Professional Documents
Culture Documents
312
43 S.Ct. 556
67 L.Ed. 996
Messrs. Gardiner Lathrop and Homer W. Davis, both of Chicago, Ill., and
William T. Faricy and Thomas F. Quinn, both of St. Paul, Minn., for
plaintiff in error.
Mr. Morton Barrows, of St. Paul, Minn., for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
'Any foreign corporation having an agent in this state for the solicitation of
freight and passenger traffic or either thereof over its lines outside of this state,
may be served with summons by delivering a copy thereof to such agent.'
Whether this statute, as construed and applied, violates the federal Constitution,
is the only question for decision.
by the carrier in Kansas for transportation over its line from one point in that
state to another. So far as appears the transaction was in no way connected with
Minnesota or with the soliciting agency located there. Defendant appeared
specially, claimed that, as to it, the statute authorizing service violated the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as
the commerce clause, and moved to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction.
The motion was denied. After appropriate proceeding, the trial court entered
final judgment for plaintiff, its judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota (150 Minn. 534, 186 N. W. 130), and the case is here on writ of
error under section 237 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. 1214).
5
That the claims against interstate carriers for personal injuries and for loss and
damage of freight are numerous; that the amounts demanded are large; that in
many cases carriers deem it imperative, or advisable, to leave the determination
of their liability to the courts; that litigation in states and jurisdictions remote
from that in which the cause of action arose entails absence of employees from
their customary occupations; and that this impairs efficiency in operation, and
causes, directly and indirectly, heavy expense to the carriersthese are matters
of common knowledge. Facts, of which we, also, take judicial notice, indicate
that the burden upon interstate carriers imposed specifically by the statute here
assailed is a heavy one; and that the resulting obstruction to commerce must be
serious.2 During federal control absences of e ployees incident to such litigation
were found, by the Director General, to interfere so much with the physical
operation of the railroads, that he issued General Order No. 18 (and 18A) which
required suit to be brought in the county or district where the cause of action
arose or where the plaintiff resided at the time it accrued. That order was held
reasonable and valid in Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Co. v. Journey, 257 U.
S. 111, 42 Sup. Ct. 6, 66 L. Ed. 154. The facts recited in the order, to justify its
issue, are of general application, in time of peace as well as of war.
7
The case at bar resembles, in its facts, but is not identical with, Missouri,
Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U. S. 565, 41 Sup. Ct. 446, 65 L. Ed.
788, and St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 Sup.
Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed. 486, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 77. In the former, the validity of a
similar Massachusetts statute was sustained in a per curiam opinion. In the
latter, jurisdiction was upheld in the absence of a statute concerning
solicitation. But in both cases the only constitutional objection asserted was
violation of the due process clause. See Reynolds v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas
Ry. Co., 224 Mass. 379, 113 N. E. 413; Id., 228 Mass. 584, 117 N. E. 913.
Since we hold that the Minnesota statute as construed and applied violates the
commerce clause, we have no occasion to consider whether it also violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.5
Reversed.
10
Mr. Justice BUTLER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The alleged cause of action having arisen during federal control, the action was
brought pursuant to sect on 206(a) of Transportation Act Feb. 28, 1920, c. 91,
41 Stat. 456, 461, against the Director General, as Agent. A contract had been
made with the carrier for the conduct of litigation arising out of operation
during federal control. Hence, under section 206(b) process could be served
upon the agent of the company 'if such agent * * * is authorized by law to be
served with process in proceedings brought against such carrier.' The question
of the validity of the service is thus the same as if suit had been brought against
the company on such a cause of action arising after federal control had
terminated.
Compare Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 19 Sup. Ct. 165, 43 L. Ed. 432;
Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, 28 Sup. Ct. 34, 52 L.
Ed. 143; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 537, 40 Sup. Ct. 2, 63 L. Ed.
1124; Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 40 Sup. Ct. 402, 64
L. Ed. 713; Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411, 40 Sup. Ct. 371, 64 L.
Ed. 638, 10 A. L. R. 716.
5
Compare Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530, 27
Sup. Ct. 595, 51 L. Ed. 916; Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243
U. S. 264, 37 Sup. Ct. 280, 61 L. Ed. 710; Rosenberg Brothers & Co. v. Curtis
Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516, 43 Sup. Ct. 170, 67 L. Ed. ; Bank of America
v. Whitney Central National Bank, 261 U. S. 171, 43 Sup. Ct. 311, 67 L. Ed.
. Also Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602,
19 Sup. Ct. 308, 43 L. Ed. 569; Lumbermen's Insurance Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.
S. 407, 25 Sup. Ct. 483, 49 L. Ed. 810; Old Wayne Life Association v.
McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345; Commercial Mutual
Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 29 Sup. Ct. 445, 53 L. Ed. 782;
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S.
93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610.