469 U.S.

241
105 S.Ct. 687
83 L.Ed.2d 622

UNITED STATES
v.
BOYLE, Executor of the Estate of Boyle.
No. 83-1266.
Argued Oct. 10, 1984.
Decided Jan. 9, 1985.

Syllabus
Respondent, executor of his mother's will, retained an attorney to handle
the estate. Respondent provided the attorney with all relevant information
and records for filing a federal estate tax return, which under 6075(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code was required to be filed within nine months of
the decedent's death. Respondent inquired of the attorney from time to
time as to the preparation of the return and was assured that it would be
filed on time. But the return was filed three months late, apparently
because of a clerical oversight in omitting the filing date from the
attorney's calendar. Acting pursuant to 6651(a)(1) of the Code, which
provides a penalty for failure to file a return when due "unless it is shown
that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect,"
the Internal Revenue Service assessed a penalty for the late filing.
Respondent paid the penalty and filed a suit in Federal District Court for a
refund, contending that the penalty was unjustified because his failure to
file the return on time was "due to reasonable cause," i.e., reliance on his
attorney. The District Court agreed and granted summary judgment for
respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The failure to make a timely filing of a tax return is not excused by
the taxpayer's reliance on an agent, and such reliance is not "reasonable
cause" for a late filing under 6651(a)(1). While engaging an attorney to
assist in probate proceedings is plainly an exercise of the "ordinary
business care and prudence" that the relevant Treasury Regulation
requires the taxpayer to demonstrate to excuse a late filing, this does not
answer the question presented here. To say that it was "reasonable" for

respondent to assume that the attorney would meet the statutory deadline
may resolve the matter as between them, but not with respect to the
respondent's obligation under that statute. It requires no special training or
effort on the taxpayer's part to ascertain a deadline and ensure that it is
met. That the attorney, as respondent's agent, was expected to attend to the
matter does not relieve the principal of his duty to meet the deadline. Pp.
245-252.
710 F.2d 1251 (CA7 1983), reversed.
Albert G. Lauber, Jr., Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Thomas E. Davies, Morton, Ill., for respondent.
Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether a

taxpayer's reliance on an attorney to prepare and file a tax return constitutes
"reasonable cause" under 6651(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, so as to
defeat a statutory penalty incurred because of a late filing.

2* A.
3

Respondent, Robert W. Boyle, was appointed executor of the will of his

mother, Myra Boyle, who died on September 14, 1978; respondent retained
Ronald Keyser to serve as attorney for the estate. Keyser informed respondent
that the estate must file a federal estate tax return, but he did not mention the
deadline for filing this return. Under 26 U.S.C. 6075(a), the return was due
within nine months of the decedent's death, i.e., not later than June 14, 1979.

Although a businessman, respondent was not experienced in the field of federal

estate taxation, other than having been executor of his father's will 20 years
earlier. It is undisputed that he relied on Keyser for instruction and guidance.
He cooperated fully with his attorney and provided Keyser with all relevant
information and records. Respondent and his wife contacted Keyser a number
of times during the spring and summer of 1979 to inquire about the progress of
the proceedings and the preparation of the tax return; they were assured that
they would be notified when the return was due and that the return would be
filed "in plenty of time." App. 39. When respondent called Keyser on
September 6, 1979, he learned for the first time that the return was by then
overdue. Apparently, Keyser had overlooked the matter because of a clerical
oversight in omitting the filing date from Keyser's master calendar. Respondent

met with Keyser on September 11, and the return was filed on September 13,
three months late.
B
5

Acting pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 6651(a)(1), the Internal Revenue Service

assessed against the estate an additional tax of $17,124.45 as a penalty for the
late filing, with $1,326.56 in interest. Section 6651(a)(1) reads in pertinent part:

"In case of failure . . . to file any return . . . on the date prescribed therefor . . .,
unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to
willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount required to be shown as tax
on such return 5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for not more
than 1 month, with an additional 5 percent for each additional month or fraction
thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the
aggregate . . . ." (Emphasis added.)

A Treasury Regulation provides that, to demonstrate "reasonable cause," a

taxpayer filing a late return must show that he "exercised ordinary business care
and prudence and was nevertheless unable to file the return within the
prescribed time." 26 CFR 301.6651-1(c)(1) (1984).1

Respondent paid the penalty and filed a claim for a refund. He conceded that
the assessment for interest was proper, but contended that the penalty was
unjustified because his failure to file the return on time was "due to reasonable
cause," i.e., reliance on his attorney. Respondent brought suit in the United
States District Court, which concluded that the claim was controlled by the
Court of Appeals' holding in Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211 (CA7
1979). In Rohrabaugh, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that reliance upon counsel constitutes "reasonable cause" under
6651(a)(1) when: (1) the taxpayer is unfamiliar with the tax law; (2) the
taxpayer makes full disclosure of all relevant facts to the attorney that he relies
upon, and maintains contact with the attorney from time to time during the
administration of the estate; and (3) the taxpayer has otherwise exercised
ordinary business care and prudence. 611 F.2d, at 215, 219. The District Court
held that, under Rohrabaugh, respondent had established "reasonable cause" for
the late filing of his tax return; accordingly, it granted summary judgment for
respondent and ordered refund of the penalty. A divided panel of the Seventh
Circuit, with three opinions, affirmed. 710 F.2d 1251 (1983).

We granted certiorari, 466 U.S. 903, 104 S.Ct. 1676, 80 L.Ed.2d 152 (1984),

and we reverse.
II
A.
10

Congress' purpose in the prescribed civil penalty was to ensure timely filing of
tax returns to the end that tax liability will be ascertained and paid promptly.
The relevant statutory deadline provision is clear; it mandates that all federal
estate tax returns be filed within nine months from the decedent's death, 26
U.S.C. 6075(a).2 Failure to comply incurs a penalty of 5 percent of the
ultimately determined tax for each month the return is late, with a maximum of
25 percent of the base tax. To escape the penalty, the taxpayer bears the heavy
burden of proving both (1) that the failure did not result from "willful neglect,"
and (2) that the failure was "due to reasonable cause." 26 U.S.C. 6651(a)(1).

11

The meaning of these two standards has become clear over the near-70 years of
their presence in the statutes.3 As used here, the term "willful neglect" may be
read as meaning a conscious, intentional failure or reckless indifference. See
Orient Investment & Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 74, 75,
166 F.2d 601, 602 (1948); Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628, 634
(CA3 1947); Janice Leather Imports Ltd. v. United States, 391 F.Supp. 1235,
1237 (SDNY 1974); Gemological Institute of America, Inc. v. Riddell, 149
F.Supp. 128, 131-132 (SD Cal.1957). Like "willful neglect," the term
"reasonable cause" is not defined in the Code, but the relevant Treasury
Regulation calls on the taxpayer to demonstrate that he exercised "ordinary
business care and prudence" but nevertheless was "unable to file the return
within the prescribed time."4 26 CFR 301.6651(c)(1) (1984); accord, e.g.,
Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122, 1124 (CA7 1981); Ferrando v.
United States, 245 F.2d 582, 587 (CA9 1957); Haywood Lumber & Mining Co.
v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769, 770 (CA2 1950); Southeastern Finance Co. v.
Commissioner, 153 F.2d 205 (CA5 1946); Girard Investment Co. v.
Commissioner, 122 F.2d 843, 848 (CA3 1941); see also n. 1, supra. The
Commissioner does not contend that respondent's failure to file the estate tax
return on time was willful or reckless. The question to be resolved is whether,
under the statute, reliance on an attorney in the instant circumstances is a
"reasonable cause" for failure to meet the deadline.

B
12

In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals recognized the difficulties
presented by its formulation but concluded that it was bound by Rohrabaugh v.

United States, 611 F.2d 211 (CA7 1979). The Court of Appeals placed great
importance on the fact that respondent engaged the services of an experienced
attorney specializing in probate matters and that he duly inquired from time to
time as to the progress of the proceedings. As in Rohrabaugh, see id., at 219,
the Court of Appeals in this case emphasized that its holding was narrowly
drawn and closely tailored to the facts before it. The court stressed that the
question of "reasonable cause" was an issue to be determined on a case-by-case
basis. See 710 F.2d, at 1253-1254; id., at 1254 (Coffey, J., concurring).
13

Other Courts of Appeals have dealt with the issue of "reasonable cause" for a
late filing and reached contrary conclusions.5 In Ferrando v. United States, 245
F.2d 582 (CA9 1957), the court held that taxpayers have a personal and
nondelegable duty to file a return on time, and that reliance on an attorney to
fulfill this obligation does not constitute "reasonable cause" for a tardy filing.
Id., at 589. The Fifth Circuit has similarly held that the responsibility for
ensuring a timely filing is the taxpayer's alone, and that the taxpayer's reliance
on his tax advisersaccountants or attorneysis not a "reasonable cause."
Millette & Associates v. Commissioner, 594 F.2d 121, 124-125 (per curiam),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899, 100 S.Ct. 207, 62 L.Ed.2d 135 (1979); Logan
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846, 854 (1966). The Eighth Circuit
also has concluded that reliance on counsel does not constitute "reasonable
cause." Smith v. United States, 702 F.2d 741, 743 (1983) (per curiam); Boeving
v. United States, 650 F.2d 493, 495 (1981); Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner,
638 F.2d 65, 66 (1981) (per curiam).

III
14

We need not dwell on the similarities or differences in the facts presented by

the conflicting holdings. The time has come for a rule with as "bright" a line as
can be drawn consistent with the statute and implementing regulations.6
Deadlines are inherently arbitrary; fixed dates, however, are often essential to
accomplish necessary results. The Government has millions of taxpayers to
monitor, and our system of self-assessment in the initial calculation of a tax
simply cannot work on any basis other than one of strict filing standards. Any
less rigid standard would risk encouraging a lax attitude toward filing dates.7
Prompt payment of taxes is imperative to the Government, which should not
have to assume the burden of unnecessary ad hoc determinations.8

15

Congress has placed the burden of prompt filing on the executor, not on some
agent or employee of the executor. The duty is fixed and clear; Congress
intended to place upon the taxpayer an obligation to ascertain the statutory
deadline and then to meet that deadline, except in a very narrow range of

situations. Engaging an attorney to assist in the probate proceedings is plainly

an exercise of the "ordinary business care and prudence" prescribed by the
regulations, 26 CFR 301.6651-1(c)(1) (1984), but that does not provide an
answer to the question we face here. To say that it was "reasonable" for the
executor to assume that the attorney would comply with the statute may resolve
the matter as between them, but not with respect to the executor's obligations
under the statute. Congress has charged the executor with an unambiguous,
precisely defined duty to file the return within nine months; extensions are
granted fairly routinely. That the attorney, as the executor's agent, was expected
to attend to the matter does not relieve the principal of his duty to comply with
the statute.
16

This case is not one in which a taxpayer has relied on the erroneous advice of
counsel concerning a question of law. Courts have frequently held that
"reasonable cause" is established when a taxpayer shows that he reasonably
relied on the advice of an accountant or attorney that it was unnecessary to file a
return, even when such advice turned out to have been mistaken. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393, 395-396 (CA7 1977); Commissioner v.
American Assn. of Engineers Employment, Inc., 204 F.2d 19, 21 (CA7 1953);
Burton Swartz Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 558, 560 (CA5 1952);
Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d, at 771; Orient
Investment & Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 83 U.S.App.D.C., at 75, 166 F.2d,
at 603; Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d, at 633-635; Girard Investment
Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d, at 848; Dayton Bronze Bearing Co. v. Gilligan,
281 Fed. 709, 712 (CA6 1922). This Court also has implied that, in such a
situation, reliance on the opinion of a tax adviser may constitute reasonable
cause for failure to file a return. See Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S.
219, 64 S.Ct. 511, 88 L.Ed. 684 (1944) (remanding for determination whether
failure to file return was due to reasonable cause, when taxpayer was advised
that filing was not required). 9

17

When an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, such

as whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that
advice. Most taxpayers are not competent to discern error in the substantive
advice of an accountant or attorney. To require the taxpayer to challenge the
attorney, to seek a "second opinion," or to try to monitor counsel on the
provisions of the Code himself would nullify the very purpose of seeking the
advice of a presumed expert in the first place. See Haywood Lumber, supra, at
771. "Ordinary business care and prudence" do not demand such actions.

18

By contrast, one does not have to be a tax expert to know that tax returns have
fixed filing dates and that taxes must be paid when they are due. In short, tax

returns imply deadlines. Reliance by a lay person on a lawyer is of course

common; but that reliance cannot function as a substitute for compliance with
an unambiguous statute. Among the first duties of the representative of a
decedent's estate is to identify and assemble the assets of the decedent and to
ascertain tax obligations. Although it is common practice for an executor to
engage a professional to prepare and file an estate tax return, a person
experienced in business matters can perform that task personally. It is not
unknown for an executor to prepare tax returns, take inventories, and carry out
other significant steps in the probate of an estate. It is even not uncommon for
an executor to conduct probate proceedings without counsel.
19

It requires no special training or effort to ascertain a deadline and make sure

that it is met. The failure to make a timely filing of a tax return is not excused
by the taxpayer's reliance on an agent, and such reliance is not "reasonable
cause" for a late filing under 6651(a)(1). The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.

20

It is so ordered.

21

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL, Justice POWELL, and

Justice O'CONNOR join, concurring.

22

I concur that the judgment must be reversed. Although the standard of taxpayer
liability found in 26 U.S.C. 6651(a)(1) might plausibly be characterized as
ambiguous,1 courts and the Internal Revenue Service have for almost 70 years
interpreted the statute as imposing a standard of "ordinary business care and
prudence." Ante, at 245-246. I agree with the Court that we should defer to this
long-standing construction. Ante, at 246, n. 4. I also agree that taxpayers in the
exercise of ordinary business care and prudence must ascertain relevant filing
deadlines and ensure that those deadlines are met. As the Court correctly holds,
a taxpayer cannot avoid the reach of 6651(a)(1) merely by delegating this
duty to an attorney, accountant, or other individual. Ante, at 250, 252. 2

23

I write separately, however, to underscore the importance of an issue that the

Court expressly leaves open. Specifically, I believe there is a substantial
argument that the "ordinary business care and prudence" standard is applicable
only to the "ordinary person"namely, one who is physically and mentally
capable of knowing, remembering, and complying with a filing deadline. In the
instant case, there is no question that the respondent not only failed to exercise
ordinary business care in monitoring the progress of his mother's estate, but also
made no showing that he was unable to exercise the usual care and diligence

required of an executor. The outcome could be different if a taxpayer were able

to demonstrate that, for reasons of incompetence or infirmity, he
understandably was unable to meet the standard of ordinary business care and
prudence. In such circumstances, there might well be no good reason for
imposing the harsh penalty of 6651(a)(1) over and above the prescribed
statutory interest penalty. See 26 U.S.C. 6601(a), 6621(b).
24

The Court proclaims the need "for a rule with as 'bright' a line as can be drawn,"
and it stresses that the Government "should not have to assume the burden of
unnecessary ad hoc determinations." Ante, at 248,249. On the other hand, it
notes that the "bright line" might not cover a taxpayer who is "incapable by
objective standards of meeting the criteria of 'ordinary business care and
prudence,' " reasoning that "the disability alone could well be an acceptable
excuse for a late filing." Ante, at 692, n. 6.

25

I share the Court's reservations about the sweep of its "bright line" rule. If the
Government were determined to draw a "bright line" and to avoid the "burden"
of "ad hoc determinations," it would not provide for any exemptions from the
penalty provision. Congress has emphasized, however, that exemptions must be
made where a taxpayer demonstrates "reasonable cause." 26 U.S.C. 6651(a)
(1). Accordingly, the IRS already allows dispensations where, for example, a
taxpayer or a member of his family has been seriously ill, the taxpayer has been
unavoidably absent, or the taxpayer's records have been destroyed. Internal
Revenue Manual (CCH) 4350, (24) 22.2(2) (Mar. 20, 1980) (Audit
Technique Manual for Estate Tax Examiners). Thus the Government itself has
eschewed a bright-line rule and committed itself to necessarily case-by-case
decision-making. The gravamen of the IRS's exemptions seems to be that a
taxpayer will not be penalized where he reasonably was unable to exercise
ordinary business care and prudence. The IRS does not appear to interpret its
enumerated exemptions as being exclusive, see id., 22.2(3), and it might well
act arbitrarily if it purported to do otherwise.3 Thus a substantial argument can
be made that the draconian penalty provision should not apply where a taxpayer
convincingly demonstrates that, for whatever reason, he reasonably was unable
to exercise ordinary business care.

26

Many executors are widows or widowers well along in years, and a penalty
against the "estate" usually will be a penalty against their inheritance.
Moreover, the principles we announce today will apply with full force to the
personal income tax returns required of every individual who receives an
annual gross income of $1,000 or more. See 26 U.S.C. 6651(a)(1); see also
6012. Although the overwhelming majority of taxpayers are fully capable of
understanding and complying with the prescribed filing deadlines, exceptional

cases necessarily will arise where taxpayers, by virtue of senility, mental

retardation, or other causes, are understandably unable to attain society's norm.
The Court today properly emphasizes the need for efficient tax collection and
stern incentives. Ante, at 248-249. But it seems to me that Congress and the
IRS already have made the decision that efficiency should yield to other values
in appropriate circumstances.
27

Because the respondent here was fully capable of meeting the required standard
of ordinary business care and prudence, we need not decide the issue of
whether and under what circumstances a taxpayer who presents evidence that
he was unable to adhere to the required standard might be entitled to relief from
the penalty. As the Court has expressly left this issue open for another day, I
join the Court's opinion.

The Internal Revenue Service has articulated eight reasons for a late filing that
it considers to constitute "reasonable cause." These reasons include unavoidable
postal delays, the taxpayer's timely filing of a return with the wrong IRS office,
the taxpayer's reliance on the erroneous advice of an IRS officer or employee,
the death or serious illness of the taxpayer or a member of his immediate
family, the taxpayer's unavoidable absence, destruction by casualty of the
taxpayer's records or place of business, failure of the IRS to furnish the
taxpayer with the necessary forms in a timely fashion, and the inability of an
IRS representative to meet with the taxpayer when the taxpayer makes a timely
visit to an IRS office in an attempt to secure information or aid in the
preparation of a return. Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) 4350, (24) 22.2(2)
(Mar. 20, 1980) (Audit Technique Manual for Estate Tax Examiners). If the
cause asserted by the taxpayer does not implicate any of these eight reasons, the
district director determines whether the asserted cause is reasonable. "A cause
for delinquency which appears to a person of ordinary prudence and
intelligence as a reasonable cause for delay in filing a return and which clearly
negatives willful neglect will be accepted as reasonable." Id., 22.2(3).

Section 6081(a) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the IRS to grant "a
reasonable extension of time," generally no longer than six months, for filing
any return.

Congress added the relevant language to the tax statutes in 1916. For many
years before that, 3176 mandated a 50 percent penalty "in case of a refusal or
neglect, except in cases of sickness or absence, to make a list or return, or to
verify the same . . . ." Rev.Stat. 3176 (emphasis added). The Revenue Act of
1916 amended this provision to require the 50 percent penalty for failure to file

a return within the prescribed time, "except that, when a return is voluntarily
and without notice from the collector filed after such time and it is shown that
the failure to file it was due to a reasonable cause and not due to willful
neglect, no such addition shall be made to the tax." Revenue Act of 1916, ch.
463, 16, 39 Stat. 756, 775 (emphasis added). No committee reports or
congressional hearings or debates discuss the change in language. It would be
logical to assume that Congress intended "willful neglect" to replace
"refusal"both expressions implying intentional failureand "[absence of]
reasonable cause" to replace "neglect"both expressions implying
carelessness.
4

Respondent contends that the statute must be construed to apply a standard of

willfulness only, and that the Treasury Regulation is incompatible with this
construction of the statute. He argues that the Regulation converts the statute
into a test of "ordinary business care," because a taxpayer who demonstrates
ordinary business care can never be guilty of "willful neglect." By construing
"reasonable cause" as the equivalent of "ordinary business care," respondent
urges, the IRS has removed from consideration any question of willfulness.
We cannot accept this reasoning. Congress obviously intended to make absence
of fault a prerequisite to avoidance of the late-filing penalty. See n. 3, supra. A
taxpayer seeking a refund must therefore prove that his failure to file on time
was the result neither of carelessness, reckless indifference, nor intentional
failure. Thus, the Service's correlation of "reasonable cause" with "ordinary
business care and prudence" is consistent with Congress' intent, and over 40
years of case law as well. That interpretation merits deference. See, e.g.,
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844, and n. 14, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, and n. 14, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).

Although at one point the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
reliance on counsel could constitute reasonable cause, see In re Fisk's Estate,
203 F.2d 358, 360 (1953), the Sixth Circuit appears now to be following those
courts that have held that the taxpayer has a nondelegable duty to ascertain the
deadline for a return and ensure that the return is filed by that deadline. See
Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner, 32 TCM 424, 425 (1973), aff'd, 502 F.2d
1148 (CA6 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992, 95 S.Ct. 1428, 43 L.Ed.2d 673
(1975); Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 205 (1967), aff'd,
410 F.2d 302 (CA6 1969) (per curiam ).

The administrative regulations and practices exempt late filings from the
penalty when the tardiness results from postal delays, illness, and other factors
largely beyond the taxpayer's control. See supra, at 243, and n. 1. The principle
underlying the IRS regulations and practicesthat a taxpayer should not be

penalized for circumstances beyond his controlalready recognizes a range of

exceptions which there is no reason for us to pass on today. This principle
might well cover a filing default by a taxpayer who relied on an attorney or
accountant because the taxpayer was, for some reason, incapable by objective
standards of meeting the criteria of "ordinary business care and prudence." In
that situation, however, the disability alone could well be an acceptable excuse
for a late filing.
But this case does not involve the effect of a taxpayer's disability; it involves
the effect of a taxpayer's reliance on an agent employed by the taxpayer, and
our holding necessarily is limited to that issue rather than the wide range of
issues that might arise in future cases under the statute and regulations. Those
potential future cases are purely hypothetical at the moment and simply have
no bearing on the issue now before us. The concurring opinion seems to agree
in part. After four pages of discussion, it concludes:
"Because the respondent here was fully capable of meeting the required
standard of ordinary business care and prudence, we need not decide the issue
of whether and under what circumstances a taxpayer who presents evidence
that he was unable to adhere to the required standard might be entitled to relief
from the penalty." Post, at 695.
This conclusion is unquestionably correct. See also, e.g., Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S.
1, 8, n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2906, n. 5, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984); Heckler v. Day, 467
U.S. 104, 119, nn. 33 and 34, 104 S.Ct. 2249, 2257-2258, nn. 33 and 34 (1984);
Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853, n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1519, 1523, n. 8, 79
L.Ed.2d 860 (1984); Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 779, n. 4, 103 S.Ct.
2187, 2191, n. 4, 76 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983).
7

Many systems that do not collect taxes on a self-assessment basis have

experienced difficulties in administering tax collection. See J. Wagner, France's
Soak-the-Rich Tax, Congressional Quarterly (Editorial Research Reports), Oct.
12, 1982; Dodging Taxes in the Old World, Time, Mar. 28, 1983, p. 32.

A number of courts have indicated that "reasonable cause" is a question of fact,

to be determined only from the particular situation presented in each particular
case. See, e.g., Estate of Mayer v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 617 (CA2 1965)
(per curiam ), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935, 86 S.Ct. 1065, 15 L.Ed.2d 852
(1966); Coates v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 459, 462 (CA8 1956). This view is
not entirely correct. Whether the elements that constitute "reasonable cause" are
present in a given situation is a question of fact, but what elements must be
present to constitute "reasonable cause" is a question of law. See, e.g., Haywood
Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769, 772 (CA2 1950); Daley

v. United States, 480 F.Supp. 808, 811 (ND 1979). When faced with a recurring
situation, such as that presented by the instant case, the courts of appeals should
not be reluctant to formulate a clear rule of law to deal with that situation.
9

Courts have differed over whether a taxpayer demonstrates "reasonable cause"

when, in reliance on the advice of his accountant or attorney, the taxpayer files
a return after the actual due date but within the time the adviser erroneously
told him was available. Compare Sanderling, Inc. v. Commissioner, 571 F.2d
174, 178-179 (CA3 1978) (finding "reasonable cause" in such a situation);
Estate of Rapelje v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82, 90, n. 9 (1979) (same); Estate of
DiPalma v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 324, 327 (1978) (same), acq., 1979-1
Cum.Bull. 1; Estate of Bradley v. Commissioner, 33 TCM 70, 72-73 (1974)
(same), aff'd, 511 F.2d 527 (CA6 1975), with Estate of Kerber v. United States,
717 F.2d 454, 454-455, and n. 1 (CA8 1983) (per curiam ) (no "reasonable
cause"), cert. pending, No. 83-1038; Smith v. United States, 702 F.2d 741, 742
(CA8 1983) (same); Sarto v. United States, 563 F.Supp. 476, 478 (ND
Cal.1983) (same). We need not and do not address ourselves to this issue.

For each month or fraction of a month that a tax return is overdue, 26 U.S.C.
6651(a)(1) provides for a mandatory penalty of 5% of the tax (up to a
maximum of 25%) "unless it is shown that [the failure to file on time] is due to
reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect." As Judge Posner observed in
his dissent below, "in making 'willful neglect' the opposite of 'reasonable cause'
the statute might seem to have modified the ordinary meaning of 'reasonable' . .
. ." 710 F.2d 1251, 1256 (CA7 1983).

As the Court emphasizes, this principle of non-delegation does not extend to

situations in which a taxpayer reasonably relies on expert advice concerning
substantive questions of tax law, such as whether a liability exists in the first
instance. Ante, at 250-251.

It is difficult to perceive a material distinction, for example, between a filing

delay that results from a serious illness in the taxpayer's immediate family or a
taxpayer's unavoidable absencesituations in which the IRS excuses the delay
and a filing delay that comes about because the taxpayer is infirm or
incompetent. The common thread running through all these unfortunate
situations is that the taxpayer, for reasons beyond his control, has been unable
to exercise ordinary business care and prudence.