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1. Heirs of Carlos Alcaraz vs. Republic

Facts: Julian Alcaraz was the possessor and actual occupant of a parcel of land,
identified as Lot No. 391, Cad-337, Meycauayan Cadastre, with an area of 2,888
square meters, more or less, and situated at Barangay Bancal, Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Upon his death on 13 April 1924, his three (3) children
namely, Carlos,Timotea and Igmedio, all surnamed Alcaraz, succeeded in the
possession and occupation of said land with each of them allocating to each other
a one-third (1/3) portion thereof.
Carlos Alcaraz had four (4) children, namely Silvino, Isabel, Flaviana and
Feliza. Timotea Alcaraz had only one (1) child named Benito Dayor who had three
(3) children, to wit: Benjamin, Leonila and Rosario, all surnamed Dayor. For his
part, Igmedio Alcaraz had two (2) children, Miguel and Cirila.
Although there was no Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement or Partition of the property
that was left by their deceased father Julian Alcaraz, the heirs and their respective
descendants nonetheless made a physical partition thereof among themselves by
confining their respective possessions and occupations of the property in three (3)
separate clusters distinguishing their respective origins from the possessions of
their ascendants, Carlos, Timotea and Igmedio. The heirs of Carlos Alcaraz had
grouped themselves on the southern portion of the land, while the heirs of
Timotea Alcaraz had settled on the western portion. The northern portion was
occupied by the heirs of Igmedio Alcaraz.
On 2 February 1974, Maria Paz Alcaraz-Gomez, representing the heirs of Carlos
Alcaraz, filed with the Bureau of Lands, District Land Office No. III-6 at Tabang,
Guiguinto, Bulacan, Free Patent Application No. (III-6) 933, Entry No. 000705
covering the entire subject parcel of land.
Thereafter, or on 28 February 1974, Geodetic Engineer Luis E. Balicanta, land
inspector of the said District Land Office, conducted an investigation and ocular
inspection of the subject land. After the requisite investigation and verification,
District Land Officer Jesus B. Toledo, for and by authority of the Director of Lands,
issued on 22 April 1974 an Order of Approval of Application and Issuance of Patent
Free Patent No. (III-6) 000705. On even date, he sent a letter-request to the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan to issue the corresponding certificate of title for Free Patent (III6) 000705, in the name of the heirs of Carlos Alcaraz.
Pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds issued on 7 May 1974 Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 1887 covering Free Patent No. (III-6) 000705 in the name of the heirs
of Carlos Alcaraz.
After some time, a formal protest was filed in the same District Land Office by the
heirs of Timotea Alcaraz and Igmedio Alcaraz, respectively represented by Benjamin
Dayor and Adela Alcaraz-Evea. Not long thereafter, the protesting heirs amended
their formal protest by assailing the validity of the free patent issued in the name of
the heirs of Carlos Alcaraz and alleging that the same was obtained thru fraudulent
acts and misrepresentation.
Thereupon, a formal investigation and ocular inspection was conducted by a land

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investigator of the District Land Office. In his report, the land investigator
recommended the recall and nullification of Free Patent No. (III-6) 000705 and the
execution of appropriate steps to restore the rights of the heirs of Timotea Alcaraz
and Igmedio Alcaraz over the subject parcel of land and grant them preferential
rights to apply for the registration of the same in their names.
Then, on 30 July 1987, in the Regional Trial Court at Malolos, Bulacan the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed against the heirs of Carlos
Alcaraz a complaint for annulment and cancellation of Free Patent No. (III-6) 000705
and OCT No. P-1887 and the reversion of the same land to the public domain on the
ground that fraud and misrepresentation attended the acquisition of said free
patent and title. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 382-M-87, was raffled to
Branch 15 of the court.
In their answer, the heirs of Carlos Alcaraz denied the material allegations of the
complaint, averring that they have complied with all the requirements for the
issuance of a free patent and have not committed any fraud or misrepresentation in
their application.
On 21 January 1988, the heirs of Timotea Alcaraz and Igmedio Alcaraz filed a motion
for intervention. Their motion having been granted by the trial court on 3 March
1988, they thereafter filed their complaint-in-intervention, therein maintaining that
they and the heirs of Carlos Alcaraz are co-owners of the land in question, hence
the latter heirs own only one-third (1/3) thereof, with the remaining two-thirds (2/3)
belonging to them. They thus prayed for the cancellation of the free patent and the
corresponding OCT issued to the heirs of Carlos Alcaraz over the entire parcel for
being null and void, and that they be declared co-owners thereof and the land itself
ordered partitioned into three (3) lots with each set of heirs allotted a one-third (1/3)
portion thereof.
After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision dated 9 October 1991, ordered
the cancellation of the free patent and title of the heirs of Carlos Alcaraz; recognized
the intervenors co-ownership rights over the same property; and decreed the
subdivision thereof.
PACIOLES JR. vs. CHING
FACTS:
Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties, stock investments, bank
deposits, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband,
petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of
Miguelitas estate.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an
opposition. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special
administratrix.
Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter
has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir.

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Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both
of them would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the
capacity of business partners.
In her omnibus motion, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to
act as special administrator.
The intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as
joint regular administrators of the estate.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila
Standard. However, no claims were filed against the estate.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of
Miguelitas estate. Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
The intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only
compulsory heirs of Miguelita.
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion
praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate
taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3)
payment of attorneys fees.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion.
The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorneys
fees but denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul
and set aside the intestate courts order which denied petitioners prayer for
partition and distribution of the estate, indicating that it (intestate court) will first
resolve respondents claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition
ISSUE:
May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions
of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?
RULING: NO.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an
intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement
of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a
probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is
to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory.
The CAs reliance is misplaced.
Under the said principle, the key
consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and

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passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a

property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such
was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and
Opposition, respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner,
taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the
settlement of Miguelitas estate, did not submit his own inventory. His mandate, as
co-administrator, is to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which
have come into his possession or knowledge.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that when a question arises as to ownership of
property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by
some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from
the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such
question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings.
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, The Property Registration
Decree, proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to
present convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership.
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties
listed in petitioners inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any
document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her
claim did nothing to improve her posture.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.
RAGUDO vs. FABELLA ESTATE TENANTS ASSOCIATION INC.
FACTS:
Earlier, the tenants of a parcel of land at Mandaluyong City with an area of
6,825 square meters (hereinafter referred to as the Fabella Estate), which formed
part of the estate of the late Don Dionisio M. Fabella, organized themselves and
formed the Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc. (FETA), for the purpose of
acquiring said property and distributing it to its members.
Unable to raise the amount sufficient to buy the property from the heirs of
Don Fabella, FETA applied for a loan from the NHMFC under the latters Community
Mortgage Program.
As a pre-condition for the loan, NHMFC required all tenants to become
members of FETA.
While the rest did, the spouses Ramon and Estrella Ragudo who were
occupying the lot, consisting of about 105 square meters of the Fabella Estate,

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refused to join the Association. The portion occupied by them was awarded to Mrs.
Miriam De Guzman, a FETA member.
FETA became the registered owner of the entire Fabella Estate, as evidenced
by a TCT.
FETA filed against the spouses Ragudo a complaint for unlawful detainer
before the MeTC. The MeTC dismissed the unlawful detainer case. The RTC affirmed
the same.
FETA then filed with the RTC-Pasig a complaint for recovery of possession. The
trial court rendered judgment in FETAs favor. On appeal by the spouses Ragudo, the
CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSSUE:
Whether or not acquisitive prescription and equitable laches had set in to
warrant the continued possession of the subject lot by Ragudo and whether the
same principle had created a vested right in favor of Ragudo to continue and
possess and own the subject lot.
RULING: NO
We have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession. In Natalia Realty Corporation vs. Vallez, et
al.,:
Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands
registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws.
Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.
While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners posture, a closer look
at our jurisprudence negates their submission.
To start with, the lower court found that petitioners possession of the subject
lot was merely at the tolerance of its former lawful owner.
4. Tan v Dela Vega
OA: Petition for quieting of title and declration of nullity of Free Patent against heris
of Macario Mencias.
1992: Respondents learned that the defendant-heirs are ejecting the occupants of
the contested lot that Mencias obtained a title of the said lot previously and such
has been inherited by his heirs. Respondents state that the said lot is a mere
portion of their own lot which is covered by their TCT. Plaintiff-heirs state that their
right to the said lot arises from a different TCT and that Respondents assertion is
incorrect.
Said lot was sold already by the respondent-heirs to New Atlantis Real Estate who
joins this petition as co-plaintiff raising the defense of buyers in good faith (given
that the annotation was not seen in the TCT of the heirs).
For failure to file their Answer, defendant Aurora M. Gabat, 11 public defendants
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Director of
Land Management Bureau and the Register of Deeds of Marikina, 12 were declared in
default.
2003: Respondents filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, granted. TC ruled
in favor of respondents and ruled that free-patent of Mencias is void and the
subsequent sale is invalid. CA affirms.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment on the pleadings is proper in this case
HELD:
In this case, we find that the trial court erred in rendering judgment on
the pleadings because the pleadings filed by the parties generated
ostensible issues that necessitate the presentation of evidence.
Respondents action for declaration of nullity of Free Patent No. 495269 and the
titles derived therefrom is based on their claim that the lot titled in the name of
petitioners, is a portion of a bigger tract of land previously titled in the name of their
(respondents) predecessors-in-interest.
It is clear from the foregoing that the pleadings filed in the instant case generated
the following issues: (1) whether respondents TCT No. 257152 is valid; (2) whether
Lot 89 is covered by TCT No. 257152; and (3) whether petitioners are purchasers in
good faith. This is clearly not a proper case for judgment on the pleadings
considering that the Answers tendered factual issues. The trial court
rendered a summary judgment on March 21, 2003 and not a judgment on the
pleadings.
In any case, a summary judgment is likewise not warranted in this case as
there are genuine issues which call for a full blown trial. A "genuine issue" is
an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a
sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear
uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to
the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue
of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not
to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render
summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as
to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or
contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. 20
In the instant case, presentation of evidence is necessary to determine the validity
of TCT No. 22395 from which respondents title (TCT No. 257152) was derived. As
alleged by defendant heirs, TCT No. 22395 was a mere reconstitution of TCT No.
45046, which per verification from the Register of Deeds of Rizal pertain to a
different piece of land measuring only about 356 square meters and located in San
Juan, Rizal. These allegations were never refuted by respondents, hence, they
cannot be simply brushed aside by the trial court.
CAJAYON vs. BATUYONG
FACTS:
Flaviana Lim Cajayon and Carmelita Lim Constantino (petitioners) and Isagani
P. Candelaria were co-owners of a 260-square meter lot. A partition agreement was
entered into by petitioners and Candelaria, wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294,
containing an area of 100 square meters was adjudicated to Candelaria, while Lot 6B, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 160 square meters was given to
petitioners. Candelaria sold his property Spouses Batuyong (respondents).
Petitioners started the construction of a seven (7)-door bungalow-type
building that allegedly intruded into the lot of Respondents. Petitioners were
summoned by barangay officials to a meeting and was then agreed upon that
petitioners would defer the construction work pending the result of a relocation
survey to be conducted by a government surveyor.
A survey was conducted by a geodetic engineer and in her report,

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Candelarias lot and petitioners lot were not correctly positioned geographically on
the ground. Thus, as per survey, sub-lot B with an area of 10.43 square meters
serves as right of way of Lot 6-B (petitioners lot) while sub-lot C with an area of
10.18 square meters was the portion of Lot 6-A (respondents lot) presently
occupied by petitioners. Despite the delineation of said boundaries, petitioners
proceeded with the forestalled construction.
Respondents filed an ejectment case against petitioners before the MeTC. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the judgment of the MeTC. Petitioners filed a motion for
new trial and/or reconsideration but it was denied. The appellate court rendered a
Decision13 dismissing the petition.
RULING:
Petitioners now come to us via the present petition, submitting as issues the
question of jurisdiction and the weight to be accorded to the verification survey
results.
It is settled that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
From the above-quoted allegations taken in tandem with the textbook
distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, it is clear that the
complaint makes out a case for forcible entry, as opposed to unlawful detainer.
Respondents had been in prior physical possession of the property in the
concept of owner prior to petitioners intrusion on 21 May 1996. When petitioners
encroached upon respondents lot and started construction works thereon the latter
was dispossessed of the area involved. Despite various demands by respondents to
vacate, petitioners obstinately refused to do so. Clearly, petitioners entry into the
said property was illegal from the beginning, precluding an action for unlawful
detainer.
On the other hand, to establish a case of forcible entry, the complaint must
allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of
that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Petitioners contend that while they concede they might have intruded on
respondents property, the action is barred by prescription because it was filed more
than one (1) year after the occurrence of the alleged intrusion. The contention is
baseless. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff to bring an action
in the proper inferior court for forcible entry or unlawful detainer within one (1)
year, respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. In
forcible entry, the one-year period is counted from the date of actual entry on the
land.
Records show that the ejectment suit was instituted on 11 April 1997.
Petitioners actual entry into the property, according to the complaint, took place on
21 May 1996. Thus, the suit was filed well within the one (1)-year period mandated
by law.