1 DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No.

127325 March 19, 1997)Facts:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples
Initiative for Reforms,Modernization and Action (PIRMA),
filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to
liftthe term limits of elective officials, through Peoples
Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the
people to exercise the power todirectly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the
COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the
petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the
case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest
Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator Roco filed a
motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that
one which is cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners
herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel
Ongpinfiled this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court against COMELEC and theDelfin petition
rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1)
The constitutional provision onpeoples initiative to amend
the constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed byCongress. No such law has been passed; (2) The
peoples initiative is limited to amendments to
theConstitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term
limits constitutes a revision, therefore it isoutside the
power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted
the Motions for Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or
not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct
of initiative onamendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions
onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of
term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision
or anamendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory,
thus, without implementinglegislation the same cannot
operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or
granted the right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress
does not provide for its implementation.The portion of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and
regulations on theconduct of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule
thatwhat has been delegated, cannot be delegated
(potestas delegata non delegari potest). Thedelegation of
the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot
validly promulgate rulesand regulations to implement the
exercise of the right to peoples initiative.The lifting of the
term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would
affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the
synchronization of elections, the constitutional
guaranteeof equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A
revisioncannot be done by initiative. However, considering
the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issueof
whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has
become academic.
2 SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
vs.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted

RA. 7227

(The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992),

which created the Subic EconomicZone. RA 7227 likewise
created SBMA to implement the declarednational policy of
converting the Subic military reservation intoalternative
productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over

the Subicmilitary reservation to the Philippines
government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the
implementation of its task, particularly thepreservation of
the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and
otherinstallations left by the American navy.

On April 1993, the

Sangguniang Bayan
of Morong
, Bataan passed
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10
,
Serye 1993
, expressing therein itsabsolute concurrence, as required
by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to jointhe Subic Special
Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the
President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a

petition
with theSangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annul
Pa
mbayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993
.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify

PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic
Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided
conditions are met.

The
Sangguniang Bayan
ng Morong acted upon the petition bypromulgating
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993
, requestingCongress of the Philippines so amend certain
provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative

under theLGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local

initiative on theground that the subject thereof was merely
a resolution and not anordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued

Proclamation No. 532
defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including
therein theportion of the former naval base within the
territorial jurisdiction of theMunicipality of Morong.


On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued
Resolution No. 2845and 2848
, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for
local referendum
andproviding for "the rules and guidelines to govern the
conduct of thereferendum

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for

certiorari
contestingthe validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that
public respondent isintent on proceeding with a local
initiative that proposes anamendment of a national law
ISSUE:
1.
WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgatingResolution No. 2848 which governs the
conduct of the
referendum
proposing to annul or repeal
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2.
WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within
the powersof the people of Morong to enact;
i
.
e
., whether such initiative "seeksthe amendment of a
national law."
HELD:
1.
YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.FIRST.
The process started by private respondents was an
INITIATIVE butrespondent Comelec made preparations for
a REFERENDUM only.In fact, in the body of the Resolution
as reproduced in the footnote below,the word
"referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative"
is notmentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise
as a "Referendum"; thecounting of votes was entrusted
to a "Referendum Committee"; thedocuments were called
"referendum returns"; the canvassers, "ReferendumBoard
of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word
"initiative" used in saidbody of Resolution No. 2848. And
yet, this exercise is unquestionably anINITIATIVE.As
defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose
bills and laws,and to enact or reject them at the polls
independent of the legislativeassembly. On the other
hand, referendum is the right reserved to the peopleto
adopt or reject any act or measure which has been
passed by a legislativebody and which in most cases
would without action on the part of electorsbecome a law.In
initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
administration andsupervision of the process itself, akin to
its powers over the conduct of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people,
hence therespondent Commission cannot control or
change the substance or thecontent of legislation.
2.
The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the
municipal resolution isstill in the proposal stage and not
yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is

not yet anapproved law. Should the people reject it,
then there would be nothing tocontest and to adjudicate. It
is only when the people have voted for it and ithas
become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights
and obligationscan be enforced or implemented
thereunder. At this point, it is merely aproposal and the
writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture
orpossibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide
only actualcontroversies, not hypothetical questions or
cases.In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court
has authority to reviewComelec Resolution No. 2848 to
determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion.
However, it does not have the same authority in regard to
theproposed initiative since it has not been promulgated
or approved, or passedupon by any "branch
or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter.
TheCommission on Elections itself has made no reviewable
pronouncementsabout the issues brought by the
pleadings. The Comelec simply includedverbatim the
proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence,
there isreally no decision or action made by a branch,
instrumentality or court whichthis Court could take
cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in theexercise
of its review powers.
3 GARCIA ET AL. VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 AM
G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993 [Initiative and
Referendum; Recall proceeding]
FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the
1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12)
municipalities of the province constituted themselves into
a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election
of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as
formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC
scheduled the recall election for the gubernatorial position
of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the
Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to
comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement"
laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government
Code 1991). They pointed out the most fatal defect of the
proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the
Resolution: the deliberate failure to send notices of the
meeting to 65 members of the assembly.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive
right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the
right of elected local public officials belonging to the
political minority to equal protection of the law.
RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will
remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and
exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall
proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any
mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure through a system
of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional
mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose

the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment

dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the
mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen
by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally
granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an
alternative mode of initiating recall elections to
supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action
of the people. The legislative records reveal there were
two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of
initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted,
viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the
direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its
expenses.
2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vicemayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities
and component cities are made members of the
preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its
membership is not apportioned to political parties. No
significance is given to the political affiliation of its
members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at
the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the
province concerned. Considering their number, the greater
probability is that no one political party can control its
majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the
only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss
of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are
in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties
but as representatives of the people. By necessary
implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on
mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our
Constitution encourages multi-party system for the
existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the
growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then,
the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating
against local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the
initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall
assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences.
We held that notice to all the members of the recall
assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its
proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of
all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in
session and in a public place. Needless to state,
compliance with these requirements is necessary,
otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which
can be given due course by the COMELEC.
4 Evardone v. Comelec, 204 SCRA 464, 472, December
2, 1991Petitioner: Felipe EvardoneRespondents: Comelec,
Alexander Apelado, Victorino Aclana and Noel
NivalPonente: Padilla
Facts:
Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having
been elected to the position during the 1988 local
elections. He assumedoffice immediately after
proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E.
Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall of
Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar,
Municipality of Sulat. The Comelec issued a Resolution
approving therecommendation of Election Registrar
Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recall
against Evardone.Evardone filed a petition for prohibition
with urgent prayer of restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. Later, inan en banc resolution, the
Comelec nullified the signing process for being violative of
the TRO of the court. Hence, this present petition.
Issue 1:
WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC
by virtue of its powers under the Constitution and BP 337
(Local GovernmentCode) was valid.

Held:
Yes
Ratio:
Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of
one to be enacted byCongress. Since there was, during the
period material to this case, no local government code
enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of
recall of elected government officials, Evardone contends
that there isno basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and
that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is
premature.The COMELEC avers that the constitutional
provision does not refer only to a local government code
which is
in futurum
butalso in
esse
. It merely sets forth the guidelines which Congress will
consider in amending the provisions of the present LGC.
Pending theenactment of the amendatory law, the existing
Local Government Code remains operative.Article XVIII,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that
all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987Constitution
shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or
revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local
Government Codeof 1991, approved by the President on
10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as
provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act.But the Local
Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1
January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg.337) is still the law applicable to the present
case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government
Code, the effectiveness of B.P.Blg. 337 was expressly
recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission. We therefore rule that Resolution No.
2272promulgated by the COMELEC is valid and
constitutional. Consequently, the COMELEC had the
authority to approve the petition for recalland set the date
for the signing of said petition.
Issue 2:
WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the
signing process of the petition for recall held pursuant to
Resolution No. 2272.
Held:
No
Ratio:
In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew
of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, on or about 21
February 1990 asevidenced by the Registry Return
Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following up and
determining the outcome of such notice. Evardonealleges
that it was only on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to
know about the Resolution of the COMELEC setting the
signing of thepetition for recall on 14 July 1990. But
despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO,
Evardone filed the petition for prohibition onlyon 10 July
1990. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but
the signing of the petition for recall took place just the
same on thescheduled date through no fault of the
COMELEC and Apelado. The signing process was
undertaken by the constituents of theMunicipality of Sulat
and its Election Registrar in good faith and without
knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As
attested byElection Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the
6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about
34% signed the petition for recall.As held in Parades vs.
Executive Secretary there is no turning back theclock.The
right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or
appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based
on thetheory that the electorate must maintain a direct
and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also

predicated upon the idea that apublic office is "burdened"

with public interests and that the representatives of the
people holding public offices are simply agents orservants
of the people with definite powers and specific duties to
perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their
respective offices.Whether or not the electorate of Sulat
has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political
question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people are the judge. "Loss of confidence is the formal
withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a
person'sability to discharge his office previously bestowed
on him by the same electorate. The constituents have
made a judgment and their willto recall Evardone has
already been ascertained and must be afforded the
highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14
July1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said
municipality is valid and has legal effect.However, recall at
this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337. TheConstitution
has mandated a synchronized national and local election
prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for
in ArticleXVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7)
months before the regularlocal election will be violative of
the above provisions of the applicable Local Government
Code
5 Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC [G.R. No.
136781. October 6, 2000]
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13
parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system as members of the
House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents,
who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38
additional party-list representatives although they
obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for
the party-list system on the ground that under the
Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives come from the
party-list representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In
other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the
party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to
define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary
to require parties participating in the system to obtain at
least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to
be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure
that only those parties having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR
determination of total number of party-list representatives
= #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of

first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of

concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional seats
for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the threeseat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted
to ensure that only those parties, organizations and
coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent
threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very
essence of "representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority emanates
from the people, but is exercised by representatives
chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation,
the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient
number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features
the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation
of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat
to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts
are apportioned according to "the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the
public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed
by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the
parties participating in the system. All parties with at least
two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat
each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the
highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as
the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of
seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is
based on proportional representation, the number of seats
to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed
that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of

additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.
6 BAGONG BAYANI vs COMELECG.R. No. 147589 - June
26, 2001Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed
before the COMELEC a Petitionunder Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued
by theCOMELEC. This resolution approved the participation
of 154 organizations and parties,including those
impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections. Petitioners
seek thedisqualification of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party list system wasintended to benefit
the marginalized and underrepresented;
not the mainstream politicalparties
, the none-marginalized or overrepresented.
Issues:
a.Whether or not political parties may participate in the
party-list electionsb.Whether or not the party-list system is
exclusive to marginalized andunderrepresented sectors
and organizations.
Held:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be
remanded to the COMELECwhich will determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties
andorganizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus
Resolution satisfy the requirements of theConstitution and
RA 7941. The resolution of this Court directed the
COMELEC to refrainproclaiming any winner during the
last party-list election, shall remain in force until after
theCOMELEC have compiled and reported its
compliance.a.Yesb.No.
Rationale:
a.
Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in
the party-listelections
. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot bedisqualified from the party-list elections, merely
on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations."Furthermore, under
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list
system
. For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a
party-list system of registered national, regional
andsectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x
x x." Section 3 expressly statesthat a
"party" is
"either a political party
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
b.
That political parties may participate in the party-list
elections does not mean,however, that any political party
-- or any organization or group for that matter -- maydo so.
The requisite character of these parties or organizations
must be consistentwith the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA7941.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.
The provision on the party-listsystem is not self-executory
. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "inaccordance
with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus
up to Congress tosculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution
.
Hence, RA 7941 wasenacted.
7 Baker v carr

Brief Fact Summary. Appellants brought suit, challenging

malapportionment of state legislatures under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An apportionment case may be
reviewed on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, so long as
these grounds are independent from political question
elements.

Facts. Apportionment cases had often been brought under

the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section: 4 of the United
States Constitution (Constitution), in which the United
States guarantees to the individual states a republican
form of government. The Supreme Court of the United
States (Supreme Court) has long held that such challenges
present a political question, not addressable by the courts.
In the current case, Appellants challenged the state
apportionment of legislatures under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Issue. Is it possible to bring a malapportionment claim
without raising a nonjusticiable political issue?
Held. Yes. Reversed and remanded.
In the past, apportionment challengers have generally
based their challenge on the Guaranty Clause of Art. IV,
Section: 4 of the Constitution. These claims are
nonjusticiable as they address issues solely directed to the
political branches of the government by the Constitution.
This is a separation of powers issue.
In Baker v. Carr, the claim is that the Appellants are being
denied equal protection of the laws by being
underrepresented in the state legislature. The Supreme
Court rules that the equal protection challenge in this case
is separable from the political questions.
Dissent. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Felix Frankfurter (J.
Frankfurter) argues the political question is inseparable
from the equal protection claim and that the Supreme
Court has effectively overturned a century of
apportionment jurisprudence. In particular, the dissent
argues that the Supreme Court has opened up all state
districting to judicial oversight.

Discussion. Baker v. Carr is the first of the cases

developing the Supreme Courts one person, one vote
legislation. This line of cases helped equalize
representation between country and city dwellers in an
increasingly urbanized nation.
8 MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011
G.R. No. 118627; 242 SCRA 213, March 7, 1995
(Constitutional Law Requirements in challenging the
constitutionality of the law)
FACTS: Petitioners suing as tax payers, assail a provision
(Sec 51) of RA No. 7859 (An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati) on the ground that the same
attempts to alter or restart the 3-consecutive term limit
for local elective officials disregarding the terms previously
served by them, which collides with the Constitution (Sec
8, Art X & Sec 7, Art VI).
ISSUE: Whether or not challenge to the constitutionality of
questioned law is with merit.

HELD: No. The requirements before a litigant can

challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-delineated.
They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
decision on the constitutional question must be necessary
to the determination of the case itself.
FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents
of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52
of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Makati). Another petition which contends the
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John
H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land
areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying
metes and bounds with technical descriptions
Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with
Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a
new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to
extend his term to more than two executive terms as
allowed by the Constitution
Whether the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot
be made by a special law
HELD/RULING:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati
shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known
as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City,
which shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig
River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by
the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on
the northwest, by the City of Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under
dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch
the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of
metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the
establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854,
the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation.
Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal
department of government, legislators felt that the dispute
should be left to the courts to decide.
Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent
elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall
continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall
exercise their powers and functions until such time that a
new election is held and the duly elected officials shall
have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided,
The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The

appointive officials and employees of the City shall

likewise continues exercising their functions and duties
and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city
government of the City of Makati.
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution provide the following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall
be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained
as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many
contingent events. Considering that these events may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the
petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper
parties to raise this abstract issue.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides
that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two
hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law.
As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a
law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.
9 Montejo v comelec
G.R. No. 118702

16 March 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of
Leyte, pleads the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No.
2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities
in Leyte as it is said to violate the principle of equity of
representation. Petitioner now seeks to transfer the
municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District of the province.
For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the
below table for the population distribution, census 1990
and 1994:
Census 1990
First District
Second District
Third District
Fourth District
Fifth District
ISSUES:

Census 1994
303, 349
272, 167
214, 499
269, 347
309, 148

178,
156,
125,
155,
181,

688
462
763
995
242

Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate

Resolution No. 2736
HELD/RULING:
The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section
2(c), Article IX of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered
to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein
made.
The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates
of the Commission wherein it was stated that the transfer
of one municipality in a district to another district is not a
minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive one. Minor
adjustments does not allow the change in allocations per
district.
It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736. Section
1 is then annulled and set aside. The petition praying for
the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District of the province of Leyte is
denied.
10 TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938,
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she
studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her
college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine
Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she
taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went
to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of
Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When
Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter.
In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa
and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a
candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in
an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under
residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due
to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality
of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election
purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion
supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile
in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of
7 months residency in the district for the following
reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban
became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law
when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual
removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new
one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands
domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does
not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda
married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only
after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning
to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban,
her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992
in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an
act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and
other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses
the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in
the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May
7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as
the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
11 Aquino vs. Comelec
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election,
Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new (remember: newly created)
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate
of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the

aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts.,

Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo
Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which under
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for
a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8,
1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended
the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to
1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed
a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and
allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino,
with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with
35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the
Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an
order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the
Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional
qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May
15 and June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy
actually connotes domicile to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral
district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile
of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the
COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood
as synonymous with domicile not only under the
previous constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was
applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require residence in the place not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of
elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the

legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from
the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was
domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point
that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it should
be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to
have the same meaning of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution

refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of

election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community
from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing
in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election
law requirements, this defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through assent of voters
those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of
residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the
district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino
should prove that he established a domicile of choice and
not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in
the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the
district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11,
1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a
registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more
than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate
indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC
also showed him to be a registered voter of the same
district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as
well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati
City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit
in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent
home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length
of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact
of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other
residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose
in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a
new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile
from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts in the case at bench. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must
prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission
on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the
district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent
Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the
next highest number of votes in the congressional
elections of Second district of Makati City made
permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the
disqualification issue involving congressional candidates
after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination
reserved with the house of representatives electional
tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
ceased in the instant case after the elections and the
remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which
is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision
despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of
jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming
arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the
residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is
contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and
jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal
impossibility of enforcing the one year residency
requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created
political districts which were only existing for less than a
year at the time of the election and barely four months in
the case of petitioners district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining
qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of
the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second
place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the
electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as
substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take
advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking
advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was
executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR,
by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If
a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself
establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease
agreement cannot be better.
12 BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad

Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was
not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is
not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those
who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in

this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that
no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original

nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was

born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however,
Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing
for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose
his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship
by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the
Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in
the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of

Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a
U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the
U.S. Marine Corps.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the

Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows
him to recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through

repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost
Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States
(1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative
of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He
won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for
reelection.

Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491

(1975)
13 Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund

No. 73-1923
Argued January 22, 1975

(e) The subpoena cannot be held subject to judicial

questioning on the alleged ground that it works an
invasion of respondents' privacy, since it is "essential to
legislating." P. 421 U. S. 508.

Decided May 27, 1975

421 U.S. 491
Syllabus
The Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, pursuant
to its authority under a Senate resolution to make a
complete study of the administration, operation, and
enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950, began an
inquiry into the various activities of respondent
organization, to determine whether they were potentially
harmful to the morale of United States Armed Forces. In
connection with such inquiry, it issued a subpoena duces
tecum to the bank where the organization had an account,
ordering the bank to produce all records involving the
account. The organization and two of its members then
brought an action against the Chairman, Senator
Members, Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee, and the
bank to enjoin implementation of the subpoena on First
Amendment grounds. The District Court dismissed the
action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that,
although courts should hesitate to interfere with
congressional actions even where First Amendment rights
are implicated, such restraint should not preclude judicial
review where no alternative avenue of relief is available,
and that, if the subpoena was obeyed, respondents' First
Amendment rights would be violated.
Held: The activities of the Senate Subcommittee, the
individual Senators, and the Chief Counsel fall within the
"legitimate legislative sphere," and since it is determined
that such is the case, those activities are protected by the
absolute prohibition of the Speech or Debate Clause of the
Constitution against being "questioned in any other Place,"
and hence are immune from judicial interference. Pp. 421
U. S. 501-511.
(a) The applicability of the Clause to private civil actions is
supported by the absoluteness of the term "shall not be
questioned" and the sweep of the term "in any other
Place." P. 421 U. S. 503.
(b) Issuance of subpoenas such as the one in question is a
legitimate use by Congress of its power to investigate, and
the subpoena power may be exercised by a committee
acting, as here, on behalf of one of the Houses. Pp. 421 U.
S. 503-505.
(c) Inquiry into the sources of the funds used to carry on
activities suspected by a subcommittee of Congress to
have a potential
Page 421 U. S. 492
for undermining the morale of the Armed Forces is within
the legitimate legislative sphere. Pp. 421 U. S. 505-507.
(d) There is no distinction between the Subcommittee's
Members and its Chief Counsel insofar as complete
immunity from the issuance of the subpoena under the
Speech or Debate Clause is concerned, and since the
Members are immune because the issuance of the
subpoena is "essential to legislating," their aides share
that immunity. P. 421 U. S. 507.

(f) Nor can the subpoena be held outside the protection of

speech or debate immunity on the alleged ground that the
motive of the investigation was improper, since, in
determining the legitimacy of a congressional action, the
motives alleged to have prompted it are not to be
considered. Pp. 421 U. S. 508-509.
(g) In view of the absolute terms of the speech or debate
protection, a mere allegation that First Amendment rights
may be infringed by the subpoena does not warrant
judicial interference. Pp. 421 U. S. 509-511.
159 U.S.App.D.C. 352, 488 F.2d 1252, reversed and
remanded.
14 HUTCHINSON v. PROXMIRE
Print this Page
Case Basics
Docket No.
78-680
Petitioner
Hutchinson
Respondent
Proxmire
Decided By
Burger Court (1975-1981)
Opinion
443 U.S. 111 (1979)
Argued
Tuesday, April 17, 1979
Decided
Tuesday, June 26, 1979
Advocates
Michael E. Cavanaugh
(Argued the cause for the petitioner)
Alan Raywid
(Argued the cause for the respondents)
Tags
First Amendment
Term: 1970-19791978
Location: Congress
Facts of the Case
In early 1975, Senator William Proxmire implemented what
he called the "Golden Fleece Award of the Month." The
award was given out to governmental agencies which
sponsored programs and research that Proxmire found to
be a waste of tax dollars. One Golden Fleece went to
federal agencies sponsoring the research of Ronald
Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist. Proxmire detailed the
"nonsense" of Hutchinson's research on the floor of the
Senate, in conferences with his staff, and in a newsletter
sent to over 100,000 of his constituents. Hutchinson sued
for libel, arguing that Proxmire's statements defamed his
character and caused him to endure financial loss.
Question
Were Proxmire's activities and statements against
Hutchinson's research protected by the Speech and
Debate Clause of Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution?
Argument
Hutchinson v. Proxmire - Oral Argument
Conclusion
Decision: 8 votes for Hutchinson, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 6, Paragraph 1: Speech
or Debate Clause

No. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and
held that Proxmire's statements in his newsletters and
press releases were not protected by the Speech and
Debate Clause. However, in upholding this ruling, the
Court also found that Proxmire's statements were not
made with "actual malice" and thus, were not libelous.
Chief Justice Burger, relying on the Court's finding in Doe
v. McMillan (1973), concluded that while speeches in
Congress and discussions with staff were protected by
Section 6, statements in newsletters and press releases
were not because they were not "essential to the
deliberations of the Senate" nor were they part of the
legislature's "deliberative process."
15 Jimenez v cabangbang
Facts: Cabangbang was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused
the publication of an open letter addressed to the
Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by
some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian
political strategists. That such strategists have had
collusions with communists and that the Secretary of
Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place
him as the president. The planners allegedly have
Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that
Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being
used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to
have been published in newspapers of general circulation.
Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a
sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang
petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said
that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and
that he is covered by the privileged communication rule
and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by
privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides
The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony,
and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech
or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
other place. The publication of the said letter is not
covered by said expression which refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made,
or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in
session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties
as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees
duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the
time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress
was not in session when the letter was published and at
the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the
said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as
officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the
finding made by the lower court the said communication is
not absolutely privileged.

The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not

sufficient to support Jimenez action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the
control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as
planners, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it
should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that it is
of course possible that plaintiffs are unwitting tools of
the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge. In other words, the very document upon
which plaintiffs action is based explicitly indicates that
they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged
operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting
tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this
statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of entitling
them to recover damages, considering that they are
officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law,
under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to
suggest that the group therein described as planners
include these two (2) high ranking officers.Petition is
dismissed.
16 PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a fullfledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular
sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed
to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of
the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may
be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting
an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended
beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he
should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI
of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason
for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To
allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes
of the correction system.
17 Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.
G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998

While the Constitution mandates that the President of the

Senate must be elected by a number constituting more
than one half of all the members thereof, it does not
provide that the members who will not vote for him shall
ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby
elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that
the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in
Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of legislature
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of
procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and
waiver by the body adopting them

FACTS:
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo
Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the
position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen.
Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President.
Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the
agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assuming position of
minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for
Sen. Fernan comprised the majority, while only those
who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to
the minority. However, senators belonging to the LakasNUCD-UMDP Party number 7 and, thus, also a minority
had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus,
Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an actual violation of the
Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate
minority leader
Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in
matters of legislative procedure
RULING:
The petition fails.
The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority
The term majority has been judicially defined a number
of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total
or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than
half or more than half of any total. The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause
simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the
votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any
construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the
majority, much less the minority, in the said body. And
there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution
had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the
President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who
could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
xxx

Majority may also refer to the group, party, or faction with

the larger number of votes, not necessarily more than
one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction with a
smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.
Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be
the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But
where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not
as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the
leader representing all the minorities. In a government
with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as
pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be
several minority parties, one of which has to be identified
by the Comelec as the dominant minority party for
purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing
composition of the present Senate, members either belong
to different political parties or are independent. No
constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the
many minority groups or the independents or a
combination thereof has the right to select the minority
leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in
Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing
a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in
both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is
that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it
may deem necessary. To our mind, the method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by
the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by
this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of
Congress the power to determine the rules of its
proceedings. xxx
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of legislature
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the
positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there
an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing
the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence
of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules,
this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine
the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On
grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of
the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to
direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the
words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the
opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be
given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to implement them, before the
courts may intervene.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of
procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and
waiver by the body adopting them
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws,
do not have the imprints of permanence and

obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are

subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. Being merely
matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern
to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a
majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power
and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may
deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and
discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of
this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere
and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to
protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the
Courts being. Constitutional respect and a becoming
regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents
this Court from prying into the internal workings of the
Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a
wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in
upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would
practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for
this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
18 avelino v cuenco
83 Phil. 17 Political Law The Legislative Department
Election of Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada invoked his
right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges
against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He
requested to do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On
the next session day however, Avelino delayed the
opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent
demand by Taada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad
and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session.
He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory
and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his
piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were being
blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled
Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order.
Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to
the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they
requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting.
Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair
and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator
Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of
record it was so made that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it
incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio
Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to
continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions
of the Senate. Taada was subsequently recognized to
deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads
Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate
President. This was unanimously approved and was even
recognized by the President of the Philippines the following
day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then
filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare
him as the rightful Senate President.

not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The

SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the
presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who
are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change
or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to
be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session
Hall not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what
will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session
and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not,
by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al)
twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be
different had the resolution been approved only by ten or
less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was
in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of
the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two
sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting
such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning
session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the
journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in
session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor).
Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate
of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares
that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum,
the House does not mean all the members. Even a
majority of all the members constitute the House. There
is a difference between a majority of all the members of
the House and a majority of the House, the latter
requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one
(23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for
the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve
did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the
arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had
been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then,
and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the
same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one
against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March
14, 1949)

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the

case.

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC
take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to
bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be
right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no
constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected
president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee
senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this
does not change the number of senators nor does it
change the majority which if mathematically construed is
+ 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12.
There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected
unanimously there was no quorum.

HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot

take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of
the power to elect its own president, which power should

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to

assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of
subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief
Justice agrees with the result of the majoritys
pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that,

under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the

constitutional requirement in that regard has become a
mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any
new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos
election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group,
taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to
satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes
against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail,
because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all
avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the
SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the
majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial justice
and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore
Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and
the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that
the majority of all the members of the National Assembly
constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said
provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as
to read a majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business, shows the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on
the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but
on actual members or incumbents, and this must be
limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to
discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or
absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other
causes which make attendance of the member concerned
impossible, even through coercive process which each
house is empowered to issue to compel its members to
attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That
the amendment was intentional or made for some
purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the
use of the words of all the members as unnecessary, is
evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original
Constitution which required concurrence of two-thirds of
the members of the National Assembly to expel a
member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the
present Constitution, so as to require the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the members of each House. Therefore,
as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent
from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of
the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were
twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.
19 Arroyo v. De VeneciaFacts:
An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was
introduced to the House of Representatives involving
taxations on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes. This waslater passed accordingly and brought
to the House of Senate. Upon the interpellation on
thesecond reading, herein petitioner moved for
adjournment for lack of quorum which isconstitutionally
needed to conduct business. Petitioners motion was
defeated and wasrailroaded. The bill was then signed into
law by President Fidel Ramos.
Issue:
Whether or not the law was passed on violation on the
constitutional mandate.
Held:
There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall
be determined by viva voce or nominal voting. The
Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the
Members betaken every time a House has to vote, except
only on the following instances upon the last andthe
third readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the
Members present and in repassing a billover the veto of
the President. Second, there is obviousness on the part of
the petitioner to delaythe business of the House, thus

eliminating the alleged skullduggery on part of the

accused.Third, the enrolled bill doctrine states that
enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus legally binding
provided it is in harmony with the constitution. Lastly, the
court upheld principle of separation of powers, which
herein, is applicable for the legislative branch for it has
exercised its power without grave abuse of discretion
resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
20 santiago v sandiganbayan
356 SCRA 636 Political Law The Legislative Department
Suspension of a Member of Congress Violations of RA
3019
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the
then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID), approved the application for
legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said
to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran
counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a
violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by
Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified.
Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago.
Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a
presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant
of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for
provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car
accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed
with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago,
who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan
ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend
Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order
suspension of a member of the Senate without violating
the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that
each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks under the Constitution. The suspension
contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by
the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be, upon
an erring member. This is quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is
not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being

imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the

Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage
the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still
the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a
senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that
the public officer concerned must be suspended only in
the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts
with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held
that the use of the word office would indicate that it
applies to any office which the officer charged may be
holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime,
can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused
must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before
trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate
a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence
of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense
charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records another evidence before
the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive
suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to
the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such
as, that he has not been afforded the right to due
preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do
not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory
suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on
any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.
21 Mabanag vs. Vito
[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]
En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate
opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed separate
opinion
Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been
proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on
Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The
three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after
the opening of the first session of Congress following the
elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their
election. The eight representatives since their election had
not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take
part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the
House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been
acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for
prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three
senators and eight representatives did not take part in the
passage of the congressional resolution, designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to
the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned
within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote
which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed

amendment would have been short of the necessary

three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The
petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement
of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary
to the Constitution. The members of the Commission on
Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor
General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are
made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and
the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular
Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the
irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an
amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation
of authorities that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power
to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the
courts by express constitutional or statutory provision.
This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the
separation of powers, a principle also too well known to
require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty
lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of
political question. The term is not susceptible of exact
definition, and precedents and authorities are not always
in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the
political departments of the government. If a political
question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to
the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution
also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of
that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political
question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question. The two steps complement each other
in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to
be noted that the amendatory process as provided in
section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification." There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from the
other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by the Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge
by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is
even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief
Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous
attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public
interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the
validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.
22 Casco Chemical Co. vs Gimenez
Facts of the Case:
Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture
of synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber and
veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought
foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the
production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in
November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May
1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the
first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of
the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3,
1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the
Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and
approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption
granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of
section 2 of RA 2609.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law
from the payment of the margin fee.

Held:
No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee.
Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which is
distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners
contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the
conjunction and between the terms urea and
formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of urea formaldehyde and not the latter.
But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the
intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the
petitioner.
23 Bondoc vs. Pineda
Post under case digests, Political Law at Monday, March
12, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Pineda from the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) and Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival
candidates for Rep of the 4th district of Pampanga. Pineda
was proclaimed winner of the election. Bondoc filed
protest to house of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET). The decision held that Bondoc won over Pineda by
a margin of 23 votes. The LDP insisted a recount and the
recount has increased Bondocs win by 107 votes. So
congressman Camasura voted with the SC justices and
Congressman Cerilles proclaimed Bondoc the winner of the
election.so Camasura being a member of the LDP revealed
to the chief congressman Conjuanco that he voted for
Bondoc and he did so in view of what was in line with truth
justice and self respect. The revelation prompted efforts
by the LDP to neutralize pro-Bondoc majority in the
Tribunal. So on the eve of promulgation of Bondocs win,
Congress man Jose Conjuangco thru a letter stated that
Camasura and Bautista were being expelled for the LDP
for allegedly helping in the organization of Partido Pilipino
of Danding cojuanco and for having members of LDP join
said pol party. The LDP informed Herrera that they were no
longer part of LDP hence; his (Camasuras) vote in favor of
Bondoc should be withdrawn. The judges in HRET all
wanted out cause of this distressing development. They
were saying that unseating should be prevented in all cost.
They also said that the tribunal should not be hampered in
doing its constitutional function by factors, which have
nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it. The
Bondoc promulgation was cancelled because the decision
lack the concurrence of 5 members as required by Section
24 of the rules of the tribunal. Bondoc asked the court to
annul the decision of the House in rescinding Camasuras
nomination and restrain the replacement of Camasura
through a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus.
Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives is
empowered to interfere with the disposition of an election
contest in the HReT by reorganizing the representation of
the majority party in the tribunal?
Held: No. Section 17 Articles VI supplies the answer to this
question.. So the HRET is the sole judge of all contests
relation to the election, returns and qualification of their
respective members. The operative term found in the
section was sole Judge. It (HRET) was made to function
as a non-partisan court although 2/3 of its members are
politicians. Its suppose to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office devoid of partisan consideration.

So they cant just shuffle and manipulate the political

component for the electoral tribunal to serve the interests
of party in power.
Its independence would be undermined if the removal of
Camasura for as a punishment for party disloyalty for
voting for Bondoc would allow them to change the
judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.If allowed so,
then the HRET isnt really a sole judge of senatorial
elections. The members of the HRET are entitled to
security of tenure just as the members of the judiciary are.
They can only be replaced in cases such as expiration,
death, permanent disability, resignation forms the political
party, and formal affiliation with another party of any valid
cause hence mere disloyalty is not a valid cause for
termination.
24 Abbas vs Senate Electoral Tribunal - A case digest
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Facts:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set
aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying,
respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or
Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter
filed.
Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were
being asked to inhibit themselves in hearing SET Case No.
002-87 as they are considered interested parties, therefore
leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal senateless, and all
remaining members coming from the judiciary.
Issue:
WON the SET can function without the Senator members.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to
not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself,
rather, just let them refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment.
25 Sampayan vs. Daza
213 SCRA 807
HRET has exclusive jurisdiction over election contests and
qualifications of members of Congress
Remedies against a disqualified House of Representative
candidate: (1) cancellation of certificate of candidacy filed
with COMELEC before election; (2) quo warranto case filed
with HRET after proclamation
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza, then
incumbent congressman of their congressional district in
Makati, from continuing to exercise the functions of his
office on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder
and a lawful permanent resident of the United States.
They also alleged that Mr. Daza has not by any act or
declaration renounced his status as permanent resident
thereby violating the Omnibus Election Code (Section 68)
and the 1987 Constitution (section 18, Article III).
Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying the
fact that he is a permanent resident of the United States

as evidenced by a letter order of the US Immigration and

Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had long
waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on
August 12, 1985.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as
a member of the House of Representatives for violation of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
RULING:
The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case, first,
the case is moot and academic for it is evident from the
manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992, that
they seek to unseat the respondent from his position as
Congressman for the duration of his term of office
commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992.
Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the
House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election returns and qualification of its members.
The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been to
file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate of
candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with
the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten days after Dazas
proclamation.
26 EMILIANO R. BOY CARUNCHO III, petitioner, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and The Chairman
ATTY. CASIANO ATUEL, JR. and MEMBERS, ATTY. GRACE S.
BELVIS, DR. FLORENTINA R. LIZANO, City Board of
Canvassers, City of Pasig, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner Emiliano R. Caruncho III was the candidate of
the Liberal Party for the congressional seat in the lone
district of Pasig City at the May 11, 1998 synchronized
elections. The other candidates were: Arnulfo G. Acedera,
Jr. (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP); Marcelino P. Arias (Nacionalista
Party); Roberto C. Bassig (Independent); Esmeraldo T.
Batacan (PDR-LM Coalition); Henry P. Lanot (LAMMP);
Francisco C. Rivera, Jr. (PRP/PDR); Elpidio G. Tuason
(Independent), and Raoul V. Victorino (Liberal
Party/LAMMP).
At 9:00 oclock in the morning of May 12, 1998, respondent
Pasig City Board of Canvassers composed of Atty. Casiano
Atuel, Jr. as Chairman, Atty. Grace S. Belvis as ViceChairman, and Dr. Florentina Lizano as Member, started to
canvass the election returns. The canvass was proceeding
smoothly when the Board received intelligence reports
that one of the candidates for the congressional race,
retired General Arnulfo Acedera, and his supporters, might
disrupt and stop the canvassing.
At exactly 6:00 oclock in the evening of May 14, 1998,
General Acedera and his supporters stormed the Caruncho
Stadium in San Nicolas, Pasig City, where the canvassing
of election returns was being conducted. They allegedly
forced themselves into the canvassing area, breaking a
glass door in the process. As pandemonium broke loose,
the police fired warning shots causing those present in the
canvassing venue, including the members of the Board
and canvassing units, to scamper for safety. The
canvassing personnel exited through the backdoors
bringing with them the Election Returns they were
canvassing and tallying as well as the Statement of Votes
that they were accomplishing. They entrusted these
documents to the City Treasurers Office and the Pasig

Employment Service Office (PESO). Election documents

and paraphernalia were scattered all over the place when
the intruders left.
The following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units
recovered the twenty-two (22) Election Returns and the
Statement of Votes from the Treasurers Office and the
PESO. However, page 2 of each of the 22 election returns,
which contained the names of candidates for
congressmen, had been detached and could not be found.
An investigation was conducted to pinpoint liability for the
loss but it yielded negative result. Hence, the Board
secured proper authority from the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC),[1] through Election Director for the
National Capital Region Atty. Teresita Suarez, for the
reconstitution of the missing page by making use of the
other copies of the election returns, particularly the
provincial copy or the copy in the ballot boxes placed
therein by the Board of Election Inspectors.
At 2:40 a.m. of May 17, 1998, the Board, satisfied that it
had finished canvassing the 1,491 election returns from as
many clustered precincts, proclaimed Henry P. Lanot as
the winner in the congressional race for the lone district of
Pasig.[2] The votes obtained by the leading three
candidates were: Henry P. Lanot 60,914 votes; Emiliano R.
Boy Caruncho III 42,942 votes, and Arnulfo Acedera
36,139 votes. The winner, Lanot, led his closest rival,
Caruncho, by 17,971 votes.
However, on May 21, 1998, petitioner Caruncho filed a
Motion to Nullify Proclamation on the Basis of Incomplete
Returns[3] with the COMELEC. He alleged that the Board
had proceeded with the proclamation of Henry Lanot as
the winning congressional candidate even though one
hundred forty-seven (147) election returns involving about
30,000 votes, were still not canvassed. He prayed that the
COMELEC en banc declare the proclamation null and void
and that the Board of Canvassers be directed to convene
and reopen the ballot boxes to recount the votes of the
candidates for the House of Representatives and
thereupon proclaim the winner. On June 1, 1998, petitioner
filed an amended motion to correct some errors in the
listing of precincts under paragraph 10, pages 2 and 3,
and paragraph 12, pages 3 and 4, of the original motion.
[4]
On June 8, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC
issued an Order requiring respondent Pasig City Board of
Canvassers to comment on the amended motion to nullify
Lanots proclamation. In his comment filed on June 23,
1998, respondent Atty. Casiano G. Atuel, Jr. admitted the
disruption and stoppage of the canvass of election returns
on May 11, 1998 but asserted that there were only twentytwo (22) election returns, not 147 as claimed by Caruncho,
that were missing but these were eventually recovered.
The Board stated in part:
x x x. Contrary to the insinuation of Atty. Irene D. Jurado,
only 22 Election Returns were reported missing. On the
following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units
have recovered the 22 missing Election Returns and the
Statement of Votes from the Treasurers Office and from
the Pasig Employment Service Office (PESO). There are no
missing election returns.
That to the surprise of the Board and of the 22 canvassing
units, they found out that Page 2 of the 22 Election
Returns they recovered were detached and missing. We
wish to inform the Commission that Page 2 of the Local
Election Returns contained the name of candidates for
Congressman. We conducted investigation on who did the

detachment of Page 2 of the 22 Election Returns. However,

nobody from the Treasurers Office nor from the PESO
admitted that they committed such election offense.
It is impossible that 147 Election Returns were missing.
The COMELEC Instruction is very specific that only Election
Returns to be canvassed are suppose(d) to be brought out
from the Ballot Boxes containing still uncanvassed Election
Returns. The instruction further stated that once it was
read by the Board, it will be stamped `READ and then
deliver the same (sic) to the 22 sub-canvassing units. Subcanvassing units cannot get another Election Returns
unless the same is finished, tallied, stamped as
`CANVASSED, and submit the same to the Secretariat and
placed inside a separate ballot boxes with stamped `READ
and `CANVASSED (sic) sealed with metal seals, padlocked,
chained and padlocked again. It was at this time where
(sic) the sub-canvassing units will get another Election
Returns from the Board for tally and so on. Sub-canvassing
units are not allowed to canvass 2 or more Election
Returns at one time. This was the very reason why only 22
Election Returns were reported missing but were
recovered without Page 2.
That at the very start of the proceeding, the leading
candidates for Congressman were as follows:
HENRY LANOT - FIRST
EMILIANO CARUNCHO - SECOND
ARNULFO ACEDERA - THIRD
As the canvass goes on, Henry Lanot was leading
Caruncho by thousands. Very few Election Returns have
Caruncho leading and even if leading, the lead was only a
few votes.
Proper authorities from the Commission on Elections was
secured through Atty. Teresita C. Suarez, Election Director
for National Capital Region for the purpose of making use
of other copies of the Election Returns particularly the
Provincial Copy or the Copy in the Ballot Boxes.
Fortunately, the authorities arrived on time so that the
Board of Canvassers waste(d) no time in opening the
Ballot Boxes to retrieve the copies from the Board of
Canvassers left inside the Ballot Boxes by the careless
Board of Election Inspectors. Provincial copies were used
as well in the reconstitution of the missing page 2 of the
22 recovered Election Returns.
That there was no truth on the insinuation made by Atty.
Irene D. Jurado that there were 147 Election Returns which
were not canvassed which will affect the result of election
for Emiliano Caruncho. The Board did everything to have
all election returns accounted forth (sic). We let no stone
unturned before we finally come to the conclusion. That
we have finished canvassing the 1,491 Election Returns
and proclaimed the winning candidates.

man, I am on the level, I have a family and I am about to

retire. x x x.
That at 2:40 A.M. of May 17, 1998, the Board of
Canvassers proclaimed all the winning candidates for Local
positions. As to the Congressman, the following results are
as follows:
HENRY LANOT - 60,914 votes
EMILIANO `BOY CARUNCHO - 42,942 votes
ARNULFO ACEDERA - 36,139 votes
The lead of Henry Lanot from Emiliano Caruncho was 17,
971 votes.
x x x x x x x x x.[5]
On June 24, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division[6]
promulgated a Resolution[7] decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission:
1. Declares that the proclamation of the winning
congressional candidate of Pasig City as NULL AND VOID;
2. Orders that the respondents-Members of the City Board
of Canvassers of Pasig City to RECONVENE at the Session
Hall of the Commission and use the Comelec copy of the
one hundred forty-seven (147) election returns abovementioned and CANVASS said authentic copy of the
election returns and include the results thereof with the
tally of all election returns previously canvassed and,
thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning candidate; and
3. Orders the Law Department of this Commission to
investigate candidate Arnulfo Acedera and if after the
investigation, the evidence so warrant, to file the
necessary charges against him.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, on June 26, 1998, respondent Board filed a
Supplemental Comment raising the following matters: (a)
the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the case under
Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code; (b) petitioner
failed to record his objections to the elections returns and
the certificate of canvass in the minutes of the
proceedings of the Board, and (c) the winning candidate,
Henry Lanot, was not impleaded in the motion to nullify his
proclamation.[8]

That granting without admitting that there were missing

Election Returns which were uncanvassed, and if ordered
canvass(ed), the more Lanot will widen his lead because
the trend was that Henry Lanots lead swollen (sic) as more
election returns were canvassed.

On July 8, 1998, proclaimed winning candidate Henry

Lanot filed a motion for leave to intervene in the case.[9]
He also prayed for the reconsideration of the June 24,
1998 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and for
referral of the case to the COMELEC en banc. In his motion
for reconsideration[10] that was attached to said motion
to intervene, movant Lanot argued that failure to notify
him of the case was fatal as he was a real party in interest
who must be impleaded therein. He also alleged that
under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7166, the
COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the case and that the
Resolution of June 24, 1998 was not based on facts.

That for the first time, I am revealing this shocking fact to

the Commission on Elections that on two (2) occasions, an
unidentified persons (sic) talked to me at the unholy hours
of the night 2 days while canvassing was going on and
offered me TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS in cold
cash just to proclaim `BOY as the elected Congressman. I
declined the offer and told the man that I am a straight

That same day, petitioner, represented by new counsel,

[11] filed a motion praying for the formation of a new
Board of Canvassers on account of the June 24, 1998
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division.[12] The
following day, the COMELEC Second Division issued an
order setting the case for hearing and postponing the
reconvening of the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig City.

[13] On July 15, 1998, movant Lanot filed an opposition to

the motion for the formation of a new Board of Canvassers
on the ground that the Resolution of June 24, 1998 is null
and void for the following reasons: (a) he was not notified
of the proceedings and therefore his right to due process
was violated; (b) said resolution had not become final and
executory by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, and
(c) the case was no longer a pre-proclamation controversy
but an electoral protest under the jurisdiction of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, not the COMELEC.
[14]
At the hearing on July 21, 1998, the COMELEC Second
Division ordered the filing of memorandum. Movant Lanot,
however, manifested that he was no longer filing a
memorandum. Thus, the COMELEC, ruled that with or
without said memorandum, the case would be deemed
submitted for resolution.[15] Meanwhile, on July 27, 1998,
petitioner filed an opposition to Lanots motion for
reconsideration[16] after which Lanot filed his comment
on the opposition.[17]
On September 28, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division
granted Lanots motion for intervention and elevated his
motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc.[18]
Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc[19] promulgated a
Resolution dated October 1, 1998 reconsidering the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and
dismissing petitioners amended motion (petition) to nullify
the proclamation on the basis of incomplete returns for
lack of merit.[20] Relying on facts narrated by the Pasig
City Board of Canvassers in its comment on the motion to
nullify the proclamation, the COMELEC en banc found:
Thus, the board of canvassers did everything to have all
election returns accounted for, and finished canvassing all
the election returns of 1,491 clustered precincts of Pasig
City. On the basis of the canvass, the board proclaimed the
winning candidates for local positions. As to the winning
candidate for congressman, the results were as follows:
Henry P. Lanot - 60,914 votes
Emiliano `Boy Caruncho - 42,942 votes
Arnulfo Acedera - 36,139 votes
However, granting arguendo that there were missing
twenty-two (22) election returns involving about 4,400
votes, the same no longer affect the results of the election
as candidate Henry P. Lanot obtained the highest number
of votes, with a lead of 17,971 votes over his closest rival,
Emiliano `Boy Caruncho. The board of canvassers duly
proclaimed candidate Henry P. Lanot as the winning
representative of the lone district of Pasig City.

incomplete canvass. However, as in the proceedings

before the COMELEC, petitioner failed to implead in the
instant petition the proclaimed winning candidate, Lanot.
The petition must be dismissed.
Petitioner initiated this case through a motion to nullify the
proclamation of Lanot as the winner in the congressional
race in Pasig City. Named respondents in the motion were
the individual members of the Board of Canvassers in that
city. The proclaimed winner was not included among the
respondents. For that reason alone, the COMELEC should
have been forewarned of a procedural lapse in the motion
that would affect the substantive rights of the winning
candidate, if not the electorate. Due process in quasijudicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due
notice and hearing.[21] The proclamation of a winning
candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of
the motion to set aside his proclamation.[22] It was only
the intervention of Lanot in SPC 98-123, which the Second
Division of the COMELEC allowed, which cured the
procedural lapse that could have affected the popular will
of the electorate.
However, petitioner again failed to implead Lanot in the
instant petition for certiorari. In this connection, Section 2,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest. By real interest is meant a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.[23] As the winning candidate
whose proclamation is sought to be nullified, Henry P.
Lanot is a real party in interest in these proceedings. The
COMELEC and the Board of Canvassers of Pasig City are
mere nominal parties whose decision should be defended
by the real party in interest, pursuant to Rule 65 of the
said Rules:
SEC. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the
petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge,
court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private
respondent or respondents with such public respondent or
respondents, the person or persons interested in
sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the
duty of such private respondents to appear and defend,
both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public
respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings,
and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the
petitioner shall be against the private respondents only,
and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as
public respondent or respondents.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where

the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not
appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or
any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher
court by either party, the public respondents shall be
included therein as nominal parties. However, unless
otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not
appear or participate in the proceedings therein.
(Underscoring supplied.)

Petitioner seeks to nullify respondent COMELEC en bancs

Resolution of October 1, 1998, contending that said body
acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in overruling his claim that 147 election returns
involving about thirty thousand (30,000) votes were not
canvassed. Petitioner argued that it was enough reason for
contesting the proclamation of Lanot as winner under an

Hence, quasi-judicial agencies should be joined as public

respondents but it is the duty of the private respondent to
appear and defend such agency.[24] That duty cannot be
fulfilled by the real party in interest such as the proclaimed
winning candidate in a proceeding to annul his
proclamation if he is not even named as private
respondent in the petition. Ordinarily, the nonjoinder of an

Consequently, we find without basis petitioners allegation

that the proclamation of Henry P. Lanot was based on an
incomplete canvass. We carefully examined the Comelec
copies of the Statement of Votes and found no truth to the
assertion that there were one hundred forty seven (147)
election returns not canvassed.

indispensable party or the real party in interest is not by

itself a ground for the dismissal of the petition. The court
before which the petition is filed must first require the
joinder of such party. It is the noncompliance with said
order that would be a ground for the dismissal of the
petition.[25] However, this being an election case which
should be resolved with dispatch considering the public
interest involved, the Court has not deemed it necessary
to require that Henry P. Lanot be impleaded as a
respondent in this case.

congressional race for the sole district of Pasig City, his

remedy should have been to file an electoral protest with
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
[27]

A crucial issue in this petition is what body has jurisdiction

over a proclamation controversy involving a member of
the House of Representatives. The 1987 Constitution
cannot be more explicit in this regard. Article VI thereof
states:

The factual question of how many election returns were

missing as a consequence of the disruption of the
canvassing of election returns has been definitely resolved
by the COMELEC en banc. Thus, raising the same issue
before this Court is pointless because this Court is not a
trier of facts.[28] The facts established below show that all
the legal steps necessary to carry out the reconstitution of
the missing page 2 of the twenty-two (22) election returns
have been followed. Proper authorization for the
reconstitution of that page was secured from the
COMELEC. The reconstitution was based on the provincial
copy of the election returns that was retrieved from the
sealed ballot boxes. For his part, petitioner failed to have
the anomaly recorded in the minutes of proceedings of
respondent Board as required by Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 7166. Respondent Board, therefore, observed the
following provisions of the Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives

shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x.
The foregoing constitutional provision is reiterated in Rule
14 of the 1991 Revised Rules of the Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives, to wit:
RULE 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
In the recent case of Rasul v. COMELEC and Aquino-Oreta,
[26] the Court, in interpreting the aforesaid constitutional
provision, stressed the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals
jurisdiction over its members, thus:
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as
Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code provide that
(t)he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. x x x. In Javier
v. Comelec (144 SCRA 194), this Court interpreted the
phrase election, returns and qualifications as follows:
The phrase election, returns and qualifications should be
interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters
affecting the validity of the contestees title. But if it is
necessary to specify, we can say that election referred to
the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of the votes; returns to the canvass of the returns
and the proclamation of the winners, including questions
concerning the composition of the board of canvassers
and the authenticity of the election returns; and
qualifications to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such
as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his
certificate of candidacy.
The word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 250 of the Omnibus Election
Code underscore the exclusivity of the Tribunals
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
Inasmuch as petitioner contests the proclamation of herein
respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta as the 12th winning
senatorial candidate, it is the Senate Electoral Tribunal
which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of
petitioner. x x x.
In the same vein, considering that petitioner questions the
proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winner in the

Even granting arguendo that the thrust of petitioners case

is to question the integrity of the election returns or the
validity of the incomplete canvass as the basis for Henry
Lanots proclamation, and not the proclamation itself, still,
the instant petition is devoid of merit.

SEC. 233. When the election returns are delayed, lost or

destroyed. In case its copy of the election returns is
missing, the board of canvassers shall, by messenger or
otherwise, obtain such missing election returns from the
board of election inspectors concerned, or if said returns
have been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers,
upon prior authority of the Commission, may use any of
the authentic copies of said election returns or a certified
copy of said election returns issued by the Commission,
and forthwith direct its representative to investigate the
case and immediately report the matter to the
Commission.
The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not
all the election returns have been received by it, may
terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates
elected on the basis of the available election returns if the
missing election returns will not affect the results of the
election.
Granting that the proclamation was made without taking
into account the twenty-two (22) election returns, still, the
COMELEC did not abuse its discretion. The election returns
represented only 4,400 votes. That number cannot affect
the result of the election because Henry Lanots lead over
his closest rival, herein petitioner, was 17,971 votes. As
the second paragraph of Section 233 of the Omnibus
Election Code aforequoted states, the Board of Canvassers
could have totally disregarded the twenty-two (22)
election returns and legally proclaimed Lanot as the
winner in the election in Pasig City for Member of the
House of Representatives.
An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be
the basis of a subsequent proclamation.[29] A canvass
cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate
unless all returns are considered and none is omitted.[30]
However, this is true only where the election returns
missing or not counted will affect the results of the
election. It bears stressing that in the case at bar, the
COMELEC has categorically found that the election returns
which were not counted by respondent canvassers
represented only 4,400 votes. To be sure, this number will

not affect the result of the election considering that Lanots

lead over petitioner was already 17,971 votes.
On the whole, this Court finds that respondent COMELEC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued
the assailed Resolution of October 1, 1998 dismissing
petitioners motion to nullify the proclamation of Henry P.
Lanot as Member of the House of Representatives for the
lone district of Pasig City.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
27 GUINGONA, JR. v GONZALESFACTS:On September
23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. in his behalf and in
behalf of LAKAS-NUCD filed a petitionto prohibit Senator
Neptali Gonzales, ex-officio Chairman of Commission on
Appointments from recognizing themembership of
Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tanada. The
resulting composition of proportionalrepresentatives is as
follows:
POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP PROP.REPRESENTATIVES
LDP 15 7.5 membersNPC 5 2.5 membersLAKAS-NUCD 3
1.5 membersLP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 membersTo resolve the
impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise
to the effect that the Senate elect 12members to the
Commission on Appointments, 8 from LDP, 2 from NPC, 9
from liberal party. This proposal wasapproved despite the
objections of Senators Guingona and Osmena. Senator
Romulo occupied the 8
th
membership of the LDP while Senator Tanada for LD-PDPLABAN.ISSUE:

WON the election of Senators Romulo and Tanada as

members of Commission on Appointments is inaccordance
with Art. 6, Section 18 of the Constitution.HELD:No, Art.6
Sec. 18 assures representation in the COA of any political
party who succeeds in electing members tothe Senate,
provided that the number of Senators so elected enables it
to put a representative in the COA. Drawing fromthe ruling
in the case of Coseteng v Mitra, Jr. a political party must
have at least 2 senators in the senate to be able tohave a
representative in the COA, so that any member less than 2
will not entitle such a party a membership in the COA.In
the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the
applicable rules and jurisprudence on the matter before
thiscourt, we declare the election of Senator Alberto
Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tanada as members of the
COA as nulland void for being in violation of the rule on
proportional representation under Art VI, Sec 18 of the
PhilippineConstitution. Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is
hereby issued ordering the said respondents Senator
Romulo andSenator Tanada to desist from assuming,
occupying and discharging the functions of members of
the COA; and orderingthe respondent Senate President
Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ec-officio chairman of
the COA, to desist fromrecognizing the membership of the
respondent Senators and from allowing and permitting
them from sitting andparticipating as members of said
commission.
28 SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE
Posted by kaye lee on 11:13 PM
156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987
[Appointing Power]
FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the
Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the

Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the

appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by CoA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.
RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority
and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without
submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He
is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions
of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4
groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus
heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers with the consent and
confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments
are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the
law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of
such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of
contention. By following the accepted rule in constitutional
and statutory construction that an express enumeration of
subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow
that only those appointments to positions expressly stated
in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those
within the first group of appointments where the consent
of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987
Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads
of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
29 De Guzman vs Commission on Elections GR
129118 19 July 2000 Facts: Comelec
reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to
Section 44 of the Voters registration act. The
act prohibits election officers from holding office in a
particular city or municipality for more than 4 years.
Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal protection
clause because not all election officials were covered by
the prohibition. Petitioners contend that RA 8189 Section
44 is unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection
clause enshrined in the constitution; that it violates
constitutional guarantee on security of civil servants; that
it undermines
the constitutional independence of comelec and comelecs
constitutional authority; that it contravenes the basic
constitutional precept; that it is void for its failure to be
read on 3 separate readings Issue: Whether or Not section
44 of RA 8189 is unconstitutional Ruling: No, RA 8189 Sec
44 is not unconstitutional. It has not violated the equal
protection clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality
of election officials by preventing them from developing
familiarity with the people of their place of assignment.
Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot

be carried out without the complicity of election officers,

who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or
municipality. G.R.No. 129118 (July 19, 2000) FACTS:
Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act provided that no
election officer shall hold office in a
particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In
accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners,
who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners
argued that the provision was not expressed in the title of
the law,
which is An Act Providing for a General Registration of
Voters, Adopting a Sy
stem of Continuing Registration,
Prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing the
Appropriation of Fund Thereof.
HELD: The contention is untenable. Section 44 is relevant
to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure
the integrity of the registration process by providing a
guideline for the Comelec to follow in the reassignment of
election officers.
30 Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado
Post under case digests, Political Law at Thursday,
February 02, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A.
No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These
measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA,
RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration Commission
and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices. The petitioners are members of the
lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges
will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The
petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purpose
(2) Whether or not it did not pass the required readings in
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in
its final form were not distributed among the members
before its passage;
(3) Whether or not it is discriminatory and encroaches on
the independence of the Judiciary
Held:
(1) Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that
"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." The
purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or
"log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of
which the title gives no intimation, and which might
therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such
publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made,
of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in
order that they may have opportunity of being heard
thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of
R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from
the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor
does it reflect its purposes. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An
Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its
Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for
Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith." The petitioners' contention is
untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an
index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as

to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been

held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject,
and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is
not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement. Furthermore, the repeal of a statute on a
given subject is properly connected with the subject
matter of a new statute on the same subject; and
therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid,
notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. The
reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such
repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and
it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required
to be briefly expressed in its title. The withdrawal of the
franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No.
7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system.
(2) It is a matter of record that the conference Committee
Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly
approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and
Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives
as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It
was then presented to and approved by President Corazon
C. Aquino on April 3, 1992. Under the doctrine of
separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon
the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in
the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of
the bill).
(3) It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory
because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the
Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the
Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives, the
Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the
Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and
the general public in the filing of complaints against public
offices and officers. The withdrawal of the franking
privileges was indeed discriminatory. If the problem of the
respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking
privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all
agencies of government, including those who do not need
it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and
withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favored, which may
or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely
needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the
Constitution. The classification was not based on
substantial distinctions.
Chiongbian vs Orbos
31 Chiongbian - Congressman in third district,
South Cotabato; Orbos - Executive Secretary Date of
Promulgation:
June 22, 1995
Ponente:
Mendoza
Motion:
Certiorari and Prohibition
;

Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court

Background
In 1968, R.A. 5435 authorized the President of the
Philippines, with the help of Commission on
Reorganization, to recognize the different executive
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the government, including banking or
financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled
by it.
Purpose was to promote simplicity, economy and
efficiency in the government.
Facts
The Congress passed the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (RA 6743)
pursuant to Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution. A
plebiscite was called in some provinces which resulted to
4 provinces (
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi Tawi
) in favor of creating an autonomous region and therefore
became the ARMM. The RA says that those provinces and
cities who did not vote in favor of it shall remain in their
existing administrative regions
provided, however,
that the President may merge the existing regions through
administrative determination.
President Cory then issued the EO containing the
provinces/cities that will be merged, transferring
provinces from their existing region to another. The
petitioners who are
members of the Congress
representing legislative districts protested the Executive
Order, saying that there is
no law which authorizes
the President to pick certain provinces and cities within
existing regions and
restructure
them to new administrative regions. The transfer of one
province under its current region to another (ex: Misamis
Occidental from Region X to IX) is a form of
reorganization,
an alteration of the existing structures of the government.
The RA 6743 only holds authority of the president to
merge
existing regions
and cannot be construed as
reorganizing
them.
Issue
W/N the power to merge administrative regions is
legislative (petitioners stand) in
character or executive as the respondents contend

Petitioners: It unduly delegates power to the President to

merge regions through administrative determination or at
any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the
power delegated

Respondents: No undue delegation but only a grant of

power to

fill up
or provide the details of legislation because the Congress
did not have the facility to provide for them
Ruling:
Petition is DISMISSED.
The creation and subsequent reorganization of
administrative regions have been by the President
pursuant to authority granted to him by law
. In conferring on the President the power to merge the
existing regions following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of
administrative regions in 1972
. (RA5453)
This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which
the President is to be guided in the exercise of power.
Standard can be gathered or implied
.
Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant
of
power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to
reorganize the Executive Department:to promote
simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to
enable it to pursue its programs consisted with the
national goals for acceler
ated social and economic development.
32 Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
By: Dennis D. San Diego
G.R. No. 115455
235 SCRA 630 (1994)
FACTS
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits questioning and challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate
exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a
mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and
it did not pass three readings on separate days on the
Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of
the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE

Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and

Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD
No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the
revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient that
the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the
bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the
President need not meet the requirement not only of
printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
33 Motion Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,
(235 SCRA 630, 249 SCRA 628)
August 25, 1994; October 30, 1995
Facts:
There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of
RA 7716 on variousgrounds.The value-added tax (VAT) is
levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goodsand
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It
is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross
value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or
exchange of services. Republic ActNo. 7716 seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance
itsadministration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code. Among the Petitioners was the Philippine
Press Institute which claim that R.A.7716 violates their
press freedom and religious liberty, having removed them
from theexemption to pay Value Added Tax. It is contended
by the PPI that by removing theexemption of the press
from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others,
the lawdiscriminates against the press. At any rate, it is
averred, "even nondiscriminatorytaxation of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
PPI argued that theVAT is in the nature of a license tax.
Issue:
Whether or not the purpose of the VAT is the same as that
of a license tax.
Ruling:
A license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its impositionon the press is unconstitutional
because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of itsright.
Hence, although its application to others, such those
selling goods, is valid, itsapplication to t
he press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovahs
Witnesses, inconnection with the latters sale of religious
books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, it is one thing to impose a tax on
income or property
of a prea
cher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for
delivering a sermon.
The VAT is, however, different.
It is not a license tax.
It is not a tax on theexercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter,lease
or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or
exchange of services and thelease of properties purely for
revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment
isnot to burden the exercise of its right any more than to
make the press pay income taxor subject it to general
regulation is not to violate its freedom under the
Constitution.
34 BENGZON VS. DRILON G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992
208 SCRA 133
BENGZON VS. DRILON
G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133

Gutierrez, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals who are currently receiving pensions
under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos
issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which
authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired
justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD
1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for
the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and
enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired
justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297
in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information
that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an
attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President
Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never
became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was
no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB
16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits
which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB
16297 did not also produce any effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain
provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment
of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional
or valid.
HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is
tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should
be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.
Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must
enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it
in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges
given by law to former Justices on the ground that there
should be no grant of distinct privileges or preferential
treatment to retired Justices ignores these provisions of
the Constitution and in effect asks that these
Constitutional provisions on special protections for the
Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal
and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and
subsisting.
35 immigration v Chadha
Brief Fact Summary. Chadha was an East Indian student
who had overstayed his visa and was deportable. The
Attorney General suspended his deportation. The House
passed a resolution that Chadha should be deported
because he did not meet the hardship requirement.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The one-house veto violated
Article I, Section: 7, the Presentment Clause, because a bill
must be presented to the President to sign or veto, and it
violated Article I, Section:Section: 1 and 7, bicameralism.

Facts. Chadha challenged the constitutionality of a

provision in Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act authorizing one House of Congress, by
resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive
Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to
the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a
particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.
The Immigration Naturalization Service (INS) suspended
Chadhas deportation. A year and a half later the House
passed a resolution to veto the suspension. Because the

resolution was passed pursuant to Section 244(c)(2) it was

not treated as an Article I legislative act. As a result, it was
not submitted to the Senate nor was it presented to the
President for action. Chadha appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The INS agreed with
Chadhas position before the court of appeals and joined
him in arguing that Section 244(c)(2) was unconstitutional.
The court of appeals held that
the House was without constitutional authority to order
Chadhas deportation.
Issue. Is it constitutional for Congress to statutorily
authorize a one-house veto of a decision the Attorney
General made, under authority delegated to him by
Congress, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain
in the United States?
Held. Chief Justice Burger opinion. No. The court of
appeals decision is affirmed.
Congress first argued that Section 244(c)(2) was not
severable. Therefore, if that provision was unconstitutional
than the whole statute was, and then the Attorney General
could not suspend Chadhas deportation order. He would
lack standing because he would receive no relief from an
order declaring Section 244(c)(2) invalid. The Court
pointed out that Congress itself had provided for
severability in Section 406 of the Act.
Even if this law or procedure were efficient, convenient
and useful in facilitating functions of government, that
alone would not save it if it is contrary to the United States
Constitution. The very structure of Articles I, II, and III
exemplify the concept of separation of powers. The
Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency. They
sought to define and limit the exercise of the newly
created federal powers affecting the states and the
people.
The one-house veto violated Article I, Section: 7, the
Presentment Clause, because a bill must be presented to
the President to sign or veto. The Presentment Clause is
an effort to check whatever propensity a particular
Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident or
ill-considered measures.
The one-house veto was unconstitutional because it
violated Article I, Section:Section: 1 and 7, Bicameralism.
The Framers were trying to balance the legislative process.
The Presidents participation was to protect the Executive
branch from Congress and to protect the whole people
from improvident laws. The Attorney General is part of the
executive branch. When Congress is vetoing his decision,
they are encroaching upon territory reserved for the
Executive branch. Both Houses had to vote on the bill
because splitting the legislative power means it will be
exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate
in separate settings.
This action was legislative in character and effect because
it was to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, it
altered the legal rights, duties and relations of persons,
including the Attorney General, executive Branch officials
and Chadha.
Dissent. Justice White and Justice Rehnquist dissenting.
J. White: Todays decision eliminates over 200 statutory
provisions in which Congress has reserved a legislative
veto which is more efficient. The Courts decision fails to
recognize that the legislative veto is not the type of action
subject to the bicameralism and presentment
requirements of Article I.
J. Rehnquist: Congress could not have intended the onehouse veto provision to be severable from the rest of the
statute. They never intended to permit suspensions of
deportation unless they could retain some sort of veto.
Concurrence. Justice Powell concurring. The case should be
decided on a narrower ground. For example, Congress may

not encroach the Judicial branch because it is a judicial

function to determine whether a particular person does
not satisfy the statutory criteria for permanent residence.
36 PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R.
No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation
Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As
passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain
items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of
Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork
barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment
of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress
presented the said bill to the President for consideration
and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into
law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act
NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR
THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY
ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the
President delivered his Presidential Veto Message,
specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on
which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1.
Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this
debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the
1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public
debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically
appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and
Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,
Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative
Code of 1987.
2.
Special provisions which authorize the use of
income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities
and Colleges (SUCs),
3.
Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract)
ratio for road maintenance.
4.
Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of
medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law
(R.A. No. 6675).
5.
The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the
appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the
Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which
requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release
of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the
entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition
which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not
be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer
planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored
personnel carriers
6.
New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use
savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
7.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme
Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
Issue:
whether or not the conditions imposed by the
President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c)
Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e)
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f)
State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional;
whether or not the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service and the automatic
appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional
Held:

The veto power, while exercisable by the

President, is actually a part of the legislative process.
There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the
presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on
those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use
is a violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an
attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt
payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the
repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not
in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no
undue discrimination when the President vetoed said
special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other
government agencies. If some government agencies were
allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund
for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws
authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund
policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D.
No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission;
E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and
Managements Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No.
2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision
which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended
70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of
medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the
formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being
directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation
item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special
provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also
vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of
Fund for the AFP modernization program that the
President must submit all purchases of military equipment
to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the
congressional or legislative veto. However the case at
bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of
the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special
Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be
disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being
inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3
were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of
the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes
and armored personnel carriers, which have been
contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional
prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the
obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts
entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said
special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to
use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP
being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of
the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find
anything in the language used in the challenged Special
Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny
to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending,
much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at
once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the
appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such
purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the

powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing

laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain
provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court,
constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there
is less basis to complain when the President said that the
expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue.
Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined
whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to
take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution
the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the
guidelines.
37 CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague
G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and
P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise
known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of
P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS
amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is
authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight
Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act),
by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in
Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the
New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the
Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities
Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of
the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being
higher than the budget for education, therefore it is
against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which
mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to
education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt
service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget
for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of
the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign the
highest budgetary priority to education, it does not
thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment
of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only
by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that
can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a
matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the
country. More especially, the very survival of our economy
is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated
to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional

38 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4

L. Ed. 579 (1819).
Facts
Maryland (P) enacted a statute imposing a tax on all banks
operating in Maryland not chartered by the state. The
statute provided that all such banks were prohibited from
issuing bank notes except upon stamped paper issued by
the state. The statute set forth the fees to be paid for the
paper and established penalties for violations.
The Second Bank of the United States was established
pursuant to an 1816 act of Congress. McCulloch (D), the
cashier of the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United
States, issued bank notes without complying with the
Maryland law. Maryland sued McCulloch for failing to pay
the taxes due under the Maryland statute and McCulloch
contested the constitutionality of that act. The state court
found for Maryland and McCulloch appealed.
Issues
Does Congress have the power under the Constitution to
incorporate a bank, even though that power is not
specifically enumerated within the Constitution?
Does the State of Maryland have the power to tax an
institution created by Congress pursuant to its powers
under the Constitution?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
Yes. Congress has power under the Constitution to
incorporate a bank pursuant to the Necessary and Proper
clause (Article I, section 8).
No. The State of Maryland does not have the power to tax
an institution created by Congress pursuant to its powers
under the Constitution.
The Government of the Union, though limited in its
powers, is supreme within its sphere of action, and its
laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form
the supreme law of the land. There is nothing in the
Constitution which excludes incidental or implied powers.
If the end be legitimate, and within the scope of the
Constitution, all the means which are appropriate and
plainly adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited,
may be employed to carry it into effect pursuant to the
Necessary and Proper clause.
The power of establishing a corporation is not a distinct
sovereign power or end of Government, but only the
means of carrying into effect other powers which are
sovereign. It may be exercised whenever it becomes an
appropriate means of exercising any of the powers
granted to the federal government under the U.S.
Constitution. If a certain means to carry into effect of any
of the powers expressly given by the Constitution to the
Government of the Union be an appropriate measure, not
prohibited by the Constitution, the degree of its necessity
is a question of legislative discretion, not of judicial
cognizance.
The Bank of the United States has a right to establish its
branches within any state. The States have no power, by
taxation or otherwise, to impede or in any manner control
any of the constitutional means employed by the U.S.
government to execute its powers under the Constitution.
This principle does not extend to property taxes on the
property of the Bank of the United States, nor to taxes on
the proprietary interest which the citizens of that State
may hold in this institution, in common with other property
of the same description throughout the State.
Disposition
Reversed; judgment for McCulloch.

Note
This opinion is occasionally cited as Mccullough v.
Maryland or alternatively as Maryland v. McCulloch.
See Martin v. Hunters Lessee for a case brief of a
constitutional law opinion holding that the Supreme
Courts interpretation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States trumps that of state courts.
Brief Fact Summary. The state of Maryland enacted a tax
that would force the United States Bank in Maryland to pay
taxes to the state. McCulloch, a cashier for the Baltimore,
Maryland Bank, was sued for not complying with the
Maryland state tax.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress may enact laws that are
necessary and proper to carry out their enumerated
powers. The United States Constitution (Constitution) is
the supreme law of the land and state laws cannot
interfere with federal laws enacted within the scope of the
Constitution.

Facts. Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United

States. Branches were established in many states,
including one in Baltimore, Maryland. In response, the
Maryland legislature adopted an Act imposing a tax on all
banks in the state not chartered by the state legislature.
James McCulloch, a cashier for the Baltimore branch of the
United States Bank, was sued for violating this Act.
McCulloch admitted he was not complying with the
Maryland law. McCulloch lost in the Baltimore County Court
and that courts decision was affirmed by the Maryland
Court of Appeals. The case was then taken by writ of error
to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court).
Issue. Does Congress have the authority to establish a
Bank of the United States under the Constitution?
Held. Yes. Judgment reversed.
Counsel for the state of Maryland claimed that because
the Constitution was enacted by the independent states, it
should be exercised in subordination to the states.
However, the states ratified the Constitution by a twothirds vote of their citizens, not by a decision of the state
legislature. Therefore, although limited in its powers, the
Constitution is supreme over the laws of the states.
There is no enumerated power within the Constitution
allowing for the creation of a bank. But, Congress is
granted the power of making all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers. The Supreme Court determines
through Constitutional construction that necessary is not
a limitation, but rather applies to any means with a
legitimate end within the scope of the Constitution.
Because the Constitution is supreme over state laws, the
states cannot apply taxes, which would in effect destroy
federal legislative law. Therefore, Marylands state tax on
the United States Bank is unconstitutional.

Discussion. This Supreme Court decision establishes the

Constitution as the supreme law of the land, taking
precedent over any state law incongruent with it.
39 Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that
the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and

Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in

Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for
its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the
Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear
as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in
the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of
military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of
consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated
in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public
officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad
and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of
executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the
public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the
executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the
executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do
so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.
40 Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee - A
case digest
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ET. AL. vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE
Facts:
Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of
the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties
of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by
the PCGG. Senator Enrile citing probable violations of
Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Section 5.
The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed
away prior the decision of the court issued this petition for

prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order

and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of
compelling them to appear before them.
Issues:
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case,
petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e.,
it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or
disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely
private transaction" which is beyond the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the
inquiry violates their right to due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme court granted the petition. The committee
investigation wanted by Senator Enrile is not in aid of a
legislation, therefore is violative of the separation of
powers between the Senate or Congress and that Judiciary.
The pending civil case of the petitioners under Civil Case
No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan is where these issues
by the Senate should be discussed.
Saying further that the power of the Senate and Congress
to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is not absolute
or without limitation.
41 Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950
DECISION
(En Banc)
OZAETA, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government

of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and
Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate
sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the
governments payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident
American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his
alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway
long before. The Senate sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at
the expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt
in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses
summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of
the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to
divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the
amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the
Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and
was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-atArms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He
thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with
the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his
detention.
II.

THE ISSUE

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner

for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person
to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?

2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner

for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against
self-incrimination?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by
Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner
for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person
to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power
to make investigations and exact testimony to the end
that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process
to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended
to effect or change; and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to
obtain what is needed.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which
the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is
pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not
and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the
validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner,
requires the Special Committee, among other things, to
determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name
of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000
involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination it
is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The
contention is not that the question is impertinent to the
subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or
materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already
indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to
show that every question propounded to a witness is
material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is
required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under
inquiry.
xxx

xxx

xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is

within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the
proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that
subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the
committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit
petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every
session and not to the end of the last session terminating
the existence of that body. The very reason for the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable

the legislative body to perform its constitutional function

without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions
may be and in practice are performed during recess by
duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to
any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to
defeat the very purpose for which that the power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but
logical to say that the power of self-preservation is
coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was
adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and
which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution
of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the
Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that
power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present
case.
3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right
against self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was
legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latters
verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain
his claim that to reveal the name of that person might
incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the
applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is
for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not
enough for the witness to say that the answer will
incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability.
The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable
and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from
the whole case, as well as from his general conception of
the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus
developed, it is the province of the court to determine
whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or
not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend
to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to
entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the
same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such
violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason
of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an
imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all
the facts and circumstances of the case whether the
witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not
relieved from answering merely on his own declaration
that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for
the trial judge to decide that question.
42 Arnault vs Balagtas GR No 6749 30 July 1955
09
Monday
Mar 2015
Posted by Rachel Chan in Case Digests, Constitutional Law
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Facts: Arnault continuously withheld information. This time
about an affidavit supposedly giving details surrounding
the acquisitions of the estates. To this he gave the name
Jesse Santos as the person he gave the amount to.
Issue: Whether or not Congress has authority to punish
recalcitrant witness?

Decision: Judgment appealed reversed. Provided the

contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power
and is committed in the course of legislative process, the
legislative authority is supreme. Said power must be
considered implied or incidental to the exercise of
legislative power or necessary to effectuate said power.
43 Mora v McNamara
Brief Fact Summary. Three people were drafted into the
United States Army in late 1965. They brought suit to
prevent the Army from requiring them to serve in Vietnam.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United
States will give great deference to Congress and the
President when dealing with war issues.

Facts. The petitioners were drafted into the United States

Army in late 1965 and were to be shipped to Vietnam six
months later. They brought suit to prevent the Army from
carrying out those orders and requested a declaratory
judgment that the present United States military activity in
Vietnam is illegal. The district court dismissed the suit
and the court of appeals affirmed. The write of certiorari to
the Supreme Court was denied.
Issue. Should the writ of certiorari be denied?
Held. Yes.
Dissent. Justice Stewart and Justice Douglas dissenting.

There are several questions, which are large and deeply

troubling. Among them were whether the present United
States military activity in Vietnam was a war within the
meaning of Article I, Section: 8, Clause 11 of the
Constitution and what relevance are treaty obligations of
the United States? These questions and problems will
solve themselves when the Court refuses to hear this case.
The Court should squarely face them by granting certiorari
and setting this case in for oral argument.
The United States Constitution inserted the phrase to
declare war as a check on the Executive when the
President might have to take emergency action to protect
the security of the United States. It should be a decision
that Congress should support. The check was to transfer
the power to declare war from the person who was to
spend to those who were to pay.

Discussion. In the Prize cases, Justice Grier emphasized

the arguments for strong presidential powers in the
majority opinion. Justice Nelson writing for the minority
interpreted the Constitution more strictly, emphasizing
that what is war in actuality may not constitute war in the
constitutional sense. This has been a recurrent theme
throughout history with the Spanish-American War, the
Boxer Rebellion, Two World Wars, Korea and then Vietnam.
Whether or not Vietnam was an unconstitutional war
was never decided. The lower courts generally ruled that
the issue was nonjusticiable.