VILLAVICENCIO v.

LUKBAN
39 PHIL 778
FACTS:
Justo Lukban, mayor of Manila, ordered the district of illrepute women closed. One hundred and seventy women
were deported to Davao without their knowledge and
consent. The women were received as laborers in a
banana plantation. Some of the women were able to
escape and return to Manila. The attorney for the relatives
and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application for heabes corpus to the
Supreme Court
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport
the women to Davao; and
2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of habeas corpus to Davao
HELD:
The respondents had no authority to deport the women.
No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The
courts are the forum which function to safeguard liberty
and to punish official transgressors. The essential object
and purpose of writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. If the mayor and the
chief of police could deport the women, they must have
the means to return them from Davao to Manila. The
respondents may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. The great
writ of liberty may not be easily evaded. No one of the
defense offered constituted a legitimate bar to the
granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14639

for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed.

Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women
were kept confined to their houses in the district by the
police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities
quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor
for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers;
with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary
for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of
October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the
chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city
of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses,
hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed
them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The
women were given no opportunity to collect their
belongings, and apparently were under the impression
that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were
destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if
they wished to depart from that region and had neither
directly nor indirectly given their consent to the
deportation. The involuntary guests were received on
board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of
Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two
steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao
during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October
29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers
by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by
Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the
hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the case, had
no previous notification that the women were prostitutes
who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further
happenings to these women and the serious charges
growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest,
but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice
it to say, generally, that some of the women married,
others assumed more or less clandestine relations with
men, others went to work in different capacities, others
assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly
portion found means to return to Manila.

March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as
remarkable as the one which this application for habeas
corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected
to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant
democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great
difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the
basic principles of popular government, and if we give
expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts,
as an independent power of such a government, were
constituted. The primary question is Shall the judiciary
permit a government of the men instead of a government
of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these
proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for
other departments of the government, the facts are these:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best
of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated
district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the

Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the
attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable
number of the deportees presented an application for
habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the
parties, was made to include all of the women who were
sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same
questions concerned them all, the application will be
considered as including them. The application set forth the
salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that
the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief
of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown
parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court.
The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and
Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration
and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be
granted because the petitioners were not proper parties,
because the action should have been begun in the Court
of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and
Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the
women under their custody or control, and because their
jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the
city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the
answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be
laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yigo and
Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in
answer to question of a member of the court, that these

women had been sent out of Manila without their consent.

The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4,
that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and
Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before
the court the persons therein named, alleged to be
deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had
returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of
counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before
the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners.
On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918,
none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued
were produced in court by the respondents. It has been
shown that three of those who had been able to come
back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by
the police and the secret service to appear before the
court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more
comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when
pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from
the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor
of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had
passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for
that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits
showing that the women were contained with their life in
Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila.
Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not
possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because
the women had never been under his control, because
they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because
they had married or signed contracts as laborers.
Respondent Yigo answered alleging that he did not have
any of the women under his control and that therefore it
was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court,
after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918,
promulgated a second order, which related that the
respondents had not complied with the original order to
the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to
do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not
in Manila be brought before the court by respondents
Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yigo on January 13, 1919,
unless the women should, in written statements
voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of
Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or
unless the respondents should demonstrate some other
legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was
further stated that the question of whether the
respondents were in contempt of court would later be
decided and the reasons for the order announced in the
final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that
of a number of the women, of certain detectives and
policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was
taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as
commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance
of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13,
1919, the respondents technically presented before the
Court the women who had returned to the city through
their own efforts and eight others who had been brought
to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the
respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the
facts and further endeavored to account for all of the
persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it
was stated that the respondents, through their
representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing
from Davao with their consent eight women; that eightyone women were found in Davao who, on notice that if
they desired they could return to Manila, transportation
fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that

fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means,

and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could
not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city
fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first
formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city
of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members
of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo, an
hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the
Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of
Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that
the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to
respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be
struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the
reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final
decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one
hundred and seventy women were isolated from society,
and then at night, without their consent and without any
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their
rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble
attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and
gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere
fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary
was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law
chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and
stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute
and practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve
the question By authority of what law did the Mayor and
the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress
these persons from Manila to another distant locality
within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and
we find
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine
Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The
Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable
aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the
Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised
Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction
and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is
a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of
any citizen of the United States, who may have been
convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and
other States have statutes providing for the commitment
to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being
common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health
authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine,
or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is
done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in
vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at
the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of
police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands
and these women despite their being in a sense lepers
of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties
as are other citizens to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine
penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not
being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels
any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of
domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American
constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so

deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so

elementary in nature as not even to require a
constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States,
who has often been said to exercise more power than any
king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either
inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the
executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of
delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police
could, at their mere behest or even for the most
praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen
so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one
thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the
same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves
such power, then any other official can do the same. And if
any official can exercise the power, then all persons would
have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could
be sent against her wishes and under no law from one
locality to another within the country, then officialdom can
hold the same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed
that "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or
be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor
will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell
to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either
justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap.
29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how
high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which
functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish
official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller,
delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States, "is the only supreme power in our system of
government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly
bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the
authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S.,
196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the
same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the
mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356,
370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of
habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very
beginning that the primary question was whether the
courts should permit a government of men or a
government of laws to be established in the Philippine
Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official
oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil
action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which
the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may
still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an
action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly
to meet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code
in force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by
regulations of a general character in force in the
Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more
than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile,
except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be

punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and

twenty-five and not more than three thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by
law or by regulation of a general character in force in the
Philippines who shall compel any person to change his
domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro
and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and
not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
(Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation,
the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer
has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will
institute and press a criminal prosecution just as
vigorously as they have defended the same official in this
action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that
the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no
bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge
Cooley in a case which will later be referred to "It would
be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by
one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it
could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a
crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until
the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the
slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of
Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as
the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by
decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the
individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy,
respondents have raised three specific objections to its
issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that
there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the
Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3)
that the person in question are not restrained of their
liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the
jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city
of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce
they could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by
counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the
deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the
city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a
petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for
the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal
liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant
a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the
court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or
restrained of his liberty, though no application be made
therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners
had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been
asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should
have been made returnable before that court. It is a
general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary
expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus
should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of
first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ
of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or
any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine
Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made

returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior

court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is
dependent on the particular circumstances. In this
instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance
of Davao was in session, or that the women had any
means by which to advance their plea before that court.
On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with
their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their
attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case
involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it
was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ
was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken
cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate
court. The failure of the superior court to consider the
application and then to grant the writ would have
amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more
difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says
counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were
under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in
Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of
police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush,
this is a tenable position. On closer examination,
acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the
first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these
women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed
them over to other parties, who deposited them in a
distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or
personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising
the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The
restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until
the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and
released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a
defense would mean. The chief executive of any
municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally
take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called
upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his
hands and claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other
municipality. We believe the true principle should be that,
if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and
has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus
to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is
addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person
before the application for the writ is no reason why the
writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police,
acting under no authority of law, could deport these
women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials
must necessarily have the same means to return them
from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach
of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the
person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no
effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus
be easily evaded.

It must be that some such question has heretofore been

presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange
as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails
to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of
respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of
Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of
habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a
person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the
State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who
has been and continues to be detained in another State.
The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this
time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice,
and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the
question presented the court was equally divided.
Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that
the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most
distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom
concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue.
Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a
large extent on his conception of the English decisions,
and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts
have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent
passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of
this court to issue the present writ on the petition which
was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the
eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended
upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its
establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke
could declare in his speech on the petition of right that
"Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no
sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and
securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas
corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of
that great clause for the protection of personal liberty,
which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so
easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be
determined without delay, that the legislature may apply
the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the
subject being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition that the statutory provisions are
confined to the case of imprisonment within the state
seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the
source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England
that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to
issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were
not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance
of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode
of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and
served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does
not reach the former except through the latter. The officer
or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors,
and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by
compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The
whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and
if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the
purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is
the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other
means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those
which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore,
not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within
reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can
be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of

affording redress is not increased by the confinement

being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater
distance may affect it. The important question is, where
the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other
remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)

been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two

negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs.
Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See
also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on
Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as

authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881],
57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac.
Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no

one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted
a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas
corpus.

The English courts have given careful consideration to the

subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the
respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the
Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother
and her husband directing the defendant to produce the
child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a
certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His
return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ
had been handed over by him to another; that it was no
longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible
for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of
court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R.,
said:

There remains to be considered whether the respondent

complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court
awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that
they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or
be taken as purged.

A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was

issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant
to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers
at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt
of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and
detained. That is a command to bring the child before the
judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can
be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it
could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully
parted with the possession of the child before the issuing
of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce
the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of
any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if
he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying
the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been
made in argument to shift the question of contempt to
some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what
was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a
contempt. But the question is not as to what was done
before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there
has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued
by not producing the child in obedience to its commands.
(The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also
to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir.
Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo,
Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of
interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to
have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia
three colored persons, with the cause of their detention.
Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had
purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington;
that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the
District of Columbia before the service of the writ of
habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control
and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that
Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected
they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court
held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that
Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being
present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered
that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until
he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise
discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards
ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two
of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban,

Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to
present the persons named in the writ before the court on
December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4,
1918. The respondents were thus given ample time,
practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as
the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited
until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to
the provincial governor of Davao. According to the
response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the
telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women
who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be
permitted to do so because of having contracted debts.
The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the
parties in question being brought before the court on the
day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order,
three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by
affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those
persons could not safely be brought before the court; or
(3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be
present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did
not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the
writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of
performance; and they did not present writings that
waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead
a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the
women were contended with their life in Davao, some of
which have since been repudiated by the signers, were
appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a
considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could
have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be
found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this
number either returned at their own expense or were
produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was
made, would have been warranted summarily in finding
the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in
sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their
excuses for the non-production of the persons were far
from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to
somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what
exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For
example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in
referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We
thought that, having brought about that state of things by
his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and
we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the
child back; that he must do much more than write letters
for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and

even if necessary himself go after the child, and do

everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and
that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute
impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return
did not show that every possible effort to produce the
women was made by the respondents. That the court
forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it
did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the
spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the
judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents
another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to
mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the
respondents appear to have become more zealous and to
have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to
Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the
municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided.
While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly
contested case are to be expected, and while a critical
reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal
fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that
there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this
effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire
to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is
now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an
executive investigation. If any particular individual is still
restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of
separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find
a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this
connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in
contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of
the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, an
hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city
of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without
which the administration of justice must falter or fail.
Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a
certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a
valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority,
adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and
must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's
failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a
writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a
contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte
Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N.
C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with
judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say
that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of
the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in
opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of
their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this
does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a
powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yigo
appears to have been drawn into the case through a
misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic
communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would

seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the

legal representative of the city government. Finding him
innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion
to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for
the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable
position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as
far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily
responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the
police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements
for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the
negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as
the head of the city government, had it within his power to
facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila,
was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His
intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His
methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas
corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly
acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section
546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the
penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof
to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties
aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to
many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him
as for a contempt. Some members of the court are
inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find
that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially
with the second order of the court, he has purged his
contempt of the first order. Some members of the court
are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two
extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of
respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court
tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of
justice to such an extent that his later activity may be
considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine
will at once command such respect without being unduly
oppressive such an amount is P100.
In resume as before stated, no further action on the writ
of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not
to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in
contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk
of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one
hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city
of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al
Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is
granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So
ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we
not be permitted to express the hope that this decision
may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly
government of laws and to protect individual liberty from
illegal encroachment.
Arellano, C.J., Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of
the majority in the decision of the habeas corpus
proceeding against Justo Lukban, the mayor of this city.
There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which
impelled Mayor Lukban to oblige a great number of
women of various ages, inmates of the houses of

prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, district of

Sampaloc, to change their residence.
We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which
clearly prohibits the opening of public houses of
prostitution, as those in the said Gardenia Street,
Sampaloc. For this reason, when more than one hundred
and fifty women were assembled and placed aboard a
steamer and transported to Davao, considering that the
existence of the said houses of prostitution has been
tolerated for so long a time, it is undeniable that the
mayor of the city, in proceeding in the manner shown,
acted without authority of any legal provision which
constitutes an exception to the laws guaranteeing the
liberty and the individual rights of the residents of the city
of Manila.
We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force
displayed by the police in complying with the order of the
mayor of the city; neither do we believe in the necessity of
taking them to the distant district of Davao. The said
governmental authority, in carrying out his intention to
suppress the segregated district or the community formed
by those women in Gardenia Street, could have obliged
the said women to return to their former residences in this
city or in the provinces, without the necessity of
transporting them to Mindanao; hence the said official is
obliged to bring back the women who are still in Davao so
that they may return to the places in which they lived prior
to their becoming inmates of certain houses in Gardenia
Street.
As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with
the orders of this court, we do not find any apparent
disobedience and marked absence of respect in the steps
taken by the mayor of the city and his subordinates, if we
take into account the difficulties encountered in bringing
the said women who were free at Davao and presenting
them before this court within the time fixed, inasmuch as
it does not appear that the said women were living
together in a given place. It was not because they were
really detained, but because on the first days there were
no houses in which they could live with a relative
independent from one another, and as a proof that they
were free a number of them returned to Manila and the
others succeeded in living separate from their companions
who continued living together.
To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good
purpose and legal object and whether he has acted in
good or bad faith in proceeding to dissolve the said
community of prostitutes and to oblige them to change
their domicile, it is necessary to consider not only the
rights and interests of the said women and especially of
the patrons who have been directing and conducting such
a reproachable enterprise and shameful business in one of
the suburbs of this city, but also the rights and interests of
the very numerous people of Manila where relatively a few
transients accidentally and for some days reside, the
inhabitants thereof being more than three hundred
thousand (300,000) who can not, with indifference and
without repugnance, live in the same place with so many
unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution.
If the material and moral interests of the community as
well as the demands of social morality are to be taken into
account, it is not possible to sustain that it is legal and
permissible to establish a house of pandering or
prostitution in the midst of an enlightened population, for,
although there were no positive laws prohibiting the
existence of such houses within a district of Manila, the
dictates of common sense and dictates of conscience of its

inhabitants are sufficient to warrant the public

administration, acting correctly, in exercising the
inevitable duty of ordering the closing and abandonment
of a house of prostitution ostensibly open to the public,
and of obliging the inmates thereof to leave it, although
such a house is inhabited by its true owner who invokes in
his behalf the protection of the constitutional law
guaranteeing his liberty, his individual rights, and his right
to property.
A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by
a known contagious disease cannot invoke in his favor the
constitutional law which guarantees his liberty and
individual rights, should the administrative authority order
his hospitalization, reclusion, or concentration in a certain
island or distant point in order to free from contagious the
great majority of the inhabitants of the country who
fortunately do not have such diseases. The same reasons
exist or stand good with respect to the unfortunate women
dedicated to prostitution, and such reasons become
stronger because the first persons named have contracted
their diseases without their knowledge and even against
their will, whereas the unfortunate prostitutes voluntarily
adopted such manner of living and spontaneously
accepted all its consequences, knowing positively that
their constant intercourse with men of all classes,
notwithstanding the cleanliness and precaution which they
are wont to adopt, gives way to the spread or
multiplication of the disease known as syphilis, a venereal
disease, which, although it constitutes a secret disease
among men and women, is still prejudicial to the human
species in the same degree, scope, and seriousness as
cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, pest, typhoid, and other
contagious diseases which produce great mortality and
very serious prejudice to poor humanity.
If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or
works suitable to her sex, which can give her sufficient
remuneration for her subsistence, prefers to put herself
under the will of another woman who is usually older than
she is and who is the manager or owner of a house of
prostitution, or spontaneously dedicates herself to this
shameful profession, it is undeniable that she voluntarily
and with her own knowledge renounces her liberty and
individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, because
it is evident that she can not join the society of decent
women nor can she expect to get the same respect that is
due to the latter, nor is it possible for her to live within the
community or society with the same liberty and rights
enjoyed by every citizen. Considering her dishonorable
conduct and life, she should therefore be comprised within
that class which is always subject to the police and
sanitary regulations conducive to the maintenance of
public decency and morality and to the conservation of
public health, and for this reason it should not permitted
that the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution
evade the just orders and resolutions adopted by the
administrative authorities.
It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed
against the said poor women, but those who have been
worrying so much about the prejudice resulting from a
governmental measure, which being a very drastic remedy
may be considered arbitrary, have failed to consider with
due reflection the interests of the inhabitants of this city in
general and particularly the duties and responsibilities
weighing upon the authorities which administer and
govern it; they have forgotten that many of those who
criticize and censure the mayor are fathers of families and
are in duty bound to take care of their children.

For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that

when the petitioners, because of the abnormal life they
assumed, were obliged to change their residence not by a
private citizen but by the mayor of the city who is directly
responsible for the conservation of public health and social
morality, the latter could take the step he had taken,
availing himself of the services of the police in good faith
and only with the purpose of protecting the immense
majority of the population from the social evils and
diseases which the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street have been producing, which houses have
been constituting for years a true center for the
propagation of general diseases and other evils derived
therefrom. Hence, in ordering the dissolution and
abandonment of the said houses of prostitution and the
change of the domicile of the inmates thereof, the mayor
did not in bad faith violate the constitutional laws which
guarantees the liberty and the individual rights of every
Filipino, inasmuch as the women petitioners do not
absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the exercise of
which they have voluntarily renounced in exchange for the
free practice of their shameful profession.
In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have
been adopted by the administrative authorities similar
measures, more or less rigorous, respecting prostitutes,
considering them prejudicial to the people, although it is
true that in the execution of such measures more humane
and less drastic procedures, fortiter in re et suaviter in
forma, have been adopted, but such procedures have
always had in view the ultimate object of the Government
for the sake of the community, that is, putting an end to
the living together in a certain place of women dedicated
to prostitution and changing their domicile, with the
problematical hope that they adopt another manner of
living which is better and more useful to themselves and
to society.
In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we
hereby hold, that Mayor Justo Lukban is obliged to take
back and restore the said women who are at present found
in Davao, and who desire to return to their former
respective residences, not in Gardenia Street, Sampaloc
District, with the exception of the prostitutes who should
expressly make known to the clerk of court their
preference to reside in Davao, which manifestation must
be made under oath. This resolution must be transmitted
to the mayor within the shortest time possible for its due
compliance. The costs shall be charged de officio.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:
I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the
majority in the decision rendered in these proceedings,
with respect to the finding as to the importance of the
contempt committed, according to the same decision, by
Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, and the
consequent imposition upon him of a nominal fine of P100.
In the said decision, it is said:
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban,
Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to
present the persons named in the writ before the court on
December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4,
1918. The respondents were thus given ample time,
practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as
the record disclosed, the mayor of the city of Manila
waited until the 21st of November before sending a
telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to
the response of the Attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the
telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women

who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be

permitted to do so because of having contracted debts.
The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the
parties in question being brought before the court on the
day named.
In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as
said in the same decision, the respondents, for the
purpose of complying with the order of the court, could
have, (1) produced the bodies of the persons according to
the command of the writ; (2) shown by affidavits that on
account of sickness or infirmity the said women could not
safely be brought before this court; and (3) presented
affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
lawyers waived their right to be present. According to the
same decision, the said respondents ". . . did not produce
the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was
granted; did not show impossibility of performance; and
did not present writings, that waived the right to be
present by those interested. Instead, a few stereotyped
affidavits purporting to show that the women were
contented with their life in Davao, some of which have
since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to
the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable
number of the women, at least sixty, could have been
brought back to Manila is demonstrated by the fact that
during this time they were easily to be found in the
municipality of Davao, and that about this number either
returned at their own expense or were produced at the
second hearing by the respondents."
The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at
the time the return to its first order was made, would have
been warranted summarily in finding the respondent guilty
of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they
obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non production of
the persons were far from sufficient." To corroborate this,
the majority decision cites the case of the Queen vs.
Barnardo, Gossage's Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and
added "that the return did not show that every possible
effort to produce the women was made by the
respondents."
When the said return by the respondents was made to this
court in banc and the case discussed, my opinion was that
Mayor Lukban should have been immediately punished for
contempt. Nevertheless, a second order referred to in the
decision was issued on December 10, 1918, requiring the
respondents to produce before the court, on January 13,
1919, the women who were not in Manila, unless they
could show that it was impossible to comply with the said
order on the two grounds previously mentioned. With
respect to this second order, the same decision has the
following to say:
In response to the second order of the court, the
respondents appear to have become more zealous and to
have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to
Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the
municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided.
While charges and countercharges in such a bitterly
contested case are to be expected, and while a critical
reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal
fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that
there is a substantial compliance with it.
I do not agree to this conclusion.
The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
let 17 days elapse from the date of the issuance of the
first order on November 4th till the 21st of the same

month before taking the first step for compliance with the
mandate of the said order; he waited till the 21st of
November, as the decision says, before he sent a telegram
to the provincial governor o f Davao and naturally this halfhearted effort, as is so qualified in the decision, resulted in
that none of the women appeared before this court on
December 2nd. Thus, the said order was not complied
with, and in addition to this noncompliance there was the
circumstances that seven of the said women having
returned to Manila at their own expense before the said
second day of December and being in the antechamber of
the court room, which fact was known to Chief of Police
Hohmann, who was then present at the trial and to the
attorney for the respondents, were not produced before
the court by the respondents nor did the latter show any
effort to present them, in spite of the fact that their
attention was called to this particular by the undersigned.
The result of the said second order was, as is said in the
same decision, that the respondents, on January 13th, the
day fixed for the protection of the women before this
court, presented technically the seven (7) women abovementioned who had returned to the city at their own
expense and the other eight (8) women whom the
respondents themselves brought to Manila, alleging
moreover that their agents and subordinates succeeded in
bringing them from Davao with their consent; that in
Davao they found eighty-one (81) women who, when
asked if they desired to return to Manila with free
transportation, renounced such a right, as is shown in the
affidavits presented by the respondents to this effect; that,
through other means, fifty-nine (59) women have already
returned to Manila, but notwithstanding the efforts made
to find them it was not possible to locate the whereabouts
of twenty-six (26) of them. Thus, in short, out of the one
hundred and eighty-one (181) women who, as has been
previously said, have been illegally detained by Mayor
Lukban and Chief of Police Hohmann and transported to
Davao against their will, only eight (8) have been brought
to Manila and presented before this court by the
respondents in compliance with the said two orders. Fiftynine (59) of them have returned to Manila through other
means not furnished by the respondents, twenty-six of
whom were brought by the attorney for the petitioners,
Mendoza, on his return from Davao. The said attorney paid
out of his own pocket the transportation of the said
twenty-six women. Adding to these numbers the other
seven (7) women who returned to this city at their own
expense before January 13 we have a total of sixty-six
(66), which evidently proves, on the one hand, the falsity
of the allegation by the respondents in their first answer at
the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one of the reasons
for their inability to present any of the said women that
the latter were content with their life in Mindanao and did
not desire to return to Manila; and, on the other hand, that
the respondents, especially the first named, that is Mayor
Justo Lukban, who acted as chief and principal in all that
refers to the compliance with the orders issued by this
court, could bring before December 2nd, the date of the
first hearing of the case, as well as before January 13th,
the date fixed for the compliance with the second order, if
not the seventy-four (74) women already indicated, at
least a great number of them, or at least sixty (60) of
them, as is said in the majority decision, inasmuch as the
said respondent could count upon the aid of the
Constabulary forces and the municipal police, and had
transportation facilities for the purpose. But the said
respondent mayor brought only eight (8) of the women
before this court on January 13th. This fact can not, in my
judgment, with due respect to the majority opinion, justify
the conclusion that the said respondent has substantially
complied with the second order of this court, but on the

other hand demonstrates that he had not complied with

the mandate of this court in its first and second orders;
that neither of the said orders has been complied with by
the respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
who is, according to the majority decision, principally
responsible for the contempt, to which conclusion I agree.
The conduct of the said respondent with respect to the
second order confirms the contempt committed by noncompliance with the first order and constitutes a new
contempt because of non-compliance with the second,
because of the production of only eight (8) of the one
hundred and eighty-one (181) women who have been
illegally detained by virtue of his order and transported to
Davao against their will, committing the twenty-six (26)
women who could not be found in Davao, demonstrates in
my opinion that, notwithstanding the nature of the case
which deals with the remedy of habeas corpus, presented
by the petitioners and involving the question whether they
should or not be granted their liberty, the respondent has
not given due attention to the same nor has he made any
effort to comply with the second order. In other words, he
has disobeyed the said two orders; has despised the
authority of this court; has failed to give the respect due to
justice; and lastly, he has created and placed obstacles to
the administration of justice in the said habeas corpus
proceeding, thus preventing, because of his notorious
disobedience, the resolution of the said proceeding with
the promptness which the nature of the same required.
Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the
authority, justice, or dignity of the court; and he is guilty of
contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or
disregard. . . ." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)
It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid
order of the court constitutes contempt, unless the
defendant is unable to comply therewith. (Ruling Case
Law, vol. 6, p. 502.)
It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the
judgment of the court, or to obstruct or attempt to
obstruct the service of legal process. If a person hinders or
prevents the service of process by deceiving the officer or
circumventing him by any means, the result is the same
as though he had obstructed by some direct means.
(Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 503.)
While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the
courts often do, of enforcing respect for the law and for
the means it has provided in civilized communities for
establishing justice, since true respect never comes in that
way, it is apparent nevertheless that the power to enforce
decorum in the courts and obedience to their orders and
just measures is so essentially a part of the life of the
courts that it would be difficult to conceive of their
usefulness or efficiency as existing without it. Therefore it
may be said generally that where due respect for the
courts as ministers of the law is wanting, a necessity
arises for the use of compulsion, not, however, so much to
excite individual respect as to compel obedience or to
remove an unlawful or unwarranted interference with the
administration of justice. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 487.)
The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law
itself, and has been exercised from the earliest times. In
England it has been exerted when the contempt consisted
of scandalizing the sovereign or his ministers, the lawmaking power, or the courts. In the American states the
power to punish for contempt, so far as the executive
department and the ministers of state are concerned, and
in some degree so far as the legislative department is

concerned, is obsolete, but it has been almost universally

preserved so far as regards the judicial department. The
power which the courts have of vindicating their own
authority is a necessary incident to every court of justice,
whether of record or not; and the authority for issuing
attachments in a proper case for contempts out of court, it
has been declared, stands upon the same immemorial
usage as supports the whole fabric of the common law. . . .
(Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 489.)
The undisputed importance of the orders of this court
which have been disobeyed; the loss of the prestige of the
authority of the court which issued the said orders, which
loss might have been caused by noncompliance with the
same orders on the part of the respondent Justo Lukban;
the damages which might have been suffered by some of
the women illegally detained, in view of the fact that they
were not brought to Manila by the respondents to be
presented before the court and of the further fact that
some of them were obliged to come to this city at their
own expense while still others were brought to Manila by
the attorney for the petitioners, who paid out of his own
pocket the transportation of the said women; and the
delay which was necessarily incurred in the resolution of
the petition interposed by the said petitioners and which
was due to the fact that the said orders were not
opportunately and duly obeyed and complied with, are
circumstances which should be taken into account in
imposing upon the respondent Justo Lukban the penalty
corresponding to the contempt committed by him, a
penalty which, according to section 236 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, should consist of a fine not exceeding
P1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding months, or both
such fine and imprisonment. In the imposition of the
penalty, there should also be taken into consideration the
special circumstance that the contempt was committed by
a public authority, the mayor of the city of Manila, the first
executive authority of the city, and consequently, the
person obliged to be the first in giving an example of
obedience and respect for the laws and the valid and just
orders of the duly constituted authorities as well as for the
orders emanating from the courts of justice, and in giving
help and aid to the said courts in order that justice may be
administered with promptness and rectitude.
I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred
pesos (P100), there should be imposed upon the
respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos
(P500), and all the costs should be charged against him.
Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to state here that the
records of this proceeding should be transmitted to the
Attorney-General in order that, after a study of the same
and deduction from the testimony which he may deem
necessary, and the proper transmittal of the same to the
fiscal of the city of Manila and to the provincial fiscal of
Davao, both the latter shall present the corresponding
informations for the prosecution and punishment of the
crimes which have been committed on the occasion when
the illegal detention of the women was carried into effect
by Mayor Justo Lukban of the city of Manila and Chief of
Police Anton Hohmann, and also of those crimes
committed by reason of the same detention and while the
women were in Davao. This will be one of the means
whereby the just hope expressed in the majority decision
will be realized, that is, that in the Philippine Islands there
should exist a government of laws and not a government
of men and that this decision may serve to bulwark the
fortifications of an orderly Government of laws and to
protect individual liberty from illegal encroachments.
Summary of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952).

The Steel Seizure Case

Facts
The Korean war effort increased the demand for steel.
Disputes arose between steel industry management and
labor that culminated in an announcement of a strike by
the union. President Truman authorized Secretary of
Commerce Sawyer to take possession of the steel industry
and keep the mills operating.
Issue
Does the President of the United States have executive
power under the war powers clause of the U.S.
Constitution, or any implied powers gleaned therefrom, to
authorize the Secretary of Commerce to seize the nations
steel mills?
Holding and Rule (Black)
No. The President does not have implicit or explicit
executive power under the war powers clause of the U.S.
Constitution, or any implied powers gleaned therefrom, to
authorize the Secretary of Commerce to seize the nations
steel mills.
The court held that there was no explicit statute or act of
Congress which authorized the President to act in such a
manner. The only two statutes which authorized the
acquisition of personal and real property were not met
here. Not only were such acts unauthorized, Congress
specifically refused to grant such authorization. The court
held that in order for the President to have this authority,
it must be found somewhere explicitly in the Constitution,
or implicitly in some historical context or foundation.
The President cannot order policy; he can only suggest it.
Congress can approve any proposal for regulation, policy,
settlement of disputes, wages, and working conditions.
None of this is delegated to the President. Under a textual
approach to interpreting the Constitution the Presidents
powers are curbed in this extension.
Dissent (Vinson, Reed, and Minton)
Many presidents have taken such action before, most
notably Lincoln (Civil War, naval blockade, Emancipation
Proclamation), Hayes and Cleveland (authorization of the
use of the military to settle strikes) without state or
legislative authority.
Concurrence (Frankfurter)
FDRs actions during the Great Depression resulted in
extensions of executive authority, but his authority was
not violative of the Constitution. Three laws had already
been enacted by Congress when FDR enacted his policy,
and six others were only enacted after Congress declared
war, thereby falling under the war powers.
Concurrence (Jackson)
In determining whether the executive has authority, there
are three general circumstances:
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, the Presidents authority is at
its greatest.
When the President acts in the absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely
upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority.
When this is the case, the test depends on the imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.
When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, the authority of the
President is at its lowest.

Justice Jackson stated that this case falls into category

three. If the Presidents argument were accepted the
executive branch could exert its authority over any
business or industry.

joint resolution or by impeachment, and Congress may not

retain the power of removal over an officer performing
executive powers.
Held:

Notes
The most important part of this case is the three part test
set forth in Justice Jacksons concurrence. This case is also
cited as Youngstown v. Sawyer and as Youngstown Sheet
Tube v. Sawyer.
See Missouri v. Holland for a case brief of a constitutional
law opinion in which the Supreme Court held that
Congress has the power under Article II to give effect to a
treaty authorized by the President pursuant to the
Executives treaty power, even if such legislation would
otherwise be an unconstitutional interference with states
rights.

1. The fact that members of the Union, one of whom is an

appellee here, will sustain injury because the Act suspends
certain scheduled cost-of-living benefit increases to the
members, is sufficient to create standing under a provision
of the Act and Article III to challenge the Act's
constitutionality. Therefore, the standing issue as to the
Union itself or Members of Congress need not be
considered. P. 478 U. S. 721.
2. The powers vested in the Comptroller General under
251 violate the Constitution's command that Congress
play no direct role in the execution of the laws. Pp. 478 U.
S. 721-734.

Bowsher v. Synar
No. 85-1377
Argued April 23, 1986
Decided July 7, 1986*
478 U.S. 714
Syllabus
In order to eliminate the federal budget deficit, Congress
enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985 (Act), popularly known as the "GrammRudman-Hollings Act," which sets a maximum deficit
amount for federal spending for each of the fiscal years
1986 through 1991 (progressively reducing the deficit
amount to zero in 1991). If in any fiscal year the budget
deficit exceeds the prescribed maximum by more than a
specified sum, the Act requires basically across-the-board
cuts in federal spending to reach the targeted deficit level.
These reductions are accomplished under the "reporting
provisions" spelled out in 251 of the Act, which requires
the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to
submit their deficit estimates and program-by-program
budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General,
who, after reviewing the Directors' joint report, then
reports his conclusions to the President. The President in
turn must issue a "sequestration" order mandating the
spending reductions specified by the Comptroller General,
and the sequestration order becomes effective unless,
within a specified time, Congress legislates reductions to
obviate the need for the sequestration order. The Act also
contains in 274(f) a "fallback" deficit reduction process
(eliminating the Comptroller General's participation) to
take effect if 251's reporting provisions are invalidated.
In consolidated actions in the Federal District Court,
individual Congressmen and the National Treasury
Employees Union (Union) (who, along with one of the
Union's members, are appellees here) challenged the Act's
constitutionality. The court held, inter alia, that the
Comptroller General's role in exercising executive
functions under the Act's deficit reduction process violated
the constitutionally imposed doctrine of separation of
powers because the Comptroller General is removable
only by a congressional
Page 478 U. S. 715

(a) Under the constitutional principle of separation of

powers, Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of
removal of an officer charged with the execution of the
laws except by impeachment. To permit the execution of
the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to
Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress
control of the execution of the laws. The structure of the
Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the
laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer
under its control what it does not possess. Cf. INS v
Chadha, 462 U. S. 919. Pp. 478 U. S. 721-727.
(b) There is no merit to the contention that the
Comptroller General performs his duties independently
and is not subservient to Congress. Although nominated
by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the
Comptroller General is removable only at the initiative of
Congress. Under controlling statutes, he may be removed
not only by impeachment but also by joint resolution of
Congress "at any time" for specified causes, including
"inefficiency," "neglect of duty," and "malfeasance." The
quoted terms, as interpreted by Congress, could sustain
removal of a Comptroller General for any number of actual
or perceived transgressions of the legislative will.
Moreover, the political realities do not reveal that the
Comptroller General is free from Congress' influence. He
heads the General Accounting Office, which, under
pertinent statutes, is "an instrumentality of the United
States Government independent of the executive
departments," and Congress has consistently viewed the
Comptroller General as an officer of the Legislative Branch.
Over the years, the Comptrollers General have also viewed
themselves as part of the Legislative Branch. Thus,
because Congress has retained removal authority over the
Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted with
executive powers. Pp. 478 U. S. 727-732.
(c) Under 251 of the Act, the Comptroller General has
been improperly assigned executive powers. Although he
is to have "due regard" for the estimates and reductions
contained in the joint report of
Page 478 U. S. 716
the Directors of the CBO and the OMB, the Act clearly
contemplates that, in preparing his report, the Comptroller
General will exercise his independent judgment and
evaluation with respect to those estimates, and will make
decisions of the kind that are made by officers charged
with executing a statute. The Act's provisions give him, not
the President, the ultimate authority in determining what
budget cuts are to be made. By placing the responsibility

for execution of the Act in the hands of an officer who is

subject to removal only by itself, Congress, in effect, has
retained control over the Act's execution, and has
unconstitutionally intruded into the executive function. Pp.
478 U. S. 732-734.
3. It is not necessary to consider whether the appropriate
remedy is to nullify the 1921 statutory provisions that
authorize Congress to remove the Comptroller General,
rather than to invalidate 251 of the Act. In 274(f),
Congress has explicitly provided "fallback" provisions that
take effect if any of the reporting procedures described in
251 are invalidated. Assuming that the question of the
appropriate remedy must be resolved on the basis of
congressional intent, the intent appears to have been for
274(f) to be given effect as written. Pp. 478 U. S. 734-736.
626 F.Supp. 1374, affirmed.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court. in which
BRENNAN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 478 U. S.
736. WHITE, J., post, p. 478 U. S. 759, and BLACKMUN, J.,
post, p. 478 U. S. 776, filed dissenting opinions.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that
the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for
its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the
Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear
as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in
the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of
military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of
consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated
in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public
officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad
and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of
executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the

necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the

public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the
executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the
executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do
so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.
Philippine Interisland Association of the Philippines, et al.
vs. CA, et al
G.R no. 100481
FACTS: Private respondent United Harbor Pilots
Association of the Philippines is the umbrella organization
of groups rendering pilotage services in different ports of
the country. The Philippine Ports Authority is a government
agency created pursuant to P.D 857, vested with the
power to control, supervise pilotage and the conduct of
pilots in any port district. It has also the power to impose,
fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates charges or
fees, for the services rendered by the authority or by any
private organization within the port. These consolidated
petitions of harbor pilots to secure enforcement of E.O
1088, which fixes the rates of pilotage services and the
efforts of the PPA and its officials, petitioners herein, to
block enforcement of the said E.O
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O 1088 issued by Pres. Marcos
(for purpose of increasing existing pilotage fees) is a valid
statute and could not be revoked by the PPA, who has the
power to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such
rates, charges or fees.
HELD: YES, rate fixing orders previously issued by the PPA
were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated
by it is the exercise of delegated power. Hence, could be
amended or revised by law. President Marcos in the
exercise of legislative powers could delegate the
ratemaking power to the PPA, so he can exercise it in
specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power
vested by PD 857.
Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368
The period contemplated for the exercise of presidential
emergency powers is limited and restrictive in nature,
coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a
period ending with the convening of that body
Art. VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by
virtue thereof should be for a limited period. Limited
period as used in the Constitution means restrictive in
duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of
emergency powers, must be temporary or it can not be
said to be an emergency.In case this were the contrary,
there would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules
and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself
was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President
could not only make new rules and regulations but he
could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature.
84 Phil. 368 Political Law First Emergency Powers Cases
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of
Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for houses and
lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was
the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to

prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the

case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased
to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055
which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter,
against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines;
he is seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the
treasury from disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to
EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which
was appropriating funds to hold the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT
DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT
OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING
THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the
Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative and that all
EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to
the president, became inoperative ex proprio vigore when
Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued
without authority of law. In setting the first regular session
of Congress instead of the first special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is
giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National
Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may
consider general legislation or only such subjects as he
(President) may designate. Such acts were to be good
only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the
following sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner
amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Even if
war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made
and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is
lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
ARTICLE VII DELEGATION OF POWERSEulogio
Rodriguez
, SR., ETC., ET AL., petitionersv. Vicente
Gella
, ETC., ET AL., respondents(92 PHIL. 603 [Feb. 2,
1953])Ponente: Paras, C.J.:Facts:Petitioners herein seek to
invalidate E.O. Nos. 545 and 546issued on November 10,
1952, the first appropriating the sumof P37,850,500 for
urgent and essential public works, and thesecond setting
aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces
and cities visited by typhoons, floods, drought,earthquakes
and other calamities. E.O.s were issued by virtueof C.A.
No. 671 The Emergency Powers Act.Issue:WON E.O.s
Nos. 545 and 546 are valid?Held: NO. Section 26 of Article
VI of the Constitution provides thatin times of war or
other national emergency, the Congressmay by law
authorize the President, x x x to prescribe/promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out adeclared national
policy. The said powers are limited in the prescribed
period. It cannot be exercised at any time as thePresident
may want to be.
MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner,
vs.

HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO,
Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau, respondents
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995
ROMERO, J.:
Facts:
Former President Cory Aquino, exercising legislative
power, issued EO211 prescribing the interim procedures in
the processing and approval of exploration, development
and utilization of minerals. To implement the act, Secretary
of DENR promulgated AO No. 57 and 82. On 25 July 1987
the then President Aquino issued EO279 authorizing the
DENR SECRETARY to negotiate and conclude joint venture,
co-production, production sharing, development and those
agreements involving technical or financial assistance by
foreign owned corporations for large scale EDU.
Pursuant to Sec 6 of EO 279, the DENR issued AO No.57
which provides that all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted AFTER the affectivity of
the 1987 Constitution, except small scale mining leases
and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry
resources covering an area of 20 hectares or less, shall be
converted into production sharing agreement within one
year from the effectivity of the guidelines.
On 20 November 1990, Sec of DENR issued EO No. 82
laying down the Procedural Guidelines on the award of
mineral Production sharing agreement. This order provides
the person or entities required to submit a LETTER OF
INTENT and MINERAL PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENT
within 2 years from the effectivity of AO No.57 or until 17
July 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period
shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry, gravel
and sand.
The Miners Association Inc assailed the validity of
the above-mentioned issuances and alleged the following:
1. Sec of DENR issued both AO57 and 82 in excess of their
rule-making power under Section 6 of EO279.
2. The orders violate the non-impairment of contracts
provision under the bill of rights on the ground the AO57
unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other
mining agreements and automatically converts them into
production-sharing agreements within one year from its
effectivity date.
3. AO No.82 declares that failure to submit the LETTER OF
INTENT and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement within
2 years from the date of effectivity of said guidelines shall
cause an abandonment of their mining, quarry, sand and
gravel permits.
On 13 November 1991, Continental Marble Corp sought to
intervene in the cases alleging that the TRO issued by the
Court, the DENR Regional Office in San Fernando
Pampanga refused to renew its Mines Temporary Permit
and claimed further that its rights and interest are
prejudicially affected by AO No.57 and 82.
Issue:
1. Whether AO57 and 82 have the effect of abrogating the
existing mining laws and unduly preterminate the existing
mining leases and agreements.
Held: No.
PD No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of
EDU of natural resources through license, concession or
lease which has been disallowed by Article XII, Sec 2 of the
1987 Philippine Constitution. By virtue of this
constitutional mandate and its implementing laws, the
provisions dealing with license, concession or leases
ceased to operate as the governing laws. In other words,
in all areas of administration and management of mineral
lands, the provision of PD463, as amended and other
existing laws still govern.

Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Consti on 2

February 1987, the State assumed a more dynamic role in
EDU. Article XII, Section 2 explicitly ordains that EDU shall
under the full control and supervision of the State. Given
these considerations, there is no clear showing that the
DENR Sec has transcended the bounds demarcated in the
EO279 for the exercise of his rule-making power.
Article XII, Sec 2 of the 1987 Consti does not apply
retroactively to license, concession or lease granted by the
government under the 1973 Consti or before the
effectivity of the present Constitution. The intent to apply
prospectively was stressed during the deliberations in the
Constitutional Commission.
AO No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases
or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of
the 1987 Consti pursuant to EO No. 211. It bears to
mention that under the text of EO211, there is a
reservation clause which provides that the privileges as
well as the terms and conditions of all existing mining
leases or agreements granted after the effectiviyt of the
present constitution shall be subject to any and all
modification or alterations which the Congress may adopt.
Hence, the strictures of the non-impairment of contract
clause do not apply to the aforesaid mining leased or
agreements after the effectivity of the 1987 Consti.
The State in the exercise of police power may not
be precluded by the constitutional restriction on nonimpairment of contracts. Police power being co-extensive
with the necessities of the case and the demands of public
interest.
Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659
J. Cruz
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo
in 1984 and these wer confiscated by the station
commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which
prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one
province to another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing
of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering
the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation
of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court
also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the
constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright
confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard
before an impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative
power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the
1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency
powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of
law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the
constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of
least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality
of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they

should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the

abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive
order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a
new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law
due to the grant of legislative authority over the president
under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise
language to avoid controvery. In the due process clause,
however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain
resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an iron rule
laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There
was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with
varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition
for due processlest they be confined to its interpretation
like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a
safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption
which bars omission of contrary evidence as long as such
presumption is based on human experience or rational
connection between facts proved and fact presumed. An
examples is a passport of a person with a criminal offense
cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular
function of police power which both restrains and is
restrained by dure process. This power was invoked in
626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of
carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original
executive order, it cant be said that it complies with the
existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition
and the purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings
as procedural due process is not juridical only due to the
urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not
have been proved in a court of justice with the accused
acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police
power because the method toconfiscate carabos was
oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied
the right to be heard or his defense and punished
immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
against the separataion of powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law
during that time was valid.
DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
Posted by kaye lee on 12:18 PM
GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982
FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the
Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the
Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP
129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior
courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the
inferior courts established by such act, would be
considered separated from the judiciary. It is the
termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify
a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the
security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been
ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of

tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the
Constitution.

Article VI: The Legislative Department, Section 1 Issues on

Delegation of Legislative Power (Filling in the Details:
authority to reorganize)

RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or
separation of the judges and justices from their services.
What is important is the validity of the abolition of their
offices.

Chiongbian vs Orbos

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does

not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the
principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith.
HIRABAYASHI v. UNITED STATES
Print this Page
Case Basics
Docket No.
870
Petitioner
Hirabayashi
Respondent
United States
Decided By
Stone Court (1943-1945)
Opinion
320 U.S. 81 (1943)
Argued
Monday, May 10, 1943
Decided
Monday, June 21, 1943
Term: 1940-19491942
Facts of the Case
In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
President Roosevelt acted to prevent incidents of
subversion and espionage from individuals of Japanese
descent living in the United States. He issued two
executive orders which were quickly enacted into law. One
gave the Secretary of War the power to designate certain
parts of the country "military areas" and exclude certain
persons from them. The second established the War
Relocation Authority which had the power to remove,
maintain, and supervise persons who were excluded from
the military areas. Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, a student
at the University of Washington, was convicted of violating
a curfew and relocation order.
Question
Did the President's executive orders and the power
delegated to the military authorities discriminate against
Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in
violation of the Fifth Amendment?
Conclusion
The Court found the President's orders and the
implementation of the curfew to be constitutional. Chief
Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into
account the great importance of military installations and
weapons production that occurred on the West Coast and
the "solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt
with their motherland. He reasoned that restrictions on
Japanese actions served an important national interest.
The Court ducked the thorny relocation issue and focused
solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a
necessary "protective measure." Stone argued that racial
discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents
having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a
greater source of danger than those of a different
ancestry."

Chiongbian - Congressman in third district, South

Cotabato; Orbos - Executive Secretary Date of
Promulgation:
June 22, 1995
Ponente:
Mendoza
Motion:
Certiorari and Prohibition
;
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court
Background
In 1968, R.A. 5435 authorized the President of the
Philippines, with the help of Commission on
Reorganization, to recognize the different executive
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the government, including banking or
financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled
by it.
Purpose was to promote simplicity, economy and
efficiency in the government.
Facts
The Congress passed the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (RA 6743)
pursuant to Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution. A
plebiscite was called in some provinces which resulted to
4 provinces (
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi Tawi
) in favor of creating an autonomous region and therefore
became the ARMM. The RA says that those provinces and
cities who did not vote in favor of it shall remain in their
existing administrative regions
provided, however,
that the President may merge the existing regions through
administrative determination.
President Cory then issued the EO containing the
provinces/cities that will be merged, transferring
provinces from their existing region to another. The
petitioners who are
members of the Congress
representing legislative districts protested the Executive
Order, saying that there is
no law which authorizes
the President to pick certain provinces and cities within
existing regions and
restructure
them to new administrative regions. The transfer of one
province under its current region to another (ex: Misamis
Occidental from Region X to IX) is a form of
reorganization,
an alteration of the existing structures of the government.
The RA 6743 only holds authority of the president to
merge
existing regions
and cannot be construed as

reorganizing
them.
Issue
W/N the power to merge administrative regions is
legislative (petitioners stand) in
character or executive as the respondents contend

Petitioners: It unduly delegates power to the President to

merge regions through administrative determination or at
any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the
power delegated

Respondents: No undue delegation but only a grant of

power to
fill up
or provide the details of legislation because the Congress
did not have the facility to provide for them
Ruling:
Petition is DISMISSED.
The creation and subsequent reorganization of
administrative regions have been by the President
pursuant to authority granted to him by law
. In conferring on the President the power to merge the
existing regions following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of
administrative regions in 1972
. (RA5453)
This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which
the President is to be guided in the exercise of power.
Standard can be gathered or implied
.
Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant
of
power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to
reorganize the Executive Department:to promote
simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to
enable it to pursue its programs consisted with the
national goals for acceler
ated social and economic development.
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who
are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold
upon the peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not
wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15,
1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their
licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their
death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons,
ten years after the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were
exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the
retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization,
economic control weights and measures and labor and
other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.

provision against the establishment or opening by aliens

actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores
or branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the
Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff:
reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives them of their liberty and property without
due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens
of their retail business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal
protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it
does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws.
There are real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully
justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality among residents. It merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all
persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens
constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the
exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing
dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this
domination and control that is the legislatures target in
the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the
distinction between the alien and the national as a trader.
The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and
makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to
the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of
crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property
subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become
the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his
customers and the people on whom he makes his profit.
Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and
practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on
the nations economy endangering the national security in
times of crisis and emergency.
IBP VS ZAMORA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian
supremacy clause]
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18,
Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal
directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned

the validity of the deployment and utilization of the

Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised,
the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal
and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

so that justice in its rational and objectively secular

conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be
founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General
Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a

breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of
the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to
direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to
the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers.
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP
does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of
Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil 726
Post under case digests, labor law at Wednesday, February
08, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the
Legislature, the Director of Public Works promulgated rules
and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street
and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a
year in prohibition against respondent-public officers.
Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and
regulations complained of infringe upon constitutional
precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the
well being and economic security of all people.
Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote
social justice.
Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered
not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given
group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic force by the State

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF

COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS. The provisions of section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative
power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications. The authority
therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of
is not to determine what public policy demands but merely
to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon,
and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to
close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall
be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to
be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the
use of national roads and to determine when and how long
a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on
the discretion of some other government official to whom
is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said
that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the
law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY;
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. Commonwealth Act No.

548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise

of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by
virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of
were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire
to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a
menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v.
Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve
the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and, personal discipline, so that there
may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment
greater authority is conferred upon the government,
logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of
liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the
fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely
the very means of insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. Social justice is "neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium
in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise
of powers underlying the existence of all governments on
the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and
as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this
petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents,
A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works;
Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City

of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of

Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic
Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca
to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and
from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure
proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance
of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which
authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval
of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control
the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2,
1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement
to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
recommended to the latter the approval of the
recommendation made by the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that
the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn
vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from
the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga
Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, in his second indorsement
addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal
Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles,
between the points and during the hours as above
indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and
regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such
enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places abovementioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of
the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act
No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and
traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power. This contention is untenable. As was observed by
this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil,
660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than
in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of cases, namely: The true
distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion
as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v.
Commrs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as
held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10
Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an
executive department or official. The Legislature may
make decisions of executive departments or subordinate
officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution
of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead,

248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to

give prominence to the necessity of the case."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive
orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control
the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules
and regulations, with the approval of the President, may
contain provisions controlling or regulating the
construction of buildings or other structures within a
reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such
roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of
traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly
authorized representatives whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or
advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a
specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative
power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications. The authority
therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of
is not to determine what public policy demands but merely
to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon
and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to
close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall
be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to
be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the
use of national roads and to determine when and how long
a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on
the discretion of some other government official to whom
is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said
that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the
law. As was said in Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert
that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend
on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the
power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law
is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or
to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper
distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot
delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law
to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its
own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the
wheels of government. There are many things upon which
wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be
known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be
a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls

of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed.

294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos.
46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in
Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service
Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940,
this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of
separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life,
the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed
by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the
legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in
administrative and executive officials, not only in the
execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of
certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public
interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and
regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an
unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and
abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by
the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount
police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted
by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic.
which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said
law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this
fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty
and authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness
for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon
the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization
advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los
Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to
exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a
business lawful today may in the future, because of the
changed situation, the growth of population or other

causes, become a menace to the public health and

welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And
in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that
"advancing civilization is bringing within the police power
of the state today things which were not thought of as
being within such power yesterday. The development of
civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth
of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of
the masses and of the government to look after and care
for the interests of the individuals of the state, have
brought within the police power many questions for
regulation which formerly were not so considered."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations
complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security of all the people. The
promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for
is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30,
1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented
and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed
as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial
Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and
disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in
a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the

respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the complaint had no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further
ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in
the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether
(2) Whether
(3) Whether
result in the

or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

or not the complaint raises a political issue.
or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs
impairment of contracts.

RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in
their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint
focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right
carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the
DENR to be the primary government agency responsible
for the governing and supervising the exploration,
utilization, development and conservation of the country's
natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is
also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which
will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right
of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty
to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or
respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion,
violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the
Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie,
the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the

constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested
upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon
even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR.,

petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an
instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the nonimpairment clause must yield to the police power of the
State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby
GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

These are consolidated cases involving common legal

questions including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D
No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia
of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and
the constitutional limitation that no private property shall
be taken for public use without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that
the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the
Congress and not to the President, the also allege that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled
for violation of the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process and equal protection. They
contended that the taking must be simultaneous with
payment of just compensation which such payment is not
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B.
ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE,
CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I.
LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA,
FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B.
MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA,
FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES,
BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S.
FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
respondent.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228
and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that
the said executive orders violate the constitutional
provision that no private property shall be taken without
due process or just compensation which was denied to the
petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot
eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has
so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree.
They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said
rules.

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

ISSUE:

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO

FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO,
PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC.,
Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental,
petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL
AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.

Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid

exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and
Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO
AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.

RULING:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain,
though there are traditional distinction between the police
power and the power of eminent domain, property
condemned under police power is noxious or intended for
noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such
property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking
of the property in Eminent Domain or the power of
expropriation which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998
FACTS:

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved

granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities
to undertake and carry out at their own expense the

reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any

foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate
docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in consultation with the
Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed
by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands
within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement
with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among
others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of
Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the
commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question
is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a
broader meaning on the term foreshore land than that in
the definition provided by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC,
and the decision was affirmed by the CA with
modifications.
ISSUE:
I.
Whether or not the term foreshore land includes
the submerged area.
II.
Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed
area is within the commerce of man.
HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to
uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term
foreshore land includes the submerged areas. To repeat,
the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water
marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the
flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or
stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line
usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and
the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked
by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA
1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much
less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of
Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have
provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could
only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the
term foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City
Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158,
and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be
outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
therefore ultra vires and null and void.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional
Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain

provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation
of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the
law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains
with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However,
the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and
does not include the right to alienate the same.
LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR
Jan. 21, 2004
Facts: R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral
agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure
for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and
withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions
govern financial or technical assistance agreements.
Petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition and
mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order alleging that at the time of the filing of the petition,
100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an
area of 8.4 million hectares, 64 of which applications are
by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8
million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned
mining company over offshore areas.
Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum,
minerals and mineral oils limited to technical or
financial assistance only?
Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance
agreements may be entered into, and only for large-scale
activities. These are contract forms which recognize and
assert our sovereignty and ownership over natural
resources since the foreign entity is just a pure contractor
and not a beneficial owner of our economic resources. The
proposal recognizes the need for capital and technology to
develop our natural resources without sacrificing our
sovereignty and control over such resources by the
safeguard of a special law which requires two-thirds vote
of all the members of the Legislature.
It is true that the word technical encompasses a broad
number of possible services. However, the law follows the
maxim casus omisus pro omisso habendus est which
means a person, object or thing omitted from an

enumeration must be held to have been omitted

intentionally.
LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR
Dec. 1, 2004
Facts: On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc
promulgated its Decision granting the Petition and
declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA
7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed
between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding
that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987
Constitution.
The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being
similar to service contracts, which, though permitted
under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently
denounced for being antithetical to the principle of
sovereignty over our natural resources, because they
allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural
resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum,
minerals and mineral oils limited to technical or
financial assistance only?
Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance
agreements may be entered into, and only for large-scale
activities. Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day
management by the contractor, provided that the State
retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set
aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the
contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which
is exercised by the board of directors of a private
corporation: the performance of managerial, operational,
financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated
to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but
the board retains full residual control of the business.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This Court is asked to legitimize a government contract
that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro
Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter.
However, published reports place the market price of land
near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square
meter.[1] The difference in price is a staggering P140.16
billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for
seventeen years and more than three times the Marcos
Swiss deposits that this Court forfeited in favor of the
government.
Many worry to death that the private investors will lose
their investments, at most not more than one-half billion
pesos in legitimate expenses,[2] if this Court voids the
contract. No one seems to worry about the more than tens
of billion pesos that the hapless Filipino people will lose if
the contract is allowed to stand. There are those who
question these figures, but the questions arise only
because the private entity somehow managed to inveigle
the government to sell the reclaimed lands without public
bidding in patent violation of the Government Auditing
Code.
Fortunately for the Filipino people, two Senate
Committees, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the

Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, conducted

extensive public hearings to determine the actual market
value of the public lands sold to the private entity. The
Senate Committees established the clear, indisputable and
unalterable fact that the sale of the public lands is grossly
and unconscionably undervalued based on official
documents submitted by the proper government agencies
during the Senate investigation. We quote the joint report
of these two Senate Committees, Senate Committee
Report No. 560, as approved by the Senate in plenary
session on 27 September 1997:[3]
The Consideration for the Property
PEA, under the JVA, obligated itself to convey title and
possession over the Property, consisting of approximately
One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four
Hundred Forty One (1,578,441) Square Meters for a total
consideration of One Billion Eight Hundred Ninety Four
Million One Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred
(P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One Thousand
Two Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos per square meter.
According to the zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, the value of the Property is Seven Thousand
Eight Hundred Pesos (P7,800.00) per square meter. The
Municipal Assessor of Paraaque, Metro Manila, where the
Property is located, pegs the market value of the Property
at Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) per square meter.
Based on these alone, the price at which PEA agreed to
convey the property is a pittance. And PEA cannot claim
ignorance of these valuations, at least not those of the
Municipal Assessors office, since it has been trying to
convince the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Paraaque
to reduce the valuation of various reclaimed properties
thereat in order for PEA to save on accrued real property
taxes.
PEAs justification for the purchase price are various
appraisal reports, particularly the following:
(1) An appraisal by Vic T. Salinas Realty and Consultancy
Services concluding that the Property is worth P500.00 per
square meter for the smallest island and P750.00 per
square meter for the two other islands, or a total of
P1,170,000.00 as of 22 February 1995;
(2) An appraisal by Valencia Appraisal Corporation
concluding that the Property is worth P850 per square
meter for Island I, P800 per square meter for Island II and
P600 per square meter for the smallest island, or a total of
P1,289,732,000, also as of 22 February 1995; and
(3) An Appraisal by Asian Appraisal Company, Inc. (AACI),
stating that the Property is worth approximately P1,000
per square meter for Island I, P950 per square meter for
Island II and P600 per square meter for Island III, or a total
of P1,518,805,000 as of 27 February 1995.
The credibility of the foregoing appraisals, however, are
[sic] greatly impaired by a subsequent appraisal report of
AACI stating that the property is worth P4,500.00 per
square meter as of 26 March 1996. Such discrepancies in
the appraised value as appearing in two different reports
by the same appraisal company submitted within a span
of one year render all such appraisal reports unworthy of
even the slightest consideration. Furthermore, the
appraisal report submitted by the Commission on Audit
estimates the value of the Property to be approximately
P33,673,000,000.00, or P21,333.07 per square meter.

There were also other offers made for the property from
other parties which indicate that the Property has been
undervalued by PEA. For instance, on 06 March 1995, Mr.
Young D. See, President of Saeil Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.,
(South Korea), offered to buy the property at P1,400.00
and expressed its willingness to issue a stand-by letter of
credit worth $10 million. PEA did not consider this offer
and instead finalized the JVA with AMARI. Other offers were
made on various dates by Aspac Management and
Development Group Inc. (for P1,600 per square meter),
Universal Dragon Corporation (for P1,600 per square
meter), Cleene Far East Manila Incorporated and Hyosan
Prime Construction Co. Ltd. which had prepared an
Irrevocable Clean Letter of Credit for P100,000,000.
In addition, AMARI agreed to pay huge commissions and
bonuses to various persons, amounting to
P1,596,863,050.00 (P1,754,707,150.00 if the bonus is
included), as will be discussed fully below, which indicate
that AMARI itself believed the market value to be much
higher than the agreed purchase price. If such
commissions are added to the purchase price, AMARIs
acquisition cost for the Property will add-up to
P3,490,992,250.00 (excluding the bonus). If AMARI was
willing to pay such amount for the Property, why was PEA
willing to sell for only P1,894,129,200.00, making the
Government stand to lose approximately
P1,596,863,050.00?

P1,200 per square meter purchase price, or a total of

P1.894 billion for the 157.84 hectares of government
lands, is grossly and unconscionably undervalued. The
authoritative appraisal, of course, is that of the
Commission on Audit which valued the 157.84 hectares at
P21,333.07 per square meter or a total of P33.673 billion.
Thus, based on the official appraisal of the Commission on
Audit, the independent constitutional body that safeguards
government assets, the actual loss to the Filipino people is
a shocking P31.779 billion.
This gargantuan monetary anomaly, aptly earning the
epithet Grandmother of All Scams,[4] is not the major
defect of this government contract. The major flaw is not
even the P1.754 billion in commissions the Senate
Committees discovered the private entity paid to various
persons to secure the contract,[5] described in Senate
Report No. 560 as follows:
A Letter-Agreement dated 09 June 1995 signed by Messrs.
Premchai Karnasuta and Emmanuel Sy for and in behalf of
AMARI, on the one hand, and stockholders of AMARI
namely, Mr. Chin San Cordova (a.k.a. Benito Co) and Mr.
Chua Hun Siong (a.k.a. Frank Chua), on the other, sets
forth various payments AMARI paid or agreed to pay the
aforesaid stockholders by way of fees for professional
efforts and services in successfully negotiating and
securing for AMARI the Joint Venture Agreement, as
follows:

xxx
Even if we simply assume that the market value of the
Property is half of the market value fixed by the Municipal
Assessors Office of Paraaque for lands along Roxas
Boulevard, or P3,000.00 per square meter, the
Government now stands to lose approximately
P2,841,193,800.00. But an even better assumption would
be that the value of the Property is P4,500.00 per square
meter, as per the AACI appraisal report dated 26 March
1996, since this is the valuation used to justify the
issuance of P4 billion worth of shares of stock of
Centennial City Inc. (CCI) in exchange for 4,800,000 AMARI
shares with a total par value of only P480,000,000.00.
With such valuation, the Governments loss will amount to
P5,208,855,300.00.
Clearly, the purchase price agreed to by PEA is way below
the actual value of the Property, thereby subjecting the
Government to grave injury and enabling AMARI to enjoy
tremendous benefit and advantage. (Emphasis supplied)
The Senate Committee Report No. 560 attached the
following official documents from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, the Municipal Assessor of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, and the Commission on Audit:
1. Annex M, Certified True Copy of BIR Zonal Valuations as
certified by Antonio F. Montemayor, Revenue District
Officer. This official document fixed the market value of
the 157.84 hectares at P7,800 per square meter.
2. Annex N, Certification of Soledad S. Medina-Cue,
Municipal Assessor, Paraaque, dated 10 December 1996.
This official document fixed the market value at P6,000
per square meter.
3. Exhibit 1-Engr. Santiago, the Appraisal Report of the
Commission on Audit. This official document fixed the
market value at P21,333.07 per square meter.
Whether based on the official appraisal of the BIR, the
Municipal Assessor or the Commission on Audit, the

Form of Payment Paid/Payable On Amount

Managers Checks 28 April 1995 P 400,000,000.00
Managers Checks Upon signing of letter 262,500,000.00
10 Post Dated Checks (PDCs) 60 days from date of letter
127,000,000.00
24 PDCs 31 Aug. 95 to 31 Jan. 98 150,000,000.00
48 PDCs Monthly, over a 12-month pd.
from date of letter 357,363,050.00
Cash bonus When sale of land begins not exceeding
157,844,100.00
Developed land from Project Upon completion of each
Costing
phase 300,000,000.00
TOTAL P1,754,707,150.00
==============
Mr. Luis Benitez of SGV, the external auditors of AMARI,
testified that said Letter-Agreement was approved by the
AMARI Board.[6] (Emphasis supplied)
The private entity that purchased the reclaimed lands for
P1.894 billion expressly admitted before the Senate
Committees that it spent P1.754 billion in commissions to
pay various individuals for professional efforts and
services in successfully negotiating and securing the
contract. By any legal or moral yardstick, the P1.754
billion in commissions obviously constitutes bribe money.
Nonetheless, there are those who insist that the billions in
investments of the private entity deserve protection by
this Court. Should this Court establish a new doctrine by
elevating grease money to the status of legitimate
investments deserving of protection by the law? Should
this Court reward the patently illegal and grossly unethical
business practice of the private entity in securing the
contract? Should we allow those with hands dripping with
dirty money equitable relief from this Court?
Despite these revolting anomalies unearthed by the
Senate Committees, the fatal flaw of this contract is that it
glaringly violates provisions of the Constitution expressly
prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain.

Thus, we now come to the resolution of the second

Motions for Reconsideration[7] filed by public respondent
Public Estates Authority (PEA) and private respondent
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation (Amari). As
correctly pointed out by petitioner Francisco I. Chavez in
his Consolidated Comment,[8] the second Motions for
Reconsideration raise no new issues.
However, the Supplement to Separate Opinion, Concurring
and Dissenting of Justice Josue N. Bellosillo brings to the
Courts attention the Resolutions of this Court on 3
February 1965 and 24 June 1966 in L- 21870 entitled
Manuel O. Ponce, et al. v. Hon. Amador Gomez, et al. and
No. L-22669 entitled Manuel O. Ponce, et al. v. The City of
Cebu, et al. (Ponce Cases). In effect, the Supplement to
the Dissenting Opinion claims that these two Resolutions
serve as authority that a single private corporation like
Amari may acquire hundreds of hectares of submerged
lands, as well as reclaimed submerged lands, within Manila
Bay under the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
(Amended JVA).
We find the cited Ponce Cases inapplicable to the instant
case.
First, as Justice Bellosillo himself states in his supplement
to his dissent, the Ponce Cases admit that submerged
lands still belong to the National Government.[9] The
correct formulation, however, is that submerged lands are
owned by the State and are inalienable. Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above
them, are part of the States inalienable natural resources.
Submerged lands are property of public dominion,
absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
[10] This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any
sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being
contrary to the Constitution.[11]
This is why the Cebu City ordinance merely granted Essel,
Inc. an irrevocable option to purchase the foreshore lands
after the reclamation and did not actually sell to Essel, Inc.
the still to be reclaimed foreshore lands. Clearly, in the
Ponce Cases the option to purchase referred to reclaimed
lands, and not to foreshore lands which are inalienable.
Reclaimed lands are no longer foreshore or submerged
lands, and thus may qualify as alienable agricultural lands
of the public domain provided the requirements of public
land laws are met.
In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the
Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this very
day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce
of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA,
592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area are still
submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the
submerged lands even before their actual reclamation,
although the documentation of the deed of transfer and
issuance of the certificates of title would be made only
after actual reclamation.

The Amended JVA states that the PEA hereby contributes

to the Joint Venture its rights and privileges to perform
Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well
as own the Reclamation Area.[12] The Amended JVA
further states that the sharing of the Joint Venture
Proceeds shall be based on the ratio of thirty percent
(30%) for PEA and seventy percent (70%) for AMARI.[13]
The Amended JVA also provides that the PEA hereby
designates AMARI to perform PEAs rights and privileges to
reclaim, own and develop the Reclamation Area.[14] In
short, under the Amended JVA the PEA contributed its
rights, privileges and ownership over the Reclamation Area
to the Joint Venture which is 70% owned by Amari.
Moreover, the PEA delegated to Amari the right and
privilege to reclaim the submerged lands.
The Amended JVA mandates that the PEA had the duty to
execute without delay the necessary deed of transfer or
conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARIs Land share
based on the Land Allocation Plan.[15] The Amended JVA
also provides that PEA, when requested in writing by
AMARI, shall then cause the issuance and delivery of the
proper certificates of title covering AMARIs Land Share in
the name of AMARI, x x x.[16]
In the Ponce Cases, the City of Cebu retained ownership of
the reclaimed foreshore lands and Essel, Inc. only had an
irrevocable option to purchase portions of the foreshore
lands once actually reclaimed. In sharp contrast, in the
instant case ownership of the reclamation area, including
the submerged lands, was immediately transferred to the
joint venture. Amari immediately acquired the absolute
right to own 70% percent of the reclamation area, with the
deeds of transfer to be documented and the certificates of
title to be issued upon actual reclamation. Amaris right to
own the submerged lands is immediately effective upon
the approval of the Amended JVA and not merely an option
to be exercised in the future if and when the reclamation is
actually realized. The submerged lands, being inalienable
and outside the commerce of man, could not be the
subject of the commercial transactions specified in the
Amended JVA.
Second, in the Ponce Cases the Cebu City ordinance
granted Essel, Inc. an irrevocable option to purchase from
Cebu City not more than 70% of the reclaimed lands. The
ownership of the reclaimed lands remained with Cebu City
until Essel, Inc. exercised its option to purchase. With the
subsequent enactment of the Government Auditing Code
(Presidential Decree No. 1445) on 11 June 1978, any sale
of government land must be made only through public
bidding. Thus, such an irrevocable option to purchase
government land would now be void being contrary to the
requirement of public bidding expressly required in Section
79[17] of PD No. 1445. This requirement of public bidding
is reiterated in Section 379[18] of the 1991 Local
Government Code.[19] Obviously, the ingenious
reclamation scheme adopted in the Cebu City ordinance
can no longer be followed in view of the requirement of
public bidding in the sale of government lands. In the
instant case, the Amended JVA is a negotiated contract
which clearly contravenes Section 79 of PD No. 1445.
Third, Republic Act No. 1899 authorized municipalities and
chartered cities to reclaim foreshore lands. The two
Resolutions in the Ponce Cases upheld the Cebu City
ordinance only with respect to foreshore areas, and
nullified the same with respect to submerged areas. Thus,
the 27 June 1965 Resolution made the injunction of the
trial court against the City of Cebu permanent insofar x x x
as the area outside or beyond the foreshore land proper is
concerned.

As we held in the 1998 case of Republic Real Estate

Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[20] citing the Ponce
Cases, RA No. 1899 applies only to foreshore lands, not to
submerged lands. In his concurring opinion in Republic
Real Estate Corporation, Justice Reynato S. Puno stated
that under Commonwealth Act No. 141, foreshore and
lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to
private parties, and that such lands remained property of
the State. Justice Puno emphasized that Commonwealth
Act No. 141 has remained in effect at present. The instant
case involves principally submerged lands within Manila
Bay. On this score, the Ponce Cases, which were decided
based on RA No. 1899, are not applicable to the instant
case.
Fourth, the Ponce Cases involve the authority of the City of
Cebu to reclaim foreshore areas pursuant to a general law,
RA No. 1899. The City of Cebu is a public corporation and
is qualified, under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions,
to hold alienable or even inalienable lands of the public
domain. There is no dispute that a public corporation is not
covered by the constitutional ban on acquisition of
alienable public lands. Both the 9 July 2002 Decision and
the 6 May 2003 Resolution of this Court in the instant case
expressly recognize this.
Cebu City is an end user government agency, just like the
Bases Conversion and Development Authority or the
Department of Foreign Affairs.[21] Thus, Congress may by
law transfer public lands to the City of Cebu to be used for
municipal purposes, which may be public or patrimonial.
Lands thus acquired by the City of Cebu for a public
purpose may not be sold to private parties. However,
lands so acquired by the City of Cebu for a patrimonial
purpose may be sold to private parties, including private
corporations.
However, in the instant case the PEA is not an end user
agency with respect to the reclaimed lands under the
Amended JVA. As we explained in the 6 May 2003
Resolution:
PEA is the central implementing agency tasked to
undertake reclamation projects nationwide. PEA took the
place of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR for brevity) as the government agency
charged with leasing or selling all reclaimed lands of the
public domain. In the hands of PEA, which took over the
leasing and selling functions of DENR, reclaimed foreshore
(or submerged lands) lands are public lands in the same
manner that these same lands would have been public
lands in the hands of DENR. (Emphasis supplied)

Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong. (Emphasis

supplied)
Finally, the Ponce Cases were decided under the 1935
Constitution which allowed private corporations to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. However, the 1973
Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain, and the 1987
Constitution reiterated this prohibition. Obviously, the
Ponce Cases cannot serve as authority for a private
corporation to acquire alienable public lands, much less
submerged lands, since under the present Constitution a
private corporation like Amari is barred from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the facts in the Ponce Cases are different from the
facts in the instant case. Moreover, the governing
constitutional and statutory provisions have changed since
the Ponce Cases were disposed of in 1965 and 1966
through minute Resolutions of a divided (6 to 5) Court.
This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party
purchaser of the reclaimed lands covered by the Amended
JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has sold any portion of the
reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed
lands remains with the PEA. As we stated in our 9 July
2002 Decision:
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title
issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly government
owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary
functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued
to any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands
to cancel PEAs patent or certificates of title. In fact, the
thrust of the instant petition is that PEAs certificates of
title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by
these certificates, being alienable lands of the public
domain, should not be sold to a private corporation.
As we held in our 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA
violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. In our 6 May 2003 Resolution, we DENIED
with FINALITY respondents Motions for Reconsideration.
Litigations must end some time. It is now time to write
finis to this Grandmother of All Scams.
WHEREFORE, the second Motions for Reconsideration filed
by Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are DENIED for being prohibited
pleadings. In any event, these Motions for Reconsideration
have no merit. No further pleadings shall be allowed from
any of the parties.
SO ORDERED.

Our 9 July 2002 Decision explained the rationale for

treating the PEA in the same manner as the DENR with
respect to reclaimed foreshore or submerged lands in this
wise:
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain
to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a
gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has
now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several
hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be
reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one
transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the
constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the
ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among

MEYER v. NEBRASKA
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a
child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the
teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet
completed the eighth grade.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from creating legislation that restricts
liberty interests when the legislation is not reasonably
related to an acceptable state objective.

Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German

under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of
foreign languages to students that had not yet completed

the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld

the conviction.
Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied
unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it
infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails to
reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the
state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than
merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The state argues
that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English
language to be the native tongue of all children raised in
the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution
extends to those who speak other languages. Education is
a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and
mere knowledge of the German language cannot be
reasonably regarded as harmful.
Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by
the states when the interference is arbitrary and not
reasonably related to a purpose which the state may
permissively regulate.
Pierce v Society of Sisters
Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools,
were protected by a preliminary restraining order
prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that
required parents and guardians to send their children to
public school. Appellants appealed the order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a
liberty interest in a parents or guardians right to decide
the mode in which their children are educated. States
may not usurp this right when the questioned legislation
does not reasonably relate to a viable state interest.

Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with

the power to establish and maintain academies or schools
and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization
conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and
military training school, obtained preliminary restraining
orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons
Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents
and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to
a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of
the preliminary restraining orders.
Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control?
Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it
interferes with protected liberty interests and has no
reasonable relationship to any purpose within the
competency of the state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of
enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees
schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools,
but parents and guardians have the right and duty to
choose the appropriate preparation for their children.
Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that
children receive a proper education, the 14th Amendment
provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in
their choice in the mode in which their children are
educated.

Winconsin v Yoder
Brief Fact Summary. Several Amish families appealed a
decision convicting them of failing to send their children to
school until the age of 16 based upon Freedom of Religion
under the constitution.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The law compelling parents to
send their children to public school until the age of 16 is
unconstitutional as applied because it impermissibly
interferes with the Amish religious beliefs.

Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin

Yutzy are members of the Amish religion. Wisconsins
compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause
their children to attend public or private school until they
reach 16. Respondents declined to send their children to
public school after completion of the eighth grade.
Respondents were convicted of violating the law and fined
$5 each.
Issue. Did the application of the compulsory attendance
law violate respondents rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution?
Held. The application of the law is unconstitutional as
applied to the Amish.
The Amish object to the high school education because the
values taught there are in marked variance from the
Amish values and way of life. It places Amish children in an
environment hostile to their beliefs and takes them away
from their community during a crucial period in their life.
The Amish do not object to elementary education. Expert
Dr. Hostetler testified that the compulsory attendance
could result in not only great psychological harm to Amish
children but ultimately the destruction of the Old Order
Amish church community.
The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations
for the control and duration of basic education. Previous
precedent has held that this power must yield to the right
of parents to provide an equivalent education in a
privately operated system. The States power is subject to
a balancing test when it impinges on fundamental rights
such as those protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents
with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.
In order for Wisconsin to compel such attendance, it must
follow that either the State does not deny the free exercise
of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a state
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause. This
Court determines that the Amish objection to the
attendance is rooted in religious beliefs that directly
conflict with the compulsory school attendance law.
The State advances two arguments. First, it notes that
some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens
to participate effectively and intelligently in our open
political system. Second, education prepares individuals to
be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. We
accept these propositions. However, the evidence adduced
shows that an additional one or two years of formal high
school would do little to serve those interests. Such
education may be necessary for preparation for the
modern society in which we live, but is not for the
separated agrarian community of the Amish faith.

The State attacks respondents position as fostering

ignorance from which children must be protected by the
State. However, the record shows that the Amish
community has been a highly successful social unit within
our society, producing productive and law-abiding citizens.
The State also supports its position on the possibility that
some children will choose to leave the Amish community.
This argument is highly speculative on the record, and the
practical agricultural training and habits of industry would
support children that did choose to leave.
The requirement for compulsory high school education is a
fairly recent development, designed to not only provide
educational opportunities, but also to avoid child labor or
forced idleness. In these terms, Wisconsins interest in
compelling school attendance is less substantial for Amish
children than for children generally.
The State finally argues that exempting the Amish children
fails to recognize the childrens substantive right to a
secondary education, giving due regard to the power of
the State as parens patriae. On this record there is no
need to decide an issue in which the Amish parents are
preventing children who wish to further their education
from attending school.
Dissent. The majority assumes that the interests at stake
are only those of the parents and the State. The children
also have a legitimate interest in their education. The
inevitable effect of the decision is to impose the parents
notions of religious duty upon their children. It is the future
of the student, not the parents, that is imperiled by
todays decision. The views of the two children in question
were not canvassed, and should be on remand.

Discussion. The majoritys decision did not determine that

the statute would violate Constitutional rights if the
children wanted to pursue further education, but found
that such a decision was unnecessary because no such
claim was made on the record. The dissent suggested that
the cause should be remanded to determine the desire of
the children.
Costitutional Law: Cabanas v Pilapil
58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974
MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Deceased Florentino Pilapil, the husband of
Melchora Cabanas and the father of Millian Pilapil, left an
insurance having his child as the beneficiary and
authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee
during his daughters minority. The lower court decided to
give the mother of the child the right to act as trustee
while her child is a minor citing the appropriate provisions
in the Civil Code. The welfare of the child is the paramount
consideration here, and the mother resides with the child
so she is the rightful trustee. The judiciary pursuant to its
role as an agency of the State parens patriae, called for
the mother to take responsibility. The defendant appealed
for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in
question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He
is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy.
Issue: Whether the mother or the uncle should be entitled
to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds
of an insurance policy from her deceased father? Whether

the trial court erred in its decision to give the right to the
mother?
Ruling: The decision is affirmed with costs against the
defendant-appellant. The provisions of Article 320 and 321
of the Civil Code became the basis of the decision. The
former provides that the father, or in his absence the
mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval
of the Court of First Instance." The latter provides that
"The property which the unemancipated child has acquired
or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any
lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in
usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under
parental authority and whose company he lives; ...
With the added circumstance that the child stays with the
mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of
maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of
the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported
by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its
adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency
of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a
minor to accord priority to his best interest This
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme
power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a
royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to
those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the
people and the destruction of their liberties." What is
more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this
concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as
a basic social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so
wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be
strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a
stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference
to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court
to decide as it did.
The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted
provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order,
however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil,
the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the
guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this
Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of
P5,000.00."
TANADA v. ANGARA
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment
272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine
ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein
respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via
signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its
major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on
its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial
products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service
sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and
more investment in the country. These are the predicted

benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by

the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement
as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic
sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First
policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives
foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said
WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the
Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered
automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith.
A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact
and reality be considered as absolute because it is a
regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as
when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it
consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the
concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate
did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine
whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is
outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of
signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction
as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be
the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be
viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO
remains as the only viable structure for multilateral
trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation,
stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the
people be allowed, through their duly elected officers,
make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Limbona v Mangelin
GR No. 80391 28 February 1989
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected
Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21,
1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a
consultation/dialogue with local government officials.
Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the
Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that
there shall be no session in November as his presence was
needed in the house committee hearing of Congress.
However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a
session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was
unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the
session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it
declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly.
Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a
resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling
petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue
that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court

against some members of the Assembly on a question

which should have been resolved within the confines of
the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that
the petition had become "moot and academic" because its
resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction
over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the
extent of self-government given to the autonomous
governments of Region XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process
to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the
latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject
alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the
President (and the Department of Local Government). If
the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably
beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the
Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were
never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense
(decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place,
mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can
make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's
removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local
autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor
of centralized power in Malacaang and the other
beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed
in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2
and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions
shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of

the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in

accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the
twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner
called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or
not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation
tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House
of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the
intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess
could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions
themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of
good faith.
Basco vs PAGCOR GR 91649 (May 14, 1991)
Posted on November 20, 2012
GR 91649
197 SCRA 52, 65
May 14, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869
for being allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and
order, monopolistic & tends toward crony economy,
waiving the Manila City governments right to impose
taxes & license fees, and violating the equal protection
clause, local autonomy and other state policies in the
Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is valid.
HELD:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The grounds for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt. The question of wether PD 1869
is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant
of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD
771, and is now vested exclusively on the National
Government. Necessarily, the power to demand/collect
license fees is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities.
PAGCOR, being a GOCC, is therefore exempt from local
taxes. The National Government is supreme over local
governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot
defeat national policies using the power to tax as a tool
for regulation. The power to tax cannot be allowed to
defeat an instrumentality of the very entity which has the
inherent power to wield it. The power of LGUs to impose
taxes & fees is always subject to limitation provided by
Congress.
The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs
sovereign within a state, it simply means decentralization.
A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all
persons/things. The equal protection clause doesnt
preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact
that some gambling activities are legalized under certain
conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render
the applicable laws unconstitutional.

Case: DISOMANGCOP vs. DPWH SECRETARY, G.R. No.

149848,11/25/2004.FACTS: Pursuant to Sec. 15, Art. X of
the Constitution (for thecreation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and theCordilleras), RA 6734 (An Act
Providing for An Organic Act for theAutonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao) was enacted.Subsequently, the four
provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,Sulu and TawiTawi, voting in favor of autonomy, became theAutonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (provinces of Basilan,Cotabato,
Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Palawan, SouthCotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboangadel
Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog,
GeneralSantos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa
and Zamboangasaid no in the plebiscite) (later virtue of
RA9054, the provinces of Basilan and Marawi City joined).
In accordance with RA6734,EO426 was issued placing the
control and supervision of theoffices of the DPWH within
the autonomous region in MuslimMindanao under the
Autonomous Regional Government.Petitioners Arsadi M.
Disomangcop and Ramir M. Dimalotang(Dimalotang), in
their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and
DistrictEngineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the 1
st
Engineering Districtof DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur
petitioned to nullify Dept. Order119 and RA8999 (creating
the Marawi Sub-District EngineeringOffice and vesting it
with jurisdiction over all nationalinfrastructure projects and
facilities under the DPWH withinMarawi City and Lanao del
Sur. Petitioners contend that thechallenged measures
violate ARMMs constitutional autonomyconsidering that
the functions of the Marawi Sub-DistrictEngineering Office
have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM 1
st
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.RULING: Petition
GRANTED. DO119 is violative of the provisions of EO426
(issued pursuant to RA6734). The 1987
Constitutionmandates regional autonomy to give a bold
and unequivocalanswer to the cry for a meaningful,
effective and forcefulautonomy. Autonomy, as a national
policy, recognizes thewholeness of the Philippine society in
its ethnolinguistic, culturaland even religious diversities. It
strives to free Philippine societyof the strain and wastage
caused by the assimilationist approach.Policies emanating
from the legislature are invariablyassimilationist in
character despite channels being open forminority
representation.A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is
decentralization.Decentralization is a decision by the
central governmentauthorizing its subordinates, whether
geographically orfunctionally defined, to exercise authority
in certain areas. Itinvolves decision-making by subnational
units. It is typically adelegated power, wherein a larger
government chooses todelegate certain authority to more
local governments. Federalismimplies some measure of
decentralization, but unitary systemsmay also
decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically
fromfederalism in that the sub-units that have been
authorized to act(by delegation) do not possess any claim
of right against thecentral government.Decentralization
comes in two forms deconcentration anddevolution.
Deconcentration (administrative decentralization)
isadministrative in nature; it involves the transfer of
functions orthe delegation of authority and responsibility
from the nationaloffice to the regional and local offices.
Devolution, on the otherhand, connotes political
decentralization, or the transfer of powers, responsibilities,
and resources for the performance of certain functions
from the central government to localgovernment units.By
regional autonomy, the framers intended it to
mean"meaningful and authentic regional autonomy (that
is, a kind of local self-government which allows the people
of the region orarea the power to determine what is best
for their growth anddevelopment without undue

interference or dictation from thecentral government). To

this end, Section 16, Article X limits thepower of the
President over autonomous regions. In essence,
theprovision also curtails the power of Congress over
autonomousregions. Consequently, Congress will have to
re-examine nationallaws and make sure that they reflect
the Constitution's adherenceto local autonomy. And in
case of conflicts, the underlying spiritwhich should guide
its resolution is the Constitution's desire forgenuine local
autonomy.E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and
functions of theDPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous
Regional Government (ARG).More importantly, Congress
itself through R.A. 9054 transferredand devolved the
administrative and fiscal management of publicworks and
funds for public works to the ARG. The aim of
theConstitution is to extend to the autonomous peoples,
the peopleof Muslim Mindanao in this case, the right to
self-determination a right to choose their own path of
development; the right todetermine the political, cultural
and economic content of theirdevelopment path within the
framework of the sovereignty andterritorial integrity of the
Philippine Republic. Self-determinationrefers to the need
for a political structure that will respect theautonomous

peoples' uniqueness and grant them sufficient roomfor

self-expression and self-construction.With R.A. 8999,
however, this freedom is taken away, and theNational
Government takes control again. The hands, once more,of
the autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up.
Thechallenged law creates an office with functions and
powers which,by virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously
devolved to theDPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in
Lanao del Sur.
Section 2, LGC- Declaration of Policy
- LGU to enjoy genuine andmeaningful autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullestdevelopment as selfreliant communities and make them effectivepartners in
attainment of national goals thru
decentralization.National agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultationswith appropriate lgu, ngo and po,
before any proect or program isimplemented in their
jurisdiction. The declaration of policy as stated in Section 2
of LGC reinforcesdeclared State policy (Art. II, Sec. 25 of
Constitution) ensuringautonomy to local government units.