205

DISCUSSION

VALUE AND FACTS

GEORGE J. STACK

In his essay "Two Dogmas o.f Empiricism" W. O. Quine identified the

two unquestioned assumptions of empiricism as the belief in the radical
distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, and reductionism. There
is also a third dogma of empiricism which may not be universally shared by
all empiricists, but which is a fundamental assumption of empiricism in
general. That is the belief that factual statements are value-free or are entirely distinct from, or unrelated to, values of valuation. It will be my intention here to try to show that this dogma is a questionable one and one
which attributes to factual assertions or factual judgments a putative
epistemic neutrality which, in fact, they do not possess. Although it will be
urged that the distinction between facts and values is both useful and inevitable, this distinction is not as radical as some empiricists might maintain. Although it may generally be agreed today that values are, in a sense,
empirical facts, I think that few would agree that, in a sense - a non-trivial
sense - facts are value-laden.
Before discussing the way or ways in which values infiltrate factual claims,
a few questions concerning the nature of facts must be raised. It is paradoxical that, although everyone would say that there are facts, there is
considerable controversy concerning the nature o~ facts themselves. The
term "fact" is itself somewhat vague. On the one hand, there are those
philosophers who maintain that facts simply a r e and are not, unlike propositions, either true of false. On the other hand, there are those (for example,
C. J. Ducasse) who claim that facts are propositions of a certain kind. Traditionally, facts have been described as "objective data" or the phenomena
which factual statements refer to or "picture." Facts are identified with
what makes propositions true. Those who claimed that propositions
"picture" facts (like the early Wittgenstein) presuppose a correspondence
theory of truth which is itself undermined by the epistemological structure
which is built upon its assumption. That is, the statement, "Language pictures the world or the totality of facts," is neither a tautology nor an analytic
proposition nor an empirically significant proposition. Hence; the nature of
its claim to truth is undeterminable. Although so large a question is not our
concern here, it is clear that the question of the relationship between language and facts is relevant to the question of the nature of facts. Moritz
Schlick once expressed this difficulty in the following way:

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the judgment is something completely different from that which is judged ... it
is not like that which is judged... Fox the concepts occurring in the judgments are
certainly not of the same nature as the real objects which they designate, and the
relations among concepts are not like the relation of things.1

This distinction between the factual judgment and the facts about which
the judgment is made (if it is a tenable one) provides a lacuna into which
a logical wedge could be driven. This logical wedge can be, I believe, bridged
by an act of interpretation. For the moment, however, our concern is with
the ambiguity of the term "fact."
In one sense, it is clear that a perceived datum (whether it is described
as a sense-datum or an object or, for that matter, a "combination of objects")
is not, strictly speaking, a fact. In order to be aware that my watch is on a
table, I must perceive a set of phenomena or I must perceive the presence of
objects in specific spatial relationships. The fact, some might say, is "discovered" in the perceptual act. But, is this truly the case,? Let us assume the
following hypothe~tical case. An individual called upon to describe what he is
perceiving is capable of using forms of the verb "to be" and is able to, express
spatial relations. Unfortunately, he is unable properly to use the words
"table," "my," or "watch." Now, such an individual would be able to
describe what he has perceived in the following way: "That is on that."
Clearly, he cannot convey a meaningful bit of factual information in this way
(even though he may be able to draw a sketch of what he has seen and
thereby transmit some information). What this case illustrates is that when
we perceive common objects we rapidly "interp,ret" the data we are perceiving. This interpretative process becomes, in time, so, habitual that we do
not realize that we are engaged in it. Such a process is revealed, however,
when we perceive objects or phenomena under peculiar circumstances or
when objects which resemble many other objects are perceived. In tactile
sensory experience this interpretation of the immediate datum perceived
is even more apparent. For, the immediate touch sensation is not, say, "hot,"
"cold," or "warm." To say, for example, "This object is warm," requires
a judgment about what is immediately experienced, an interpretation of the
primitive tactile datum which is a particular kind of touch sensation. The
difficulty which individuals possessing normal vMon have (when blindfolded) in accurately identifying the shape of objects: suggests, at least, that
(as Berkeley pointed out) perception involves the synthesis of the data
acquired through the various modalities of sense, a process which can be
described as fundamentally interpretive. In order for the objective datum to
be described as a fact, it must be "made" intelligible. But an event or occurrence (say, a flash of lightning) is: not in itself intelligiNe; its intelligibility
seems to lie in the logical form of the description of it. It makes sense to say
that "There is a flash of lightning" is true or false; but what sense does it
make to say that a flash of lightning is itself true or false? The problem of
determining what facts are is not merely a problem of terminology. For, if
1 Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, Berlin, 1925, p. 56.

Discussion,

207

we assume that only certain kinds of propositions are facts, then how are
we to describe the data which these facts "picture," "refer to,," or describe?
What is there or present to perception continues to be there whether we call
them facts or not. Now, one of the consequences of calling facts a type of
proposition (e.g., a contingent statement) is the implication that all contingent propositions are true or appear to embody a truth-claim. Thus, for
example, if I say that p is a fact, the implication is that "p" is. true. For,
when we describe a statement as a fact we seem to, say, by implication, that
it is true or is a verified or confirmed fact. We are led to. talk of positive
fact-statements and negative fact-statements rather than saying that " p " is
true because it describes a state of affairs in the world o.r is false because it
does not describe a state of affairs: in the world. There seems to. be good
reason for maintaining the distinction between fact-statements and the: facts
they purport to "report" or describe. If we desire to, keep the notion that
facts are contingent statements or propositions, it may be possible to, talk
about the objective data by using the terms factum or facta. Thus, lacta
would be the data or phenomena or collection of objects which are referred
to in factual statements or by F-propositions (fact-claiming propositions as
distinct from the truth-claims of tautologies, or analytic statements). However we designate the data to which F-statements refer, the question of the
valuational element implicit in the selection and designation of facts remains.
Although it is often admitted that the social sciences are not or perhaps
cannot be completely value-free, it is. usually said that the biological o,r
physical sciences are truly value-free. The "pure" description of facts is, often
considered as one of the bases of scientific method or the scientific approach
to nature. Although one may admit that it is difficult to separate the, purely
factual and the evaluation contents of some of the terms: used in the social
sciences,2 this separation is not merely possible in, say, the physical sciences;
but is actual. If one is to. argue that "facts" are, as it were, value-laden, it is
necessary to show that this is the case in what is generally considered the
paradigm of science as such, the physical sciences. Before attempting to. do
this, some general remarks concerning the influence of value on the identification of facts can be made.
In the first place, it may be asked why anyone believes there are facts at
all (i.e., facta). In the second place, one may legitimately ask why facts: are
construed in the way they are construed. To speak of objective facts which
are discovered by man or which present themselves to. perception is to assume a cultural viewpoint in which facts (or factual knowledge) are prized
or valued. Historically, factual explanations followed in the: wake of mythical
or religious explanations. That is, impersonal, non-mythic accounts of
natural phenomena replaced the previous modes of explanation. In the
earliest Greek philosophers (e.g., Thales) one can see the curious (to our way
of thinking) intermixture of poetry, animism, and science. T o pnt it briefly,
the factual orientation of Western man has historical roots which have been
2 Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York, 1961,p. 491.

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and could be traced. What this means, in general, is that at various stages
of his development man had to "choose" which modes of description or
interpretation he would apply to the natural world. Although this "choice"
is strictly metaphorical, it is clear that some group or some individuals did
decide what explanations would count as factual and which would be dismissed as fictive, or mythical. This general orientation towards the way in
which the world is to be understood can, I believe, be described as a cultural
"set" or a cultural value, ff this generalization seems to claim too much, it
could be shown that there are historical instances in which men came upon
certain discoveries which remained undeveloped because of what I have
called the prevalent cultural value or set. This is the: case, for example, in
the ancient Greeks' discovery of the steamboat and their subsequent abandonment of its development. What a civilization, a people, a nation, a
culture values will often determine what they generally accept as, "true."
To choose, from the complex multiplicity of po,ssible phenomena, specific
phenomena, and to. identify such phenomena as "facts," reflects, in a general
sense, a particular value-orientation. The evaluation of facts or factual
explanation was not a necessary stage in the development of man or of human culture. That it has been an effective or a useful one is undeniable; the
point is that alternative ways of interpreting or understanding nature or the
world could have been (and occasionally have been) adopted by man. In this
general sense, then, one may say that facts or the factual orientation towards
nature or the world is a value or, more cautiously, an expression of a cultural
value. What Max Weber says about scientific truth in general may with equal
force be applied to a fact orientation. "The belief in the: value of scientific
truth is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man's original
nature." 8 Although I think it is not necessary to, refer to, man's "original
nature" (whatever that may have been), Weber's point is. clear. There is no
obvious necessity in man's "choice" or "decision" to embrace "scientific
truth" as the ultimate paradigm of truth. And since the accumulation of
"objective" factual data is intimately related to the search for scientific
truth, the valuation o{ facts is also, culturally conditioned. If the above suggestions are valid, it is clear that, in a general way, facts. (or a dependence
upon factual data) are valuations insofar as "facts" are conceived of as
being "worth something" or as having value. This is not to say that facts (or
"facta") are values - that is, that the two terms are fused - , but that the
appreciation of the significance of facts is a value. Even if this rather general
statement of the intimate interrelationship, between facts and value is
dubious or questionable, there are more specific reasons for maintaining
that facts are valuational at least in some respects.
While the reliance on "hard data" or "brute facts" in empirical sciences
is usually unquestioned or unexamined, it has occasionally been noted that
values play a significant part in science, particularly as "determinants of

3 Max Weber, The Methodology o/the Social Sciences, Glencoe, Ill., 1949, p. 110.

Discussion

209

the meanings which are seen in the events with which it (science) deals." 4

This determination of the meaning of facts is basically a hermeneutic problem. A factual judgment is essentially an interpretive act. Isolated empirical
data are not significant in scientific understanding. The "objective" data
are inevitably related to, general evaluative concepts which "make them
worth knowing." What is significant about such data is ultimately derived
from generally accepted evaluative concepts. 5 In o~der to determine what a
fact is or in order to know how to, construe facts, we must assume some
evaluational criteria. If the language of factual judgment is that of physicalobject statements, this does not mean that the judgment is entirely value-free
or independent of cultural values universally adopted at a particular time.
"Physical objects are conceptually imported into the [knowing, judgmental]
situation as convenient intermediaries - not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible p o s i t s . . . " Such entities (i.e., physical
objects) are conceptually relevant as "cultural po,sits." 6 What W. O. Quine
has referred to as cultural posits are, I believe, reducible to cultural values.
What is to be noted here is that facts are construed in terms o~ conceptual
schema which are themselves evaluative. Thus, for example, if a philosopher
prefers to conceive of (and describe) physical phenomena in terms of
"processes," "interactions," "reciprocal interrelationships," or "events,"
this selected cognitive framework de~ermines how he conceives of facta.
But why is this framework accepted? Usually it is said that this "new"
framework is "better than" previous cognitive systems of explanations, or
is pragmatically valuable, or heuristically valuable, or is a more effective
conceptual schema. In science it is often said that explanation E' replaces
explanation E because "it is more consistent with the facts." It is to be
noticed, however, that there is a certain circularity involved here. For, it is
said that a set of facts (which are described in a newly adopted terminology)
are better explained by this more recent cognitive framework. It is assumed
that E' is more accurate because it more effectively deals with the phenomena in question. But this assumption itself is based upon a choice between E and E' which is surely not only made in terms of the data (or facta)
to be explained. Hence, it is safe to assume that an evaluation of the various
merits of E' over E is carried out. That is, there is some kind o~ value judgment made. It is clear that the objective data are not neutral data, but are
reinterpreted in the fight of an emergent value, a value which is very often
what Quine has called a cultural posit and which I would describe more
generally as a cultural value. T o understand physical phenomena "as" pro,,
cesses or "as" events already presupposes that a value-interpretation has
been made. Whereas Heidegger would say that a presupposed ontology
conditions our understanding of ontic of factual phenomena, I would want
4 Abraham Kaplart, The Conduct of Inquiry, San Francisco,, California, 1964, p.
382.
Max Weber, op. cir., p. 111.
6 W. O. Quirte, From a Logical Point of View, New York, 1963, p. 44.

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The Journal o[ Value Inquiry

to maintain that culturally determined values (e,g., perhaps the sub-culture

of the scientific community) condition interpretation and hence our understanding of factual phenomena. In order to understand something as something, Heidegger has pointed out, "The 'as' makes up the structure of the
explicitness of something that is understood. It constitutes the interpretation." 7 Although Heidegger would deny that values, cultural or otherwise, lie at the basis of ontologies, he quite rightly points out that how we
interpret physical phenomena, empirical data, or nature itself will determine
our understanding of our relationship towards nature or to, the "world."
If the natural world is conceived of as a system of "things" which are to be
used or manipulated or exploited, then man's relation to these things is the
Nietzschean "mastering advance into world-conquest and world-rule." 8
The "thingification" (Verdinglichung) of nature was, Heidegger maintains,
a precondition for the emergence of a technological orientation towards
nature. Although Heidegger's conception of the detrimental effects of
"metaphysics" on the Western mind is an extravagant claim, his insights
concerning the radical reformulation of man's understanding of nature as
a whole or ontic phenomena in particular and its effects upon how one conceives of the "world" are profound. We do not have to accept the Heideggerian phenomenology of the "world" in order to agree with his general
view that man could have understood ontic phenomena or beings in ways
quite different from the way in which he has come to. understand such
phenomena.
Althotlgh it is granted that value judgments or valuations cannot be
entirely extracted, say, from historical accounts;9 it is thought that valuations do not enter into the protocol statements of the scientist. This, however, is not entirely the case. For, observation statements or protocol statements themselves involve "interpretations" of the facts observed." 10 But
surely interpretations are selected from a number of possible alternatives and
reveal a particular theoretical preference or valuation. Observed data are
not, in themselves, intelligible; in order to "make" them intelligible or to
transform them into an intelligible structure (e.g., facts or F-statements), they
must be interpreted; but no interpretation of any data is purely neutral or
entirely divorced from implicit or explicit valuations. If, for example, a
theory or hypothesis is embraced in terms of, say, "epistemie utility," this
is clearly an expression of value. When the Japanese physicist Yukawa
postulated the "existence" of neutral mesons or neutrettos he did so, in
terms of an assumption of the symmetrical structure of nuclear fields, an
aesthetic consideration which clearly reflects the influence of non-factual
valuation considerations on his theoretical preferences. 1~ In the convention7 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Ttibingen, 1963, p. 149.
s Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Pfullingen, 1961, II, p. 171.
9 Morto~ White, Foundations of Historical Knowledge, New York, 1965, p. 4ft.
10 Rudotf C~rrtap, Erkenntnis, 2 (1932), p. 107.
11 Lo,uisde Brog[ie, Physics and Microphysics, New York, 1960, p. 37.

Discussion

211

alism of Henri Poincar6 we can again see the significance of valuation

preferences upon the selection of viable hypotheses. When attempting to
discover which hypothesis best explains a given set of facts or phenomena,
we are faced with a problem of choice. This choice, Poincar6 suggested,
must be guided by considerations of simplicity.~e Clearly, the principle o~
simplicity is not justified in terms of an appeal to, factual data or any observed phenomena. The statement, "The best hypothesis is: the simplest
one," is not analytically true, not tautological, and not an empirical statement. It clearly has the form of a value judgment. It has recently been said
that the selection of the simpler of two, theories can be justified in terms of
"beauty" and "convenience." a~ Without concerning ourselves with the
question of the degree of probability of confirmation which a simpler theory
may possess, it is obvious that the above bases for preference of a simpler
theory or hypothesis are grounded in valuational preferences which are
similar to those which determine the interpretation of factual phenomena.
Strictly speaking, then, there are no uninterpreted factual data. Pure description is a myth. Factual phenomena are selected and this selective activity takes place in accordance with various criteria which are value-laden.
When a scientist appeals to the heuristic value of a theory or hypothesis o~
to its pragmatic value, he has revealed that his inquiry is not, strictly speaking, wertefrei. These values may be subjective, conditioned by generally
accepted beliefs of the scientific community at a particular historical mo,
ment, or may be expre:ssions of unanalyzed cultural values. It is clear that
"what we are prepared to recognize as fact depends to a large extent on the
values we hold." 24 And it is precisely such values which are the: unquestioned
assumptions of scientific inquiry and of the ordinary interpretation of facts.
What is accepted as "brute" facticity is often a veiled value-interpretation
of an ostensibly neutral factual phenomenon.
The description of nature or of factual phenomena is not possible without
the assumption of some theoretical structure. Even the most ordinary singular statements are invariably "interpretations of the "facts' in the light of
theories." 25 But it is clear that the theories which influence our interpretation of facts are, in the most general sense, historically conditioned.
The most significant historical phenomena, o~ course, are related to the
theoretical structures generally accepted by the scientific discipline in which
a specific theory is relevant. Often, changes in theoretical explanations bring
in their wake ontological reformations and changes in the most elemental
ix Henri Poincarr, Science and Hypothesis, New York, 1952,p. 146.
13 W. O. Quine, "On Simple Theories of a Complex World," in Probability, Confirmation, and Simplicity, ed. by M. H. Foster and M. L. Martin, New York, 1966.
14 Peter Caws, Science and the Theory of Value, New York, 1967, p. 63.
1~ Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York, 1961, p. 423. Cf. Paul
Feyerabend, "Problems of Empiricism," in Beyond the Edge of Certainty, R. G.
Colodny, ed., New Jersey, 1965, p. 175: "... the description of every single fact [isl
dependent o,n some theory."

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T h e Journal o f V a l u e Inquiry

meaning of the terms used.l~ It is for this reason that Heidegger's claim that
the scientist is engaged in the projection of nature is not wholly incompatible
with the views of some philosophers of science. In his discussion of the rise
of mathematical physics Heidegger argues that what was decisive was not a
high regard for o,bserved "facts," but the way in which nature or natural
processes were "mathematically projected." The projected concept of nature
(in mathematical terms) determines the kinds of facts which are relevant.
As Heidegger puts it, "the grounding of 'factual science' was possible only
because the researchers understood that in principle there are no 'bare
facts.' " it The totality of such "p~rojection" as characterizes mathematical
physics is, for Heidegger, thematizing (Thematisierung). Thematization is
objectification. What is understood o,r identified as subject to, mathematical
interpretation is no longer a neutral datum, but is already "constituted" by
the theoretical framework adopted. T o choose or to select a given theoretical
framework is to value that framework over other alternative modes of interpretation or explanation. The understanding of what is "there" presupposes
an implicit or explicit ontological commitment, a commitment which itself
cannot be justified in terms of the "facts" of "factual data" which are "discovered" on the basis of its assumption. The interpretation of a datum is
never purely presuppositionless. Although Heidegger would want to deny
that values lie at the basis of interpretation, I believe such a notion is not
entirely inconsistent with his view that
If, when o,ne is engaged in a particular co,ncrete kind of interpretations.., orte
likes to appeal to what "stands there," then o,ne finds that what "stands there" in
the first instance is nothing other than the obvious und.'isc~tssedassamaptton o6 the
persoaa who does the interpreting.iS
The question is, what is the source of such an "undiscussed assumption"?
If it is a theory, then that theory can be shown to have been selected or
chosen on the basis of some criterion or criteria which, in turn, can be
traced to a fundamental belief (e.g., in the uniformity of nature) which is
itself based upon a value-preference. To adopt the maxim of the uniformity
of nature, or the view that " . . . things similar in some respects tend to pro,ve
similar in others," is to adopt a vague notion of similarity which is itself
"relative to the structure of one's conceptual scheme or quality space." 19
Such phenomena are related to the value system of an individual (or,
usually, the value systems of a culture or a scientific community), Primitive
assumptions are very much like basic beliefs which we hold without any
absolute justification, but which are preferences which we find it difficult
16 Paul Feyerabend, "Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism.," in Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, III, pp. 28-9.
17 Martin Heiclegger,Sein und Zeit, p, 362.
is 1bid., p. 150.

10 W. O. Quine, "On Simple Theories of a Complex World!," in Probability, Confirmation, and Simplicity, p.. 250.

Discussion

213

to abandon. Thus, for example, sub-atomic fields may or may not be symmetrical in actuality. But physicists tend to have a preferential disposition
to believe that, in fact, they are symmetrical. As Poincar6 put it, "scientists
think that certain facts are more interesting than others because they complete an unfinished harmony." e0 This quest for "harmony" and "symmetry"
may be charactea'ized as the valuational project of the scientist. So pervasive
can this phenomenon be that scientists, faced with emerging evidence that
historically valuable principles do not apply or seem to apply to specific
factual data, are unwilling to abandon such principles. When confronted
with indeterminacy in quantum physics Max Planck maintained that he
"firmly" believed that the quantum hypothesis would eventually result in a
"more exact formulation of the law of causality." 21 The desire to, preserve
a conceptual model of explanation in the face of contrary evidence suggests
an unwillingness to part with a valued ontological "projection."
Many philosophers of science are willing to admit the inevitability of the
intrusion of value judgments in the social sciences, but would exclude them
entirely from, say, the physical sciences. Karl Popper, for example, has said
that
where p~ed[lections and intere:sts have such influence on the content o~ scientific
theo,ries and predictiorts, it must become highly doubtful whether bias ca~ be
determined and avcrided. Thus we need not be saarprised to, find that there is very
little in the social sciences that resembles the ob~jectiveandi ideal quest for truth
which we meet in physies.:~e
In his R e a s o n and N a t u r e M. R. Cohen made a similar observation 2z by
suggesting that the social sciences should abandon their attempt to be
wertefrei. But surely there is some evidence that the physical sciences are
also infiltrated by valuations or value considerations as well. T o be sure,
some or the valuations of the physical scientist are intimately related to
existing knowledge or to purely scientific considerations. But, on the other
hand, certain epistemic preferences do reveal a commitment to extrascientific (often metaphysical) values. Thus, for example, it has been shown
that Helsenberg, in order to eliminate references to uno,bservable quantities,
"adopted" a phenomenological orientation which would eliminate from
physical theory whatever does not strictly correspond to observable entities
or phenomena.24 This proposal reflects a value preference which is not
adopted purely in terms of the data to be interpreted or in terms o~ the
theoretical structure o~ quantum mechanics. It is analogous to the adoption
of a behavioristic method in psychology in order to describe and explain
human behavior Values, in the broadest sense of the term, do indeed enter

so Henri Poincar6, The Value o] Science, New York, 1958, p,. 142.
zl Max Plauck, Where is Science Going?, New York, 1933, pp. 143, 155.
ze Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, New York, 1964, p. 16.
~3 Morris R. Cohen, Reason andNature, New York, 1953, p,. 349.
2~ Louis de Broglie, The Revolution in Physics, New York, 1953, p. 189.

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The Journal of Value Inquiry

into the "objectivity" of the physical sciences. What is remarkable about this
phenomenon is that it is readily admitted by physical scientists despite the
denials of philosophers of science.:~ There are a number of non-factual
criteria which enter into the selection of theories or hypotheses, criteria
which are often reflections of dominant metaphysical, methodological,
personal, aesthetic, linguistic, or symbolic values. Very often extra-scientific
valuations involve the choice of a method of description or exp4anation
which is not an exact "fit" with the relevant facts. Pierre Duhem was well
aware of the phenomenon (~f selectivity and noted that quite often valued
symbolic formulae do not accurately describe what he called "practical
facts2' He maintained that there cannot be complete parity between an
abstract symbol and the concrete fact which it ostensibly represents. The
theoretical formulae which the physicist appeals to in order to "express" the
concrete facts he has observed in experimentation cannot be the exact
equivalent o~ these facts?6 Considerations of "simplicity," "neatness," or
"aesthetic uniformity" may be the non-factual criteria which "justify" the
abandonment o~ an exact correspondence between concrete facts and
theoretical description. It is clear that the acceptance of specific extrascientific criteria on the basis of implicit or explicit value preferences can
and does determine (a) what facts are relevant and (b) what factual data
will be ignored or bracketed in orrder that the non-factual criteria may be
satisfied. It is obvious that in such cases the significance o~ valuations for
the "structure" of scientific explanation or description cannot be ignored.
The factual data which are dealt with are not treated as if they were neutral
data, but are shaped and transformed by theoretical preferences which are, in
turn, determined by extra-scientific or non-factual criteria.
In regard to historical explanation it has been observed that accounts of
historical events are notoriously value-laden. Particular historical events are
selected as "significant" or discarded as "insignificant" and the personal or
cultural values of the historian deeply influence his judgments and descriptions of historical events. As M. R. Cohen has remarked,
the historian has to supplement the facts before him with hypothetical ones - in
which pro.ces,s he is obviously dependent on his general philosophy of life or
schema of relative value.., he must select from the great mass of facts those
which he considers most important, which again involves a process of valuation since importance is distinctly a category o~ value.27
One of the most revealing instances of valuation preferences in historical
explanation is found in the selection of causal factors which are considered
to be historically "relevant" or "significant." Whether the historian empha-

25 Cf. Erwin C. Schr,Sdirtger,Science, Theory, and Man, New York, 1957, Chapter
IV and p. 37.
e0 Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, New York, 1962,
p. 151.
~7 Morris R. Cohen, op. cit., p. 381.

Discussion

215

sizes "cultural," "political," "military," "geographical," "climactic," "philosophical," or "economic" factors will pervasively influence his interpretation, description, and evaluation of the "facts" which he selects and organizes. A subjective or culturally determined preference for mechanistic, or
teleological, or evolutionary accounts of historical developments will again
determine what [acta the historian thinks are relevant or what events are
significant. Value judgments or valuational preferences in historical explanation are ineluctable. Cultural values, not only influence the writing of
history, but clearly determine whether historical explanations, will or will not
be valued as such.
The Western valuation of the importance of history is obviously not universally shared by all peoples. India, for example, has been for the most part
an ahistorical nation. The significance of the concatenation of events in the
human world has simply not been recognized. It has been noted that
the cultures of the East... belittle man as individual man. Und!er this runs an
indifference to. the wo,rld of the senses, of which the indifference to experienced
fact is one face... These cultures of the East... lack the language artdi the very
habit of fact.2s
The "habit of fact" is perhaps the most universally shared value in the
Western world; it is the universal determination of any possible act of understanding or interpretation. It is obviously a value which cannot be justified
by an appeal to "objective data," but can only be justified in terms of some
practical or teleological value. That facts, or factual data are recognized or
considered as of worth or value indicates the most universal way in which
values infiltrate any attempt to achieve a purely neutral understanding or
description of objective phenomena. Even if we do adopt a factual orientation towards the world or towards human actions the scientific description
and selection of facts is not possible, as we have seen, without some appeal
to extra-scientific or non-factual values.
When considering what will count as relevant data we cannot only rely
on the historical development of science o.r the alleged neutrality of facts;
rather, as has recently been said, we must reconstrue the concept of data in
such a way as to incorporate the prospective aspect of the world "presently
apprehended as value." 29 It is not necessary to collapse the distinction
between facts and values in order to become, aware of the influence of values
upon factual judgments, to admit that, in a sense, the value-laden character
of factual data (or facta) is part and parcel of the scientific or empirical
enterprise. Factual data can, in some cases, clearly be distinguished from
values; but values cannot be wholly divorced from our understanding and
interpretation of factual data. The intelligiNlity of phenomena is not
"given"; hence, there is an inevitable interpretative element in philosophy as
well as science. Insofar as interpretation is necessary for understanding or
2s j. BronowskL Science and Human Values, New York, 1956, p. 43.
e9 Peter Caws, op. cit., p. 75.

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The Journal of Value Inquiry

intelligibility, human knowledge cannot be entirely accounted for without

referring to the influence of valuations. Facts are not literally identical with
values, but are related to values, are intelligible in terms of value-laden interpretations. In this sense, factual data are "structured" in terms of individual
or cultural values, cultural posits or sets.
The alleged epistemic neutrality of scientific fact or of facts in general
may be called, in Kantian language, an ideal of reason; but it is not an
actuality. The bifurcation between facts and values which is o,flen supported by radical empiricists (especially logical positivists) is clearly an
exaggeration, one which neglects the obvious influence of valuation upon
a generalized factual orientation, the selectivity of factual data, and the
significance of facts themselves. The judgment that x is a fact requires, as
I have said, interpretation; and all interpretation, as Nietzsche once pointed
out, is fundamentally value-interpretation. We need not abandon a distinction which has a pragmatic value; but, on the other hand, we must no,t
be led to believe that facts and values are not interrelated, that facts are not
value-laden. For, this leads to an inevitable empirical dogmatism which is
surely as pernicious as the aprioristic dogmatism it intended to overcome.
S.U.N.Y. College at Brockpo,rt