediately without waiting for the peace treaty. He had already obtained the official approval
of the Greek Government, and talks were more or less on the way with the Ankara Government which
declared
o t him "at least four times" that it took a positive stand on the exchange issue (1 December 1922,
Minutes no. 8, Meray, Lausanne, pp. 115- 116).
5 1 December 1922, Meray, Lausanne, p. 123.

compulsory or voluntary. What really mattered for him was the exclusion of Istanbul Rum
population (about 110.000 in the area to be finally designated as non-exchangeable) from
compulsory exchange. Because, he said, the number of Rum refugees would be so
tremendously augmented that "Greece would see herself in the obligation to ask the USA
to increase her emigration quota"6.
Of course, Veniselos had another, probably a more important reason for this: As the
champion of Greek irredentism {"Megali Idea",the national idea), he had long been feeding
the Greek public opinion with the idea that "ionia" (western Turkey) would become Greek.
Now it would be very difficult to have them digest the exchange of Istanbul Rums because
this would unequivocally mean the eradication of the Megali Idea even from Istanbul, "The
Second Rome", the seat of the Holy Phanar Rum Orthodox Patriarchate 7. What 's more,
the latter institution would most probably have to move to Mount Athos (Greece) and this
would inevitably mean a tremendous friction between two rival institution0 , the
autocephalous Church of Greece and the Patriarchate, "Ecumenical " and " Primus inter
Pares" .
As for the acceptation of the exclusion from the Exchange of a substantial number of Turks
right at the Turkish border, it was a price Veniselos had to pay to ensure the all-important
stay of the Istanbul Rums and of the Patriarchate.
3) The third element that desired, and very much8, a compulsory exchange was Turkey.
Ismet Pasha, the Turkish head-delegate, said that in case of such an exchange, it should
include all the Rums of Turkey, Istanbul and Izmir comprised9. On the other hand, he
wanted the Turks of Western Thrace (WT) be excluded from the exchange.
The reasons behind Ismet Pasha's asking that all the Rums should leave were manifold:
Firstly, Christian minorities had always been no.1 excuse for the Principal Powers to
interfere with the domestic affairs of the Ottomans. Secondly, the peace treaty ahead
would be including a section of "Protection of Minorities" and getting rid of as many Rums
(the most important non-Muslim minority) as possible would minimise the possible
interfering effect of these "plus" rights. Thirdly, the memories of the Rum minority's and of
the Patriarchate's collaboration with the occupying Greek armies were only too vivid, and
the Kemalists were eager to destroy once and for all any hope that the Greek irredentism
might still have, since the time seemed now ripe.
On the other hand, there was one unspoken reason behind the Turkish desire for a
complete and compulsory exchange: Like practically all the states (especially, the new
states) of Eastern Europe and the Balkans of the time, Turkey was ready to embark on a
full-scale nation-building process and her non-Muslim minorities were considered a real
stumbling bloc in this endeavour.
As to the reason why Ismet Pasha wanted WT to be excluded from the Exchange, the

idem.
In the later stages of the Conference, Veniselos seemed to o
try t withdraw from the idea of a compulsory
exchange, but this was no more realistic and probably was a diplomatic move only. Dr. Riza Nur, the i urkish
delegate at the "special corhmittee" (later, Sub-commission on Minorities, again later, on the Exchange), in
the memoirs he wrote in 1928 and left in manuscript to the British Museum to be disclosed in 1960, explains
this by the probability that the Greek government at that time was against the Exchange (Veniselos was not
amember of the government during the Lausanne Conference). See Dr. Riza Nur, Hayat ve Hatiratim (My
Life and Memoirs), vol. Ill, Istanbul, Altindag Yayinevi, 1967, p. 1113.
The compulsory exchange proposal of the Allies has been a most pleasant surprise for Dr. Riza Nur who
writes: "...I was astonished. I had been wondering all long how in the world I could propose them such a thing
that was unheard of in history; it came all by itself. It was like a present from Heaven" (p. 1040).
9 1 December 1922, Meray, Lausanne,
p. 121.

Turkish delegation put it this way: The third point of our National Pact10 asks for a plebiscite
in this piece of territory where the Turks are in majority. Its fate has not been decided upon
yet. On the other hand, beside this rational reason, it seemed that Turkey was asking, on
this Greek territory contiguous to the Turkish border, a "symmetry" to the Istanbul Rums
excluded from the Exchange11, since the latter's stay was openly inevitable now.
Legal/Socio-Political Aspects and Consequences of the Exchange
The Convention was composed of nineteen articles and one protocol, but it had two main
articles to speak of:
1) By its A
tr . 1, the Convention set the rule as compulsory exchange and defined those
who would be asked to leave definitely: From Turkey, Turkish nationals of Rum Orthodox
religion12, and from Greece, Greek nationals of Muslim religion.
As a consequence of this article , 355.635 Muslims left Greece for Turkey and 189.916
Rum Orthodox left Turkey for Greece13. But as mentioned above, Greece had to host a
total of 1.200.000 refugees because, as mentioned above, she had already received some
one million refugees that had fled Turkey upon the defeat of Greek armies in August 1922
{" Mikrasiatiki Katastroff 'Y 4.
2) By its Art . 2, the Convention set the exception and defined those who would be
permitted to stay, called "etablis" : In Turkey, Rums of Istanbul15 settled in the Istanbul
prefecture prior to 30 October 1918, and in Greece, Muslim population ofWT.
As a consequence of this Art . 2, around 130.000 Turks stayed in WT (Greece) and around
the same number of Rums in Istanbul.
Six months later, Art . 14, para. 2 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty excluded from the
Exchange "the populations [substantially composed of Rums] of the islands of Gok^eada
[or Imroz, in Greek: Imbroz] and of Bozcaada [in Greek: Tenedos]" when the said Treaty
ceded to Turkey these two islands at the mouth of the Dardanelles for security reasons.
In 1920 about 9000 Rums were living on the two islands16.
Art . 1 created emigrants. These people were asked to leave practically with what they
could carry. In their respective kin-states they would receive property equivalent to what
they left behind.
These emigrants suffered a lot for a good number of reasons: A tremendous amount of
unforeseen problems came out during the implementation of the Convention and these
70 National Pact (Misaki Mill!) was a declaration adopted by the last Ottoman parliament (Meclisi Mebusan)
on 28 January 1920 as to the minimum requirements for a just and durable peace. It was in a way considered
the holy aim of the Kemalists.
11 Ismet Pasha also profited from the fact that the exclusion of WT from the Exchange was proposed by Lord
Curzon at the very outset. See 1 December 1922, Meray, Lausanne, p. 124.
12 Therefore, the Exchange did not include Catholic or Protestant Rums although the Turkish delegate
preferred the expression "Rums of Turkish citizenship" so that "the Greek irredentism disappears from Turkey"
(16 January 1923 afternoon session, Minutes no. 4, Meray, Lausanne, Series 1, Volume 1, Book 2, p. 312).
13 C.A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities, London, Oxford University Press, 1934, p.446.
tr . 3, those who had e
14 According to A
l ft the exchangeable territories prior to 18 October 1912 were to be
considered in the scope of A
tr . 1 (exchangeables).
15 Therefore, in contradistinction with A
tr . 1, all the Rums of Istanbul (not only Orthodox Rums) were declared
non-exchangeables etablis).
16 Alexis Alexandris, "Imbros and Tenedos: A Study in Turkish Attitudes Toward Two Ethnic Greek Island
Communities Since 1923", Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora , Vol. VII, No. 1, Spring 1990, p. 27.

were not solved until almost eight years later. These people had to leave everything
behind, from their homelands to neighbours and to memories. Some of them did not even
understand the language of their new country17. Both parties were considered strangers
by their new compatriots for a very long time18.
On the other hand, the innumerable problems that such a radical exchange inevitably
raised continued to poison Turco-Greek relations well until the 1930 Ankara Agreement
definitely settled problems of property rights of the^exchangeables and these relations
became normal (and even friendly) after this date\pnl^
Art . 2 created national minorities. These people were allowed to stay and when the
peace treaty was made, they were given minority rights formulated in the " Protection of
Minorities" section: For the Rums as non- Muslims it was Art.37 through 44 (basically the
same rights as in the Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919), and for the Turks Art . 45
establishing a reciprocity ("Rights given to Turkey's non-Muslim minority will be recognised
by Greece to her Muslim minority")19.
But most of these rights stayed on paper as will be fully o
d
tl
the

ahead. As a consequence,

experience of those who were allowed to stay proved to be even more difficult than those
who had to leave.
Although those who had to leave by A
tr . 1 had suffered a lot, their problems were more or ^ y
less confined to one generation. These problems considerably diminished, if not faded ^
away, as the 1923 emigrants got adapted to their new countries. But in the final analysis, ^ ,
the experience of those who were allowed to stay has proved to be more difficult for a ^-v^ .
'
"
oaw
. or reasons:
-

number
^ ^^
Firstly, since 70-odd years they have never been considered by their host-states as their
own people and they have always been forced to live a separate life, sometimes in
harassment.
Secondly, this two-sided negative attitude never diminished Jsy the passing of time. urte <?k/

17 As in the case of the Karamanii Orthodox who spoke Turkish only and of some Aegean Islands Muslims
(Cretans in particular) who spoke Greek only.
18 Many Rum Orthodox who left Turkey for Greece, especially those from Izmir and Istanbul areas, belonged
to a higher social class than the mainland Greeks. Therefore they met with some jalousie and were despised
as "Turkish sperms". On the other hand, they also segregated themselves from autochthonous Greeks; Izmir
Rums founded Nea Smirni and a sports club called Pan-ionion, and the Istanbul Rums lived (and still live) in
i
Faliron and supported (and they still do) AEK (Athletiki Enosis Konstantinopol). On the other hand, the habits x> K;'^e<
of many of the Muslims who e
l ft Greece for Turkey were much more liberal than their rather conservative new
compatriots. The latter considered them "yahgavur " (half-infidel), despised them as " Muhacif" (emigrants),
and abstained from intermarriage for a long time.
19 While the rights of the Rum minority consists of those depicted in the Lausanne system (i.e., the above
mentioned articles of the peace treaty, plus, the Exchange Convention), the Western Thracian Turks have,
beside these, minority rights depicted in two other instruments as well: 1) Athens Treaty and its Protocol no.3
(14 November 1913). This bilateral treaty between Greece and Ottoman Empire was done at the enr
i of the
second Balkan war to protect the rights of Muslims in Greece. (See B. Oran, Tiirk-Yunan Ylipkilerinde Baty
Trakya Sorunu [The Question of Western Thrace in Turco-Greek Relations], updated second edition, Ankara,
Bilgi, 1991, pp. 62-64. For the text of the treaty see Nihat Erim, Devletlerarasy Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih
Metinleri [International Law and Political History Texts], Ankara, TTK, 1953, pp. 477-488); and 2) Treaty on
the Protection of Minorities in Greece (Sevres, 10 August 1920). This multilateral treaty was done between
Greece on one side and Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other. (See Oran, op.cit , pp. 72-75.
For the text of the treaty see British Foreign and State Papers, Vol.113, p. 471). However, in various
^
diplomatic notes she sent to Turkey, Greece said she does not recognise these two treaties. (For a legal i^vvi.
appraisal on the validity of these treatieiTarc
i Tan analysis of the probable political reasons of this refusal see
Oran, op.cit., pp. 101-112).

the contrary, the respective lives of the two etablis communities were made even more
difficult after the 1960s, when another human issue came to poison the Greco-Turkish
relations/Cyprus question.
Thirdly, and more importantly for the subject matter of our Conference here, these two
etablis communities created by A
tr . 2 were forced, with an interval of half a century, to
share the fate of those who had to leave by Art . 1: They had to emigrate to their respective
kin-states; some of them even became refugees and stateless persons.
As a matter of fact, the Rum minority of Istanbul, with a very low rate of population growth
for being city dwellers, has practically withered away by diminishing from 110.000-odd
souls to around 2500 in our day, and the Rum population of the two islands to around 500
souls20. The Turkish minority of Greece, with a very high rate of population growth for being
rural people, is now lower than the 120.000-odd people in 1923; an estimated 300-4no.QOO
of them21 left Greece since 1923.
In this respect, the story of those who were allowed to stay has a lot more to teach us than
the story of those who had to leave. To show this, I'll now try to take a look at the situation
of the two respective minorities in the context of Greco-Turkish relations as far as their
rights under international instruments already mentioned are concerned22:
II - THE TWO MINORITIES AND GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS
It's a fact that the issue of respective minorities somehow influenced the bilateral relations
in the course of history. But, ever since the Convention began to be implemented, these
relations have influenced the lives of these two minorities on an incomparably greater
scale.
Roughly three periods can be detected in this respect:
1) The initial violations: Emptying the strategic territories of their etablis d 923-1930):
Violations started as soon as the Convention began to be implemented. First of all, both
sides tried to get rid of the etablis constituting a majority on strategic territory:
In Greece the Evros province at the frontier was emptied of the Turks, and this people who
formed the majority in WT in 1922 (129.120 Turks against 33.910 Greeks) and who held

20 Helsinki Watch [Lois Whitman], Denying Human Rights and Ethnic Identity - The Greeks of Turkey,
USA, March 1992, p. 29.
21 An August 1990 report of the Helsinki Watch estimated that, even with a population growth rate of 2 per cent
(which is too low), the numerical size of the WT minority today ought to be around 500.000. (Helsinki Watch
[Lois Whitman], Destroying Ethnic Identity - The Turks of Greece, USA, October 1990, p.2).
22 Being rather an expert on-Western Thracian Turks, I'll first look at the problems from their angle and then
try to make a summary the other side of the coin as written mostly by Alexis Alexandris, the indisputable
expert on the Rum minority in Turkey, in his already mentioned book (The Greek...") and article ("Imbroz and
Tenedos ..."). The plighl ofthe Rums of Turkey can be followed mainly from Alexandris ' works (see footnotes
^ Watch
2and 16), from the Helsinki
Report on The Greeks of Turkey (footnote 20), and also from the yearly
Human Rights Reports of the US Department of State, Section Turkey. The plights'of the Turks of Greece
can be followed mainly from my book in Turkish (footnote 19), from the Helsinki Watch Report on The Turks
of Greece (footnote 21), and also from the yearly Human Rights Reports of the US Department of State,
Section Greece.

84 per cent of the lands in this territory 23 became a numerical minority in their own lands.
This happened because the Rum refugees from Eastern Thrace, crossing the Maritza river
in the autumn of 1922, freely seized property and livestock of the WT etablis living on the
territory adjacent to the Turkish border, and security forces did not stop them At the end,
Turks had to abandon everything and take refuge in Turkey24, a year after (1924) the
number of Greeks became 189.00025.
Also , a law was made in 1920 (law 1920/1920) to meet the requirement of the 1913 Athens
Treaty (see footnote 19) as to the election of the Mufti and Head-Mufti by the Turkish
community, but as it was never implemented, the community was never able to elect its
religious leaders.
In Turkey, the special self-administration privileges brought to the inhabitants of the two
islands near the mouth of the Dardanelles by A
r
t . 14 of the peace treaty were never
applied; even their right to education in their mother language medium was denied in 1927
(l a w 1151)26.

2} The rapprochement period (1930-1954):

The etablis question and other bilateral problems were settled in 1930. Also with the help
of common fears (first, the Italian " Mare Nostrum" policy of Mussolini in pre-war period of
1930s, and then, the Stalinist policy of the Soviets in the post-war period of 1940s and the
early 50s), Greece and Turkey were engaged in friendly relations.
This rapprochement atmosphere was also reflected to the two etablis communities and
alleviated their problems. A "Culture Agreement " in 1951 permitted an exchange of school
teachers for minority schools and decided to purify textbooks from "wrong information"
In Greece, the minority schools were officially called "Turkish" instead of " Muslim" for the
first time in 1954 (The " Papagos Law", 3065/ 1954).
In Turkey, the Rum minority's "golden age" started with the coming in 1930 of Greek
citizens to live and work with residence permits27. The two countries became the best
partners in the Balkans. In the 50s the teaching of Greek was began again on the two
islands. Under American influence the bilateral relations prospered, which also caused a

23 23 November 1922, Minutes no 3, Meray, Lausanne, Series 1, Volume 1, Book 1, pp 41, 42, 54, 61
24 Alexandris, The Greek..., p 120-121. This fact, also acknowledged in between lines by Veniselos at the
Conference (see 1 December 1922, Meray, Lausanne, p 122), happened because the Greek Minister of
Agriculture Anastas Bakkalbasi revoked an order of eviction of some 60.000 of Rum refugees from the homes
of the Turks, as he wrote at page 2 of an election pamphlet he published to be re-elected in 1950 (see Trakya
[newspaper in Turkish published by O.N Fettahoglu from 1932 to 1964 in Xhanti/lskece], 24 May 1954)
25 A A Pallis, Racial Migrations in the Balkans, p 327 in Dimitn Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of
Minorities and Its Impact Upon Greece, Pans, La Hague, Mouton et Co , 1964-^ p 136
'226 Here I'm not mentioning in the text the pressures of 1926 on the Rum Orthodox Patriarchate to renounce
to the first paragraph of Art 42 (personal and family status) of the peace treaty because this did not concern
the Rums only, but all non-reiigious minorities; but this should also be added to their plights (At that date the
Swiss civil code was adopted, which made civil marriage compulsory. Non-Muslim minorities were '"-ned to
comply with the law and have civil marriage executed first, the religious ceremony later The Jewish and
Armenian communities complied, but the Rums were "persuaded" much later See Alexandris, The Greek...,
p136 onwards)
27 At the time, there was over-employment (needo
rf specialised handicrafts) in Turkey in some sectors
because of the vacuum left by the departed non-Muslims. One of three agreements signed in 1930 provided
for free-circulation between the two countries and under-employed Greeks were able to come and settle in
Turkey, in Istanbul particularly .

revival of the Patriarchate .

On the other hand, the core of the problems for the respective etablis communities
remained untouched.
In Greece, the "Forbidden Zone" declared in 1953 "against the communist infiltration from
Bulgaria" and encompassing 1/8 of WT was in fact used, together with the military
" Restricted Zone" running parallel in its south, to keep separate the Pomaks in the northern
mountains from the Turks in the south. (This practice still continues to our day) Complaints
about land problems still prevalent today begin in May 1952
at the collections of Trakya newspaper mentioned above.
In Turkey, it was the heyday of Turkish secular nationalism and this reflected on the Rum
community particularly as the Turkish Orthodox movement of Papa Eftim, a Karamanii
Rum Orthodox priest. This movement which was never recognised by world churches
pressurised the most important Rum institution in Turkey, the Patriarchate28.

3) The point of no return: The Cyprus imbroglio begins (1955 onwards)

Grievances of the Turkish Minority

The Cyprus question29 was taken by Greece to the United Nations in 1954 and since then
an era of disaster for both communities began. On 6-7 September 1955 street
demonstrations protesting the Cyprus affair soon degenerated into vandalism devastating
the Rum properties in Izmir and particularly Istanbul, taking lives as well30.
Assassination of Cypriot Turks in Christmas 1963 by Cypriot Rums also caused another
Turkish reaction in 1964 that turned into a real debacle for the Istanbul Rum community:
As a reaction to these events, the Turkish Government, in search of a retaliation against
Greece, cancelled the working and residence permits of some 13.000 Greek citizens who
had come as a result of 1930 agreements. These Greeks had to return home, and with
them also left, with the passing of time, the core of the Rums because they had
intermarried extensively with them and because Cyprus issue did not seem terminable.
Istanbul was almost emptied of its historical Rum community. Also in 1964 education in
Greek medium was again forbidden on the two islands and in 1965 many Rum properties

28 For the story of this movement not created or supported, but much tolerated by the Turkish government see
Alexandria, The Greeks..., p. 149 onwards. The reason for not mentioning the "Citizen, Speak Turkish"
campaigns, the Turkification of commerce of the 30s and the Wealth Tax of 1942 in the text above is that
these were " nationalist" applications of the period intended against all non-Muslim minorities, not the_ Rum j.
community in particular. For instance, the economic nationalism of the Kemalists used the notorious Wealth
Tax (Varlik Vergisi) to break the quasi-monopoly that the non-Muslim bourgeoisie enjoyed over economy. In
reality a badly needed extraordinary tax in the miserable war years, it turned, in the pro-fascist atmosphere
of the period,n
o
it a shameful discriminatory application against non-Muslim minorities. It goes without saying
that these events should be considered among the plights^of the Rum minority.
29 The island, the population of which was 1/5 Turkish and 4/5 Rum Cypriot, was then attached to Great
Britain, Greece and Cypriot Rums were then asking for Enosis, union with Greece.
30 This shameful incident damaging other non-Muslim minorities was initially organised by the government to
prove that it enjoyed the support of the public opinion while the London Conference went on. But, with the
lumpens participating and the police tolerating, it turned into a real plunder. Prime Minister of the time
Menderes was tried after the coup d'Etat of 1960 and the Turks were able to learn that the Ataturk House
bombing in Salonica that triggered the whole thing was a plot of the Turkish secret police.

minority
were expropriated
o t build an open agricultural prison, as a result of which this
also took refuge in Greece.
ie two
This 1964 incident was not the beginning of a debacle for the Rums only, because i.i
Turks
became
much
minorities were the two faces of the same coin. The plights of the WT
coup
The
behave.
Greece
make
to
d
' Etat
heavier, because there was no more reciprocity
worse.
things
made
of the Colonels in 1967
that had the
Education The school board elections were no more permitted All the signs
word "Turkish" on them were forbidden. The "Papagos Law" was repealed by the decree
1109/1972 and the Turkish schools were again called "Muslim Schools" By law 695/ 1977,
the graduates of the Saloniki Special Academy of Pedagogy, a teacher school set up in
schools,
1966 to educate Pomak youngsters to turn Turkish schools into Greek-medium
of the Pomak
were appointed by priority and this caused interminable school boycotts
students especially31 Starting from 1984 the lycee students had to pass their exams in
graduates from
Greek language even for Turkish-medium courses, and there were no
Komotini after 1985. On the other hand, teachers and books that should be arriving from
Greece.
Turkey according to the 1968 Cultural Protocol were not permitted to enter
not have the
As a result, the youngsters (who , unlike their counterparts in Istanbul, do
alternative to go to American, British, German etc. /ycees) try to go to Turkey for secondary
because
and higher education. A great majority of these never come back, precisely
organisation
university diplomas obtained in Turkey are not recognised by the official
(Dikatsa)
Social organisation. The religious leaders (Mufti) of the community ought to be elected by
repealed in
Muslim according to the 2345/1920 law. It was never applied and when it was
by
the
Minister
December 1990 the new decree (no. 182) provided for a mufti appointed
this
m
u
f
t
i
calls
community
"The Mufti
of National Education and of Religious Affairs. The
the
Greece,
In
freedoms.
religious
to
blow
severe
a
as
this
"
describes
of the Christians and
the other
State is not involved at all in the election process of Orthodox clergymen On
of
backbone
social
hand, Muslim pious foundations (Wakfs) that form the economic and
under strict
the community are, since the presidential decree of January 1991,
administration of the provincial governors
the minority
As for the organisational structure of civil society, the three associations of
1987 on
dating back to 1927, 1929, and 1936 respectively were closed down in November

tSVp h^

31 The Pomaks in WT are well known to be "more Turkish than the Turks" and the Romans "more Turkish than
"
GreelTadministration calls the
the Pomaks" The reasons for this subjective identity are multifold 1) The
a great reaction among this
creates
".
Pomaks "Grandsons of Alexander the Great Islamicised by force This
When people fighting
living
a
making
hardly
very religious community, 2) The Pomaks are mountain people,
adverse effects
produce
may
ideology
this
bombing,
encounters a continuous ideological
i utle
is
with such dfic
"
function of
negative
,
this
themselves
'
use
o
r
f
t
When the Greek government calls them with names they don
government
the
When
3)
government,
same
the
against
ideology" enters into circuit and creates a reaction
inadvertently unites the
insistently uses "Muslim" instead of Turkish", choosing the "lesser of the two evils", it
supports the National Identity when
minority, instead of dividing it into three parts ,4) Because Religion always
Greece is definitely the backbone
the notion They/The Others" is represented by a different religion, Islam in
with Muslim in the Near East
of Turkishness, 5) As I already stated above (see footnote 2), Turk is identical
being
a Turk is definitely more
generally, and in the Balkans particularly , 6) For a multitude of reasons,
Empire, they are
Ottoman
of
the
r
o
f /on, afloman Turks are the heirs
prestigious than being a Pomak, orta
they have a
minority,
WT
of
the
000)
the richest element of the minority, they form thiTmaJonty (70 000/110.
'
the
is
Turkey
only State
more,
't,
s
and
what
kin-state and the two other elements (Pomaks and Romans) don
minority
is
the
Because
7)
finally
,
and
minority
that is actively concerned with the problems of the WT
here
juxtaposed
Muslim
are
identities
i
m
portant
very
incomparably less wealthy than the Greek majonty, three
identity) We know that any two of
(religious identity), Turkish (ethnic/national identity), and the needy (class
each other, let alone all three
with
juxtaposed
if
situation
these identities suffice to form a highly explosive
together

10

the grounds that they the word "Turkish" in their titles could only refer to citizens of Turkey,
and its use to describe Greek Moslems endangered public order. A large demonstration
took place in Komotini participated mainly by Pomaks coming from the "Forbidden Zone"
in the north .
Fundamental rights and freedoms: While in the past there was only police oppression, the
authorities have increased their pressure in parallel with the growth of Turkishness among
the minority, and mass attacks on life and property have started to occur. On 29 January
1990 several mobs damaged Muslim workplaces following the broadcasting of an
erroneous piece of news on the local radio and 50 people including the acting mufti and
aMuslim MP were also injured. Police did not intervene. Similar mob attacks occurred in
August 1991 and again in July 1998, again without effective police intervention.
The right to petition, the freedom to elect and be elected, and the right to a fair trial have
also ceased
o t exist for the community. When Sadik Ahmet (he died in a controversial car
accident), an MD, prepared a text entitled "Grievances and Requests of the Turkish-Muslim
Minority Living in Western Thrace" and collected 13.000 signatures for it, he was
sentenced to thirty months in prison and fined 100.000 drachmas. In addition, he and
Ibrahim Sherif (an MP) were each sentenced to eighteen months in prison and were
deprived of their political rights for three years. The charges were " openly or . indirectly
inciting citizens to violence or creating rifts among the population at the expense of social
peace" by using the word "Turkish" in their campaign literature. There were rather tragicomic scenes in the courtroom , where the judges shouted at one Christian witness: "You
are making political propaganda", and the prosecutor shouted at Dr. S. Ahmet: " Look what
the audience thinks of you. Your end will be like Ceausescu' s". When in the elections of
April 1990 Dr. Ahmet became an independent MP, the electoral system was amended in
November 1990 to bring a 3% minimum vote requirement for independent candidates as
well, making the election of an independent Muslim impossible.
Under Art . 19 of the Greek law on citizenship (3370/1955) Western Thracian Turks (whose
uncertain numbers range from hundreds to thousands) lost their citizenship without a
hearing or an effective right of appeal, and became stateless persons. This racist provision
which stated that a person of " non-Greek ethnic origin" going abroad "without the intention
of returning" may be deprived of citizenship was referred to by the US State Department
in the following terms: "[In Greece] exile is unconstitutional and does not occur, except in
the form of an administrative decree on the loss of citizenship by non-ethnic Greek?" This
article which put Greece in an indefensible position was denounced in 1991 by Prime
Minister Mitsotakis as "the product of another era"; it was only repealed in July 1998 under ,
heavy pressure from European Union. Nothing as yet has been heard about the status of '
stateless persons it created from 1955 to 1998.
Art . 19 was also used in conjunction with another method inhibiting the freedom of
movement of the WT minority. As of 1985 the police began crossing out the printed
mention "including return" from the passports of Muslims, mostly illiterates, going on a visit
to Turkey. These people were then denied entry upon return to Greece and were deprived
of citizenship under Art . 19. Restriction of the freedom of movement is of course a
continuous practice at home because of the " Forbidden Zone" mentioned above.
The minority is discriminated against in the delivery of housing repair licences (alleviated
since a year or two), tractor driving licences (vital for peasants), and for opening of
businesses.
The economic sphere: The WT minority is 70% peasant. It held 84% of the lands in WT
in 1922; it now has between 20-40 % of them only. This stems from the following four
practices of the Greek administration: Firstly, the Orthodox population is encouraged to buy

11
Muslim lands by soft loans given by the State for this purpose only. Secondly, laws are
systematically applied in a discriminatory way. Fertile lands of the minority are expropriated
for political motives (building of prisons, universities, etc.). Land consolidation (anadasmos}
works against them. Thirdly, possession documents and title deeds are not recognised.
Fourthly, since 1965 law 1366/ 1938 is used to thwart the minority from purchasing new
property. According to this law encompassing almost half the Greek territory, purchase and
sale of real estate and even the use of possession rights are subject to special licence in
the coastal areas, frontiers, and the islands. Christians have no problems, but Muslims do.
However, this problem has been alleviated since a year or two now, again under heavy
pressure of the European Union, after a British citizen had problems buying land on a
coastal area (see European Court of Justice decision dated 30.05.1989).
Overall evaluation: The Greek administration seems to have a double target in WT : To
assimilate the Muslim minority of Pomak origin, and to obtain the emigration of the Muslim
minority of Turkish origin. As a consequence of these pressures and violations, the WT
minority has always been inclined to immigrate to Turkey. Some of its members went to
work in Germany, where they set up active associations to tell European public opinion on
violations in WT.
As it has already been stated above, some 400.000 people are estimated to have left WT
since 1923. Some of these are stateless persons as a result of Art . 19. On the other hand,
four facts are keeping the numerical size of this minority more or less the same: Firstly,
Greece is economically much better place to live than Turkey. Secondly, Turkey has been
shaken with anarchy since the end of 1960s and with terrorism since 1984. Thirdly, this is
mainly a community of peasants and peasants do not easily leave their lands. Fourthly ,
and most importantly , WT minority's rate of population growth is as high as 2,8% (Greece's
average is close to zero).
Grievances of the Rum Minority

Education: The Rums of Turkey have had the same problems in the field of education:
Books, teachers, school administration, repair of school buildings, etc.
However, there is one difference with the situation in WT. There has been no denial of their
" Rum" identity32. School signs that read "Rum Minority School" were kept in place, with one
exception that I know of: The sign at the entrance of the Istanbul Rum Phanar Lycee that
read in Greek letters "The Great School of Our Race" was put down in retaliation of the
broken marble sign in Arabic letters on the 114 year-old Xhanti Clock Tower in May 1970.
Social organisation: In this sphere, the Rums of Turkey have generally had the same kinds
of problems: Although the Patriarch is elected by his fellow clergymen, the Turkish
administration, according to custom based on Rum Patrikli6i Nizamati (Rules Concerning
the Rum Patriarchate) of 1862, has always interfered with the election list prepared by the
32 Lois Whitman in The Greeks of Turkey is wrong in looking for a parallelism in this respect. As has already
been stated above (see footnote 2), the term "Rum" is the denotation given by the Istanbul minority to
themselves since time immemorial: It comes from Romios, Romioi, that means "from [eastern] Rome". They
never called themselves "Yunanii" (Greek, citizen of Greece), a term born after Greece emergedo
lf !o"'"ng the
1821 revolution. In this respect, it would be interesting to know that even the Ottoman Sultans started to call
themselves "Sultani Iklimi Rum" (Sultan of the Rum Lands) after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, just
as the Kurds called the Turkish soldiers at least after 1639 (the date after which Kurdistan entered under
Ottoman rule) " Rum Askerf {Rum soldiers), always for the same reason.

12

clergymen by crossing out some names, except for the last election where no name was
crossed out. Rum pious foundations have encountered the pressure of the administration.
The Turkish administration has declared that all donations made to communal institutions
of the non-Muslim minorities are the property of the government. The Haiki School of
Theology was closed by a Constitutional Court decree in 1971 that nationalised private
institutions of higher learning, making it impossible to train the Orthodox clergy in Turkey.
The Patriarchate itself is getting extinct.
Other violations concerning fundamental or economic rights have steadily occurred. There
has been harassment by the police, interference with the election of board members, etc.
Overall evaluation: As a consequence of these pressures and violations, the Rum minority
of Istanbul and of the two islands has immigrated to Greece. This people who live around
Faliron and Nea Smirni in Athens still keep their Turkish citizenship, but their grand children
became Greek citizens, speaking no more Turkish. The Rum minority of Turkey is almost
extinct, numbering no more than 2500, mostly senior citizens.
On the other hand, since the Turkish minority in WT faced with the very same problems
managed to keep its numerical strength, there should be other reasons for this extinction
as well.
Firstly, because a lot of young Rums who didn't want to serve in the Turkish army (where
they were not made officers) left after Greek citizens were expelled in 1964, this
community 's marriage opportunities have become increasingly difficult. Secondly, the Rum
minority had for several centuries lived as more or less wealthy city dwellers. Unlike the
peasants of WT they are not dependent on land and what's more, their horizons are not
as limited. Thanks to commercial links long maintained with Europe, and especially after
the Greek membership process started after 1975, the Rums began leaving for Greece
(per capita income four times that of Turkey at the time) when the pressures intensified
because of the Cyprus events. It has of course been very painful, but they transferred what
capital they had to Athens and re-organised their business there. This is what a Japanese
researcher refers to by the term "footloose Greek merchant"33. Thirdly, beside the police
harassment, the Rums, an upper-middle and middle class community, were very much
disturbed by the anarchic atmosphere of Turkey. Fourthly , as city people they had a very
low rate of population growth.
Some of these criteria do not apply to the Rum inhabitants of the two islands. For this
rather rural society psychological atmosphere created by the quasi extinction of Istanbul
Rums seems to have been effective, beside the expropriations of their lands.
Ill -LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE 1923 EXPERIENCE
The end of the Soviet experience opened a new era in international politics in the 1990s.
This might as well be called the opening of Pandora's Box, because the plights of
minorities and the sufferings of refugees, which were considered things of the distant past
in Europe, came once more and even more strongly on the international agenda.
For this renewed problem of Europe and elsewhere, can we draw any lessons from the
most radical solution found to this problem so far; i.e., the compulsory exchange of
populations of 1923 between Greece and Turkey?
t
33 Iwao Kamozawa, "Ethnic Minority in Regionalization, The Case of Turks in Western Thrace", Population I
Mobility in the Mediterranean World, Tokyo, Mediterranean Studies Research Group at Hitotsubashi '
University, 1982, p. 129.

13

After 75 years, I think it would be at least tempting to review the Convention and its
implementation from this particular angle, because I believe there are important
parallelisms between the post-WW I situation and the post-Cold War era
1) Both eras were/are transitory periods of striking importance for the nation-state: In the
first, the keynote was transition from Empire to Nation, in the second it's transition from
Nation to Globalisation34.
2) Both eras lived/live through two contradictory main trends at a time:
a) Winds of nationalism:
In the first era it was, on the one hand, the continuation of the irredentist policy of
aGreecethat had built her national identity by using the Ottoman image in the 1820s, and
on the other hand, a Turkey trying
o t build her own by using the Greek threat exactly a
century later35.
In the second era, on the one hand, it's the continuation of the irredentist policy of a Serbia
the expansion of which was inhibited in the first era, and on the other hand, the Bosnians
trying to build their national identity and the Albanians and the Macedonians trying to build
their nation-state, all by using the Serbian threat.
b) Winds of globalisation:
The first era was the zenith of the second globalisation. The second it's the
beginning of the third globalisation during which the fading away of national identities,
under the shaping influence of the global market, seems inevitable in the long run (see the
last paragraph of footnote 38).
3) Both eras witnessed/witness, for opposing reasons, outbursts of nationalist excess

34 Globalisation is a much-discussed concept and therefore it needs further evaluation

Globalisation can best be defined as the expansion of the Western system, carrying with it both its
infrastructure (capitalism), and superstructure (rationalism, secularism, human & minority rights, democracy,
etc )
Globalisation today (1990s) is actually the third There has been two previous waves, both corresponding to
the needs of capitalism then 1) Globalisation of 1490s Geographical discoveries necessitated by the trade
policies of the Mercantilist period that ended up what we call today "Colonialism", and 2) Globalisation of
1890s Western expansion required by the needs of the Industrial Revolution's monopoly stage (cheap flow
of raw materials, new markets, new territories to increase the marginal productivity of the capital, new lands
for the excess population, etc ), in short , what we call today "Imperialism" The first globalisation was naturally
weak, the second was much stronger and paved the way for the third
This third globalisation is created by three successive and complementing developments that took place
during the last thirty years 1) The appearance of Multinational Companies in the 70s, 2) Revolutionary
developments in Communications in the 80s, and 3) The fall of the Soviet system in the 90s
The first development enlarged the marketplace as to embrace the whole globe now (hence, "globalisation")
The second development made it possible to conquer the minds of people instead of their country (and that
made it very difficult to challenge the conquest this time) The third (actually, an outcome of the first two
combined) practically gave the West monopolistic control over international developments political as well
as economic
'"'
Here, it's very important to underline once more the fact that this radical change in the concept of territory
(marketplace shifting from the national state to the Globe) will have two very important effects on people all
over the world 1) The concept of "motherland" is now bound
o t change, because the concept of territory is
primordial when it changes, everything else changes for the individual in due time, and 2) Europear-. history
is now bound to reflect World history as well, because globalisation is transforming the whole world into a
reflection of the West.
35 Herkul Millas, Tiirk-Yunan Ylibkilerine Bir Onsoz, Tencere Dibin Kara (A Foreword to Turkish-Greek
Relations- The Kettle Calling the Pot Black), Istanbul, Amac, February 1989, p 21.

14

***

Now we can proceed to final observations on the 75-year experience of the Excnange
when the two main articles of the Convention are reconsidered with today's consciousness:
Art. 1:
1) The implementation of Art. 1 has been painful indeed, but if/s outcome was very
successful. The whole event took much more time and effort than anticipated, but
everything subsided by the end of 1930.

Ms'

The main reason of this (at least technical) success was the fact that, for different reasons,
all the important actors of the scene (England, Greece, and Turkey) strongly wanted a
radical exchange of populations, even a compulsory one.
2) This is not at all to mean that a similar experience can be repeated in our day: The postWW I era cared for the concept of minority rights, not human rights. The latter was
unknown then even to the terminology of international law and relations; it's now the sacred
cow of the post-Cold War era and will not permit such an internationally organised forceful
displacement of human populations.

\/
^

Art. 2:
1) The outcome of Art . 2 has been a failure. The respective minorities never felt
themselves a component part of their host-state and the host-states always considered
them an alien tissue to reject.
The reasons of this failure are numerous:
a) A retrospective look today teaches us that for particular reasons of international
setting, this particular fate of the respective minorities was obvious the very day the
Convention was signed:
The two States were part of those new or less-new small states of eastern Europe who
were naturally very eager to build their own nation and nation-state. But they soon found
out that this was conditional upon their acceptance of special minority protection
provisions, imposed by the Principle Allied and Associated Powers who sought to make
the "New World Order" as problem-free for themselves as possible and who, by the same
token, wanted to control those small states. This was hardly what the latter have been
aspiring for. They tried to resist and get rid of (at least some of) those provisions, or better ,
of the minorities themselves by making life difficult for them.
i/v^b ^ ^
Therefore, the main reason of this failure is the fact that these respective minorities were
like unwanted children at the very beginning. The two main actors (Greece and Turkey)
accepted them (etablis) as necessary evils, or worse, considered them as a " Fifth Column"
left back by the other side.
b) Greece and Turkey can hardly be considered ideal partners for this very difficult
experience: Their historical past has been full of conflicts , their nation-building process was
on the way, their religions are different, they have other points of conflict beside this human
issue (Cyprus, Aegean Sea, etc.)
c) Permitting minorities to remain in two important strategic areas especially (in
Greece the Evros province contiguous to the Turkish border, and in Turkey the two islands
at the mouth of the Dardanelles) does not seem to have been a good idea.
d) Reciprocity was the main asset of both minorities. But this proved to bo a fi agile
rationale: The moment it was broken, it started to function in a very adverse fashion.
2) This is not at all to mean that a similar experience can not be repeated in our day. With

15

the spread of globalisation, multi-culturalism is bound to become one of the most important
characteristics the post-Cold War era.
For example, Greece's record in the last two years seems to suggest that certain external
dynamics (globalisation) can play a positive role in the amelioration of a State's ill treatment
to its minority. Full membership of Greece in the European Union has, for the time being,
brought meaningful amelioration to two very important ways extensively used by the Greek
governments to create immigrants and stateless persons: The non-deliverance of
building/repair licences and of the permits to buy land, and the application of Art . 19 of the
citizenship code.
On the other hand, the Balkans are hardly the dream area for such a development today.
The nationalist excesses of 1920s had highlighted the opening festivities of the era of
nationalism. Those of 1990s highlight its closing festivities now; it's only normal that they ' ll
be even more colourful.

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