Professional Documents
Culture Documents
and to pay attorneys' fees. Some of the petitioners were former NARIC
employees, others allegedly were recently employed by RCA and
never employed by NARIC. The record is not altogether clear as to
whether petitioners are members of the Naric Workers' Union [NWU].
For, they claim they are not, a fact negated, and no evidence was
taken by CIR thereon.
RCA pleaded disclaimer upon the averment, inter alia, that because
"RCA was created under Republic Act 3452 since June 14, 1962 as a
service agency or instrumentality of the government to implement a
government policy and program pursuant to R.A. 3452, the law
applicable governing the extra hours of work of employees of the
Administration, is no longer Commonwealth Act 444 known as the
Eight-Hour Labor Law but Commonwealth Act 246 known as the
Budget Act"; and that "the liabilities transferred from the NARIC to the
RCA are those liabilities incurred by the NARIC but not those to be
incurred by the RCA such as the claims for overtime from creation of
the RCA on June 14, 1962 stated in the herein petition."
Allowed to intervene, NWU moved to dismiss upon the ground of
pendency of incidental case No. 746-V (21) filed 10 days after the
petition below which is a petition similar in terms to the aforesaid
petition filed in CIR by the 147 laborers and employees, in that the
union also sought to compel RCA to pay its laborers and employees
under the same partial decision, from June 14, 1962. It is to be noted
that Case No. 746-V (21 )3 is filed as an incident in Case No. 746-V of
the Court of Industrial Relations where said partial judgment was
entered.
CIR, through then Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, on December
6, 1963, sustained the pendency of another action theory advocated by
NWU. On February 27, 1964, acting on petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, CIR en banc in a resolution, affirmed the order of
Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez. Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista
dissented in an opinion subsequently filed on March 30, 1964.
The resolution en banc finally disposed of petitioners' case below.
Hence, this appeal to review the order and resolution en
banc aforesaid.
Ratio
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the
legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to courts
Sec 13 is defining the law which is invasion of Judicial jurisdiction
The legislative branch cannot validate a law which has weight unto
decisions made by the court
Chief Justice Marshall stated that A statute which is in violation of a
fundamental law should be reviewed by the judiciary, Any other course
will be destructive to the Constitution.
Other reasons of the SC are income taxe is a dimmunition of
compensation mainly because it is deducted from the time of pay
unlike before where income tax is paid separately in a later time.
Judiciary officers are few in number and receive low pay. The nation
benefits more from independence of judges than revenue of taxes
Justices serve the country similar to soldiers , who were exempted
from income tax during 1942 -1945.
Result: Appeal is AFFIRMED. Judicial officers are excluded from tax.
RAMOS VS CIR
The meat of the case, as tendered by the pleadings below, is whether
Rice and Corn Administration [RCA] should be held answerable
from June 14, 1962 when the National Rice and Corn Corporation
[NARIC] ceased to exist and RCA was created for an obligation
created by agreement confirmed in a partial judgment of the
Commission of Industrial Relations [CIR]1 rendered on February 16
1953, directing NARIC, to pay 25% additional compensation for
overtime work, night work, and work rendered on Sundays and legal
holidays by its laborers and employees.
The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed with ClR 2 on
February 9, 1963, almost ten years to the date of the CIR partial
decision. Petitioners are 147 workers and employees, allegedly in the
service of RCA, who lodged the petition in their individual capacity, not
as union members. They pray that respondent RCA be required to
comply with CIR's February 16, 1953 partial judgment from June, 1962
1. We do not go along with the majority of the CIR judges in their ruling
that this case should be dismissed upon the ground of pendency of
another action. The action referred to is Case 746-V (21), which is a
petition filed as aforesaid after the petition below was lodged in
court also to enforce the 1953 partial judgment in Case 746-V.
The 1953 judgment in that case (746-V) was against NARIC. It is
contended on one side that RCA is responsible for NARIC's obligation
thus created. But a genuine issue was raised in RCA's answer: Under
the law of its creation, RCA should not be held liable from the time it
was constituted on June 14, 1962, for any continuing obligation under
the 1953 partial judgment aforesaid contracted by NARIC which had
ceased to exist. RCA did not contract that obligation.
In effect then, petitioner's action herein is a fresh suit against RCA to
enforce NARIC's continuing liability against RCA as NARIC's
successor. It is idle to contend that the present should be but an
incident of the former suit. For, petitioners here do not seek to alter or
clarify the partial judgment. Neither could the present petition be
considered as one for execution of the partial judgment of 1953.
Because judgment for execution is against a defeated party or its
privies. No privity, if RCA is to be believed, exists here between RCA
and NARIC. That is a question which, in our opinion, demands serious
consideration. CIR should have passed upon it. Pendency of another
similar petition presented ten days after the present case was
commenced in court should not have stood on the way. First. Because
the identity of party respondents in the previous 1953 case (Case 746V), from which case 746-V (21) sprang and in the present 1963 case
(Case 1799-V) deserves explicit determination. Second. If at all, it is
posterior Case 746-V (21) which should be held in abeyance.itcalf Indeed, CIR stopped proceedings therein pending decision by this
Court of the present case.
2. Is there merit then to RCA's defense that it is not liable for NARIC's
continuing obligation aforesaid from and after its constitution on June
14, 1962?
This is the poser because RCA concedes that under the law of its
creation, Republic Act 3452, it should answer for all the liabilities
contracted by NARIC, but only those incurred prior to the date of
NARIC's abolition.
The main issue in this petition was aptly deposited by the Solicitor
General in his consolidated comment; Whether or not KAMAPI should
be allowed to participate in a certification election thru a motion for
intervention without a prior showing that it has the required support
expressed in the written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent of all
employees in the collective bargaining unit. In taking the negative
stance, petitioner cites Section 6, Rule V of the Rules Implementing
Executive Order No. 111, which reads:
Pertinent to the above rule is Section 7 of E.O. 111 to which the former
relates, and which provides:
xxx
Art. 258. Petitions in unorganized establishments.
In any establishment where there is no certified
bargaining agent, the petition for certification
election filed by a legitimate labor organization
shall be supported by the written consent of at
least twenty (20%) percent of all the employees in
the bargaining unit. Upon receipt of such petition,
the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order the
conduct of a certification election.
This leads Us to the question of purpose. the reason behind the 20%
requirement is to ensure that the petitioning union has a substantial
interest in the representation proceedings ** and, as correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, that a considerable number of workers
desire their representation by the said petitioning union for collective
bargaining purposes. Hence, the mere fact that 20% of the workers in
the bargaining unit signify their support to the petition by their written
consent, it becomes mandatory on the part of the Med-Arbiter to order
the holding of a certification election in an unorganized establishment
(Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Noriel, 134 SCRA
152). The 20% requirement, thereof, is peculiar to petitions for
certification election.
PAWU VS NLRC
This is a classic case of dilatory tactics employed to obstruct justice.
On July 31, 1981, this Court rendered Judgment in this case, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is hereby granted, the decision of
the respondent Commission is hereby set aside, and private
respondent is hereby directed to pay, in addition to the increased
allowance provided for in P.D. 1123, the negotiated wage increase of
P0.80 daily effective April 1, 1977 as well as all other wage increases
embodied in the collective bargaining agreement, to all covered
employees. Costs against private respondent.
This decision, is immediately executory (p. 178, rec.).
A motion for reconsideration of the July 31, 1981 decision. this Court
was filed by private respondent. Petitioner, through the Paterno D.
Menzon Law Office, filed a comment thereon. This Court, on October
21, 1981 denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and the
denial was declared final Entry of judgment was made on October 30,
1981 (Rollo, p. 244).
On December 18, 1981 the respondent NLRC issued an order, through
Labor Arbiter Antonio Tria Tirona, directing the Chief of the Research
and Information Division of the NLRC to designate a Socio-Economic
Analyst to compute the awards due the members of the petitioner
union in accordance with the final disposition of this case.
On January 10, 1983 petitioner flied an "Urgent Manifestation and
Motion" claiming that despite its filing of a motion for execution dated
November 12, 1981, a manifestation and motion dated February 10,
1982, and another manifestation and motion dated February 26, 1982,
the execution arm of public respondent NLRC continued to fail to
implement the decision of this Court. Petitioner prayed that those
obstructing the implementation of the decision be declared in
contempt, especially the president of Bagong Pilipino Philippine
Apparel Workers' Union (BPPAWU) and private respondent PAI for
circumventing the final decision of this Court by offering members of
petitioner the amount of P500 each as full payment of their claims in
the instant case.
The respondent NLRC, in its Comment on petitioner's "Urgent
Manifestation and Motion" explained that it could not issue a writ of
execution because the actual or exact amounts of the various awards
due the members of the petitioner union could not be determined. For
that matter, even with the submission of the "Report of Examiner"
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order dated November
10, 1979, of respondent Deputy Minister of Labor, Amado G. Inciong,
in NLRC case No. RB-IV-1561-76 entitled "Insular Bank of Asia and
America Employees' Union (complainant-appellee), vs. Insular Bank of
Asia and America" (respondent-appellant), the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows: t.hqw
xxx xxx xxx
ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en
banc of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 20 June 1978
be, as it is hereby, set aside and a new judgment. promulgated
dismissing the instant case for lack of merit (p. 109 rec.).
The antecedent facts culled from the records are as follows:
On June 20, 1975, petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent
bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of
Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office No. IV in
Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties,
the case was certified for arbitration on July 7, 1975 (p. 18, NLRC rec.
On August 25, 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a
decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioner's complaint for
payment of holiday pay. Pertinent portions of the decision read: t.
hqw
xxx xxx xxx
The records disclosed that employees of respondent bank were not
paid their wages on unworked regular holidays as mandated by the
Code, particularly Article 208, to wit: t.hqw
Art. 208. Right to holiday pay.
(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular
holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly
employing less than 10 workers.
(b) The term "holiday" as used in this chapter, shall include: New Year's
Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April the first of May,
the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the
twenty-fifth and the thirtieth of December and the day designated by
law for holding a general election.
xxx xxx xxx
This conclusion is deduced from the fact that the daily rate of pay of
the bank employees was computed in the past with the unworked
regular holidays as excluded for purposes of determining the
deductible amount for absences incurred Thus, if the employer uses
the factor 303 days as a divisor in determining the daily rate of monthly
paid employee, this gives rise to a presumption that the monthly rate
does not include payments for unworked regular holidays. The use of
the factor 303 indicates the number of ordinary working days in a year
(which normally has 365 calendar days), excluding the 52 Sundays
and the 10 regular holidays. The use of 251 as a factor (365 calendar
days less 52 Saturdays, 52 Sundays, and 10 regular holidays) gives
rise likewise to the same presumption that the unworked Saturdays,
Sundays and regular holidays are unpaid. This being the case, it is not
amiss to state with certainty that the instant claim for wages on regular
unworked holidays is found to be tenable and meritorious.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) xxx xxxx xxx
(b) Ordering respondent to pay wages to all its employees for all
regular h(olidays since November 1, 1974 (pp. 97-99, rec.,
underscoring supplied).
Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it
complied with the order of Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano by paying their
holiday pay up to and including January, 1976.
On December 16, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 850 was promulgated
amending, among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right
to holiday pay to read as follows: t.hqw
Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his
regular daily wages during regular holidays, except in retail and service
establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but
such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his
regular rate and
(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes New Year's Day, Maundy
Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of
June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and
the thirtieth of December, and the day designated by law for holding a
general election.
Accordingly, on February 16, 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same
Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated
the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay.
The controversial section thereof reads: t.hqw
Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working
days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established
minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month
whether worked or not.
For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the
statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days divided by twelve"
(italics supplied).
On April 23, 1976, Policy Instruction No. 9 was issued by the then
Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule,
pertinent portions of which read: t.hqw
xxx xxx xxx
The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit
principally daily employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose
monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal
holidays are entitled to the benefit.
Under the rules implementing P.D. 850, this policy has been fully
clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid
employees, The new determining rule is this: If the monthly paid
employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly
minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to
December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal
holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on
account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled
to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. ..." (emphasis supplied).
526). In the earlier case of Contreras and Ginco vs. Felix and China
Banking Corp., Inc. (44 O.G. 4306), it was stated that the rule must be
adhered to regardless of any possible injustice in a particular case for
(W)e have to subordinate the equity of a particular situation to the
over-mastering need of certainty and immutability of judicial
pronouncements
xxx xxx xxx
III
The despotic manner by which public respondent Amado G. Inciong
divested the members of the petitioner union of their rights acquired by
virtue of a final judgment is tantamount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law Public respondent completely ignored the
rights of the petitioner union's members in dismissing their complaint
since he knew for a fact that the judgment of the labor arbiter had long
become final and was even partially executed by the respondent bank.
A final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and
protected by law under the due process clause of the Constitution
(China Ins. & Surety Co. vs. Judge of First Instance of Manila, 63 Phil.
324). A final judgment is "a vested interest which it is right and
equitable that the government should recognize and protect, and of
which the individual could no. be deprived arbitrarily without injustice"
(Rookledge v. Garwood, 65 N.W. 2d 785, 791).
lt is by this guiding principle that the due process clause is interpreted.
Thus, in the pithy language of then Justice, later Chief Justice,
Concepcion "... acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive,
can deny due process only under pain of nullity, and judicial
proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the same
sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary notwithstanding (Vda.
de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sengbengco 110 Phil. 118, emphasis
supplied), And "(I)t has been likewise established that a violation of a
constitutional right divested the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights" (Phil.
Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Phil. Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc., 51 SCRA 211, June 5, 1973).
Tested by and pitted against this broad concept of the constitutional
guarantee of due process, the action of public respondent Amado G.
Inciong is a clear example of deprivation of property without due
process of law and constituted grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated November 10,
1979.
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE ORDER
OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS SET ASIDE, AND THE DECISION OF
LABOR ARBITER RICARTE T. SORIANO DATED AUGUST 25, 1975,
IS HEREBY REINSTATED.
COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT INSULAR BANK OF ASIA
AND AMERICA
CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION VS OPLE
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the
respondent Secretary, now Minister of Labor which denied the
petitioner's claim for holiday pay and its claim for premium and
overtime pay differentials. The petitioner claims that the respondent
Minister of Labor acted contrary to law and jurisprudence and with
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of
the Integrated Rules and in issuing Policy Instruction No. 9, both
referring to holidays with pay.
On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in
representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a
complaint with the Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, now
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against private respondent
Chartered Bank, for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays,
as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal
holidays from November 1, 1974.
The memorandum for the respondents summarizes the admitted
and/or undisputed facts as follows:
l. The work force of respondent bank consists of 149 regular
employees, all of whom are paid by the month;
2. Under their existing collective bargaining agreement, (Art. VII
thereof) said monthly paid employees are paid for overtime work as
follows:
Section l. The basic work week for all employees excepting security
guards who by virtue of the nature of their work are required to be at
their posts for 365 days per year, shall be forty (40) hours based on
five (5) eight (8) hours days, Monday to Friday.
Section 2. Time and a quarter hourly rate shall be paid for authorized
work performed in excess of eight (8) hours from Monday through
Since the private respondent premises its action on the invalidated rule
and policy instruction, it is clear that the employees belonging to the
petitioner association are entitled to the payment of ten (10) legal
holidays under Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code, aside from their
monthly salary. They are not among those excluded by law from the
benefits of such holiday pay.
Presidential Decree No. 850 states who are excluded from the holiday
provisions of that law. It states:
ART. 82. Coverage. The provision of this Title shall apply to employees
in all establishments and undertakings, whether for profit or not, but
not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel
members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for
support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another,
and workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of
Labor in appropriate regulations. (Emphasis supplied).
The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and
the Secretary's Policy Instruction No. 9 add another excluded group,
namely, "employees who are uniformly paid by the month." While the
additional exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all
monthly paid employees have already been paid holiday pay, it
constitutes a taking away or a deprivation which must be in the law if it
is to be valid. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the
benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is
obviously ultra vires.
It is argued that even without the presumption found in the rules and in
the policy instruction, the company practice indicates that the monthly
salaries of the employees are so computed as to include the holiday
pay provided by law. The petitioner contends otherwise.
One strong argument in favor of the petitioner's stand is the fact that
the Chartered Bank, in computing overtime compensation for its
employees, employs a "divisor" of 251 days. The 251 working days
divisor is the result of subtracting all Saturdays, Sundays and the ten
(10) legal holidays from the total number of calendar days in a year. If
the employees are already paid for all non-working days, the divisor
should be 365 and not 251.
The situation is muddled somewhat by the fact that, in computing the
employees' absences from work, the respondent bank uses 365 as
divisor. Any slight doubts, however, must be resolved in favor of the
workers. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate of
promoting social justice and affording protection to labor (Sections 6
and 9, Article II, Constitution). The Labor Code, as amended, itself
provides:
ART. 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.
Any remaining doubts which may arise from the conflicting or different
divisors used in the computation of overtime pay and employees'
absences are resolved by the manner in which work actually rendered
on holidays is paid. Thus, whenever monthly paid employees work on
a holiday, they are given an additional 100% base pay on top of a
premium pay of 50%. If the employees' monthly pay already includes
their salaries for holidays, they should be paid only premium pay but
not both base pay and premium pay.
The contention of the respondent that 100% base pay and 50%
premium pay for work actually rendered on holidays is given in addition
to monthly salaries only because the collective bargaining agreement
so provides is itself an argument in favor of the petitioner stand. It
shows that the Collective Bargaining Agreement already contemplated
a divisor of 251 days for holiday pay computations before the
questioned presumption in the Integrated Rules and the Policy
Instruction was formulated. There is furthermore a similarity between
overtime pay, which is computed on the basis of 251 working days a
year, and holiday pay, which should be similarly treated
notwithstanding the public respondents' issuances. In both cases
overtime work and holiday work- the employee works when he is
supposed to be resting. In the absence of an express provision of the
CBA or the law to the contrary, the computation should be similarly
handled.
We are not unmindful of the fact that the respondent's employees are
among the highest paid in the industry. It is not the intent of this Court
to impose any undue burdens on an employer which is already doing
its best for its personnel. we have to resolve the labor dispute in the
light of the parties' own collective bargaining agreement and the
benefits given by law to all workers. When the law provides benefits for
"employees in all establishments and undertakings, whether for profit
or not" and lists specifically the employees not entitled to those
benefits, the administrative agency implementing that law cannot
exclude certain employees from its coverage simply because they are
paid by the month or because they are already highly paid. The
remedy lies in a clear redrafting of the collective bargaining agreement
with a statement that monthly pay already includes holiday pay or an
amendment of the law to that effect but not an administrative rule or a
policy instruction.
WHEREFORE, the September 7, 1976 order of the public respondent
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 24, 1976 decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission which affirmed the
October 30, 1975 resolution of the Labor Arbiter but deleted interest
payments is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ORENCIA VS ENRILE
Petitioner, in his appeal against a lower court decision, dismissing his
suit for mandamus to compel respondent officials, the then Secretary
of Justice, the then Commissioner of Land Registration and the then
Commissioner of Civil Service, 1 to recognize his alleged right as
Assistant Chief, Clerks of Court Division, Land Registration
Commission is confronted with obstacles not only formidable but
insurmountable in character. For all the skill evident in his brief as
appellant, submitted by his counsel, former Delegate Ramon
Gonzales, he was not able to demonstrate his clear legal right to such
a position. Nor is the procedural hurdle the only one that stands in the
way. There are barriers substantive in character that refuse to yield
even under the most vigorous and insistent attack. For the crucial
issue, a public office being involved and public interest being the prime
consideration, is whether the choice for the position of Assistant Chief
of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission
should fall on respondent Guillermina M. Gener, a member of the Bar,
rather than on petitioner, whose educational attainment was that of a
high school graduate. For respondent officials, the answer was not in
doubt. Since there was a new legal provision to be construed, one
which admittedly, to follow the approach of counsel for petitioner, has
an ambiguous aspect, they chose to follow the principle that a public
office is a public trust. Certainly, such a contemporaneous construction,
one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate, is
entitled to the highest respect from the judiciary. In manifesting such an
attitude, the lower court could not have been in error. We affirm.
What did transpire in this suit? From petitioner's statement of the case:
"On June 20, 1967, petitioner-appellant filed the said petition
for mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Manila Court of
First Instance against respondents docketed as Civil Case No. 69840,
alleging substantially that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks
of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission, an he has been
performing functions of Assistant Chief of said division and has been
considered and recognized as such until Rep. Act 4040, enacted June
18, 1964 increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Divisions,
among others, implemented where he was left out while co-assistant
chief of the nine (9) other divisions of the Land Registration
Commission were so recognized and extended increased
compensation, in spite of his protest to respondents Secretary of
Justice, Land Registration Commissioner, and Commissioner of Civil
Service; and to add insult to injury, respondent Guillermina M. Gener,
was appointed assistant of the Clerks of Court Division, when there
was no vacancy to said position and given an increased compensation
of P9,600.00 for the said position, while petitioner continued to receive
the old rate of P3,070.08 per annum, and praying that he be extended
similar recognition as assistant chief of the Clerks of Court Division of
the Land Registration Commission, and paid the corresponding salary
under Rep. Act 4040 and that the appointment of respondent
Guillermina M. Gener be declared null and void, with damages and
attorney's fees. On July 17, 1967, respondents filed their answer, and
after usual admissions and denials, interposed a defense that
petitioner is unqualified for the position of Assistant Chief, Clerks of
Court Division, and being a new position created under Republic Act
4040, the same can only be filed by a qualified person; that respondent
[Gener], being a lawyer, is more qualified than petitioner who is only a
high school graduate with second grade civil service eligibility, and
praying that the petition be dismissed." 2
Then from his statement of facts: "Petitioner is a deputy clerk of court
of the Clerks of Court Division, Land Registration Commission, having
been appointed as such on July 16, 1962 after having [risen] from the
ranks for the last 23 years in said office ... with compensation of
P3,070.08 per annum ... . The Clerks of Court Division is one of the ten
(10) divisions in the Land Registration Commission, all of which prior to
Rep. Act 4040 are headed, each by a Chief and Assistant Chief, but
none of them carries an appointment of Division Chief and Assistant
argue that to view the matter in a way opposed to his would in effect
"sanction removal of petitioner from such position, without cause in
violation of the constitution ... ." 11 Here, he seeks shelter within the
provision of Section 4 of the 1935 Constitution. 12 There is here a
glaring misapprehension. To so construe such provision by way merely
of assurance of term to a government functionary and to lose sight of
the paramount public interest involved is to ignore and disregard the
fundamental postulate that a public office is a public trust. That
accounts for the rather qualified and limited sense it possesses as
property safeguarded by the due process clause. 13 The essential
requirement then for a place in the government service is the
possession of the requisite ability and competence. Only thus may
there be fulfillment of a trust. Evidently, that was in the mind of
respondent dignitaries. A member of the bar, respondent Gener met
the prescribed standard. The position in question is that of Assistant
Chief, precisely of the Division for the Clerks of Court.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that petitioner's scholastic
background is much more limited, he being merely a high school
graduate. 14 Under such circumstances, his previous experience in his
capacity as Deputy Clerk of Court attesting to his years of service
could not avail. As this Court had occasion to observe in Aguilar vs.
Nieva, Jr.: 15 "Whatever sympathy might be elicited for public officials
who had stayed long in the public service and who, for some reason or
another, did not receive the promotion to which they felt they should be
entitled, cannot obscure the discretion that the law leaves in the hands
of the appointing official. ... The basic intent of the law itself is to foster
a more efficient public service. It is ever timely to keep in mind the
public trust character of any governmental office. Its creation is
justifiable only if it serves to assure that the functions of government,
whether through the traditional public offices or government-owned or
controlled corporations, be attended to with dispatch and competence.
Necessarily then, the appointing official, especially so where his
position is a constitutional creation, as in this case, must be left that
necessary latitude of choice as to who can best discharge the
responsibilities of the office where the vacancy occurs. This is what
happened here, and no legal infirmity can validly be said to have
vitiated such an appointment. The impassioned plea of counsel for
petitioner, while not without its plausibility, if the individual welfare of
those in the ranks of government personnel were considered, certainly
cannot merit our approval in the light of the greater and more exigent
public interest which has to be served." 16
3. Presumably not unaware of the inherent weakness of his stand,
petitioner would discern an alleged legislative intent in Republic Act
No. 4040 to accord him the recognition his heart is set on. What he
sees is a mirage. Assuming ambiguity in the applicable statute, it must
receive a construction in accordance with and not in disregard of the
cardinal postulate of a public office being a public trust. Moreover, if
there is any other principle of legal hermeneutics that can be invoked,
it is that of contemporaneous construction. Petitioner, after the
unanimity shown by the Commissioner of Land Registration, the
Secretary of Justice, and the Commissioner of Civil Service on the
precise point at issue, certainly is not in a position to do so. All three
find his pretension bereft of any merit. They are for respondent Gener.
It is not inappropriate to note that such a principle was given
expression by Justice Malcolm in Molina v. Rafferty 17 in these words:
"Courts will should respect the contemporaneous construction placed
upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it,
and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be
controlled thereby." 18 Later that same year in 1918, inMadrigal v.
Rafferty, 19 there was a reiteration of the same doctrine by the same
jurist. So it has been ever since.20
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of March 26, 1968, dismissing
the petition for mandamus, is affirmed. No costs.
SY KIONG VS SARMIENTO
This is an action for declaratory relief filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila for the purpose of determining if petitioner is liable to pay the
municipal license tax upon his sales of flour to bakeries under
Ordinance No. 2723 of the city of Manila, as amended.
Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the
city of Manila and an importer of flour who sells it either to bakeries or
to retail dealers for the purposes of resale. Sometime in September
1948, the Treasurer of the City of Manila assessed against him the
sum of P566.50 which, it is claimed, represents the alleged deficiency
municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales made to retail
dealers for the purposes of resale. Petitioner, instead of honoring the
demand, filed the present action for declaratory relief.