Conflict Resolution

Conflict Resolution and Peace Building:
The Role of NGOs in Historical Reconciliation

and Territorial Issues
Published on April 7, 2009
Published by the Northeast Asian History Foundation
Edited by Sungho Kang John W. McDonald Chinsoo Bae
Imkwang Bldg., 77 Uijuro, Seodaemungu, Seoul 120-705, Korea
Tel : (82-2) 2012-6065
Fax : (82-2) 2012-6187
E-mail : book@historyfoundation.or.kr
Copyright 2009 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation
All Rights Reserved. No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form
without written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.
This book is based on each contributors personal academic opinion and
may not necessarily reflect the publishers position
ISBN 978-89-6187-085-6-93300
Publisher's Foreword
The Northeast Asian History Foundation was founded in September 2006

with the goal of establishing a basis for peace and prosperity in Northeast
Asia by confronting distortions of history that have caused considerable anguish in this region and the world at large, as well as developing a better
understanding of history through comprehensive longterm research and systematic and strategic policy development. To this end, since its creation,
the Foundation has been profoundly involved with four key programs such
as research, strategy policy development, international exchange, and cooperation as well as education and publication.
In this connection, the Northeast Asian History Foundation hosted various international conferences and dialogues in an attempt to bring to the
discussion table as many parties as possible and make issues known to the
rest of the world. As part of such attempts, the Foundation sponsored the
International NGO Conference on History and Peace in Seoul, Korea, in
2007 which turned out to be a great success, with participation of more
than 200 NGO leaders and activities from more than 20 countries. It also
hosted a similar conference in Seoul, Korea, in 2008, with over 400 participants from 200 NGOs and 23 countries. Through these conferences, NGOs
built consensus, taking full advantage of collaboration and communication
based on more universal values of humanity beyond boundaries, ideologies,
and national interests. They brought together their wisdom for the discussion of a less confrontational writing of their histories of the 20
th
century. Territorial issues and conflict resolution were also considered in

the context of historical reconciliation. It is very rewarding to publish a
book with selected papers presented at the International NGO Forum on
4 Conflict Resolution and Peace Building
Territorial Issues and Conflict Resolution both in 2007 and in 2008.

Peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia, and globally, is a hope dear
to all people. The regional communitys efforts towards this common goal
have been seriously hindered in the past by the gap in the perceptions of
their history. The work of the Northeast Asian History Foundation has been
and will continue to be that of advocating a new historical outlook, rising
above any selfcentered, nationalistic visions that would undermine a better
mutual understanding of all the people in the region.
As the title of this book Conflict Resolution and Peace Building: The
Role of NGOs in Historical Reconciliation and Territorial Issues implies,
we hope this publication will serve as a useful source of information and
ideas to NGOs and governments alike, contributing to preventive diplomacy,
conflict resolution and peacebuilding.
January 2009
Kim, Yongdeok
President
Northeast Asian History Foundation
Publisher's Foreword 5
Contents
Introduction
Sungho KangJohn W. McDonaldChinsoo Bae / 9
New Trends and Challenges in Modern Armed Conflicts

Ekaterina Stepanova / 23
Conflict Transformation and Historical Reconciliation Through Mutli-Track Diplomacy

John W. McDonald / 47
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea

Hasjim Djalal / 61
Resolving the Territorial Issue in the Mindanao Conflict: Challenges for

the Civil Society
Kamarulzaman AskandarAyesah Abubakar / 91
Leading Role of NGOs in Solving Water Disputes between India and Bangladesh:
Farakka Barrage Case
M. M. Mahbub Hasan / 117
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving and Securing
Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute
Justice M. Mbuh / 135
An Educational Model for Peace Building and Conflict Prevention:

The Role of the UN mandated University for Peace
Victor Valle / 185
Women and the Role of NGOs in Conflict Resolution in Africa

Rebecca N. Mbuh / 197
Three Episodes in Developing a Harmonized World

Yuahn Rao / 221
Contents 7
Conflict Resolution and Peace Building: The Role of

NGOs in Historical Reconciliation and Territorial Issues
Introduction
Sungho Kang John W. McDonald Chinsoo Bae
The First Annual International NGO Conference on History and Peace took
place from 12 to 16 September, 2007 in Seoul, Korea. The Second Annual
International NGO Conference on History and Peace on The Role of Global
Civil Society towards Historical Reconciliation in East Asia was held in
Seoul on 8-12 October, 2008, with participants from 23 countries. During
the conference, an NGO Forum devoted several sessions especially to territorial issues and conflict resolution. Experts and NGO leaders from different
parts of the world discussed the root causes and background of international
conflicts. The aim was to explore territorial issues; clarify the role of NGOs
in finding peaceful solutions to these problems within the context of historical reconciliation; and promote international cooperation and NGO (civil
society) networking for preventive diplomacy and peace building.
There have been many NGO gatherings in the world covering a range
of issues, but this meeting was unique in addressing this theme. The main
events of the 2008 NGO Conference on History and Peace included plenary
sessions, workshops, exhibitions, a film festival and several cultural
performances. The special workshop on territorial issues and conflict resolution was co-organized by The International Network for Peace and Conflict
Resolution
(INCORE)
and The Korean Future Foundation, two NGOs based
in Seoul.
introduction 11
As the background papers of both conferences indicate, we confirmed

that hegemonic acts of militarism, exclusive nationalism, expansionism, colonialism, and a failure to address past issues and grievances, including denying
past atrocities and war crimes, have blocked the road to regional peace and
reconciliation in East Asia. The nationalistic way of remembering war, which
conceals agonies and sacrifices of individuals, has proven to be an offensive
way to belittle the pains of others. Therefore, the participants of the conferences
agreed to the promotion of a more equitable teaching of history and peace
as a key to solving problems of remaining historical trauma.
With regard to modern history in East Asia, we recognize that the
teaching of history, based on historical wounds, including colonialism, warfare, violence, poverty, discrimination and human rights infringement, does
degenerate into a teaching that fans resentment instead of coexistence and
co-prosperity for future generations.
In order to build a future vision for a peaceful East Asian community,
based on cooperation and coexistence, a youth-oriented history curriculum
one that reinforces peace educationshould be strongly supported.
Universal values of peace and coexistence and the possibility of history education based on a peace culture were highlighted by civil society actors
during the conference.
The NGO Forum on Territorial Issues and Conflict Resolution provided
during the 2008 Conference a unique opportunity for overseas and local
experts on conflict resolution and territorial issues to engage in candid discussions regarding different cases of territorial issues and they identified
contributions of NGOs to their solutions. At the same time, the participants
shared their friendship with mutual trust and promoted the establishment
of an NGO networking mechanism as a follow-up to the conference. The
NGO Forum reached consensus that the approach to historical reconciliation
and territorial issues should be based on universal values and people-centered

norms.
Today, with the radical development of science and technology, the world
is shrinking and increasing the consciousness of the necessity of interdependence. In the past, when human consciousness was confined only to
one state or one region, it was easy to denigrate other ethnic groups. However,
as barriers between states are decreasing and transnational exchanges and
trade are increasing, the global society of a common destiny, based on mutual
cooperation, is emerging. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,
the Cold War between West and East seems to be replaced by the goal
of ethnic independence and the revitalization of nationalism. The world is
more unstable today because national sovereignty is supreme, with the result
that there are now more than 100 on-going intra-state conflicts, more than
half of which take place in Africa and Asia.
Generally speaking, conflict can be defined as an incompatible state
of discord caused by the actual or perceived opposition of needs, values
and interests. A conflict can be internal
two or more individuals).
(within oneself)
or external
(between
Social conflict can be defined as the perceived in-
compatibility of the interests or aspirations of groups. Two major key factors

of this kind of conflict are the existence of two or more parties confronting
conflicts regarding the distribution of limited resources or values.
International conflict is based on the refusal of governments to negotiate
territorial issues or to allow freedom of religion, language and culture. In this
regard, governmental approaches to the solution tend to be power-oriented,
holding the belief that they have the sole authority and ability to solve the
conflict. This explains the explosion since the 1990s of non-governmental
organizations/civil society organizations, demonstrating their abilities to help
1 Definition from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflict).
introduction 13
reduce conflict.
There are currently thousands of individuals and organizations outside
governments and intergovernmental organizations that are working for peace
around the world. These people are achieving significant results which are
not recognized enough. It seems that governments are reluctant to admit
non-state actors into the business of peace and security.2
This publication focuses on the work of NGOs and, in particular, their
transnational networking mechanisms which serve as an effective means of
preventive diplomacy and conflict management. Because historical conflicts
and territorial issues are usually associated with national legitimacy, it is
not easy to solve such matters at the governmental level alone. Countries
in East Asia, in particular, Northeast Asia, face numerous challenges to achieve
historical reconciliation because of historical wounds and territorial disputes
which are barriers to the progress of regional cooperation and peaceful
coexistence.
The International NGO Forum on Territorial Issues and Conflict Resolution
is a means of the implementation of Second Track or Citizen Diplomacy.
Citizen Diplomacy is facing the profound challenge of complex conflicts
by bringing together all those working to build a sustainable and just peace.
Under the principle of Second track or Citizen Diplomacy, they work together
to understand better the dynamics underlying the conflict and conflict transformation from violence to a collaborative process of peace building and official
diplomacy, opening up opportunities for communication, and cross-cultural
understanding. It can introduce new insights and ideas to the official process,
reduce tensions and misunderstanding, build capacity in civil society, and
promote public support and political will.3
2
Paul van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema, and Juliette Verhoeven, eds.
People Building Peace II (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), p. 47.
John Davies and Edward Kaufman, Eds. Second Track/Citizens Diplomacy
First track diplomacy operated by the government is influenced by the

interests of states as the primary unit of the international system and the
ultimate legitimate vehicle of coercive power as formal, bureaucratic, and
low-risk behavior in its practitioners. Nevertheless, the first track diplomatic
system has the legitimacy and resources necessary for establishing the peacemaking process. At the same time, second track diplomacy has contributed
to conflict resolution and transformation as a complementary system that
takes advantage of resources and opportunities unavailable at the official
level. It can promote momentum for peace by engaging a broader spectrum
of civil society, as needed to translate any official agreement into a sustainable reality. In contrast to the power politics associated with official diplomacy and predominant in protracted violent conflicts, second track facilitators draw on integrative methods of conflict resolution, emphasizing the
joint responsibility of the stakeholders for approaching their problems in
a way that respects the interests, needs and values of all.4
In addition, the Seoul NGO Forum is intended to promote and implement
NGO networking among NGO experts, scholars, and activists of communitybased NGOs. In this regard, the concept of multi-track diplomacy was
discussed. In 1991, the idea of Track One and Track Two diplomacy was
expanded into nine tracks and was called a systems approach to peace.
Track III dealt with the Role of Business in conflict resolution; Track IV
dealt with Citizen Exchanges; Track V covered Education and Training in
conflict resolution; Track VI dealt with Peace Activism; Track VII covered
Religion; Track VIII involves Funding; Track IX covers Communication,
including Media. The eight tracks were put into a circle and the ninth track
became an inner circle which ties all the other tracks together. The basic
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), p. 2.

4
Ibid., p. 5.
introduction 15
philosophy of this concept, called a systems approach to peace is that

no one track, including Track I
(governments)
can successfully develop peace
by itself. This book became the foundation for the Institute for Multi-Track
Diplomacy in 1992 in Washington, D.C.5
The fundamental belief of this approach is that the only way to solve
a conflict is to sit down face to face and talk about it. It is worth noting
that a dozen universities in the United States offer a Masters or Ph.D degree
in conflict resolution, beginning in 1982. Unfortunately no university in
South Korea offers a full course on conflict resolution. One university in
China and two universities in Japan have developed curricula in conflict
resolution. It is hoped that the two conferences in Seoul and this book will
stimulate the establishment of courses and degrees in conflict resolution,
beginning to establish this discipline as a field in East Asia.6
To manage conflicts, it is logical to involve not only the international
organizations, but also regional and sub-regional organizations and networks
with strong links to local and community-based organizations. Such regional
players can have a significant role not only in early warning and early response but also in crisis management on the ground. It is therefore, important
to build partnerships than bring NGOs together with governmental, intergovernmental, sub-regional, and regional organizations. This is all the more
important in view of the fact that NGOs often have a better knowledge
and understanding of the regional political and cultural dynamics, greater
capacity to analyze local developments, and well-established links with con5
For more details, see the following work of John W. McDonald and Dr. Louise
Diamond, Multi-Track diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace (US. Institute
for Peace, 1991; West Hartford, Connecticut, Kumarian Press, Inc., Third Edition,
1996; also translated into Chinese and published by Beijing University, 2007).
See John W. McDonald and Noa Zanolli, The Shifting Grounds of Conflict and
Peacebuilding : Stories and Lessons (Lanham: Lexington Books, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2008).
tending local parties.7

Transnational NGO Networks are trying to live up to the universal values
and people-centered norms, being free from exclusive national interests and
authorities. They promote cooperation based on complementary interests and
objectives, especially when there is a scarcity of communication means while
facilitating the exchange of information and experience when the issues or
tasks at hand are complex.
While the end of the Cold War brought about drastic changes in other
regions of Asia in terms of receding threat perception and increased optimism
for peacebuilding prospects, Northeast Asia has remained in the conventional
confrontation and power posturing. The two Koreas still remain technically
at war, tensions are still alive between Mainland China and Taiwan. Also,
there are maritime territorial problems between China
(Taiwan)
and Japan,
between Japan and Russia, between Korea and China, between Korea and
Japan. This region does not have any multilateral security institutions, intergovernmental bodies, economic initiatives or other multilateral institutions.
The Northeast Asian region is economically the most rapidly developed area,
but there are many unfavorable factors which hinder regional cooperation
and peacebuilding at present. They can be listed such as existing border
disputes, island disputes, lingering historical animosities and a difference
in economic systems with weak inter-regional trade linkages.8
As a preliminary step toward regional cooperation, forming NGO networking and their operation will contribute to making a breakthrough. For
this purpose, the NGO Forum on Historical Reconciliation and Territorial
Issues has been conducted since 2007 with the participation of numerous
7 op. cit., p. 52.
8 Tobi P. Dress, Designing a Peacebuilding Infrastructure: Taking a Systems Approach
to the Prevention of Deadly Conflict (New York and Geneva: UN Non-Governmental

Liaison Service, 2005), p. 190.
introduction 17
scholars and practitioners, NGO leaders and experts from different parts of
the world. They discussed different cases of conflict resolution and territorial
issues and shared their experiences and their wisdom. This book is a collection of their presentations at the International NGO Forum on Territorial
Issues and Conflict Resolution.
This publication titled Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding : The Role
of NGOs in Historical Reconciliation and Territorial Issues contains nine
papers.
Ekaterina Stepanova, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), presented New Trends and Challenges in Modern Armed
Conflicts by which she is indicating that armed conflicts have undergone
significant changes in the last couple of decades. She analyzes the trends
of conflicts with statistics by comparing the Cold War era and the Post-Cold
War era. She shows the increase of bothnumber of conflicts and locations
since the beginning of the Post-Cold War era. Internal
(intra-state)
conflicts
outnumbered interstate conflicts by four times since the 1950s. In the past
decade, 95 percent of conflicts have not been fought between states, but
within states. Therefore, there is a tendency of increase of internally displaced persons since 1990. It means the necessity of our understanding of
security from national security centered on the security of the state to
a broader notion of human security centered on the security of people,
both individually and collectively. She emphasizes that the more our understanding of security integrates elements of human security, the greater is
the role it assigns to civil society, including at the global level, and in shaping
and promoting security through conflict resolution.
John W. McDonald, the co-founder and president of the Institute for
Multi-Track Diplomacy in 1992 in Washington, D.C., explains the necessity
of citizen diplomacy or Track Two diplomacy, considering the contemporary
international system based on the concept of national sovereignty and the
nation-state system. He also indicates the weak point of the United Nations
which cannot interfere with intra-state conflicts because of national
sovereignty. This vacuum can be filled by non-governmental organizations
with the participation of private citizens who can change the thinking of
governments through peaceful, focused and dedicated action. He introduced
his concept of citizen diplomacy, i.e., multi-track diplomacy as a systems
approach to peace. He and one of his colleagues came up with the idea
of the systemic nature of the nine tracks in the multi-track systems approach
to peace
(see page 3).
He presented some examples of success stories in the
context of multi-track diplomacy, using his multi-track approach with regard

to the Israeli-Palestinian water issues, the development of a Bill of Rights
for Northern Ireland and finally regarding the conflict in the country of
Georgia. Ambassador McDonald is emphasizing that multi-track diplomacy
can make the Impossible Possible.
Hasjim Djalal, a member of the Indonesian Maritime Council, presented
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea where multiple territorial claims to islands exist. The maritime disputes in this area were bilateral,
trilateral or even in some instances, multilateral in connection with natural
resources, strategic location, and maritime resources. China and Taiwan confront ASEAN countries including Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei
Darussalam in this dispute. There were armed conflicts between China and
Vietnam and still potential conflicts are very possible, so Dr. Djalal thought
that a sense of community in the South China Sea area should be
developed. For this cause, he initiated The South China Sea Informal
Working Group
(SCS-IWG)
in 1990 with its first meeting in Bali. The ap-
proach to this gathering started on an informal basis to encourage candid

and friendly discussions. Since then, the annual meeting has been conducted
until now with the improvement of its function and impact. In his paper,
he indicates some conditions for successful efforts for preventive diplomacy
introduction 19
and basic principles in managing potential conflicts.

Kamarulzaman Askandar, a coordinator of the Southeast Asian Conflict
Studies Network, presented his paper on the case of the Mindanao Conflicts
and Challenges for civil society. Mindanao
(Philippines)
is a good example
of intra-state conflict in a historical context. He illustrates the participation

of the civil society in peacebuilding activities that would support peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Mindanao. He emphasizes the historical
approaches to the resolution of the Mindanao conflicts with the consideration
of the role of its indigenous people, the Bangsamoros. It is significant that
over the years, various organizations, institutions, and groups have come
together and formed alliances and networks aimed towards strengthening
the peace advocacy and promoting the non-violence agenda in Mindanao.
Mahbub Hasan, Partnership Coordinator of Costal Development Partnership
in Bangladesh, discussed the water conflict case of Farakka Barrage
(dam)
on the Ganges between India and Bangladesh. India carried out the plan
of the establishment of Farakka Barrage on the Ganges in 1974 which causes
serious damage to more than 20 million farmers in Bangladesh. When the
water conflict could not be resolved between the two governments, NGOs/
civil society organizations in this region rose to be engaged in advocacy
activities through NGO networking. Mr. Hasan focused on voluntary commitment of citizen diplomacy with the participation of NGOs/CSOs from
Bangladesh, India, and Nepal toward the resolution of the Farakka Barrage
disputes.
Justice Mbuh, Professor, University of Yaound, Cameroon, in Africa,
presented his paper on sustainable peace and security over the Bakassi
Peninsula Dispute. The Bakassi Peninsula dispute has been understood by
many scholars as only a boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria,
ignited mostly over the resources of oil and gas, but Prof. Mbuh revealed
the complex historical background of the Bakassi Peninsula area which is
called Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons).
Ambazonia, still maintaining its unique
culture and identity, was manipulated by the Cameroon government, and

the Bakassi Peninsula was illegitimately merged in 1961 into Cameroon.
Justice Mbuh argues that the Bakassi Peninsula should be properly recognized by international society and it should return to Ambazonia for the
benefits of its indigenous people.
Victor Valle, Professor at the University for Peace in Costa Rica, presented An Educational Model for Peace Building and Conflict Prevention
by explaining the history, educational programs, and orientation of the UN
mandated University for Peace in Costa Rica.
Rebecca N. Mbuh, Professor of Sookmyung Womens University in
Seoul, spoke on Women and the Role of NGOs in Conflict Resolution
in Africa. She has done research on conflicts in Africa and the role of
women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. She focused on womens
contributions to the recovery of the genocide trauma in Rwanda. Her research
is a good example of a best practice through womens NGO networks.
Finally, Yu-An Rao, President of the Pacific Rim Institute for
Development & Education, shares his ideas by presenting the Three
Episodes in Developing a Harmonized World. He looks at the guiding
principle of each period by dividing the time period from the Second World
War to the 21 century into three categories. He relates the time from 1945
to 1990 to the motivation of nationalistic interests and power politics as
the first episode. Then, the second episode of world peace is structured by
mutual inter-dependent relationships from 1991 to 2008. Finally, he emphasizes the partnership between NGOs and the UN in leading to the third
episode of world peace with the development of a world conscience.
Please note that for several authors, English is not their mother tongue.
We tried to preserve their original writings as much as possible, with the
hope that the readers will generously understand this situation.
introduction 21
We believe this publication will serve as useful information and inspiration to promote and support citizen diplomacy and NGO networking so that
the efforts and goals of the NGO Forum on Territorial Issues and Conflict
Resolution will spread and be fulfilled in the near future.
Finally, we appreciate the encouragement of the Northeast Asian
Foundation of Korea for making this publication possible.

New Trends and Challenges

in Modern Armed Conflicts
Ekaterina Stepanova
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI))
While much of the Seoul International NGO Conference is on peace and

history, this paper will focus more on conflict and trends in armed conflicts
on a global scale at the present stage. However, any trends in contemporary
armed conflict can only be traced in the context, and against the background,
of a broader historical perspective.
Both armed conflicts and our understanding of them have undergone
significant changes in the last couple of decades
(the late 20 early 21 century).

th
st
This is also part of the broader process it is not only our understanding
of armed conflict, but also our basic understanding of security that is changing: from the more traditional militarized interpretation of national security
centred on the security of the state to a broader notion of human security
centred on the security of people, both individually and collectively.
Needless to say that the more our understanding of security integrates elements of human security, the greater is the role it assigns to the civil society,
including at the global level, in shaping and promoting security, including
through conflict resolution.
There are two broad approaches to the contemporary analysis of armed
conflict in the global context, as distinct from the study of individual or
region-specific conflicts. One approach is focused on collection and quantitative analysis of data
(represented by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme : UCDP),
New Trends and Challenges in Modern Armed Conflicts 25
Uppsala University
Center
(Canada)
(Sweden),
Maryland University
(USA),
Human Security
etc. Another approach prioritizes qualitative analysis from
theoretical and conceptual work1 to comparative empirical, field studies and

more contextual analysis. In theory, these two approaches are complementary and should supplement one another; in practice, data-oriented analysis and qualitative analysis are often disconnected and separated from one
another. What SIPRI tries to do in its Armed Conflict and Conflict
Management programme is to bridge the gap and combine both approaches.
The data-centered approach tries to explore the nature and trends in
armed conflicts by measuring their various parameters. The main problems
with this approach are: (a) a lot of data a little of analysis; (b) while
it generates a lot of data, much of the data are tailored to measure outdated
parameters and the types of conflicts that may no longer be prevalent or
even actual. At the same time, there are considerable gaps in data on the
more urgent trends in armed violence
(for instance, up until recently, only data on
state-based conflicts were collected, ignoring conflicts where state is not a party).
Still, for any analysis of armed conflicts that goes beyond any narrow
local or regional perspective or is not limited to any single theoretical angle,
i.e. for any analysis of conflicts on a global scale, some common ground
must be established. This common ground is most naturally provided by
data on armed conflicts that measures their main parameters across the globe.
The parameters must be basic enough to be applicable to most armed conflicts
around the world. In particular, if different global conflict datasets based
in different parts of the world and using different methodologies show similar
trends in armed conflicts, this is a good scientific indication of the genuine
nature of these trends.
1 See, for instance, Kaldor, M. New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global
Era, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007) and Global Civil Society: An
Answer to War (Polity Press, 2003).
The main trends in armed conflict since the early 1990s

To start, one needs a definition of an armed conflict. The UCDPthe
main provider of conflict data to SIPRIcome up with one of the
broadest modern definitions of armed conflict as contested incompatibility
concerning government or territory over which armed force is used between organized military forces of at least two parties resulting in at least
25 battle-related deaths. If at least one of these parties is the government
of the state, the conflict is state-based. If neither party is a government,
the conflict is referred to as non-state conflict. An armed conflict qualifies
as war if it results in at least 1000 battle-related deaths/year. Other conflicts are defined as minor conflicts.
In 60 years since the end of World War II until 2007, there have been
a total of 232 armed state-based conflicts active in 148 locations throughout
the world. While most conflicts were fought in less-developed regions of
the world
(see Fig. 1),
the worlds top 3 most war-prone countries since the
end of WWII, by the number of international conflicts that a country has

been involved in, have been the UK and France as the two largest remaining colonial empires, followed by the USA and USSR/Russia. In terms of
the total years in war, the absolute leader is Israel
Slightly more than half of these conflicts
(124)
(see Fig. 2).
in 80 locations were ac-
tive during the 17 years since the end of the Cold War: more armed conflicts have taken place since the end of the Cold War than over the previous post-WWII decades
(see Fig. 3).
However, the conflict potential was
unevenly distributed throughout the post-Cold War period: according to the

UCDP, the highest number of state-based armed conflicts was recorded in
early 1990s, with 52 conflicts active in both 1991 and 1992.
The first major trend in armed conflicts since the early 1990s until the
mid-2000s has been that of an uneven, but marked decline in state-based
conflicts
(down to the post-1989 low of just 29 state-based conflicts in 2003)
number of locations remains stable at its post-Cold War low of 23
and the
(see Fig.
4 and 5).
The second trend was the shift in the direction away from major wars.
There were only four armed conflicts in 2007 that reached the intensity of
war (the threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths): Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri-Lanka, and
Somalia. Even the conflicts in Lebanon

(August 2008)
(2006)
or South Ossetia/Georgia
did not qualify as wars, as they resulted in less than 1000 bat-
tle-related deaths. An intermediate category between UCDPs war and

minor conflict is the SIPRI category of a major armed conflict that: a)
involves the state as at least one of the parties; b) has at least once reached
the level of war
(1000 battle-related deaths);
c) continues to result in at least 25
such death in the following years. Normally, major armed conflicts comprise
about half of all state-based conflicts and about one fourth of all conflicts
(see Fig. 6).
As major armed conflict is a broader category than war, in
2007 there were 14 major armed conflicts, including all four major wars.
The third trend is the absence or a very limited number of inter-state
conflicts. In the post-World War II period more conflicts were always
fought within states, not between states
(but inter-state warson the Korean pen-
insula or between Iran and Iraqwere also some of the deadliest, each with over million
deaths).
But in the decade since 1998, only three conflicts were fought be-
tween states, in the strict sense: Eritrea-Ethiopia

(1997-2003),
(1998-2000),
and U.S. and allies against Saddams Iraq
over Kosovo that involved NATO intervention

that involved Russian intervention
(2008)
(1999)
(2003).
India-Pakistan
Even conflicts
and in South Ossetia
would not qualify as inter-state
conflicts in the strict senserather, they were internal conflicts with foreign intervention, or internationalized intra-state conflicts. Until 2008, for
the four years no inter-state conflict was recorded.
The related, fourth trend is rather a continuation of a longer-term developments, than a radically new one. In the past decade, 95 percent of conflicts have not been fought between states, but this is part of a much longer-term trend of a sharp, 12-fold increase in number of civil wars between
1946 and 1991. Much of this rise in the numbers of internal conflicts was
due to proliferation of anti- and post-colonial conflicts polarized by Cold
War ideological confrontation, but kept relatively low-scale. Todays
intra-state conflicts are hardly confined within certain states territory and
may
only involve internal actors
(governments and domestic non-state actors)they
be heavily internationalized
(an anti-government non-state actor may receive military
and other support from a foreign government, including military intervention i. e. by NATO
forces in Yugoslavia over Kosovo or by Russia in support of Abkhazia and South Ossetia),
spill over the border, may involve a government of one state and non-state
groups from another state
(sometimes supported by another state),
but they are not
fought between organized armed forces of two or more states and the original incompatibility is internal.
In sum, the vast majority of modern conflicts are low- to mid-intensity
intra-state conflicts that not always involve the state and maybe heavily
internationalized. Much less frequent are asymmetrical state-based conflicts
(between high-tech forces and conventionally incomparably weaker state and non-state actorsUS-led coalition vs. the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 or vs. Saddam Husseins regime
in Iraq in 2003).
These two type of conflict are often interconnected or follow
one another.
The fifth trend is the growing shift of the central focus from the state
as the main actor in armed conflicts towards armed actors other than state.
According to UCDP, non-state conflicts
(where state is not a party)
are not only
as widespread as state-based conflicts, but outnumber them in proportion

of 2:1
(see Fig. 6).
Up to 80 percent of conflicts between non-state actors
take place in Africa. Also, such conflicts occur or even tend to be con-
centrated in the same countries or locations that are also areas of statebased conflicts
(such as Darfur/Sudan).
The good news is that conflicts between
non-state groups involve fewer battles and are usually less deadly in terms
of battle-related deaths. Also, they tend to last shorter than conflicts with
the participation of the state, especially some protracted insurgencies against
the state. The bad news is that violence by non-state actors seems to target
civilians more than armed actors and more civilians are killed one-sidedly
these days by non-state actors than by governments.
The sixth trend reveals that the change in armed conflict patterns
from major battle-oriented wars to civil wars and asymmetrical conflicts)
(away
is also paired
with and reflected in the changing casualty patterns. Today, the overall
proportion of civilian fatalities from collective armed violence, including
both civilians killed as a result of fighting between the combatants and civilians targeted directly by armed actors is higher than military fatalities.
The fifth trend is that much of contemporary armed political violence
goes beyond armed conflict as such
armed parties).
(as a contested incompatibility between two
At least as common as armed conflicts is intentional and direct
one-sided violence against civilians. While 99 percent of such violence by

an armed actor against civilians takes place in the course and in the context
of an armed conflict, it is not a conflict itself, as civilian victims cannot
fight back and defend themselves with arms.
The sixth trend points to the new types of armed conflict emerging: e. g.
between a state and a non-state actor based and originating in another state,
such as the conflict between Israel and the Lebanese Shia movement
Hizbullah. This may revive the category of an extra-state conflict
(reminiscent
of the term extra-systemic conflict that used to be applied to anti-colonial movements).
On
a global scale, the modern version of an extra-systemic conflict would be

the conflict between Al Qaeda vs. the United States and its allies. The latter
conflict also shows that armed conflicts are no longer tied to a particular
location
(confrontation between the USA and al-Qaeda is waged globally).
Finally, new types of incompatibility over which a conflict may be

fought emerge, distinct from the traditional categories of either government
(governmental power within the state, the nature of political regime etc.)
fight for autonomy or independence).
or territory
(the
Of the more intensive major armed conflicts,
more were fought over government in the past decade. However, more
state-based conflicts are fought over territory.
This brief list of the main trends in todays armed conflicts is hardly
complete or exhaustive. It could, for instance, be supplemented by the rise
of some forms of violence that used to be relatively marginal on a global
scale
(such as terrorism).2
Other important trends include conflicting influences
of (a) the growing fragmentation of armed violence in the context of many

conflicts, the multiplication and diversification of armed actors, from rebels
and government-aligned non-state groups to sub-clan militias, criminal
gangs and local power-brokers and (b) in an era of globalization, the growing transnationalization of violence which easily spills over state borders.3
Old challenges
It is also useful to break-up the broad trends listed above. Such trends
and developments are commonly viewed as either positive, or negative,
or unchanged. However, it may be more accurate to view them as old and
2 For more detail, see Stepanova, E. Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological
and Structural Aspects, SIPRI Research Report no. 23 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008).
3 For more detail on fragmentation of violence, see Stepanova, E., Trends in Armed
Conflicts, in SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International

Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), chapter 2, pp. 44-71.
<http://www.sipri.org/contents/conflict/YB08chapter2.pdf/download>
new challenges regarding modern armed conflicts.

Even from this brief overview, it is clear that many old challenges
associated with armed conflicts have either been overcome, or there has
been some progress in addressing them, or they have eroded on their own.
The most positive trend of all has been that the declining magnitude of
armed conflicts if judged by:
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the only ones for
which data is available for several decades. Overall, there had been
a 40 percent decrease in the numbers of such conflicts since the early
1990s. A particularly sharp decrease can be traced in the number of
major wars which is lower than ever in the post - WWII period, except
for a few years in 1950s. A sustained decline in the number of intra-state conflicts since the early 1990s, including armed self-determination conflicts, is also notable, particularly as compared to the sharp
rise of such conflicts in 1946-1991.
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across the last 20 years
(but also steadily
declining annual totals for battle deaths since the end of World War II)
see Fig.
7 and 8. Much of this decline is due to shift in modes of warfare:

from conventional wars fought with the help of one of the superpowers,
or both to internal conflicts between weak or semi-functional government forces confronting rebel forces, often with participation of foreign
forces and government-affiliated non-state actors and frequently mired
in a myriad of locally-based mini-conflicts between all sorts of actors
not necessarily related to the main incompatibility. In such conflicts,
hit-and-run attacks, lower-scale clashes and skirmishes, as well as
one-sided attacks against civilians, are more common than traditional
major battles between combatants.
t
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, both
at the political and institutional level and in practical management of

conflicts and post-conflict peace-building. Much of this was made possible by the growing operationalisation of the UN in the post-Cold
War period, the rise of other regional and international institutions and
their strengthened capacity to address armed conflicts. A good example is provided by the data on the continuing growth of UN peace
operations, with 61 peace operations in 2007 the highest level since
1999 involving 170,000 personnel
(see Fig. 9).
New challenges
If, however, one turns to the qualitative research
grasping change)
(which is better tailored for
and some new datasets, the overall picture will be much
less rosy. Both have begun to trace the rise of new forms of warfare and
violence and the diversification and proliferation of armed actors
(large-scale
predatory gangs, government-affiliated and autonomous clan militias, transnational violent religious networks).
Violent conflicts in which these groups are engaged cannot
be grasped by parameters of traditional state-based conflicts and are not

easy to measure or categorize. While some of the old challenges associated with armed conflicts have been overcome, new challenges constantly emerge. Of these new challenges, the following are the most
important.
First, there are clear limits and potential reversals to the downward trend
in numbers of conflicts that began at the dawn of the post-Cold War era.
By the mid-2000s, the downward trend in all type of conflict has stopped
and the conflict numbers have stabilized. Also, the long-run trend in the
number of states engaged in armed conflicts, either their own or multilateral wars, is up. A larger portion of the global community of states is
now involved than in any other time in the past 6 decades. It also point
at growing internationalization of conflicts
(see Fig. 10).
Furthermore, new
armed conflicts have been erupting at roughly the same pace for the past
60 year. Most recently, there has been an unusually large number of new
or revived conflicts since the mid-2000s, especially from the failure of past
peace processes
(Sri Lanka, Myanmar, India, South Caucasus).
Among other things, this means that the downward trend in conflict is
not the result of effective prevention of new conflicts (despite the six-fold
increase in the UN preventive diplomacy missions
(1990-2002).
Rather, the
decline in armed conflicts between early 1990s and mid-2000s resulted

from resolution of some of the older conflicts. In other words, there has
been a major failure in conflict prevention: efforts to prevent the outbreak
of conflict lag behind efforts to resolve existing ones. This major failure
in conflict prevention by states and formal international institutions points
to a major area for expansion of the civil society activity.
Second, changes in intensity of conflicts are more ambiguous than it
may seem on the surface. On the one hand, battle-related fatalities from
armed conflict are going down. On the other hand, this trend is driven entirely by the impact of five particularly lethal conflict the Chinese civil
war, 1946-49; the Korean war, 1950-53, the Vietnam war, 1955-75, the
Afghan civil war, 1978-2002, and the Iran-Iraq war, 1980-88. However,
these five major wars represent only two percent of all conflicts since 1946.
In the other 98 percent of conflicts, there is no discernible upward or downward trend in intensity, i. e. neither major escalation, nor significant
de-escalation. In sum, it is not that armed violence has become less frequent
it is just that the type of conflict that resulted in highest battle-related
deaths major wars is becoming increasingly marginal
(see Fig. 11).
Third, while there has been a sharp increase in international conflict

management and peace operations since the early 1990s, there are also
clear limits to peaceful settlement of conflicts. The rosy conclusions about

the overall decrease of armed conflict and violence in the world over the
post-Cold War years is not fully supported by the record of peace processe
outcome and sustainability. Since the end of the Cold War
(1989),
accords between warring parties have covered only 40%
(51)
armed conflicts active since 1989
(see Fig. 12).
over 145
of the 124
Two thirds of peace agree-
ments in 1989-2005 were signed in conflicts over government, while most

conflicts were fought over territory, indicating that territorial conflicts are
generally harder to resolve peacefully. Many peace settlements are not sustainable; a good half of them have failed and 40 percent of post-conflict
countries relapse into the fighting again. In other words, much of the recent
decline in armed conflicts occurred due to suppression or containment,
rather than resolution, let alone prevention.
Fourth, violence against civilians and human cost of conflict have not
been in decline. In particular, since the early 1990s, the average lethality
of war may have decreased for combatants and civilians caught-up in
cross-fire, but not for civilians targeted one-sidedly by armed actors. While
previous global studies have all focused on mass killings or genocide, the
more recent UCDP dataset counts campaigns of one-sided violence, starting
from the slaughter of at least 25 civilians over a year, for a period since
1989. These data show 2 distinct trends: while relatively few major, identifiable actors
(spikes)
(such as the Rwandan government or al-Qaeda)
of mass killings
engage in short periods
(the single biggest campaign was the 1994 mass killings of
Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda when over 500,000 people were killed),
a much
larger number and range of actors undertake a fairly constant level of

low-intensity violence against civilians. It is this latter pattern all parties
to an armed conflict and all other armed actors in a conflict area undertaking routine, daily attacks against, and other abuses of, civilians, that
is the dominant pattern today
(see Fig. 13).
Fifth, forms of violence that are not in decline or those that are even
on the rise
(terrorism, sectarianism, inter-communal warfare)
are far less lethal than
major wars, but are primarily directed against civilians.

global dynamics of terrorism).
(see Fig. 15 for the
Similarly, there is little or no decrease in hu-
man rights abuse.

Sixth, there are many discouraging trends in displacement of civilians
as a result of armed violence. While the number of refugees has slightly
declined earlier this decade, it has increased in 2006 for the first time since
2002. The number of internally displaced persons
(IDPs)
remained relatively
stable over the last years, but increased over the last couple of years.
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, by 2007 there
were 24.5 mln IDPs around the world, mostly in conflict-affected countries
Sudan, Colombia, Iraq, Uganda and DRC, with 15.6 mln exposed to se-
rious threat to their physical safety. The new development is that refugee/IDP flows are no longer side-effects, but central goals of violence. In
many cases, violent deaths may be avoided by displacement, but in the longer term, if not addressed, todays displacement will breed tomorrows violence as it has been the case with the 4.8 mln Palestinian refugees today
(see Fig. 16).
Finally, as noted above, the recent data show that non-state conflicts
(that are not initiated by the state and not involving the state)
are more numerous than
state-based conflicts. It is even more disturbing that violence by non-state

actors ranging from rebels to government-affiliated militias to autonomous local power-brokers is increasingly, and mainly, directed against civilians more than against other combatants. In 1999-2004, in five years
out of six more civilians have died from violence by non-state actors today
than from government violence
(see Fig. 14).
In territorial conflicts, rebels kill
almost six times more civilians than governments. Various forms of

non-state violence, including one-sided violence against civilians, are well
represented, integrated and widespread in areas of major state-based armed

conflicts and account for a good deal of the ongoing violence in these
areas.
***
Clearly, such important changes in armed conflicts and armed violence
in general should have considerable implications for the role of civil society at the local, national and transnational level. In both globalizing and
increasingly identity conscious world, the very notion of civil society can
no longer be limited to one specific Western culture. The term should
be interpreted more broadly, including social networks, groups and mechanisms that may not exactly fit a model Western NGO, but perform many
of humanitarian, social, mediation, reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction tasks
(such as Islamic networks in the Muslim world).
The fact that most conflicts today are internal, but often cross-border;
that the state is not necessarily the central actor and non-state conflicts outnumber state-based ones; the phenomenon of failed, absent or persistently
failing states; the combination of localization/fragmentation and transnationalization of violence; and, above all, the fact that most victims from
all forms of armed violence today are not combatants, but civilians all
these elements come together to form a reality in which the urgent need
for a qualitative upgrade and expansion of the role of civil society is
self-evident. It is not the state or the military, but civilians that are the
greatest and most direct victims of todays armed conflicts and other forms
of armed violence. The civil society groups which are the most direct representatives of the civilian population can no longer be seen as an
auxiliary, additional extra in dealing with armed violence they should
and will increasingly assume the role among the key stakeholders in
addressing the challenges posed by modern armed conflicts and in building

peace after conflict.
Fig. 1_Armed conflicts by region, 1946-2007 (UCDP data)
Fig. 2_States' involvement in international conflicts, 1946-2003 (PRIO data)
Fig. 3_State-based conflicts and conflict locations during and after the Cold War, 1946-2003
(PRIO data)
Fig. 4_Armed conflicts by type, 1946-2007 (UCDP data)
Fig. 5_Armed conflicts by type, 1945-2005 (CIDCM data)
Fig. 6_State-based conflicts (incl. major conflicts) and non-state conflicts, 2002-2006 (SIPRI/
UCDP data)
Fig. 7_Battle-related deaths in armed conflicts, 1946-2002 (dataset by B.Lacina and

N.P.Gleditsch)
Fig. 8_Battle death totals, 1946-2005 (CIDCM data)
Fig. 9_UN peacekeeping operations, 1948-2004 (FBA/UCDP data)
Fig. 10_Percentage of countries involved in conflict, 1946-2005 (CIDCM data)
Fig. 11_Battle deaths in conflicts short of major wars, 1946-2005 (CIDCM data)
Fig. 12_Peace agreements in armed conflicts, 1989 - 2007 (UCDP)
Fig. 13_Annual fatalities of one-sided violence, 1989-2004 (UCDP data)
Fig. 14_Annual fatalities of one-sided violence by actor, 1989-2004 (UCDP data)
Fig. 15_Terrorist incidents, fatalities and injuries,1998-2006 (MIPT data)
Fig. 16_Terrorist incidents worldwide and in Iraq, 2001-2006 (based on MIPT data)
Fig. 17_Terrorism fatalities worldwide and in Iraq, 2001-2006 (based on MIPT data)
Fig. 18_Internally displaced persons and refugees, 1990 - 2006

Conflict Transformation and Historical Reconciliation

Through Multi-Track Diplomacy
John W. McDonald (Institute
for Multi-Track Diplomacy : IMTD)
I thank the Organizers of the 2008 International Conference of History-related

NGOs to invite me to Seoul.
Before talking about the important role of non-governmental organizations and multi-track diplomacy, I would like to share three of my theories
about the state of the world today.
I call my first theory my Empire Theory.
If you go back to the beginning of the 20th century, you will find that
the world was dominated by ten great empires. These empires ruled by fear
and by force, and they kept the lid on conflicts within their empires.
Today, those ten empires have disappeared and there is no authority in
the world to suppress emerging conflicts.
At the end of World War I, the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed, the
German Empire disappeared, and the Ottoman Empire, which had been
around for five hundred years, disintegrated. At the end of World War II,
the Japanese Empire crumbled. During the next 20 to 25 years, the British,
French, Dutch, Belgian and Portuguese empires collapsed.
The last of the ten, the Soviet Empire, disappeared in three months in
1991.
In 1945, 51 nations signed the UN Charter. Every nation in the world,
except Switzerland, which joined the UN only a few years ago, became
Conflict Transformation and Historical Reconciliation Through Multi-Track Diplomacy 49
members of the United Nations. Today, there are 193 members in the UN.
Where do all these new nations come from? They came from the collapsed
empires. This means that more two thirds of the nations in the world today
are less than 45 years old. Many are still trying to find their path to this
day, and many are having trouble doing so.
My second theory has to do with ethnic conflict and its definition.
In 1989, two of my colleagues and I were invited to Moscow by the
Soviet Academy of Sciences to talk about conflict resolution. During our
visit we met with five members of the recently elected Soviet Parliament,
who had been democratically elected for the first time in 70 years. They
were curious about the concept of conflict resolution, unknown to them.
For decades, the Soviet Empire used firing squads, deportation to Siberia,
and labor camps, to resolve their problems.
Within in the first few minutes of our meeting, I was asked how to
solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I
said that I had no quick fix that would help them and suggested that they
call on the OSCE
(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe),
of which
they were a member, to help them on this issue.

I then said that I estimated that there were 70 ethnic conflicts below
the surface of their empire for which they were responsible because they
had denied the existence of three non-negotiable issues.
The first non-negotiable issue had to do with Language. They required
by law that all the citizens in their Empire speak only Russian. I urged
the Parliamentary leaders to change the law because their diverse peoples
want to speak their own language.
My second non-negotiable issue has to do with Religion. Few people
realize today that the Soviet Empire was an atheist Empire for 70 years.
No religion of any kind was allowed to be practiced by the people. I said
that throughout history people have fought for the right to practice their
religion and I urged the Parliamentarians to change those laws.

My third non-negotiable issue has to do with culture. I said that they
tried to destroy the culture of these 70 ethnic groups by denying them their
birth and marriage and death ceremonies, the food they eat, the clothes they
wear, their art, their dance, their music, and their literature. They in fact
had denied the ethnicity of these groups who are striving to maintain their
cultural identity.
There is no doubt in my mind that, when one denies these three non-negotiable issueslanguage, religion and cultureone is one hundred percent
guaranteed to have violence, and a long-term deep hatred will develop.
I told them that they, as elected members of Parliament, can change
the situation by the stroke of the pen. These were all man-made laws by
the Soviet government and they were now personally in a position to bring
about change.
The fall of the Soviet Empire in 1991 led to changes, but the scars created over so many decades are still there and require long-term efforts in
conflict resolution.
My third theory has to do with the state of the world today, in 2008.
The Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Year War
(1618-1648)
in Europe, defined the concept of national sovereignty and the nation-state

system. Today, the Charter of the United Nations, created in 1945, is based
on national sovereignty. This means among other things that the nationstate is supreme and its leaders can deny any person or group from entering
their nation. The problem with solving conflict in todays world is that all
conflict is intra-state, that is, within national boundaries. However, Chapter
VII of the UN Charter is designed to take effect only when one nation-state
invades another nation-state. In other words, the Charter only deals with
inter-state conflict.
We are, as a world, not designed today to cope with intra-state conflict
when the leadership of that country denies access to those nations and the
United Nations who want to be of assistance in reducing conflict within
national boundaries.
The most dramatic example in the world today is Sudan. The Sudanese
government has encouraged genocide in the province of Darfur for the last
four years, with hundreds of thousands of people killed. The head of state
of Sudan has prevented the United Nations from sending in a peacekeeping
force, quoting the right of national sovereignty.
This leaves a vacuum with regard to dealing with the 40 ethnic conflicts that are taking place today across the world. Thanks to the rise of
non-governmental organizations in many countries, this vacuum is being
partially filled. Small non-governmental organizations like my Institute for
Multi-Track Diplomacy are trying to assist the peoples in these internal
conflicts, to find a path towards peace.
I spent 40 years of my career as a U.S. diplomat and the last 20 years
I managed two small non-governmental organizations interested in conflict
resolution and peacebuilding.
While still a U.S. diplomat I became intrigued by the role that private
citizens can play in the field of foreign affairs with regard to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. As a result of this interest I wrote the first book
on that subject in 1985, Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, and
demonstrated that private citizens can change the thinking of governments
through peaceful, focused and dedicated action.
We call the work of Governments Track One diplomacy, and refer
to citizen action as Track Two diplomacy. Track One is always guided
by written instructions when it negotiates with other countries and is always cautious, formal, not flexible or risk-taking.
Track Two, on the other hand, allows much more freedom of thought
and action, is informal, flexible, risk-taking and innovative. Track Two does
things that governments do not want to do or are afraid to do, or do not

know how to do.
In 1989, I wrote a chapter in a book expanding the two tracks to five
Tracks and then, in 1991, with my colleague Dr. Louise Diamond we wrote
a book called Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace.
Last year this book was translated into Chinese by Beijing University
Press.
Let us take a look together at what Multi-Track diplomacy is and does
beyond the first two tracks. Track Three is the role of business in conflict
resolution. Business can be a powerful change agent and actor in reducing
conflict, once the people from the business community understand and
agree to the process.
Track Four involves people exchanges between cultures. I come to your
culture and learn about your culture and then I take those ideas and skills
back to the United States and across the world.
Track Five is education and training, which is what our Institute for
Multi-Track Diplomacy does since we were established in 1992 in
Washington, D.C.
Track Six is Peace Activism or People Power where we have shown
that large numbers of private citizens can peacefully change systems and
governments, such as the 1998 transformation of Indonesia from a dictatorship to a democracy.
Track Seven is Religion, an important element of conflict resolution and
it is bringing religious leaders together to understand each other and build
peace together.
Track Eight is Funding, which is always difficult to obtain because this
concept of multi-track diplomacy and its effectiveness are not yet widely
understood across the world.
Track Nine in our Logo is the Inner Circle which is about Communications,
including the Media. This is the heart of the multi-track system, because
to build peace that lasts, all tracks have to work together.
IMTD's Logo illustrates the systemic nature of the nine tracks

in the multi-track systems approach to peace.
Track One: Government

Track Eight:
Funding
Track Two:
NGOs and Professionals
Track Seven:
Religinon & Culture
Track Three:
Business & Trade
Track Six: Peace

Activism &
Advocacy
Track Four:
Private Citizens
Track Five: Research,
Training and Education
Track Nine: Communications (Inner Circle)
I know from my experience that no single track, including Track One, can
build a peace process by itself. Unfortunately most governments today do
not realize that yet.
The basic concept I am talking about is a system of nine tracks that
must work together over time to resolve individual conflicts around the
world.
Since 1992, we have operated in Cyprus, Israel/Palestine, BosniaHerzegovina, the following African countries: Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zimbabwe,
Tanzania, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda, Congo, Nigeria and
Equatorial Guinea. In the Indian subcontinent we have worked with the
Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in Exile, with divided Kashmir
on both sides, in the divided Provinces of Punjab, in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and
Georgia in the Caucasus. We also worked in Taiwan and in Cuba. In every
case we have applied the principles of multi-track diplomacy and helped
to bring about a conflict transformation.
How do we work? We only go where we are invited to come by the
people in the conflict. We are not invited by governments, but we are invited by people who are hurting, often traumatized, and who want help.
When we decide to take on a project, we raise the money and go and
listen. Unfortunately Track One is not a good listener. It is essential for
Track Two to listen. We ask people what their needs are and how we can
help them. We tell them we do not have any money but we do have some
useful skills and we want to help.
Whenever we take on a project, we make a minimum of a five year
commitment to that project. We do not fly in for a weekend or a month.
We worked eight years in Cyprus and 11 years in Kashmir, because people
wanted our help.
We usually contact Track One to let them know that we are in their
country and to invite them to participate in our conflict resolution training
sessions. They rarely take advantage of this opportunity to learn about multi-track diplomacy and conflict resolution. But they have never prevented
us from doing our work.
We are totally transparent and neutral. Our goal is to bring people together from both sides of the conflict, and build understanding. We provide
skills that are only truly successful when we touch the heart. When the
participants realize that the enemy, across the room, has the same hopes
and fears and aspirations, we can go on to the process of healing, forgiveness and reconciliation. We begin to design together a more peaceful future.
Where ever we go, trauma and fear of the other side is present. And we
have to recognize that and work with skill and lots of patience together
on forgiveness and reconciliation. That is never easy but can be achieved.
Let me give you a few examples of our work. In 1985, the governments
of Great Britain and Ireland signed an international treaty which among
other things stated that the two governments would develop a Bill of
Rights for Northern Ireland. I was fascinated by this Track One idea and
in 1989, after my retirement from the U.S. Government, and now being
President of an NGO in Iowa, I called on the British Foreign Office to
find out what they had done about this great idea of a Bill of Rights for
Northern Ireland. I learned that they had done nothing and did not plan
to do anything. They only put the idea forward as a public relations ploy.
I decided to take on this project and do the staff work for Track One
on this subject, with the hope they would accept our work.
We convened a small group of experts from Northern Ireland and the
United States and agreed that two Irish men, one Catholic and one
Protestant, would draft a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Then the Iowa
Peace Institute would take that draft and convene political leaders from
Northern Ireland and other international experts to review the document to
give it greater credibility.
We held a conference in Des Moines, Iowa, in December 1991, funded
by the Iowa business community, Track Three. Eight Irish men, including
five political leaders, and seven international experts approved, after one
week of discussions, this draft document. A year later, in London, Track
One, Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland, held a conference on Northern
Ireland. Track One created an ad hoc committee on the Bill of Rights for
Northern Ireland and the only document on the table was the one developed in Des Moines, Iowa. Three of the five political leaders who were
present in Iowa, were members of the ad hoc committee. At the end of
the conference, both governments, Britain and Ireland, announced to the
world that they approved the Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, and it
is mentioned four times in the April 1998 Final Agreement.
This is a key example of how a small NGO can take one piece of a
larger conflict and focus Track Ones attention on it and get it adopted by
Track One.
My second example has to do with the problems the world is facing
today with regard to drinking water and sanitation issues. I want to focus
particularly on the current water situation in Israel and Palestine and show
how an NGO can take a piece of this larger conflict and again try to do
the staff work for Track One.
In November of 2007, President Bush convened forty Track One governments in Annapolis, Maryland, to focus on the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. One of the key issues that not resolved at the Annapolis meeting
was the question of the fair and equitable distribution of water between
Israel and Palestine.
A Quaker Group
(also called the Society of Friends)
in Annapolis, Maryland,
decided that it would offer its help to Israeli and Palestinian water experts
to focus on their precarious and difficult water situation. The Group spent
a great deal of time and effort on raising money and organizing a Dialogue
between Track Two water experts from both sides. They asked me to be
the Mediator to facilitate the interaction between the participants of the two
groups. In august 2008, this Quaker Group organized, under the leadership
of a Quaker member, who is a Judge in the Maryland Court system, a
meeting which took place in a safe, neutral conference center in Maryland.
They brought together five Israeli water experts and five Palestinian water
experts. In addition, there were four U.S. water experts, all private citizens.
One had been the Water Commissioner for seven years on the US-Mexican
border, the other was a practicing lawyer on water related issues, the third
was a professor of International Water Law, and the fourth a professor of
Economics involved in water issues.

We met four days and nights and at the end of our time together, developed a ten page document, 98 percent of which was approved by the entire
group. At the end of our meeting, the Israelis and Palestinians have delegated two persons from each side to meet together again in Jerusalem to
agree on the remaining differences.
This is the first time for the two parties, which had met several times
before, that an agreement on water issues has emerged. The next step is
for this document to be presented informally to Track One, to be included
in a future Final Peace Settlement between Israel and Palestine.
My third example has to do with the country of Georgia in the South
Caucasus. You have all read about the Russian invasion in 2008 of the
Georgian province of South Ossetia, which surprised the world. How can
a small NGO in Washington, D.C. help with regard to this critical conflict?
My first visit to Georgia was in 2001 where I was invited to speak
about a pipeline that was going to be built to bring oil and gas from Baku,
Azerbaijan through Georgia and exiting through Southern Turkey into the
Mediterranean, bypassing the Black Sea and Russia. During my several visits I became friends with the Minister of Petroleum and was able to help
him solve some environmental conflicts related to the pipeline.
During one of my visits a friend of the Minister of Petroleum briefed
me about Georgias problems with the Provinces of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. The more I listened to his ideas for the future, the unhappier I
became. I finally suggested that what was needed was a Peace Zone for
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
A Peace Zone is first of all a demilitarized zone with no weapons
or soldiers. But it also goes far beyond that because the goal is to bring
individuals and communities together to meet and work with the other side
and gradually build trust relationships, so that the economy can be revived,
business can develop, and there can be a free interchange of peoples

throughout the region.
The Minister had never heard about this idea and thought it was
outstanding. With his help, I met with other Georgian Cabinet officials and
finally had my idea approved by the then president of Georgia, Mr.
Shevardnadze. In September 2003 I invited the Deputy Chairman of the
Georgian Parliament to Washington, D.C., to talk with Senior Officials in
Washington about a Peace Zone for these two provinces. Washington officials were enthusiastic about this idea.
In November 2003, after a massively flawed election, Mr. Shevardnadze
was ousted, peacefully, in the Rose Revolution by the people of Georgia.
On 4 January, 2004, a new president was elected. Georgia began to build
a democratic society.
My Institute tried again with the new administration to push the idea
of a Peace Zone for the two Provinces. We were not successful. In July
of 2008 we reactivated the Peace Zone idea with key members of the
U.S. State Department and the Georgian Foreign Ministry. A few weeks
thereafter the invasion by Russia occurred.
We have yet again reactivated the concept. I met two weeks ago with
four journalists from Georgia and Abkhazia
(part of our Track Nine)
and they
were enthusiastic about the idea. My most recent information from Georgia
and the State Department is that support for this idea is increasing.
My hope is that in the months ahead funding is being made available
by the U.S. Government so that we might be able to start a Dialogue with
various Track One entities to make this idea a reality and transform the
conflict zone into a peace zone.
Before closing, let me say a few words about the importance of Dialogue.
At my Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy we are bringing for example
together, in regular intervals, graduate students from several universities in
the Washington, D.C. area, to share information about their home countries.
It is amazing how quickly these young people in a Taiwan-China dialogue,
in a Korea-Japan dialogue, in a Japan-China dialogue, or Korea-China dialogue, change their prejudices and views about each other and how they
deal with their history, when they talk to each other about it. They always
wait eagerly for the dialogues to continue.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that, based on my experience,
NGOs everywhere can bring about a positive change for a more peaceful
environment by applying the concept of multi-track diplomacy to any conflict, including the issues that beg for a solution in North East Asia to create
a more peaceful world. Multi-Track Diplomacy can make the Impossible
Possible.
I strongly believe that the only way to solve a conflict, at any level
of society, is to sit down face to face to talk about it.

Managing Potential Conflicts

in the South China Sea
Hasjim Djalal (Indonesian
Maritime Council)
Background
The long road towards peace and cooperation in the South China Sea
(SCS)
started back in the late 1980s. This was after several decades of
disputes and confrontation that began soon after the end of the Second
World War when countries around the SCS first started making claims to
sovereignty over features within the sea. In the late 1980s and before the
conclusion of the Cambodian war through the Peace Agreement in Paris
in 1991, I recognized that prospects for peace and cooperation may finally
have come to Southeast Asia, although there were still potential for worrying developments and conflicts in the SCS.
The countries around the SCS have a long history of confrontation and
very little experience of cooperation. Armed clashes between China and
Vietnam have occurred primarily in 1974 with the latest in 1988. Multiple
territorial claims to islands existed, as well as claims to national maritime
zones of jurisdiction, particularly in and around the Spratly islands group.
The island disputes were bilateral, trilateral or even in some instances,
multilateral. The rapid economic development of the countries around the
SCS, particularly China, led to a scramble for the natural resources of the
SCS, both living and non-living.
Strategic issues were also at stake. The strategic significance of the SCS
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea 63
to non-littoral countries could not be ignored. The sea-lines of communications through the area are significant both for the region and for world
trade and the global economy. Consideration needed also to be given to
increasing problems of pollution and the safety of navigation as well as
to the protection of the marine environment and fragile marine ecosystems.
Then there were the political factors that inhibited the process of
cooperation. The SCS is surrounded by countries that are vastly different
from one another, in land size, population, per capita income, employment
in fisheries, fish catch and consumption of fish per capita. Political systems
also markedly varied from the communist/ socialist countries of the northern littoral, namely China and Vietnam, to the non-communist southern and
eastern insular countries
Darussalam).
(Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei
There was also the complicating factor of Taiwan/Chinese
Taipei as a claimant. An important geographical fact is that the insular

countries control maritime approaches to and from the coasts of the mainland SCS countries.
The Interests of Major Powers

The SCS is one of the most strategic waterways in the world. The approaches to the SCS, especially the Straits of Malacca-Singapore,
Sunda-Karimata, Balabac, Mindoro, Bashi and Taiwan Straits are located
in non-communist countries. These approaches are important for the passage of military and commercial vessels, including and especially oil
tankers. The Soviet Union, and now the Russian Federation, placed great
importance on the right of transit passage through the Malacca and
Singapore Straits, as well as through the surrounding waters in the SCS
area, primarily because these passages were important for communication
between western and eastern Russia through the warm waters of the South
Seas.
For Japan, the SCS and its approaches, especially the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore, are extremely important since more than 80 percent of its
oil imports are transported through these waterways. These waterways are
also extremely important to Japanese trade with Southeast Asia, South
Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Japanese interest in the preservation of peace and cooperation in the SCS may increase as the result of
its new orientation and increasingly intensive economic, trade and investment relations with ASEAN, South Asian and Middle-eastern counties.
The United States has always been interested in the area because it offers the shortest route from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, and because
it is essential for the movement of United States fleets, both for its own
global strategy or for defending its allies in the region. The U.S. also has
large trade, economic and investment relations with the countries around
the SCS. In May 1995, the U.S. Department of State announced the U.S.
policies on the South China Sea which basically were as follows:
a. The U.S. urges peaceful settlement of the issue by the states involved
in a manner that enhances regional peace, prosperity and security;
b. The U.S. strongly opposes the threat or use of military force to assert
any nations claim in the South China Sea, and would view any such
use as a serious matter;
c. The U.S. takes no position on the legal merits of competing sovereignty claim and is willing to help in the peaceful resolution of the
competing claim if requested by the parties;
d. The U.S. has a strategic interest in maintaining maritime line of communication in the region and considers it essential to resist any maritime claim beyond those permitted by UNCLOS;
e. The U.S. strongly supports multilateral security dialogue and, in particular, Indonesias on-going effort to develop a peaceful solution to
the South China Sea disputes, and urges all involved to work diligently within the framework provided by Indonesia.1
Conflicting Territorial and Jurisdictional Claims

Both China and Vietnam claim territorial sovereignty over the Paracel
group of islands situated south-east of Hainan. It was occupied by the
former regime of South Vietnam until China took it by force in 1974.
Vietnam still maintains a claim over islands in spite of its occupation by
China. Both China and Vietnam rely on historical records to support their
respective territorial claims to the Paracels. Except for its possible impact
on the situation in the SCS as a whole, the Paracels are generally regarded
as a bilateral matter between China and Vietnam.
The Spratly islands are the main source of territorial dispute. Some of
the islands, rocks, and reefs in the group are presently occupied by Vietnam
(22), the Philippines (11), China (14), Malaysia (10), and Taiwan (1).
Brunei Darussalam claims certain portions of the nearby sea as its EEZ
or Continental Shelf but does not occupy any feature.
China claims the South China Sea islands for historical reasons. It has
also based its claim on a map produced in 1947 by the Republic of China,
indicating nine undefined, discontinued and dashed lines. This claim was
renewed in 1958 in which China proclaimed a 12 nautical miles territorial
sea and declared that no foreign vessels for military use and no foreign
aircraft may enter Chinas territorial sea and the airspace above it without
the permission of the government of the PRC2. China claims all the fea1 These policies were mentioned in the House of Representatives Resolution No. 114
of the 104 Congress, First Session, submitted by Congressman Gilman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, and in the Statement of the U.S. Department of State on the
Spratlys and the South China Sea on May 10, 1995.
tures encompassed by those nine undefined and dashed lines, although it

began to occupy some of them only recently. There was no definition of
those dashed lines, nor were their co-ordinates stated. Therefore the legality
and the precise locations indicated by these lines are not clear. It was presumed, however, that Chinas claim at least initially, was limited to the islands, the rocks, and perhaps the reefs, but not the whole sea enclosed by
those nine undefined-dashed lines. Some recent Chinese writers seem to
imply that China also claims the adjacent sea of the islands and rocks
but again, the concept of adjacent sea has not been clearly defined.
Taiwans claim in the South China Sea was basically similar to that of
China. The Chinese claim was originally described in the Taiwanese/KMT
map of 1947. Therefore, the positions of the participants from China and
Taiwan in the SCS Workshops were sometimes very similar. Taiwan has
occupied Itu Aba, the largest island in the group, since 1956.
Vietnams claim is also basically historical. It claims the Paracel islands
as well as the whole Spratly group together with all its continental shelf.
Again, the boundary lines of the claim are not clearly identified, either by
description or by co-ordinates. The claim also covers quite an extensive
area of the South China Sea, and Vietnam has also occupied a considerable
number of features.
The Philippines claim is based on the so-called proximity principle
and discovery of the islands concerned by a Philippine explorer Thomas
Cloma in the 1950s. Unlike the Chinese claim, the Philippine claim clearly
defines the coordinates and therefore is quite identifiable. However, the co-
2 Point 3 of the Declaration of the Peoples Republic of China on Chinas Territorial
Sea, dated September 4, 1958. This point was repeated in Article 6 of the Chinese
Law No. 55/1992 on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of China, passed by
the 24th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 7th Congress of the PRC on
February 25, 1992
ordinates are not measured from base points on land, but from fixed positions at sea. The Philippines has also occupied a number of islands and
rocks.
The Malaysian claim is primarily based on the continental shelf principle and is clearly defined by coordinates. It occupies islands that it considers to be situated on its continental shelf. Equally, Bruneis claim seems
to have been based also on the principle of EEZ and continental shelf, although the boundary lines are drawn almost parallel from, and are the continuation of, two points at sea at the 100 fathoms depth contour that were
announced in 1958 by the British as the continental shelf boundaries between Brunei and Sarawak and North Borneo
(Sabah).
All or most of these claims overlap with one another and some of them
with several other claims. All the claimants, with the exception of Brunei,
have occupied several rocks and reefs. There is no clear pattern of
occupation. Some Chinese occupations have been quite far to the south.
The significance of the various conflicting claims is very clear. It is basically a scramble for space and resources, either living or oil and gas, which
are believed to be abundant in the area. Exploration efforts are continuing
for oil and gas and fishery resources are being exploited. Conflicts have
arisen in the past and may arise again in the future.
Indonesian Initiative
Indonesia is not a claimant to any islands or rocks in the Spratly group.
But if the Chinese/Taiwanese dashed lines of 1947 are taken into consideration and continuously connected, then the Chinese/Taiwanese claims
could also intrude upon Indonesias EEZ and continental shelf as defined
in the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention
(UNCLOS),
and as demarcated
in the Indonesian-Malaysian Agreement of 1969 and Indonesian-Vietnam
Agreement of 2003. China, however, has assured Indonesia that they do

not have any maritime boundary problems with Indonesia in the South
China Sea.
Indonesia took the initiative to try to manage the potential conflicts in
the area and to promote actual cooperation among the claimants. Indonesia
saw that the end of the Indochina war in 1989-1990 provided the opportunity to transform an environment of bickering and confrontation into one
of cooperation. When the end of the Cambodian conflict was in sight in
1990, ASEAN and Indochina seemed ready for economic development and
cooperative relations. Development efforts needed peace, stability and
cooperation. Indochina later joined ASEAN. However, with regard to the
SCS, it was essential to seek ways and means of preventing potential conflicts from erupting into armed conflagration.
I thought that a sense of community in the South China Sea area
should be developed. There was the basis of cooperation in UNCLOS, especially in the EEZ regime
(Articles 61-67)
and the Enclosed or Semi
Enclosed Seas concepts as stipulated in Article 122 and 123. That Article
123 stated that;
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-operate
with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance
of their duties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour,
directly or through an appropriate regional organization:
a. to co-ordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea;
b. to co-ordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
c. to co-ordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where
appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area;
d. to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international or-
ganizations to co-operate with them in furtherance of the provisions

of this article.
It was difficult at that time to see whether ASEAN had a perspective on
SCS. However there was a strong conviction in Indonesia and in ASEAN
that we should concentrate on promoting development, particularly economic development, as well as the ASEAN and Southeast Asian principles
of resilience and cohesiveness. We did not want to see a repeat of the disturbances that had occurred before in Southeast Asia and in the SCS area.
At about the same time, the issues of Paracels and the Spratlys were attracting attention and posing a threat to Southeast Asian stability. In the
meantime, I had developed contact with Professor Ian Townsend-Gault of
the University of British Columbia in Vancouver who was willing to seek
Canadian support to help manage potential conflicts in the South China informally if the countries around the SCS were interested. The Canadian
International Development Agency
(CIDA)
was later willing to support all
the meetings. The South China Sea Informal Working Group
(SCS-IWG)
was
established in Vancouver and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, which
I had established and directed in Jakarta, would collaborate and help develop the agenda for the meeting, prepare background papers, and arrange for
the participation of resource persons.
In view of this, at the end of 1989 I traveled around the ASEAN capitals
to find out whether and what we could do together about the SCS within
the context of preventive diplomacy. For that purpose, 1 prepared a basic
working paper. Out of this trip, I found out that:
practically everybody thought that we should do something;
there was apprehension that territorial disputes could pose major difficulties in developing cooperative efforts;
in view of difficult and sensitive territorial issues, it would be better
if the approach were informal, at least at the initial stage; and

there was a notion that ASEAN members should coordinate their
views and positions first before they engaged non-ASEAN states in
such efforts.
Consequently, I felt that regardless of the territorial disputes, we should always try to find ways to manage potential conflict and to find an area or
areas in which everyone could agree to cooperate, no matter how small or
how insignificant it might seem. We should be guided by the idea that despite potential conflict, there was always an opportunity for cooperation.
At that time, I had three basic objectives:
to manage the potential conflicts by seeking an area in which everyone could cooperate;
to develop confidence building measures or processes so that the various claimants would be comfortable with one another, thus providing
a conducive atmosphere for the solution of their territorial or jurisdictional disputes; and
to exchange views through dialogue on the issues involved in order
to increase mutual understanding.
It would be a major achievement for the region to work together to transform the habit of confrontation into a habit of cooperation. This could be
achieved sooner if we had programs designed to achieve it. Therefore, it
was important to find a common denominator, no matter how slow the
process might be or how small was the result at the beginning. Patience
was important then as it still is today.
The Workshop Process

Despite many concerns and reservations at that time, all of us in
ASEAN agreed to try to manage the potential conflicts in the SCS and
to convert them as much as possible to cooperation. We all agreed informally to come to the First Workshop on the South China Sea in Bali
in 1990. This was basically a meeting among ASEAN participants only.
The following areas were identified for discussion at the first meeting: a)
territorial and sovereignty issues, b) political and security issues, c) marine
scientific research and environmental protection, d) safety of navigation, e)
resources management, and f) institutional mechanisms for cooperation. We
also discussed whether and how to include other non-ASEAN countries in
the discussion on the South China Sea, particularly Vietnam, China, Taiwan
(Chinese Taipei),
Laos, and Cambodia. The Workshop was acknowledged as
a platform for policy oriented discussions, not only for an academic exchange of views.
Each ASEAN country was asked to prepare a specific paper and to take
a leading role in discussions. Malaysia was to lead the discussion on territorial and sovereignty issues; Singapore on political and security issues;
Indonesia on marine scientific research and environmental protection; the
Philippines on safety of navigation; Thailand on resources management;
and Brunei Darussalam on institutional mechanisms for cooperation. Since
this was the first exploratory meeting, there was no statement issued at the
end of the meeting, although informal records were prepared by the
organizer.
The First Workshop laid the groundwork and it was apparent that there
were quite a few areas where participants were prepared to cooperate. In
preparing the Second Workshop, I thought that China and Taiwan
Taipei)
(Chinese
should be included as they have claims in the SCS and also occupied
some features in the area. But it was not easy at that time to bring China
into the discussion, primarily because China considered that the SCS issues
should not be regionalized or internationalized, and that China would
discuss whatever problems it had directly and bilaterally with the countries
concerned. In Chinas view, its claims to sovereignty over the SCS islands
were undisputable. In addition, it would be difficult for China to sit down
with Taiwan in international meetings like the South China Sea Workshop,
if these were formal meetings. But by the Second Workshop in Bandung
in 1991, it had become an all inclusive group; not only Vietnam and
China were invited and participated but also Taiwan
(Chinese Taipei).
Even
land-locked Laos was invited. Cambodia was invited later after the political
situation there became clearer.
Thus, by the Second Workshop in Bandung in February 1991, we were
able to bring China, Vietnam, Laos, and Chinese Taipei into the Workshop
Process. The Bandung meeting went into more detail with the topics mentioned above, including the problems of sovereignty over the Spratlys and
the Paracels, the roles of major non-SCS powers in the region, as well as
confidence building measures. More technical discussions took place on
marine scientific research, marine environmental protection, safety of navigation, and on resources management. Some ideas to establish a secretariat
as well as to formalize the meeting were mentioned. More significantly,
the participants attending the Bandung meeting agreed to issue a statement
saying that the SCS disputes should be settled peacefully, that force shall
not be used to settle the disputes, and that the parties to the disputes shall
exercise restraint in order not to exacerbate the potential conflicts. This
statement was a precursor to a much more formal ASEAN Declaration
on the South China Sea in Manila in July 1992, which provided guiding
principles for efforts to manage potential conflicts in the SCS through
cooperation.
By the Third Workshop in Yogyakarta in 1992, more specific dis-
cussions took place on the various topics. By this time, I felt that devising
cooperative projects would have to be worked out in more detail by specific technical working groups
(TWGs)
and groups of experts meetings
(GEMs).
Thus, the meeting in Yogyakarta agreed to establish two TWGs, namely

the TWG on Marine Scientific Research and the TWG on Resources
Assessment. Some participants continued to consider that it was necessary
to establish a secretariat for the workshop process as well as to formalize
the process. There was no consensus to establish a secretariat because many
participants were not yet willing to institutionalize or formalize the process.
In addition, there were also many technical reasons for not establishing the
secretariat. It was generally felt that the Center for Southeast Asian Studies
(Pusat Studi Kawasan Asia Tenggara)
in Jakarta should continue to be the focal
point for the Workshop Process.

With regard to formalizing the Workshop Process, some countries also
had difficulties, particularly China, primarily due to its problems to sit
down with Taiwan/Chinese Taipei in a formal process. Thus, the informal
set-up of the Workshop Process was a necessity and perhaps the only possibility for bringing in China and Chinese Taipei together. Moreover, it was
generally thought that discussions and ideas could flow more freely in an
informal process. In a more formal meeting participants would be extremely constrained by the policies of their respective governments.
The Fourth Workshop in Surabaya in 1993 discussed the participation
of non-SCS countries. It agreed that non-SCS participation would be allowed on a case-by-case basis to implement specific agreed programs of
cooperation. In the meantime, the TWG on Marine Scientific Research
(TWG-MSR)
had already began discussions in Manila and the TWG on
Resources Assessment
(TWG-RA)
had been convened in Jakarta. The
Surabaya meeting also discussed the results and recommendations of the

two TWG meetings, and further agreed to convene follow-up meeting of
the TWG-MSR in Singapore. It also agreed to establish the TWG on

Marine Environmental Protection
Matters
(TWG-LM)
(TWG-MEP),
and the TWG on Legal
and discussed the possibility of establishing the TWG on
Safety of Navigation, Shipping and Communications
(TWG-SNSC).
Finally,
the participarits also indicated that the workshop series had reached a stage
where it would have to concretize programs or projects to realize cooperative efforts through a step-by-step approach.
The Fifth Workshop in Bukittinggi in 1994 approved some specific
projects, which had been formulated by the Technical Working Groups, particularly a program for cooperation on the study and conservation of biodiversity in the SCS. The Bukittinggi Workshop also agreed, among others,
to authorize me to seek support and funding for the project proposal on
biodiversity; to convene another meeting of the TWG on Marine Scientific
Research to finalize proposals on sea-level and tide monitoring, and on a
database, information exchange and networking; and to convene the first
meeting of the TWG on Legal Matters in Thailand. The Workshop also
further discussed confidence-building measures, including discussion in detail on the need for non-expansion of existing military presence in the
South China Sea.
The Sixth Workshop in Balikpapan in 1995 approved the two project
proposals drawn-up by the TWG on Marine Scientific Research, namely
study on tides and sea level change and regional cooperation in the field
of marine science data and information network in the SCS. The participants also agreed to forward these project proposals to their respective authorities for their consideration and support in their implementation. I was
asked to solicit support from various sources for these projects.
The Seventh Workshop in Batam in 1996 further discussed the problems of implementing the agreed project proposals. Since 1995 there were
some difficulties in implementation, not only because of the financial prob-
lems but also because of political issues. Practically all countries in the
SCS have indicated willingness to participate in the implementation of the
agreed programs either in providing expertise, facilities or some even
financial. But China believed that the implementation of the agreed programs should be left to national institutions alone, particularly due to the
sensitive nature of the issues dealing with territorial and sovereignty claims.
It was only at the Eighth Workshop meeting in Pacet, Puncak, in December
1997 that the participants agreed to jointly implement the agreed programs
for cooperation. I was asked to continue to approach various international,
regional and national agencies, governmental or non-governmental, to support the implementation of the agreed programs.
The Ninth Workshop in Ancol, Jakarta, in 1998, continued discussion
on implementing the agreed projects. A representative of the UNEP indicated to the meeting that UNEP could help with the implementation of
some components of the Biodiversity Project. The Meeting also continued
discussion on the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. On the Safety
of Navigation, the participants agreed to recommend to their respective authorities to consider ratification of the Rome Convention on the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988, of the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992,
of the International Convention on the Establishment of International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, and of the International
Convention on Oil Spill Pollution and Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990.
The Tenth Workshop in Bogor in 1999 noted that the atmosphere of
co-operation had improved, despite some difficulties. The Workshop also
discussed and endorsed the recommendations of the various meetings of the
TWGs and GEMs. The issues of the formulation of the Code of Conduct
for the South China Sea and the issues of implementation, as well as link-
ages with other activities, continued to be the subject of discussion. In order to avoid difficulties with regard to implementation of bio-diversity expedition in the South China Sea, it was agreed to conduct the expedition
in and around the undisputed Indonesian islands of Anambas in the South
China Sea.
The Eleventh Workshop was held in Cengkareng in March 2001. This
Meeting, while discussing and endorsing the reports and recommendations
of the various TWGs and GEMs, was also confronted with the decision
of Canada, for reasons unknown to us, not to extend its financial support
to the Workshop Process beyond the current support
(early 2001).
In view
th
of this situation, the 11 Workshop decided unanimously to make all efforts

to continue the process and to hold a Special Meeting to explore various
options to continue the process.
The Special Meeting, which took place in Jakarta in August 2001,
agreed to continue the Workshop activities in an informal, unofficial and
track-two way, focusing on building confidence and cooperation while
avoiding controversial, political and divisive issues. The Workshop could
continue to be held in Indonesia, but if Indonesia is not in the position
to hold such a Workshop, it could be held in other places, at the expense
of the host authorities concerned. With regard to funding, the Workshop
process should seek voluntary donations from participating authorities, voluntary donations from the non-governmental organizations, foundations or
private companies from the SCS region, and voluntary donations from the
nongovernmental organizations, foundations or private companies, from
outside SCS region, provided no political conditions were attached. It was
also decided that the Workshop process should function more as a thinktank group and should develop implementable projects, taking into account
the limited availability of financial and human resources. They also agreed
to recommend the establishment of a Special Fund to be administered by
Pusat Studi Asia Tenggara
(the Center for Southeast Asian Studies)
in Jakarta.
In the meantime, the Anambas Expedition to study biodiversity in the

South China Sea was conducted on 11-22 March, 2002. Financed by voluntary contributions from the participants. The Expedition discovered a number of marine species unknown before. The scientific results of the expedition were published in the Raffles Bulletin of Zoology in Singapore
in March 2004.
The Twelfth workshop in Jakarta in October 2002 agreed to continue
efforts to manage the potential conflict in the SCS and to implement agreed
projects by their own means and with voluntary support from various
sources. They also agreed to establish the Special Fund for this purpose.
The Thirteenth Workshop was held in Medan in September 2003. It discussed the preparation for the Palawan Biodiversity Expedition as a continuation of the Anambas Expedition. It continued discussion on the Database
Information Exchange and Networking
Tide Monitoring Project
(coordinated by China),
(coordinated by Indonesia),
Marine Ecosystem Monitoring
Sea Level and
and Training Program for
(coordinated by the Philippines).
It was agreed to
revise the projects in the light of comments by participants. The Workshop

discussed further the development of the Special Fund.
The Fourteenth Workshop held in Batam in November 2004 reviewed
the projects so far planned, namely (1) Marine Science Data and Information
Networking, (2) Biodiversity Studies, (3) Study of Tides and Sea Level
Change, (4) Training Program for Marine Ecosystem Monitoring, (5) Training
Program for Seafarers, (6) Fisheries Stocks Assessments, (7) Hydrographic
Survey, (8) Search and Rescue and Illegal Act at Sea including Piracy and
Armed Robbery at Sea.
China reported that it has convened a working group meeting in Hainan
in September 2004 to discuss the Marine Database Program and in the light
of the discussion, has revised the program. The Workshop decided to en-
dorse the revised proposal and requested China to continue with the preparation to implement the project. With regard to the Palawan Biodiversity
expedition, the Philippines informed the workshop that it has changed the
implementation of the expedition from a Track Two activity to a Track One
activity and had widened the area of the expedition to also include Luzon.
This announcement created problems, and the workshop decided not to
continue discussion on this matter since Track One activity was outside the
purview of the workshop. As it turned out, some participants later withdrew
their participation in the Luzon-Palawan expedition. The workshop also
asked Indonesia to continue with the preparation for the study of Sea Level
Rise and asked Malaysia to initiate works on cooperation with regard to
Search and Rescue. At this occasion, Chinese Taipei proposed the establishment of South East Asian Ocean Network for Education
(SEAONE)
for train-
ing purposes to promote ocean science research. China has difficulties with
this proposal, and due to lack of consensus, the proposal was not discussed
further, noting that Chinese Taipei could initiate the program as its own
by inviting all other participants to make use of it.
The Fifteenth workshop was held in Anyer, Banten, in November 2005.
The workshop discussed and endorsed the result of the TWG meeting on
the Database Information Exchange and Networking project, held in
Tianjin, China, on 11-12 October, 2005. The workshop also discussed and
endorsed the result of the TWG meeting on the Study of Tides and Sea
Level Change and their impact on coastal environment in the SCS, held
in Anyer, Banten, Indonesia, on 22-23 November, 2005, and agreed to begin its implementation. All participants acknowledged the importance of the
workshop process as a confidence building measure and a preventive diplomacy mechanism which was still relevant to the current situation. In addition, after the implementation of the biodiversity project in Anambas
later in Palawan),
(and
it encouraged China, Chinese Taipei, the Philippines, and
Vietnam to consider the possibility of conducting biodiversity expeditions

that will include the Northeast and Northwest area of the South China Sea
in order to complete the picture of biodiversity in the SCS as a whole.
The Sixteenth Workshop was held in Bali in November 2006. It discussed regional cooperation in the field of marine science and information,
and China undertook to organize a technical training course on constructing
a website and sub-website with data on the SCS area. Equally, Indonesia
was continuing its preparation for cooperation on the study of sea level
change and the coastal environment in the SCS affected by potential
th
climate change. The participation of certain authorities, as in the 15 Workshop, was already covered by the Special Fund which was established in
2004.
The Seventeenth Workshop was held in Yogjakarta in November 2007.
It discussed the various programs, particularly regarding the impact of global climate change on the South China Sea. It was agreed that the Workshop
Process is still relevant to maintained peace, stability, and cooperation in
the region, and it shall remain informal, participants attending the workshop
in their personal capacities, and that the workshop will continue to work
on the basis of consensus.
The Eighteenth Workshop is now being planed for November 2008 in
Menado, Noth Sulawesi, Indonesia.
Dialogue Between the Parties

We have also encouraged more discussions and dialogues mong parties
to the territorial disputes to find the basis for a solution that would be
acceptable to all concerned. The bilateral dialogue between China and the
Philippines in August 1995 produced an eight point code of conduct between them. Similarly, bilateral dialogue between Vietnam and the Philippines
has also produced a nine-point code of conduct, which in many respects

were similar to the China and the Philippines Code of Conduct. I understand there has also been dialogue between China with Vietnam and
Malaysia, and between Malaysia and other claimants, although the dialogues have not led specifically to bilateral Codes of Conduct.
In this context it is encouraging to note the signing of bilateral Agreements between China and Vietnam on 25 December, 2000 regarding the
maritime boundaries between the two countries in the Gulf of Tonkin, covering the boundaries of their respective Territorial Seas, EEZs and
Continental Shelves, and another Agreement on Fishing Cooperation in the
Gulf. There is no agreement yet, however, regarding the delimitation of
contiguous zones between the two countries. The Fishing Cooperation
Agreement is interesting because it establishes a common fishing area,
or some kind of joint development zone in the Gulf and a buffer zone
for small fishing boats. The Agreement also covers the right of passage
of Vietnamese vessels through the Qiangzhou Strait between Hainan and
mainland China, which China so far has always regarded as part of its internal waters.
Equally interesting, on the same day, the Foreign Ministers of the two
countries signed a Joint Statement regarding relations between the two
countries, which is tantamount to a bilateral code of conduct. In the statement, the two sides recalled their time-honored traditional friendship,
comprehensive cooperation, mutual trust, equality and mutual benefits between them. They reaffirmed that they will follow the guidelines and principles of the UN Charter, the five principles of peaceful co-existence, and
the principles of international relations, independence, sovereignty, full
equality, mutual respect and non-interference. They agreed to regularly hold
high-level meetings, exchange visits, and continue to broaden cooperation
in economic, commercial, scientific, and technical cooperation. They also
agreed to strengthen cooperation and coordination at multilateral, regional

and international forums, to carry out multilevel military exchanges and expand cooperation in the security field, and many other areas of cooperation.
Specifically on maritime issues, and apparently with the disputes in the
SCS in mind, the two countries will continue to seek everlasting solutions
acceptable to both sides through peaceful negotiation. Pending that solution,
the two sides will not take action to complicate or aggravate disputes, nor
will they resort to force or threat of force. They will consult each other
in a timely manner in case of disputes and adopt a cool and constructive
attitude to handle them properly in order not to allow disputes to impede

the normal development of bilateral ties.
It appears that in formulating any Code of Conduct, several elements
should be included, such as: (1) Peaceful settlement of disputes; (2)
Prohibition against the use of force or threats of force; (3) The exercise
of self-restraint; (4) Development of CBMs; (5) Cooperation; (6) Consultation; (7) Transparencies; (8) Respect for International Law and Freedom of
Navigation in the South China Sea; and (9) The area of application of the
Code.
Joint Development Concept

One of the most important issues in the South China Sea was the question of Joint Development
(JD)
or Joint Cooperation
(JC).
I personally
supported this approach in overcoming the territorial problems. We even

formed a Special Technical Working Group on Resources Assessment and
Ways of Development
(TWG-RA)
to deal with this topic and the TWG met
twice in Jakarta in July, 1993 and in 1999. The TWG-RA also established
a Study Group
(SG)
to better understand the concept, and this SG had met
twice in Vientiane in June 1998 and in Tabanan, Bali in July 1999.
The TWG on Resources Assessment
(TWG-RA)
agreed that the JD had
excellent potential, and that we should study the various concepts or models of joint development around the world and to learn from them what
could be applied to the SCS area. I believed the concept should be formulated with agreement on at least four points:
1) The zone where the joint development will take place;
2) The nature, the subject or the topics of the cooperation
(fisheries,
minerals, gas, oil, environment, marine scientific research, marine parks, etc.);
3) The mechanism for such joint development, which could be an

Authority or a loose coordinative organization or arrangement; and
4) Who shall participate in such Joint Development or joint Cooperation
activities, governments or companies or corporation.
These four points, it seemed to me, were the sine qua non of joint
development. In 1996 I suggested several principles for joint development
and attempted to find out and define the zone where every participant,
at least those having overlapping claims, could cooperate on the basis of
UNCLOS. Theoretically this was that part of the SCS beyond 200 miles
from undisputed coast lines or islandsthe so-called Donut hole. On the
basis of various comments and reactions by participants, I submitted a revised proposal in 1998 to the participants directly concerned, which in
essence reduced the zone and the number of possible participants. For
some reasons, discussion of the JD or JC concept stalled in the Workshop.
However, some bilateral agreements have been reached on Joint Development, such as between Malaysia and Thailand and between Malaysia and
Vietnam in the Gulf of Siam, and between China and Vietnam in the Gulf
of Tonkin.
Conclusions
A. Preventive Diplomacy
In view of our experience with developing cooperation to promote preventive diplomacy in the SCS, some conditions for successful efforts would
seem to be:
1) Realization by the parties to the disputes that conflict, especially
armed conflict, will not settle the disputes and will not bring benefits to any/either party; in fact they only bring mutual damage or
loss to the parties. I feel that the parties to the disputes in the SCS
are now aware of this.
2) Political will is required to settle the disputes peacefully and to prevent the disputes escalating into armed conflicts. The parties must
realize that their interests lie in finding a solution of the disputes
rather than in prolonging them. I feel that we still have to do a lot
to strengthen political will, although some progresses has been
made.
3) The parties should not legislate any territorial claims especially in
areas where claims are clearly disputed. Legislating territorial claims
and seeking support through public opinion tend to harden the position of all sides and make it more difficult to seek solutions or compromises, or even temporary solutions such as joint development. I
feel that this point still needs to be appreciated.
4) There is a need to increase transparency in national policy, legislation and documentation with more frequent meetings among the
legal officers of the various regional countries in order to exchange
documentation and information, including with legislative planning.
5) Successful efforts often begin with informal activities, either through
the Track Two or informal Track One processes. After such efforts
have had some success, a more formal track-one approach could be
attempted. This was the case with the Cambodian issue

with informal cocktail parties),
(which started
the Southern Philippines and the South
China Sea Workshops. Preventive diplomacy requires patience, tenacity and consistent efforts.
6) Preventive diplomacy should be undertaken by all parties who
have an interest in the solution of problems, both regionally and
internationally. Solutions that take into account only national and regional interests, but ignore the interests of states outside the region
are not necessarily an effective solution for the long run. I feel that
this point is slowly being appreciated.
B. Basic Principles
In managing potential conflicts, it is important to take into account several
basic principles, such as:
1) To use an all inclusive approach and not exclude any directly interested countries or parties.
2) To start with less sensitive issues with which participants feel comfortable discussing without incurring the animosity of their respective governments or authorities.
3) The participants should be senior enough or eminent persons in their
government although they are participating in the process in their
private capacity.
4) The structure of the process should not be institutionalized by creating a permanent or well-organized mechanism. The process should
be kept as flexible as possible.
5) Differences should not be magnified and cooperation should be
emphasized.
6) In view of the delicacy and sensitivity of some issues, it is wise to
start with what is possible and follow a step by step approach and
take into account the principles of cost effectiveness.

7) It should be understood that the process of managing potential conflicts is a long-term continuing process where lack of immediate
concrete results should not be cause for despair and frustration.
8) Objectives should be kept clear and simple. The South China Sea
Workshops have clear objectives: to learn how to co-operate; and
to implement co-operation. The goal is to build confidence through
dialogue and cooperative programs.
9) The roles of the initiator, the interlocutor, or the convener of the
process, as well as the roles of disinterested supporters and sponsors,
are very crucial. The key persons must be impartial, have patience
and dedication, as well as tenacity and sufficient knowledge of the
delicate issues involved, and be able to retain the respect and the
continued support and cooperation of all participants.
C. Current Prospects
The current situation of the Workshop Process on managing potential conflicts in the SCS could be summarized as follows:
1) Discussion on territorial and jurisdictional issues, after several meetings, have stalled in the Workshop Process, because of the objections of China and certain other participants. China and Vietnam,
however, have reached bilateral agreement on maritime delimitation
in the Gulf of Tonkin, and Indonesia and Vietnam have reached bilateral agreement on the delimitation of their continental shelf boundary in the SCS.
2) Discussion and bilateral dialogues among parties concerned have
achieved results. As indicated above, there are already an eight point
Code of Conduct between the PRC and the Philippines and a nine
point Code of Conduct between the Philippines and Vietnam. In fact
the six points basis for settlement of disputes agreed upon by the
Second Workshop in Bandung in July 1991 and the five points
ASEAN Declaration on the SCS in Manila in July 1992 have became elements for the formal ASEAN-China Dialogue resulting in
the Declaration on the conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,
adopted in Phnom Penh in 2002.
3) Discussion on Confidence Building with regard to military activities
has also slowed down, although there is still agreement to continue
discussion on this matter.
4) Discussion on formulating cooperation in technical matters has made
a lot of progress in the various Technical Working Groups. In fact,
three projects of cooperation have been agreed, namely on biodiversity, climatic change and sea level monitoring, as well as on
preparing a data base and net-working. A bio-diversity expedition
took place in 2002 in Anambas area, followed by the Philippines
bio-diversity expedition near the Palawan Island.
5) The efforts to develop cooperation through Joint Development have
also produced concrete results, such as the Agreement between
China and Vietnam on the Common Fishery Area in the Gulf of
Tonkin in 2002. An agreement between China and Philippines to
conduct a joint exploration survey for oil between the oil companies
of the two countries, was signed in Beijing in 2004, and a similar
agreement for three years on marine seismic undertakings between
the oil companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam, was signed
on 14 March, 2005.
Throughout the discussion of South China Sea issues, China has played a
key role. I am happy to note that China has moved away from being reluctant and skeptical to become an ardent supporter of the workshop
process. Chinas neighbors in the SCS area have responded positively, and
the policy of the Southeast Asian countries of constructive engagement
with China seems to be working. China and its neighbors in Southeast Asia
may see closer relations and cooperation in the future.
One of the successes of the efforts to manage the potential conflicts
in the SCS would be the absence or continued absence of armed conflict
in the area. Yet, precisely the absence or the prolonged absence of conflicts
in the area would also be one of the reasons for the argument that the
Workshop Process would no longer be needed. This argument could also
be used as an excuse not to implement agreed projects of cooperation,
which have been so painstakingly discussed and formulated. I personally
believe that this reasoning or argument is dangerous, because I do not share
the view that we have to wait until disputes erupt into actual armed conflict
before we do something about it. If disputes erupt into armed conflict, then
the efforts to manage potential conflicts in the SCS would have failed.
D. Concluding Remarks
There are good opportunities for promoting cooperation in various areas
and developing confidence-building measures and processes for the SCS.
The more discussion takes place on relevant issues, the better are the prospects for managing potential conflict in the area. The prognosis for the future would be much worse if South China Sea countries were not prepared
to talk about the issues, and to transform them into actual cooperation.
It has indeed been a long road towards peace and cooperation in the
South China Sea but it has all been worthwhile. In this context, I hope
that Indonesia, together with all its partners in the South China Sea
Workshop, will continue to exercise wisdom and leadership, albeit informally, in taking the initiative to promote peace, stability and cooperation
in the SCS and South East Asia in general, for their own respective good
and common interests. There are also good prospects for the model of the
South China Sea workshops to be used to deal with similar problems, including in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan or East Sea.

Resolving the Territorial Issue in the Mindanao Conflict:

Challenges for the Civil Society
Kamarulzaman Askandar (Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network : SEACSN) &
Ayesah Abubakar (Mindanao Peace Program)
Introduction
The Mindanao conflict in Southern Philippines is an example of a protracted conflict that has persisted for many years. There are many analyses and different interpretations about the causes and nature of this conflict
identity, justice, communal, ethno-religious, poverty, governance, self-
determination, etc. However, one thing that is consistent in all these analyses
is the geographical nature of this conflict. It involves the areas in Southern
Philippines inhabited by the roughly 8 million Bangsamoro people, together
with their Christian and Lumad neighbours. The areas include parts of the
Mindanao island as well as other islands in this Southern Philippines archipelago Palawan, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, among the bigger and better
known islands. These islands constitute the areas in contention in this conflict
and have been designated the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro. These
are the areas that will be covered by this short paper.
Territorial issues and territorial conflicts are not the concerns of states
alone. It is well noted that since the end of the cold war, the nature of
most conflicts around the world and especially in the developing countries have involved the state being in collision with non-state actors.
Some of these conflicts have been of the type called self-determination
or separatist, meaning they involve groups asking for the independence
Resolving the Territorial Issue in the Mindanao Conflict 93
or separation of their areas from the present state boundary. These areas
constitute their domain justified by current occupation or history of previous ownerships, either as personal properties or part of the territory of
their rulers or ancestors, or both. These areas then constitute part of the
core problem or issue when addressing conflicts of this nature. Negotiations
between parties to the conflict have always include the need to address the
boundaries, limits, and scope of the areas in question, the occupants, both
current and former, and the nature of the takeover or creation of the land
areas. If the nature of the takeover can be proven to be illegal, then the
matter of returning it back to its rightful owner will have to be addressed.
In cases where this is not possible or practical, the issue of compensation
has to be raised. This is when the process can become rather tricky. Of
importance also is the issue of politics and governance. Who have the right
to govern and administer these areas, and how can they achieve this mandate? Is it through a presidential or congressional order, or through provisions provided or created in the constitution, or through the signing of an
agreement or treaty between the parties and confirmed through a plebiscite
or referendum, conducted and monitored by independent third parties?
The Mindanao conflict situation has gone through many rounds of negotiations involving a number of actors. On one side, the state, represented
by the president and the appointed negotiating panel is always a constant.
On the other side, the Bangsamoro has been represented by two main
groups the Moro National Liberation Front
Liberation Front
(MILF).
(MNLF)
and the Moro Islamic
Both groups have been involved in separate peace
processes with the government side. The MNLF started out demanding independence but subsequent negotiations, with the OIC as the third party,
have convinced them to accept autonomy over specific Bangsamoro occupied areas. The Philippines government or the GRP and the MNLF signed
the Tripoli Agreement in 23 December, 1976. This agreement, unfortunately,
was not fully implemented resulting in the breakdown of the relationship

between the GRP and the MNLF in the succeeding years.1
Negotiations, however, persisted over the years, but it was only during
the time of President Fidel Ramos that the peace talks have prospered and
resulted in the signing of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the
GRP and the MNLF, creating the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao
(ARMM).
The then existing ARMM was developed to be the ven-
ue for a cooperative engagement of governance of the GRP in the Moro

areas. Besides ARMM, the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and
Development
(SPCPD)
was also set-up to fast-track the economic progress
of the region. Both ARMM and SPCPD were headed by the MNLF but
with much subservience from the GRP as leaders were subject to political
appointments and fiscal management remained with the central government.
Presently, the ARMM remains as an institution, but is riddled with poor
governance, inadequate resources, ineffective regional framework, bureaucratic isolation from national governance, and shows a lack of democratization in its processes.2 On the other hand, the SPCPD was abolished by
President Arroyo in 2002 due to management failures.3 With these, the
GRP-MNLF 1996 Final Peace Agreement is largely viewed as a failure in
delivering peace and development to the Moros.
On another front, soon after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement, and
1 For more information about the history and development of the Mindanao conflict,
please see Kamarulzaman Askandar and Ayesah Abubakar (eds.), The Mindanao
Conflict (Penang: SEACSN, 2005).
2 For a discussion of the ARMM governance please see the ARMM Roundtable Series
published by the Center for Autonomy and Governance-Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung,

Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, October-December 2003.
3 The MNLF protested this allegation considering that most of the funding management
were not handled by MNLF personalities, instead by appointed officers from the
national government.
the eventual breakdown of the Tripoli Talks in 1977, the leadership of

Hashim Salamat broke away from the MNLF and formed the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front
(MILF).
Under Salamat, the MILF continue to pursue the
Bangsamoro aspiration for independence. Consequently with the conclusion

of the GRP-MNLF peace pact, President Ramos started its round of peace
negotiations with the MILF, but it was during the time of President Joseph
Estrada that the talks have picked up and created substantial progress.4 In
spite of this development, the nation was caught by surprise with the imposition of an all-out-war by the GRP against the MILF in 2000. This
episode of full scale armed confrontation lasted for more than 6 months
in year 2000 and brought the whole peace negotiation to a halt.
As a departure from the all-out-war policy of President Estrada with
the MILF, President Arroyo declared an all-out-peace in 2002 upon her
assumption to office. This resumption of peace negotiation was not only
limited to the MILF, but also including other rebel groups like the
NDF-CPP-NPA. Meanwhile, upon the request of the GRP and the MILF,
the Government of Malaysia hosted the resumption of their peace talks in
March 2001 in Malaysia. Since then, Malaysia has served as a third party
facilitator and host to the GRP-MILF negotiations. This negotiation has
gone through several rounds to date agreement on the ceasefire, agreement on socio-economic issues and the setting up of the Bangsamoro
Development Agency
(BDA),
and the aborted agreement on the issue of an-
cestral domain.
Ceasefire between the two sides was achieved in 2003 when first the
MILF declared a unilateral ceasefire effective on 2 June, 2003, with the
government following with its own ceasefire declaration on 19 July, 2003.
The GRP and MILF kept its ceasefire but have proceeded with an on and
4 This progress is manifested when the MILF has divulged the location of its 23 camps
in Mindanao to the GRP as part of their peace negotiations.
off peace talks. Taking into account the crucial atmosphere of the ceasefire, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels have proactively instituted some
mechanisms to ensure its success. The peace panels created the Joint
GRP-MILF Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities
and Local Monitoring Teams
(LMTs)
(CCCH)
to monitor, promote, and strengthen the
ceasefire between the AFP and the MILF forces. Moreover, taking heed
of the calls of the civil society groups5, they have also established the
International Monitoring Team
(IMT)
tasked to monitor the implementation
of the preliminary agreements signed by the GRP-MILF. These initial

agreements constitute the security aspect
law)
(ceasefire and international human rights
and the rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development of the conflict
affected areas particularly pertaining to the victims of the 2000 all-out-war

that devastated the Moro communities.
The IMT was deployed on 10 October, 2004 as the key third-party
peacekeepers in Mindanao. This group composed of members from Brunei,
Libya, and with Malaysia forming the major contingent
IMT focusing on socio-economic issues).
(Japan later joined the
Meanwhile, the peace talks continue in
Malaysia on the issue of ancestral domain. Besides the ancestral domain,

the political solution or aspect is yet to be tackled as this would constitute
the comprehensive final agreement between the GRP and the MILF.
Generally, the Mindanao conflict resolution is highlighted in its formal
peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts. However, another greater challenge
remains heavily on the participation of the greater civil society in peacebuilding activities that would support peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Mindanao.
The Mindanao peace process has gone through what can only be called
a roller coaster period since even the beginning. Negotiation on ancestral
5 Bantay Ceasefire 2003 Report (Davao City: IID, 2003)
domain was on and off in 2007 and finally resumed again in early 2008.
The resumption of the peace talks was again followed by a break-down
and withdrawal of some members of the Malaysian International Monitoring
Team
(IMT);
resumption of the talks again after pressures from all sides,
and finally the announcement of the impending signing of the Memorandum

of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD).
The roller coaster period
continued with the peace panels signing their initials on the agreement on
April 27, 2008 with a promise to come back on 5 August, 2008 to formally
sign it in front of and with the endorsement of as many groups as possible
including the Malaysian government, a representative from the Organization
of Islamic Countries
(OIC),
civil society groups, and other invited foreign
observers. The situation, however, took an unexpected turn of event after

that as points from the MOA-AD were leaked to the public, with negative
results. The process broke down when a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)
was issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines in response to petitions

by those opposing the MOA-AD, especially by local politicians in
Mindanao on the eve of the August 5 signing. This TRO surprised and
shocked everybody including members of the Philippine government team,
led by their Foreign Minister, sent to the agreement signing ceremony in
Putrajaya, Malaysia, who actually found out about the orders not to sign
the MOA-AD only when they arrived in Kuala Lumpur and switched on
their mobile phones. Needless to say, everybody, including international observers, the more than 100 members of the civil society members from
Mindanao, the media, and other invited guests went home very disappointed.
Although some emergency meetings and discussions were held at the venue
of the ill-fated signing, there was a general sense of hopelessness with the
whole exercise. Everybody left Kuala Lumpur knowing that the situation
holds so much uncertainty and could only get worse in the next days.
Territorial Issues in the Mindanao Conflict: Ancestral

Domain and the MOA-AD
The very first paragraph of the Concepts and Principles part of the MOAAD specified that it is the birthright of all Moros and all indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros.
The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization and their descendants whether mixed or of full native blood. The freedom of choice of the
indigenous people shall be respected.6
This first paragraph clearly lays down who are involved in this agreement the Bangsamoros, who are seen as the original inhabitants or indigenous peoples of the area. It also made clear the fact that they were forced
to become subjects of the current state by conquest or colonization. The
following paragraph then went on to say that it is important to lay the
foundation of the Bangsamoro homeland in order to address the Bangsamoro
peoples humanitarian and economic needs as well as their political
aspirations. Their future and the wellbeing of their people can only be addressed by them having control of their own homeland. The next two paragraphs explain their concept of territory under the Bangsamoro ancestral
domain.
3. Both Parties acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part
of the public domain but encompasses ancestral, communal, and customary lands, maritime, fluvial and alluvial domains as well as all natural resources therein that have inured or vested ancestral rights on the
6 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001, Concepts and Principles, Paragraph 1, p. 2, Distributed

by the Malaysian Secretariat of the Mindanao Peace Process, 5 August, 2008.
basis of native title. Ancestral domain and ancestral land refer to those
held under claim of ownership, occupied or possessed, by themselves
or through the ancestors of the Bangsamoro people, communally or individually since time immemorial continuously to the present, except
when prevented by war, civil disturbance, force majeure, or other forms
of possible usurpation or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as
a consequence of government and private individuals, corporate entities
or institutions.
4. Both Parties acknowledge that the right to self-governance of the
Bangsamoro people is rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a
Pangampong ku Ranaw. The Moro sultanates were states or karajaan/kadatuan resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements
of nation-state in the modern sense. As a domestic community distinct
from the rest of the national communities, they have a definite historic
homeland. They are the First Nation with defined territory and with
a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations. The Parties concede that the ultimate objective of entrenching the Bangsamoro homeland as a territorial space
is to secure their identity and posterity, to protect their property rights
and resources as well as to establish a system of governance suitable
and acceptable to them as a distinct people.
These points clearly highlight the importance of territory and it effective
governance in the Mindanao conflict situation. The areas being covered by
the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE)
are highlighted in the
MOA-AD document. This can be accessed at www.mindanews.com or

www.luwaran.com. The MOA-AD also provided for the arrangement of the
plebiscite in the category A areas within 1 month of the signing of the

MOA-AD. For category B areas
(or the Special Intervention Areas),
which re-
fers to conflict affected areas outside the BJE, special socio-economic and
cultural affirmative action implemented by the Central Government will be
carried out. This area will also be subjected to a plebiscite not earlier than
25 years from the signing of the Comprehensive Compact to determine the
question of the accession to the BJE.
(please see the Annex of the MOA-AD for
more detail regarding the areas covered).
The Suspension of the GRP-MILF Peace Process after the

Non-Signing of the MOA-AD on 5 August, 2008.
The news of the Philippine Supreme Courts Temporary Restraining
Order
(TRO)
Philippines
on the eve of the Government of the Republic of the
(GRP)
and Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF)
official signing
event on the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain came as

a big surprise. It brought a great feeling of frustration and insecurity, especially among the civil society groups who attended the August 5 occasion
at the Marriott Hotel in Putrajaya, Malaysia. In a press conference, they
were quick to predict that this unsettling period poses a very real threat
to the ongoing ceasefire between the conflict parties and that it might lead
to another major armed conflict in Mindanao, considering that there is already an increasing campaign of opposition to the MOA-AD led by
Cotabato Province Vice Governor Pinol, Zamboanga Mayor Celso Lobregat
and company in their local communities. The following days, disgruntled
over the MOA-AD non-signing, MILF fighters occupied some areas in
North Cotabato triggering mass evacuations from the communities. A negotiation for their withdrawal was done within the joint ceasefire committees
of the government and the MILF. However, the very fragile situation was
threatened by an increasingly hostile environment with government militias

(CAFGU and CVO)7
and which made the withdrawal of the MILF fighters
very difficult. The stand-off between government and MILF forces ended
but incidences of confrontations could not be prevented and have started
to spillover in other areas in the succeeding days.
On 18 August, 2008 several towns in Lanao del Norte, Saranggani and
Sultan Kudarat were attacked by MILF groups. This ensued a major military operation by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP).
Apart from
this, Christian vigilante groups have also emerged to protect their communities and, at the same time, threatened the Bangsamoro communities. By
23 August, the Department of Interior Local Government
(DILG)
issued
13,000 shotguns to local civilians in various areas in Central Mindanao

(Zamboanga Peninsula, Davao, Northern Mindanao, and Socksargen)
in response to calls
of local leaders and politicians. The whole security situation have created
panic among the people and forced more mass evacuations even in places
where no actual armed conflict or attacks have occurred, like in Iligan and
Ozamiz cities. This was further escalated with the continuous fanning of
the conflict by local and national leaders who are giving pro-war public
statements and even to the point of polarizing communities. It was very
fortunate that various civil society groups and peace advocates in these
communities have helped ease the tension by verifying reports of incidences, engaging the communities in dialogue, and tirelessly responding
to the needs of the Internally Displaced Peoples
(IDPs).
In as much peace
groups tried their very best to maintain a level of calmness among the con7 Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) are civilian volunteers recruited
by the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Army Division to serve as its auxiliary group
on the ground, while the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) are civilian
volunteers recruited by the local governments as its added security enforcements for
local executives and politicians. CVOs are deputized by the Philippine National Police
but under the financial support and jurisdiction of these local governments.
flict affected communities, the national environment is clearly sliding down

to escalating the conflict. The national media exploited the crisis and more
politicians and other sectors in Manila have put down the MOA-AD in
public debates. Worse, the whole peace process has been dragged down due
to suspicion that it was part of President Arroyos political agenda to stay
in power, and even on alleged connivance with other nation states that have
shown support for the MOA-AD and the peace process in general.
The anti-Arroyo groups and Left-leaning movements were also very vocal in raising and protesting the growing presence of the U.S. military in
Mindanao leading to further speculations of their interest in the region. The
Focus on the Global South, a Bangkok-based think thank has reported that
the U.S. military troops are actively taking part in AFP military operations
including offensive operations with the MILF. Mindanews reports that it
has sighted American soldiers in North Cotabato and Maguindanao areas
during this renewed armed conflict. The U.S. interference in Mindanao is
perceived negatively by these groups based on two reasons: it is feared that
the Mindanao armed conflict can be exploited as another front for the U.S.
anti-terrorism campaign, and conversely, should the GRP-MILF peace process succeed
(and the MOA-AD be signed),
the U.S. intends to primarily secure
its economic and security interests in the region.

Another foreign intervenor, Malaysia, as host and third party facilitator
of the peace talks have also not been freed of criticisms by some politicians
and public influencers mainly in Manila. They have questioned Malaysias
role and have added more fire by speculating on Malaysias interest on the
Philippine Sabah Claim. Various donor agencies, like the World Bank and
others were also accused of providing financial support to the Bangsamoro
Development Agency
(BDA),
who in turn was alleged to have diverted these
funds for war material and preparations. And contrary to the move of
President Arroyos government to attract more foreign intervenors and help
support the peace process, public opinion is being swayed to resist more
foreign interventions on the issue.
The heightened interest on the Mindanao peace process created a national impact. It surprisingly became a national issue at a time when the
Philippines is equally occupied with many challenges with regards to its
national leadership and politics and its difficulties in coping with the global
economy and poverty issues. Yet, as the issue grabbed the limelight, the
increasing humanitarian crisis in Mindanao has not moved the country to
put a stop to the ongoing armed conflict. Mindanews reports that there are
currently over 500,000 IDPs staying in evacuation centers, while at least
62 people have died since August. While military operations continue in
pursuit of the lawless MILF group as declared by the government, the
general public in Mindanao is in constant fear of another full-blown
all-out-war. In spite of President Arroyos assurances of her commitment
to the search for peace in Mindanao, there is a wide public opinion that
she has already, in fact, given up on the peace process with the MILF. She
has dissolved her peace panel and the Office of the Solicitor General has
defended the executive branch at the Supreme Court
(over the TRO)
saying
that it will not sign the MOA-AD on its present form. Thus, President
Arroyos recent actions have given more doubts on her political will for
this peace process after turning its back despite the many years of hard
work and investment put in by her peace panel and advisers.
On 11 September, 2008, Secretary Hermogenes Esperon, Jr, from the
Office of the Presidential Adviser of the Peace Process
(OPAPP),
was sent
as President Arroyos Special Envoy to meet Malaysian Prime Minister

Abdullah Badawi, Malaysian Foreign Minister Rais Yatim, and the GRPMILF Peace Talks Third Party Facilitator Othman Abdul Razak. President
Arroyo, in her letter to the Malaysian Prime Minister, officially gave her
position on the GRP-MILF Peace Talks in a 4-Point Agenda: (1) that the
peace process continues; (2) that the MILF must take control of Commanders
Kato and Bravo and turn them over to the government; (3) that the
MOA-AD will become a major reference, if and when peace talks resume;
and (4) that the issue of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
(DDR)
must be put as the first agenda in future talks. At present, the peace
talks are suspended and the ceasefire mechanisms are not in full operations
and have no clear control over the security situation. The strength of the
International Monitoring Team
(IMT)
was decreased to compose of 12
Malaysians, 4 Libyans, 10 Bruneians, and a Japanese that are all based in

Cotabato City. Upon the request of the Philippine government, their term
was extended up until end of December.8 While other ceasefire mechanisms
remain intact, the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities
(CCCH)
was recently put under the oversight of the OPAPP instead of hold-
ing its usual hierarchy of authority.9 During normal situations, all ceasefire
8 The complete IMT manpower is at 60 members operating in 5 strategic areas all over
Mindanao as stated in its Terms of Reference. The IMT has been deployed since
2004. However, due to the long impasse on the peace negotiations on the Ancestral
Domain that lasted for more than a year, the Malaysian government had decided to
withdraw a big number of its IMT contingent in May 2008. The Malaysian
government maintains that the peacekeeping mission in Mindanao as part of
confidence building on the ongoing peace talks. However, if the peace talks are not
progressing, then there is no reason to maintain the peacekeeping mission since the
peace process cannot be hinged on peacekeeping alone, but on a final settlement of
the peace talks. With the suspension of the peace process soon after August 5 and
the volatile environment on the ground, the Philippine government unilaterally
requested for the extension of the IMT on August 28 for another three months. This
mission is being led by then IMT Deputy Head, Gen. Maj. Datuk Mat Yasin Mat
Daud from Malaysia.
9 A Mindanews article on September 5 quoted Brig. Gen. Rey Sealana, chair of the
governments CCCH that OPAPP Sec. Esperon told him that temporarily, the
governments CCCH are directly under the Office of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process. Besides the IMT, other ceasefire mechanisms include the Joint
Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and the Ad Hoc
Joint Action Group of the AFP and the MILF.
mechanisms work collaboratively and submit their reports to the GRPMILF Peace Panels for actions. Due to the non-existence of the GRP Peace
Panel, these mechanisms, therefore, can only fulfill their responsibilities in
a very limited manner. Also, in the meantime, National Security Adviser
Secretary Norberto Gonzalez has initiated a series of dialogues on the
Mindanao peace process among the civil society groups led by Church
leaders. Whether this is now what constitutes the new peace process, without the involvement of the MILF, is very unsettling and proves to be a
complete round-about.
While the Philippine government has announced its new directions in
the peace process, should it decide to resume, MILF Chair Ebrahim Murad
maintains that the MILF will not re-negotiate the MOA-AD as this had
been agreed upon in the last peace talks. Thus, the peace talks, when it
resumes, can only start from where it left off. As of September 15, the
MILF Chair had given instructions to its soldiers to defend themselves
against the AFP operations. He also insists that Commanders Kato and
Bravo will not be surrendered to the government. The MILF attributes the
failure of the peace process to the governments lacking commitment and
support by allowing the Supreme Court TRO and national politics play its
part in deciding the fate of the MOA-AD and the peace process itself. At
an official level, the GRP and MILF have disengaged themselves in any
direct communication channels except for their official statements being
coursed through the Malaysian third party facilitator.
Challenges for NGOs and the Civil Society: Saving the

Peace Process and Reconciliation of the Conflict Actors
The situation now in Mindanao presents a daunting challenge for all
peace advocates who have been supporting the peace process since it
begun. In spite of appeals from civil society groups and the international
community for the two parties to resume the peace talks, there appears to
be no clear path out of this crisis. This break down of the peace process
has not only divided the Filipino society, generated deep prejudices and
biases, but has also greatly eroded any sense of confidence on President
Arroyos management on Mindanao. It is during these times of crisis, and
upon their shoulders, that peace advocates in Mindanao, Manila, and from
the international community, have to unravel possibilities for a bilateral
ceasefire, fully re-start the peace process between the GRP and the MILF,
and sustain this momentum until a final peace agreement is achieved. This
is the challenge facing the NGOs and the civil society and they have to
build upon all the work and experiences that they have done in the past.
According to an earlier work by Ayesah Abubakar10, peacebuilding initiatives in Mindanao can be grouped into at least nine categories. (1) peace
movement and alliances; (2) peace education and research; (3) relief, rehabilitation reconstruction, and development; (4) truth commissions and
investigative missions; (5) grassroots ceasefire monitoring; (6) peace journalism; (7) dialogue and consultations; (8) interfaith dialogue, and (9) arts
and culture for peace advocacy. They all need to be continued and enhanced in this time of uncertainty to revive the ailing peace process. Of
these, several types of initiatives will be of utmost importance now. These
include strengthening the peace movement and alliances, providing relief
and humanitarian support, organizing ceasefire monitoring missions, and
engaging the parties and stakeholders in dialogue and consultations, including inter-faith dialogue.
Peace movement and alliances: Over the years, various organizations,
10 Paper presented at the Seminar in The Roles of Civil Society in Peacebuilding in
Southeast Asia, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University,

Sweden, May 2005.
institutions, and groups have come together and formed alliances and networks aimed towards strengthening the peace advocacy and promoting the
non-violence agenda in Mindanao. These involves Track Two and Track
Three stakeholders that include church-based organizations, academic institutions, political groups, sectoral groups, non-government organizations
and the grassroots community associations or groupings. Unique to
Mindanao is its multi-diverse constituency from various ethno-linguistic
tribes. This consolidation of a peace movement is proudly defined as
tri-people referring to the Christians, the IPs or lumads, and the Moros.
The Mindanao peace movement is exemplified with the existence of the
Mindanao Peaceweavers that is known as the convergence of all networks
and alliances. Another smaller but significant network is the Consortium
of Bangsamoro Civil Society
(CBCS)
which is also a member of the
Mindanao Peaceweavers.
The organization of Mindanao Peaceweavers
(MPW)
in 2003 was a con-
certed response from Mindanao civil society groups to take the challenge
of claims from President Arroyos administration that there is a weak
peace constituency. This explains the February 2003 escalation of violence
wherein the AFP was unstoppable in conducting its military offensives
on the MILF since according to a high ranking official, there are more
hawks than doves in Malacanang meaning that there was more support
for taking the military solution in resolving Mindanao once and for all.11
The work of these NGOs and other civil society actors will need to be
increased to counter the work of those opposed to the peace process.
Relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development: The occasional
armed conflicts over the years have created much havoc to the communities
in Mindanao. Thousands of people often had to flee their homes and seek
11 Public forum with Sec. Bert Gonzales of Office of the President, organized by the
UP Third World Studies Center, February 2003.
temporary shelters from nearby places, and often upon their return, they are
faced with the reality of having to rebuild their homes and their livelihood.
During the relief operations stage, normally half of the Internally Displace
Peoples
(IDPs)
are taken care of by their immediate families and commun-
ities since the combined support from the government, NGOs and other
agencies is able to handle only half of the population. Apart from the government help, many of the NGOs contribute to this effort by providing food
and shelter relief services to the IDPs. At a later stage, rehabilitation and
reconstruction of the conflict affected communities, and the general economic upliftment and development of these areas are also slowly addressed.
Among the local NGOs doing this type of activities are a couple of Moro-led
organizations, such as the United Youth for Peace and Development
(UNYPAD)
and the Bangsamoro Development Agency
(BDA).
Shortly after
the announcement of the TRO, clashes happened between frustrated MILF

troops and the government forces, forcing the people to flee and become
IDPs again. To date, there are now about 500,000 IDPs on Mindanao since
the peace process collapsed.
Grassroots ceasefire monitoring and peacekeeping: Over the years, despite the existence of a ceasefire agreement, sporadic clashes have happened
between the armed parties. This has resulted in civil society groups forming
their own ceasefire monitoring and peacekeeping missions. Some of the
more notable groups engaged in this activity are the Mindanao Peoples
Caucus, known for its Bantay Ceasefire
(literally meaning ceasefire watch)
program, and the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society with its Task
Force Kalilintad
(literally meaning care for peace)
program. With the pullout
of more than half the members of the IMT, the task of monitoring for violations and keeping the peace will have to be taken up by the CSOs again.
The task however might be daunting and difficult for them now, given that
both sides are determined not to back down from their positions. The GRP
is keen on arresting what they call rogue commanders of the MILF whom
they blamed for attacks on Christian groups and villagers, to the extent of
arming local Christian militias and villagers. The MILF on the other hand,
has steadfastly refused to hand in these commanders and has given orders
to their followers to protect themselves. In this volatile period, it is unsure
really how much unarmed civilian monitors can effectively do their monitoring and peacekeeping duties. The best strategy really would be to increase foreign monitors, be they the one being led by Malaysia or to even
get the UN peacekeepers to come in.
Dialogue and consultations: Conflict resolution is not limited to track
1 in Mindanao. This also occurs across the Tracks two and Three levels
where the civil society is involved through the conduct of dialogues and
consultations. The tri-people of Mindanao proactively engage each other
and define their own differing and common interests, and generate ideas
and solutions to the conflict issues which may be of help to the peace
panels. Groups like the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society
(CBCS),
and the Mindanao Peoples Caucus continue to engage each other in constructive discussions vis--vis their position to the GRP-MILF peace
negotiations. This is also being supplemented by those involved in the interfaith dialogue. With religion and identity seen by some as factors of the
conflict, there is clearly a need to be more educated of each others religion, belief, and culture. Interfaith dialogues are particularly crucial because
it opens more avenues for understanding, tolerance, and acceptance
amongst peoples. Groups like Silsilah Foundation and the Bishops-Ulama
Forum have helped bridge the divide and polarization on religion brought
about by the conflict.12 This more than ever now is needed. Pro-peace
12 Reina Neufeldt, Sarah McCann, and Jaco Cilliers, Case Study: Explicit and Implicit
Peace Building: Catholic Relief Services in Mindanao, Philippines and BosniaHerzogovina, Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (Cambridge, MA: Collaborative
groups from different orientations and leanings have to come together and
show that they are all for peace.
As a response to the overwhelming negativity on the MOA-AD and the
GRP-MILF peace process, civil society groups and peace advocates
launched various fora and public discussions explaining the MOA-AD in
Mindanao, Manila and overseas. Big universities like University of the
Philippines, Ateneo de Manila, Miriam College, De La Salle, Ateneo de
Davao, and many others hosted public seminars. The usual conferences and
meetings of peace and development workers in Mindanao were also utilized
th
as platforms for similar discussions, like the 4 Mindanao Media Summit

organized by Mindanews. On the legal aspect, two civil society groups
have also submitted appeals in support of the MOA-AD at the Supreme
Court.13 A series of dialogues were conducted with the Bishops-Ulama
Forum, business sectors in Manila, among civil society groups in Lanao
areas, Cagayan de Oro, Cotabato City, Manila, and others. The Mindanao
Peoples Caucus
(MPC)
brought together 15 representatives from the conflict
affected communities to Manila for them to articulate the situation to university students, religious leaders, senators, media, other government officials, and President Arroyo herself. They appealed to President Arroyo to
halt the ongoing military operations that have destroyed more homes and
lives in Mindanao. Almost all of them have come with statements condemning the breakdown of the peace process and the ensuing war.14
for Development Action, September 2000)
13 MUSLAF and Mindanao Multi-Sectoral Network submitted their appeals since
August. However, their cases have yet to be heard. Thus far, the petitioners against
the MOA-AD have already done their hearings at the Supreme Court.
14 The support has not only come from within the Philippines but also from
neighbouring countries. For example, a Statement of Support was made in Jakarta,

Indonesia on August 14 2008 by members of the Southeast Asian Forum on Islam
and Democracy (SEAFID). This Statement, which was signed by 33 NGOs and civil
Conclusions
As mentioned in this paper, the Mindanao conflict does involves territorial issues in the form of areas in contention by the parties. Currently,
there is an entity called the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)
governed by the MNLF. This area will be enlarged under the pro-
posed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE)
which is being based on the ances-
tral domain claim by the MILF in their deliberations with the Philippine
government
(GRP).
The peace process between the GRP and MILF that
started in 1997 went through several rounds with ancestral domain being
discussed in the third round. The MOA-AD which was supposed to be
signed in August 2008, and which was to be a prelude to political discussion in the next round, was finally rejected by the GRP after protests
from some quarters. This, and the dissolution of the GRP peace panel, effectively killed off the peace process for the time being and regressed the
situation to one of war again. To date more than 60 people have been killed
and more than 500,000 people have had to flee the confrontations and becoming IDPs.
The Mindanao Peace Process between the GRP and the MILF is now
dead. This is the conclusion that can be made from the recent events that
have unfolded since the ill-fated non-signing of the MOA-AD on 5 August,
2008. These events actually started with the issuance of the Temporary
Restraining Order
(TRO)
by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on 4
August, 2008 and culminated with the same body making the temporary
permanent through the majority 8-7 vote on 14 October, 2008, declaring
society organizations from all over Southeast Asia called upon the conflict actors to
observe the ceasefire and go back to the peace process. They called upon the
Supreme Court to lift the TRO and sign the MOA-AD as soon as possible to achieve
peace in Mindanao. They also call upon the Malaysian government to continue its
role in facilitating the peace talks and leading the IMT. For further detail, please
see www.mindanews.com.
the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution, and which effectively
killed off the peace process.
What then of peace in Mindanao? The situation now is uncertain, in
the sense that there is no clear direction for peace in Mindanao on the part
of the major actors. But for many concerned observers and affected populace there, the picture is clear. There can be no peace while this current
government is in power the last exercise has effectively killed off any
trust-building created over the years. The MILF can make the conclusion
that it is futile to enter in any new negotiation with the current government.
In fact they have already said that there will not be any renegotiation on
the points already agreed to. It is also clear that the message given by the
Supreme Court in its decision says that future activities, including any
peace negotiation, would have to be within the jurisdiction of the constitution.
It makes it difficult then to think out of the box when the boundaries
have been clearly marked out, and doing things out of this box will be
deemed illegal and unconstitutional.
This brings us to a difficult predicament what to do now, given the
current political climate and an environment which is unresponsive and
even hostile to peace initiatives. Peacebuilders need to take stock of the
realities of current events and try to figure the next moves. For example,
hostilities have and will probably increase; there have been numerous
armed clashes and the ceasefire is hanging by a thread, despite some quarters arguing for the validity and continuation of the earlier ceasefire agreement; the numbers of IDPs and those affected by the war will increase,
creating a difficult humanitarian crisis that all of us are not ready or well
equipped for; the dilemma facing concerned third parties including the facilitator, Malaysia, as well as those involved in the IMT Brunei, Libya,
and Japan; the dilemma facing donors such as JICA, World Bank and others as to whether they need to continue their programs, revise them given
the current climate, or to even stop them; the problem of those involved
in rehabilitation and development programs, both international and local,
and decisions that they have to make regarding the continuation and extent
of their investments. These are the questions that those involved in peacebuilding in Mindanao at all levels have to address. Everybody will have
to grapple with the various options in front of them and pray that they,
and others, will when the time comes, choose the most practical, suitable,
and viable one. Whatever decision that will be made, however, might not
prove to be the most acceptable one for everybody. But it will have to be
made.
So, what are some of the scenarios for Mindanao and options on the
table for the stakeholders and peacebuilders to choose from? The first scenario is of course the continuation of the current status quo situation largely
envisioned in the previous part. Not only for Mindanao but also for the
Philippines. Nothing will change for the moment and things will stay that
way until the next presidential election in 2010. The next scenario is an
increase in the intensity of the conflict situation. There have already been
many reports of armed clashes involving both sides, and if things are not
controlled
(if they can be controlled)
then the situation will worsen. The danger
of both sides taking the military option in pursuing their goals is very real.
There is also very little prospect of further negotiations between the sides.
The option, and the challenge for all including the facilitator and the IMT
is to somehow find creative ways to improve and maintain the ceasefire.
This will have to be coupled with enhancing humanitarian efforts on the
ground, and limiting the impact of the armed clashes on the people. Several
things, many of those have already started, will need to be continued and
enhanced. These include continuing rehabilitation and development work,
both by the local civil society groups as well as international bodies. These
activities are also necessary to instill a sense of hope to the people of
Mindanao, apart from the obvious target of cushioning and repairing the
impact of war on the affected areas as well as the general Mindanao area.
Other important activities that need to be continued are those that can contribute to the improvement of the mindsets of the parties and the affected
people. These include doing consultation and dialogue between the various
groups at all levels, including communities, civil society organizations, as
well international actors. Hopefully this can contribute to the dissemination
of information and education on the situation in Mindanao and the various
scenarios and options that are on the table for the people. And lastly, this
hopefully can contribute to the creation of a stronger constituent for peace
on all sides that will be supportive of the goals, objectives, and processes
of future peace initiatives.

Leading Role of NGOs in Solving Water

Disputes between India and Bangladesh:
Farakka Barrage Case
M. M. Mahbub Hasan
(Coastal Development Partnership : CDP)
Background
Bangladesh is located in Southern Asia, in the Northeast of the Indian
sub-continent, and covers a total area of 147,570 km2. Bangladesh is a
small part of the hydrodynamic system that includes the countries of Bhutan,
China, India, and Nepal. She is possessing unique natural characteristics
and being located at the mouth of the largest delta in the world. This delta
of loose soil is formed by alluvial deposit brought down by the numerous
distributaries of the Ganges. But the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta has been
created by deposition of river-borne sediments. Ganges water and sediment
have been diverted through a barrage
(dam)
at Farakka in India. This has
adversely affected agriculture, navigation,

irrigation, fisheries, forestry, industrial activities, salinity intrusion of coastal rivers,
groundwater, riverbed aggradations, sediment influx, coastal erosion, and submergence
in Bangladesh. Endowed with an abundance of natural resources and high biological diversity, there was need for an apGanges River Delta Bangladesh
propriate development initiative for optimal
Leading Role of NGOs in Solving Water Disputes between India and Bangladesh: Farakka Barrage Case
119
utilization of its resources for improving the living standard of the people.
Impelled these suffering the people of this region have launched numerous
social movements demanding mitigation of the problems.
Part-1: Farakka Case
What is the situation between Bangladesh and India in

connection with Farakka Barrage?
The Farakka Barrage Dispute is a historical conflict concerning the sharing
th
of Ganges river flows since 1951. On 29 October, 1951, Pakistan officially objected Indias plan to construct Farakka Barrage. In order to divert
water from the Ganges to the Hooghly river
(in India)
by a 42 km long feed-
er canal with a carrying capacity of 1133 m /sec. India officially admitted

the unilateral construction of the Barrage on 30th January, 1961. East
Pakistan
(Bangladesh after 1971)
insisted that Ganges flows across Indias east-
ern border be maintained at pre-partition levels. In 1974, India completed

a barrage at Farakka, 10 miles west of the India-Bangladesh border for the
benefit of the port of Calcutta. Since then, Ganges water became the key
source of conflict between the two nations.
The river Ganga or Ganges rises in the Gangotri glacier in the Uttar
Kashi district of Uttar Pradesh province in India, at an elevation of about
3,139 m (Encarta, 2001) above sea level. Many important tributaries
including Mahakali, Gandak, Kosi, and Karnali originate in Nepal and
China (Tibet). The Ganges river has total length of about 2600 km and
the total drainage area is of about 1,080,000km2 and is shared by China,
Nepal, India and Bangladesh. The Ganges basin is located 70~8830
east longitude and 21~31 north latitude
In a joint declaration on 16 May, 1974, the prime ministers of
Bangladesh and India acknowledged
(that there was)
a need to augment the
lean season flow of Ganges to meet the full requirements of both countries
and expressed their determination that before the Farakka project would be
commissioned they would arrive at a mutually acceptable allocation of the
water available during the periods of minimum flow in the Ganges. The
declaration authorized Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission (JRC)1 to
study schemes relating to the augmentation of the dry season Ganges flow
and make recommendations to meet the requirements of the both countries.
Farakka barrage started operation on 21 of April 1975. On June 1975,
Indo-Bangladesh JRC submitted its report in pursuance on the 1974 joint
declaration. Bangladesh side suggested augmentation of dry season flow
through building storage reservoirs in Nepal and whereas Indian side
stressed augmentation through diversion of water from the Brahmaputra
river to the Ganges River
(Abbas, 1984: 42).
Neither side agreed on the others
proposal.
After a 1975 coup installed
an anti-India government in
Bangladesh, India began diverting as much as 60 percent of
the Ganges dry season flows. In
1976, India continued unilateral
diversion of the Ganges flow
beyond the stipulated period in
the 1975 ministerial declaration
throughout the 1976 dry season
and withdrew 1133 m3/sec of
water
(full capacity of the feeder ca-
Satellite View of the Mouth of the Ganges River
th
1 On 24
November, 1972, India and Bangladesh signed statutes of the Indo- Bangladesh
Joint River Commission (JRC).
121
nal)
th
at Farakka. Consequently, on 26 November, 1976, as a response to
Bangladeshs appeal to the UN, the UN General Assembly adopted a consensus statement, which directed both countries to urgently negotiate a fair
and expeditious settlement of the Farakka problem to promote the wellbeing of the region
(UN, 1976).
In 1977, upon the direction of the UN, India
and Bangladesh signed Ganges Water Agreement on 5th November, 1977

th
for the duration of 5 years. On 7

Understanding
(MOU)
October, 1982, a Memorandum of
was signed between the two countries for sharing dry
season flow of Ganges at Farakka in 1983 and 1984. On 22nd November,

1985 another MOU was signed for three years
st
(1986-1988),
which expired
rd
on 31 May, 1988. On 23 October, 1995, Bangladesh again raised the issue to 50th UN General Assembly about the misery of Bangladeshi people
due to the unilateral water diversion at Farakka Barrage. An agreement between Bangladesh and India on sharing the Ganges water at Farakka was
signed on 12th December, 1996 for the duration of 30 years.
On 19-20 September 2006 a Indo-Bangladesh Ministerial meeting held
in Dhaka for resolving river erosion problem in the boarder side, but ending no fruitful result. On January 2008 a letter has been sent to the Indian
Government for ensuring water ratio between Bangladesh and India according to the water treaty1996 by JRC. Hence, the 2246 m long Farakka
barrage is still a lingering source of conflict and tension between Bangladesh
and India.
What is the matter with Farrakka Barrage?

a) According to 4th IPCC report, Bangladesh is one of the highest climate
change vulnerable country all over the world and it has a higher possibility to submerge its one third parts within 50 years. Regarding this
situation mismanagement of Ganges water is affecting several times
the southwest part of Bangladesh.

b) This barrage has two different affect during the two seasons. During
the dry season India withdraws the water in huge quantity and in
monsoon period she opens the gates of the Farakka Barrage so that
Bengal is getting overflooded.
c) Consequence of this barrage: Over 40 million people mainly peasants
are directly affected and over 70 million people have been infected
with arsenic disease as people compelled to utilize the underground
water for their drinking and agricultural purpose.
d) India is not only withdrawing the water from the Ganges but also
from other 53 common international rivers shared by two countries.
More than one third territory of Bangladesh is affected. The Farakka
Barrage is not only threatening the very existence of Bengal but also
provoking the world ecology.
e) India has declared the ecological war against the Bengal. The Farakka
Barrage is the Atom Bomb for Bangladesh. It is the biggest crime
against the humanity of this nature that ever happened in the world
history. In 1998, 30 million people were affected by the flood caused
by the Farakka Barrage.
f) World Bank, Asian Development Bank
(ADB),
IMF and other interna-
tional financial institutions have got the involvement and are the direct beneficiaries of this catastrophing situation. As far as the adverse
affect of the globalization on ecology and environment is concerned,
the Bengal is the worst victim.
g) Bengals major economy is based on the agriculture and about 80 percent people are involved with agriculture. Without water for irrigation
and with the overflooded situation, it made Bengal one of the poorest
countries in the world.
h) Whole social, economic and political systems are directly co-related
123
with this Farakka Barrage. The abject poverty has provoked the women
and child smuggling. Five million women and girls have been already
smuggled and kidnapped and sold to the prostitute markets of the
India
(Mainly Mumbai)
and Pakistan. Every year thousands of the children
are being stolen and kidnapped and their organs are smuggled to the
foreign countries. Some of these children are also sold to the oil-rich
middle-east countries for the use of the camel race.
Does the Indian government keep their contract with

Bangladesh?
Since Bangladeshs independence in 1971, only over Farakka issue have
Bangladesh-India relations become distant, tremulous, and tense
212, Rahaman, 2005a).
(Novak 1993:
The two governments realize the need to cooperate with
each other in finding a solution to the long-term problem of augmenting

the flows of the Gange/Ganges during the dry season. People also feel the
necessity of cooperation between themselves. However, its realization has
not come true. This will perhaps go down in the history of International
Treaties in regard to sharing a life-sustaining commodity as a vagueness
of Himalayan-proportion. While vagueness pervades the entire body of the
Treaty, contradiction is another characteristic of the much-vaunted document.
We may discuss it here.
In case flow at Farakka falls below 50,000 cusec in any 10-day period,
the two governments will enter into immediate consultations to make adjustment on an emergency basis, in accordance with equity, fair play, and
no harm to either party. Therefore while the formula does guarantee
35,000 cusec under all flow regimes to each country for 3 ten-day periods,
it may be conveniently interpreted as inapplicable if the flow comes down
below 50,000 cusec. This is a serious flaw in the Treaty and will be a constant source of misunderstanding between the two countries, as it has been
this year. And therefore a Treaty flagged as a historic one just tread on
a muddy ground. More so because low flow will occur naturally during
the period when water-needs will be higher
(March-April).
The new treaty
sets 10 day periods from March to May in which India and Bangladesh will
alternately take most of the water reaching Farakka, set at a minimum of
34,500 cubic feet per second. But on 27 March, during a period when the
flows were supposed to favor Bangladesh, the monitoring team at Hardinge
Bridge recorded only 6,500 cubic feet per second, the lowest figure ever.
Many Bangladeshi accused India of surreptitiously diverting water at
Farakka at night when no monitoring team was present. Its very difficult
to deal with such mistrust, after even the process is running by the NGOs
and CSOs.
125
Part-2: Role of NGOs
How and what role NGOs and Civil Society

Organizations are playing in this region in keeping
peaceful solution on this matter?
NGOs and CSOs of Bangladesh are fighting against the Ganges water
dispute between Bangladesh and India. Several times they have tried to resolve the Farakka problems. But the Indian government is always ignoring
the NGOs and CSOs demands without any specific reason. It has been
proved by various researches and Bangladesh is not getting legitimate share
of Ganges water according to the water sharing ratio of Farakka Water
Treaty.
Nearly 35 million people in about one-third of the total area of
Bangladesh are directly dependent upon the Ganges for their livelihood.
Hence, the impact of water availability can have far-reaching consequences.
The diversion of Ganges waters by India and the ensuing decrease in flow
through Bangladesh has disrupted fishing and navigation, brought unwanted

salt deposits into rich farming soil, adversely affected agricultural and industrial production, changed the hydraulic character of the rivers, and
brought about changes in the ecology of the Delta. In addition, there have
been increased health problems due to the decreased availability of fresh
water2. The worst effects are felt during the dry season between the months
of January and May.
There are a number of existing NGOs that are capable of conducting
good work, but suffer from a lack of access to data about the problem.
Such organizations include the Centre for Policy Research in India, the
Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies in Bangladesh, and the
Institute for International Developmental Studies in Nepal. These three
NGOs at least should become heavily involved in lending their local
expertise. The role of this working group would be to see that
tional security issues)
(beyond na-
the remote sensing data is available to all parties involved
so that all players can see a common picture as to what the effects of the
water withdrawal at Farakka truly are. Within that context of a common
understanding, then possible solutions can be formulated
(such as India aban-
doning withdrawal for Calcutta, because the Ganges will ultimately bypass Farakka in its slow
drift to the east).
How do NGOs cooperate with each other for this cause?

Although there are diverse NGOs in Bangladesh, a common vision has
been created in some NGOs and CSOs which are protesting the unjust
IFIS unfair investment, illegal pressure and policy of Donor agencies)
(i.e.
and active for en-
suring social justice. At the same time some NGOs are inactive against
2 Swain, A., Displacing the Conflict: Environmental Destruction in Bangladesh and
Ethnic Conflict in India, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1996, pp. 189204.
127
these issues and overlooking this great human aspects as well as they are
thinking about the interest on their investment. The NGOs which are still
alive against this unjust discrimination are trying to play their role from
a common platform. Though they are creating different issue based on networks but their inner aspect of the movement and vision is almost same
that is to save Bangladesh from any kinds of intrigue and unjustness. From
this spirit there are many NGO networks created in Bangladesh. They are
helping each other to run social movement like in the case of Farakka
Barrage. For example, in the south-west region of Bangladesh some network
has been created on water rights issue which is continuously pressuring government for resolving Indo-Bangladesh water problems in connection with
the Farrakka Barrage.
In the efforts of coordinating the remaining local conflicting interests
and meeting the local security needs prevalent in rainy season, key roles
may be expected played by Water Management Groups or Cooperative
Associations along with local government staffs of BWDB and LGED,
and by local NGOs including Area Water Partnerships (AWPs) in particular, which have been organized under Global and Bangladesh Water
Partnership (GWP, BWP) as policy forum for implementing IWRM on
a grass-root level (Miwa OKURA).
They are jointly organizing various meetings, workshops, seminars, and
conferences for ensuring peoples livelihood by resolving water problems.
Peoples River Commission (PRC): A solidarity efforts for

regional peace
Coastal Development Partnership
Peoples River Commission
(PRC)
(CDP)
initiated this project to form a
comprising NGOs, CBOs, Civil Society
initiatives and activists in Bangladesh, India and Nepal in order to influence

the governments concerned to form a Joint River Commission of the three
countries for optimum utilization of the waters of the Ganges and its
tributaries. On the way back from the Asian Social Forum Seminars in
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh India, Ashraf-ul-Alam Tutu
peoples leader, passed away on 12 February, 2008)
(A pioneer activist and
Coordinator of CDP and Mr.
Shashanka Saadi of Action Aid Bangladesh, held a meeting with a network

of several NGOs active in West Bengal and held discussions with them
in respect of the PRC. They assured their support, as their areas too, had
suffered vast devastation by the flood of 2000, which had affected the
Southwestern border districts of Bangladesh. Under PRC network, CDP
published some advocacy newsletter and this network played a vital role
in protesting Indian River linking project.
The Supreme Court of India on October 31 last year (2002) directed
the Indian government to initiate the plan of inter-linking 37 rivers
through excavating 9,000 km of more than 600 canals to create irrigation facilities for an additional 150 million hectares of land in the next
decade. Following this verdict the Indian government embarked on the
ambitious action plan with a budget of Rs 560,000 crores, equivalent
to around 2 percent of the Indias GDP, for inter-linking the rivers by
building hundreds of reservoir. India plans to divert vast quantities of
water from major rivers, including the Ganges and the Brahmaputra
threaten the livelihoods of more than 100 million people downstream
in Bangladesh, the Bangladeshi government fears. (Sources: The
Independent, 11/10/2003 and 07/30/2003)
129
It was the second attempt to attack by India for destroying Bangladesh after
the first attack of Farrakka Barrage. But the continuous movement of NGOs
at the local, national and international level discouraged the Indian government to stop her inhumanity plan against Bangladesh but they are still
thinking about their river linking mechanism.
What process may be an appropriate solution for

mitigating the conflicts?
Our previous experience reveals that peoples solidarity among various organizations and civil society members from Bangladesh, India & Nepal is
essential to work out a peaceful resoultion of Farakka dispute. CDP-facilitated peoples movement on PRC should be explored again for mitigating
this conflict. Through the PRC, grassroot activists in the Bangladesh, India
and Nepal can move forward to the national level as well as to the international level for governments concernted. Then governments will have no
way to overlooking the problems raised by those peoples. NGOs have to
do it, otherwise goventments will never come forward willingly to reslove
this problem as we have seen for last 60 years that they could not finalize
their discussion agenda through the 130 meetings on Farakka issue. We
have to come forward, to challenge this issue, because this is not an issue
of an individual, but the issue of millions of people while this is affecting
their livelihoods, and destroying them for a long time.
Advocacy is a process of influencing the attitudes and behaviour of targeted
actors in order to change the policy and practice of governments and other
institutions. It is a first step in collective action and ensures that policymaking is informed by the views of civil society. To fight corruption in
the water sector it is necessary to advocate for better institutions, better participation, and better laws and regulations. (Transparency International (TI)
and the Water Integrity Network (WIN) in their publication Global

Corruption Report 2008)
Engr Quamrul Islam Siddiqui said all water experts along with social scientists, experts on geography and other experts should come forward to build
a forum to ensure the smooth flow of water in the international rivers. We
should take steps on how to increase the conservation of water, he said.
He also said, The Padma and Brahmaputra are the main rivers of the
country which provide with huge quantity of surface water. If India builds
a water grid line to shift water from the northern region to southern region,
it would be disastrous for Bangladesh and the country will be deprived of
surface water drastically.
Dr. Ainun Nishat said, India, China, Turkey and Brazil are conserving
water without considering the demands of water of downstream countries.
But, under the international laws, conservation of water from the upper-riparian is not legal without taking the demands of down stream counties
into consideration.
Recommendation:
An immediate long-term solution to the environmental and economic problems caused by Indias diversion of the Ganges flow is imperative. From
my above discussions, therefore, to ptotect the people of the border regions
from the ravages of various problems and to prevent massive loss of lives
and property, the following steps are recommended;
1. The Indian Government has to change their mentality, although they
could never change it before even they could never able to set the
Indo-Bangla water conflicts mitigation meeting agenda in the last over
hundred of meetings.
2. Ganges water sharing issue has to be considered as the regional issue,
131
this is not a bilateral issue because this is directly related to Bangladesh,

India and Nepal. Therefore, South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation
(SAARC)
has to come forward with this issue.
3. UN has to come forward for resolving the historical water conflict

between Bangladesh and India to make peaceful neighborship
relationship.
4. The Indian government has to change their river linking project planning with the respect of international laws.
5. Re-excavation of all dead and dying rivers and dranage channels. This
will evict all illegal encroachments on the river channels, whether for
agricultural puposes or for fishery of shrimps or fish. As most of the
encroachers are influential peoples, this requires political commitment.
6. Water reservoirs may be built in the boarder areas to hold excessive
water during periods of heavy rains or flood.
7. Demolish and reconstruct all culverts, bridges etc. that restrict the
flow of rivers of canal that are capable of drainig surplus water.
8. Develop an efficient internal flood warning system for the region and
improve cooperation with upper riparian India. For this to be effective, experts, social workers and disaster management personnel need
to exchange and share information and opinions on a regular basis.
9. Develop close relationship between NGOs in Bangaldesh, India, and
Nepal on Farakka Issues.
10. Mobilization of people on the grassroots level, and consultation with
peoples and govenments, while organizing advocacy and lobbying
with the authority for solving the problems.
11. Build up the capacity of local people to address disaster situations
effectively, including appropritae curriculam in schools.
12. Conducting issue-based research on Farakka problems
Livelihood, Environment, River etc.)
(e.g. Agriculture,
13. Identify all other environmental unbalance and rectify them.

14. Identify the appropriate method of resolving the conflicts with all
parties concerned.
15. To observe the day of May 16 as the International Barrage Resistant
Day every year.
16. Mobilization of resources for implementing this movement successfully.
Conclusion:
Water is invaluable and useful environment resource of nature. Preservation
of natural water resources and river channel is important for the sustainable development of nature. Ecology and environment as well as bio-diversity depend on natural river flow. Due to withdrawal of water from the
rivers by India will reduce the water availability in Bangladesh. Water on
the Ganges flows from upstream to downstream and falls into the Bay of
Bengal, so its course depends on upstream river which is the sources of water flow of Bangladesh. I heartily request all CBOs, CSOs, and NGOs, policy makers, the UN, the SAARC, the other local, national, and international
communities, to support the protection of the adverse impact of Farakka
barrage that is highly affecting Bangladesh, ensure over 30-million peoples
livelihoods, save us from the highest climate change vulnarability by a
peaceful and meaningful solution to the Indo-Bangla water conflict that remains to be solved for last 60 years.
133

The Expected and Projected Role of International

Law in Resolving and Securing Sustainable Peace
and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute
Justice M. Mbuh
(National Polytechnic, Nkwen, Bamenda, NWP, Cameroun.)
Introduction
The fraudsters and violators of international law have had their say with
political manipulations that satisfy their individual rationale, as opposed
to that of the badly abused, re-colonized and collective nationals of
Ambazonia and Cameroun as a contemporary torn state. It is time to lay
bare their track record and call for order and respect of the rule of law
and the rights of Man so provided by Nature, God and The Law of
Nations. This paper is based upon the proposition that the propensity of
the Bakassi Peninsula dispute, in its post-hand-over phase1 of becoming a
protracted armed conflict beyond Bakassi to include the entire British
Cameroons
(Southern Cameroons and Northern Cameroons)
is a function of the de-
1 We should note that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on the dispute over
Bakassi on 10/10/2002; and the Annan-Bakassi Peace Accord (ABPA) signed by both
Cameroun and Nigerian authorities from 29 January-02 February 2005 to return to
their boundaries at independence as ordered by the Court, 1913 and 1919 for Nigeria
and Cameroun, respectively; and the Green Tree Agreement (GTA) 12/06/2006
replaced the ABPA and carried out the hand-over of the peninsula from one illegal
occupant (Nigeria) to another (Cameroun)! This is grounds enough to expect and
project future escalation between Ambazonia and Cameroun using expected utility
theory of understanding international conflicts (Beuno de Mesquita, B., 1991; Jervis,
1976, 1981, 1983).
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
and Securing Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute 137
gree to which the President of Cameroun Mr. Paul Biya stops fidgeting
with the Law of Nations. The core of arguments is that by invoking a treaty, which Cameroun knowingly, consistently, glaringly and deliberately violated to claim Bakassi from Nigerias own 419 attempts at doing same,
Cameroun also knowingly and deliberately lied to the Court, thus invariably
committing acts of perjury against the law of nations and setting up the
entire Gulf of Guinea sub-region for future conflicts. This paper dismisses
the Green Tree Agreement
(GTA) (12 June, 2006),
ask Cameroun President Paul
Biya to answer seven questions; ask the United Nations officials to answer
ten questions against eleven evidence of the history of Ambazonia, attempts
providing a compromise solution, appeals to UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon and shows that Cameroun rule of Ambazonia and claims over
Bakassi Peninsula because of the United Nations Plebiscite of 11 February,
1961 are absolutely bogus, fraudulent and illegal.
This author, in configuring and conceptualizing this particular dispute
in 2000 two years ahead of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ)
ruling,
held that the Bakassi Peninsula border dispute was first a case of the sovereignty of Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons)2
before determination could be
made as to which nation sovereignty of the peninsula lies. Since 1916, international law protected both Cameroun and Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons)
2 Coined from Ambas Bay Colony, founded by Reverend Alfred Saker at about
1843-1858, with Victoria as Capital (Mbuh, J. 2000, 2005). Upon illegally annexing
Southern Cameroons in violation of the Trusteeship, UN Resolution 1608 of 21 April
1961 and because of the appellation Cameroun, elite of the erstwhile Southern
Cameroons or given the false pretense of implementing the unity Agreement
stipulated by the said UN Resolution 1608, confronted Cameroun in 1985 with three
landmark documents, renamed the territory or Southern Cameroons as Republic of
Ambazonia and since then Cameroun Republic, which had independence on 1 January,
1960 has been in denial of any violation of international law, let alone the inalienable
rights of Ambazonians, to the extent they issue death ordinances as that in the
appendix herein.
as League of Nations Mandated Territories and United Nations Trust

Territories and secured international legal materials for their future attainment of independence as distinct states or as two equal states in a
confederation. Before 1916, and until 1961-1972, the Bakassi Peninsula has
always been part of Ambazonia. What caused the dispute was that while
international law protected both states, and while Cameroun attained independence as La Republique du Cameroun on 1 January, 1960, Ambazonia
was left as a free for all3 territory for Cameroun and Nigeria to gamble
over all or portions of it. One would suppose that Nigeria claimed portions
of Ambazonia and Cameroun defended its sovereignty because both nations
were hiding the truth that the UN Plebiscite of 11 February, 19614 was both
illegal and in violation of the terms of the UN Trusteeship Agreement for
the states that comprised British Cameroons.
International, domestic and continental legal instruments, international
historic materials and contemporary evidence of false pretenses of being
law abiding and the misrepresentation of history and the rule of law are
utilized to debunk and refute Cameroun claims over both Bakassi and
Ambazonia. This paper does not shy from demanding swift intervention
from the UN, in the light of truth, and wonders if it is possible for
Ambazonians to let bygones be bygones; and rather than stress total independence, still commit themselves to a union with Cameroun in the face
of recent trends of compromise solution paradigm now being sponsored
3 This is a typical of parlance of former Cameroun Foreign Minister Jacque Roger
Booh-Booh who became Under Secretary General to the UNSG Boutrous-Boutrous

Ghali and was noted for mis-informing the UN about conditions in Rwanda, which
acts set the pace for the genocide that followed (Mbuh, J., 2004, 2005; Peterson, S.,
1999).
4 By the terms of the 1960 Two Alternatives for which the UN Plebiscite held,
Cameroun was to become East Cameroon and Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) was
to be known as West Cameroon, provided there was a unitary constitution on or before
1 October, 1961. This is never been honored by Cameroun!
and accepted by Africans and the international community

Congo, Ivory Coast, Guinea, etc.),
(Kenya, Zimbabwe,
the abuses and wanton exploitation of
Ambazonia since 1961 by successor state
(Cameroun)
apart. This would avert
the propensity for future escalation of the sovereignty dispute into a war
of liberation of Ambazonia
(which could then include Northern Cameroons)
against
Cameroun. The trouble with this proposition, however, is that Cameroun,

st
which attained independence as La Republique du Cameroun on 1 January,

1960 is a French surrogate state and does not do anything without consulting them! Since history has proven that Africans cannot trust the French
(Rwanda and Bamilike/Cameroun Genocide!);
and if Ambazonians cannot trust
Cameroun, how then can Ambazonians substitute independence for a union

of Two Equal States, now brandished as recolonization by Cameroun, given
Camerouns track record in the last forty-seven years? Indeed, we cannot
count how many Ambazonians have died directly from bullets of Cameroun
soldiers or indirectly due to consequential poverty and despondence imposed on them, as against zero-deaths
(from the governments of Ambazonia)
since
when Ambazonia first had a parliament and government when they separated from Nigeria
(1954),
until 1972 when Cameroun plots against their
sovereignty materialized with the lies of United Republic of Cameroon

(URC).
The study of the case of the Bakassi Peninsula
(Mbuh 2000, 2004, 2007)
reveals that even though it would appear that Nigeria has handed over the
peninsula to Cameroun, the question as to the legitimacy of Cameroun
claims over the peninsula and the entire Ambazonia
na-
tional territory still remains unanswered. This is because Cameroun is supposed to be one of two states in a union with Ambazonia
Studies by Mbuh
(2000)
uphold the argument and this was confirmed by re-
dactions of the ICJ Ruling, that Cameroun has not only illegally occupied
Ambazonia, but did also file doctored statements to the international court
in staking her claims over Bakassi, which acts confirm state-succession and
illegal annexation of Ambazonia.
In utilizing and defending the projected and expected role of international law that it has enough provisions that can defuse any tensions and
conflicts between nations, Expected Utility Theory
Bruno de Mesquita, 1991; 1993)
(EUT) (Jervis, 1981, 1983;
shows that even though Cameroun and Nigeria
might have, in claiming the peninsula, ordered their preferences and undertook the dangerous mission of defending the peninsula even militarily
(because of its oil and other resources wealth and for that Ambazonians thank them enormously!),
their acts were illegal and therefore at contrast with the expected
utility of international law and accurate interpretation of contemporary

events and the history surrounding the peninsula and associated disputes.
In this regard, this paper also reveals that legal processes were tampered
with by Judges and Jurist in contempt of the law; and this is likely to cause
future conflicts. These arguments are based on the fact that the current
trend of legal posturing and false pretences in the face of gross illegalities
by Cameroun authorities before and since the Green Tree Agreement
(12 June, 2006)
(GTA)
must be seen as uncivilized attempts at interpreting power-pol-
itics vis--vis abounding misperceptions and misutilization of the law.

When uncovered, as we have herein, misperceptions can be very devastating to any regime because these could become very provoking of the
masses, generate and fuel future conflicts
(Jervis, 1976).5
This explanation is
not too different from that of conception and misconception, which are a
measure of intensity of ones beliefs and conceptualization of what is, rightly or wrongly, consequences of peoples causal effects of phenomena.
In this regard, Willingness would denote, and grants opportunity for
5 For details, see Jervis, R. (1976) Perception and Misperception in International
Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. See also, Jervis (1969) Hypothesis
on Misperception. International Politics and Foreign Policy.
implementing policy suggestions that bring together what would otherwise

have become dissident forces that build up the propensity for retaliation,
and in escalatory stages, produce warring tendencies and consequences. In
Morgenthaus words, the ubiquity of evil in human action arising
from mans ineradicable lust for power that transform churches into political organizations revolutions into dictatorshipslove for country into
imperialism, the explanation that suffices for domestic ills serves as
well to explain frictions and wars among States
(Waltz, 1959).
In the case of the Bakassi Peninsula and her aftermath, handing over
to Cameroun is a necessary but insufficient condition for peace and security.
The sufficient condition for prolonged, sustainable peace, therefore, lies in
the ability of Cameroun authorities to set aside all other considerations and
engage dissident voices in meaningful dialogue be they for power-sharing, for reformation of a sorry system, or for self-determination dissident
voices must not be seen as destructive, but rather, for the sense it makes
utilizing all or aspects of their claims to strengthen unity, be it in diversity
(Mbuh, 2007).
In preventing escalation and providing meaningful suggestions
to resolve a potentially deadly conflict over the sovereignty of Ambazonia,

Cameroun authorities should be led to see reasons why utilization of willingness and opportunity, international law and interventionist endeavors
make more sense than pretending and upholding illegalities before the law.
Eut and Individual -v- Collective Rationality Concerns

Before coming of age in the essay by Bruce Beuno de Mesquita in
Handbook of War Studies
(Midlarsky, ed., 1991),
EUT had been used by
many authors and researchers in international conflict studies to provide explanations of political decisions such as voting, study of international conflict, notably deterrence, war termination,
(Riker and Ordeshook, 1973; Ferejohn
and Fiorina, 1972; Beuno de Mesquita, 1981; Gilpin, 1981; Mitchell and Nicholas, 1983),
the construction of a general theory

Beuno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1986)
(Altfeld and Beuno de Mesquita, 1979; and
and for the purpose of this paper, war ini-
tiation and escalation given First Order Threats
(FOTs)
and poor manage-
ment of triggers and or de-escalators of conflicts in Africa

Ambazonias Challenge to the United Nations, Mbuh
(Mbuh, 2000, 2004).
(2007)
utilizes EUT to
defend truths of the history and the proper interpretation of the law in relation to Ambazonia and reveal that regardless of the ICJ ruling, there still
exist a serious threat to global peace and security over the Gulf of Guinea
Sub-region because Ambazonias sovereignty and not that of Bakassi is
what is at stake.
When parameters of the Bakassi and Ambazonia sovereignty disputes
are examined, they expose the fact that triggers and escalators are a function, primarily of FOTs and their individual, greedy choices and discrimination, especially abuse of the law, which fuel exclusion into national economic and political discuss
(individual -v- collective rationality).
No example in
history is as strong as that of the French Revolutionaries led by Robespierre

(Bastiat, F., 1964).6
Many cases in African leadership reveal that like Robespierre,
the law does always catch up with them from Halle Salesie, Colonel
Mengistu Haile Mariam, Field Marshal Dada Idi Amin, Ahmadou Ahidjo,
Houphouet Boigny, Mathieu Kereku, Samuel Doe, Charles Taylor, Mubutu
Sese Seko, Ian Smith, and of course Piet Botha and the now old racist bastion in South Africa to current FOTs such as Paul Biya, Omar Bongo,
Yoweri Museveni, and Robert Mugabe. This is because in ordering their
preferences, African leaders are prone to putting individual rationality
ahead of collective rationality, which is by far more sustainable and successful in preventing dissent by securing for one and all opportunity, great6 Bastiat, Frederic (1964) The Law. Fifth Ed. New York: Foundation for Economic
Education, Inc., p. 54-55.

er peace and security. To this effect, such leaders are classified as FOTs.
Just as Robespierre knew no better, so too has leadership in Cameroun displayed blunders and plundering against the law and the rights of their
masses, especially those of Ambazonia. And just like the fate of
Robespierre, so too should the law triumph over the abuses of FOTs by
Cameroun authorities over Ambazonian sovereign rights. The degree of
collective rationality is so limited, and better measured in terms of the adversity or despondency of the masses as a consequence of escalating conflicts
(opportunity cost of unity against sovereignty or independence).
Again, nothing
would give us clarity into conflict triggers and escalators than the core
study of the Bakassi Peninsula border dispute and her aftermath, if at all
by Nigeria handing over the peninsula to Cameroun matters have been put
to rest.
Concerning the Bakassi Peninsula dispute, the misperceptions by FOTs,
guided primarily by individual rationality led belligerent states to take the
matter to the ICJ in 1994. By August 2008, Nigerian authorities finally
submitted to the 2002 ICJ ruling, however ambiguous, to hand over the
Peninsula to Cameroun. In addition to the ICJ Ruling, Nigerias High Court
had two victories of dissenting voices from Ambazonians
Bakassians)
(including
that disputed the handing over of the peninsula to Cameroun
citing misinterpretation of the rule of law and the history of the territory
under dispute.7 Dissenting voices also held
(and the Nigerian High Court ruled)
that the handover should not take place without associated disputes given
7 For details see case of Southern Cameroons versus Nigeria in Abuja High Court, 2002;
Bakassians -V- Nigeria in the same court, 2008. The primary contentions being that
Bakassi was part of the Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) during the UN Plebiscite
in February 1961; and that the results of the said UN Plebiscite having never been
implemented, it is a breach of international law to handover Bakassi to Cameroun,
which had separate independence from Southern Cameroons and has illegally occupied
and ruled the said territory with impunity.
their due treatment such as the case of Ambazonia -v- Cameroun and the
compensation and assimilation of Bakassians and Nigerians who have lived
there all their lives into Cameroun polity. In other words, the factors that
triggered and led to escalatory skirmishes over the peninsula have not been
properly addressed. Gross misperceptions and misconceptions, and even
misinterpretation of the ICJ Judgment still abound. Since provisions of international law to this effect have already been discussed
2007),
(Mbuh, 2000, 2004,
it is not necessary to do so again. However, it was provocation of
dissenting voices when Cameroun President Paul Biya went on National

Television 21 August, 2008 praising the Cameroun army for a job well
done and assuring Nigerians in the Bakassi Peninsula of their security in
Cameroun and followed a few days afterwards by declaring Ambazonias
supposed National Day of 1 October as Cameroun Armed Forces Day. The
following seven questions seek answers from Cameroun President Paul
Biya or his assigned public official on claims of unity and sovereignty of
Cameroun over Ambazonian national territory:
1. Was it the Cameroun army that won Bakassi from Nigeria or the rule
of law?
2. Which National Day is Camerouns and which is being celebrated in
Cameroun these days, if at all any: 1st January, or 1st October?
3. If Ambazonians
(Southern Cameroonians)
under Cameroun illegal annexation
have been addressing the UN, domestic Cameroun, Nigerian and African
Union Courts and winning their cases in support of demands for independence from Cameroun, are such legal victories not enough justification that they have lived under tyranny and insecurity under Cameroun
rule?
4. Do such legal victories not mean that the root causes of the Bakassi
Peninsula dispute have not been properly addressed by international and
domestic jurists and that whatever decision they arrived at was due to
duress, if they neglect the glaring fact that Cameroun has breached her
boundary at independence?
5. If Cameroun authorities have already given out contracts for exploitation
of oil in the peninsula, and given that Ambazonian oil since 1972 has
not been accounted for and very little or nothing has been done to this
territory in the name of development
(Mbuh, J., 2005, 2007),
why should
any observer not see Cameroun President Paul Biya as a FOT and their
greedy ambitions of embezzling state funds, using Ambazonian resources to develop Cameroun as being guilty of crimes against humanity?
6. In addition, if Camerouns President is not being truthful to Nigerians
at Bakassi, even though they were never part of the Ambazonian population that voted in the Bakassi District in the UN Plebiscite in 1961
and this is evidence of either the presidents misperception of
Cameroun unity with Ambazonia and the failure thereof; given the underdevelopment, over-exploitation, gross and continuous abuses of basic
and fundamental inalienable human rights of Ambazonian masses, how
then can Nigerians in Bakassi trust the utterances of Cameroun President
Paul Biya, when there is surmounting evidence that he and his predecessor, Ahmadou Ahidjo, never honored the terms of union with then
Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
and because of that Ambazonian na-
tionals and independentists do not trust Cameroun authorities either?

7. The UN and African Union should demand from Cameroun President
to present the map of Cameroun at her independence on 1 January, 1960,
and in so doing acknowledge that the Plebiscite Treaty has not been
honored. If he does that, with a high degree of certainty, would he still
claim union with Ambazonia and that Bakassi is Cameroun territory?
Here, utilizing EUT, we also seek resolve and explanation from the
United Nations on the following nine questions surrounding the sovereignty

of Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons):
1. By imposing a plebiscite on Ambazonia
(and all of British Cameroons in 1961),
was this consistent with Mandatory Territory

Agreement
(1946)
(1922)
and UN Trusteeship
laws?
2. That by failing to ensure that a truly uniting and democratic con-Federal

Constitution on the terms of the 1960 UN Two Alternatives, which gave
only eight Federal powers
(Concurrent Jurisdiction)
to the Federal Government,
was such misapplication and eventual abandonment of the instrument of

law consistent with the UN Trusteeship Agreement?
3. That when Cameroun abolished multiparty democracy in 1966
(which was
a historic characteristic peculiar to, and when Ambazonians demanded and re-instated it
in 1990, at the expense of many of their citizens being killed, maimed, tortured and illegally detained)
was this not a violation of the constitutional and inalienable
rights of the people of Ambazonia?

4. That when Cameroun appointed a would-be Federal Inspector to whom
the West Cameroon government
(Ambazonia)
was to be answerable, this
without a Con-federal or Federal Constitution on the terms of the union,

was this not a breach of international treaty as well as of trust between
the two parties, thus nullifying the very essence of union?
5. That when Cameroun, pretending to be concretizing national unity,
which they claimed had matured, utilized a name-changing syndrome to
usurp, completely and illegally annex Ambazonia through the lies of a
Federal Republic of Cameroon
(URC, 1972)
(FRC, 1961),
United Republic of Cameroon
and now simply the Republic of Cameroon
(RC, 1984),
were
these developments consistent with the letter of the law protecting 1922
Mandatory Territories and 1946 Trust Territories, let alone the terms of
the Two Alternatives of 1960?8
6. That when Cameroun attained separate independence on 1 January, 1960
and secured her boundary by the 1916, 1919, 1931 and 1933 AngloFrench boundary treaties, was this consistent with the evidence they
(Cameroun)
tendered at the ICJ when laying claims to Bakassi Peninsular
that Ambazonia or Southern Cameroons is part of Cameroun? and
if so, can they tender any agreements with Ambazonians to this effect?
7. That when the UN Human Rights Committee ruled in Fongum GorjiDinka -v- Cameroun9 that they did not have the authority to deal with
matters of self determination, citing ratione material and ratione temporis, neglecting the primary causes which set the Ambazonia leadership against Cameroun
(The Three Landmark Documents released in 1985 and for
which Fon Fongum Gorji-Dinka was arrested, detained, tortured and paraded before the
Yaound, Cameroun Military Tribunal, House arrested and pushed into exile, as has millions of Ambazonians)
all this is consistent with the rule and application of
the letter of the law of treaties and of Trust Territories and benefits that
accrue to a people thereof ?
8 Cameroun Republic tendered all these documents of the Mandated Territory, 1931/
33 Boundary Agreements and Trusteeship, as evidence against Nigeria, forgetting that

as Jesus Christ said, they were indeed testifying against themselves that they are
not owners of any Ambazonian (Southern Cameroonian) patch of land. They thus must
have bribed the international community to continue bending the rule of law and
allowing them to act in place of Ambazonians. Any Judge worthy of that name ought
to see this right away and demand restitution of Ambazonia as a sovereign state, while
perpetrators of such stinking international crimes shall be held accountable.
9 Fongum Gorji-Dinka -v- Cameroun. This should have been the major turning point,
which the United Nations ought to utilize in correcting all anomalies over the
erstwhile Southern Cameroons or Ambazonia, removing all ambiguities that create
gross human rights abuses by Cameroun of Ambazonians. Sadly enough, the UN
Tribunal ruled that it does not have powers to decide matters on self-determination.
Sadly again, the Tribunal and all her Judges erred for Article 1, of the United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UNICCPR) disproves
them! However, the ruling did uphold all previous rulings in Cameroun Tribunals
and Courts, citing these were enough to have remedied the situation and stop the
abuse of individual and collective rights. This is the core argument in this work.
8. That when Cameroun kills Ambazonian nationalist leaders, issues death

ordinances, to eliminate them without traces
(see appendix),
shoots dead
their children in elementary, secondary and high school, and universities,

rapes their women, deprives Ambazonians of any economic development
(infrastructural and development of social amenities),
these are good grounds to
defend expected utility of unity and the law against self-determination/

independence?
9. Lastly, that when the ICJ ruled that Bakassi belongs to former UN Trust
Territory of the Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia),
was it not directly or
implicitly calling into question Cameroun claims that they have sovereignty over Bakassi because Southern Cameroons united with them in
1961?
Unless these questions are given befitting answers, and the United Nations
fully brings her weight to bear on Cameroun and her colonial master
France who sponsors the Cameroun illegalities and atrocities with cash and
supplies, the United Nations should brace herself for the worse in a pending feud between Ambazonia and Cameroun. That Cameroun attained separate independence is but incriminating and self-explanatory evidence that
they are illegally occupying Ambazonia and must be stopped. Therefore, it
is time the United Nations challenges itself and Cameroun to prove that
indeed the Plebiscite of 11 February, 196110 was the letter of the law
(Two
10 11 February, 1961 UN Plebiscite. This is the date during which the vote for the Two
Alternatives for Ambazonians (Southern Cameroonians) to attain independence by

joining an independent Nigerian Federation or an independent Cameroun Republic.
The masses voted for Cameroun because, as would be seen in next footnote, the
terms were different: voting for Nigeria meant absorption with at most a regional
statue. Voting for Cameroun meant voting to become an one of Two Equal States
in a Confederacy with Concurrent Jurisdiction in eight matters with the Federal
Cameroon Republic Government as opposed to Forty-Three if they voted for Nigeria.
For more details see Appendix and page nine of the Two Alternative Statutory
Alternatives and UN Resolution 1608 of 21 April 1961).11
herself that the state of Ambazonia
Cameroun should defend
(West Cameroon or Southern Cameroons)
has
not suffered materially and otherwise because of the manner by which

Cameroun has claimed sovereignty over this territory and portions of it
(Bakassi Peninsular).
Ambazonia: From Discovery to Independence

The Republic of Ambazonia got her modern name from Ambas Bay,
which lies at the eastern coast of the Gulf of Guinea just about longitude
10 degrees east of the GMT, along the coast of West Africas Atlantic
Ocean. At the time Ambazonia was discovered and documented as The
Chariot of Gods, God also instructed King Cyrus the Great12 of Persia to
build for Him and in His Honour a Temple in Jerusalem; it was Cyrus who
helped Jewish exiles to return to Jerusalem in about 500 B.C.
2 Chronicles 36:22-23).
(see Ezra 1:1-2;
The Republic of Ambazonia has a mandate to exist as
a separate nation and in this new age, lead the world in defence of human
Instrument. We must note here that the Federal Cameroon Republic was distinct from
the Cameroun Republic, which attained separate independence from Ambazonia on
1 January, 1960. This is also the heart of the dispute between Ambazonia and
Cameroun that Ambazonia did not vote to be absorbed into an alien system which
hardly protect human rights but abuses them endlessly.
11 UN Resolution 1608 of April 21, 1961. This UN Resolution currently haunts the
Bakassi Accords, especially the Green Tree Agreement (GTA). The Resolution
demanded that the results of the Plebiscite should be implemented in accordance with
the terms of the Two Alternatives of 1960, on or before 1 October, 1961. Till this
date, that has not been the case and is reason why Ambazonians currently rebel
against Cameroun rule and want total independence.
12 Cyrus The Great. He built a Great Temple for God in Jerusalem in obeying God
even as Jews were in captivity. Set Jews free to return to Israel. Was Leader of
Persia and under him Persia became the Worlds First Super Power. For details, see
Ezra 1:1-2; 2 Chronicles 36:22-23.
rights and peace missions based on the rule of Gods Laws, International
Law and eleven historic stages of Ambazonia Statehood as follows:
1. Carthaginian Navigator Hanno at about 500 B.C. while on a mission to
attempt sailing to India met Mount Mongo-Ma-Loba erupting. Incidentally,
the traditional name ties with the name Chariot of Gods provided by
Hanno the Navigator. It is not known which name preceded which.13
This means that Ambazonia was discovered 1980 years before the
Portuguese named river Wouri as Rio dos Cameroes or River of Prawns
in 1472 and from which Cameroun got her name!
2. Ambas Bay Colony, founded by Reverend Alfred Saker between 1831
and 1843-1884 when this territory became part of the larger German
Kamerun
(1884-1916)
Protectorate.
3. Upon the defeat of Germany by the joint Anglo-French army in the area
of Douala in 1914, and sharing the booty by the Anglo-French Treaty
of 1916, the territory of British Cameroons was carved out of Kamerun,
with Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
constituting the Southern portion
of British Cameroons.
4. The boundaries of British
Cameroons
(Ambazonia and Northern Cameroons)
(Republic of Cameroun)
and French
in 1919.
5. The League of Nations, which placed both territories as separate

Mandated Territories in 1922 with minor changes of boundaries by the
Anglo-French Treaty of 1931.
6. The United Nations Trusteeship Council made Southern Cameroons a
Trust Territory
(1946)
under the Administration of the British who jointly
administered the territory with Nigeria, a British Colony until decolonization was re-stated and misinterpreted in 1960.
13 For more details, see Mbuh, J. (2005) Inside Contemporary Cameroun Politics.
Authorhouse Inc., Bloomington, Indiana, USA, 678 pages. For ordering details see,
http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore/ItemDetail~bookid~26923.aspx
7. A revolt against Nigerian politics by Southern Cameroons elite in then

Eastern Regional Government of Nigeria termed Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality in 1954 led to separation from Nigeria and self-government
for Ambazonia
8. 1960, the UN formerly terminated Trusteeship over Southern Cameroons

and instead of granting unfettered independence to the territory decided
to impose Two Alternatives on the territory in violation of Trusteeship
Agreement and United Nations General Assembly Declaration Granting
Independence to All Colonial and Other Peoples of 14, December, 1960.
9. In the Plebiscite of 11 February, 1961 Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
masses and elite protested to no avail for the independence option and
voted for the better of the two options to join Cameroun. Such a union
would be the formation of a confederacy of two equal states. The
United Nations passed a resolution approving the results of the plebiscite
and as demanded by UN Resolution 1608 of 21 April, 1961. This conference has not been held.
10. Cameroun has since then ruled Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
with a
series of imposed constitutions with name-changing tactics which have

almost made the world to believe a lie that Cameroon was a federation made up of West Cameroon
(French-Speaking) (1961-72),
(English-Speaking)
and East Cameroon
a United Republic of Cameroon
simply Republic of Cameroon
(1972-1984)
and
(1984 present).
11. By March 1984 elites of the Southern Cameroons or former West

Cameroon who before the said Presidential Decree had been meeting secretly as the Ambazonia Restoration Council
(ARC)
fired back. Three re-
leases were made which explained the nature of the Cameroun-Southern

Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
relationship, insisting that because Cameroun
was using the name Cameroon in attempting to recolonize Southern

Cameroons, the said territory will henceforth be known by her tradi-
tional name Ambazonia
(coined from Ambas Bay Colony as in (1) above, with her
hinterlands serving as the zonia hence Ambazonia).14
International law is clear and very unambiguous on conditions for attaining

statehood, independence or self-government. International law is also clear
on conditions necessary for exercise of sovereignty over any peoples or
piece of land
(Mbuh, J., 2004).
How sovereignty is attained is a function of
a peoples discovery, history and polity in relation to practitioners of international law, international organizations, political activists, writers and leaders of nations and international organizations
(Falk, DAmato et al, 1990).
Thus
in the face of surmounting evidence from which the Cameroun governments have displayed intransigence and lack of foresight, it is but clear that
nothing can be said in their favour once escalation takes place. As to
whether Ambazonia will be free, it is only a matter of when, not how
for surely, in such disputes where brute force is confronted with the discipline of law and preponderance of evidence, it is not hard to foretell who
the victors and the vanquished would be. Perhaps Ambazonians have to
prove that they are not gun-shy, after all.
No one echoed these fears more than the Americans and the British.
The evidence is abundant in the report presented to the U.S. Government
by their Lagos, Nigeria Console John K. Emmerson in 1959.15 The Report,
far from condemning Ambazonia or Southern Cameroons, did in fact raise
alarm and signalled that humanity was only attempting to dodge a problem
and postpone it for a future date for, in Emmersons predictions, the
Southern Cameroons was far more important than its population of 800,000
14 Ibid.
15 For more details, see document by U.S. Nigeria Console John K. Emmersons report
to the U.S. Government on the situation in the Southern Cameroons in 1959.

Emmersons predictions have all come true.
people, back in 1959. Emmerson noted that far from its small population
and small territory, it was a frontier of French and British influence in
Africa, why not the world. What Emmerson did not foresee was that
Ambazonia was to become the seat and centre of a global revolution for
respect of human rights and the Law of Nation, of God and of Mother
Nature a development which no nation in the world can boast of! The
lead powers of the world feared communism and deprived Ambazonians
of their inalienable rights, what are they going to do now when confronted
with an Ambazonian global revolution? They cannot now stand in the way,
can they? If they do, they would face the wrath of God, for it has been
written that this day and time will come; that prophesy is now fulfilled!
The violation of Ambazonian sovereign rights apart, the fact that the
West Cameroon
(Ambazonia between 1961-72)
government was answerable to a
Federal Inspector appointed by Cameroun First President Ahmadou Ahidjo

and that his approval had to be sought in any matter concerning Ambazonia,
it becomes very clear that Cameroun had ulterior motives besides fanning
for Re-Unification
(1961)
and later on Unification
(1972)
tales. No other aca-
demic work is much appropriate in explaining the dilemma of the Ambazonians

after the dateline for independence went by than an article written by
Sanford H. Bederman, and published in The Atlanta Economic Review in
September 1968.16 The article examines the entire economy of the Ambazonia,
back then as West Cameroon, and like today, laments about the bad deal
the masses got from the United Nations in 1961 a testimony of false pretences surrounding utilization and application of both unity and the rule of
law an abuse of EUT and good governance/good business practices!
16 The Atlanta Economic Review, Bederman, Sanford H. (September, 1968). Betwixt
and Between: The Dilemma of West Cameroon.
The Letter of The Law Invoked

The letter of Law begins with Gods Laws, Natural Laws and those
made by man and which are all under serious violations. In pleading
Ambazonias case before God, therefore, we invoke the beginning and ending of the Holy Scriptures! From the Beginning to the End from Genesis
as in Revelations, God the Alpha and Omega takes cognisance of
self-determination and the rights of peoples to belong to disparate nations,
in His promise to Abraham. Even when God comes with a universal government
(Isaiah 9:6, 63:1; as in other verses of additional Books of Prophesy Ezekiel,
Daniel, Revelations),
He does not destroy nations but rather subject their lead-
ers under His rule, with rod of iron
(He overthrows those who disobey)!
How then
can we doubt the false pretences of the courts and tribunals over the issue
of Ambazonia sovereignty? In defence of Ambazonia sovereignty, we again
invoke the following documents, cases/judgments that reveal that the hypocrisy of the international system is not limited in documents but also in
her tribunals and implementation processes:
1. The UN Trusteeship Agreement: It was badly terminated in such a way
that the letter of the law did not apply.
2. UN General Assembly Declaration Granting Independence to All Colonial
and Other Peoples of 12 December, 1960 was made barring any conditions
(without any pre-conditions, so the Declaration stated!)
on peoples in-
dependence or right to self-determination, the UN Plebiscite slated for

11 February, 1961 was thus knocked out on that technicality. Applying
commonsense, no one territory can claim to attain independence by
joining another!
3. International Protocol on Civil and Political Rights (IPCPR). Ambazonian
nationalists utilized international and domestic laws to give legitimacy
to two previous cases won in Camerorun against the dictatorial regimes
of Paul Biya in:
a. Cameroun Military Tribunal Judgment of 1986 when the leader of the

Ambazonia Restoration Council
(ARC)
Fon Fongum Gorji-Dinka was
tried and acquitted on charges of High Treason

Landmark Documents:
(a) New Social Order
(for releasing the Three
(March 1985)
to Cameroun Letat-Major: Defuse the Time Bomb,

Revolt of Ambazonia
(July 1985)
(b) Open Letter
(May 1985)
(c) The
all demanding that Camerouns
President Paul Biya should withdraw Cameroun administration from

Ambazonia peacefully and in accordance with Cameroun Restoration
law of 24 April, 1984;
b. Proclamation Formalizing the Independence of the Republic of
Ambazonia submitted with the UN and OAU in 1990 and 1991, respectively;
c. Cameroun High Court Judgment HCB/28/92 Holden at the Bamenda
Cameroun High Court, where Cameroun authorities after admitting a
case against their illegal occupation of Ambazonia failed to contest
the estoppel within the case and so the Court, especially internationally have recognized the Judgment in rem against Cameroun;
d. Ambazonia Head of State Fongum Gorji-Dinka -v- British Foreign
Secretary in 1997, Crown Court, London in which the British government was forced by surmounting evidence to plead no contest,
thereby admitting that the process of handing over erstwhile Southern
Cameroons to Cameroun was marred and inconsistent with the rule
of law
(Trusteeship Agreement and Commonwealth of Nations laws);
e. In addition, in Ambazonia Head of State in-exile Fongum GorjiDinka -v- Cameroun at the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) (following Mukong -v- Cameroun)
in a summative case reviewed
all the above cited cases. Judgment in favour of Ambazonias leader

was delivered in New York, NY, on 17 March, 2005.17 These victories, beyond the law expose Cameroun as a lawless entity pretending
to be law-abiding in the face of gross human rights abuses meted

upon the Ambazonian leaders and their masses. Without misinterpretations, the two victories justify reinforce arguments (1) and (2)
above.18
4. Triple-tautology comes in here: (a) Following Paul Biya 1984 Decree,
the ICJ failed to question what rights Cameroun had to lay claims on
Bakassi Peninsular; (b) This is because by that decree, Cameroun pulled
out of the supposed union; (c) The Court ruled that Cameroun has sovereignty, while stating that historically the peninsula belongs to a territory termed Southern Cameroons
belongs to Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia).
(Ambazonia)
How does a peninsula that
become a property of Cameroun
if union with Cameroun has been imposed, not enforced without violation of basic and fundamental human rights and terms of the agreement?
5. The Judgment of the Abuja, Nigeria High Court in Southern Cameroons
-v- Nigeria
(Law Suit N0. FHC/ABJ/CS/30/2002),
which states that Nigeria;
has a legal duty to place before the International Court of Justice

and the United Nations General Assembly and ensure diligent prosecution to conclusion the claim of the peoples of the Southern
Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
to self-determination and their declaration of in-
dependence;
ensure diligent prosecution to conclusion the claims of the peoples of the Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
to self-determination and
their declaration of independence;

[Nigeria] should stop treating or continuing to treat or regard the
Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
and the peoples of the territory as an
17 For more details, see case and decision of the UN Tribunal in Fongum Gorji-Dinka
-v- Cameroon, UNICCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002.

18 For more details, see UN Committee on Human Rights Communications No. 1134/
2002: Cameroon. 10/05/2005 CCPR/C/83/D1134/2002.

integral part of La Republique du Cameroun
(Republic of Cameroon),
6. The Judgment of the ICJ on the Bakassi Peninsula, which states,

a. The peninsular was recognized by the United Nations since the 11
February, 1961 United Nations plebiscite, as being part of the British
Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia and Northern Cameroons).19
b. The map attached to the report of the United Nations Plebiscite

Commissioner shows that Bakassi formed part of the Victoria South
West plebiscite district in the southwest corner of Cameroon
(Ambazonia).
c. This would show that the Peninsular was recognised by the United
Nations as being part of the Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)20
d. For the entire period of 1922 till 1961 when trusteeship was terminated Bakassi was comprised within British Cameroons.21
e. Moreover, as the Court has shown in para 213 in 1961 / 62 Nigeria
clearly and publicly recognized Cameroon
(Ambazonia)
title to Bakassi.22
f. The Court accordingly concludes that the boundary between Cameroon

(Ambazonia)
and Nigeria in Bakassi is delimited by articles XVIII to XX
of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March, 1913; and This means,

therefore, that solution to the Bakassi problem is entirely a matter for
Nigeria and Ambazonia; and the map to append to the Green Tree
Agreement
(GTA) (to make it compatible to the ABPA that France suppressed)
is
that of Nigeria and Ambazonia, not Cameroun / Cameroon be it her

1961, 1972 or 1984 maps!
g. That sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsular lies with Cameroon
(Ambazonia).23
19 For details, see ICJ Ruling on Bakassi Peninsular, 10/10/2002, para. 210, line 8-10.
20 Ibid, para. 210, line 24-27.
21 Ibid, para 212, line 36-39.
Furthermore, the ICJ Judgment states, The Court notes that

Cameroon is under an obligation in the present case expeditiously
and without condition, to withdraw its administration and its military
and police forces to the east of the 1919 Franco-Cameroon boundary
line 24
7. The Green Tree Agreement of 12 June, 2006. Fortunately, for all errors
as well as such false pretences to have been set aside by the law against
alteration of ICJ judgments, article 7 of the GTA states,
This agreement shall in no way be construed as an interpretation or
modification of the judgment of the International Court of Justice of
10th October, 2002 from which the agreement only sets out the modalities of implementation.
Thus by operation of law, the GTA, even in post-Bakassi hand-over
phase, should now stand automatically corrected, so that the map of
Ambazonia replaces that of the false pretence URC; and the appellation
Ambazonia replaces the appellation Cameroon on the Green Tree
Agreement
(GTA).
Unless the above is true, the GTA of 12 June, 2006,
while claiming to not be tempering with the ruling of the ICJ, in setting
aside its Article 7, clearly violated the rule of law. This is not only
shameful, illegal but also morally very wrong!
8. The case of the Southern Cameroons National Council
Cameroons Peoples Organization
Cameroun
(Republic of Cameroun)
(SCAPO)
(SCNC) /
Southern
against La Republique du
in the African Union Court, demanding
Cameroun respects her boundary inherent from independence;

9. International law consistent with Ambazonia
Constitution.
The CCPR Communications No. 458/1991, Mukong v. Cameroon, Views

24 Ibid, ICJ Ruling on Bakassi Peninsular, 2002.
adopted on 21 July, 1994: Author exercised his Southern Cameroons

(Ambazonia)
constitutional rights. What Mukong and Ambazonians have
gone through are also documented in his three works and are continuous
testimonies against Cameroun.25
10. Fongum Gorji-Dinka v. Cameroun.26 This case, more than even that
over Bakassi and the Green Tree Agreement
(GTA)
further exposes the
failures of the UN system and the crimes committed by misinterpretation

of the law to suite the figments of the imaginations of Cameroun and
the UN authorities.
Analysis of the Icj Ruling Vis-A-Vis Ccpr and the Gta

It is not surprising that besides other reports from the Unrepresented
Peoples Organization
(UNPO)
Summit, the organizations Secretary General,
Marino Busdachin equally lamented,

The policy of the government of La Republique du Cameroun in continuous harassment and aggression against peaceful peoples of Southern Cameroons has to be
brought to an end. UNPO strongly condemns recent incidents and calls upon the
responsibility of La Republic du Cameroun, recognizant of its Human Rights
Council membership, to respect fundamental human rights and fulfil its obligations
under international law.27
With that, the UNPO then moved on to call on the people of the Southern
Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
to not be daunted by threats and suppression of
their voices of dissent [and] to radicalize factions within the movement in

25 Mukong, Albert. For more details of works, see the following works of his: (a) My
Stewardship in the Southern Cameroons Struggle; (b) Prisoner without a Crime and
(c) The Case for the Southern Cameroons Independence.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
Southern Cameroons,28 but should continue to use peaceful methods commensurate with SCNC principles in stating and pursuing their cause for
independence. In a symposium titled, The Right to Self- Determination in
International Law,29 academics, human rights activists and practitioners
defend the right to self-determination. Most participants based their arguments on cases presented to the UN Committee on Human Rights, invoked
The Charter Declaration on the Right to Self-Determination, The Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous People, The International Covenant on Civil
and Political rights
(ICCPR),
and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. Much of what was discussed borders on what
has been expressed in many paragraphs of this work. Certain excerpts
caught this authors eyes. Self-Determination beyond an individual was defended in a paper presented by Anna Batalla,30 as well as by Marco
Perduca.31 To Perduca, it seems the question over Ambazonia was a little
confusing when he notes, Cameroons
(under French administration)
dependent as Cameroon in 1960. Cameroons
became in-
(under British administration) the
northern territory joined Nigeria and the Southern territory joined Cameroun
(1961). 32
28 Ibid.
29 International Symposium, The Right to Self-Determination in International Law,
held at The Hague from 29 September until 1 October, 2006.

30 Anna Batalla, a Consultant with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UNHCHR). At the symposium above, she presented a paper in which she
invoked The International Covenant on Civil and Political rights (ICCPR), and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to defend the right
to self-determination of all peoples and also challenging the Human Rights
Committee rulings as being inconsistent.
31 Marco Perduca is a Member of the General Council of the Transnational Radical
Party (TRP) and of the UNPO Foundation. He presented a paper at the symposium
(above) titled, Can We Get Out of the Self-Determination Trap?
32 Ibid, p. 2.
We now know from preceding discussions in this work that decolonization of the British Cameroons was not as simple as stated. Furthermore,
we can observe from the little excerpt above a flaw that has rocked this
dispute in Ambazonia -v- Cameroun. The name issue marred the union
for
now we see even educated minds telling us that Cameroon attained
separate independence but Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
joined Cameroun!
This confusion is why at onset of the legal pursuits in 1985 the name
Ambazonia was invoked for Southern Cameroons. Invoking article 1 of
the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights, Batalla noted,
Article 1 of both Covenants clearly establishes the right of all peoples to self- determination, including their right to freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and the corresponding obligation of state parties to respect and promote the realization of that right. This recognition is all the more remarkable considering the legally binding nature and wide
acceptance of the two international covenants. Yet, we notice that the main body
charged with this task of surveying the implementation of the ICCPR, the Human
Rights Committee (the Committee), has been cautious when interpreting and applying Article 1, especially in the context of the individual complaints procedure
established by the Optional Protocol to the OP-ICCPR.33
The trouble with the praise which accepts the two international covenants
is that it is just that acceptance and nothing more, especially when law
defenders and implementers are confronted with the pressures of power
politics, fuelled for the most part by the corruption influences of nations
guilty of violations of the law. Is it not such political pressures and why,
most likely, even bribery and corruption of Committee Members that cause
such circumvention of the rule of law? Otherwise, it beats the mind of this
author why case after case, the Committee waters down the article, which
33 Ibid, p. 1; see also Batalla, A., p. 1.
should serve as a catcher, the trunk and backbone to collective peoples

rights. Batalla regrets that the Committee has, systematically refused to examine complaints based solely on article 1, arguing,
The OP-ICCPR procedure is reserved to individuals and that, consequently, only individual rights recognized in part III of the ICCPR (article 6 to 27, included) can
be invoked. This may hardly be surprising in light of the strong political implications that the right to self-determination has entailed from the onset. The
Committees restrictive approach with regard to individual complaints based on article 1 of the Covenant has been partly compensated by a broad interpretation of
article 27, which recognises the rights of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their
language.34
There is continuous concern as to the definition of a peoples and even

as the Committee consistently ruled, that individual claims that bordered
on self-determination of a peoples could not be handled by them because
the Optional Protocol applies only to individuals within a system or state,
it is hard to swallow such shallow and myopic interpretation of the law.
This is especially true in the case of self-determination and the ICCPR because, like Batalla continues to argue, the right to self-determination is not
limited to individuals and even more, a peoples is not also limited to colonial people. It applies also for a peoples right to secede from a polity
or system that does not protect and serve their best interest, citing
Azerbaijan. In that case, the ICCPR shot its feet when it ruled in favour
of self-determination. Notes Batalla,
In its Concluding Observations on the report on Azerbaijan, the human rights committee recalled that under article 1 of the Covenant, the principle of self-determination applied to all peoples and not just to colonized peoples. According to CCPR
34 Ibid.
General Comment No. 12, article 1 (3) imposes specific obligations on States parties
to respect and to promote the realization of the right to self-determination, not only
in relation to their own peoples but also vis--vis all peoples which have not been
able to exercise or have been deprived of exercising that right.35
As we explore the rule of law violated in Fongum Gorji-Dinka -v- Cameroun

and in the Green Tree Agreement
(GTA)
of 12 June, 2006, we are confident
that it is only but a matter of time for the skies to broke lose over
Ambazonia-Cameroun relations. When this happens, Cameroun authorities
shall face the wrath of God in the anger of the masses of Ambazonia and
the fight to be put up by Gods Angels
(Graham, 1986)
against the devilish
system, which now ruin the world under United Nations nose and possible
cover. Alternatively, the UN should immediately follow with deployment
of UN Peace Keeping Troops to facilitate Cameroun withdrawal and the
re-instatement of a transitional Government to run the affairs of Ambazonia
(and possibly including Northern Cameroons)
and prevent potentially deadly, geno-
cide situations from occurring. Similarly, the failures of the application of

the rule of law are noted in the UN Committee position that,
Insofar as the author claims that his peoples rights to self-determination has been
violated by the state partys failure to implement the 1961 plebiscite, Restoration
Law 84/01, the 1992 Judgement of the High Court of Bamenda, or by its subjugation of Ambazonians, the Committee recalls that it does not have competence
under the Optional Protocol to consider claims alleging a violation of the right to
self-determination protected in article 1, of the Covenant. (5) The Optional Protocol
provides a procedure under which individuals can claim that their individual rights
have been violated. These rights are set out in Part III (article 6 to 27) of the
Covenant. (6) It follows that this part of the communication is inadmissible under
article 1 of the Optional Protocol.36
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid, see section 4.4, p. 5/9.
And what did the very Committee rule in the case of Azerbaijan? Is this
not blatant abuse of the law, or at best even racism against African situations? Could it have been possible for the UN Committee to be truly
effective and in so doing seal all doors and avenues through which
Cameroun authorities were passing to violate the rights of Ambazonians?
Could the Committee Members have done something, and without necessarily appearing to be instigating a revolt against Cameroun or even favouring State party by simply making a recommendation to the UN General
Assembly and or the UN Security Council about the facts of the matter?
A recommendation such as, a case was presented to us and we do not
have jurisdiction over the matter or all other aspects of it, but it is clear that
if nothing is done,
(citing the two cases against Cameroun in the ICCPR),
the situation
would only get worse.

By siding with State party, even when Cameroun authorities again deliberately ignored the Committees request for an opinion as to the validity
of the case against them, the Committee did appear to be sloppy and favouring a government, which by every measure fits the profile of an Axis
of Evil nation, the parlance of George W. Bush and fit for random bombing and digging up rat-mole holes to catch the likes of Paul Biya and hold
them accountable for crimes against humanity. The way Ambazonias case
was handled is wrong and is most definitely, not the way to handle complaints of such magnitude and with such barrage of legal arguments and
legal victories against the accused. The UN can do better and if UNSG
Ban Kimoon means it with reforming the UN Bureaucracy, and to ensure
that such silly, bribery-prone statements as, The Committee recalls that it
does not have competence under the Optional Protocol, do not taint
the integrity of this World Body
(UN),
he should lead the charge and de-
mand a swift restoration of the states of Cameroun and Ambazonia as of

their respective independence dates before the deluge.
The Committee said they do not have the competence Yes, clearly and from the foregone analyses, they were most definitely incompetent
to even have dared handling the matter: they were accomplices and complimenting crimes against humanity and should be held accountable. UNSG
Ban Kimoon should do right by Ambazonia, fire the Committee Members,
call them to order and then set the ball rolling for the total and final liberation of Ambazonia without the necessity of her peoples and those of
Cameroun shading unnecessary innocent blood.
Law does not deal in and with isolation and isolated matters but takes
into consideration all relevant evidence where and when applicable. Here
was a case where the relevance and the necessity of expanding the verification process so as not to appear circumventing the truth and rule of
law was completely missed
(missed opportunity and show of no willingness!)
and
the Committee wants us to think they did not have the powers and or mandate to deal effectively with the matter? Here are some of the arguments,
which make UN current position on the Ambazonia question to look extremely questionable, lawless and even preposterous, while at the same time
fanning a dangerous dyadic and genocidal war:
1. Once the United Nations Committee on Civil and Political Rights
(UNCCPR)
(URC)
ruled on 17 March, 2005 that United Republic of Cameroon
was dissolved in January 1984 it meant that President Paul Biya
of Cameroon is guilty of international deception
(if not fraud)
by present-
ing the map of the defunct URC as the map of Republic of Cameroon
(RC)
to the drafters of the Green Tree Agreement
(GTA).
This has dis-
torted studies of Geography worldwide, and continues to give the global

population the false impression that all is well in Cameroun and that
the treaty of union for which the UN Plebiscite was conducted on 11
February, 1961 was actually honored. This is totally false and must be
resisted as such.
2. The Green Tree Agreement
(GTA)
which purports to set out the modal-
ities for implementing the Judgment of the International Court of Justice

(ICJ)
on the Bakassi Peninsula has presented an opportunity to put an
end to this deception, distortion and fraud. The JIC Judgment, in numerous instances, and without any ambiguity at all clearly states to whom
the Bakassi Peninsular belongs
(re-iterated in footnotes 20-24, herein).
To give effect to this Judgment the United Nations Secretary General

(UNSG)
got both Nigerias President Obasanjo and Cameroons President
Biya to sign a commitment

2005)
(Annan Bakassi Peace Accord ABPA of 29-31 January,
to withdraw to their respective territorial boundaries as obtained at
independence, according to the letter of the ICJ Judgment, without any

preconditions at all. Cameroon President Paul Biya on his part states,
I President Paul Biya of the Republic of Cameroon do hereby commit
myself and my government to, in a bid to bringing a lasting solution

to the Bakassi conflict, fully respect the territorial boundaries of as obtained at independence of my country.37 This, in itself, is a self-incriminating admission, that he, President Biya is illegally occupying
Ambazonia, in violation of international law. Cameroon is hereby and
henceforth
(as demanded by the ICJ ruling)
ordered to withdraw to the 1919
international boundary separating it and Ambazonia; that boundary line

enters the Atlantic Ocean through the Mungo River; and this is located
over 350 miles away from the Bakassi Peninsula.
3. The French Secret Agents having failed to destroy the ABPA have man37 Section of the Annan Bakassi Peace Accord (ABPA) of 29-31 January, 2005, signed
by Cameroun President Paul Biya, which action infuriated the French government;
the French in turn threaten to shoot down the UNSGs Plane, and indeed had him
and the UN Entourage searched so as to retrieve the signed ABPA and which with
threat and harassment they succeeded to force Kofi Annan to yield to the dictates
of the French by suppressing and replacing the ABPA with the Green Tree
Agreement (GTA) of 12 June, 2006.
aged to get Nigerias Obasanjo and concerned parties to sign a Green

Tree Agreement
(GTA)
Republic of Cameroon
based on the false pretences that the United

(URC)
still exist, or even so was legal, as per the
terms of union; since it was only through it that Cameroon had any connection with Ambazonias oil rich Bakassi Peninsular. One would wonder if Kofi Annan did this knowingly or under duress of his plane being
shut down on the return trip from having Cameroun President Paul Biya
sign the ABPA on 31 January, 2005. Did the UNSG knowingly violate
the rule of law by modifying the ICJ ruling with conditionalities while
claiming it was not doing such a thing?
4. Fortunately, all errors as well as such false pretences have been set aside
by the law against alteration of ICJ judgments restated in Article 7 of
the GTA which reads thus, This agreement shall in no way be construed as an interpretation or modification of the judgment of the
International Court of Justice of 10th October, 2002 from which the
agreement only sets out the modalities of implementation, ICJ Ruling
on Bakassi Peninsular, 2002.38 It seems the drafters of the GTA shot
their own feet and by so doing, clearly revealed that the intent of the
GTA was not executing the ICJ Judgment but giving illegal oil-bunkering rights to certain parties, hoping that Ambazonia would not go to
war, either to recover Bakassi or drive Cameroun out of their national
territory. How far is that true? And would those who hatched the fraud
over Bakassi go free of such illegal manipulations of the rule of law?
Thus, by operation of law, this author wrote to the UN Secretary
General on 15 July, 2006 insisting that the GTA should stands automatically corrected, so that the map of Ambazonia replaces that of the false
pretence URC; and the appellation Ambazonia replaces the appellation
38 Ibid, Article 7 of the GTA purporting not to be modifying the ICJ Ruling but indeed
did just the opposite.
Cameroon on the GTA, if they truly meant to defuse future escalations
in the region.39
5. Under international law Ambazonia assumes primarily responsibility for
law and order, as well as for international peace and security in the
Bakassi peninsular, its territorial waters and air space. The fact that there
is an Ambazonian government in exile only means that nations of the
world are under an obligation to offer Ambazonians the assistance needed in their struggle to liberate themselves from
(in the words of United Nations
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-UNICCPR) the
subjugation by
Franco-Cameroon armed forces and militia groups. Nations of the

world should either give direct open or covert assistance or pressure the
UN General Assembly to attend to this matter with urgency.
6. Nigerias President Obasanjo and the False Pretence: By signing unto
the Green Tree Agreement
(GTA)
based on the false pretence that the
United Republic of Cameroon still exist, Nigerias President Obasanjo

appears to be an active accomplice to the false pretence and could be
just a victim of (i) his predecessors and (ii) his legal advisers.
Firstly, for Nigerias security interest President Ibrahim Babangida,
during his term of office should have called on the Cameroon President
who dissolved the URC in January 1984 to withdraw to its western territorial boundary, which enters the Atlantic Ocean through the Mungo
River
(over 350 miles away from the Cross river estuary).
But he preferred to be
39 This author wrote Bakassi: Corrigendum to the Green Tree Agreement, to the UN
in his capacity as Foreign Minister of Ambazonia 15 July, 2006 (O/Ref: AG07/15/

06001/FA). The UN Political Affairs Officer Sophie Bronniman responded encouraging Ambazonia to bring your concerns to the attention of the appropriate governments.
We note here that in these exchanges, Nigerian and Cameroun authorities were communicated through the UN Representatives Oseloka Obaze and Sammy Kum Buo,
respectively. This is testimony of further FOTs and lawlessness and disorder reigning
over both states.
an active accomplice to the Franco-Cameroon false pretence that the

URC still exists;
Secondly Nigeria was expected get the ICJ order Nigeria and
Cameroon
(under article 41 of the ICJ statutes)
to return to the June 1961
boundaries; and then from there each would argue its case for expansion
(see fig 2).
Neither Nigeria nor Cameroon would have a valid case to
make; and that would have ended the Bakassi case by June/July 1994.
But French Agents succeeded to get the Nigerian legal team back this
false pretence; gave Cameroon locus standi it did not have, to drag
Nigeria to a very predictable humiliating defeat. These same people
must have either hidden from President Olusegun Obasanjo the map of
the United Republic of Cameroon
(URC)
which was appended to the
GTA, as the Republic of Cameroon, or simply advised him to sign up

in the hope that no one in the world detect this falsehood and raise
alarm.
A law-abiding but badly entrapped President Obasanjo or his successor Yar Adua should in the light of the forgoing, back off the false
pretence; and would hence forth deal with Ambazonia in accordance
with the facts, the truth and law so set out. For the alternative would
be to stick to the false pretence and firmly identify themselves as active
accomplices to false pretences. They would have to explain in retrospect
and posterity why the ICJ case was not titled United Republic of
Cameroon -v- Nigeria.
7. President Paul Biya and the Republic of Cameroun, through the
Cameroun Restoration law 84/01 and the High Court of the Republic
of Cameroun judgment HCB/28/92, as well as January 2005 Annan
Bakassi Peace Accord have legally, recognized Ambazonia as a sovereign
nation. So it is only an aspect of self-contempt on Africas part, to have
to wait for Europe or America take the lead to accord Ambazonia full
diplomatic recognition. There are moral grounds upon which international relationships ought to be built; it is the duty of the World Body
or Member States thereof to defend that morality the Golden Rule.
8. Under international law, primary responsibility for law and order, as
well as international peace and security in Bakassi, its air space and territorial waters falls on Ambazonias government in-exile. It would need
moral and material assistance to have this come to fruition as peacefully
as possible, short of which, it is still a moral obligation protected by
international law for Ambazonians to defend themselves and their national territory from an aggressive neighbor, when such a neighbor is
a manipulator of the rule of law as badly as Cameroun authorities have
always been.
Appeal to Unsg Ban Kimoon

Fundamental differences exist between Ambazonia and Cameroun,
as they do between North Korea and South Korea)
(just
in: (1) Discovery; (2) Colonial
Heritage; (3) Recognition; (4) Independence; (5) Pre-independence

Nationalism; (6) Post-Independence Nationalism; (7) Education; (8) Tradition
and Culture; (9) Records of Administration and Accountability; (10) Records
of Government Respect of Human Rights; (11) Transparency, Form of
Government and Democracy; and lastly, (12) National Language
2007).
(Mbuh,
It is therefore necessary that the UN Chief sees sense in our proposal
of compromise solution below and adopt it to make peace, not war with
Cameroun authorities, if they are accessible; failure of which Cameroun
must respect her boundaries at independence or face sanctions or an inevitable decision by Ambazonia to restore her sovereignty rights, nimporte
quo, nimporte comment! They wish to try? Resistance would be futile!

Compromise Solution Proposal

Even with stark differences between Cameroun and Ambazonia, one can
still defend the union should Cameroun authorities do certain things:
1. Acknowledge wrong-doing against
(Ambazonia or Southern Cameroons);
2. Acknowledge submitting claims that when tested with concrete, verifiable facts and legal provisions do not defend truths of the situations under dispute;
3. Agree and fix a timeline for implementing the UN Plebiscite results with
modifications to protect Ambazonian sovereign rights to include rotating
Presidency, separate international representation in sports and other economic and investment matters, etc.;
4. Redefine issue of nationality and make provisions which if violated by
one state would automatically secure total independence of the other;
5. Ensure and impose balanced bilingualism on both states from primary
through higher education, as opposed to co-habitation bilingualism in
false pretences of Cameroun claims of being a bilingual nation, when
indeed the language of instruction and execution of national policies is
French
(see document targeting elimination of certain Ambazonia operatives of the
SCNC appended);
6. Payment of reparations to activists of Ambazonia

and SCYL and the Ambazonia government)
(and the SCNC, SCAPO
of at least five million dollars
(US)
each, unless evidence is tendered against certain members of the groups

that they were indeed Cameroun operatives, would such be excluded,
for illegal exploitation and gross human rights violation of Ambazonians
and their sovereign territory;
7. Execute within specified timeframe projects to be enumerated by the
Ambazonia High Command Council
(AHCC),
of which this author is one
of its deputies;
8. An Ambazonian national, preferably this author to take over power from
Paul Biya in the event of Cameroun accepting this compromise solution;

9. Institute a term limit of four to eight years, depending on the performance of the Head of State, permitting succession within Presidents original state, or from the other;
10. Cameroun should make an apology to the international community and
to the UN and her legal branches for misrepresenting the rule of law;
and
11. Cameroun should also apologize to the Ambazonia masses and promise
never to again violate or misrepresent them, without reliable justification
in constitutional provisions.
Eut -V- Compromise Solution

1. EUT confirms that compromise solution between Ambazonia and
Cameroun would be marred by Cameroun-French Relations, which
would remain biased against Ambazonians should the territory remain part of contemporary Cameroun;
2. EUT confirms that upon taking Nigeria to the ICJ both Nigeria and
Cameroun invoked right international legal materials but misinterpreted
them to suite their tiny FOT interests;
3. That by the ICJ invoking the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty, it invariably
admitted and set free the entire British Cameroons since by the independence of both Nigeria and Cameroun, none of these states had
sovereignty over the said territory;
4. That by their own admittance and false pretences that followed endorsement, reneging and relegation by substitution of the ABPA with the
Green Tree Agreement, the UN has invariably placed herself under suspicion and questioning as to her intensions in resolving international
conflicts peacefully with the defence of the rule of law and so is thereThe Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
fore part of the false pretence exercised by Nigeria and Cameroun over
the Bakassi peninsula;
4. By issuing death ordinances against Ambazonia operatives in postBakassi handover era, Cameroun authorities confirm EUT charges of
false pretence and fears of continuous and endless abuse of Ambazonians
in any future union of the two states;
5. EUT propounds that compromise solutions seem to be an international
order that seeks and actually does protect ruling status quo against the
back drop of serious violations of international law, as in Kenya,
Zimbabwe and Bakassi
(Ambazonia -v- Cameroun)
and so are not to the in-
terest of long-term peace;

6. EUT therefore concludes that where there is surmounting evidence that
state parties have both violated the rights of other and in so doing knowingly misrepresenting the rule of law, that they be made to pay by defending the rule of law without any compromise solution for two
wrongs do not make a right.
The Ban Kimoon connection requires that we compare Ambazonia and
Cameroun to support the South Korea-North Korea analogy. We hope that
by the time this comparison is examined, the UNSG would be convinced
that Ambazonia and Cameroun are but two distinct nations whose inherent
qualities do not warrant them to be together as one nation: what God has
put apart, together no man should try joining as one! Still on North Korea
and South Korea, war was used to intensify the distinction between the
two. Even more, an uneasy peace reigns with a demilitarized zone between
them with twenty-four hours on-seven alertness of soldier who staff and
man the borderline. The war took a toll on Koreans of both states and even
the Americans and Russians who back the South and the North, respectively.
Yet, compared to Ambazonia-Cameroun, the differences came because of
colonial masters making peace between themselves

defeating one other power
(Germany)
(Britain and France)
after
and sharing the loot, bounty. Thus, with
treaty obligations backed by The League of Nations Mandated Territories

and United Nations Trusteeship systems, respectively, it is far easier to
keep peace and guarantee lasting security between Ambazonia and
Cameroun than between the Koreas. Given that, UNSG Ban Kimoon knows
just too well the wars of liberation, which have taken a toll on human life
in Asia from Vietnam and the Killing Fields of Cambodia; given the experiences of Rwanda and Congo, Somalia and Sudans South and Darfur
regions, it is not hard to see how preventive diplomacy for peaceful co-existence between Ambazonia and Cameroun can take central stage now.
Seon Master Deahaeng Kun Sunim40 teaches us that we are called upon
to trust our Buddha Nature, our foundation. She teaches that only when we
do so shall we realise that our foundation is what does everything for us.
So Master Deahaeng teaches people to trust in its ability, to trust everything we face to that foundation, and then move forward.41 Furthermore,
The Master cautions that, while we experiment with what comes out, we
should let go of even the things we learn and experience. Our foundation
knows all about what we have experienced, so we do not need to worry
about forgetting those things.42 The Master then cautions that this may
sound easy, vague but that with practice: it becomes a wide-open
path that frees us from all our habits and karma. By continually melting
down the narrow-mindedness, greed, and anger that are hidden within us,
we are left free to become true human beings, which is what we were intended for when we were born into this world. 43 In the spiritual as well
40 Seon Master Deahaeng Kun Sunim (2002) Find the Treasure Within.
41 Ibid, p. 8.
42 Ibid, pp. 8-9.
43 Ibid, p. 9.
as in the material world, the wages of evil and sin are all well known and
few spiritual leaders would claim differently in all religions, especially
Christianity
(Exodus 23:6,8; Deuteronomy 16:19; Proverbs 17:23; Isaiah 9:7).
Under
Buddhism, Master Deagaeng notes, good karma brings good results,

and bad karma brings bad results The eternal life is the true self,
the inherent nature intrinsically pure and bright, and functions smoothly without any friction.44
In light of the foregone discussion and the entire grievances of
Ambazonia so presented here, we would assume that like individuals, nations too do have a birth date and a date they die. History has taught us
just that with its long lists of rise and fall of nations, hence the competition
for survival, rivalry and wars for self-preservation. We would also assume
that the nations that are extinguished are those that, because of their dirty
karma, simply meet their fate, what they are in their Buddha-nature.
Looking at Ambazonia from birth by the Anglo-French Treaty of 1916 and
baptized by the League of Nations in 1922, therefore, suggests that only
such a nation that has a dirty or bad karma should go extinct, not nations
like Ambazonia. This author does not think the comparison between
Ambazonia and Cameroun
(as with North Korea and South Korea)
warrants that
if Cameroun is in existence, Ambazonia should be extinct. We must all

wonder why nations like Cameroun are still in existence, if by comparative
standards of values and deeds it is worse than Ambazonia could ever have
been in a million years. What has the international community got to say
about this?
In utilizing the Anglo-German treaty of 1913 to rectify the hinterlands
and maritime
(at Bakassi Peninsula)
boundary of Cameroun and Nigeria, the
ICJ ruling did the UN Trusteeship Agreement a great service by directly

supporting the sovereignty quest of British Cameroons, now represented by
44 Ibid, p. 34-35.
Ambazonia
(possibly expanding to include Northern Cameroons).
This takes into con-
sideration arguments that the 1961 UN Plebiscite was illegal, null and void
ab initio. The ruling, however, under-looked the fact that Cameroun
President Ahmadou Ahidjo had in 1961, after the UN Plebiscite by which
Northern Cameroons went to Northern Nigeria, protested the ICJ ruling
back then when he charge voter rigging in that territory. From these, several questions again beg for answers:
1. Did the ICJ ruling over the entire Cameroun-Nigeria boundary vindicate
Camerouns first President Ahmadou Ahidjo and now the UN in revisionist terms, regret not giving German Kamerun independence as
planned by the German Bundestag before World War I?
2. Did the ICJ ruling override its earlier ruling in Cameroun -v- Nigeria
over the post-1961 UN Plebiscite over Northern Cameroons sovereignty
and independence quest?
3. If so, what should now be done that would be legally efficacious in
keeping greater peace and security in the interest of collective rationality
over distractions fuelled by individual rationality, as the Bakassi Case
has proven?
4. In addition, by invoking the United Nations Resolution on the Two
Alternatives, did Cameroun authorities invariably shoot their own feet
before the battle for liberation of Ambazonia ever began?
5. Lastly, where do the two ICJ rulings stand as far as Trusteeships of both
Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
now stand,
given the legal and diplomatic landscape of ongoing activities of the

Ambazonia and Northern Cameroons liberation groups?
Inconsistencies, ambiguity, neglect of the law and political buffoonery that
lead World Organizations to neglect utilizing properly legal parameters that
serve and protect collective rights against individual rent-seeking and profThe Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
it-seeking misadventures should never again become a quality of the rule

of law!
Conclusion
The controversy over the Bakassi Peninsula dispute has not ended; indeed the real battle has just begun and it is intrinsically woven in to
the sovereignty dispute over Ambazonia
and even the
entire British Cameroons not just Bakassi Peninsula, which by 1960 was
comprised of Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
and Northern Cameroons.
Ambazonias case we plead in the right quarters, back to her foundation,

the United Nations. Ambazonias case has been tabled before God and He
sees no sin, no guilt of her masses! The karma of the United Nations and
all those nations whose manipulations of the law of God, Man and Nature
have inflicted untold injury upon the psyche and lives of the masses of
Ambazonia are now held accountable, held hostage by the Supreme Laws
of the Creator of the Universe. Those who participate and pretend to be
servants of God and continue to do so even right now in Ambazonia, let
alone Cameroun itself, are also held accountable and pronounced guilty by
EUT analysis be it of the law or of rationality claims. Thus, the laments
and cries of a great servant of God, Ellen G. White would never go unheard on earth as in the spiritual realms.45
Ambazonia has not only utilized but demonstrated practical love of God
by not spilling innocent human blood,
(let alone the guilty)
and for the rule
of law by tabling their case to the appropriate authorities. From protests,

petitions, lawsuits
(1 Co. 6:7),
Ambazonians have faith in God and righteous-
ness would be done onto them by the law
45 White, E., p. 668.
(Gal. 3:21-24)!
By the law, there-
fore, God will hold those who have caused senseless bloodshed in
Ambazonia accountable, if The Law of Nations should fail them.46 By persecution, harassment, torture and death Camerouns President Paul Biya and
his predecessor Ahmadou Ahidjo pitted Ambazonians against Camerounians
and melted life out of bodies and crust in rent-seeking misadventures. Paul
Biya, especially has so suddenly forgotten the small Biblical lessons he
learnt at the seminary that, by Justice a King gives a country stability.47
The Law of Nations invoked by Ambazonia in domestic and international remedies exhaustion phases is as good as the law of God and of
Mother Nature. We cannot accept one and reject the other. They will,
standing in the path of Justice about to be rendered by and in defence of
the very law they have rejected
(Jn. 12:47-50).
In like manner, those who
have faith in the law, like Ambazonians do, but are afraid or are ashamed
that if they defend truth and the law, harm from other humans whose interests would be at stake would visit them are not different from Pharisees.
Of them, the Bible says, For they love the praise from men more than
praise from God.48
Utilization of the Bakassi dispute as a distraction a wag the dog policy,
or as an instrument to legitimize Cameroun re-colonization of Ambazonia
and tolerate Nigerian benefactors by having Northern Cameroons as part
of Northern Nigeria have now been exposed thanks to the wrangling
over Bakassi Peninsula. Just as Nigeria could not contest and win Bakassi
over her 1913 boundary treaty, so too would Cameroun be in limbo, unable
to contest, win and hold comfortably both Bakassi and Ambazonia
(and the
entire British Cameroons, which by the 1913 Anglo-German treaty knocks out Northern
46 For details, see Ezekiel. 3:18:20; 33:6, 8; 34:10.

47 For more details, see Proverbs 29:4; Leviticus 19:15, Exodus. 23:2; Deuteronomy
16:19.
48 For details see John. 12:42-43; Psalms 96:9-10, 110:6; Daniel 9:11.
Cameroons from Nigeria)
over her 1919 boundary treaty invoked by the ICJ rul-
ing over Bakassi. The rule of law invoked in treaties and treaty agreement
violations are here exposed enough to indicate that the case of Ambazonia
-v- Cameroun
(including the case of the entire British Cameroons sovereignty)
surpasses
that of Bakassi peninsula dispute between Nigeria and Cameroun because

to begin with, both nations had no case at all!
A free Ambazonia
(that would include Northern Cameroons)
would open the
doors, legally, for good things to happen to all. A free Ambazonia, her
North and her South, a country whose rivers flow of milk and honey, a
great and beautiful mountainous country that in frustration worshipped
idols, backslidded and was cast away into the arms of the devil, a new
covenant with God makes her His Sanctuary, a New Israel
(Eze. 37:15-28).
To the world, Ambazonians and this author say: Fear not; we bring the
promise of the reign of God, light, peace, prosperity, greater interdependence and life for all humanity! For where there is God, there is life!
The controversy between Ambazonia and Cameroun, like all disputes,
would end. The rest lies with the Karma of the United Nations as we await
redress from the High Offices and dignitaries of World Bodies and
Intelligentsia. At the moment of concluding this essay, Cameroun authorities are utilizing power outage to torture the population of Ambazonia;
armed gangs are holding cities hostage and breaking and looting their bank
coffers; and even the President and his Body Guard are confused as to who
actually attempted fleeing with billions of looted funds, while attending the
63rd Session of the UN General Assembly. These are indicators that sooner
or later the masses would grow weary and if they were previously gun-shy,
would rise up, with or without guns and greater chaos shall reign and in
all, the Cameroun government misinterpretation, misrepresentation of historic political, legal and diplomatic instruments would hardly escape blame.
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An Educational Model for Peace Building

and Conflict Prevention: The Role of the
UN mandated University for Peace
Victor Valle
(University for Peace, Costa Rica)
Introduction
No doubt, education as a social process, public system and discipline
has the potential of being a powerful tool for social change and progress
and empowerment of peoples, two major benefits of peaceful societies
where conflicts are duly managed.
University education is intended to educate and train high level personnel to conduct major and human endeavors.
United Nations Organization, since its establishment in 1945, in the aftermath of the deadly World War II, has been committed to peace and security around the world. Not always the UN role in obtaining results for
peace and security has been successful. In the long darkness of the cold
war, UN principles were disdained and disrespected by many parties, either
superpowers or insurgent groups. So it happens in current times of the
struggle against the terrorism.
However, United Nations continues to be a focus of hope especially for
less developed countries and vulnerable groups of peoples.
The University for Peace is a United Nations mandated institution,
which should contribute mainly to international peace. In order to understand its educational model it is important to know the political and his-
An Educational Model for Peace Building and Conflict Prevention 187
torical context in which it was established.
A visionary President of Costa Rica and singular developing society

In February 1978 a new President Mr. Rodrigo Carazo took office
in the singular country named Costa Rica. This Central American country
has high prestige in the international community as a an army-less country,
with a long standing democracy, proven respect of human rights and good
record in environmental protection. Central America and the world were
in turmoil in 1978, amidst various expressions of the cold war at work.
One Costa Rican land owner Mr. Cruz Rojas Bennet had close relationships with politicians and in a very selfish-less gesture donated to the
President Carazo 300 hectares of forest to establish an educational center
devoted to peace and environment.
President Carazo since the very beginning of his tenure in high office
took the initiative to conceive and promote, with the United Nations endorsement, a specialized international institute for post-graduate studies related to peace In fact, on 18 December, 1978 the UN General
Assembly approved the Resolution 33/109 by which it took note with
appreciation of the proposal submitted by President of the Republic of
Costa Rica for the establishment of a University for Peace within the system of the United Nations University and of his offer to the world
community.
When one knows the dynamics of the UN governing bodies and taking
into account that it took only 10 months between the inauguration of
President Carazo and the above mentioned resolution, it is easy to infer
the big effort deployed by the Carazo Government to lobby in favor of the
University for Peace. The seed had been sowed.
History and noble aspirations of the United Nations

The United Nations has a long history of concern about education and
training for peace. Its principles needed to be instilled in staff members,
diplomats and decision makers. Indeed, to maintain international peace and
security, to develop friendly relations among nations and to achieve and
facilitate international cooperation for social progress the corner stones of
the UN system- it was necessary to make efforts of education, training, applied research and systematic dissemination of valid, updated and operational knowledge about peace and security issues.
More than forty year ago, in 1965, United Nations established the
United Nations Institute for Training and Research
(UNITAR, a autono-
mous body within the United Nations with the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of the
Organization through appropriate training and research. (http://www.unitar.org/about_en.htm)
The function and target populations of UNITAR were To conduct

training programmes in multilateral diplomacy and international cooperation
for diplomat accredited to the United Nations and national officials involved in work related to United Nations activities.
(ibid)
A few years later, in 1969, UN Secretary-General U Thant, from current

Myanmar, launched the idea to founding and international university
devoted to the Charter objectives of peace and progress. Other seed for
peace had been sowed. U Thant died in 1971 and was succeeded until 1981
by the Austrian diplomat and politician Kurt Waldheim.
It was during the Waldheims tenure that the United Nations University
was established as a decentralized system of affiliated institutions, integrated into the world university community, devoted to action-oriented research into the pressing global problems of human survival, development
and welfare that are the concern of the United Nations and its agencies,
and to the post-graduate training of young scholars and research workers
for the benefit of the world community.
(United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions 27/2951 of 11 December, 1972 and 28/3081 of 6 December, 1973)
When President Carazo knocked doors in the UN for his idea of a

University for Peace there were some preceding and related deeds and decisions taken by the UN General Assembly about education, research, training and dissemination of knowledge on peace and security.
After the 1978 UN General Assembly Resolution 33/109 about the proposal for the establishment of a University for Peace and as a result of
the Costa Rican President lobby in United Nations the UN General
Assembly gave a step forward. On 14 December, 1979 the UN General
Assembly approved the Resolution 34/111 by which it approved the
idea of establishing a University for Peace as an international centre of
higher learning for post-graduate studies, research and the dissemination of
knowledge specifically aimed at training for peace, with its headquarters
in Costa Rica. It also decided to establish an international commission, which, in collaboration of the Government of Costa Rica, shall prepare the organization, structure and setting in motion of the University for
Peace
The last stroke of President Carazo to establish the University for Peace
was during the United Nations General Assembly when the Resolution
35/55 was approved on 5 December, 1980 to establish the University for
Peace. In the same Resolution the UN General Assembly approved an 8-article International Agreement for the Establishment of the University for
Peace and, as annex to such international agreement, a 17-article Charter
of the University where the nature, purposes, functions, governance and
management are explained.
Nature of the University for Peace

Essentially, the University for Peace is an international institution of
higher education for peace with the aim of promoting among all
human beings the spirit of understanding, tolerance and peaceful co-existence, to stimulate cooperation among peoples and to help lessen obstacles and threats to world peace and progress, in keeping the noble aspirations proclaimed in the Charter of United Nations.
(Article 2-Charter of
UPEACE)
The studies carried out at the University shall focus on the topic of
international peace.
(Article 15-Charter of UPEACE)
The University shall, inter alia, grant masters degrees and doctorates
under terms and conditions established by the Council.
(Idem)
So far, one can state the following assertions:

Costa Rica and President Carazo
(1978-1982)
were determinant driving
forces for the establishment of the University for Peace in 1980. Even
though UPEACE has a global mandate, its history, actual possibility,
major infrastructure, legality and legitimacy is in Costa Rica, where
headquarters are located.
UPEACE is part of the UN efforts to offer education and training for
peace and security.
UPEACE complements the role and functions of other similar organizations such as UN Institute for Training and Research and the
United Nations University. In fact, the Rector of the United Nations
University is Ex-Officio member of the Council of the University for
Peace.
UPEACE is a higher teaching oriented institution to offer, mainly,
post-graduate degrees at Masters and Doctoral levels in peace and
conflict related subjects. Ideally, UPEACE academic programmes
should be benefited of the research and applied research that is undertaken by UNITAR and United Nations University.
The niche for the programmes offered by UPEACE is in international
peace and related matters. The guiding principles of the academic programmes at UPEACE should be the purposes and principles of the
United Nations as stated in its Charter.
UPEACE is an autonomous institution that enjoys academic freedom
and its budget is not part of the United Nations budget, and derives
its revenues from voluntary contributions.
Times of cold war

UNITAR, UNU and UPEACE were established by United Nations between 1965 and 1980, a 15-year period that was characterized by dramatic events around the world that affected peace and security and were
normal happenings in the framework of the so-called cold war.
Let us remember a sample of them: the Vietnam War and the corresponding USA defeat there, the territorial expansion by war of Israel, the
fall of the last dictatorships in Europe
(Spain and Portugal)
the fall of Sha in
Iran, the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, the dictatorship in Greece, the

India-Pakistan war, the military dictatorships and revolutionary insurgencies
in Latin America, the Cultural Revolution in China, and the revolutions and
independence movements in Africa.
Amidst such conflicting period of history, those organizations related to
the UN system were created to put education, training and research in function of the world needs of peace and security. And the struggle continues.
The UPEACE educational model" for peace building and

conflict prevention
The essential academic efforts at the University for Peace are oriented
to educate to understand the nature of the conflicts, the differences among
human beings and the peaceful ways for building and keeping healthy rela-
tions among peoples.

The educational model adopted by UPEACE should reflect such
principles. In that sense, the higher teaching-learning process at UPEACE
is characterized as follows:
It is multicultural in nature.
It instills the understanding, the respect and the potential of the differences.
It provides skills and studies of legal and legitimate instruments to approach conflicts.
It identifies the different realms where major conflicts may occur: in
communities, among nations, in unstable and depredated environments, in peoples suffering humiliations and attempts against their dignity and in the international relations.
It emphasizes and privileges the multiplier effect of its activities.
It teaches major and fundamentals concepts and principles of the nature of conflicts and the different approaches to actual peace building.
It is intensive. Courses last three weeks of daily classes and demanding readings and homework during eleven months.
It has a combination of resident faculty and visiting professors.
It includes practitioners currently in actual action as visiting professors.
The MA programmes offered by the University for Peace

The above mentioned issues explain the reasons for having at UPEACE
ten Master programmes that, in the current academic year 2007-2008,
have students from more than 50 countries of all continents. They fields
of those MA programmes are:
International Law and Human Rights
International Law and the Settlement of Disputes
Natural Resources and Sustainable Development
(Dual Programme with US
American University)
Natural Resources and Peace

Environmental Security
International Peace Studies only in Costa Rica campus
International Peace Studies Dual campus: UPEACE in Costa Rica
and Ateneo de Manila University in Philippines for Asian students.
Media, Conflict and Peace Studies
Gender and Peace Building
Peace Education
For more information visit: www.upeace.org
The Foundation Course in Peace and Conflict Studies

All UPEACE students enrolled for obtaining a graduate degree must
take a compulsory Foundation Course in Peace and Conflict Studies,
which is designed to engage students in an examination of the major
contemporary challenges to peace, sources of conflict and violence, and
several key non-violent mechanisms for conflict transformation and
prevention.
(Syllabus of the course PCS-6000 Foundations in Peace and Conflict Studies
University for Peace)
The outline of this 3-credit course is:

Understanding conflict and peace
The reasons of war
conflict escalation, dynamics and processes
theories of conflict, violence and the State
Political Economy and war
Environmental Security
Stalemate and beyond: conflict resolution tools

Building negative peace
Introduction to conflict interventions
War, Law and Human Rights
Building Positive Peace
Mediating conflicts: a practitioner experience
The gender dimension of peace and conflict
Peace education
Corporate Social Responsibility
Sustainable Development
In general, the course explains how to make a conflict analysis its context,
relationship and dynamics; the differences between peacekeeping, peace
making and peace building, the nature of violent conflict and conflict prevention, the differences between negative peace and positive peace and between conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation.

Women and the Role of NGOs

in Conflict Resolution in Africa11
Rebecca N.Mbuh
(Sookmyung Women's University)
Introduction
While it is absolutely necessary to seek ways to end conflicts and build
lasting peace, it is critical to ask the question: Whose responsibility is
it? We often hear our parents say: If you broke it, fix it. Often, the parties
involved in conflicts and wars are adamantly opposed to resolving it quickly
irrespective of the amount of lives lost and the sufferings endured by the
citizens. The process of conflict resolution and peace building is usually
assumed by a third party. In many conflict areas around the world, third
parties have stepped in to try to bring about an end to the conflicts. Third
parties are usually some other governments, civil societies/NGOs, womens
groups, other governments agencies, or international organizations.
In order to engage in meaningful and productive dialog on effective ways
to deal with conflicts and build peace in communities that have been ravaged
by conflict, it is essential to first understand the nature of the causes of
various conflicts. The next step is to take measures to prevent such conflicts
in the future by understanding and incorporating these identified causes of
conflict in the reconciliation, conflict resolution, and peace building and
1 Portions of this paper have previously been presented in Excavating the Past,
Prospects for the Future: Lessons from Womens Groups in Cameroon on Peace and
Justice at the UN Peace and Governance Conference in Tokyo, Japan.
Women and the Role of NGOs in Conflict Resolution in Africa 199
maintaining process. Much research has already been conducted to ascertain

the major causes of conflicts that result in violence leading to human
suffering. Many local and international NGOs and governmental agencies
throughout the world have spent enormous amounts of time and human/
monetary resources to bring about quick alleviation of suffering resulting
from conflict. While peace is important, it is equally important to not view
peace building as the cure for conflict. Rather the two challenges of modern
times must be approached together. Lasting peace can not be achieved from
a spring board of a hurriedly concluded conflict.
During the past decade and continuing today, NGOs and other civil
societies throughout the world have played a significant role in conflict
resolution and peace building. While the majority of the activities of many
NGOs have centered on humanitarian assistance, this approach is changing
with the necessity to look beyond immediate relief and strategize for the
long term survival of victims of conflict situations. There is growing demand
for NGOs to venture into other long term endeavors to ensure sustainability.
More and more, the scope and impact of NGOs is broadening to encompass
such areas as advocacy work; awareness-raising and peace education;
organization of peace marches, rallies, and other manifestations for peace;
bringing together persons from different ethnic groups; research and
information; informal diplomacy; reconstruction of war-torn areas; and
mobilization of people to satisfy their own basic needs
(Orjuela, 2003).
The
expanded role of NGOs in many African countries now also includes

advocacy for democratic reforms.
This paper examines some of the critical issues pertaining to women and
conflict resolution by first examining the role women play in conflict
resolution from the grass roots level to the international arena. It also
explores how womens NGOs have gravitated together to rebuild their
communities while working to reconcile groups and individuals through
reconciliation, forgiveness, conflict resolution, and global peace through

unity. The second purpose of this paper is to provide a forum for discussing
conflict resolution at the global level for a better understanding of ourselves,
others, communities and the world at large.
Causes of Conflicts in Africa

Conflict and wars result from many causes and can spread from a small
part of a nation to other neighboring countries and regions as is the case
in many African conflicts
(Juma, 2005; Shaw, 2003).
For example, the war in
the Democratic Republic of Congo has involved eight countries. Africa is

a vast and heterogeneous continent which renders the causes of its countries
conflicts equally complex. Some of these causes include: poverty, decline in
community ethics, lack of appropriate education, governments inability to
settle conflicts quickly, disintegration of societies, lack of trust, individualism,
self-interest, and politics and power
(exploitation of minor conflicts by leaders).
Of the 193 countries in the world, 46 nations are experiencing some form
of conflict either internally or with neighbors. About thirty three percent
or fifteen of these countries are in Africa
(PeaceWomen, 2006).
The Rwanda
genocide, as unfortunate as it was, also created in human beings all over

the world a consciousness about the urgency to apply conflict resolution
in understanding and settling disagreements among and within nations. In
every conflict a select subgroup of people bear the burden. In many instances
women and children are the most affected. It is during these difficult times
that women rise up and engage in developing peaceful coping strategies
for their survival and that of their nation as a whole.
Women and Conflict Resolution

Before moving into the discussion of the role of women in the resolution
of conflict, it is first necessary to examine the causes of conflict to better

provide an understanding of the extent of its nature. The degrees and meaning of conflict are as complex as the word itself. Nevertheless, one way
of viewing conflict can be by associating its causes with extreme hatred,
fear, mistrust, misunderstandings, power, suspicion, and ignorance. Moreover,
violence, war, rape, murder, refugees, prostitution, massacres, amputations,
hunger, illiteracy, unemployment, shattered families, emigration, reconciliation, strength, forgiveness, spirituality, peace-building, reconstruction, underdevelopment, non-governmental organizations, networking, democratization, civil society, grass roots organizations initiatives, grass roots support
organizations, counseling,
(re)training,
child labor, accountability, strategy,
policy, peacekeepers, sanitation, health issues, sustainable development, and

education are some of the words that are most commonly associated with
conflict
(Fisher, 1998; Barrow & Jennings, 2001; Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001; Lewis, &
Wallace 2000).
A report by the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, entitled Progress in

Tacking Africas Conflicts indicates that among other factors, conflict is
caused by limited natural resources, poverty, weak governments, and
unemployment
(2004).
Several studies have linked the causes of the Rwandan
conflict to many of the factors listed in the Secretary Generals report
(Human
Rights Commission Reports and Resolutions, 2003; CEDAW, 1993; Rapp, 2006; Hamilton,
2000; Women Waging Peace, 2003; Mutamba and Izabilia, 2005).
Regardless of the causes of conflict, women and children are the groups
affected the most by it. Researchers of conflict are overwhelmingly
unanimous on this fact. Mention the word conflict and sad images of the
genocide or mass killings in Rwanda come to mind. What is so terrible
about the situation in Rwanda is that the death of so many people could
have been prevented had the world, led by the United Nations, recognized
the gravity of the situation and intervened at the appropriate time with
resolution strategies. Instead, many developed nations chose to minimize the

internal conflict in Rwanda stating that it was a domestic affair. The conflict
(which lasted 100 days from April to July in 1994)
left a visible mark that will affect
the way humankind views conflict today and in the future. During the short
time of the massacres, the Tutsis and Hutus turned on each other killing
men, women and children in a brutal and systematic manner; those who
survived the genocide describe that era as senseless and merciless killings
according to a female survival that this author interviewed in 2004 in
Rwanda. It is almost twelve years since the genocide and from an outsider
looking into the Rwandan society for the first time it would appear that
the country is a peaceful, lively and progressive place. What lies hidden
beneath the faces of the nationals is a burden that even now they are very
reluctant to discuss. It is now against the law to ask someone in Rwanda
about their ethnicity because it is generally believed that ethnic conflict was
the root cause of the genocide.
Women are affected differently by war and conflict regardless of where
they are taking place. Studies conducted on this issue reveal that women
and girls are usually the victims of rape and sexual violence and widowed
while men are mostly, imprisoned or killed
(Mutamba & Izabiliza, 2005).
During
conflict women also suffer other forms of violence against such as murder,
sexual slavery, forced pregnancy and forced sterilization; thousands of other
women are victims of rape, trauma, physical injuries, and distrust of the
society
(Division for the Advancement of Women, 2000; Mutamba & Izabiliza, 2005).
Many
regard women mainly as victims of war and conflict but this view fails
to acknowledge the crucial part they play in conflict resolution. Women are
forced to embrace roles that are necessary for survival not only for
themselves but for orphans and others in their communities as well.
The post genocide government of Rwanda, realizing the critical role of
women in rebuilding the nation, adopted a policy that promotes gender
equality
(this is a milestone in a patriarchal society)
and empowers women as a
prerequisite for sustainable peace and development. The Rwandan womens

role in conflict resolution is in keeping with research findings that indicate
that during and immediately after conflict there is an expansion of womens
roles in the public arena
(PeaceWomen, 2006).
During conflict and immediately
following it, womens role in conflict resolution is necessary as women find

themselves assuming prominent roles in the domestic areas, community, and
public life. This was the case in Rwanda after the 1994 Genocide. Currently,
Rwanda has a higher proportion of female representatives in the national
Parliament than any country in the world
(Breneman and Mbuh, 2006).
The United Nations also has been instrumental in promoting the active
participation of women in conflict resolution. Starting with the Beijing
Conference in 1995 and following in 1998 with a conference by the United
Nations Commission on the Status of Women, governments and the international community have been encouraged to implement policies and programs
that make women partners in the discussions on conflict resolution and to
include measures to ensure gender sensitive justice, address the specific
needs and concerns of women refugees and displaced persons, and increase
the participation of women in peacekeeping, peace-building, pre- and postconflict decision-making and conflict prevention
(Division for the Advancement
of Women, 2000).
With the frequency of wars and conflicts in many parts of the world,
it seems inevitable that womens experiences in the process are needed to
bring about resolutions quickly and ensure that they last. We can see the
role that women in Afghanistan and Iraq have assumed since the wars began
in that part of the world as current examples of how women quickly become
a part of conflict resolution and peace building. Womens groups have been
active in fostering dialogue in societies that traditionally do not recognize
equal rights for women as compared to men. Wars and conflicts have
empowered women to join in the search for solutions to a peaceful living

not by governmental policy design but by shear necessity. The following
summary highlights some of the ways women around the world are actively
engaged in the conflict resolution processes and decisions:
The Netherlands has introduced a programme entitled Engendering the
Peace Process, which encourages Israel and Palestine to appoint more
women to negotiating teams and political decision-making posts in the
on-going Middle East peace process.
The African region developed a First Ladies for Peace Initiative in
early 1997, which has included conferences on peace and humanitarian
issues, the resolutions of which have been presented to African heads
of states and government. In addition, the Organization of African Unity
and the Economic Commission for Africa launched the Womens
Committee on Peace and Development in 1999.
Belgium has initiated a joint project with the United Nations Childrens
Fund
(UNICEF)
through which a womens non-governmental organization
identifies detained children and negotiates their release from rebel

soldiers. Belgium has also supported the use of women mediators in
conflict situations and has developed an initiative for peace-building
between the women of two parties in conflict.
Georgia has adopted a Plan of Action for Improving Womens Conditions,
which includes the development of a mechanism to ensure the active
involvement of women in decision-making in armed conflicts and peacebuilding.
The United Kingdom has taken steps to ensure that women are included
in the peace process in Northern Ireland.
In several states, including the United Kingdom and the United States,
women occupy high-level decision- making posts, including as secretary
of state and departmental heads, posts which have important implications
for conflict prevention and peace processes
(Division for the Advancement
of Women, 2000).
In Cameroon, the Cameroon Association of University Women
(CAMAUW)
works with womens groups at the village levels to resolve long standing
conflicts by conducting sensitization workshops for women and leaders
from the two villages, examining the possible causes of conflict in a
community, the consequences for society and the important role of women
as peacemakers
(International Federation of University Women, 2006).
From north to south and east to west, women from all works of life are organizing into groups formally or informally beginning at the grass roots
levels to put an end to conflicts and rebuild communities. Without wavering they put the interest of the general community first by regarding them
as one large family that must live together peacefully.
Role of Womens NGOs in Peace Building

After fifty years, the Council recognized that international peace and
security is advanced when women are included in decision-making

and peacebuilding
(Felicity Hill of UNIFEM, 2002)
UN Security Council Resolution 1325
referring to the October 2000
(Women Waging Peace, 2003).
Resolution
1325 on Women, Peace and Security requires member states to include

women in all UN peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and humanitarian activities, and rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. On 31 October,
2000, the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC)
unanimously adopted
Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Resolution 1325 marks the
first time the Security Council addressed the disproportionate and unique
impact of armed conflict on women, recognized the under-valued and underutilized contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping,
conflict resolution and peace-building, and stressed the importance of their

equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security
(Peace
Women, 2006).
Womens NGOs play a diverse role in conflict resolution and peace

building because women have been victimized and because they have no
choice and by their nurturing nature are raised to care for and protect the
family. Women are mainly viewed as victims of conflict and war but they
too have demonstrated that they are not only survivors but are peace builders
and protectors. A report published in the Christian Science Monitor by
Abraham McLaughlin
(October 2006)
would shock many readers outside of
Rwanda because it presents a unique reconciliation and peace building

alliance between a Tutsi woman and a Hutu from a trickle down perspective.
During the genocide of 1994, the Tutsi womans husband, child and more
than one hundred family members were killed by the Hutus making
forgiving a Hutu very difficult. A group of women in a village started a
cooperative to market their coffee beans and called it living together
because it included Hutu killers. Through the cooperative, Jeannette says:
Weve been building a relationship that changed our lives. We ended up
reconciling in a way we didnt know. She adds that the only solution
was to go together with my countrymen even the killers. There was no
alternative,
(Christian Science Monitor, 2006).
Jeannette Nyirabaganwas experience
is one of hundreds of instances where women in conflict zones are putting

the horrendous deeds committed against them and their families and utilizing
their energies to build peaceful communities.
Womens groups have a reputation for peaceful resolution of conflicts
and building peace throughout Africa. Recently in Cameroon,
February, 2006)
(January to
a group of older, mostly widowed women in their 70s to 90s
marched naked for about 15 kilometers from a village to the governors

office in the North West Province to demand an end to violence and conflict
between farmers and cattle owners. The conflict had been going on for many
years with no lasting resolution and the women were fed up with the
situation. In addition to this conflict, violence also erupted when men of
one village dragged a traditional ruler or chief from his car and beat him
to death for taking large sums of money as bribes from rich cattle owners
and giving them more land taken from farmers. The government failed to
negotiate successfully. It is a taboo for a male to see members of this group
of women naked and this rule is widely respected. The police officers and
military officers were helpless since they could not face the naked women.
The occupation of the governors office yielded immediate results as even
the governor being male could not face the women. His wife
than the women)
(much younger
had to mediate through an interpreter. What ensued was
immediate calm and a rebuilding of the communities to restore peace and

trust.
We can easily observe that where there is conflict or war, there will also
be NGOs of different orientations providing humanitarian needs, helping to
resolve the conflict, and networking with other local and international NGOs
to deliver services or engage in development or democratization initiatives.
Their specific role in peace building is usually taken for granted even when
they post the lives of their workers in danger. Since the 1990s, there has
been a dramatic shift in the role of NGOs efforts in providing humanitarian
aid to resolving conflict. As NGOs embark on the exercise of their missions,
it is also necessary for them to engage in networking and influencing
strategies necessary for reducing suffering that occurs in complex political
emergencies and very dangerous situations with domestic or local non
governmental organizations
(LNGOs) (Lewis & Wallace, 2000).
At an international conference on conflict prevention organized by the

international NGO Women Waging Peace on 13 November, 2003, women
spearheading peace building in conflict areas from India, Afghanistan,
Burundi, and South Africa presented different perspectives of peace building

initiatives in their countries. From Burundi to India, these initiatives included:
Organizing peace marches and conferences for peace
(Burundi)
Creating associations and learning exchanges to encourage participation

in politics
(Burundi)
Protesting and reminding the African National Committee

women are the majority
Lobbying
(ANC)
that
(South Africa)
(South Africa)
Increasing literacy and equalizing balance between men and women

(Afghanistan)
Encouraging academics to research to prove positive effects of women

in conflicts
(India) (Women Waging Peace, 2003)
Protesting and marching to government offices to demand an end to

violence against women and conflicts
(Cameroon)
Many African womens NGOs engaged in peace building activities operate

on a strong belief in the goodness of humankind and that a woman brings
together what has been shattered or scattered for the sake of peace.
According to Archbishop Emmanuel Kolini of the Anglican Church in
Rwanda, A woman is the epitome of peace. It is from her that peace flows
and radiates to other members of the family
the global society
(Authors emphasis).
(Mutamba & Izabiliza, 2005)
and
Therefore, it is only natural to involve
women as equal participants in deliberating and implementing strategies for

peace building and sustaining them. While the men, boys and in some
instances women and girls join in conflicts or wars, the majority of those
left behind to tender to domestic affairs are women. In examples such as
those from Rwanda to India, women have shown that through organized
womens groups actions can be taken that transcend gender to benefit the
whole nation.
Lessons from African Womens Groups on Peace and

Justice
One of the focal points in this discussion has to do with the idea of women
wanting to be a part of the power process that brings about change and
their active role in such activities that bring justice and lasting peace in
their communities. Sadly though, as history indicates, women are still excluded in these efforts in many parts of Africa and the world. Rampant
and long-lasting conflicts in African nations have placed a death sentence
on the future of many youths and women. Without adequate access to education many of these children are doomed for a life of misery and even
crime or death. Currently Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, and
many other African countries are facing up to the damage done or being
done to the future of their nations through the youth and women. African
womens groups across the continent view this as an urgent situation needing immediate intervention. These womens groups resort to unconventional
methods to bring about peace and justice where their male leaders have
failed. Women know that they cannot just stand by idly and watch the values of their traditions erode and plunge their communities/nations into chaotic and insecure conditions.
Whenever injustices, violence, discrimination and other forces of conflict
threaten a community and nation it is usually the womens groups such as
the ones in Cameroon, Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda and others that are at the
forefront organizing to defend and protect their children and preserve the
culture. One of the most important lessons drawn from these approaches
is the consistence and perseverance demonstrated by womens groups. Their
refusal to be compromised and be corrupted by the system is worthy of
attention. Many conflict resolution and peace building approaches have failed
or been marginalized in part due to rampant corruption within the political
systems. This has certainly been the case in Cameroon and many African
countries.
Historical, African womens uprising or rebellions or wars served as a
springboard for the more contemporary womens movements; leading us to
conclude that these womens self mobilized rebellions/uprisings also
provided the foundation for womens gentle approach to resolving conflict
and reinstating peace. The examples of womens approaches to conflict
resolution and peace building discussed in this paper stress a non-violent
cause. No weapons whatsoever are used except when men join in the struggle
as in the case in Nigeria and Cameroon. Justice is stressed for the community
and not just for women. Peace is essential for the continuity of a healthy
and prosperous society. With the many conflicts and wars within and between
many African countries, it is necessary to refrain from the pressures to deal
with conflicts just to settle them and give the appearance of peace on the
surface. Pulling from some of the womens strategies described in this paper
could open up new ways into long lasting dialog and subsequent resolutions
thus paving the way for peace. Unfortunately, many of the conflict resolution
and peace negations are notorious for excluding women from the negotiation
tables. Womens groups ought to be the conveners and leaders of such
endeavors given the failure rate of conflict resolution headed by men.
Women view themselves as creators and preservers of life. When life is
threatened they instinctively respond to save it. When conflicts erupt that
threaten the security of their communities they rally to bring about stability
and order. Since the womens world conference in Beijing in 1995, African
womens groups have gained support from global groups sympathetic to their
course. These groups helped to bring African womens struggles to the tables
at international conferences. Many African governments have finally taken
notice of the growing importance of womens roles in the development of
their nations and have begun paying more attention to their needs. Furthermore,
many international donor organizations are stipulating the inclusion of wom-
en in decision-making roles as a condition for more funding. Moreover, the

NEPAD wing of the newly created African Union is taking steps to involve
women in politics at the higher levels. On this we shall wait to assess their
success.
An important lesson from the Rwandan genocide is that in order for peace
to be lasting there most first be an understanding of each other in the conflict
situation, followed by complete forgiveness. Jeannette Nyirabaganwas
experience is one of hundreds of instances where women in conflict zones
are putting aside the horrendous deeds committed against them and their
families and utilizing their energies to build peaceful communities. An
international NGO that focuses on empowering women through sharing is
recording much success in Rwanda through one of its programs. Heifer
Internationals operation in Rwanda gives a cow or goat to a woman who
must then give the first calf from her gift cow/goat to another needy family
from the opposite ethnic group. One of the beneficiaries I talked with
indicated that she has given more than five calves to other families who
not too long ago would have been considered the other or enemy since
she is a Tutsi. The success of this project is now being imitated in other
neighboring countries.
Partnership with men, while building solidarity among womens groups,
can also facilitate the peace process. A womens cooperative, AVEGA whose
motto is No Peace Without Justice2, in Rwanda is working with men,
including men in their activities and educating them about womens issues.
Here, men are involved in marketing baskets made by widows and the
proceeds used to help widows and children of the genocide.3 To the womens
group, basket means peace because it holds together.
2 For more information about AVEGA, please visit: www.avega.org.rw.
3 Interview with the director of The Association of Genocide Widows (AVEGA) in
December, 2006 in Kigali, Rwanda.
The Future of Global Peace (Networking, Consulting, and

Collaboration)
While there are numerous ways to resolve conflict and build peace within
societies that have been plagued by conflicts and wars, even the best practices can only succeed if the two parties are willing to dialog and commit
to the process. Conflict resolution is very complex and does not require
a hasty solution or a band aid approach. Negotiations, understanding, forgiveness, networking, consultation and collaboration are all needed at various stages. Because the effects and implications of conflicts rapidly spread
to other regions with the potential to cause further conflicts in other areas,
a universal approach to conflict resolution should engage consultation and
collaborative efforts of the international community. Nations far and near
conflict areas are presently integrated in peace building endeavors directly
or indirectly through international and their local NGOs. These organizations go to great lengths to work with their counterparts or other grass
roots organizations in conflict areas to assist with basic needs first before
engaging the long and tedious process of conflict resolution and peace
building.
International organizations such as CARE International,4 Population
Services International
(PSI),5
Catholic Relief Services
(CRS)6
and numerous
individual non profit organizations in various countries are working on a

regular basis with NGOs in conflict regions in areas such as education,
4 CARE International helps poor people in more than 70 countries and especially in
conflict regions where the focus is on women and children. For additional information
on the organizations activities, visit: http://www.care.org.
5 PSI Rwanda, Burundi, and the Great Lake Regions is instrumental in conflict
resolution and peace building by working with both women and men organizations
to rebuild lives, families, and communities. To get a complete overview of their
activities, visit: http://www.psi.org.
6 See more about the programs and services of CRS at: http://www.crs.org.
empowerment of women, rehabilitation of boy/girl soldiers, health care

(malaria/HIV prevention and treatment), reconstruction, and developing
peace education programs to be included in curriculums as early as the
primary school level.
Several NGOs in the United States are currently in collaborative and
networking relationships on various womens projects such as those stated
below:
Women political and NGO leaders from Ghana, Nigeria, Mali and Senegal
are receiving leadership training under a program managed by Michigan
State.
The AIDS Action Committee of Massachusetts is assisting women and
their families to fight HIV/AIDS in Botswana.
Women of Vision is helping groups fighting domestic violence in South
Africa.
The American Bar Association has partnered with Nigerian organizations
to develop women-led conflict mediation programs in southeastern
Nigeria.
The African-American Institute is providing leadership training for
women from sixteen African countries and assisting women members
of the Senegalese parliament.
Heartland International is building the capacity of the Tanzanian
Association of Women Entrepreneurs.
The League of Women Voters is building womens civil society institutions
in eight African countries.
The Womens Coalition of Duluth is supporting a coalition fighting
Violence against Women in Kenya.
Women for Women International is completing leadership training for
Nigerian women.
Four counties in Ohio are enhancing management skills of women in
local government in Tanzania
(Steinburg, 2003).7
Moreover, within the African continent a regional NGO serves as a liaison

between women NGOs in seven West and East African countries
Ghana, Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Kenya)
(Nigeria,
to train leaders/managers
to transform the negative image regarding women as helpless victims of

conflict and war to stakeholders who contribute meaningfully to peace
building efforts in their nations
(Ekiyor, 2001).
Many of these NGOs build
schools and educate orphans, provide training to empower women in business

and politics, provide care for widows and the elderly people, and identify
and deal with challenges that prevent women from full participation in peace
building in their communities.
Conclusion
Bringing about lasting peace in conflict areas and preventing further
conflict requires continuous action. We are gathered here today to tackle
a crucial issue that threatens all of us directly or indirectly. It is therefore
our collective responsibility to address this challenge through venues such
as our meeting today to discuss, pull resources together, and act as advocates to end or prevent conflict and ensure that peace building is lasting.
As educators we can instill in our students the importance of peace building and provide training/internship programs that introduce them to organizations that are engaged in conflict resolution and peace building activities
in our communities and elsewhere. As activists at the international, regional, and local levels we can introduce and support legislation and policies
7 Summerized from a speech presented by Donald K. Steinburg, on March 6, 2003 to
the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City. For a full report visit:
http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/18759.htm.
that build friendly, understanding, and trusting neighborhoods with the aim
of preventing conflicts in the first place. Guaranteeing the rights and dignity of all citizens must be a key consideration for lasting peace. Our focus
should be in devising projects to prevent conflict rather than curing it for
the old saying prevention is better than cure still holds in conflict resolution and peace building today.
Conflict resolution and peace building can not be achieved without the
involvement of more than half of the population
(women).
In many conflict
areas women are now the majority of the population. Additionally, women
and children are affected most by the effects of conflict and wars. The
participation of both men and women is needed to achieve lasting peace.
Networking and collaboration with other NGOs within the country and internationally is needed to exchange ideas and support one another. The research
on women and peace building point to the advantages of such a union and
encourage governments to implement policies that empower women to be
leaders at all levels of the society. Women should be strategically represented
in bilateral and/or intergovernmental and international decision making bodies
that address conflict resolution and peace building activities.
The Rwandan example demonstrates the importance of women in peace
building and stresses the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation in the
peace building process. Rather than wait for a crisis to emerge before
scrambling for solutions, the global community should convene on a regular
basis to discuss strategies for preventing conflicts in the first place and
training local leaders to recognize and deal with the causes before they
escalate into mass killings and violence against women.
Proverbs and Maxims Relating to Peace and Non-Violence
1. Reciprocity in peace brings about dialogue.
2. Peace brings about progress, war only destruction.
3. Peace enriches people, war impoverishes them.

4. People prosper in peace and wither away in violence.
5. A man of peace lives in peace.
6. Do not rush to a conflict with your kinsfolk.
7. Mens mattress is peace.
8. He who embraces violence rarely sleeps in peace.
9. Do not hasten to wage war, particularly against your own.
10. Both parties lose in a civil war.(Mursal
Saddexle, Somali)
Basket: A Symbol of Peace

Avega Womens Cooperative Kigali, Rwanda, 12/14/06
If there was no laying down of arms, the old women, naked and on their
knees, would crawl towards the foolhardy combatants and say to them:
We are your mothers,
We do not want war,
We do not want bloodshed.

Do not fight with your brothers.
They have sent us to sue for peace.(M.J.
Mathey et al, Central African Republic)
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Three Episodes in Developing

a Harmonized World
Yuahn Rao (Pacific
Rim Institute for Development & Education : PRIDE))
The First Episode of world peace and the balance of fear

(1945-1990)
By the time, the First World War ended, the Second World War had already begun from its inside factors. Historians have differing opinions regarding the causes of World War II, but the consensus of opinions seems
to be, that power hungry, criminal leaders such as Hitler, Mussolini and
Hideki Tojo, deliberately plotted the war. British historian Prof, A.J.P.
Taylor published his 1961 book, The Origin of World War II, and cited diplomatic mistakes as major factors that contributed to the causes of the
Second World War. So, when we discuss how to prevent a third world war,
we must use hind sight in analyzing the ending of the Second World War,
which centered on the division and control for territorial occupancy from
the victories, including competition for military control. This new situation
created a cold war, which began even before the war ended.
Wars have been continuous on different levels during this period
1990)
(1945-
and continuing to our present time, always with the threat of using
nuclear weapons. During these five decades, we saw an inexorable increase

of armed conflicts and nearly all other forms of political violence. We witnessed the cold war of internationalism, nationalism and racism, dictatorship and democracy, including the blind and hateful emotions propagated
Three Episodes in Developing a Harmonized World 223
against an assumed, fabricated enemy, or so-called foreigner. Hitler,

openly murdered millions of people and this pattern of Genocide has been
repeated by other governments within their respective countries. People always seem to be living in a threatening or upside down condition. The crisis of a third world war is only one step away and there are many instances
when it almost happened. Our humanitarian spirit has not grown strong
enough to stop the violence and greediness of various nations. This first
episode of world peace after the end of World War ll, demonstrated its limitations by countries focusing on self-interests, maintained by fear of revenge to balance the dangerous power of atomic weapons.
Conflicts and Human Nature:
We see that the conflicts and warring factors among countries have always
had other, deeper causes and root factors hidden in human nature and national character. These factors were covered by multifaceted masks of politicians that were more than diplomatic mistakes. The root factor is related
to mans human nature which has never been seriously investigated as a
practical approach for solving conflicts. It consists of ingrained selfishness,
greed and brutal determination as the motivating factors to possess material
wealth and power.
Hegemony by big or small emperors, dictates their intention as rulers
to occupy as much territory as possible and spread their influence, no matter
how it is accomplished. Invasions and injustice prevails; treaties or agreements are meaningless, with each trying to divide the other ones territory
for their own benefit. This is why we say: History repeats itself. We see
factors in handling relations among countries with territorial conflicts since
World War I. These same patterns and factors occurred in Germany, Japan
and Italy as the Fascist system in World War II. There is a common picture
of diplomatic phenomena: states have no permanent friends, but only per-
manent interests. It doesnt matter if it is within a capitalist group under

USA, or socialist group under former Soviet Union, between developed
countries or underdeveloped countries. In many cases, such as in Bosnian,
Serb, Kosovo, Darfur, Rwanda, the armed conflicts happened inside the
same country between tribes and sectors becoming wars of genocide! It appears that when fighting occurs inside the same countrys territory, the battles
become even more violent and brutal.
After 1990, the UN led the movement of peace building and human
rights efforts supported by member countries and the UN NGO civil
organization. Since then, those small, regional wars have declined and the
decline has continued. By 2003, there were 40 percent fewer conflicts than
in 1992. The deadliest conflictsthose with 1,000 or more battledeaths
fell by some 80 percent. The number of genocides and other mass slaughters of civilians also dropped by 80 percent, while core human rights abuses
have declined in five out of six regions of the developing world since the
mid-1990s. A number of UN peacekeeping operations and missions to prevent
and stop wars have increased by more than 400 percent since the end of
the Cold War. But the abject failure to stop the Rwandan genocide remains.
The UN/NGO body has been developing and increasing its understanding
of the important role of society, at the grassroots level and its power and
influence on governments to help solve conflicts. When we exam many social
affairs, we can clearly see that to fulfill these international goals requires
persistent and massive actions.
Lets review the situation of the war against drugs, the war against AIDS
(we will see a further globalization of the epidemic spreading to every single corner of the
planet,),
war against human slavery, trafficking, the protection of the rights
of children, especially those without parents and families, the equal right
of gender in decision making, the protection of environment and forests,
the moral education for social behavior code, education to overcome preju-
dices, racism and narrow minded nationalism; the monitoring of positional

power used in government systems etc. Without peoples willingness to
volunteer, along with their sincere support and involvement, government
projects would totally fail.
The narrow-minded prejudices and racism cultivated massive hate
groups. It has been like a cage, locking peoples minds and enslaving them.
Countries steeped in nationalism become a threat to other countries rather
than a world securing force. Up to 2008, some of these countries use any
means to develop their own nuclear weapons, so they can become a nuclear
bomb club member. As we know, once military fire starts from any small
ignition, it can immediately become a huge flame impacting the entire
world. So, here we should ask: how do we win a military war today, and
what are the material benefits? The answer is: no one could have any benefits from world wide nuclear war and self-extinguishment becomes the
result.
Since it appears there are no benefits from war, we must seriously limit
our armaments and open our minds to explore new ways to solve all kinds
of the world conflicts. At the same time, education and scientific research
are desperately needed to solve the urgent threatening of global warming,
eco-pollutions, energy and food crises, drinking water, AIDS control and
SARS rescue. These problems are universal and require every country to
collectively consider our future life on this planet. Our collective future will
be determined by our care and considerate actions to survive. The destruction of mankind may not come from war; it may come from the collective
pollution perpetrated by countries caught up in power control and greed.
The time has come for countries to agree that military competition is a
dead road, and focus their primary attention, not on war and killing, but
finding peaceful solutions for settling differences and solving problems of
global disasters. It is apparent that the 47 years first episode for developing
world peace is still motivated by nationalistic self-interest and some kind

of forced peace.
The Second Episode of world peace is structured by

mutual inter-dependent relationships (1991-2008)
PC Internet, satellite digital TV media, technique development has greatly helped the linking net to form a new world relationship. Continental
communication, cross-cultural exchange in education, scientific research,
sports, arts fields, and collaborations in economy, trading and financial industries have been increasing their exchanges, penetrating and merging
each others countries, including international marriages, multi-national families, and orphans cross-countries adoptions. All of these combinations have
promoted a modern world transformed into a global village, every one linking
to the other. The newest facts, about the United States secondary mortgage
crisis, have influenced the whole worlds real estate market, crippled the
hundred-year-old Wall Street. This bankruptcy has extended its problems
to include the worlds largest banks and the international stock markets.
These iron facts prove that no country can isolate itself from the entire
world. We have to share the good and bad together. When AIDS, SARS,
the bird flu, mad cow virus were spreading, we had to join together to organize
scientists in many countries, research in many areas and find the solutions
for the safety of all the people in the world.
At the same time, many countries are witnessing suicide bombings on
a daily basis on resident streets; it has become a world wide war of
revenge. Those radical extremists combined with nationalism, racism and
religious fanaticism are newer factors occurring in this chaotic world stage,
and it has invaded every ones normal life, especially in those border areas
between different countries. Most terrorist solders and human resources are
from illiterate and poverty areas, including those children without parents
and families, but their organizers and leaders are educated, intelligent and
knowledgeable with training from good income family. Their Terrorist actions completely deviate from a basic moral standard common to all, yet
they are willing to kill so many innocent families and ready to massacre
lots more by inciting national or religious hatred towards these countries
and their people. The golden rule of global ethics states, Putting oneself
in the place of another
for mankind.
(Buhhdism), That
(Muhammad); Never
choose for yourself.
which you want for yourself, seek
impose on others what you would not
(Confucius-Analects XV.24,); Just
do for you, do the same for them.
(Luke 6:31)
as you want others to
These terrorist solders have
been misguided and are being used as living bombs, because they lack of
the opportunity of education for independent thinking and global ethics
training.
It is necessary to change the poverty imbalanced gap between the rich
and the poor for the foundation of an unforced world peace. As this extreme gap is the cause of all kinds of crisis and violence. There are pioneer
model persons in our economic society who give their wealth and power
for the interests of humanity, such as Bill Gates family, Warren E. Buffett
and many other donators who are ordinary people, but want to help educate
the masses and strive for peace. These generous people have donated large
percentages of what they have accordingly to support disaster incidents.
This philanthropy is the hope of our future development for a caring and
harmonized world peace without borders.
In the past, nationalism and racism produced world war leaders similar
to Hitler, so today we need to expand our vision and emphasize the importance of global ethics to prevent history from repeating itself. This educational movement can help solve those hard issues, especially for understanding the dangerous of nationalism, and awakening to oneness of entire
human race, every one is the member of the big earth family. We are all
linked together, we have no choice. This is the second episode of 17 years
towards world peace with structures of mutual and inter-dependent relationships.
The Third Episode of world peace with a world conscience: How to solve the paradox of war and conflict?
(2009-Future)
George Carlin said We conquered outer space but not inner space. Weve
done larger things, but not better things. Weve cleaned up the air, but polluted the soul. Weve conquered the atom, but not our prejudice. We have
multiplied our possessions, but reduced our values. We talk too much, love
too seldom, and hate too often. We wish to solve the conflicts over territories in peaceful ways and governments have been using traditional negotiation skills and diplomatic procedures for almost three thousand years.
Have we found any real fair solutions to settle these conflicts to satisfying
both sides without protesting and complaining after? We have so many bilateral or six lateral territory disputers from longer borders to small islands;
we have so many newer or newest rocket-atomic bomb weapons aimed in
different directions; we have out of control drug addicts and AIDS spreading wars, we have rapidly increased orphans crying in six continents, obliviously, we havent found amicable solutions to overcome these war
tragedies. This is the reason we are turning to non-governmental organizations, who represent peoples opinions to consult on the oldest issues under new conditions outside of the governments diplomatic systems.
The UN, which originally was a government assembly organization, has
become todays UN/NGO combined working team, fulfilling incredible jobs
mostly on a volunteer basis. It is by working in tandem with NGO volun-
teers and supporters, that the limited resources of the UNs global mission
has been leveraged to extraordinary levels, as much as 100 to one. Together
they have done some remarkable things such as:
Millions of refugees, mostly women and children, are receiving food,
shelter, medical aid, education and repatriation assistance.
Safe drinking water has been made available to billions people in rural
areas during this last decade.
A 75 percent increase in immunization rates has saved the lives of
more than 3 million children each year, and 7 million more from going blind from the river blindness and dying from the guinea worm
and other relentless and remote diseases, etc.
In the 5th September, 2003, UN General Assembly conference report
Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further changes, had
not mentioned of how to improve the NGOs function with the UN, but
in the report of 60th General Assembly, 5 July, 2006 and 21, November,
st
2006, the 61 session of the forum on General Assembly and the UN foundation with NGOs relationships concluded that: participation of civil society, in collaboration with other stakeholders, is essential to the success of
the United Nations.
In order to unify the peoples minds and their power of influences,
NGOs must also transform themselves and overcome their own prejudices
to improve and strengthen themselves. We suggested NGO self-education
program in following aspects:
1. Emphasize every UN/NGO member free their mind from creating competitiveness rather than cooperation. A more universal attitude concerning the worlds problems will provide a greater understanding for NGOs
to work together effectively
2. Promote principles to overcome and reduce attitudes of self-centeredness
and improve UN/NGOs decision-making process. This will assist UN-
NGLS, NGOIC to help unify and bridge the gaps between States and
NGOs. Also, it will increase decision-making transparency and help unify UN/NGOs.
3. When NGOs suggestions and resolutions with similar contents have
overlapping goals, they should try to merge them into one resolution
through full and frank consultation to find out the common parts acceptable to the related parties. They can be merged with recommendations,
suggestions and resolutions with complementary points to embrace each
other.
The term of NGO appeared on the horizon when the UN was established, the first one worldwide NGO, CONGO
Relations with UN)
(Conference of NGOs in Consultative
set up in 1948, and now the civil people organizations are
growing like tidal waves. When people unify their steps and consult constructively suggestions to solve all humans problems, this becomes a new
growing power of helping peaceful solutions for all kinds of nations
conflicts. It will not only help in solving the territory and natural resource
dispute and fighting, but also cooperating in managing global crisis affecting every ones daily survivals.
In order to root out the causes of war and armed conflicts, there must
be education available for every village resident, fostering an awareness of
how small and vulnerable our global village is. With all the aspects of natural disasters like global warming, can we stop it or keep it from entering
any of our territory? When the hurricanes approach, do we have any way
to defeat it and keep it outside our boarder lines? It is impossible to separate the integrity of the whole earth, because we are all born within this
inter-related universe.
The damage caused by modern war can no longer be controlled by individual country leaders and the so-called conquering victories can only
bring ashes and destruction as their results. To solve this paradox of endless
recycle, It requires a drastic change in attitude and thinking. It is evident

that world conflicts cannot be solved with old methods, including the negative ideology that attitude is based on survival of the fittest and the concept
that man is a one-sided animal created with only a selfish gene.
Although humans have a material or animalistic nature, history reveals
that man has continuously demonstrated the existence of a dual nature,
which allows him to balance his lower traits of selfishness with higher
qualities of selflessness. Apart from animalistic tendencies, the human nature exemplifies a spirit of kindness, compassion and self-sacrifice for
others. So, both capacities for selfishness and selflessness are a part of human nature. To be or not to be the beginning of an ending world depends
on we continuants the jungle philosophy, the stronger one is the survivor
of competition in the material world. Or raise up our understanding level
above our individual national background with its differences.
Conclusion
A stable structure for developing a harmonized world must incorporate
a shift in measuring our values and worth such as work performed in a
spirit of service should be placed on a higher level. Many Non-Governmental
Organizations are presently serving vast areas of our global society to help
those in need, struggling to create change, and provide education for the
less fortunate. People, who have developed a conscience from I to We,
will play a major role in bringing about a better world by promoting education in global ethics for every nations peoples starting from the grassroots
level to the top.
There is a traditional saying regarding the Chinese dream: The Great
Oneness under the Sky. This philosophical concept for equality and world
unity is universal to all nations. World unity is the goal towards which a
harassed humanity is striving. A sustainable structure for world peace will

require a new way of thinking and a revolutionary change in attitude regarding life on this planet. A commitment to abandon our prejudices and
search out peaceful solutions to global conflicts requires us to view ourselves as inhabiting this planet as one universal family. As we wished in
the 3rd global ethics symposium declaration that our common humanity
was underlined in the hope that one day we will see Christian and Jewish
families adopt Moslem orphans, and Moslem families adopt Hindu parentless children, so that the principles of the oneness of humanity, of universal
love and of motherhood will apply to all children without any form of
prejudices. It is apparent that peace and security are unattainable unless
the basic unity of the world is firmly established. In this age of maturity,
we conclude, that it is important to fully realize the possibility of a third
world war bringing in its wake destruction and annihilation, which will be
the end of our world, while mature understanding leads us to accept not
only the possibility of peace, but affirms and reinforces its inevitability.
This means the end of our old world thinking and the beginning of growth
into a harmonized world and bright new civilization.
Contributors
Sungho Kang (kang@khu.ac.kr) is on the faculty of the Center for the Reconstruction
of Human Society, Kyunghee University in Seoul, Korea. He specializes in international relations with a particular interest in conflict resolution and International
cooperation. He has been involved in NGO activities as Director for Program
Planning at the Global Common Society (GCS) International, an international NGO
based in Seoul. He was on the Steering Committee of the 2008 International NGO
Conference on History and Peace and acted as the Director for program planning
for the Korea Organizing Committee of the 1999 Seoul International Conference
of NGOs. In addition, he is leading an NGO named International Network for
Peace and Conflict Resolutionas its representative. He has written or edited books
and articles including NGO Networking for Peaceful Conflict Resolution (in Korean,
2008), Strategies for the Implementation of UN Millennium Development Goals in
Korea (in Korean, 2005), and White Paper of the 1999 Seoul International Conference
of NGOs (2000).
John W. McDonald (jmcdonald@imtd.org) Ambassador John W. McDonald is a lawyer,
diplomat, former international civil servant, development expert and peacebuilder,
concerned about world social, economic and ethnic problems. He spent twenty
years of his career in Western Europe and the Middle East and worked for sixteen
years on United Nations economic and social affairs. He is currently Chairman and
co-founder of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (www.imtd.org), in
Washington D.C., which takes a systems-approach to Beace Building on the national and international level. In February, 1992, he was named Distinguished
Visiting Professor at George Mason Universitys Institute for Conflict Analysis and
Resolution, in Fairfax, Virginia. He was one of the six co-chairs at the 2008 Seoul
International NGO Conference on History and Peace. He has written or edited eight
books on negotiation and conflict resolution including the groundbreaking Multi
-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace (3rd edition, 1996). He published
most recently The Shifting Grounds of Conflict and Peace Building : Stories and
Lessons (2008)
Chinsoo Bae (jsbae@historyfoundation.or.kr) is currently a senior research fellow at

Northeast Asian History Foundation in Seoul, Korea. He earned a B.A. at Seoul
National University in 1982 and a Ph.D. in International Relations at Florida State
University (USA) in 1991. His publication extensively involve with issues over conflict studies, territorial disputes, conflict resolution, and the role of civil societies
in the region of Northeast Asia. While serving as Head of Research Division
(Territorial Dispute Resolution) of Northeast Asian History Foundation, he has organized several conference panels regarding territorial issues at the following
International Conferences: the 2008 Global Conference of IPRA (International Peace
Research Association, Belgium, 1519 July, 2008), 1st International NGO Forum
on Territorial Issues (Seoul Korea, September 1317 2007), 2nd International NGO
Forum on Territorial Issues (Seoul Korea, October 811 2008), etc. He has also
published several books and articles, in English or Korean, including Territorial
Issues in Europe and East Asia: Colonialism, War Occupation, and Conflict
Resolution(2009) Territorial Disputes in the World and Colonial Legacy (2008),
NGO Networking for Peaceful Conflict Resolution (2008), The Networking and
Infrastructuring of NGOs in Northeast Asia (2006), The White Paper of NGOs in
Northeast Asia (2005), Testing Crisis Learning Theory: The Case of Minor-Minor
Power Dyads, 1946-1985, etc.
Ekaterina Stepanova (stepanova@sipri.org) is a Senior Fellow and a Programme Leader

on armed conflicts and conflict management at the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI). She focuses on trends in armed conflicts, conflict management and post-conflict peace-building, political economy of conflicts, and unconventional security threats such as terrorism and transnational crime. She serves
on editorial boards of journals such as Terrorism and Political Violence (St Andrews
University, UK) and Security Index (CREP, Geneva). The latest of her four books
is Terrorism in Assymetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects (Oxford
Univ. Press, 2008). Her previous book The Role of Illicit Drug Business in the
Political Economy of Conflicts and Terrorism (Moscow, 2005) won the medal for
young scientists from the Russian Academy of Sciences. She has also co-edited/co-authored two volumes and is the author of 75 other research publications in
six languages.
Hasjim Djalal(hdh@cbn.net.id) has distinguished career in various fields. He has served

at the Indonesian Embassies in Belgrade, Washington D.C. and he was Ambassador/
Deputy Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN in New York (1981-
Contributors 235
1983), Ambassador to Canada (1983-1985), Germany (1990-1993) and Ambassador

at-large for the Law of the Sea and Maritime Affairs (1994-2000). He was President
of the International Seabed Authority (ISBA) in Jamaica (1995, 1996), and currently serves as Chairman of the Finance Committee of the ISBA. Since 1989 he
has been the initiator and convener of the Workshop Process on Managing Potential
Conflicts in the South China Sea, and he has been involved the in development
of maritime cooperation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Currently, he is a member
of the Indonesian Maritime Council, Senior Advisor to the Indonesian Minister for
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and to Indonesian Naval Chief of Staff. He lectures
at universities and other institutions learning of higher learning in Indonesia. He
has written extensively on the Law of the Sea and Regional issues. His books include Indonesian Struggle for the Law of the Sea (1979), Indonesia and the Law
of the Sea (1995), Indonesian Foreign Policy in the 1990s (1997), Preventive
Diplomacy in South East Asia: Lessons Learned (2003), Seeking Lasting Peace in
Aceh (2006), and numerous articles in Indonesia and abroad.
Kamarulzaman Askandar (zam@usm.my) Prof. Askandar is based at Universiti Sains

Malaysia (USM) in Penang, Malaysia, where he is the Coordinator of the Research
and Education for Peace, as well as an Associate Professor at the School of Social
Sciences of USM. He is also the Regional Coordinator of the Southeast Asian
Conflict Studies Network, a network of peace and conflict studies scholars and institutions in the region (www.seacsn.net). He graduated with a PhD in Conflict
Resolution from the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. He
has been involved in many workshops and training programs on peacebuilding and
conflict resolution around the region. His research interests include Southeast Asian
politics, self determination type conflicts especially Aceh, Mindanao, and Southern
Thailand, peacebuilding, and peace education. He has also written and edited a few
articles and books on the subjects of peace and conflict resolution. Some of his
publications in recent years include The Management of Public Policy Conflicts
in Southeast Asia (Penang: SEACSN, 2007), Building Peace: Reflections from
Southeast Asia (Penang: SEACSN, 2007), Peacebuilding in Aceh: Lessons Learned
from Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland (Bangkok: Forum Asia, 2005), Management
and Resolution of Inter-State Conflicts in Southeast Asia (Penang: SEACSN, 2003),
etc.
M. M. Mahbub Hasan (cdpmahbub@yahoo.com) has been working with the Coastal
Development Partnership (CDP) as its partnership coordinator. CDP is a third-gen-
eration, and pioneer human rights focused, non-for-profit, and public interest serving national research and advocacy organization in Bangladesh. He is also a Senior
Staff Reporter of the Monthly Upakul Paribesh Barta, a national news paper in
Bangladesh which is published by Coastal Development Partnership (CDP) focused
on environment, water & river management, climate change and governance issues
etc. He wrote several books and articles including Effectiveness and Accountability
of ADB Project in South-West Bangladesh (2008), River Erosion in the Southwest
Region of Bangladesh and its Distressed People (2004).
Justice Mbuh (jmbuh@yahoo.com) has been engaged for a long time in the academic
field and recently he is involved in the foreign affairs of the Republic of Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons) Government in Exile as Acting Minister. He is teaching at
National National Polytechnic, Nkwen, Bamenda, NWP, Cameroun as well as at
the Department of Economics of Ecole Normale Superieure Annex de Bambili
(ENSAB) at University of Yaound 1, Yaound, Cameroun. He is the author of several books such as Ambazonias Challenge to the United Nations (2007), Inside
Contemporary Cameroun Politics (2005), International Law and Conflicts: Resolving
Border and Sovereignty Disputes in Africa (2004).
Victor Valle (vvalle@upeace.org) is currently Dean and professor of the UN mandated
University for Peace with headquarters in Costa Rica, Central America. He has a
long career in international cooperation for educational development, university education and high level management training in public enterprises. He spent from
1981 to 1992 as Senior Educator in the Organization of American States, based
in Washington D.C., the regional organization of all the countries in the Western
Hemisphere. He has written several books and articles about education, social issues
and politics. During early1990s he was a member of the National Commission for
Peace, in charge of verifying the UN mediated Peace Accords that ended the civil
war in El Salvador, Secretary-General of the Salvadoran political party and member
of the Socialist International, National Revolutionary Movement, a political ally of
the insurgency during the whole civil war.
Rebecca N. Mbuh (inaneh@yahoo.com) is a professor of business administration at
Sookmyung Womens University, Seoul, Korea, since 2001. She received her Ph.
D from the University of South Carolina in 1993. After receiving her doctorate,
Dr. Mbuh worked at Allen University, Columbia, South Carolina, first as Director
of Institutional Research and Effectiveness and adjunct professor of Business
Contributors 237
Administration, then as Dean of Academic Affairs, and from 1999 as Provost. She
received a research grant and spent a year conducting research on women managers
in Cameroon and Indonesia. She is the author of several articles and book chapters
on womens issues (particularly African women) and has presented numerous papers at conferences in the United States of America and internationally. She is the
co-author of a book Women in the New Millennium: The Global Revolution (March
2006) and Full Moon (June 2006). Dr. Mbuh is the editor for the Asian Women
journal and is a regular contributor of articles to the South Carolina Black Media
Group newspapers in the United States of America.
Yuahn Rao (PRIDE9@aol.com) is Founder/President of the Pacific Rim Institute for
Development & Education, (PRIDE), Non-profit International NGO, in Special
Consultant status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
(ECOSOC). He was a scientist of physics. He was engaged in the joint research
and technology project for the Perceptual Systems of Psycho-Physics in the
Department of Psychology at the University of California, Los Angeles. He was
a former instructor of advanced studies at the Central Civil Engineering Ministry
of China and thesis instructor at University of Science and Technology of China.
He is credited with over 16 publications on diversified interdisciplinary subjects
related to space-time correlation and localization. He is also a member of New
York Academy of the Sciences and Scientific Research Society of North America.
He has organized three Global Ethics Symposia in Beijing and Los Angeles hosted
by PRIDE with the participation of many delegates from both the US, China, and
other countries. He assisted many Chinese government delegations in different
fields to study and being trained in the U.S.
Keyworld : Conflict Resolution, Conflict Management NGO, Civil Society, Territorial
Issue, Territorial Dispute, Peace Building, Preventive Diplomacy, Citizen
Diplomacy, Second Track, NGO Networks, Multi-Track Diplomacy

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Conflict Resolution and Peace Building:

The Role of NGOs in Historical Reconciliation

The Northeast Asian History Foundation was founded in September 2006

century. Territorial issues and conflict resolution were also considered in

4 Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

Territorial Issues and Conflict Resolution both in 2007 and in 2008.

New Trends and Challenges in Modern Armed Conflicts

Conflict Transformation and Historical Reconciliation Through Mutli-Track Diplomacy

Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea

Resolving the Territorial Issue in the Mindanao Conflict: Challenges for

6 Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

An Educational Model for Peace Building and Conflict Prevention:

Women and the Role of NGOs in Conflict Resolution in Africa

Three Episodes in Developing a Harmonized World

Conflict Resolution and Peace Building: The Role of

and The Korean Future Foundation, two NGOs based

As the background papers of both conferences indicate, we confirmed

12 Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

and territorial issues should be based on universal values and people-centered

Social conflict can be defined as the perceived in-

compatibility of the interests or aspirations of groups. Two major key factors

1 Definition from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflict).

John Davies and Edward Kaufman, Eds. Second Track/Citizens Diplomacy

14 Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

First track diplomacy operated by the government is influenced by the

(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), p. 2.

philosophy of this concept, called a systems approach to peace is that

can successfully develop peace

16 Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

tending local parties.7

to the Prevention of Deadly Conflict (New York and Geneva: UN Non-Governmental

18 Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

(see page 3).

He presented some examples of success stories in the

context of multi-track diplomacy, using his multi-track approach with regard

in 1990 with its first meeting in Bali. The ap-

proach to this gathering started on an informal basis to encourage candid

and basic principles in managing potential conflicts.

of intra-state conflict in a historical context. He illustrates the participation

20 Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

Ambazonia, still maintaining its unique

culture and identity, was manipulated by the Cameroon government, and

22 Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

Conflict Resolution and Peace Building: The Role of

New Trends and Challenges

(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI))

While much of the Seoul International NGO Conference is on peace and

(the late 20 early 21 century).

(represented by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme : UCDP),

New Trends and Challenges in Modern Armed Conflicts 25

etc. Another approach prioritizes qualitative analysis from

theoretical and conceptual work1 to comparative empirical, field studies and

(for instance, up until recently, only data on

26 Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

The main trends in armed conflict since the early 1990s

(see Fig. 1),

the worlds top 3 most war-prone countries since the

end of WWII, by the number of international conflicts that a country has

(see Fig. 2).

in 80 locations were ac-

(see Fig. 3).

However, the conflict potential was

unevenly distributed throughout the post-Cold War period: according to the

New Trends and Challenges in Modern Armed Conflicts 27