SECTION 18.

There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the

President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Guingona vs. Gonzales [G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992] Aurello, Raymar
FACTS: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP
senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To
suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA,
the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political
party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula
would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKASNUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader,
nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that
Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two
NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said
compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional
representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys
representation in the CoA.
HELD:
RULE IN THE APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS.
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a
fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of
each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as above. The problem is
what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The
LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect
Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is
clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its
mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party
either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC.
On the claim of Senator Taada that under the ruling in the case of Senator Lorenzo
Taada, and the case of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, he has a right to be elected as a
member of the Commission on Appointments because of: (a) the physical

impossibility of dividing a person, so that the fractional membership must be

rounded up into one senator, (b) being the sole elected senator of his party, his
party is entitled to be represented in the Commission on Appointments; (c) having
been elected senator, rounding up into one full senator his fractional membership is
consistent with the provision and spirit of the Constitution and would be in full
accord, with the principle of republicanism that emphasizes democracy.
The cases of the two former senators mentioned cannot be invoked as a precedent
in support of incumbent Senator Taada's claim to a membership in the present
Commission on Appointments. In the time of his illustrious father, out of 24 elected
senators in the upper chamber of Congress, 23 belonged to the Nacionalista Party,
while Senator Lorenzo Taada, who belonged to the Citizens' Party, was the lone
opposition. By force of circumstance, he became a member of the Commission on
Appointments because he alone represented the minority party. Had there been
another senator belonging to a party other than the Citizens' Party, this problem of
who should sit as the sole representative of the opposition party would have arisen.
In the case of Senator Ponce Enrile, there were two senators elected from the
opposition party, namely, he and Senator Estrada. Applying the rule of proportional
representation mentioned earlier (see formula), the opposition was entitled to one
full member (not a fractional membership). Senator Enrile was thus legally
nominated and elected as the minority representative in the Senate. In the present
case, if there were a political party other than the present four political parties is the
Senate. and We follow Senator Taada's claim that he is entitled to full membership
as lone representative of his party, We would have the anomaly of having 13
senators, where the Constitution allows only twelve (12) in the Commission on
Appointments.
We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments
by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance
with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the
same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that twelve senators
shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political
parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make
a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give
the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional membership
of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character
and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or
disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a
majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer
force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a
check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of
power. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow
it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a
party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and

more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a
diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission.
Section 18 also assures representation in the Commission on Appointments of any
political party who succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided that the
number of senators so elected enables it to put a representative in the Commission
on Appointments. Drawing from the ruling in the case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr., 12 a
political party must have at least two senators in the Senate to be able to have a
representative in the Commission on Appointments, so that any number less than 2
will not entitle such a party a membership in the Commission on Appointments. This
applies to the respondent Senator Taada.
We lay down the following guidelines accordingly:
1)

In the Senate, a political party or coalition must have at least two duly
elected senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments.

2)

Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a
political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot
constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission.

We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to

the Commission on Appointments. The Constitution does not contemplate that the
Commission on Appointments must necessarily include twelve (12) senators and
twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives. What the Constitution
requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. Under Section
18, the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members and in Section
19, the Commission shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the call of its
Chairman or a majority of all its members "to discharge such powers and functions
herein conferred upon it". Implementing the above provisions of the Constitution,
Section 10, Chapter 3 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, provides as
follows:
SECTION 10. Place of Meeting and Quorum: The Commission shall
meet at either the session hall of the Senate or the House of
Representatives upon call of the Chairman or as the Commission may
designate. The presence of at least thirteen (13) members is necessary
to constitute a quorum. Provided, however, that at least four (4) of the
members constituting the quorum should come from either house . . ."
It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election and presence
of twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in
order that the Commission may function. Other instances may be mentioned of
Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their functions even if not fully
constituted and even if their composition is expressly specified by the Constitution.
Among these are the Supreme Court, Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Election, Commission on Audit. They perform their functions so long as there is the
required quorum, usually a majority of its membership. The Commission on

Appointments may perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten
(10) senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists.

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
NeriI vs Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
[G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008] Wacquisan, Franklin
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September
18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN
Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during
which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that
the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in
contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until
such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered
by executive privilege?
HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege.
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and
abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others,
the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is
because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications

privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may
be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought
likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public
officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are
presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close
advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third,
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of
executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern. We might have agreed with such
contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his
willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of
those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7
of
Article
III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of
the President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public

official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will receive the
benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of
information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or
forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the
Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the Presidents
conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of
judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all
citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally
ordained separation of governmental powers.

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
Garcillano vs House of Representatives [G. R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008]
Pati, Jezen
Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During
the 2007 election the conversation of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner
Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the president
to have a favorable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was
recorded and was played during the house of representative investigation. Because
of such turn of events, a petition was filed before the court praying that such
playing of the illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the antiwiretapping law. Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee
be prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason that
there was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such
investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.
Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the
senate to further proceed with their investigation?
Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of
the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or
the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the
Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice
or tradition followed by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise

known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry
subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by
the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot
proceed for the reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly
published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed
without observance of the required publication will put a persons life, liberty and
property at stake without due process of law. Also, the further assertion of the
senate that they already published such rules through their web page, in
observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the
court as matter of evidence and still does not conforme with what the constitution
propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the
senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
In Re Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo Sabio [ G. R.
No. 174340, October 17, 2006] Pena, Czarina
FACTS: On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate
Res. No. 455 directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by
their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator
Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of
the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs unhampered performance of its task.
Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he
threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No.
THE POWER OF THE CONGRESS TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION
CANNOT BE RESTRICTED BY MERE LEGISLATIVE FIAT. Dispelling any doubt as to the
Philippine Congress' power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their maiden
appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. Then came the 1987
Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore
implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence,
became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of
Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This is significant because it
constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it
means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
and expansive construal. The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more
evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is
broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced
the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of
inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly

repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and
staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in
the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within
the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the
Constitution stating that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives."
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested
with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the
powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be
exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the
intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of
duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of
the people, and not their rulers.
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of
public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of
courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public
accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and nonaccountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea, Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as "obiter" the portion of the majority opinion
barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages
filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted,
clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here
interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal
terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No. 1. If Section 4 (a)
were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member
thereof from civil liability "for anything done or omitted in the
discharge of the task contemplated by this Order," the constitutionality
of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious
doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the
irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the
PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987
Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of
the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. . . . .

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member

of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such
members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each
House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to
written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the
State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Senate vs. Ermita [GR 169777, April 20, 2006] Cantuba, Kendi
FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail
Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a
public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing
in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain
department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource
persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot
attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP
Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president,
excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were
already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive
departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the
executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who
in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from
appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate
committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the
scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying
President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved
from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and
duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity
of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22
of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no
provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do
possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is
closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a
supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet
would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but
also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which
anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in
contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary
in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21
and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should
not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to
elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the
power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it
under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands
for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.
They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the
power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then
to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances
in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is

discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of

department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21,
the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest
invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking
Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are
invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION AND QUESTION HOUR.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of
which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21,
the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with
the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle
of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the

legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to

comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt
by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may
be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It
is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power
of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence,
each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but
also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.
This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo,
admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Senate vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006]
QUESTION HOUR. Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not,
unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are
covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made
the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of
department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads'
possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In
fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to
executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is
grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to
as the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative,
with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House,
as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard
by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before
their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to
written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President
so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning
of Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be
interpreted vis--vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of

Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." As the following excerpt of the

deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were aware that
these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
MR. MAAMBONG. . . . When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22
on the Question Hour] yesterday, I noticed that members of the
Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the
House of Representatives or before the Senate. I have a
particular problem in this regard, Madam President, because in
our experience in the Regular Batasang Pambansa as the
Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim Batasang
Pambansa one of the most competent inputs that we can put
in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in
congressional investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet
ministers. We usually invite them, but if they do not come and it
is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.
I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner
Suarez when he said that the fact that the Cabinet ministers
may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the
Senate [when requested under Section 22] does not mean that
they need not come when they are invited or subpoenaed by the
committee of either House when it comes to inquiries in aid of
legislation or congressional investigation. According to
Commissioner Suarez, that is allowed and their presence can be
had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam
President?
MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20
refers only to what was originally the Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the
House. 83 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez
bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the
appearance of department heads discretionary in the question hour.
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the
Committee on Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the
provision on question hour from its original position as Section 20 in the original
draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This
gave rise to the following exchange during the deliberations:
MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the
Committee on Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding Officer, to the

Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the

Legislative Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his
reaction.
THE

PRESIDING OFFICER
recognized.

(Mr.

Jamir).

Commissioner

Davide

is

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction
to the Question Hour. I propose that instead of putting it as
Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?
MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we
sequenced this but we reasoned that in Section 21, which is
Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in terms of
its own lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a
power in terms of its own lawmaking power because in
Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put
Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will
consider this.
MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative
power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of
the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of
Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application
of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.
MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in
the suggestion of Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are
accepting that and so this Section 31 would now become Section
22. Would it be, Commissioner Davide?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide
and Maambong proceeded from the same assumption that these provisions
pertained to two different functions of the legislature. Both Commissioners
understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from
the power to conduct inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner Davide's
only concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers be placed closely
together, they being complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner
considered them as identical functions of Congress.
The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners' alone. From the abovequoted exchange, Commissioner Maambong's committee the Committee on Style
shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct functions of Congress.
Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman

of the Committee on the Legislative Department. His views may thus be presumed
as representing that of his Committee.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a
definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the
Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation
of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question
period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution
86 which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly
conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the
ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate
accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They
shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of government and
shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system
where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their
term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as
they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is
lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such
appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform
more fully to a system of separation of powers. 88 To that extent, the question hour,
as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of
the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in
a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless
to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence
of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress' right to executive
information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative.
As Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the
subject under discussion, it is that the Congress has the right to obtain
information from any source even from officials of departments and
agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike
the situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in
Britain, a clear separation between the legislative and executive
branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right
to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions
of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are
adequately to be carried out. The absence of close rapport between
the legislative and executive branches in this country, comparable to
those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence
in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period
have perforce made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain
information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform
its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain

executive information, its power of oversight of administration in a

system such as ours becomes a power devoid of most of its practical
content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information
parceled out ex gratia by the executive. 89 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance [G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994]
Galunza, Silver
FACTS: Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines, Roco, and
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association) seek reconsideration of the
Courts previous ruling dismissing the petitions filed for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Petitioners
contend that the R.A. did not originate exclusively in the HoR as required by
Article 6, Section 24 of the Constitution. The Senate allegedly did not pass it on
second and third readings, instead passing its own version. Petitioners contend that
it should have amended the House bill by striking out the text of the bill and
substituting it with the text of its own bill, so as to conform with the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the R.A. is unconstitutional for having originated from the
Senate, and not the HoR.
HELD: Petition is unmeritorious.
WHAT IS NEEDED TO ORIGINATE FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IS ONLY
THE BILL AND NOT THE LAW. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716
did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art.
VI, 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two
distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out
that although Art. VI, 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution, it is
notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine
Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in the
American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered
as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of
H. No. 11197.
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the
revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the
House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that
the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the
conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to
note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To
insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with
amendments" but also to " propose amendments." It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the Senate.
The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in
respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the

treaty-ratifying power and thereby equalize its powers and those of the House
overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing
here with the legislative power, which under the Constitution is vested not in any
particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate
and a House of Representatives." The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not
the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive
power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of
the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such non-legislative
power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate has
never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of
Representatives.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand,
the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on
the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate
as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore,
understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months
before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate.
After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the
Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of
legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways
and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on February 7,
1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the
time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to
amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed
in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only
a substitute of those earlier bills.

SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
Alvarez vs Guingona [G. R. No. 118303, January, 1996] Chongael, Gemma
FACTS: In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago)
was passed in the House of Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB
8817 was introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the
Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate
Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB
8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law
(RA 7720).
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said
law on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower
house and that City of Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least
P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported
average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not be.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGUs
income.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record
shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the
HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its
1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in
anticipation of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average
annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income
because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government
unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need
of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute
income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much
needed funds.

To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to
classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition
and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally
makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of
funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and
government-owned-or-controlled corporations.
INTRODUCTION OF A BILL OF LOCAL APPLICATION IN THE SENATE IN ANTICIPATION
OF THE BILL TO BE PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IS NOT
PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION. Although a bill of local application like HB No.
8817 should, by constitutional prescription, originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same
import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be
denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB
No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own
admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed
on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said
Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that
initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act
No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is
perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already
approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate
Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB
No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and
transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter
or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted
public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on
SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading,
from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it
receives the House bill.