454 U.S.

1
102 S.Ct. 18
70 L.Ed.2d 1

Jack DUCKWORTH, Warden

v.
Isadore SERRANO.
No. 80-2041.
Oct. 19, 1981.

Page 2 PER CURIAM.

The motion of respondent to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ
of certiorari are granted.

This habeas corpus case involves the presentation to a federal appellate court of
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that had never been raised in a state
court. Respondent, Isadore Serrano, was convicted of the murder of Debra
Gomez in Sunnyside Park, East Chicago, Ind. At trial, Norma Hernandez
testified that Serrano had told her that he had killed Gomez. The respondent
was represented by William Walker. Upon cross-examination, Mrs. Hernandez
stated that the firm of Walker & Walker had represented her on a traffic ticket
in the past and that she had asked William Walker to represent her on a pending
robbery charge, unrelated to the Gomez slaying. Serrano did not challenge the
effectiveness of counsel in his appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, which
affirmed his conviction, Serrano v. State, 266 Ind. 126, 360 N.E.2d 1257
(1977), or before the Federal District Court, which dismissed his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.

The issue was first raised in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
which reversed the District Court's dismissal on grounds that Serrano's
attorney's representation of a prosecution witness constituted a per se violation
of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective representation. 654 F.2d 725
(1981). While acknowledging that the ineffective-assistance argument had
never been presented to the state courts, the court nevertheless decided that "in
view of the clear violation" of respondent's rights and "in the interest of judicial

economy," there was no reason to await the state court's consideration of the
issue. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-3.
4

No cases were cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its decision. Nor
could such support reasonably be found. 1 It has been settled for nearly a
century that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state remedies
before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the federal courts. Ex parte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886); Ex parte Hawk, 321
U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572 (1944); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404405, 79 S.Ct. 825, 831, 3 L.Ed.2d 900 (1959); Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224,
229, 90 S.Ct. 1963, 1966, 26 L.Ed.2d 578 (1970); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.
270, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971); Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 95
S.Ct. 1748, 44 L.Ed.2d 317 (1975). The exhaustion requirement, now codified
in the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. 2254(b) and (c),2 serves to minimize
friction between our federal and state systems of justice by allowing the State
an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners'
federal rights. Picard v. Connor, supra, 404 U.S., at 275, 92 S.Ct., at 512;
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250, 92 S.Ct. 407, 408, 30 L.Ed.2d 418
(1971). An exception is made only if there is no opportunity to obtain redress in
state court or if the corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render futile
any effort to obtain relief. See, e.g., Wilwording v. Swenson, supra, 404 U.S., at
250, 92 S.Ct., at 512. State courts are "equally bound to guard and protect rights
secured by the Constitution," Ex parte Royall, supra, 117 U.S., at 251, 6 S.Ct.,
at 740, and here neither the Court of Appeals nor the respondent contends that
Indiana's postconviction procedures are inadequate to adjudicate the
ineffective-assistance claim.3 Because obvious constitutional errors, no less
than obscure transgressions, are subject to the requirements of 2254(b), the
Court of Appeals was obligated to dismiss respondent's petition.

Sound judicial policy points in the same direction. Creating a new exception for
"clear violations" would not promote judicial economy, but rather would invite
habeas petitioners to make a practice of first seeking relief on these grounds in
federal courts. Significantly more time and resources would be consumed as
district and appellate courts examined the merits to determine whether a claim
met the requisite level of validity to justify dispensing with the exhaustion
requirement. It is likely that in most cases the violation would not be so "clear"
and that state prisoners would be directed to seek relief in the state system.
Moreover, even when such clear violations are found, considerations of federalstate comity would still inhere, and it would be unseemly in our dual system of
government for the federal courts to upset a state-court conviction without
affording to the state courts the opportunity to correct a constitutional violation.
Picard v. Connor, supra, 404 U.S., at 275, 92 S.Ct., at 512.

The Court of Appeals engrafted an exception onto the habeas statute not
envisioned by Congress, inconsistent with the clear mandate of the Act, and
irreconcilable with our decisions requiring the exhaustion of state judicial
remedies. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

So ordered.

Justice MARSHALL dissents.

Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 194, 19 L.Ed.2d 41 (1967), referred
to by respondent as an example where the possibility of success in the state
courts did not require denying relief, is not to the contrary. The habeas
petitioner in Roberts thoroughly exhausted his state remedies, and we held,
relying upon Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 449, n.3, 73 S.Ct. 397, 403, n.3, 97
L.Ed. 469 (1953), that "Congress had not intended "to require repetitious
applications to state courts.' " 389 U.S., at 42, 88 S.Ct., at 195.

Title 28 U.S.C. 2254 provides in pertinent part:

"(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court should not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or
the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
"(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right
under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented."

Indiana Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, Rule 1, 1,

provides that
"(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court
of this state, and who claims
"(1) that the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of
the United States or the constitution or laws of this state

*****
". . . may institute at any time a proceeding under this rule to secure relief."
The Seventh Circuit has previously recognized that resort to this procedure was
necessary to fully exhaust state remedies. Evans v. Lane, 419 F.2d 1337, cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 939, 90 S.Ct. 1839, 26 L.Ed.2d 273 and 398 U.S. 944, 90
S.Ct. 1858, 26 L.Ed.2d 281 (1970).