Professional Documents
Culture Documents
248
111 S.Ct. 1801
114 L.Ed.2d 297
FLORIDA, Petitioner
v.
Enio JIMENO et al.
No. 90-622.
Argued March 25, 1991.
Decided May 23, 1991.
Syllabus
Having stopped respondent Jimeno's car for a traffic infraction, police
officer Trujillo, who had been following the car after overhearing Jimeno
arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction, declared that he had
reason to believe that Jimeno was carrying narcotics in the car, and asked
permission to search it. Jimeno consented, and Trujillo found cocaine
inside a folded paper bag on the car's floorboard. Jimeno was charged
with possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of Florida
law, but the state trial court granted his motion to suppress the cocaine on
the ground that his consent to search the car did not carry with it specific
consent to open the bag and examine its contents. The Florida District
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court affirmed.
Held: A criminal suspect's Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches is not violated when, after he gives police
permission to search his car, they open a closed container found within the
car that might reasonably hold the object of the search. The Amendment is
satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for
the police to believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted them
to open the particular container. Here, the authorization to search extended
beyond the car's interior surfaces to the bag, since Jimeno did not place
any explicit limitation on the scope of the search and was aware that
Trujillo would be looking for narcotics in the car, and since a reasonable
person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in
some form of container. There is no basis for adding to the Fourth
Amendment's basic test of objective reasonableness a requirement that, if
police wish to search closed containers within a car, they must separately
request permission to search each container. Pp. 250-252.
564 So.2d 1083 (Fla.1990), reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE,
BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ.,
joined.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J.,
joined.
Michael J. Neimand, Miami, Fla., for petitioner.
John G. Roberts, Jr., Washington, D.C., for the U.S., as amicus curiae,
supporting the petitioner, by special leave of Court.
Jeffrey S. Weiner, Miami, Fla., for respondent.
Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case began when a Dade County police officer, Frank Trujillo, overheard
respondent, Enio Jimeno, arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction over
a public telephone. Believing that respondent might be involved in illegal drug
trafficking, Officer Trujillo followed his car. The officer observed respondent
make a right turn at a red light without stopping. He then pulled respondent
over to the side of the road in order to issue him a traffic citation. Officer
Trujillo told respondent that he had been stopped for committing a traffic
infraction. The officer went on to say that he had reason to believe that
respondent was carrying narcotics in his car, and asked permission to search the
car. He explained that respondent did not have to consent to a search of the car.
Respondent stated that he had nothing to hide, and gave Trujillo permission to
search the automobile. After two passengers stepped out of respondent's car,
Officer Trujillo went to the passenger side, opened the door, and saw a folded,
brown paper bag on the floorboard. The officer picked up the bag, opened it,
and found a kilogram of cocaine inside.
3
The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to
suppress the evidence of the cocaine. 550 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). In
doing so, the court established a per se rule that "consent to a general search for
narcotics does not extend to 'sealed containers within the general area agreed to
by the defendant.' " Ibid. (citation omitted). The Florida Supreme Court
affirmed, relying upon its decision in State v. Wells, 539 So.2d 464 (1989) aff'd
on other grounds, 495 U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). 564
So.2d 1083 (1990). We granted certiorari to determine whether consent to
search a vehicle may extend to closed containers found inside the vehicle. 498
U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 554, 112 L.Ed.2d 561 (1990), and we now reverse the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida.
his car to include consent to examine a paper bag lying on the floor of the car.
We think that it is.
6
The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object. United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). In this case, the
terms of the search's authorization were simple. Respondent granted Officer
Trujillo permission to search his car, and did not place any explicit limitation
on the scope of the search. Trujillo had informed respondent that he believed
respondent was carrying narcotics, and that he would be looking for narcotics
in the car. We think that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude
that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search
containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be
expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a
container. "Contraband goods rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a
car." Id., at 820, 102 S.Ct., at 2170. The authorization to search in this case,
therefore, extended beyond the surfaces of the car's interior to the paper bag
lying on the car's floor.
The facts of this case are therefore different from those in State v. Wells, supra,
on which the Supreme Court of Florida relied in affirming the suppression
order in this case. There the Supreme Court of Florida held that consent to
search the trunk of a car did not include authorization to pry open a locked
briefcase found inside the trunk. It is very likely unreasonable to think that a
suspect, by consenting to the search of his trunk, has agreed to the breaking
open of a locked briefcase within the trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a
closed paper bag.
Respondent argues, and the Florida trial court agreed with him, that if the
police wish to search closed containers within a car they must separately
request permission to search each container. But we see no basis for adding this
sort of superstructure to the Fourth Amendment's basic test of objective
reasonableness. Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d
527 (1983). A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the
search to which he consents. But if his consent would reasonably be understood
to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no grounds
for requiring a more explicit authorization. "[T]he community has a real
interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting search may yield necessary
evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime, evidence that may ensure
that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal offense."
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, at 243, 93 S.Ct., at 2056.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is accordingly reversed, and the
case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
10
It is so ordered.
11
12
13
14
15
closed container do not merge when the individual uses his car to transport the
container. In this situation, the individual still retains a heightened expectation
of privacy in the container. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 425, 101
S.Ct. 2841, 2845, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (plurality opinion); Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-764, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2592-2593, 61 L.Ed.2d 235
(1979). Nor does an individual's heightened expectation of privacy turn on the
type of container in which he stores his possessions. Notwithstanding the
majority's suggestion to the contrary, see ante, at 251-252, this Court has
soundly rejected any distinction between "worthy" containers, like locked
briefcases, and "unworthy" containers, like paper bags.
16
17
18
search of the car from the driver's seat could also be deemed to consent to a
search of his person or indeed of his body cavities, since a reasonable person
may be expected to know that drug couriers frequently store their contraband
on their persons or in their body cavities. I suppose (and hope) that even the
majority would reject this conclusion, for a person who consents to the search
of his car for drugs certainly does not consent to a search of things other than
his car for drugs. But this example illustrates that if there is a reason for not
treating a closed container as something "other than" the car in which it sits, the
reason cannot be based on intuitions about where people carry drugs. The
majority, however, never identifies a reason for conflating the distinct privacy
expectations that a person has in a car and in closed containers.
19
The majority also argues that the police should not be required to secure
specific consent to search a closed container, because " '[t]he community has a
real interest in encouraging consent.' " Ante, at 252, quoting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2056, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). I
find this rationalization equally unsatisfactory. If anything, a rule that permits
the police to construe a consent to search more broadly than it may have been
intended would discourage individuals from consenting to searches of their
cars. Apparently, the majority's real concern is that if the police were required
to ask for additional consent to search a closed container found during the
consensual search of an automobile, an individual who did not mean to
authorize such additional searching would have an opportunity to say no. In
essence, then, the majority is claiming that "the community has a real interest"
not in encouraging citizens to consent to investigatory efforts of their law
enforcement agents, but rather in encouraging individuals to be duped by them.
This is not the community that the Fourth Amendment contemplates.
20
Almost 20 years ago, this Court held that an individual could validly "consent"
to a searchor, in other words, waive his right to be free from an otherwise
unlawful searchwithout being told that he had the right to withhold his
consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra. In Schneckloth, as in this case,
the Court cited the practical interests in efficacious law enforcement as the
basis for not requiring the police to take meaningful steps to establish the basis
of an individual's consent. I dissented in Schneckloth, and what I wrote in that
case applies with equal force here.
21
"I must conclude, with some reluctance, that when the Court speaks of
practicality, what it really is talking of is the continued ability of the police to
capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what
they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing relinquishment of
constitutional rights. Of course it would be "practical" for the police to ignore
I dissent.
**
Alternatively, the police could obtain such consent in advance by asking the
individual for permission to search both the car and any closed containers
found inside.