#1 MANANTAN v.

CA REYES
FACTS:
1. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial
court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a
ruling on his civil liability.
a. Manantan was charged with reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide when he side swept the jeep
driven by Charles Codamon, causing the said
automobile to turn down resulting to the death on
Ruben Nicolas, passenger of the jeep.
2. Private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil
aspect of the TCs judgment.
3. CA modified the decision. Appellee held civilly liable in the
amount of 174K for the death of Ruben Nicolas.
a. At the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a
state of intoxication. It found that petitioner's act of
driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of
Section 53 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
(R.A. No. 4136) and pursuant to Article 2185 of the
Civil Code, a statutory presumption of negligence
existed.
ISSUE/S:
1.WON the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further
inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence or
reckless imprudence.
2.WON the court erred in finding that petitioners acquittal
did not extinguish his civil liability.
3.WON CA committed a reversible error in failing to apply the
Manchester doctrine to the case.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE:
PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS: [1] CA should not have
disturbed the findings of the TC on the lack of negligence or
reckless impudence under the guise of determining his civil
liability; [2] TCs finding that he was neither imprudent nor
negligent was the basis of his acquittal, and not reasonable
doubt; [3] finding him liable for indemnity and damages put
his acquittal in suspicion and put him in double jeopardy.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS: [1] The TC, in finding

the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt, did not state

in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not
recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence, TC impliedly
acquitted him on reasonable doubt; and [2] Since civil
liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt, the CA had to review the
findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for
awarding indemnity and damages.
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY. [CHECK ELEMENTS, THIS IS NOT
THE REAL TOPIC]
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not
the author of the act or omission complained of.
o closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such
act or omission.
o There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of
the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the
delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated
in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
Second is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the
guilt of the accused.
o even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.
o This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the
Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for
the same act or omission."
Although the two actions have different purposes, the
matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in
the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the
civil action to establish any fact there determined, even
though both actions involve the same act or omission.
The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the
same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are
applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's

acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether

Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the
question
of
petitioner's
negligence
or
reckless
imprudence.
SECOND ISSUE:
Petitioner argues that his acquittal bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter TCs judgment shows that the
acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare the nonexistence of petitioner's negligence or imprudence. Hence,
they argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on
reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to
come into play.
Acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence,
petitioner's civil liability was not extinguished by his
discharge.
TCs declaration did not discount the possibility that
"the accused was really negligent." However, it found
that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of
the accused presented itself before the Court" and
since said "hypothesis is consistent with the
record...the Court's mind cannot rest on a verdict of
conviction."
o clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was
predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had
not been established with moral certainty.
Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for
the same act or omission lies.
THIRD ISSUE:
Petitioner submits that the non- payment of filing fees on the
amount of the claim for damages violated the doctrine in
Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals
and SC circular No.7. Respondents argue that Manchester
Doctrine is not applicable in the case. Said doctrine has no
retroactive effect.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the
implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions
was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules
of Court.

under said rule, it was not required that the

damages sought by the offended party be
stated in the complaint or information.
However, being in the nature of a curative statute, the
amendment of rule 1111 in the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, shall apply retroactively and affect this
case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted
together with the criminal action, the actual damages
claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are
not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing
fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such
as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages
are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they
are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
FILING FEES WERE DEEMED PAID FROM THE FILING OF
THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.
o

IT IS NOW REQUIRED THAT: When the offended party seeks to

enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil
action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is
alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing
fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in
court for trial.

#2 LIM v. KOU CO PING - MERCADO

TOPIC: Independent civil actions
FACTS:
1. FR Cement Corporation (FRCC) issued several withdrawal
authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders
(Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt).
2. Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt sold the withdrawal
authorities (covering 50,000 bags of cement) to Co.
3. Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim.
4. Lim withdrew 2,800 bags of cement and 10,000 bags
were sold back to FRCC.
5. Thereafter, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the
remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal
authorities, but will only do so if Lim would agree pay the
price increase or receive a lesser quantity of cement.
6. Lim objected and argued that the said withdrawal
authorities were not subject to price fluctuations.
7. Lim sought legal recourse.
Criminal case
1. An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or
Conversion was filed against Co before the RTC.
2. The private complainant Lim participated in the criminal
proceedings to prove her damages.
3. RTC acquitted Co of the estafa charge for insufficiency of
evidence and also relieved Co of the civil liability to Lim.
4. Lim filed her notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the
criminal case.
5. CA dismissed appeal.
The civil action for specific performance
1. Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages before the RTC. (Defendants Co and all other
parties to the withdrawal authorities).
2. The complaint asserted 2 causes of action breach of
contract and abuse of rights.
a) Due to the refusal of FRCC to allow Lim to withdraw
the 37,200 bags of cement, Co committed a breach
of contract and is therefore liable to deliver to Lim
the bags of cement. If he cannot, then he must pay
her the current FMV thereof.

b) FRCC is also liable to deliver to Lim the amount of

the cement.
c) Cos acts of falsely representing to Lim that she
may be able to withdraw the cement from FRCC
caused Lim to incur expenses and losses.
d) FRCCs unjust refusal to honor the withdrawal
authorities they issued also caused damage to Lim.
e) Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual
commitments and for the defendants to be
solidarily liable to her for the damages she
incurred.
3. Co filed a MTD.
4. RTC denied MTD.
5. CA denied Cos MR.
ISSUE: WON Lim the complaint for specific performance and
damages is considered to be an independent civil action
YES.
HELD:
1. A single act or omission that causes damage to an
offended party may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender.
a) Civil liability ex delicto civil liability arising from
the criminal offense under Article 100 of RPC.
b) Independent civil liability civil liability that may be
pursued independently of the criminal proceedings.
2. The independent civil liability may be based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained
of as felony.
3. The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is
based on the acts or omissions that constitute the
criminal offense. Thus, it is impliedly instituted with the
criminal offense.
4. On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are
separate from the criminal action and may be pursued
independently.
5. Therefore, an offended party may pursue the two types of
civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without
offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or
res judicata.

6. In the case at bar, the first action is a civil action ex

delicto, it having been instituted together with the
criminal action while the second action is a civil action
arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious
conduct (abuse of rights).
7. The second action involves only the obligations arising
from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the
estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising
from the offense charged.
8. They present different causes of action, which are
considered separate, distinct, and independent from
each other.

#3 ALLADO v DIOKNO - PELAYO

DOCTRINE: If upon the filing of the information in court, the
trial judge, after reviewing the information and the document
attached attached thereto, finds that no probable cause
exists, he must either call for the complainant and the
witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no
reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to
an open and public accusation of the crime when no cause
exists.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza,
alumni of the College of law, University of the Philippines,
are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and
Allado.
2. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an
alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard
(Umbal), they have been accused of the heinous crime of
kidnapping with murder of a German national named Van
Twest.
3. UMBALS CONFESSION:
o He was met by Petitioners at Silahis Hotel with
his companions.
o Petitioner paid P2.5M to them to apprehend Van
Twest who allegedly had an international
warrant of arrest against him.
o Umbal,
Ex-policeman
Gamatero,
AFPCIG
Santiago and SPO2 Antonino abducted Van
Twest,
o They blocked his blue Nissan Pathfinder under
the Alabang overpass and forced him into their
car.
o Brought him to a "safe house" just behind the
New Bilibid Prisons where Umbal watched over
him.
o After 4 days, Gamatero, Santiago and Antonino
returned to the "safe house" together with
petitioners and SPO2 Roger Bato, known to
Umbal also as "Batok."

SPO2 Bato faked the interrogation of Van Twest,

pretending it was official, and then made him
sign certain documents.
o The following day, Gamatero shot Van Twest in
the chest with a baby armalite.
o Antonino stabbed him repeatedly, cut off his
private part, and later burned his cadaver into
fine ashes using gasoline and rubber tires.
o Umbal could not recall the exact date when the
incident happened, but he was certain it was
about a year ago.
Based on that confession of Umbal, a search warrant
was issued by Judge Roberto Barrios of the RTC of
Manila.
Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC), armed with the search warrant issued
separately raided the dwellings of police officers who were
also pointed by Umbal as the perpetrators of the crimes.
Several firearms and ammunitions were found in the raid
including Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two
lawyers and their other co-defendants were charged with
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions,
carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and
usurpation of authority.
Their case was referred by Sr., Supt. Panfilo Lacson, Chief
of PACC Task Force Habagat to the DOJ who took over the
case.
Senior State Prosec Ferdinand R. Abesamis issued a
subpoena to petitioners informing them that a complaint
was filed against them by PACC TF-Habagat.
o

4.

5.

6.
7.

8. Not satisfied with the affidavits attached to the subpoena,

petitioner Mendoza moved for the production of other
documents for examination and copying to enable him to
fully prepare for his defense and to submit an intelligible
counter-affidavit.
Petitioners likewise sought the inhibition of the
members of the panel of prosecutors, which was
created to conduct the preliminary investigation, on
the ground that they were members of the legal staff

assigned to PACC and thus could not act with

impartiality.
New Panel Made and they granted the prayer of
petitioner Mendoza for the production of additional
documents used or intended to be used against him.
Task Force Habagat, in compliance with the order,
submitted only copies of the request for verification of
the firearms seized from the accused, the result of the
request for verification, and a Philippine Times
Journal article on the case with a marginal note of
President Fidel V. Ramos addressed to the Chief of the
Philippine National Police directing the submission of a
report and summary of actions taken thereon.
Not having been provided with the requested
documents, petitioners nevertheless submitted their
respective counter-affidavits denying the accusations
against them.
9. After preliminary investigation, the Judge Roberto Diokno
found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest
without bail.
10.Petitioners filed this petition and principally contended
that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in:
o "whimsically holding that there is probable
cause against petitioners without determining
the admissibility of the evidence against
petitioners and without even stating the basis of
his findings,"
o & "relying on the Resolution of the Panel
and their certification that probable cause exists
when the certification is flawed."
11.Petitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary
investigation which respondent judge solely relied upon
failed to establish probable cause against them to justify
the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
12.Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors' "clear sign of
bias and partiality.
13.On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General
argues that the determination of probable cause is a
function of the judge who is merely required to personally

appreciate certain facts to convince him that the accused

probably committed the crime charged.
ISSUES:
1. WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in the preliminary investigation which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest.
2. WON warrant of arrest without bail can be set aside and
the case be dismissed for lack of probable cause even if
the accused was not in the custody of the court
HELD:
1. In the Order of respondent judge, it is expressly stated
that "[t]his court after careful evaluation of the evidence
on record, believes and rules that probable cause exists;
and therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued."
2. However, SC were unable to see how respondent judge
arrived at such ruling. SC have painstakingly examined
the records and we cannot find any support for his
conclusion.
3. On the contrary, there are a number of reasons why the
SC considers the evidence submitted to be insufficient for
a finding of probable cause against petitioners.
4. The PACC relies heavily on the sworn statement of
Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed his
participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van
Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on VanTwest's
reported death since the corpus delicti has not been
established, nor have his remains been recovered. Umbal
claims that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes
with the use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten
o'clock in the evening to six o'clock the next morning. This
is highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body
cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with
the use of gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even
crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the
corpse is subjected to intense heat. Thereafter, the
remains undergo a process where the bones are
completely ground to dust.
5. Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported
abduction which culminated in his decimation by

cremation, his counsel continued to represent him before

judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Hence, even Asst.
Solicitor General Estoesta believes that counsel of Van
Twest doubted the latter's death.
6. Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of
petitioners it appearing that he did not personally
examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant
and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts.
Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the
prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise,
he would have found out that the evidence thus far
presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of
petitioners.
7. In Soliven v. Makasiar, we said that the judge (a)shall
personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the
existence of probable cause.
8. In People v. Inting, SC emphasized that the important
features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The
determination of probable cause is a function of the judge;
it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain.
Only the judge and the judge alone makes this
determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a
prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him
in making the determination ofprobable cause. The judge
does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to
him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable
cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other
supporting
documents
behind the
prosecutor's
certification which are material in assisting the judge in
his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and
prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary
inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertainswhether the offender should be

held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be

conducted inthe course of one and the same proceeding,
there should be no confusion about their objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant is made
by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper
whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore,
whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial is a function of the
prosecutor.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the PACC from enforcing the
warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from
further proceeding in the case on the ground of lack of
probable cause. As with other earlier cases resolved by the
high court, the accused is deemed to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding such, there is no requirement that the
accused be in the custody of the law. Various reliefs can be
granted by the Supreme Court to accused even if they are
not in the custody of the law.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted. ALLADO WON.

#4 REYES V PEARLBANK SECURITIES - LAZATIN

TOPIC: Probable Cause in Preliminary Investigations
FACTS:
1. Reyes is the VP of Wincorp, a corporation that arranges
and brokers loans of its clients, one of whom is Pearlbank
Securities.
2. Sometime before this case, investors or lenders made
demands on Pearlbank to pay several loans that were
brokered by Wincorp. The investors alleged that they
werent able to collect on their outstanding credits with
Wincorp because Pearlbank didnt pay. Apparently,
Pearlbank alleges that it did not have any outstanding
loans
that
WINCORP
brokered.
Thus,
Pearlbank
investigated on these alleged debts.
3. Pearlbank demanded from Wincorp a full and accurate
accounting of the identities and investments of the
lenders and the alleged debts of Pearlbank with
supporting records and documents. Wincorp did not
respond to this demand.
4. Pearlbank instituted a case with the SEC, now pending
with the RTC (bec. of the law which transferred jd with the
RTCs)
5. Pearlbank, through its treasurer, also filed complaints with
the DOJ against officers of Wincorp, one of them was
Reyes, for falsification of commercial and private
documents.
6. The DOJ filed the criminal case with the MTC. Later,
however, DOJ USec Merciditas Gutierrez ordered the
withdrawal of the Informations. This decision was reversed
by the DOJ Sec, thus the case proceeded.
7. Reyes filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, where he
raised, among others, that the SEC case is a prejudicial
question to the criminal case for falsification. CA denied
certiorari thus criminal case proceeds.
ISSUE: WON the SEC case is a prejudicial question that has
to be resolved before the criminal case for falsification may
proceed- NO
RULING:

1. A prejudicial question is defined as one which arises in a

case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal.
2. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime, but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
3. It comes into play generally in a situation in which a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending and there
exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be a determinative presumption of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
4. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question
is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
5. One of the issues taken in the SEC case is whether
Pearlbank has outstanding loans with Wincorp. However, a
finding that Pearlbank indeed has outstanding debts will
not totally absolve Reyes of any criminal liability. In other
words, it is not an absolute defense, since what is
determinative in the falsification case is whether there
really were falsified documents.

#5 MANEBO vs. ACOSTA - SULLANO

FACTS:
1. Bernadette M. Dimatulac, the victim, and Flordeliza V.
Bagasan (Bagasan) were seated beside each other on a
papag watching television inside the church of the
Kaibigan Foundation, Inc. Suddenly, a man later identified
as SPO1 Roel Acosta (respondent Acosta), with an
unidentified male companion, both with short firearms,
entered the church premises. Respondent Acosta
approached the victim and Bagasan and, at an arm's
length distance, respondent Acosta shot the victim
several times on the head and body causing her
instantaneous death.
2. Severino Sardia (Sardia), who was standing in front of his
house when he heard several gunshots and saw two men
with short firearms run out of the Kaibigan Foundation,
Inc. Chapel. The two men immediately boarded an ownertype jeep without a plate number parked along Maharlika
Highway and proceeded to the direction going to San
Leonardo town. While the driver of the jeep was in the
process of backing up his vehicle, Sardia recognized the
driver as Sapiandante, the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Tagumpay, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija.
3. A complaint for murder was filed by Nieva Manebo
(Manebo), sister of the victim, against respondents Acosta
and Sapiandante before the Special Action Unit (SAU) of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
4. Respondent Acosta claimed that on May 4, 2000, he was
on a special assignment in San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija,
pursuant to a directive issued by Police Chief Inspector
Fernando Galang; that there was no reason for him to kill
the victim, as he had no grudge against her; that
Bagasan's description of him did not fit his physical
attributes; that there was a substitution of witness,
considering that the person beside the victim when she
was shot was identified in the police report as Liza
Gragasan and not Flordeliza Bagasan.
5. Respondents filed MR as regards the filing of an
information against them
6. Reversed by DOJ. Affirmed by OP

ISSUES:
WON the CA, the OP and the Secretary of Justice committed
grave errors in the appreciation of facts and of laws in
recommending the dismissal of the complaint based solely on
the matters, which are best, determined during a full-blown
trial
HELD: YES
1. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating
officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause
implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare
suspicion but less than evidence to justify a conviction.
2. To determine the existence of probable cause, there is
a need to conduct a preliminary investigation. A
preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to
determine whether (a) a crime has been committed;
and (b) there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering
which person or persons may be reasonably charged
with a crime.
3. The conduct of a preliminary investigation is executive
in nature. The SC may not be compelled to pass upon
the correctness of the exercise of the public
prosecutors function, unless there is a showing of
grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his
findings. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power
must have been done in an arbitrary or a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It
must have been so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
4. In this case, we find that the DOJ committed a manifest
error in finding no probable cause to charge
respondents with the crime of murder.
5. While the initial police report stated that the name of
the person who was seated beside the victim when the
latter was shot was Liza Gragasan, such report would

not conclusively establish that Liza Gragasan could not

have been Flordeliza Bagasan, the witness who
executed an affidavit four months after the incident.
Notably, Flordeliza's nickname is Liza, and her
surname Bagasan sounds similar to Gragasan.
6. The DOJ Secretary's finding that the description given
by Bagasan did not fit the physical attributes of
respondent Acosta is not persuasive, since Bagasan
was able to positively identify respondent Acosta. She
did so when a cartographic sketch of respondent
Acosta was shown to her and later when she was
asked to identify him from among the three pictures of
men shown to her during the investigation at the NBI.
Notably, there was nothing in the records that showed
that Bagasan was impelled by any improper motive in
pointing to respondent Acosta.
7. Ordered prosecutor to withdraw the Motion to
Withdraw Information

#6 LEDESMA vs. CA- TING

FACTS:
1. Dr. Torres filed a libel complaint with the Prosecutors
Office of Quezon City charging Dr. Ledesma of libel
a. Dr. Ledesma sent a letter to the Director of the
Philippine Heart Center seeking payment of her fees
because she said that the payment for all the patients
handled by her and Dr. Torres was divided equally.
Despite the fact that Dr. Torres was habitually absent
and unprofessional which left all the work to her.
2. Prosecutor found probable cause and filed an information
for libel with the RTC
3. Upon appeal to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) Drilon, he
said that there was no probable cause
a. The letter was privileged communication sent by Dr.
Ledesma in good faith to her superior
b. She merely wanted to seek relief and payment
c. It took Torres 1 year before he realized said letter was
defamatory
4. SOJ ordered the withdrawal of the information.
5. RTC refused to dismiss the case.
ISSUE: WON Dismissal of the case is properYES
HELD:
1. The determination of probable cause is an executive
function
2. The purpose of a preliminary investigation (PI) is to free
the respondent-accused from a formal trial until there is
reasonable belief he/she is probably guilty
a. Also, to relieve the courts from false/ frivolous cases
3. Appeal to the SOJ is valid
a. SOJ has control and supervision over all under him
including the prosecutors
b. However, according to a department order, appeals to
the SOJ is not allowed when the accused has already
been arraigned in court.
4. In this case, the RTC Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in not dismissing the case

a. First, there was no probable cause. The letter was

priviledged communication made in good faith. It was
for seeking of a relief. It was made to a person with a
corresponding duty or interest in the case
b. Second, the judge had no independent
consideration of the case
i. The RTC judge must make its own study and
evaluation of the Motion to Dismiss or the
Motion to withdraw the information
ii. He need not only rely on the resolution of the
prosecutor
c. Note: when the SOJ reviews a resolution, the
RTC must first suspend the case

#7 WEBB V. DE LEON - MONTEALTO

FACTS:
1. NBI filed with DOJ charging petitioners Hubert Webb,
Gatchailan, Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of
Rape with Homicide.
2. DOJ formed a panel to conduct the preliminary
investigation of those charge with the rape and killing of
Carmela Vizconde, her mother Estrellita, and her sister
Marie in their home at BF Homes.
3. During preliminary investigation, NBI presented the ff:
a. Sworn statement of principal witness (Jessica
Alfaro) who allegedly saw the commission of the
crime and the maids.
b. Sworn statement of Carlos Cristobal who alleged
that he was a passenger of United Airlines who
expressed doubt whether petitioner Webb was his
co-passenger.
c. Autopsy reports of the victims were also submitted.
4. Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb
filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for Production and
Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI
which was granted by DOJ.
5. Petitioner Webb claimed during preliminary investigation
that he did not commit the crime at bar as he went to the
US. This was corroborated with different evidences:
a. Car and bicycle purchase in US
b. Issuance of Drivers license in US
c. US Embassy records that he was in US.
6. Other accused submitted sworn statements and a motion
to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing of
Vizcondes. They alleged that they were at the residence
of their friend.
7. DOJ issued a resolution finding probable cause to hold
respondents for trial and recommending that an
information for Rape with homicide be filed against
petitioners.
8. Information was filed. Judge De leon and Escano issued
warrants against the petitioners. Subsequently, Judge
Escano voluntarily inhibited since he was an employee of
NBI before he was appointed. The case was reraffled and
Judge Amelita issued new warrants against petitioners.

9. However, petitioners voluntarily surrendered themselves

to the police authorities.
ISSUE:
1. WON DOJ gravely abused its discretion in holding that
there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of
rape with homicide?
2. WON DOJ denied them their constitutional right to due
process during their preliminary investigation?
HELD:
First Issue:
1. Petitioners fault the DOJ for finding probable cause. They
insist the statement of Alfaro was weak. They also criticize
the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and
inconsistencies in the statements of the witnesses for NBI.
a. Sec 1 Rule 112 provides that a preliminary
investigation should determine whether there is a
sufficient ground to engender a well grounded
belief that a crime cognizable by RTC has been
committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and therefore should be held for trial.
b. Sec 3 except as provided for in Sec. 7 hereof, no
complaint or information for an offense cognizable
by the RTC shall be filed without a preliminary
investigation.
PLEASE
READ
THIS
SECTION
SOBRANG HABA.
c. There is need for probable cause in arrest cases as
provided in the Bill of Rights.
d. Applying these, DOJ panel gravely abused its
discretion when it found probable cause against the
petitioners.
2. The alleged inconsistencies did not erode the credibility of
Alfaro. She was having reservations when she first
executed an affidavit and held back vital information.
However, the panel believes that the inconsistencies were
sufficiently explained.
3. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has
been committed and what is clear before us is that the
totality of the evidence submitted by the complainant
indicate prima facie case against Webb and others.

a. House maid of one of the accused saw bloodstains

on the clothes.
b. Carlos Cristobal alleged that he met Freddie Webb
in the airport and he knew Webb because of the
television show Chicks to chicks. Webb told him
that his son, Hubert, is going to San Francisco.
Subsequently, he saw Webbs wife on the television
wherein the latter described her son, and Carlos
realized that it was not their son that was with him
in the flight.
4. DOJ panel also did not gravely abuse its discretion in
refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory
questions. It is in the sound discretion of the investigator.
Second Issue
1. Petitioner also complain about the denial of their
constitutional right to due process and violation of
their right to an impartial investigation.
a. Alleged hasty and malicious prosecution by the
NBI and DOJ panel.
b. Prejudicial
publicity
that
attended
their
preliminary investigation.
2. The court rejected these contentions. The DOJ Panel
did not conduct the preliminary investigation with
indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity
to prove lack of probable cause against them.
a. Webb actively participated in the preliminary
investigation.
b. Sec 3 Rule 112 states that investigating officer
shall resolve the case within 10 days from
termination of preliminary investigation. But in
this case, it was done 27 days later so that they
can study the case fully. They could still have
submitted evidences at this point.
3. The court recognizes that pervasive and prejudicial
publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an
accused of his due process right to fair trial. However,
there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influence by the barrage of publicity.
a. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records
that will prove that tone and content of the

4.

5.

6.

7.

publicity to fatally infect the fairness and

impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners also charge the NBI with violating their right
to discovery proceedings during their preliminary
investigation by suppressing original copy of the sworn
statement of Alfaro and FBI report.
a. Our Rules on Crim Pro do not expressly provide
for discovery proceedings during the preliminary
investigation stage of a criminal proceeding. Sec
10 and 11 of Rule 117, however, provide an
accused the right to move for bill of particulars
and production or inspection of material
evidence in possession of the prosecution. But
these provisions apply AFTER the filing of the
complaint.
The failure to provide discovery procedure during
preliminary investigation does not, however, negate its
use by a person under investigation when
indispensable to protect his constitutional right to life,
liberty and property.
The right to preliminary investigation is a substantive
right. It should therefore be scrupulously conducted so
that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential
accused can be protected from any material damage.
The court then recognized the right of the petitioner to
demand from the prosecutor the orginial copy of the
sworn statement of Alfaro and FBI Report.
a. However, there will still be probable cause thatll
be found even if there is production of the
statement.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.

#8 LEVISTE v. ALAMEDA LACAP

TOPIC: Procedure in cases not requiring preliminary
investigation; When person lawfully arrested without
a warrant
FACTS:
1. Petitioner (Leviste) was charged with homicide for the
death of Rafael de las Alas
2. Petitioner was placed under police custody but was able
to post bail. He was released from detention. His case was
set for arraignment
3. Complainant (heirs of De las Alas) filed with the public
prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the
deferment of the proceedings to allow the public
prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
4. RTC granted the order:
a. Arraignment was deferred
b. Allowed the prosecution to conduct reinvestigation
to determine proper offense.
5. Petitioner appealed to the CA on the said order via
certiorari and prohibition
6. Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and
Motion to defer acting on the public prosecutors
recommendation on the proper offense until after the
appellate court resolves his application for injunctive
reliefs (see number 5), or alternatively, to grant him time
to comment on the prosecutors recommendation.
7. Despite the petition in number 6, the RTC issued two
orders:
a. FEB 7 ORDER which admitted the Amended
Information for murder and directed the issuance of
warrant of arrest
b. FEB 8 ORDER which set the arraignment
8. Petitioner questioned both orders to the CA via
supplemental petition but the latter dismissed the
petition.
9. Records show that the arraignment scheduled on March
21, 2007 pushed through during which petitioner refused
to plead, drawing the trial court to enter a plea of not
guilty for him.

10.The trial court, absent any writ of preliminary injunction

from the appellate court, went on to try petitioner under
the Amended Information. By Decision of January 14,
2009, the trial court found petitioner guilty of homicide,
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12
years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
PETITIONER: posits that the prosecution has no right under
the Rules to seek from the trial court an investigation or
reevaluation of the case except through a petition for review
before the Department of Justice (DOJ)
In cases when an accused is arrested without a
warrant, petitioner contends that the remedy of
preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.
ISSUE: Whether the amendment of the Information from
homicide to murder is considered a substantial amendment,
which would make it not just a right but a duty of the
prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation. YES
HELD:
The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide
range of discretion the discretion of what and whom to
charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. The
prosecutions discretion is not boundless or infinite, however.
The standing principle is that once an information is filed in
court, any remedial measure such as a reinvestigation must
be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case,
whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal
of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.
Before the accused enters a plea, a formal or
substantial amendment of the complaint or information may
be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea,
only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of
court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the

accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is

proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases
involving a substantial amendment of the information. Due
process of law demands that no substantial amendment of an
information may be admitted without conducting another or
a new preliminary investigation.
The amendment involved in the present case
consists of additional averments of the circumstances
of treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty,
which qualify the offense charged from homicide to
murder. It being a new and material element of the
offense, petitioner should be given the chance to
adduce evidence on the matter. Not being merely
clarificatory, the amendment essentially varies the
prosecutions original theory of the case and certainly
affects not just the form but the weight of defense to
be mustered by petitioner.
Considering that another or a new preliminary
investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in
the present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate
the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no
substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation
and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same
manner and for the same objective of determining whether
there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
Petitioner did not, however, make much of the
opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the
proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing,
petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and
declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution,
in the reinvestigation.
DISPOSITIVE: PETITION DENIED. Decision of the Court of
convicting the petitioner was affirmed.
DISCUSSION ON INQUEST

(you may skip this but in case Atty. Sanidad asks, its here)
A preliminary investigation is required before the filing
of a complaint or information for an offense where the
penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months
and one day without regard to fine. As an exception, the rules
provide that there is no need for a preliminary investigation
in cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant involving such
type of offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has
been conducted.
Inquest is defined as an informal and summary
investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal
cases involving persons arrested and detained without the
benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the
purpose of determining whether said persons should remain
under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.
It is imperative to first take a closer look at the
predicament of both the arrested person and the private
complainant during the brief period of inquest, to grasp the
respective remedies available to them before and after the
filing of a complaint or information in court.
BEFORE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT:
the private complainant may proceed in coordinating
with the arresting officer and the inquest officer during
the latters conduct of inquest
the arrested person has the option to avail of a 15-day
preliminary investigation
provided he duly signs a waiver of any objection
against delay in his delivery to the proper judicial
authorities
NOTE: In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable
cause, the private complainant may pursue the case through
the regular course of a preliminary investigation.
ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT:
the rules yet provide the accused with another
opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation

within five days from the time he learns of its filing

The Rules on Inquest are silent, however, on whether
the private complainant could invoke, as respondent
heirs of the victim did in the present case, a similar
right to ask for a reinvestigation.

The Court holds that the private complainant can move

for reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the ensuing
disquisition.

#9 TORRES v. AGUINALDO - ADOBO

FACTS:
1. Respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed
before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, a
complaint against petitioner Artemio T. Torres, Jr. (Torres)
for falsification of public document. They alleged that
titles to their properties covered by Transfer Certificates
were transferred without their knowledge and consent in
the name of Torres through a forged Deed of sale. In
which Torres denied such allegation claiming that
Aguinaldo sold the subject properties to him as evidence
by the deed of absolute sale.
2. OCP found probable cause and recommended the filing of
information for falsification of public documents against
Torres, which was filed before the MTC.
3. On appeal the sec. of justice reversed the findings of
investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of
information.
4. A Motion to Withdraw Information was filed which the MTC
granted. It should be noted that petitioner has not been
arraigned.
5. Meanwhile, Aguinaldo filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari which was granted in the assailed
decision.
6. Torres motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the
instant petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
Whether the order of MTC granting the motion to withdraw
the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed
by Aguinaldo for the purpose of reinstating the resolution of
the OCP and in the alternative, whether the rule on
provisional dismissal under sec 8, Rule 117 applies.
HELD:
1. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to
dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court,
their legal effects varies. The order granting the
withdrawal of information attains finality after 15 days
from receipt thereof, without prejudice to the refilling of
the information upon reinvestigation

2. On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss

becomes final 15 days after receipt thereof, with prejudice
to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves
finality. In Baares v. Balising, a motion to dismiss was filed
thus putting into place the time-bar rule on provisional
dismissal.
3. In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was
filed and not a motion to dismiss. Hence, Baares II v.
Balising would not apply. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a
motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and
does not fall within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that
the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative once
the judge dismisses, with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party: (a) a case
involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, where such
provisional dismissal shall become permanent one (1)
year after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived; or (b) a case involving a penalty of
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, where such
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2)
years after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived.
4. There is provisional dismissal when a motion filed
expressly for that purpose complies with the following
requisites, viz.: (1) It must be with the express consent of
the accused; and (2) There must be notice to the offended
party. Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the filing of a
motion to dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw
information. Thus, the law on provisional dismissal does
not apply in the present case.
5. The Motion to Withdraw Information was filed by the
Assistant City Prosecutor and approved by the City
Prosecutor without the conformity of the accused, herein
petitioner Torres. Thus, it cannot be said that the motion
was filed with his express consent as required under
Section 8, Rule 117.

#10 GUINGONA JR. VS CITY FISCAL CASTILLO

TOPIC: INJUNCTION & WRITS OF RESTRAINT ONLY IN
PROPER CASES
FACTS:
1. Respondent Clement David, an Australian citizen and his
sister Denise Kuhne made placements with Nation Savings
and Loan Association, Inc. (NSLAI), P1,145,546.20, savings
deposits of P13,531.94 and US$75,000 of which $50,000 was
deposited in the account of Teofisto Guingona, Jr. with
Security Bank because NSLA did not have any dollar account.
2. Petitioners Guingona (director), Martin (president), and
Santos (GM) are officers of NSLAI at the time of the money
placements. Due to Davids insistence, the investments were
treated as special accounts with interest above the legal rate,
and recorded in separate confidential documents; that only a
portion of said deposits or investments were to be reported
because he did not want the Australian government to tax his
total earnings nor to know his total investments.
3. On March 21, 1981, NSLAI was placed under receivership
by the Central Bank (CB) because of serious fraud and
irregularities committed by its key officers. Guingona and
Martin executed a PN to David acknowledging a debt of
P1.33M and $75K to be paid in installments with interest, but
upon Davids request, it was novated by another PN, whereby
Guingona acknowledged 1/2 of the obligation as his debt and
secured by mortgages on his QC properties with stipulation
that the mortgage of 1 parcel should be cancelled upon
payment of 1/2 of his 1/2 share in the obligation.
4. Martin assumed the other half of the total debt and
secured it with the pledge of a ring. On July 22, 1981, David
received a report from the CB that only P305K of their
placements were recorded in NSLAIs books.
5. Guingona filed in CFI-QC against David for specific
performance with damages for his failure to accept his
additional payment of P300k (in addition to his previous
payment of P200K) and to release one of the mortgaged
properties so David filed with the City Fiscals Office, a
complaint for estafa and violation of CB Circular No. 364 and
related regulations alleging the difference between his

placements and the amount entered in NSLAIs books

constitutes the defraudation against him.
6. At the start of the investigation, petitioners moved to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the claims alleged are
purely civil obligation which has been novated, but was
denied. After the testimony of Davids first witness,
petitioners again moved to dismiss on the same ground, but
also denied. Therefore, petitioners filed petition for
prohibition, which the Court granted and issued a TRO.
Solicitor General did not file MR and it became final
executory, but David filed this MR within the reglementary
period.
ISSUE:
WON the City Fiscal should be prohibited from
completing his preliminary investigation on the ground that
the charges are civil in nature?
NO.
RATIO:
1. The petitioners have no cause of action because the City
Fiscal has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation. It has not been finished, thus filing of the
petition is premature. The case does not fall within any of the
exceptions when prohibition lies to stop the preliminary
investigation.
2. As a general rule, an injunction will not be granted to
restrain a criminal prosecution, with more reason if the case
is still at the preliminary investigation stage. The Court
should not usurp the primary function of the City Fiscal to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the estafa charge
and of the petitioners counter-charge for perjury. The City
Fiscals office should be allowed to finish its investigation and
make its factual findings, not the Court because it is not a
trier of facts.
3. The case is primarily between David and the petitioners,
so non-filing of MR by the Solicitor General, as counsel of the
public respondents, does not estop David from continuing
with the prosecution of the petitioners.
DISPOSITIVE:
Decision reconsidered. Petition dismissed.
City Fiscal directed to finish preliminary investigation.