233 U.S.

473
34 S.Ct. 646
58 L.Ed. 1051

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY

v.
JOSEPH BEHRENS, Administrator, etc.
No. 241.
Argued March 6, 1914.
Decided April 27, 1914.

Messrs. Blewett Lee, Hunter C. Leake, and Gustave Lemle for the Illinois
Central Railroad Company.
Mr. Armand Romain for Joseph Behrens.
[Argument of Counsel from page 474 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. Alfred L. Becker, Mauice C. Spratt, and Lester F. Gilbert as amici
curice.
Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court:

In an action in the circuit court for the eastern district of Louisiana, under the
Federal employers' liability act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. at L. 65, chap. 149,
U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), against a railroad company, by a
personal representative to recover for the death of his intestate, the plaintiff
prevailed, and the defendant took the case by writ of error to the circuit court of
appeals. That court, desiring instruction upon a question of law arising in the
case, certified the question here under 239 of the Judicial Code [36 Stat. at L.
1157, chap. 231, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 228]. The facts shown in the
certificate are these: The intestate was in the service of the railroad company as
a member of a crew attached to a switch engine operated exclusively within the
city of New Orleans. He was the fireman, and came to his death, while at his
post of duty, through a head-on collision. The general work of the crew
consisted in moving cars from one point to another within the city over the
company's tracks and other connecting tracks. Sometimes the cars were loaded,

at other times empty, and at still other times some were loaded and others
empty. When loaded the freight in them was at times destined from within to
without the state or vice versa; at other times was moving only between points
within the state, and at still other times was of both classes. When the cars were
empty the purpose was usually to take them where they were to be loaded or
away from where they had been unloaded. And oftentimes, following the
movement of cars, loaded or empty, to a given point, other cars were gathered
up and taken or started elsewhere. In short, the crew handled interstate and
intrastate traffic indiscriminately, frequently moving both at once and at times
turning directly from one to the other. At the time of the collision the crew was
moving several cars loaded with freight which was wholly intrastate, and upon
completing that movement was to have gathered up and taken to other points
several other cars as a step or link in their transportation to various destinations
within and without the state. The question of law upon which the circuit court
of appeals desires instruction is whether, upon these facts, it can be said that the
intestate, at the time of his fatal injury, was employed in interstate commerce
within the meaning of the employers' liability act.
2

Considering the status of the railroad as a highway for both interstate and
intrastate commerce, the interdependence of the two classes of traffic in point
of movement and safety, the practical difficulty in separating or dividing the
general work of the switching crew, and the nature and extent of the power
confided to Congress by the commerce clause of the Constitution, we entertain
no doubt that the liability of the carrier for injuries suffered by a member of the
crew in the course of its general work was subject to regulation by Congress,
whether the particular service being performed at the time of the injury,
isolatedly considered, was in interstate or intrastate commerce. Baltimore & O.
R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 618, 55 L. ed. 878,
882, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621; Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 26,
56 L. ed. 72, 74, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2, 3 N. C. C. A. 822; Second Employers'
Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L.
ed. 327, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C. C. A. 875;
Interestate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co. 224 U. S. 194, 213,
56 L. ed. 729, 737, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v.
Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 432, 57 L. ed. 1511, 1555, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1151, 33
Sup. Ct. Rep. 729. The decision in Employer's Liability Cases (Howard v.
Illinois C. R. Co.) 207 U. S. 463, 52 L. ed. 297, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141, is not to
the contrary, for the act of June 11, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 232, chap. 3073, U. S.
Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1316), there pronounced invalid, attempted to
regulate the liability of every carrier in interstate commerce, whether by
railroad or otherwise, for any injury to any employee, even though his
employment had no connection whatever with interstate commerce.

Passing from the question of power to that of its exercise, we find that the
controlling provision in the act of April 22, 1908, reads as follows: 'That every
common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the
several states . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while
he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of
such employee, to his or her personal representative, . . . for such injury or
death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency,
due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed,
works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.' Giving to the words 'suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce' their natural
meaning, as we think must be done, it is clear that Congress intended to confine
its action to injuries occurring when the particular service in which the
employee is engaged is a part of interstate commerce. The act was so construed
in Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 229 U. S. 146, 57 L. ed. 1125, 33
Sup. Ct. Rep. 648, 3 N. C. C. A. 779. It was there said (p. 150): 'There can be
no doubt that a right of recovery thereunder arises only where the injury is
suffered while the carrier is engaged in interstate commerce and while the
employee is employed by the carrier in such commerce.' Again (p. 152): 'The
true test always is: Is the work in question a part of the interstate commerce in
which the carrier is engaged?' And a like view is shown in other cases. Second
Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U.
S. 1, 56 L. ed. 327, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C. C. A.
875: Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Moore, 228 U. S. 433, 57 L. ed. 907, 33 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 580; St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 158, 57 L.
ed. 1129, 1133, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651; North Carolina R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U.
S. 248, 256, 58 L. ed. , 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305; Grand Trunk Western R. Co.
v. Lindsay, 233 U. S. 42, 58 L. ed. , 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581.

Here, at the time of the fatal injury the intestate was engaged in moving several
cars, all loaded with intrastate freight, from one part of the city to another. That
was not a service in interstate commerce, and so the injury and resulting death
were not within the statute. That he was expected, upon the completion of that
task, to engage in another which would have been a part of interstate
commerce, is immaterial under the statute, for by its terms the true test is the
nature of the work being done at the time of the injury.

The question is accordingly answered in the negative.