UNILAB, INC. vs.

ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163858
June 28, 2005
FACTS:
UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products,
especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing
operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the
issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant
directing the police to seize finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins. No
fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml
bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the
sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court
granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence,
alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were
seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were
valid under the plain view doctrine.
HELD:
It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized
things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove
that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a
prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular
order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent
to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not
enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of
officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered
inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be
stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents
thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI
agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI
failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.

G.R. No. 93239

March 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDISON SUCRO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP) to monitor the
activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana.
Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the
compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a
buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which
he gave to a group of persons. Pat. Fulgencio called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as
Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth
Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant.

Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana.
When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro. The police team was able to
overtake and arrest appellant and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel
and another teabag from Macabante
ISSUES:
Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently.
Whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the
instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, withinthe meaning of the rule authorizing
an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro
conduct his nefarious activity and the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing
the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellantclearly
indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal
act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro's
nefarious activity. Police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had
earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the
exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. There is
nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with therequirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo,
the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.

G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started
drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant. She overheard the three men talking about
their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Fredo, Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace .
Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing as follows: Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito
Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and
when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged
Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.
Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo
Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was
brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive
fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object.

Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they
found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by
Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the
house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin
purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente,
was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.
Two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation
of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, and for Murder. The trial court convicted him of Violation of
Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the prosecution; and
2. Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite the absence
of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
The appealed decision was affirmed.
ARREST
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace.
They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when theyinspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments
of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The
eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor,
Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the
violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest
Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled
the law as his two companions did.
SEARCH and SEIZURE
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissibleprecautionary measure of arresting
officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them
unless he is first
CONSPIRACY
When there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was
proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions
conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and
caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved
by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit".

G.R. No. 74189 May 26, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO ENRILE Y VILLAROMAN and ROGELIO ABUGATAL Y MARQUEZ, accused-appellants.

CRUZ, J.:
Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Antonio Enrile
faults the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for convicting him. 1 His co-accused, Rogelio Abugatal, was killed in
an attempted jailbreak and this appeal is dismissed as to him. 2 We deal here only with Enrile.
The evidence for the prosecution showed that at about half past six in the evening of October 25, 1985, a buybust team composed of Pat. Jaime Flores and Pat. Wilson Rances of the Quezon City Police Anti-Narcotics Unit
was dispatched to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. The
plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato Polines, a police informer, who was himself to pose as the
buyer. 3
In their separate testimonies, 4 both policemen said that on the occasion they saw Polines hand over to Abugatal
the marked money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money and returned ten
minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two policemen then approached Abugatal and
placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory examination
revealed this to be marijuana with flowering tops weighing 22 grams. 5
The prosecution also showed that, upon providing Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20 De Vera Street,
also in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City, where he called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out and met
them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana, whereupon the policemen
immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front pocket of his trousers the marked money
earlier delivered to Abugatal, with Serial No. PJ966425. 6
At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession affirming the above narration. 7 Enrile refused to
make any statement pending consultation with a lawyer.
In his defense, Enrile testified that the marked money was "planted" on him by the police officers, who he said
simply barged into his house without a warrant and arrested him. He stoutly denied any knowledge of the
marijuana. He claimed that at the time of the alleged incident, he was attending, as a dental technician, to a
patient whom he was fitting for dentures. 8 The supposed patient, Alicia Tiempo, corroborated him. 9
Enrile admitted that he had earlier been convicted of selling marijuana and that he had a pending application for
probation. He suggested that this could be the reason the policemen sought to implicate him in the new charge
and thus weaken his application. 10
Abugatal contradicted his earlier sworn statement and declared on the stand that he had not sold any marijuana
to Polines. What really happened, he said, was that two male teenagers approached him that evening and told
him to buy marijuana, giving him P50.00 for the purpose. When he said he did not have any marijuana and did not
know where to buy it, they forced him to go to Enrile's house and to give him the marked money. He did so
because they had a knife. Enrile handed him a plastic bag which was later found to contain dried marijuana
fruiting tops. 11
Judge Willelmo C. Fortun erred when he gave credence to the sworn statement of Abugatal, considering that it
was made without compliance with the requisites of a custodial investigation, including the right to the assistance
of counsel. The confession was clearly inadmissible. It did not follow the ruling of this Court in Morales v.
Enrile, 12promulgated on April 26, 1983, as reiterated in People v. Galit, 13 promulgated on March 20, 1985, where
Justice Hermogenes Concepcion laid down the correct procedure, thus:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible
or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court

upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may
be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory, in whole
or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The challenged decision of the trial court was promulgated on February 14, 1986, long after the above-cited
decisions had become effective.
Even under the old doctrine, in fact, it is doubtful if Abugatal's confession without the assistance of counsel could
have been sustained. It was not enough then to inform the suspect of his constitutional rights. The trial court had
to ascertain for itself that the accused clearly understood the import and consequences of his confession and had
the intelligence and mental capacity to do so. 14 There is no showing in the record that this was done, short of the
statement in the decision that Abugatal had been informed of his rights and had validly waived the assistance of
counsel.
If the sworn statement of Abugatal was inadmissible against him, much less was it admissible against Enrile.
The prosecution rejected Abugatal's testimony that he was forced to go to Enrile's house and buy marijuana from
him, insisting instead on the extrajudicial confession. With that confession outlawed and the testimony disowned
by the prosecution itself, there is no evidence at all against Enrile to tie him with Abugatal.
It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen as he sold the marijuana to Polines.
Enrile was not even at the scene of the entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he did lead the policemen to
Enrile's house where he pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even assuming this to be true, that
circumstance alone did not justify Enrile's warrantless arrest and search.
Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a warrantless
arrest only under any of the following circumstances :
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the policemen who
later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the source of marijuana.
According to the policemen themselves, what happened was that they asked Abugatal who gave him the
marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house and
immediately arrested him. 15
What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of the information supplied by
Abugatal, and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest Enrile. They
had no right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and subsequently disallowed) allegations of
Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the police station as if he had been caught in flagrante delicto.
The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. The
marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not retroactively validate the
warrantless search and seizure.

The principle has been honored through the ages in all liberty-loving regimes that a man's house is his castle that
not even the mighty monarch, with all its forces, may violate. There were measures available under the law to
enable the authorities to search Enrile's house and to arrest him if he was found in possession of prohibited
articles. The police did not employ these measures.
What they did was simply intrude into Enrile's house and arrest him without the slightest heed to the injunctions of
the Bill of Rights. By so doing, they were using the tactics of the police state, where the minions of the
government place little value on human rights and individual liberties and are obssessed only with the
maintenance of peace and punishment of crime.
These are laudible objectives in any well-ordered society. But it should never be pursued at the cost of
dismantling the intricate apparatus for the protection of the individual from overzealous law-enforcers who
mistakenly believe that suspected criminals have forfeited the safeguards afforded them by the Constitution. Lawenforcers are not licensed to themselves break the law to apprehend and punish law-breakers. Such a practice
only leads to further defiance of the law by those who have been denied its protection.
In the light of the proven circumstances of this case, the Court is not convinced that there is enough evidence to
establish Enrile's guilt beyond the shadow of doubt. The paucity of such evidence only strengthens the suspicion
that the marked money was really "planted" on Enrile by the police officers who were probably worried that their
earlier efforts in securing Enrile's conviction as a drug pusher would be thwarted by his application for probation.
Whatever their motives, the fact is that Abugatal's sworn statement implicating Enrile is inadmissible against
Enrile, and so is the marked money allegedly found on him as a result of the illegal search. The only remaining
evidence against the appellant is Abugatal's testimony, but this has been questioned and discredited by the
prosecution itself. Its case against Enrile is thus left without a leg to stand on and must therefore be dismissed.
Law-enforcement authorities are admonished that mere enthusiasm in the discharge of their duties is not enough
to build a case against a person charged with a crime. They should build it with painstaking care, stone by stone
of provable fact, and with constant regard for the rights of the accused, before they can hope to secure a
conviction that can be sustained in a court of justice.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Antonio Enrile in the challenged decision is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED.
The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and shall be released immediately. It is so ordered.