PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE MAXIMIANO C.

ASUNCION GR NO. 122092 MAY 19, 1999

To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be followed strictly. Where the judge fails
to personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latters witnesses, or where the
I.
witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge, the search warrant must be struck
down.
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying for (1) the nullification of Search
II.
Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City; and (2) the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist from
III.
proceeding with IS No. 95-167.
In its October 23, 1995 Resolution, this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the
respondents to comment on the said Petition. On December 20, 1995, Respondent PNP Traffic
Management Command filed its 31-page Opposition to the Petition, together with 90 pages of annexes.
On February 22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment agreeing with petitioners
that the writs prayed for must be granted. After petitioners filed a Reply to the Opposition, the Court
gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, in its February 5,
1997 Resolution,[7] required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to prepare the memorandum for the public
respondents. After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June 23, 1997, [8] the Court in its September
24, 1997 Resolution gave him a non-extendible period ending on October 31, 1997 within which to file
the required memorandum. In view of Daceras manifestation that he was only a nominal party and that
he had yet to receive the records of the case from the PNP, the Court, in its December 8, 1999
Resolution, ordered the Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic Management Command to file
its memorandum within thirty days from notice; otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for
decision.[9] Even after the expiration of the said period, the required pleading was not yet received by
this Court. Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOUs refusal/failure to submit its memorandum as
a waiver of its privilege to do so.
Facts: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search
warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City, stating:
1.

2.

That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo
G[.] Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions,
explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the
offense, and which xxx are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises herein described.
That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and
bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties. Attached to the application [11] were
the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, [12] as well as a
summary of the information and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the
contested search warrant,[13] the pertinent portion of which reads: It appearing to the satisfaction of
the undersigned, after examining under oath, SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, that there is probable
cause to believe that the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located
at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice
President Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its possession or control the following properties mentioned.

In violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition and

Explosives), and the same should be seized and brought before this Court. NOW, THEREFORE, you
are hereby authorized to make an immediate search daytime between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the
aforementioned premises and to seize and bring the articles above-described and make an immediate
return there[of]. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound
and seized the following: make/type caliber, serial number brand, magazine assembly qty., live
ammunition qty.
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to
Quash before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to
Quash and a Motion to Suppress Evidence.

On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners motions. On
August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.
ISSUES: In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in support of their cause:
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or has
exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799(95). Probable cause [has] not
xxx been sufficiently established and partaking as it does of the nature of a general warrant.
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or has
exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799(95) on the ground that it was
unlawfully served or implemented.
Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave abuse of discretion or
exceeding his jurisdiction in continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167 on the basis of illegally
seized evidence.
In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. As a preliminary matter, we shall
also discuss respondents argument that the Petition should be dismissed for raising factual questions.
RULLING: The petition is meritorious.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE: ALLEDGES FACTUAL QUESTIONS
In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions
of fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They maintain that the Petition
merely assails the factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and the regularity of its implementation.
This argument is not convincing. It is settled that there is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts. [23] In the present case, petitioners do not question the truth
of the facts as found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which those findings were arrived
at, a procedure which they contend was violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. We agree
that the Petition raises only questions of law, which may be resolved in the present case.
MAIN ISSUE: VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT
The fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the basic conditions for
the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court,[24] detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant as follows:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. -- A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she
may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically
describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. [25] In the present case, the search
warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other
deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search
warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms;
and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.
NO PERSONAL EXAMINATION OF WITNESS
In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the search warrant was valid, stating
that before issuing the subject warrant, the court propounded searching questions to the applicant and
the witnesses in order to determine whether there was probable cause x x x. [26] (Emphasis
supplied.) This was supported by the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, which argued that it is
erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable Court did not propound searching questions upon

applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the witnesses he produced. [27] The records, however,
proclaim otherwise.
As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascuas application for a search warrant was supported by (1)
the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, (2) a summary of
information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua
and Bacolod, however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial
court. Moreover, the applicants participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant
consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod. Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he
said nothing more. In fact, he failed even to affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial
judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses
other than Bacolod (whose testimony, as will later be shown, is also improper). Obviously, His Honor
relied mainly on their affidavits. This Court has frowned on this practice in this language: Mere affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine
the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it
will be found later that his declarations are false.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or proforma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application. Bacolods Testimony Pertained Not to Facts Personally Known to Him: Bacolod appeared
during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his testimony showed that he did
not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were not licensed to possess
firearms, ammunitions or explosives.
In his Deposition, he stated: When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he
believed that the PICOP security guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however,
does not meet the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not
belief. Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound
was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guards were not licensed. He
also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before the trial
court that PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms. Worse, the
applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy of the aforementioned
no license certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP, or to present it during
the hearing. Such certification could have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located in
Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based. In People v. Judge Estrada, the Court held:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could
be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where
the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of
a license required by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control
of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the
time of the application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefore during the examination by
the judge.
Particularity of the Place to Be Searched
In view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable search, the
Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant.[33] Thus,
this Court has held that this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that
to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach
of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except
in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.[34] Additionally,
the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least under some
circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a
sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in a particular place. [35]
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with particularity. It
simply authorizes a search of the aforementioned premises, but it did not specify such premises. The
warrant identifies only one place, and that is the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located
at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur. The PICOP compound, however, is
made up of 200 offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses,
6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out
over some one hundred fifty-five hectares.[36] Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled
and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound.[37]
In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement, because
they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the warrant. They add

that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched, because they were not among those
identified during the hearing. These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by
the police were not made integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asuncion. Moreover, the
fact that the raiding police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound
housed firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the place to be searched.
[39]
Otherwise, confusion would arise regarding the subject of the warrant the place indicated in the
warrant or the place identified by the police. Such conflict invites uncalled for mischief or abuse of
discretion on the part of law enforcers.
Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals,[40] this Court ruled that the police had no authority to search
the apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if they
really intended it to be the subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot
be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police: In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the
warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds
as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same;
and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It [was] neither
fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim
that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant [was] exactly what they had in
view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is
material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the
applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the
warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4)
apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers
own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application
for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search
warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It
would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that
delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to
officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from
them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by
the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers
conducting the search. (Emphasis supplied.)
Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence
As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95) issued
by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a complaint docketed as IS No.
95-167 against herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. State Prosecutor Dacera, to whom
the Complaint was assigned for preliminary investigation, issued a subpoena requiring petitioners to file
their counter-affidavits. Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension of
the preliminary investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash the search warrant. They
argued, as they do now, that the illegally obtained firearms could not be the basis of the criminal
Complaint. Their motion was denied. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration met the same fate. In
the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assert that State Prosecutor Dacera cannot
have any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167.[41]
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court,
all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[42] As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[43] Verily, they are the fruits of the poisonous tree. Without this
exclusionary rule, the constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence. In the present case, the
complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms and other materials seized pursuant
to Search Warrant No. 799 (95).Since these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the
Complaint and the proceedings before State Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand on. This
Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and order in the
country; however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so only upon strict
observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our people. Indeed, there is a right way to do the
right thing at the right time for the right reason.[45]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search
Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL andVOID. The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 83, QUEZON CITY; and AIDEN LANUZA
The People of the Philippines, through this petition for review, seeks the reversal of the order of
respondent Judge Estrella T. Estrada, dated December 7, 1995, which granted private respondent Aiden
Lanuzas motion to quash Search Warrant No. 958 (95), as well as the order dated April 1, 1996 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.
On June 27, 1995, Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and
Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the issuance of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza of
516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, for violation of Article 40 (k) of Republic Act
7394 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines).
1.

2.

3.
4.

In her application for search warrant, Atty. Cabanlas alleged, among others, as follows:
On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I received reports from
SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command of the PNP
that certain: Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said
Officer Cabiles various drug products amounting to Seven Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Two
Pesos (P 7,232.00) on May 29, 1995; Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has no license to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug
products from the BFAD; Distribution, sale or offer for sale or transfer of drug products without
license to operate from BFAD is in violation of Art. 40 (k) of RA 7394 (or the Consumer Act).
In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the various drug
products sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and
Lanuza Bag 2 of 2 were enclosed; and the same are likewise submitted herewith.
The application, however, ended with the statement that the warrant is to search the premises of
another person at a different address:
This is executed to support affiants application for a search warrant on the premises of Belen
Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay Cebu.[2] (Emphasis supplied)
In support of the application, the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles, a member of the Regional

Intelligence Group IV of the PNP Intelligence Command, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna,
was attached thereto, wherein he declared that:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Upon the request for assistance by BFAD, he conducted surveillance for persons distributing,
selling or transferring drug products without license to operate from BFAD.
On May 29, 1995, a certain Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City
sold to him various drug products amounting to P7,232.00 and
Upon further verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises, the said person and
place have in fact no license to operate.
Earlier than May 29, 1995, affiant saw a delivery of drug products from the residence of Mrs.
Lanuza in 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City to another person.
Accompanying this affidavit are the various products sold to/and purchased by the affiant contained
in two (2) plastic bags marked Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza Bag 2 of 2.

This is executed in support of the affiants report to BFAD and for whatever legitimate purpose this
may serve. [3] (Emphasis supplied)
The BFAD also submitted with the application a copy of the sketch[4] of the location of Aiden
Lanuzas residence at her stated address. On the same day the application was filed, the respondent
Judge issued Search Warrant No. 958 (95), which reads in full:
SEARCH WARRANT. It appears to the satisfaction of this Court, after examining under oath Atty.
Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) and her witness, Manuel P. Cabiles, member of the Intelligence
Group IV, Intelligence Command, PNP, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of Article 40(k) in relation to Article 41 of Republic Act No.

7394 (Consumer Act) has been committed or about to be committed and there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that Ms. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose dela Montana Street, Cebu City has in her
possession and control at said address the following described properties: medicines and drugs of
undetermined quantity which she is selling, distributing and transferring without the necessary license
from the Department of Health.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the DAY or NIGHT of the
premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the undetermined amount of
drugs and medicines subject of the offense and to bring the same to this Court to be dealt with as the
law directs. You are further directed to submit a return of this Search Warrant within ten (10) days from
today.This Search Warrant is valid within a period of ten (10) days from the date of issue.
On June 28, 1995, the search warrant was served at private respondent Lanuzas residence at the
indicated address by a composite team of policemen from the PNP 7th Criminal Investigation Command,
Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City.
How the search warrant was implemented was briefly narrated in the Joint Affidavit,[6] dated June
29, 1995, of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Marckbilly Capalungan, both members of the search
and seizure team. They stated in their affidavit that their team, armed with the search
warrant, conducted a raid at the premises of one AIDEN LANUZA of 516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Cebu City x x x; that the raid was witnessed by Luis Rivera, Demetrio Panimdim and Francisco
Ojales, both (sic) Brgy. Tanod of Kasambagan, Cebu City; that the service of the (search) warrant
resulted in the confiscation of fifty-two (52) cartoons (sic) of assorted medicines from the possession
and control of AIDEN LANUZA; and that the said items were brought to the 7CICRO office for detailed
inventory headed by Atty. Lorna F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division of
the BFAD, Manila.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
The present petition, however, narrates a different account of what actually happened during the
implementation of the search warrant. Paragraph 5 of the petition states: At the commencement of the
search, the members of the team discovered that the premises described as 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was actually a five thousand (5,000) square meter compound
containing at least fifteen (15) structures which are either leased residences, offices, factories,
workshops or warehouse. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent
Lanuza at Lot No. 41 of said address. Finding no drug products thereat, they proceeded to search a
nearby warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound and address above stated. This search
yielded fifty-two (52) cartons of assorted drug products which were then inventoried in due course.
In an order[9] dated July 3, 1995, the respondent Judge noted the inventory of the seized drugs and
authorized the BFAD to retain custody of the same, to have samples of the drugs analyzed and be
brought to the registered drug manufacturers for parallel testing.
On August 22, 1995, private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a verified motion [10] praying that Search
Warrant No. 958 (95) be quashed and that the seized articles be declared inadmissible in any
proceeding and ordered returned to the warehouse owned by Folk Arts Export & Import Company
located at Lot No. 38 inside the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City. The
motion is based on the grounds that the search warrant is illegal and null and void because: (1) it was
applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was
issued to search the residence of private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Cebu City; (2) it was issued for a non-existing offense; (3) Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas was
not duly authorized by applicant BFAD to apply therefor; (4) it failed to particularly describe the place to
be searched and the things to be seized; (5) the applicant's witnesses had no personal knowledge of
the facts upon which it was issued; and (6) its implementation was unreasonable as it was enforced on
a different or wrong place which was lawfully occupied by a different or wrong person.[11]
Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas, who appeared for the BFAD, opposed[12] the motion to quash the
search warrant, to which the private respondent countered with a reply.
After the contending parties had submitted their respective positions without further oral
arguments, the respondent Judge issued the assailed order[13] dated December 7, 1995, quashing
Search Warrant No. 958 (95). Accordingly, the order dated July 3, 1995 was revoked and all the articles
seized were declared inadmissible in any and all proceedings against private respondent Aiden
Lanuza. Also, the BFAD was ordered to return at its expense all the seized items to the warehouse of

Folk Arts Import & Export Company at Lot No. 38, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City
within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice of the said order.[14]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the December 7, 1995 order was denied in an
order[15] dated April 1, 1996, impelling petitioner to file the present petition asserting that the respondent
Judge erred:
A. In holding that the defect appearing in BFAD's application for a search
warrant is so "grave" in nature as to warrant quashal of the search warrant
issued thereunder, considering that such variance is actually a harmless
clerical error.
B. In holding that Atty. Cabanlas was not authorized by the BFAD to apply for a
search warrant concerning the unlicensed distribution of drugs, considering
that the grant of BFAD authorization upon her to investigate fake,
misbranded, adulterated or unregistered drugs necessarily contemplates the
authority to investigate the unlicensed activities above noted.
C. In holding that applicant BFAD had failed to discharge the burden of proving
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, by failing to present
documentary proof indicating that private respondent had no license to sell
or distribute drug products, considering that under the authority ofCarillo v.
People (229 SCRA 386) the BFAD only had the burden of proving the
negative ingredient of the offense charged on the basis of the best evidence
procurable under the circumstances.
D. d) In holding that the place sought to be searched had not been described
with sufficient particularity in SW No. 958 (95), considering that Aiden
Lanuza's residence at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo,
Cebu City was not so conspicuously or notoriously represented to the public
as such by her as to contradict the investigating and serving officers'
perception of the outward appearance of her dwelling, which led them to
believe that the more general address of 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City referred to her dwelling.
E. e) In ordering the return of the things seized, the possession of which is
prohibited.[16]
We granted the petitioners application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a
resolution[17] dated June 26, 1996 and restrained the implementation of the assailed orders, effective
immediately and until further orders from this Court.
Private respondent Aiden Lanuza later filed her comment [18] on the petition, but petitioner's reply
thereto was not admitted by this Court in a resolution [19] dated January 13, 1997, for failure by the
Solicitor General to file the same within his first extension of thirty (30) days, that was granted, but with a
warning that no further extension would be given. Instead of filing his reply, the Solicitor General asked
for two (2) more extensions of time, which were denied.
Now to the assigned errors of the respondent Judge raised by petitioner.
The requirements for the issuance of a search warrant are inscribed in Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, to wit: "Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."
In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of the respondent Judge that the application
for its issuance suffered from a grave defect, "which escaped (her) attention," considering that it was
applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was
issued to search the residence of herein private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Cebu City.[20]
We nonetheless find such error in the application for search warrant a negligible defect.

The title of the questioned application, and the allegations contained therein, pertinent portions of
which we quote:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I received reports
from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command of the
PNP that certain
a.

b.

Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City
sold to said Officer Cabiles various drug products amounting to Seven
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P 7,232.00) on May 29,
1995;
Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has no license to operate, distribute, sell or
transfer drug products from the BFAD;

2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the
various drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked Lanuza
Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza Bag 2 of 2 were enclosed; and the same are likewise submitted
herewith.
Unmistakably reveal that the said application was specifically intended against private respondent
Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. She has been the only one
identified in the application, as well as in the aforequoted affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles upon which
the application was based, as having allegedly sold to said SPO4 Cabiles various drugs amounting
to P7,232.00 on May 29, 1995, without any license to do so, in alleged violation of Article 40 (k) of R.A.
7394. It is noteworthy that, as stated in the above-quoted paragraph 2 of the application, the plastic
bags which contained the seized drugs and which were submitted together with the application, were
marked as "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2." These markings with the name "Lanuza"
obviously refer to no other than the herein private respondent. And when the respondent Judge issued
the search warrant, it was directed solely against private respondent Aiden Lanuza at her address: 516
San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
The Solicitor General explained the error in the application by saying that on the same day
applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas filed the questioned application on June 27, 1995, another
application for search warrant was also filed against one Belen Cabanero at her residence at New
Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu City. This can be deduced from the following examination conducted by
respondent Judge on Atty. Cabanlas
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the name and address of one Belen Cabanero
were erroneously copied in paragraph 3 of the application in question. Such defect, as intimated earlier,
is not of such a gravity as to call for the invalidation of the search warrant.
There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant. Firstly, we cannot fault
the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was not convinced that there was
probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to present documentary proof
indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs.
It must be noted that in the application for search warrant, private respondent is charged with the
specific offense of selling drugs without the required license from the Department of Health, which is in
violation of Article 40 (k) of R. A. 7394, and penalized under Article 41 thereof. The said application was
supported by the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles where, in paragraph 3 thereof, he declared that he
made a "verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises" and discovered that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza had "no license" to sell drugs.
We agree with the respondent Judge that applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas should have
submitted documentary proof that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no such license. Although no
explanation was offered by respondent Judge to support her posture, we hold that to establish the
existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must
show facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that

an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched."[24]
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could
be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in
cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged - for instance,
the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case - and such evidence is within the
knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence
could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor
during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before
a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of
his home and personalties. As well stated by this Court through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando
in Villanueva vs. Querubin: It is deference to ones personality that lies at the core of this right, but it
could be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily ones home but
not necessarily thereto confined (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 [1966]). What is sought to be
guarded is a mans prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge,
his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind
of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon
to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life (Cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757, Brennam, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630). In the same vein,
Landynski in his authoritative work, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966), could fitly
characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the
privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in
case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards (Ibid, p.
47). (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the
Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel could have easily procured such certification when he went to the
BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why
such certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private
respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. The presumption of
regularity cannot be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it. [26] We apply by
analogy our ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.:[27]
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their
possession the pirated films. The petitioners argument to the effect that the presentation of the master
tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature
and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search
warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily
reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner
pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the
copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to
determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause.Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant. (Emphasis supplied)

Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in
the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually
located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be
seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is
owned by a different person. Again, the respondent Judge is correct on this point.
This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. [28] In the present case, it must be
noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch [29]of the compound at 516
San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of
private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of
other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have
been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as
to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant
merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu
City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house
of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent
sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is
violative of the constitutional requirement.
While the questioned search warrant had all the characteristic of a general warrant, it was correctly
implemented. For, the searching team went directly to the house of private respondent Aiden Lanuza
located at Lot No. 41 inside the compound known as 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City. However, the team did not find any of the drug products which were the object of the
search. Frustrated, and apparently disappointed, the team then proceeded to search a nearby
warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import Company owned by one David Po located at Lot No. 38 within
the same compound. It was in the warehouse that drug products were found and seized which were
duly receipted. In the Joint Affidavit of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Markbilly Capalungan,
members of the searching team, is a statement that the confiscated 52 cartons of assorted medicines
were found in the possession and control of private respondent Aiden Lanuza. This is a blatant
falsehood and is aggravated by the fact that this was committed by officers sworn to uphold the law. In
searching the warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import Company owned by one David Po, the searching
team went beyond the scope of the search warrant. As the trial court aptly observed: The verified motion
to quash and reply also show that the search at the house of defendant-movant yielded negative result
and the confiscated articles were taken from another place which is the warehouse of Folk Arts Import
and Export Company owned by another person. In the return of the search warrant, it is stated that
Search Warrant No. 958 (95) was served at the premises of 516 San Jose dela Montana St., Cebu City
and that during the search, drug products were found and seized therefrom which were duly
receipted. Accompanying said return is the Joint Affidavit of two (2) members of the searching team,
namely: SPO2 Froctuoso Bete and SPO2 Markbilly Capalingan, both of the 7 th Criminal Investigation
Command, PNP, with station at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gerardo Avenue, Cebu City which also
mentioned only the address as 516 San Jose dela Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City and the confiscation
of 52 cartoons(sic) of assorted medicines purportedly from the possession and control of defendantmovant. However, as indicated in the sketch attached to the application for search warrant, said Folk
Arts Import and Export Company is owned by one David Po, which is a concrete proof that the
searching team exceeded their authority by conducting a search not only in the residence of defendantmovant Lanuza but also in another place which the applicant itself has identified as belonging to another
person, David Po. The foregoing are strong reasons to support the conclusion that there has been an
unreasonable search and seizure which would warrant the quashal of the search warrant. [30]
The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion to quash the search warrant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued in a
resolution dated June 26, 1996 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

a.
b.

Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the company;

Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the distribution of
the canned sardines processed by UNIFISH;
c.
Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders and
buys from UNIFISH without any receipt of his purchases;
d.
The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH through Uy
Chin Ho delivers to the different supermarkets such as White Gold,
Gaisano, etc.;
e.
Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made by
checks drawn payable to cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These
payments are also not receipted (sic);
f.
Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines he had
withdrawn from the corporation;
3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Hos direction is the sale of
imported oil locally to different customers. This is a case of smuggling in the sense that UNIFISH,
being an export company registered with the Board of Investments, is enjoying certain exemptions in
their importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its processing of canned tuna for export. These
tax exemptions are granted by the government on the condition that the oil is to be used only in the
processing of tuna for export and that it is not to be sold unprocessed as is to local customers.
4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax exemptions in
its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that these are to be used as containers for its
processed tuna for export. These cans are never intended to be sold locally to other food processing
companies.
5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION was
then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to
as PREMIER) [,] which corporation was being controlled by the same majority stockholders as those
now running and controlling UNIFISH; [a]t that time, PREMIER was also committing the same
fraudulent acts as what is being perpetrated by UNIFISH at present.
6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of both UNIFISH AND
PREMIER, are found in the office of the corporation at its factory site at H. Cortes Street, Mandaue
City. The particular place or spot where these records [official receipts, sales invoices, delivery
receipts, sales records or sales books, stock cards, accounting records (such as ledgers, journals,
cash receipts books, and check disbursements books)] are kept and may be found is best described
in the herein attached sketch of the arrangement of the offices furniture and fixture of the corporation
which is made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex A
7. 7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the foregoing allegations and he is
reserving his right to claim for reward under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2338.
On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the
BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The application
sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.
After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the
disputed search warrants. The first[2] is docketed as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
FOR: VIOLATION OF SECTION 253 ("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of two pages. A verbatim
reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:
FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, respondents.
Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish
Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof.
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities
constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be a former
employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit[1] stating:
1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as
UNIFISH), a canning factory located at Hernan Cortes Street, under the active management of UY
CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is selling by the thousands of [sic] cartons of canned sardines without
issuing receipt. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the Internal Revenue Code.
2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme:

SEARCH WARRANT (TO ANY PEACE OFFICER)

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath (sic), Nestor N.
Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a (sic)
probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax
has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho c/o Unifish
Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and control, the
following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

5.
6.
7.

Sales Records, Job Order;

Corporate Financial Records; and
Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said
premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles abovementioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the undersigned to
be dealt with as the law directs.
The second warrant is similarly docketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF
SEC. 253 ("Search Warrant A-2").Search Warrant A-2, reproduced below, is almost identical in content
to Search Warrant A-1, save for the portions indicated in bold print. It consisted of only one page.
SEARCH WARRANT (TO ANY PEACE OFFICER)
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath [sic], Nestor N.
Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a [sic]
probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax
has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy
and Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and
control, the following:
Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books,
Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts; Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,]
Stock Cards; Unregistered Delivery Receipts; Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices; Sales Records,
Job Order; Corporate Financial Records; and Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said premises
and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles above-mentioned
and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt
with as the law directs.
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant,[4] which was docketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-1080 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263 (hereinafter, "Search Warrant B"). Except for
the docket number and the designation of the crime in the body of the warrant (Section 238 in relation to
Sec. 263 - non-issuance of sales invoice and use and possession of unregistered delivery receipts
and/or sales invoices), Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-2.
On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the Philippine
National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. They
seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said search
was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.
On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the Department of Justice. The
records, however, do not reveal the nature of this case.
On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants with Branch 28
of the Cebu RTC. The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent
motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA dismissed their petition, holding that petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6
of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which states:
a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and a copy thereof
shall be served on each of the respondents, and must be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
decision or order complained of and true copies of the pleadings and other pertinent documents and
papers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November 24, 1992).
The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to Quash, (2)
the Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos.
The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question the resolution denying the
motion to quash.
In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners, assuming that the Department
of Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for reinvestigation; the right to post bail; a Motion to
Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an appeal, after judgment on the merits, or after the case
shall have been tried. This brings us to the case of Lai vs. Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the
pronouncement, thus:
Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner has other
remedies available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners (referring to the petition for certiorari)
from the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by Judge Diez, the same should not have

been granted. Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course
of law against Judge Lomeda's order for their arrest. These remedies are as enumerated by respondent
appellate court in its decision: "1. they can post bail for their provisional release; 2. They can ask the
Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the charge against them. If unsatisfied with the fiscal's resolution
they can ask for a review by the Minister of Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as amended by P.D.
911); 3. iftheir petition for review does not prosper, they can file a motion to quash the information in the
trial court. (Rule 117, Rules of
Court). 4. If the motion is denied, theycan appeal the judgment of the court after the case shall have bee
n tried on the merits.
Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial.-- Moreover, in the case
of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held
that when amotion to quash a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial witho
ut prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said Motion. In the event that an adverse
decision is rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom should be the next legal step.
xxx
In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the Search Warrants
without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore that the Court committed
an error in not describing the persons or things to be searched; that the Search Warrants did not
describe with particularity the things to be seized/taken; the absence of probable cause; and for having
allegedly condoned the discriminating manner in which the properties were taken, to us, are merely
errors in the Court's finding, certainly not correctible by certiorari, but instead thru an appeal. [5]
In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was
committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants. As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved
futile, petitioners filed the instant petition for review. Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA
certified true copies of the pleadings and documents listed above along with their Petition, as well as in
their Motion for Reconsideration. An examination of the CA Rollo, however, reveals that petitioners first
submitted the same in their Reply, after respondents, in their Comment, pointed out petitioners failure to
attach them to the Petition.
Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although, to its credit, it
did touch upon the merits of the case.First, it appears that the case could have been decided without
these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed them essential to the resolution of the
case, it could have asked for the records from the RTC. Third, in a similar case, [6] we held that the
submission of a document together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial
compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the submission of a certified true
copy of material portions of the record as are referred to [in the petition], and other documents relevant
or pertinent thereto along with the petition. So should it be in this case, especially considering that it
involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right. The rules of procedure are not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial
justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be defeated.[7]
The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail of certiorari to question the resolution
denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. We note that the case of Lai vs.
Intermediate, cited by the appellate court as authority for its ruling does not appear in 220 SCRA 149.
The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as observed by petitioners, [8] appears to have been
taken from the case of Yap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 245 (1993). Yap, however, is
inapplicable since that case involved a motion to quash a complaint for qualified theft, not a motion to
quash a search warrant.
The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman,[9] where we held that the issuing judges disregard
of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which
may be remedied by certiorari:
Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that certiorari is
available where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is indisputable that Judge de
Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant. Indeed, he acted whimsically
and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that
a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized; and that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense. The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said rule
renders the warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been held that where the order

complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained
despite the existence of the remedy of appeal. Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman
would neither be an adequate nor speedy remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the
warrant. The seizure of her personal property had resulted in the total paralization of the articles and
documents which had been improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate
and expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage
and injury to a party.
This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement in Silva vs. Presiding Judge, RTC
of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,[10] which also involved a special civil action for certiorari:[11]
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional requirement
that he must determine the existence of probable cause by examining the applicant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes
grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982,
114 SCRA 657, the capricious disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements before
issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing judge violated the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the disputed search warrants,
which, if true, would have constituted grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners also alleged that the
enforcers of the warrants seized almost all the records and documents of the corporation thus resulting
in the paralysis of its business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequate remedy that would afford
petitioners expeditious relief.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are: the warrant must be issued upon
probable cause; the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant
or any other person; in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; andthe warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.[12]
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrants.
[13]
The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of
process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is
none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The
warrants will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical
accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer
undertakes to justify under it.[14]
Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their
nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in Search
Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search Warrants A-1
and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the
same crime, for the same place, at a single occasion is cited as another irregularity. Petitioners also
dispute the existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants. Finally, they
claim that the things to be seized were not described with particularity. These defects, according to
petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence.
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED

Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho
alias Frank Uy as Hernan Cortes St., CebuCity while the body of the same warrant states the address
as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City. Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the
address of petitioner as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City.
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description
of the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized. [16] The rule is that a description of a
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended [17]and distinguish it from other places in the community.[18] Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. [19] Thus, in Castro vs. Pabalan,
[20]
where the search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners therein as
Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court "admitted that the deficiency in
the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation."
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu
City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of
petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the
premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrants invalidation in this case.
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSONS NAMES IN THE TWO WARRANTS
Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search Warrants A-1
and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy. Search Warrant A2, on the other hand, was directed against UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and Unifish Packing
Corporation.
These discrepancies are hardly relevant.
In Miller v. Sigler,[21] it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, from
which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is historically derived, does not require the warrant to
name the person who occupies the described premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the
search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to name the
owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant;
and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted in the
search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched is otherwise
correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the place to be searched.[22]
Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or occupying
the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could not be declared
unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the premises, because of
inconsistencies in stating their names.
TWO WARRANTS ISSUED AT ONE TIME FOR ONE CRIME AND ONE PLACE
In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant A-2. Two
warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court for the same crime
(violation of SEC. 253 of the National Internal Revenue Code). It appears, however, that Search Warrant
A-2 was issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search Warrant A-1, as well as to
include Unifish Packing Corporation as a party against whom the warrant was issued. Search Warrant
A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be more precise in the names of the persons
against whom the warrant was issued and in the description of the place to be searched. Indeed, it
would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single occasion two warrants authorizing the search of a
single place for a single offense. Inasmuch as the apparent intent in issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to
supersede Search Warrant A-1, the latter should be deemed revoked by the former.
THE ALLEDGES ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject search
warrants. Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. [24] In the determination of probable
cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an examination of the witnesses under oath. The
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma. The examining
magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the
intent and justification of the application. [25] Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application
for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the
requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.[26]
The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual

making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
[27]
Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or
belief.[28]
It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses, namely,
Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old employee of Unifish. Petitioners
claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree with this contention, but only as to
the testimony of Labaria, who stated during the examination
The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of the alleged illegal activities of
petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was merely supplied by Abos. Therefore,
the deposition of Labaria, which is based on hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify the issuance of the
search warrants.[30]
The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias deposition but is
supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged illegal practices was apparently
obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos detailed the schemes employed by
Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described the place where the documents
supposedly evidencing these schemes were located
In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan collects all the records
from this girl and this girl makes the statements.This first girl delivers the receipts. The second girl
prepares the bill of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of all the stocks.
This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records from these people are
stored in this place which is marked as "C".
Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the company records, and
even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we reject the contention that this witness did
not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified. The contents of the deposition clearly
demonstrate otherwise. The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries
made by the judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness affidavit. We find such
inquiries to be sufficiently probing.
ALLEDGED LACK OF PARTICULARITY IN THE DESCRIPTOPN F THE THINGS SEIZED
Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the subject warrants
and those in Stonehill vs. Diokno,[32]Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz,[33] and Asian Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. vs. Herrera.[34]
In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the requirements set forth by
the Constitution since: the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business
transactions of
petitioners
herein,
regardless
of
whether
the
transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of
our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its
major object: the elimination of general warrants.
In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description as those
in Stonehill: The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant
No. 2-M-70 in this manner:
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers' ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and
securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business
communications; accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits
and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized. In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain
the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized, to wit: Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97)
specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized
to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be made, - that abuses may not be committed. That is the correct interpretation of this
constitutional provision borne out by the American authorities.

The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant
issued in this case. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when
the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil,
384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the warrant officer
may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to any
of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the
said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen
such evidence. In this event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have
mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of
payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages
and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among
others, enumerated in the warrant.
In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of the things to be seized, i.e.,
Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss,
Loss Registers, Book of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc.
was held to be an omnibus description and, therefore, invalid: Because of this all embracing description
which includes all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze its
business, petitioner in several motions filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure
of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the
company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds
issued by it, including the government itself, and of the general public. And correlating the same to the
charges for which the warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old.
In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the following manner: Multiple sets of
Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or
Records; Provisional & Official Receipts; Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
Unregistered Delivery Receipts; Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices; Sales Records, Job Order;
Corporate Financial Records; and Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity, especially
since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. The
issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents from said photocopies
instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a generic term or a general
description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is
unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general description in a
warrant.[35] The use by the issuing judge of the terms multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers,
journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts,
production record books/inventory lists, stock cards, sales records, job order, corporate financial
records, and bank statements/cancelled checks is therefore unacceptable considering the
circumstances of this case.
As regards the terms unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase & sales invoices,
however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings of these
documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are unregistered.
[36]
Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Taking
into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and
detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular
description of the contents thereof. [37] Although it appears that photocopies of these unregistered
documents were among those handed by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be impractical to require
the latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof, to the minutest detail.
The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire
warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts
and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search warrant is
severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant. In United States v. Cook,[38] the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) made the following
pronouncement:
The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal.Rptr. 415
(1961). In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two particularly described books and
myriad other generally described items. On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that only the
books were particularly described in the warrant and lawfully seized. The court acknowledged that the

warrant was flawed, but rather than suppress everything seized, the court chose to sever the defective
portions of the warrant and suppress only those items that were not particularly described.
Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a
conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately,
must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The
invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books. The
search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects
concerning other articles.
We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the majority of state courts
that have considered this question and hold that in the usual case the district judge should sever the
infirm portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional muster. See United States v. Giresi, 488
F.Supp. 445, 459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were not described with the requisite particularity in the
warrant should be suppressed, but suppression of all of the fruits of the search is hardly consistent with
the purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the items improperly described prohibits the
Government from profiting from its own wrong and removes the court from considering illegally obtained
evidence. Moreover, suppression of only those items that were not particularly described serves as an
effective deterrent to those in the Government who would be tempted to secure a warrant without the
necessary description. As the leading commentator has observed, it would be harsh medicine indeed if
a warrant which was issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items were to
be invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a
search for other items as well. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
4.6(f) (1978).
Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to petitioners.
Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants, were also taken by
the enforcing officers: One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters, Two (2) pages
writing with Chinese characters, Two (2) pages Chinese character writing, Two (2) packs of chemicals,
One (1) bound gate pass, Surety Agreement.[39]
In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier Industrial and
Development Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.
The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not
particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order to comply with the constitutional
provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized under a warrant must
be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder.[40] In Tambasen vs.
People,[41] it was held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond
the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The evident purpose
and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly
described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles
they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that
abuses may not be committed (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v.
Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same constitutional
provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful invasions
of the sanctity of the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v.
Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized
from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing
subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected right of an
individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although
public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize, such power must be exercised and
the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra,
citing Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it in Bagahilog v.
Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), [z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary
methods that the Constitution itself abhors.
The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive in the
penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other properties relative to such
violation," which in no way can be characterized as a particular description of the things to be seized.
As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return in the present
proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been

impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties.[42]
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 June 1996 and 14 May
1987, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED insofar
as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the seizure of the
unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED with
respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants. The respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue is
hereby ordered to return to petitioners all items seized from the subject premises and belonging to
petitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices. SO
ORDERED.

A search warrant was served on a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa, on August 1, 1997, by SPO1 Angel
Lumabas, SPO3 Celso de Leon, Maj. Dionisio Borromeo, Capt. Jose, SPO3 Malapitan, PO2 Buddy
Perez and PO2 Eugene Perida.
As a result of the search, an information against appellant Priscilla del Norte was filed with the trial
court, viz:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PRISCILLA DEL NORTE Y DIWA AND JANE
DOE, true name, real identity and present whereabouts of the last accused still unknown(,) of the crime
of VIOLATION OF SEC. 8, ART. II, R.A. (No.) 6425, committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of August 1997(,) in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping with (sic) one another, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession, custody and control(,) MARIJUANA weighing 6748.37 gms.
knowing the same to be a prohibited drug under the provisions of the above-entitled law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. PRISCILLA DEL NORTE

Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 28,
finding appellant Priscilla del Norte guilty of the crime of illegal possession of drugs, viz: WHEREFORE,
in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Pricilla (sic) Del Norte (g)uilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime for (sic) Violation of Sec. 8, Art. II, R.A. 6425, and hereby sentences her
to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion (P)erpetua and a fine of P1,000,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The marijuana subject matter of this case is confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn-over the subject marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board
for proper disposal/destruction.
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to transfer the accused Priscilla del Norte
to the Correccion (sic) Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City for the service of her sentence. SO
ORDERED.[1]

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
SPO1 Lumabas testified that on August 1, 1997, their group was tasked to serve a search
warrant[3] against a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa residing at No. 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada
St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 6425. They were ordered to
forthwith seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of shabu and marijuana leaves. They
coordinated with the barangay officials and proceeded to the house pointed out to them by the local
officials. Upon reaching the house, its door was opened by a woman. SPO3 De Leon introduced
themselves as policemen to the woman who opened the door, whom they later identified in court as the
appellant.[4] They informed her they had a search warrant, but appellant suddenly closed and locked the
door. It was only after some prodding by the barangay officials that she reopened the door. The
authorities then conducted the search. They found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in Manila paper
under the bed and inside the room.[5] They asked appellant who owned the marijuana. She cried and
said she had no means of livelihood.[6] Appellant was brought to the police headquarters for further
investigation. Both SPO1 Lumabas and SPO3 De Leon identified the confiscated five (5) bundles of
marijuana[7] in court.
Mrs. Grace Eustaquio, a forensic chemist testified that pursuant to a letter request[8] from the Chief
of the Caloocan City Police, she conducted an examination on a specimen consisting of five bundles of
suspected marijuana. She found that each of the bundles was positive for marijuana. This finding was
reduced to a Laboratory Report.[9] The report also contained a finding on the supposed weight of each
bundle in grams, i.e., (A) 973.45, (B) 1,840.31, (C) 472.99, (D) 1,678.8, and (E) 1,782.82. [10]
SPO2 Florencio Ramirez, a police officer in the Intelligence Branch of the Caloocan Police Station,
testified that on August 1, 1997, the appellant was brought before him by SPO3 De Leon and SPO1
Lumabas. They also submitted two weighing scales, five bricks of marijuana leaves, and two bunches of
marijuana leaves wrapped in an old newspaper.[11] He apprised appellant of her constitutional rights
before investigating her. After the laboratory test showed that the evidence yielded was marijuana, he
sent a referral slip[12] to Prosecutor Zaldy Quimpo for inquest.
Appellant assailed the validity of the search warrant against her. She contended that she lived at
376 Dama de Noche, Barangay Baesa, Caloocan City,[13] and that on August 1, 1997, she was merely
visiting a friend, Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. She went to Marlyns house to borrow money. Marlyn was out and she waited. While
appellant was seated near the door, several people introduced themselves as policemen, made her sign
a white paper and entered the house. She heard them say we already got Ising, and was surprised why
they suddenly arrested her. She saw Ising, her sister, at a house two steps away from the house where
she was arrested. Despite her claim that she was not Ising, the policemen brought her to the police
station.[14]
Appellants daughter, Christine also took the witness stand. She testified that she is one of the eight
children of the appellant. Since June 1997, she recalled that they had lived at 376 Dama de Noche St.,
Caloocan City, as proved by the address stated in her school identification card, [15] and a receipt
evidencing payment for the rental of their house at Dama de Noche St. from July 18 to August 18, 1997.

[16]

The trial court convicted appellant. In this appeal, she raises the lone error that the lower court erred
in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged, when her guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.[17] Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish who owned the house
where the search was conducted, and avers that her mere presence therein did not automatically make
her the owner of the marijuana found therein. She likewise argues that the search warrant specified the
name of Ising Gutierrez as the owner of the house to be searched, and that since she is not Ising
Gutierrez, the lower court erred in admitting the confiscated drugs as evidence against her.[18] The
Solicitor General contends that the totality of the evidence demonstrates appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[19] He cites the case of United States vs. Gan Lian Po,[20] that when illegal drugs are
found in the premises occupied by a certain person, such person is presumed to be in possession of the
prohibited articles. It then becomes the accuseds burden to prove the absence of animus possidendi.[21]
We reverse the trial courts decision. The prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral
certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulated drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.[22]
We first rule on the validity of the search warrant. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
personsor things to be seized. (emphases supplied)
Appellant argues that the marijuana seized as a result of the search is inadmissible due to the
irregularity of the search warrant which contained the name Ising Gutierrez Diwa and not Priscilla del
Norte. She alleges that Ising is her sister. During her arrest, she claimed she saw Ising nearby and
pointed her to the authorities, but her efforts were futile the authorities arrested her.
The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only the place to be
searched, but also the persons to be arrested. We have ruled in rare instances that mistakes in the
name of the person subject of the search warrant do not invalidate the warrant, provided the place to be
searched is properly described. In People v. Tiu Won Chua,[23] we upheld the validity of the search
warrant despite the mistake in the name of the persons to be searched. In the cited case, the authorities
conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently
implementing it. They had personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place to be
searched although they did not specifically know the names of the accused.
The case at bar is different. We cannot countenance the irregularity of the search warrant. The
authorities did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search. They did not
conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant. It was only when they implemented the warrant that
they coordinated with the barangay officials. One of the barangay officials informed SPO3 De Leon that
Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del Norte are one and the same person, but said barangay official
was not presented in court. The authorities based their knowledge on pure hearsay.
On the merits, we believe the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutions witnesses failed to establish appellants ownership of the
house where the prohibited drugs were discovered. Except for their bare testimonies, no other proof
was presented.
This is in contrast to appellants proof of her residence. The prosecution did not contest the punong
barangays certification,[24] Christinas school ID[25] and the rental receipt,[26] all of which show that
appellant and her family live at 376 Dama de Noche St. There being no substantial contrary evidence
offered, we conclude that appellant does not own the house subject of the search.
The prosecution likewise failed to prove that appellant was in actual possession of the prohibited articles
at the time of her arrest. This is shown by the testimony of the prosecutions witness:

Fiscal Lomadilla to Witness

Q: What did you find in that house at No. 275?
A: We found marijuana.
Q: What is the quantity of the marijuana you found?
A: Five bunch (sic) or bricks of marijuana and two weighing scale(s), sir.
Q: Mr. Lumabas, you mentioned a search warrant issued by Judge Rivera. What
was the result of the execution of that search warrant?
A: We were able to find marijuana inside the house of Priscilla del Norte.
Q: What is the quantity?
A: More or less six kilos.
Q: Was it arranged? How was it placed?
A: It was wrapped inside the plastic tape and it looks (sic) like in bricks form.[27]
Q: What part of the house did you discover these five bricks of marijuana?
A: Inside the room, sir, under the bed.
Q: You said you found the accused Priscilla del Norte, where was she when you
found her?
A: Inside the sala, sir.[28]
In fact, it seems that the authorities had difficulty looking for the drugs which were not in plain view, viz:
Atty. Yap to witness
Q: You made mention about the bricks found?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you said further that it was inside the room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when you entered the room, was it locked?
A: No, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, there was no padlock of that room, is it correct?
A: I did not notice, sir, but it was open.
Q: And this alleged marijuana was protruding under the bed?
A: No, sir but it was under the bed, dulong-dulo.
Q: Was it also the same plastic bag?
A: No, sir.
Q: Was it also already wrapped in newspaper?
A: No, sir, only plastic tape. We were not able to notice that it was marijuana
because it is (sic) wrapped in a plastic tape.
Q: How long did you search?
A: Half an hour, sir.[29]
The prosecutions weak evidence likewise shows from the following testimony:
Atty. Yap to witness
Q: Were you able to search the personal effects?
A: Yung iba.
Q: Did you find any I.D. (of the persons) who occupy this room?
A: No, sir.
Q: In other words, your assumption is because Priscilla del Norte was around so
(sic) it follows that she was the possessor of that illegal drugs?
A: Yes, sir because it is their house.
Q: Was there a picture or photograph taken inside the room of that particular
person?
A: None, sir.
Q: So a family lived thereat?
A: None, sir.
Q: Was there a separate picture of Ising Gutierrez?
A: I did not see any.

Q: There was no incriminating evidence except this (sic) drugs taken by

Police Officer de Leon and the barangay tanod, no other incriminating
evidence?
A: None, sir. (emphases supplied)
In all criminal cases, it is appellants constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved beyond reasonable doubt.[30] In the case at bar, we hold that the prosecutions evidence treads
on shaky ground. We detest drug addiction in our society. However, we have the duty to protect
appellant where the evidence presented show insufficient factual nexus of her participation in the
commission of the offense charged.[31] In People vs. Laxa,[32] we held:

The governments drive against illegal drugs deserves everybodys support. But it cannot be
pursued by ignoble means which are violative of constitutional rights. It is precisely when the
governments purposes are beneficent that we should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As
Justice Brandeis warned long ago, the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by
men of zeal, well meaning without understanding.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City is
reversed. Appellant is acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.