THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156109. November 18, 2004]

KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by ARMANDO REGINO, petitioner,
vs. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A.
GAMUROT and ELISSA BALADAD, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Upon enrolment, students and their school enter upon a reciprocal contract. The students agree to
abide by the standards of academic performance and codes of conduct, issued usually in the form
of manuals that are distributed to the enrollees at the start of the school term. Further, the school
informs them of the itemized fees they are expected to pay. Consequently, it cannot, after the
enrolment of a student, vary the terms of the contract. It cannot require fees other than those it
specified upon enrolment.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,[1] seeking to nullify the July 12,
2002[2] and the November 22, 2002[3] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan (Branch 48) in Civil Case No. U-7541. The decretal portion of the first assailed
Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action.[4]
The second challenged Order denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went
to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During the second semester of
school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle
A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the Rave Party and Dance
Revolution, the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the schools tennis and
volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The
project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with
additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to
take the final examinations.

Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and
celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the
scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers -- Respondents
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.
According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were
taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she
was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their statistics examinations for failing
to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioners pleas ostensibly
went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as
compliance with PCSTs policy.
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint[5] for damages against
PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. In her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages;
P500,000 as moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual
damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorneys fees.
On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[6] on the ground of petitioners failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the
determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should
have been initiated before the proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education
(CHED).
In her Comment to respondents Motion, petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies was unnecessary, because her action was not administrative in nature, but one purely
for damages arising from respondents breach of the laws on human relations. As such,
jurisdiction lay with the courts.
On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In granting respondents Motion to Dismiss, the trial court noted that the instant controversy
involved a higher institution of learning, two of its faculty members and one of its students. It
added that Section 54 of the Education Act of 1982 vested in the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) the supervision and regulation of tertiary schools. Thus, it ruled that the
CHED, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the controversy.[7]
In its dispositive portion, the assailed Order dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action
without, however, explaining this ground.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present Petition on pure questions of law.[8]
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in a civil action
exclusively for damages based on violation of the human relation provisions of the Civil Code,
filed by a student against her former school.
Whether or not there is a need for prior declaration of invalidity of a certain school
administrative policy by the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) before a former student
can successfully maintain an action exclusively for damages in regular courts.
Whether or not the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has exclusive original jurisdiction
over actions for damages based upon violation of the Civil Code provisions on human relations
filed by a student against the school.[9]
All of the foregoing point to one issue -- whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is applicable. The Court, however, sees a second issue which, though not expressly
raised by petitioner, was impliedly contained in her Petition: whether the Complaint stated
sufficient cause(s) of action.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioners alleged failure to exhaust
administrative remedies before resorting to the RTC. According to them, the determination of the
controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCSTs academic policy. Thus,
the Complaint should have been lodged in the CHED, the administrative body tasked under
Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state policy to protect, foster and promote the right of
all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure that
education is accessible to all.[10]
Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to the present case since she is praying for
damages, a remedy beyond the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the
courts.[11]
Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing
on the present case. In Factoran Jr. v. CA,[12] the Court had occasion to elucidate on the
rationale behind this doctrine:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for
reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the
available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. x x x.[13]

Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to
allow her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational
institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not adequately redress her grievances;
under the circumstances, the consequences of respondents acts could no longer be undone or
rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the
part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of.[14] Administrative
agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial
tribunals.[15] Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award damages.[16] Hence,
petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely
legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court.[17] Petitioners action for damages
inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls
within the jurisdiction of the courts.[18]
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
Sufficient Causes of Action Stated
in the Allegations in the Complaint
As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently allege a cause of action; failure to do so warrants its
dismissal.[19] A complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears
solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Assuming
the facts that are alleged to be true, the court should be able to render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint.[20]
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
alleged facts. In their Motion to Dismiss, respondents did not dispute any of petitioners
allegations, and they admitted that x x x the crux of plaintiffs cause of action is the determination
of whether or not the assessment of P100 per ticket is excessive or oppressive.[21] They thereby
premised their prayer for dismissal on the Complaints alleged failure to state a cause of action.
Thus, a reexamination of the Complaint is in order.
The Complaint contains the following factual allegations:
10. In the second week of February 2002, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot, in connivance
with PCST, forced plaintiff and her classmates to buy or take two tickets each, x x
x;
11. Plaintiff and many of her classmates objected to the forced distribution and selling of
tickets to them but the said defendant warned them that if they refused [to] take or
pay the price of the two tickets they would not be allowed at all to take the final
examinations;

12. As if to add insult to injury, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot bribed students with
additional fifty points or so in their test score in her subject just to unjustly
influence and compel them into taking the tickets;
13. Despite the students refusal, they were forced to take the tickets because [of] defendant
Rachelle A. Gamurots coercion and act of intimidation, but still many of them
including the plaintiff did not attend the dance party imposed upon them by
defendants PCST and Rachelle A. Gamurot;
14. Plaintiff was not able to pay the price of her own two tickets because aside form the fact
that she could not afford to pay them it is also against her religious practice as a
member of a certain religious congregation to be attending dance parties and
celebrations;
15. On March 14, 2002, before defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot gave her class its final
examination in the subject Logic she warned that students who had not paid the
tickets would not be allowed to participate in the examination, for which threat
and intimidation many students were eventually forced to make payments:
16. Because plaintiff could not afford to pay, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot inhumanly
made plaintiff sit out the class but the defendant did not allow her to take her final
examination in Logic;
17. On March 15, 2002 just before the giving of the final examination in the subject
Statistics, defendant Elissa Baladad, in connivance with defendants Rachelle A.
Gamurot and PCST, announced in the classroom that she was not allowing
plaintiff and another student to take the examination for their failure and refusal to
pay the price of the tickets, and thenceforth she ejected plaintiff and the other
student from the classroom;
18. Plaintiff pleaded for a chance to take the examination but all defendants could say was
that the prohibition to give the examinations to non-paying students was an
administrative decision;
19. Plaintiff has already paid her tuition fees and other obligations in the school;
20. That the above-cited incident was not a first since PCST also did another forced
distribution of tickets to its students in the first semester of school year 20012002; x x x [22]
The foregoing allegations show two causes of action; first, breach of contract; and second,
liability for tort.
Reciprocity of the
School-Student Contract

In Alcuaz v. PSBA,[23] the Court characterized the relationship between the school and the
student as a contract, in which a student, once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for
one semester.[24] Two years later, in Non v. Dames II,[25] the Court modified the termination of
contract theory in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual relationship between the school and the
student is not only semestral in duration, but for the entire period the latter are expected to
complete it.[26] Except for the variance in the period during which the contractual relationship
is considered to subsist, both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in characterizing the schoolstudent relationship as contractual in nature.
The school-student relationship is also reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences appurtenant to and
inherent in all contracts of such kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and
obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them
to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the
academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations.[27]
The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the moment of its inception -- upon
enrolment of the student. Standards of academic performance and the code of behavior and
discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new students at the start of every school
year. Further, schools inform prospective enrollees the amount of fees and the terms of payment.
In practice, students are normally required to make a down payment upon enrollment, with the
balance to be paid before every preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their failure to pay
their financial obligation is regarded as a valid ground for the school to deny them the
opportunity to take these examinations.
The foregoing practice does not merely ensure compliance with financial obligations; it also
underlines the importance of major examinations. Failure to take a major examination is usually
fatal to the students promotion to the next grade or to graduation. Examination results form a
significant basis for their final grades. These tests are usually a primary and an indispensable
requisite to their elevation to the next educational level and, ultimately, to their completion of a
course.
Education is not a measurable commodity. It is not possible to determine who is better educated
than another. Nevertheless, a students grades are an accepted approximation of what would
otherwise be an intangible product of countless hours of study. The importance of grades cannot
be discounted in a setting where education is generally the gate pass to employment
opportunities and better life; such grades are often the means by which a prospective employer
measures whether a job applicant has acquired the necessary tools or skills for a particular
profession or trade.
Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set academic
standards, completion of academic requirements and observance of school rules and regulations,
the school would reward them by recognizing their completion of the course enrolled in.
The obligation on the part of the school has been established in Magtibay v. Garcia,[28] Licup v.
University of San Carlos[29] and Ateneo de Manila University v. Garcia,[30] in which the Court

held that, barring any violation of the rules on the part of the students, an institution of higher
learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the
course they seek to pursue.
We recognize the need of a school to fund its facilities and to meet astronomical operating costs;
this is a reality in running it. Crystal v. Cebu International School[31] upheld the imposition by
respondent school of a land purchase deposit in the amount of P50,000 per student to be used for
the purchase of a piece of land and for the construction of new buildings and other facilities x x x
which the school would transfer [to] and occupy after the expiration of its lease contract over its
present site.
The amount was refundable after the student graduated or left the school. After noting that the
imposition of the fee was made only after prior consultation and approval by the parents of the
students, the Court held that the school committed no actionable wrong in refusing to admit the
children of the petitioners therein for their failure to pay the land purchase deposit and the 2.5
percent monthly surcharge thereon.
In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the middle
of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students taking the final
examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee,
however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the school year.
Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.
Such contract is by no means an ordinary one. In Non, we stressed that the school-student
contract is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to
education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions.[32] Sections 5 (1) and (3) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution provide:
The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such declaration
accessible to all.
Every student has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject
to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.
The same state policy resonates in Section 9(2) of BP 232, otherwise known as the Education Act
of 1982:
Section 9. Rights of Students in School. In addition to other rights, and
subject to the limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils
in all schools shall enjoy the following rights:
xxxxxxxxx
(2) The right to freely choose their field of study subject
to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to

graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or

violation of disciplinary regulations.
Liability for Tort
In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents inhumanly punish students x x
x by reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated
upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;[33] as a result of such
punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second semester of that
school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of respondents
supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and demoralization of unimaginable
proportions in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These provisions of the law
state thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An
academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with
its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. We ruled thus in PSBA vs.
CA,[34] from which we quote:
x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between
parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even
when there obtains a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private
respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat
aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitionerairlines liability as one arising from tort, not one arising form a contract of carriage. In
effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there
is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x This view was
not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar

mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: x x
x. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between
the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
particularly Article 21 x x x.[35]
Academic Freedom
In their Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to academic freedom. We are not
impressed. According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may
be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.[36] In Garcia v. the
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,[37] the Court upheld the respondent
therein when it denied a female students admission to theological studies in a seminary for
prospective priests. The Court defined the freedom of an academic institution thus: to decide for
itself aims and objectives and how best to attain them x x x free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.[38]
In Tangonan v. Pao,[39] the Court upheld, in the name of academic freedom, the right of the
school to refuse readmission of a nursing student who had been enrolled on probation, and who
had failed her nursing subjects. These instances notwithstanding, the Court has emphasized that
once a school has, in the name of academic freedom, set its standards, these should be
meticulously observed and should not be used to discriminate against certain students.[40] After
accepting them upon enrollment, the school cannot renege on its contractual obligation on
grounds other than those made known to, and accepted by, students at the start of the school year.
In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action against
respondents, and that it should not have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is
not holding respondents liable for the acts complained of. That will have to be ruled upon in due
course by the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSED. The
trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the Complaint and, with all deliberate speed, to continue
the proceedings in Civil Case No. U-7541. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

Today is Wednesday, March 02, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-40779 November 28, 1975

EPICHARIS T. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE, LOYOLA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY, herein represented by FR. ANTONIO B. LAMBINO, respondent.
Epicharis T Garcia in her own behalf.
Bengzon, Villegas, Zarraga, Narciso and Cudala for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The specific issue posed by this mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, represented by Father Antonio B. Lambino, to
allow petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia, to continue studying therein is whether she is deemed possessed of such a right that has to be respected. That is denied not only on general
principle, but also in view of the character of the particular educational institution involved. It is a seminary. It would appear therefore that at most she can lay claim to a privilege, no
duty being cast on respondent school. Moreover, as a reinforcement to such an obvious conclusion, there is the autonomy recognized by the Constitution in this explicit language:
1
"All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." The petition must therefore fail.

Petitioner alleged: "3. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology; 4. That on May
30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-76, Respondent told her about the letter he
had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission in their school; 5. That the reasons stated in said
letter, dated May 19, 1975 ... do not constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any of the
school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct; 6. That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much time and effort in
said school for the purpose of arriving at a compromise that would not duly inconvenience the professors and still allow her to enjoy the
benefits of the kind of instruction that the school has to offer, but all in vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's
Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it were better for her to seek for
admission at the UST Graduate School; 7 Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her
pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical
Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in
Theology which would entail about four to five years more of studies whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is
being unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail only about two years more; 8. That Petitioner, considering that time was of the

essence in her case, and not wanting to be deprived of an opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for her life's work, enrolled as a
special student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not thereby be credited with any academic units for the subject
she would take; 9. That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the First
Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of Education, since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975
is the last day for registration; ... " 2 She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester.
She made it more specific in a pleading she called Amended Petition so that she would be allowed cross-enrollment even beyond the
June 11, 1975 deadline for registration and that whatever units may be accredited to her in the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties be likewise
recognized by respondent. Her petition included the letter of respondent Father Lambino which started on a happy note that she was
given the grade of B+ and B in two theology subjects, but ended in a manner far from satisfactory for her, as shown by this portion
thereof: "Now, you will have to forgive me for going into a matter which is not too pleasant. The faculty had a meeting after the summer
session and several members are strongly opposed to having you back with us at Loyola School of Theology. In the spirit of honesty
may I report this to you as their reason: They felt that your frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the
effect of slowing down the progress of the class; they felt you could have tried to give the presentation a chance and exerted more effort
to understand the point made before immediately thinking of difficulties and problems. The way things are, I would say that the
advisability of your completing a program (with all the course work and thesis writing) with us is very questionable. That you have the
requisite intellectual ability is not to be doubted. But it would seem to be in your best interests to work with a faculty that is more
compatible with your orientation. I regret to have to make this report, but I am only thinking of your welfare." 3
This Court, in a resolution of June 23, 1975, required comment on the part of respondent Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School
of Theology. 4 As submitted on behalf of Father Lambino, it set forth the following: "Respondent is the Chairman of the Faculty
Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, which is a religious seminary situated in Loyola Heights, Quezon City; In
collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila University, the Loyola School of Theology allows some lay students to attend its classes and/or
take courses in said Loyola School of Theology but the degree, if any, to be obtained from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de
Manila University and not by the Loyola School of Theology; For the reason above given, lay students admitted to the Loyola School of
Theology to take up courses for credit therein have to be officially admitted by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo
de Manila University in order for them to be considered as admitted to a degree program; Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was
admitted by respondent to take some courses for credit but said admission was not an admission to a degree program because only
the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can make such admission; That in the case of petitioner, no acceptance
by the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School was given, so that she was not accepted to a degree program but was
merely allowed to take some courses for credit during the summer of 1975; Furthermore, petitioner was not charged a single centavo
by the Loyola School of Theology and/or the Ateneo de Manila University in connection with the courses she took in the summer of
1975, as she was allowed to take it free of charge; That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., and/or the Loyola School of Theology
thru its Faculty Admission Committee, necessarily has discretion as to whether to admit and/or to continue admitting in the said school
any particular student, considering not only academic or intellectual standards but also other considerations such as personality traits
and character orientation in relation with other students as well as considering the nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary.
The Petition for Mandamus therefore does not lie, as there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of respondent to admit the
petitioner therein in the current year to take up further courses in the Loyola School of Theology." 5 It was likewise alleged in the
aforesaid comment that as set forth in the letter of May 19, 1975, the decision not to allow petitioner to take up further courses in said
seminary "is not arbitrary, as it is based on reasonable grounds, ... ." 6 Then reference was made to the availability of non-judicial
remedies which petitioner could have pursued. 7 The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner sought
permission to reply and it was granted. Thereafter, she had a detailed recital of why under the circumstances she is entitled to relief
from the courts. In a resolution of August 8, 1975, this Court considered the comment of respondent as answer and required the parties
to file their respective memoranda. That they did, and the petition was deemed submitted for decision. As was made clear at the outset,
we do not see merit in it. It must therefore be dismissed.
1. In respondent's memorandum, it was made clear why a petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy. Thus: "Petitioner cannot
compel by mandamus, the respondent to admit her into further studies in the Loyola School of Theology. For respondent has no clear
duty to so admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood. Petitioner is admittedly and obviously
not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman. And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that she is qualified to
study for the priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of respondent to admit her to said studies, since the school has clearly the
discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and
component considerations." 8 No authorities were cited, respondent apparently being of the view that the law has not reached the stage
where the matter of admission to an institution of higher learning rests on the sole and uncontrolled discretion of the applicant. There
are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's

terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore satisfy the
prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty imposed on the Loyola School of
Theology. In a rather comprehensive memorandum of petitioner, who unfortunately did not have counsel, an attempt was made to
dispute the contention of respondent. There was a labored effort to sustain her stand, but it was not sufficiently persuasive. It is
understandable why. It was the skill of a lay person rather than a practitioner that was evident. While she pressed her points with vigor,
she was unable to demonstrate the existence of the clear legal right that must exist to justify the grant of this writ.
2. Nor is this all. There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying academic
freedom. It is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to
make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions
are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. For the
sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to
communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are
unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution." 9 As for the educator and philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his version: "What is
academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is
10
subject to no control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines."

3. That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not comprehend fully the scope of academic freedom recognized by the
Constitution. For it is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would follow
then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain
them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a
wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly
manner or in a gradging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the
University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom
to the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." 11 He cited the following from
Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France, President of the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of European
universities: " "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the problems of
freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it;
in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must
distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university
teacher." " 12 Also: "To clarify further the distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he says:
"The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher recognized and effectively guaranteed by society
to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the
status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to
which they belong and through which they disseminate their learning."' 13 He likewise quoted from the President of the Queen's
University in Belfast, Sir Eric Ashby: "'The internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should
have de facto control of the following functions: (i) the admission and examination of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of study; (iii)
the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure. It
would be a poor prospect for academic freedom if universities had to rely on the literal interpretation of their constitutions in order to
acquire for their academic members control of these four functions, for in one constitution or another most of these functions are laid on
the shoulders of the law governing body .'" 14 Justice Frankfurter, with his extensive background in legal education as a former
Professor of the Harvard Law School, referred to what he called the business of a university and the four essential freedoms in the
following language: "It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment
and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." 15 Thus is reinforced
the conclusion reached by us that mandamus does not lie in this case.
4. It is not an easy matter then to disregard the views of persons knowledgeable in the field, to whom cannot be imputed lack of
awareness of the need to respect freedom of thought on the part of students and scholars. Moreover, it could amount to minimizing the
full respect that must be accorded the academic freedom expressly granted by the Constitution "to institutions of higher learning." It is
equally difficult to yield conformity to the approach taken that colleges and universities should be looked upon as public utilities devoid
of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly higher,
category.

5. It only remains to be added that the futility that marked the persistence of petitioner to continue her studies in the Loyola School of
Theology is the result solely of a legal appraisal of the situation before us. The decision is not to be construed as in any way reflecting
on the scholastic standing of petitioner. There was on the part of respondent due acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for
reasons explained in the letter of Father Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of the school as well as of the other
students and her own welfare, that she continue her graduate work elsewhere. There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the
circumstances deemed relevant. It could be that on more mature reflection, even petitioner would realize that her transfer to some other
institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned. At any rate, as indicated earlier, only the legal aspect of the controversy was
touched upon in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Makalintal, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the dismissal of the petition for manifest lack of merit.
On the threadbare claim that during the summer of 1975 she had been admitted by respondent Fr. Antonio B.
Lambino, S.J., chairman of the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology (a religious
seminary for the priesthood) to attend therein free of charge two summer courses for credits, petitioner has filed
the present petition for mandamus against respondents to order her admission in said school as a student for an
M.A. in Theology and for the payment to her of exemplary and moral damages and "an amount equivalent more
or less to attorney's fees which petitioner would have paid a competent lawyer, had she employed one."
(According to petitioner, her enrollment in the Loyola seminary would allegedly entail "only about two years more"
where she would need "about four to five years more of studies" at the UST Graduate School for Ecclesiastical
Faculties where she has now enrolled as a special student without credit for any academic units for the subjects
taken by her.)
The original respondent, Fr. Lambino, filed his comment on the petition, while the two other respondents, the
Director of Private Schools and the Director, UST Graduate School, did not even deign (and were not required)
to file their comments, notwithstanding the Court's resolution of June 23, 1975 requiring their comment on the
amended petition, since by the very terms of said petition, petitioner had not even bothered to make any
application or representations with them before hailing them before this Court as parties-respondents on her
fancied right to enrollment and cross-enrollment at the two institutions (Loyola and UST ).
The petition must be dismissed, since petitioner has admittedly failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

The facts of record amply show that petitioner is obviously disqualified, and is not studying, for the priesthood,
she being a laywoman and not eligible for admission to respondent seminary. Mandamus to order her admission
in respondent seminary cannot lie in the absence of a clear right on her part and a clear duty on respondent's
part to so admit her.
Petitioner in her petition admits that she has failed to avail of and exhaust the administrative remedies open to
her but seeks to justify her failure by alleging.
That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he
being with the First Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of
Education, since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day for
registration; ...
This execuse is of course patently inept, since neither the university president's temporary absence nor the
Secretary of Education's having "his busiest time of the year" justifies petitioner's by passing these officials
whose final administrative decision should first be given. Such exhaustion of administrative remedies is a precondition for court action and would get all the facts in so as to enable the courts in a petition for review simply to
decide on the basis of the facts whether the questioned act of petitioner's non-admission constitutes an arbitrary
action that would warrant judicial intervention.
Withal, the facts of record amply show that far from being arbitrary , petitioner's non-admission was for perfectly
valid considerations, as follows:
The Loyola School of Theology, is a seminary for the priesthood; and petitioner is admittedly and obviously
disqualified and is not studying, for the priesthood, she being a laywoman and therefore not eligible for
admission;
Petitioner was admitted free to take some summer courses this year for credits, but according to respondent
Fr. Lambino this was not an admission to a degree program since the official admission by the Assistant Dean of
the Graduate School of the Ateneo de Manila University (which is the institution, not the Loyola School of
Theology, that grants the decree) required for the purpose has neither been sought by petitioner nor granted by
the said Assistant Dean. Respondent Fr. Lambino thus asserts that he is the wrong party to be sued;
Petitioner claims on the contrary that she was actually admitted for a degree program, and arguing that "The
factual issue, however, of whether or not petitioner was actually admitted for a degree program needs to be
resolved first" 1 vehemently insists that this Court resolve the factual issue in her favor on the basis of her bare counter-assertions
and the respondent school's very letter rejecting her admission; (Petitioner who is not a lawyer of course does not appreciate that this
Court is neither a trier nor reviewer of facts and that precisely one of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is that all the
facts may be placed before the final administrative authorities, whose decision may be reviewed by the courts only upon a clear
showing of fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake. 2); and
Aside from the fact that her non-admission to respondent seminary for the priesthood by virtue of her being disqualified as a
laywoman is a matter of school policy and regulation that obviously can in no way be said to be arbitrary (since females all over the
world are up to now not admitted to the priesthood), the faculty's "strong opposition" to having her back in the school after summer
because "they felt that (her) frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the
progress of the class" and respondent Fr. Lambino's courteous but candid appraisal "that the advisability of (her) completing a program
(with all the course work and thesis writing) with us is very questionable" are matters of technical and academic judgment that the

courts will not ordinarily interfere with.

Petitioner's action for mandamus clearly does not lie, since no cleat right for her admission to a degree program for an M.A. in Theology
nor a clear duty on the part of the Loyola School of Theology (or of the Ateneo Graduate School which is not even a party) to so admit
her have been shown.
Only after exhaustion of administrative remedies and when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic
judgment of the school faculty and the proper authorities as to the competence and fitness of an applicant for enrollment or to continue
taking up graduate studies in a graduate school. The courts simply do not have the competence nor inclination to constitute themselves
as Admission Committees of the universities and institutions of higher learning and to substitute their judgment for that of the regularly
constituted Admission Committees of such educational institutions. Were the courts to do so, they would conceivable be swamped with
petitions for admission from the thousands refused admission every year, and next the thousands who flunked and were dropped would
also be petitioning the courts for a judicial review of their grades!

Before closing this concurrence, I must make of record my concurrence with and adherence to the fundamental principles of freedom
and liberty eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice Makasiar in his dissent. His expression of deep concern for the preservation and
enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality citing Justice Cardoso's injunction that man's freedom must be given
sanctuary "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments and the scorn
and derision of those who have no patience with general principles", and Laski's thesis that "the happiness of the individual, not the
well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behavior was to be judged, his interests, not its power, set the limits to the
authority it was entitled to exercise" reaffirm forcefully the basic tenet that distinguishes a democratic from a totalitarian state, viz, that
the State exists for the individual rather than the other way around.
I part ways with him of course in his factual premises and assumptions which to my mind are not supported by the record nor the facts
at bar. Foremost among these are the premise that petitioner had been admitted to the theology course and cannot be refused further
attendance therein, when as shown above, the question of whether petitioner was in fact admitted to a degree program is a
controverted one with petitioner herself making no such averment in her petition and precisely asking that this Court resolve this "factual
issue" and the disinclination to give due credence to the reason given by Fr. Lambino for the faculty's "strong opposition" to petitioner's
admission viz, that her "frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of
the class" and her failure "to give the (faculty's) presentation a chance and exert(ed) more effort to understand the point made before
immediately thinking of problems and difficulties", 3 when not even the petitioner questions in her petition the veracity of such faculty
opposition and the quoted factual reasons therefor but only whether the same "constitutes valid legal ground for expulsion".
I do not share his view that private educational institutions may operate only by delegation of the State and "are no different in this
respect from the commercial public utilities whose right to exists and to operate depends upon State authority" 4 and the assumption
that respondent has prescribed "unreasonable rules or regulations" when such rules have not even been submitted to the Court nor is
there any claim that such rules have even been questioned in or disapproved by the Director of Public Schools (assuming that said
official has jurisdiction over a religious seminary such as the Loyola School of Theology).
Petitioner according to her petition has obtained enrollment at the UST Graduate School for Ecclesiastical Faculties where according to
her own petition she could pursue her graduate studies for an M.A. in Theology (after fulfilling their requirements for Baccalaureate in
Philosophy and assuming she has the required recognized undergraduate units, as to which there is some question). Under the
circumstances, it seems fair to state that petitioner may well heed the voices and visions (that call her to a degree in Theology) without
rejection other than that of respondent school and certainly without being destined to be another Joan of Arc.
Makalintal, C.J., concurs.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
With his usual scholarship and characteristic style, Mr. Justice Fernando has woven a persuasive majority opinion that commands

respect.
The 1973 Constitution provides that: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom" (Sec. 8[2], Art. XV). This is
broader than Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy
academic freedom." Under the aforecited clause of the 1973 Constitution, all colleges and universities of higher learning, whether
established by the State or not, are guaranteed academic freedom.
It should be stressed that the academic freedom thus guaranteed is not limited to the members of the faculty nor to the administrative
authorities of the educational institution. It should also be deemed granted in favor of the student body; because all three the
administrative authorities of the college or university, its faculty and its student population constitute the educational institution,
without any one of which the educational institution can neither exist nor operate. The educational institution is permitted by the State to
exist and operate, not for the benefit of its administrative authorities or faculty members, but for the benefit of its studentry.
As Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in Sweezy versus New Hampshire, emphasized: "No field of education is so
thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if
any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die" (354 US 234; 250; 1 L. ed. 2nd 1311, 1325, emphasis supplied).
An individual has a natural and inherent right to learn and develop his faculties. It is for this reason that the 1973 Constitution directs the
State to aid and support the parents in the rearing of the youth (Sec. 4, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); to promote their physical, intellectual
and social well-being (Sec. 5, Art II); to establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in the field of education (Sec. 7, Art. II;
to establish and maintain a complete adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national development (Sec.
8[1] Art, XV); to recognize and protect the academic freedom of all institutions of higher learning (Sec. 8[2], Art. XV); to maintain a
system of free public elementary education and where finances permit, a system of free public education up to the secondary level (Sec
8[5], Art. XV); to provide citizenship and vocational training to adult citizens and out-of-school youths and to create and maintain
scholarships for poor and deserving students (Sec. 8[6], Art. XV) and to promote scientific research and invention, to patronize arts and
letters, scholarships, grants-in-aid or other forms of incentives for specially gifted children (Sec. 9[1], [2] and [3], Art. XV).
On the other hand, no private person or entity has the inherent right to establish and operate a school, college or university.
Hence, there is need of re-examining and recasting the limited definition of academic freedom conceived by Professor Arthur Lovejoy
(Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, p. 384) to the effect that it is "the freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher institutions of
learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to express his conclusions, whether through publication or in the
instruction of the teacher, without interference from political and ecclesiastical authorities or administrative opinions of institutions in
which he is employed, unless his methods are found by a qualified body of his own profession to be clearly incompetent or contrary to
professional ethics", which is echoed by MacIver (MacIver, Academic Freedom in Our Time [6], 1955) and by Hook (Hook, Academic
Freedom and Academic Anarchy). The scope of academic freedom should not be restricted to the narrow formulation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter as "an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms of a university to determine for its own academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study"' (His concurring opinion in
Sweezy vs. New Hampshire, 353, US 234, 263 [1957]), which neutralizes his belief that "it is the business of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation", to which he however exhibits loyalty as he continued to
state:
Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings made in the laboratory. Insights into the
mysteries of nature are born of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is this true in the pursuit of
understanding in the groping endeavors of what are called the social sciences, the concern of which is man
and society. The problems that are the respective preoccupations of anthropology, economics, law, psychology,
sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable
division of analysis, with interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. For society's good if understanding
be an essential need of society inquiries into these problems, speculation about them, stimulation in others
of reaction upon them, must be left unfettered as

possible ... .
... One need only refer to the address of T. H. Huxley at the opening of Johns Hopkins University, ... :
"In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A university ceases to
be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or any sectional interest. A
university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates "to
follow the argument where it leads." This implies the right to examine, question, modify or
reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept
of an immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a university. The concern of its scholars is
not merely to add and revise facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever
examining and modifying the framework itself.
"Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and experiment
are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge. A sense of freedom
is also necessary for creative work in the arts which, equally with scientific research, is the
concern of the university" (Sweezy vs. New Hampshire 354 US 234; 262-263, emphasis
supplied).
The cardinal article of faith of our democratic civilization is the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality. It was Mr. Justice Frankfurter himself who emphasized that man's "inviolate character" should be "protected to the largest
possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person" (American Communications Association, etc. vs. Douds,
339 US 382, 421, cited in Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Assn. vs. Phil. Blooming Mills Co., Inc., et al., L-31195, June 5, 1973, 51
SCRA 189,200), so that the individual can fully develop himself and achieve complete fulfillment. His freedom to seek his own
happiness would mean nothing if the same were not given sanctuary "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles"
(Justice Cardoso, The Nature of Judicial Process, 90-93, cited in Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Assn. vs. Phil. Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc., supra, 201).
WE likewise reiterated in the Philippine Blooming Mills case, supra, that "the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the Courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech or free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and to the fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections" (51 SCRA 201),
much less on the caprice of bigoted, intolerant and impatient professors and college administrators. In the stirring language of Laski,
"the happiness of the individual not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged, his interests,
not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise" (51 SCRA 201). This individual freedom and right to happiness
should be recognized and respected not only by the State but also by enterprises authorized by the State to operate; for as Laski
stressed: "Without freedom of the mind ... a man has no protection in our social order. He may speak wrongly or foolishly, ... . Yet a
denial of his right ... is a denial of his happiness. Thereby he becomes an instrument of other people's ends, not himself an end" (Laski,
Liberty in the Modern State, 73, cited in Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 1952 ed., 315).
As Justice Holmes pronounced, "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out" (Abrams vs. U.S. 250 US 616).
The human mind is by nature an inquiring mind, whether of the very young or of the very old or in-between; for freedom of speech in the
words of John Milton is the "liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience above all liberties."
What is involved here is not merely academic freedom of the higher institutions of learning as guaranteed by Section 8(2) of Article SV
of the 1973 Constitution. The issue here strikes at the broader freedom of expression of the individual the very core of human liberty.
Even if the term "academic freedom" were to be limited to institutions of higher learning which to the mind of Dr. Vicente Sinco, an
eminent authority in Constitutional Law, is the right of the university as an institution, not the academic freedom of the university

professor (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 1962 ed., 489) the term "institutions of higher learning" contained in the aforecited provision of
our New Constitution comprehends not only the faculty and the college administrators but also the members of the student body. While
it is true that the university professor may have the initiative and resourcefulness to pursue his own research and formulate his
conclusions concerning the problem of his own science or subject, the motivation therefor may be provoked by questions addressed to
him by his students. In this respect, the student specially a graduate student must not be restrained from raising questions or from
challenging the validity of dogmas whether theological or not. The true scholar never avoids, but on the contrary welcomes and
encourages, such searching questions even if the same will have the tendency to uncover his own ignorance. It is not the happiness
and self-fulfillment of the professor alone that are guaranteed. The happiness and full development of the curious intellect of the student
are protected by the narrow guarantee of academic freedom and more so by the broader right of free expression, which includes free
speech and press, and academic freedom.
After having been admitted to the theology, course, petitioner cannot be refused further attendance therein on the ground that "her
frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class ... ." It seems
that this excuse is merely an euphemistic way of characterizing her questions which might be embarrassing to the clergy or to the
professor or other sensitive souls, for her questions might impugn the validity of their tenets, dogmas and beliefs. It is hard to believe
that "her frequent questions and difficulties" slowed down the progress of the class; because respondent Father Lambino himself
recognized that the petitioner is endowed with "the requisite intellectual ability" and accordingly merited grades of B+ and B in two
theology subjects.
Respondents obviously fear Laski's prophecy:" The heresies we may suppress today may be the orthodoxies of tomorrow. New truths
begins always in minority of one; it must be someone's perception before it becomes a general perception. The world gains nothing
from a refusal to entertain the possibility that a new idea may be true. Nor can we pick and choose among our suppressions with any
prospect of success. It would, indeed, be hardly beyond the mark to affirm that a list of opinions condemned in the past as wrong or
dangerous would be a list of the commonplaces of our time" (Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 75, cited in Taada and Fernando,
Constitution of the Philippines, 1952 ed., 316-317).
If she flunked in said subjects or the entire course, she could have been justifiably denied enrollment in the second semester. But that is
not the case here, as aforestated.
The respondents never offered as justification for their refusing petitioner admission to the next semester limitations of space facilities,
professors and optimum classroom size. It is doubtful whether the same could have been a valid reason in refusing her further
admission, after she had complied with all the other requirements.
And the fact that she was admitted free to study theology without intending to be a priest, does not weaken her position. It should be
stressed that education is a sovereign state function. It is a vital duty of the state which can delegate the same to private educational
institutions that are qualified and duly authorized to operate. Private educational institutions therefore are no different in this respect
from the commercial public utilities, whose right to exist and to operate depends upon State authority. The moment they are allowed to
operate, they must abide by the Constitution, laws and implementing rules of the Government on the matter. While the college or
university can prescribe regulations for admission to the various courses of study offered by it, this prerogative does not include the
power to prescribe unreasonable rules or regulations violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen, such as freedom of expression in
general and academic freedom in particular. The educational institutions perform a more vital function than the ordinary public utilities.
The institution of learning feeds and nurtures the human mind and spirit to insure a robust, healthy and educated citizenry on whom
national survival and national greatness depend. The ordinary public utilities merely serve the material comforts and convenience of the
people, who can certainly go on living without them. But the people cannot wallow in darkness and ignorance without hastening their
extermination from the face of the earth.
To repeat the reminder of Chief Justice Warren: "Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die " (354 US 234, 250; 1 L ed. 2nd 1311, 1325, emphasis supplied.).
Justice Fernando himself fittingly concludes: "Intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The
mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or
through the media, and thus seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupations. Embraced in such

concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association" (Fernando
on the Philippine Constitution, 1974 ed., p. 565).
The case of herein petitioner is a mild prelude to a re-enactment of the persecution of Joan of Arc. Sectarian schools should have
realized by now that intolerance, bigotry and the inquisition relics of the Dark Ages tyrannize the mind and spirit of man and are
antithetical to their very function of nourishing the intellect and spreading enlightenment.
In my view, the petitioner has a clear right, and the respondents have the equally clear duty to allow her to continue studying theology.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the dismissal of the petition for manifest lack of merit.
On the threadbare claim that during the summer of 1975 she had been admitted by respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., chairman
of the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology (a religious seminary for the priesthood) to attend therein free of
charge two summer courses for credits, petitioner has filed the present petition for mandamus against respondents to order her
admission in said school as a student for an M.A. in Theology and for the payment to her of exemplary and moral damages and "an
amount equivalent more or less to attorney's fees which petitioner would have paid a competent lawyer, had she employed one."
(According to petitioner, her enrollment in the Loyola seminary would allegedly entail "only about two years more" where she would
need "about four to five years more of studies" at the UST Graduate School for Ecclesiastical Faculties where she has now enrolled as
a special student without credit for any academic units for the subjects taken by her.)
The original respondent, Fr. Lambino, filed his comment on the petition, while the two other respondents, the Director of Private Schools
and the Director, UST Graduate School, did not even deign (and were not required) to file their comments, notwithstanding the Court's
resolution of June 23, 1975 requiring their comment on the amended petition, since by the very terms of said petition, petitioner had not
even bothered to make any application or representations with them before hailing them before this Court as parties-respondents on
her fancied right to enrollment and cross-enrollment at the two institutions (Loyola and UST ).
The petition must be dismissed, since petitioner has admittedly failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The facts of record amply
show that petitioner is obviously disqualified, and is not studying, for the priesthood, she being a laywoman and not eligible for
admission to respondent seminary. Mandamus to order her admission in respondent seminary cannot lie in the absence of a clear right
on her part and a clear duty on respondent's part to so admit her.
Petitioner in her petition admits that she has failed to avail of and exhaust the administrative remedies open to her but seeks to justify
her failure by alleging.
That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the
First Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of Education, since this is his busiest time of
the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day for registration; ...
This execuse is of course patently inept, since neither the university president's temporary absence nor the Secretary of Education's
having "his busiest time of the year" justifies petitioner's by passing these officials whose final administrative decision should first be
given. Such exhaustion of administrative remedies is a pre-condition for court action and would get all the facts in so as to enable the
courts in a petition for review simply to decide on the basis of the facts whether the questioned act of petitioner's non-admission
constitutes an arbitrary action that would warrant judicial intervention.

Withal, the facts of record amply show that far from being arbitrary , petitioner's non-admission was for perfectly valid considerations, as
follows:
The Loyola School of Theology, is a seminary for the priesthood; and petitioner is admittedly and obviously disqualified and is not
studying, for the priesthood, she being a laywoman and therefore not eligible for admission;
Petitioner was admitted free to take some summer courses this year for credits, but according to respondent Fr. Lambino this was
not an admission to a degree program since the official admission by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo de
Manila University (which is the institution, not the Loyola School of Theology, that grants the decree) required for the purpose has
neither been sought by petitioner nor granted by the said Assistant Dean. Respondent Fr. Lambino thus asserts that he is the wrong
party to be sued;
Petitioner claims on the contrary that she was actually admitted for a degree program, and arguing that "The factual issue, however,
of whether or not petitioner was actually admitted for a degree program needs to be resolved first" 1 vehemently insists that this Court
resolve the factual issue in her favor on the basis of her bare counter-assertions and the respondent school's very letter rejecting her
admission; (Petitioner who is not a lawyer of course does not appreciate that this Court is neither a trier nor reviewer of facts and that
precisely one of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is that all the facts may be placed before the final administrative
authorities, whose decision may be reviewed by the courts only upon a clear showing of fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality,
imposition or mistake. 2); and
Aside from the fact that her non-admission to respondent seminary for the priesthood by virtue of her being disqualified as a
laywoman is a matter of school policy and regulation that obviously can in no way be said to be arbitrary (since females all over the
world are up to now not admitted to the priesthood), the faculty's "strong opposition" to having her back in the school after summer
because "they felt that (her) frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the
progress of the class" and respondent Fr. Lambino's courteous but candid appraisal "that the advisability of (her) completing a program
(with all the course work and thesis writing) with us is very questionable" are matters of technical and academic judgment that the
courts will not ordinarily interfere with.
Petitioner's action for mandamus clearly does not lie, since no cleat right for her admission to a degree program for an M.A. in Theology
nor a clear duty on the part of the Loyola School of Theology (or of the Ateneo Graduate School which is not even a party) to so admit
her have been shown.
Only after exhaustion of administrative remedies and when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic
judgment of the school faculty and the proper authorities as to the competence and fitness of an applicant for enrollment or to continue
taking up graduate studies in a graduate school. The courts simply do not have the competence nor inclination to constitute themselves
as Admission Committees of the universities and institutions of higher learning and to substitute their judgment for that of the regularly
constituted Admission Committees of such educational institutions. Were the courts to do so, they would conceivable be swamped with
petitions for admission from the thousands refused admission every year, and next the thousands who flunked and were dropped would
also be petitioning the courts for a judicial review of their grades!

Before closing this concurrence, I must make of record my concurrence with and adherence to the fundamental principles of freedom
and liberty eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice Makasiar in his dissent. His expression of deep concern for the preservation and
enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality citing Justice Cardoso's injunction that man's freedom must be given
sanctuary "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments and the scorn
and derision of those who have no patience with general principles", and Laski's thesis that "the happiness of the individual, not the
well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behavior was to be judged, his interests, not its power, set the limits to the
authority it was entitled to exercise" reaffirm forcefully the basic tenet that distinguishes a democratic from a totalitarian state, viz, that
the State exists for the individual rather than the other way around.
I part ways with him of course in his factual premises and assumptions which to my mind are not supported by the record nor the facts
at bar. Foremost among these are the premise that petitioner had been admitted to the theology course and cannot be refused further

attendance therein, when as shown above, the question of whether petitioner was in fact admitted to a degree program is a
controverted one with petitioner herself making no such averment in her petition and precisely asking that this Court resolve this "factual
issue" and the disinclination to give due credence to the reason given by Fr. Lambino for the faculty's "strong opposition" to petitioner's
admission viz, that her "frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of
the class" and her failure "to give the (faculty's) presentation a chance and exert(ed) more effort to understand the point made before
immediately thinking of problems and difficulties", 3 when not even the petitioner questions in her petition the veracity of such faculty
opposition and the quoted factual reasons therefor but only whether the same "constitutes valid legal ground for expulsion".
I do not share his view that private educational institutions may operate only by delegation of the State and "are no different in this
respect from the commercial public utilities whose right to exists and to operate depends upon State authority" 4 and the assumption
that respondent has prescribed "unreasonable rules or regulations" when such rules have not even been submitted to the Court nor is
there any claim that such rules have even been questioned in or disapproved by the Director of Public Schools (assuming that said
official has jurisdiction over a religious seminary such as the Loyola School of Theology).
Petitioner according to her petition has obtained enrollment at the UST Graduate School for Ecclesiastical Faculties where according to
her own petition she could pursue her graduate studies for an M.A. in Theology (after fulfilling their requirements for Baccalaureate in
Philosophy and assuming she has the required recognized undergraduate units, as to which there is some question). Under the
circumstances, it seems fair to state that petitioner may well heed the voices and visions (that call her to a degree in Theology) without
rejection other than that of respondent school and certainly without being destined to be another Joan of Arc.
Makalintal, C.J., concurs.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
With his usual scholarship and characteristic style, Mr. Justice Fernando has woven a persuasive majority opinion that commands
respect.
The 1973 Constitution provides that: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom" (Sec. 8[2], Art. XV). This is
broader than Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy
academic freedom." Under the aforecited clause of the 1973 Constitution, all colleges and universities of higher learning, whether
established by the State or not, are guaranteed academic freedom.
It should be stressed that the academic freedom thus guaranteed is not limited to the members of the faculty nor to the administrative
authorities of the educational institution. It should also be deemed granted in favor of the student body; because all three the
administrative authorities of the college or university, its faculty and its student population constitute the educational institution,
without any one of which the educational institution can neither exist nor operate. The educational institution is permitted by the State to
exist and operate, not for the benefit of its administrative authorities or faculty members, but for the benefit of its studentry.
As Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in Sweezy versus New Hampshire, emphasized: "No field of education is so
thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if
any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die" (354 US 234; 250; 1 L. ed. 2nd 1311, 1325, emphasis supplied).
An individual has a natural and inherent right to learn and develop his faculties. It is for this reason that the 1973 Constitution directs the
State to aid and support the parents in the rearing of the youth (Sec. 4, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); to promote their physical, intellectual
and social well-being (Sec. 5, Art II); to establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in the field of education (Sec. 7, Art. II;
to establish and maintain a complete adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national development (Sec.
8[1] Art, XV); to recognize and protect the academic freedom of all institutions of higher learning (Sec. 8[2], Art. XV); to maintain a
system of free public elementary education and where finances permit, a system of free public education up to the secondary level (Sec
8[5], Art. XV); to provide citizenship and vocational training to adult citizens and out-of-school youths and to create and maintain
scholarships for poor and deserving students (Sec. 8[6], Art. XV) and to promote scientific research and invention, to patronize arts and

letters, scholarships, grants-in-aid or other forms of incentives for specially gifted children (Sec. 9[1], [2] and [3], Art. XV).
On the other hand, no private person or entity has the inherent right to establish and operate a school, college or university.
Hence, there is need of re-examining and recasting the limited definition of academic freedom conceived by Professor Arthur Lovejoy
(Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, p. 384) to the effect that it is "the freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher institutions of
learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to express his conclusions, whether through publication or in the
instruction of the teacher, without interference from political and ecclesiastical authorities or administrative opinions of institutions in
which he is employed, unless his methods are found by a qualified body of his own profession to be clearly incompetent or contrary to
professional ethics", which is echoed by MacIver (MacIver, Academic Freedom in Our Time [6], 1955) and by Hook (Hook, Academic
Freedom and Academic Anarchy). The scope of academic freedom should not be restricted to the narrow formulation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter as "an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms of a university to determine for its own academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study"' (His concurring opinion in
Sweezy vs. New Hampshire, 353, US 234, 263 [1957]), which neutralizes his belief that "it is the business of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation", to which he however exhibits loyalty as he continued to
state:
Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings made in the laboratory. Insights into the
mysteries of nature are born of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is this true in the pursuit of
understanding in the groping endeavors of what are called the social sciences, the concern of which is man
and society. The problems that are the respective preoccupations of anthropology, economics, law, psychology,
sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable
division of analysis, with interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. For society's good if understanding
be an essential need of society inquiries into these problems, speculation about them, stimulation in others
of reaction upon them, must be left unfettered as
possible ... .
... One need only refer to the address of T. H. Huxley at the opening of Johns Hopkins University, ... :
"In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A university ceases to
be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or any sectional interest. A
university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates "to
follow the argument where it leads." This implies the right to examine, question, modify or
reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept
of an immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of a university. The concern of its scholars is
not merely to add and revise facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever
examining and modifying the framework itself.
"Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and experiment
are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge. A sense of freedom
is also necessary for creative work in the arts which, equally with scientific research, is the
concern of the university" (Sweezy vs. New Hampshire 354 US 234; 262-263, emphasis
supplied).
The cardinal article of faith of our democratic civilization is the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality. It was Mr. Justice Frankfurter himself who emphasized that man's "inviolate character" should be "protected to the largest
possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person" (American Communications Association, etc. vs. Douds,
339 US 382, 421, cited in Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Assn. vs. Phil. Blooming Mills Co., Inc., et al., L-31195, June 5, 1973, 51
SCRA 189,200), so that the individual can fully develop himself and achieve complete fulfillment. His freedom to seek his own
happiness would mean nothing if the same were not given sanctuary "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles"
(Justice Cardoso, The Nature of Judicial Process, 90-93, cited in Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Assn. vs. Phil. Blooming Mills Co.,

Inc., supra, 201).

WE likewise reiterated in the Philippine Blooming Mills case, supra, that "the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the Courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech or free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and to the fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections" (51 SCRA 201),
much less on the caprice of bigoted, intolerant and impatient professors and college administrators. In the stirring language of Laski,
"the happiness of the individual not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged, his interests,
not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise" (51 SCRA 201). This individual freedom and right to happiness
should be recognized and respected not only by the State but also by enterprises authorized by the State to operate; for as Laski
stressed: "Without freedom of the mind ... a man has no protection in our social order. He may speak wrongly or foolishly, ... . Yet a
denial of his right ... is a denial of his happiness. Thereby he becomes an instrument of other people's ends, not himself an end" (Laski,
Liberty in the Modern State, 73, cited in Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 1952 ed., 315).
As Justice Holmes pronounced, "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out" (Abrams vs. U.S. 250 US 616).
The human mind is by nature an inquiring mind, whether of the very young or of the very old or in-between; for freedom of speech in the
words of John Milton is the "liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience above all liberties."
What is involved here is not merely academic freedom of the higher institutions of learning as guaranteed by Section 8(2) of Article SV
of the 1973 Constitution. The issue here strikes at the broader freedom of expression of the individual the very core of human liberty.
Even if the term "academic freedom" were to be limited to institutions of higher learning which to the mind of Dr. Vicente Sinco, an
eminent authority in Constitutional Law, is the right of the university as an institution, not the academic freedom of the university
professor (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 1962 ed., 489) the term "institutions of higher learning" contained in the aforecited provision of
our New Constitution comprehends not only the faculty and the college administrators but also the members of the student body. While
it is true that the university professor may have the initiative and resourcefulness to pursue his own research and formulate his
conclusions concerning the problem of his own science or subject, the motivation therefor may be provoked by questions addressed to
him by his students. In this respect, the student specially a graduate student must not be restrained from raising questions or from
challenging the validity of dogmas whether theological or not. The true scholar never avoids, but on the contrary welcomes and
encourages, such searching questions even if the same will have the tendency to uncover his own ignorance. It is not the happiness
and self-fulfillment of the professor alone that are guaranteed. The happiness and full development of the curious intellect of the student
are protected by the narrow guarantee of academic freedom and more so by the broader right of free expression, which includes free
speech and press, and academic freedom.
After having been admitted to the theology, course, petitioner cannot be refused further attendance therein on the ground that "her
frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class ... ." It seems
that this excuse is merely an euphemistic way of characterizing her questions which might be embarrassing to the clergy or to the
professor or other sensitive souls, for her questions might impugn the validity of their tenets, dogmas and beliefs. It is hard to believe
that "her frequent questions and difficulties" slowed down the progress of the class; because respondent Father Lambino himself
recognized that the petitioner is endowed with "the requisite intellectual ability" and accordingly merited grades of B+ and B in two
theology subjects.
Respondents obviously fear Laski's prophecy:" The heresies we may suppress today may be the orthodoxies of tomorrow. New truths
begins always in minority of one; it must be someone's perception before it becomes a general perception. The world gains nothing
from a refusal to entertain the possibility that a new idea may be true. Nor can we pick and choose among our suppressions with any
prospect of success. It would, indeed, be hardly beyond the mark to affirm that a list of opinions condemned in the past as wrong or
dangerous would be a list of the commonplaces of our time" (Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 75, cited in Taada and Fernando,
Constitution of the Philippines, 1952 ed., 316-317).
If she flunked in said subjects or the entire course, she could have been justifiably denied enrollment in the second semester. But that is

not the case here, as aforestated.

The respondents never offered as justification for their refusing petitioner admission to the next semester limitations of space facilities,
professors and optimum classroom size. It is doubtful whether the same could have been a valid reason in refusing her further
admission, after she had complied with all the other requirements.
And the fact that she was admitted free to study theology without intending to be a priest, does not weaken her position. It should be
stressed that education is a sovereign state function. It is a vital duty of the state which can delegate the same to private educational
institutions that are qualified and duly authorized to operate. Private educational institutions therefore are no different in this respect
from the commercial public utilities, whose right to exist and to operate depends upon State authority. The moment they are allowed to
operate, they must abide by the Constitution, laws and implementing rules of the Government on the matter. While the college or
university can prescribe regulations for admission to the various courses of study offered by it, this prerogative does not include the
power to prescribe unreasonable rules or regulations violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen, such as freedom of expression in
general and academic freedom in particular. The educational institutions perform a more vital function than the ordinary public utilities.
The institution of learning feeds and nurtures the human mind and spirit to insure a robust, healthy and educated citizenry on whom
national survival and national greatness depend. The ordinary public utilities merely serve the material comforts and convenience of the
people, who can certainly go on living without them. But the people cannot wallow in darkness and ignorance without hastening their
extermination from the face of the earth.
To repeat the reminder of Chief Justice Warren: "Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die " (354 US 234, 250; 1 L ed. 2nd 1311, 1325, emphasis supplied.).
Justice Fernando himself fittingly concludes: "Intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The
mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or
through the media, and thus seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupations. Embraced in such
concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association" (Fernando
on the Philippine Constitution, 1974 ed., p. 565).
The case of herein petitioner is a mild prelude to a re-enactment of the persecution of Joan of Arc. Sectarian schools should have
realized by now that intolerance, bigotry and the inquisition relics of the Dark Ages tyrannize the mind and spirit of man and are
antithetical to their very function of nourishing the intellect and spreading enlightenment.
In my view, the petitioner has a clear right, and the respondents have the equally clear duty to allow her to continue studying theology.

EN BANC

THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT

SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION
(PSDSA), its officers, to wit: DR.
ANILLA A. CALAMBA, President;

G.R. No. 157286

Present:

DR. CARMELITA L. PALABAY,

Gen. Vice-President; MS. ESTELITA
R. REYES, Board Secretary; DR.

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

THELMA A. GALANG, Asst. Board

PUNO,

Secretary; MR. FERNANDO LAVITA,

QUISUMBING,

Treasurer; MS. LITA DIONISIO, Asst.

* * On leave.

YNARES-SANTIAGO,*

Treasurer; MS. ROSELILY PADRE,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

Auditor; MR. ROMAN CALICDAN,

CARPIO,

Asst. Auditor; MR. TOMO-AY, MR.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

OSCAR PEAFLORIDA, Bus.

CORONA,

Managers; DR. ANTONETTE ANG,

CARPIO MORALES,

DR. MAGNITA LABRADOR, P.R.O.S;

CALLEJO, SR.,

MR. BONIFACIO MIGUEL (Region I), AZCUNA,

MR. JOSE CALAGUI (Region II), DR.

TINGA,

REYNALDO SAGUM (Region III), MR.

CHICO-NAZARIO,

RUBEN PANAHON (Region IV), MR.

GARCIA, and

OSCAR BARBA (Region V), MS. IRMA VELASCO, JR., JJ.

GANELA (Region VI), DR. ERLINDA
NAPULI (Region VII), DR. PONCIANO
GABIETA (Region VIII), MR.
FEDERICO FIDEL (Region IX), MR.
EMILIANO V. RODRIGUEZ (Region X),
MS. EDWINA ALAG (Region XI), MR.
DOMINADOR ATAM (Region XII), MS.
CONSUELO VELASCO (NCR), MR.
VICTORINO AGMATA (CAR), MS.
NATIVIDAD SALASAB (ARMMCARAGA), All PSDSA Vice-Presidents
for their respective Regions: DR. LOLITA
CABANAYAN, MR. CICERO AKLANG,
DR. RUSTICO OCAMPO, MR. ROMEO
SANTOS, MR. EMMANUEL CAMA,
MR. ROMEO TUMAOB, MR. JOVENCIO
MENDOZA, MR. ALEJANDRO BARING,
JR., MS. BERNARDITA APOSTOL, MS.

LORETA MACALUDAS, DR. MYRNA

LYN MARACON, MS. ELIZABETH SAN
DIEGO, SITH HINDRON DAMMANG,
MS. IMMACULADA BRINGAS, and MS.
GLORIA DERECHO, all members of the
PSDSA Board of Directors, in their own
behalf as current District Supervisors and
IN REPRESENTATION OF ALL
DISTRICT SUPERVISORS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Petitioners,

- versus -

HON. EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS,

Department Secretary, THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, and
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
June 16, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction filed by the Public Schools District Supervisor
Association (PSDSA) seeking to declare as unconstitutional Rule IV, Section 4.3;
Rule V, Sections 5.1 and the second paragraph of Section 5.2; and Rule VI, Section
6.2, paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of 2003. The
petition likewise seeks to compel, by way of a writ of mandamus, the Department
of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) and the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) to upgrade the salary grade level of the district supervisors
from Salary Grade (SG) 19 to SG 24.

The Antecedents

Ever since the Department of Education (DepEd)1[1] was founded decades

ago, its management had been so centralized in the Manila office. Schools in the
national, regional, and division levels merely followed and implemented the orders
and memoranda issued by the Education Secretary. Due to the evolution of the
learning process and the onset of information technology, there was a need for a
radical change in the governance of the DepEd. Thus, a study on how to improve
the management of the Department was conducted, and one of the proposals was
the abolition of the office of the district supervisor.

Then Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta, the Chairman of the Committee on

Education, authored Senate Bill No. 2191, the thrust of which was to change the
existing management style and focus on the schools where the teaching-learning
process occurs. The bill was intended to highlight shared governance in the
different levels in the DECS hierarchy and establish authority, accountability, and
responsibility for achieving higher learning outcomes. While the governance of
basic education would begin at the national level, the field offices (regions,
divisions, schools, and learning centers) would translate the policy into programs,
projects, and services to fit local needs.2[2] The national level was likewise to be
tasked to define the roles and responsibilities of, and provide resources to the field
offices which would implement educational programs, projects, and services in
1[1] Formerly the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).

communities they serve.3[3] At the forefront would be the DepEd Secretary, vested
with the overall authority and supervision over the operations of the department on
the national, regional, division, and schools district level.4[4]

Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Governance of Basic

Education Act 2001, became a law on August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section
27(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Under the law, each regional office shall have
a director, an assistant director, and an office staff for program promotion and
support, planning, administrative and fiscal services. 5[5] The regional director was
given the authority to hire, place and evaluate all employees in the regional office
except for the position of assistant director,6[6] as well as the authority,
accountability, and responsibility to determine the organization component of the
divisions and districts, and approve the staffing pattern of all employees therein; 7
[7] evaluate all division superintendents and assistant division superintendents in

2[2] Sec. 2, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9155 entitled An Act Instituting a Framework of
Governance for Basic Education, Establishing Authority and Accountability,
Renaming the Department of Education, Culture and Sports as the Department of
Education, and for Other Purposes.
3[3] Sec. 3, R.A. No. 9155.
4[4] Sec. 7, R.A. No. 9155.
5[5] Sec. 7(B), par. 1, R.A. No. 9155.
6[6] Sec. 7(B)(9), R.A. No. 9155.
7[7] Sec. 7 (B)(8), R.A. No. 9155.

the region;8[8] and other functions as may be assigned by the proper authorities. 9
[9]

A division, on the other hand, is headed by a schools division superintendent

with the following responsibilities, among others: to supervise the operations of all
public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools, and learning
centers;10[10] to hire, place and evaluate all division supervisors and schools
district supervisors as well as all employees in the divisions, both teaching and
non-teaching personnel, including school heads, except for the assistant division
superintendent;11[11] and perform other functions as may be assigned by proper
authorities.12[12]

The office of the schools district supervisor has been retained under the law.
Each district is headed by a school district supervisor and an office staff for
program promotion. However, the responsibilities of the schools district supervisor
are limited to the following: (1) providing professional and instructional advice and
support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers
8[8] Sec. 7 (B)(10), R.A. No. 9155.
9[9] Sec. 7 (B)(14), R.A. No. 9155.
10[10] Sec. 7(c)(7), R.A. No. 9155.
11[11] Sec. 7(c)(3), R.A. No. 9155.
12[12] Sec. 7(C), R.A. No. 9155

in the district or cluster thereof; (2) curricula supervision; and (3) performing such
other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities. The schools district
supervisors have no administrative, management, control or supervisory functions
over the schools and learning centers within their respective districts.13[13]

On the school level, an Elementary School Principal (ESP) was designated as

school head for all public elementary schools; and a Secondary School Principal
(SSP) for high schools or a cluster thereof. 14[14] The ESP and the SSP serve as
both instructional leaders and administrative managers with the following
authority, accountability and responsibility:

(7)Administering and managing all personnel, physical, and fiscal resources of the
school;
(8) Recommending the staffing complement of the school based on its needs;
(9) Encouraging staff development;
xxxx
(11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants for the purpose of upgrading
teachers/learning facilitators competencies, improving and expanding school
facilities, and providing instructional materials and equipment. Such
donations or grants must be reported to the appropriate district supervisors
and division superintendents; and
(12) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities. 15
[15]
13[13] Sec. 7(D), R.A. No. 9155.
14[14] Sec. 7(E), R.A. No. 9155.
15[15] Sec. 7(E), R.A. No 9155.

Under Section 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90) days after the approval of
the Act, provided that the principle of shared governance shall be fully
implemented within two (2) years after such approval.

Before the DepEd could issue the appropriate implementing rules and
regulations, petitioner sought the legal assistance of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) National Committee on Legal Aid to make representations for
the resolution of the following administrative issues:

1.

Restoration of the functions, duties, responsibilities, benefits, prerogatives,

and position level of Public Schools District Supervisors.

2.

Upgrading of Salary Grade level of Public Schools District Supervisors from

Salary Grade Level 19 to Salary Grade Level 24 under DBM Circular No. 36,
otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Rules and
Regulation.16[16]

In a Letter dated March 1, 2002 addressed to then DepEd Secretary Raul Roco, the
IBP stated that, per its review of the documents submitted by the PSDSA, it found
the latters position valid and legal, to wit:

16[16] Rollo, p. 109.

First: The basis for the abolition of the position of District Supervisors
under the Attrition Law and DECS Department Order No. 110, Series of 1991 is
no longer valid and rendered moot and academic due to issuance of DECS
Department Order No. 22, Series of 1996 and the passage by Congress of the
Philippines of Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Basic Education
Governance Act of 2000. Under R.A. 9155, school districts are mandated to be
maintained and responsibilities of Public Schools Districts Supervisors have been
clearly defined.
Second: There is a clear case of discrimination of grant of salaries and
benefits to District Supervisors compared to salaries and benefits received by the
School Principals which position is lower in the hierarchy of positions as prepared
by the Department of Education and the Department of Budget and Management.
School Principals and District Supervisors enjoy the same level of Salary Grade
even if the latter position is considered as a promotion and enjoys a higher level
of position than that of the position of School Principals.17[17]

The PSDSA thus requested the DepEd Secretary to call an immediate consultation
with the district supervisors nationwide through a convention, and their valid
inputs be considered in formulating the rules and regulations to be urged by the
DepEd. However, the Secretary failed to reply. Thus, the IBP reiterated the
concerns raised by the PSDSA in a Letter18[18] to the DepEd dated April 15, 2002.

17[17] Id. at 110-111.

18[18] Id. at 109.

On January 6, 2003, DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus issued DECS Office

Order No. 1, which constitutes the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
R.A. No. 9155. Sections 4.1 to 4.3, Rule IV of the IRR provide:

SECTION 4.1. The Schools Division Superintendent. A division shall

consist of a province or city which shall have a schools division superintendent.
There shall be at least one assistant schools division superintendent and office
staff for programs promotion, planning, administrative, fiscal, legal, ancillary, and
other support services.
SECTION 4.2. Authority, Accountability, and Responsibility of the
Schools Division Superintendent. Consistent with the national educational
policies, plans, and standards, the schools division superintendents shall have
authority, accountability, and responsibility for the following:
1) Developing and implementing division education development
plans;
2) Planning and managing the effective and efficient
performance of all personnel, physical, and fiscal resources of
the division, including professional staff development;
3) Hiring, placing, and evaluating all division supervisors and
schools district supervisors as well as all employees in the
division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including
school heads, except for the assistant division superintendents;
4) Monitoring the utilization of funds provided by the national
government and the local government units to the schools and
learning centers;
5) Ensuring compliance of quality standards for basic education
programs and for this purpose strengthening the role of
division supervisors as subject area specialists;
6) Promoting awareness of, and adherence by, all schools and
learning centers to accreditation standards prescribed by the
Secretary of Education;
7) Supervising the operations of all public and private
elementary, secondary, and integrated schools, and learning
centers; and
8) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by the
Secretary and/or Regional Director.

SECTION 4.3. Appointing and Disciplinary Authority of the Schools

Division Superintendent. The schools district superintendent shall appoint the
division supervisors and school district supervisors as well as all employees in the
division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads,
except for the assistant schools division superintendent, subject to the civil service
laws, rules and regulations, and the policies and guidelines to be issued by the
Secretary of Education for the purpose.
The schools division superintendent shall have disciplinary authority only
over the non-teaching personnel under his jurisdiction.
Such exercise of disciplinary authority by the schools division
superintendent over the non-teaching personnel shall be subject to the civil
service laws, rules and regulations, and procedures and guidelines to be issued by
the Secretary of Education relative to this matter.
The Regional Director shall continue exercising disciplinary authority
over the teaching personnel insofar as the latter are covered by specific and
exclusive disciplinary provisions under the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers (R.A. No. 4670).19[19]

Sections 5.1 and 5.2, Rule V of the IRR, in turn, provide:

SECTION 5.1. The Schools District Supervisor. A school district shall

have a school district supervisor and office staff for program promotion.
The schools district supervisor shall primarily perform staff functions and
shall not exercise administrative supervision over school principals, unless
specifically authorized by the proper authorities. The main focus of his/her
functions shall be instructional and curricula supervision aimed at raising
academic standards at the school level.
The schools district supervisor shall be specifically responsible for:
1)
Providing professional and instructional advice and
support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and
learning centers in the district or cluster thereof;
2)
Curricula supervision; and
19[19] Id. at 77-79.

3)
Performing such other functions as may be assigned
by the Secretary, Regional Directors, and Schools Division
Superintendents where they belong.
The schools district supervisor being mentioned in this section shall refer
to a public schools district supervisor.
SECTION 5.2. The School District. A school district already existing at
the time of the passage of this Act shall be maintained. However, an additional
school district may be established by the regional director based on criteria set by
the Secretary and on the recommendation of the schools division superintendent.
For this purpose, the Secretary of Education shall set standards and formulate
criteria as basis of the Regional Directors of the establishment of an additional
school district.20[20]

On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public
school district supervisors of the DepEd, in behalf of its officers and members,
filed the instant petition for prohibition and mandamus, alleging that:

I.

THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN REMOVING

PETITIONERS
ADMINISTRATIVE
SUPERVISION
OVER
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS (SCHOOL HEADS)
WITHIN HIS/HER DISTRICT AND CONVERTING HIS/HER
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION TO THAT OF PERFORMING STAFF
FUNCTION FOR THE DIVISION OFFICE PER SECTION 5.1 RULE V OF
THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC
ACT 9155 (DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003) IS A GROSS
VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 THE GOVERNANCE OF BASIC
EDUCATION ACT OF 2001.

II. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF REPUBLIC ACT

9155 AS PROMULGATED UNDER DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF
2003 EXPANDED THE LAW AND INCLUDED PROVISIONS WHICH
ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF
THE SUBJECT LAW.

20[20] Id. at 79-80.

III. THE DOWNGRADING OF SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF THE PUBLIC

SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OR THE NEGLECT OR REFUSAL
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT TO UPGRADE THE SALARY GRADE
LEVEL OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT TO A RESPECTABLE LEVEL
OF SALARY GRADE HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE PRINCIPALS
DESPITE CLEAR INTENTION OF R.A. 9155 TO RETAIN THE
POSITION OF PSDS IN THE HIERARCHY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGERS AND OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.21[21]

Petitioners maintain that the questioned provisions of the IRR are invalid
because they extended or expanded and modified the provisions of R.A. No. 9155.
They argue that the said law should be read in harmony with other existing
educational laws which it did not specifically repeal, such as Batas Pambansa Blg.
232, otherwise known as The Education Act of 1982, as amended by R.A. No.
7798; R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School
Teachers; and R.A. No. 7784 captioned An Act to Strengthen Teacher Education in
the Philippines by Establishing Centers of Excellence, Creating a Teacher
Education Council for the Purpose, Appropriating Funds Therefore, and for Other
Purposes.
Petitioners assert that under Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, the district offices of
the DepEd are intended as field offices where the district supervisors can assist the
ESPs and teachers/learning facilitators within their district as experienced
educational managers. Thus, the district supervisors were not divested of the
inherent administrative functions to manage and oversee the schools within their
respective districts, including their subordinates. They emphasize that the law
provides an office staff for program promotion in the school districts, which would
21[21] Id. at 30.

be of no use if the office has no administrative supervision over schools within its
respective districts.

Petitioners assert that under the IRR, the schools district supervisors
primarily perform staff functions and shall not exercise administrative supervision
over school principals, unless specifically authorized by the proper authorities.
Thus, under the IRR, the exercise of administrative supervision over school
principals was made discretionary and subject to the whims and caprices of the
proper authorities. The logical inference of this provision, petitioners aver, is that
the administrative supervisory powers can be withdrawn from a district supervisor
without any reason at all, a provision which has no basis in the enabling law.

Petitioners further contend that the DepEd has no authority to incorporate its
plan of downgrading the position of district supervisor, that is, from being an
administrator of a particular district office to a position performing a staff function,
to exercise administrative supervision over the school principals only when
specifically authorized by proper authorities. Petitioners insist that respondent
Education Secretary was focused on removing the level of management in the
district office, such that the IRR empower school heads (principals) to have
administrative and instructional supervision of school or cluster of schools, while
supervision of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools
and learning centers was given to the division office.
Petitioners further insist that respondent Education Secretary failed to
consider the fact that R.A. No. 9155 strengthened the district office as a mid-level

administrative field office of the DepEd. The law even mandates to allow the
district supervisor to have an office staff for program promotion in the district
office. Apart from the current administrative functions inherent in the district
office, DECS Service Manual 2000 vested additional specific functions to the
district offices, to provide professional and instructional advice and support to the
school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district,
as well as curricula supervision.

Petitioners posit that R.A. No. 9155 did not, in anyway, allow or authorize
the reorganization of the entire DepEd; it never reduced the position, rank,
classification, and salary grade level of district supervisors, nor abolished the
district offices which are responsible for the administration and management of
elementary schools within its jurisdiction. It did not remove from the district
supervisors the function of administrative supervision over schools within their
respective areas. In fact, petitioners insist, what the law did was to give the district
supervisor additional responsibility of providing professional and instructional
advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and
learning centers in the district or cluster thereof.

Petitioners point out that under Section 4.3, paragraph (b), Rule IV of the
IRR, the schools division superintendent was given the power to appoint the
division supervisors and schools district supervisor and other employees subject to
civil service laws, rules, and regulations, and the policies and guidelines to be
issued by the Secretary of Education for the purpose. On the other hand, the school

division superintendent shall have disciplinary authority only over the nonteaching personnel under his jurisdiction. Such exercise of disciplinary authority
by the schools division superintendent over the non-teaching personnel shall be
subject to civil service laws, rules, and regulations, and procedures and guidelines
to be issued by the Secretary of Education relative to this matter. The regional
director shall continue exercising disciplinary authority over the teaching personnel
in so far as the latter are covered by specific and exclusive disciplinary provisions
under the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers (R.A. 4670).

Petitioners posit that this grant of disciplining authority to the regional

director for teaching personnel who commit violations of laws, rules, and
regulations is definitely not provided for in R.A. No. 9155. The division
superintendent was given the power not only to hire and appoint the division
supervisors, district supervisors, school heads, or principals as well as employees
in the division, both teaching and non-teaching positions. However, when it comes
to disciplining officers and teaching personnel who commit infractions or
violations of law, rules, and regulations of the DepEd, the exercise of such
disciplining authority is lodged in the hands of the regional director. Petitioners
point out that the power to hire teachers is in the hands of the division
superintendent; principles of administrative rules and procedure provide that the
authority to hire and appoint carries with it the authority to discipline and fire the
hired and appointed personnel particularly if the law is silent thereon. Since the
division superintendent has the authority to hire teaching personnel within its
division, he/she should also take the responsibility of disciplining erring teachers
and employees. If the set-up of placing the power of hiring and power to discipline
or fire an errant personnel is separated or divided between two offices of the

DepEd, the proliferation of palakasan or bata-bata system will flourish, to the

detriment of the public education system and public service.

Petitioners also point out that under Section 7(E)(11) of R.A. No. 9155,
school heads are authorized to accept gifts, donations, bequests, and grants for the
purpose of upgrading teachers/learning facilitators competencies, improving and
expanding school facilities and providing instructional materials and equipment,
which, in turn, shall be reported to the appropriate district supervisors and division
superintendents. However, under Section 6.2(11), Rule VI of the IRR, on the
authority, accountability, and responsibility of school heads, district supervisors
were deleted as one of the administrative officers to whom such reporting is to be
made. Petitioners conclude that to the extent that the division superintendents are
not mandated to report donations and grants to district supervisors, the IRR is void.

On their plea for mandamus, petitioners pray that the Court compel the
DepEd and the DBM to upgrade their present salary grade. They claim that the
position of an ESP is already classified as SG 21, which is higher by two grades
than that of district supervisors, SG 19. Considering their higher position in the
departments pecking order, vis--vis that of the ESPs, petitioners opine that to
rectify the present grade-level distortion, their salary grade should be upgraded to
SG 24.22[22]

22[22] Id. at 50.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that a perusal of
Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155 shows that the district supervisor has limited
responsibilities, and that the power to exercise administrative supervision over the
ESPs is not covered by any of those responsibilities. The Education Secretary is the
disciplining authority in the DepEd, with the regional directors acting as the
disciplining authority in their respective regions.

As to petitioners gripe that the IRR deleted district supervisors from among
those school heads who should report when [a]ccepting donations, gifts, bequests,
and grants for the purpose of upgrading teachers/learning facilitators competencies,
improving and expanding school facilities, and providing instructional materials
and equipment, the OSG avers that this reportorial function is directory and merely
for convenience.

Anent petitioners grievance on their alleged stagnant salary grade level, the OSG
points out that the same is already provided for under FY 2003 GAA, [thus],
petitioners complaint against the non-increase of their SG level is already moot and
academic. The OSG also emphasizes that the upgrading of the ESPs salary grade
over the petitioners is not violative of petitioners right to equal protection of the
law, since district supervisors and ESPs are not similarly situated.

In reply, petitioners contend that the upgrading of the salary grade level of
district supervisors to SG 21 is an admission by the DepEd and by the DBM of the
validity of their demand to increase their salary grade to a respectable SG 24.

The petition is partially granted.

It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate

rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided
for in the legislative enactment.23[23] The implementing rules and regulations of a
law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal
a statute is vested in the legislature.24[24] It bears stressing, however, that
administrative bodies are allowed under their power of subordinate legislation to
implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details. All that
is required is that the regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the
law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms with the standards
prescribed by law.25[25] Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court accords great
respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only
because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations
entrusted to their jurisdiction.26[26] The rationale for this rule relates not only to
the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and
the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying
those needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience and growth of

23[23] Blaquera v. Alcala, G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, 112056, and 119597,
September 11, 1998, 295 SCRA 366, 436, citing Teoxon v. Member of the Board of
Administrators, 33 SCRA 585 (1970).
24[24] National Tobacco Administration v. Commission on Audit, 370 Phil. 793, 809
(1999).
25[25] Sigre v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 711, 719 (2002).
26[26] Santiago v. Deputy Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 78163, December 10, 1990,
192 SCRA 199, 206, citing Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, 166 SCRA 657 (1988).

specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a

particular statute.27[27]

We have reviewed the IRR and find that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1
and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The provisions merely reiterate and implement the
related provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has
the authority and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors
and district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and
non-teaching personnel, including school heads.28[28] A school head is a person
responsible for the administrative and instructional supervision of the schools or
cluster of schools.29[29] The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises
the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated
schools and learning centers.30[30]

Administrative supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an

officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails

27[27] Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86738, November 13,
1991, 203 SCRA 504, 511 citing Abejo v. De la Cruz, 149 SCRA 654 (1987).
28[28] Sec. 7(C)(3), R.A. No. 9155.
29[29] Sec. 4(M), R.A. No. 9155.
30[30] Sec. 7(C)(7), R.A. No. 9155.

or neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such action or steps as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties.31[31]

A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district supervisors
have no administrative supervision over the school heads; their responsibility is
limited to those enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit:

(1)
Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school
heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or
cluster thereof;

31[31] Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 230 Phil.

379, 385 (1986).

(2)
(3)
authorities.

Curricula supervision; and

Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper

As gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2191, the
district supervisors were divested of any administrative supervision over
elementary and public high schools. The Senate resolved to vest the same in the
division superintendents, and the Lower House concurred. Senator Rene Cayetano
proposed that the traditional function of the school supervisors of exercising
administrative supervision over the elementary and public high schools be
maintained. However, Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta, the Chairperson of the Senate
Committee on Education and the Sponsor of the Bill, objected to such proposal:

The President:
Why do we not say AND SHALL NOT BE INCLUDED?
Senator Cayetano:
Yes, better yet, Mr. President. I thank the Chair for that amendment.
The President:
All right. Can we approve that? The sponsor accepts the amendment, I
assume.
Senator Aquino-Oreta:
Yes, Mr. President.
The President:
Is there any objection from the floor? (Silence) There being none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Cayetano:
Thank you, Mr. President.

In line 17, it ends with the conjunction and. I would like to propose an
amendment by inserting a new paragraph (b). This is, of course, the duties
and responsibilities of schools district supervisors. It is to SUPERVISE
SCHOOL PRINCIPALS IN THE DISTRICT, because right now, this is
exactly their job.
Again, the reality is, there are efforts to minimize, if not remove, the principal
function of school supervisors, which is to supervise school principals in the
district. I just want it to be there to ensure that their primary functions remain
as such.
Therefore, what appears as paragraph (b) in line 18 will now be subparagraph
(c).
The President:
What does the sponsor say?
Senator Aquino-Oreta:
Mr. President, may I just explain. There are two school supervisors. One is
for the academic function and the other is for the administrative function. As
such, if these two supervisors will dictate to the principals, then our thrust in
reducing the level of bureaucracy might not be met. Also, the thrust of this
governance bill really is to flesh out the importance of the school as the heart
of education here. In that heart, we have the teacher, the student, and the
school head.
What we are trying to do here is to bring to the forefront the school itself. In
fact, right now, there is a move in the DECS to do away with the school
supervisor in charge of administrative and leave that function to the principal.
If the principal, the school head will be dictated upon by these two school
supervisors, we might not be able to achieve what we want to do here putting
to the forefront the school itself. Meaning, putting to the forefront the school
head, the teacher, and the student.
Senator Cayetano:
Mr. President, I would like to thank the sponsor for that enlightenment. That
is precisely my point.
Not too long ago, I was a speaker before the school supervisors all over the
land. One of the points that they complained about was, in most cases, their
job to supervise school principals is now being removed or have been
removed simply because and I may be inaccurate here the Japanese
government I know it is a foreign government that funded a study of the
organizational setup of the DECS has recommended the abolition of school
supervisors.

This is the reason this representation would like to ensure that the traditional
function of the school supervisors, among which is to supervise school
principals, remain as such. What is good for the Japanese education is not
necessarily good for the Philippines. This representation knows that this is
precisely one of the complaints of the school supervisors.
The lady sponsor admitted that, indeed, there is an effort to phase out the
school supervisors. That is precisely my point, Mr. President. I do not want
the school supervisors to be phased out simply because a foreign government
which funded the study of our education has suggested it.
The President:
What does the sponsor say?
Senator Aquino-Oreta:
Mr. President, actually, it is not Japanese. It is an ADB proposal to the DECS.
The DECS had a study made on how to improve the management order of the
DECS. That was one of the proposals. They gave three proposals. One of
them was to take out the school supervisors.
But precisely, Mr. President, we are not doing that, we are not taking them
out. What we are saying is for the school supervisor to focus on the
curriculum because in the administration of the affairs of the school, we are
saying that the principal knows best how to administer or how to run the
school better. And so, we are saying here that school supervisors will be there
contrary to the view of that ADB study. We will maintain them, but the focus
of the school supervisors will be on the curriculum of the schools.
Senator Cayetano:
Mr. President, again I thank the lady senator. But again let us look at who
supervisors of schools are. Supervisors of schools once upon a time were all
school principals. They rose from the ranks, that is why they are fully aware
of the administrative as well as the instructional capability of the principals
now who are under them. To remove their right to supervise, now it is the
ADB, I am correct, the lady senator is correct because as I said I was not sure
to remove this traditional function would really render the supervisors
practically without anything to do. That is why they are now being justified
that henceforth there will be no principals that will be promoted as school
supervisors because when the school supervisors reach the age of retirement
and retire, no principals shall be promoted to that level. But these school
supervisors now, Mr. President, were once upon a time in their professional
lives principals, and they know best how the schools should be run
administratively and instructionally. That is the reason for that, Mr. President.
The President:
What does the sponsor say?

Senator Cayetano:
So, may I ask the sponsor to accept this, Mr. President.
Senator Aquino-Oreta:
Mr. President, what was the amendment?
Senator Cayetano:
To insert a new paragraph, paragraph (b) in line 18, which states:
SUPERVISE SCHOOL PRINCIPALS IN THE DISTRICT.
The President:
May I suggest, THE SUPERVISION OF SCHOOL PRINCIPALS IN THE
DISTRICT, because
Senator Cayetano:
Yes, Mr. President.
The President:
the antecedent for that is, The schools district supervisor shall be responsible
for.
Senator Cayetano:
That is right, Mr. President. Supervision, yes.
The President:
What does the sponsor say?

Senator Aquino-Oreta:
Mr. President, may I have one minute?
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
Senator Tatad:
Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for one minute.
The President:
Is there any objection? (Silence) There being none, the session is suspended
for one minute.
It was 5:33 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 5:43 p.m., the session was resumed.
The President:
The session is resumed.
SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 2191
Senator Tatad:
Mr. President, we are still trying to find a way out of these conflicting points
of view on the role of the supervisor. To allow the parties to have a little more
time to work on this, I move that we suspend consideration of Senate Bill No.
2191. (Underscoring supplied)32[32]

When the session resumed, Senator Cayetano no longer pursued his

proposed amendment, and moved instead that the same be amended to read
Curricula Supervision. The Senate approved the proposal of the Senator:

The President:
The session is resumed. Senator Cayetano is recognized.
CAYETANO AMENDMENT
32[32] TSN, Special Session No. 6, May 29, 2001, pp. 448-450.

Senator Cayetano:
Thank you, Mr. President.
With the permission of the lady senator, after consulting her and the Majority
Leader, I would like to propose an amendment by rewording the original
amendment I was proposing last night. The reworded proposed amendment
would be like this: CURRICULA SUPERVISION.
The President:
That would be on what page?

Senator Cayetano:
That would be on page 10, line 17, as a new paragraph (b).
The President:
And how will it read?
Senator Cayetano:
CURRICULA SUPERVISION.
The President:
Just that?
Senator Cayetano:
Just that, Mr. President.
Senator Tatad:
Put a semicolon (;).
Senator Cayetano:
And because of that, line 18 which is paragraph (b), should now be paragraph
(c).
The President:
What does the sponsor say?
Senator Aquino-Oreta:
The amendment is accepted, Mr. President. (Underscoring supplied)33[33]

Thus, under R.A. No. 9155, administrative supervision over school heads is
not one of those responsibilities conferred on district supervisors.

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one

person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the
familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms,
is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction,
33[33] Id. at 452-453.

be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature
would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not
to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.34[34]

It is not surprising that Senator Aquino-Oreta maintained her position that district
supervisors should not have administrative control or even supervision over ESPs
and SSPs. As early as 1990, the DECS had adopted the policy that, effective
January 1, 1991, the positions of district supervisors and division supervisors
would be gradually phased out by not filling-up these positions as they become
vacant.35[35] On September 17, 1991, then DECS Secretary Isidro Cario issued
DECS Order No. 110, Series of 1991, declaring that, to foster better considerations
and articulation of progress in the elementary level, all elementary school
principals shall report directly to the school division superintendents. In his Order
dated June 22, 1994, then DECS Secretary Armand V. Fabella declared that DECS
Order No. 110 shall remain in effect, with the recommendation that, in order to
facilitate the phase-out of district supervisor positions, incumbent district
supervisors were encouraged to transfer to vacant division supervisor positions,
provided they meet the qualification standards for such positions. 36[36] For his
part, in his DECS Order No. 22, Series of 1996, DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria
restored the district supervisor positions but only on a selective basis and subject to
the following guidelines:
34[34] Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29,
2004.
35[35] Rollo, p. 93.
36[36] Id. at 94.

a)Schools superintendents, with the concurrence/approval of their

regional directors, may have the option to restore the position
in selected districts after a careful evaluation of need. For this
purpose, the number of schools and their geographical location
and distance for effective monitoring, the availability of
regular transportation, urban-rural setting, etc., should be
considered in the decision.
b) The role of the district supervisor as an instructional leader
and resource for teachers, rather than merely as an
administrative supervisor, should be emphasized in their
functions and duties.
c)

In the event of restoration and appointment of the position in a

particular district, the school superintendent shall ensure that
the system of field supervision previous to the issuance of
DECS Orders No. 110, s. 1991 and No. 41, s. 1994 shall,
likewise, be restored. Correspondingly, the designation of
coordinating principals in affected districts shall be
withdrawn.

d) Should a division office opt not to restore some or all district

supervisor positions, the funds for such positions may be used
to create new positions or upgrade existing positions, subject
to the approval of the Department of Budget and Management.
e)

Considering that a number of vacated district supervisor

positions in some divisions may have been converted to other
positions and/or otherwise phased out since 1991,
appointments of district supervisors shall be issued by regional
directors only upon verification from the Department of
Budget and Management that the said position may be filled.

It is enjoined that regional directors and schools superintendents shall

exert special effort to ensure that the implementation of this Order shall be
harmonious and conducive to field supervision.37[37]

37[37] Id. at 96-97.

Under DECS Order No. 36, Series of 1998 issued by DECS Secretary Erlinda C.
Pefianco, the positions of district supervisors were restored to their original status
as a supervisory level in the DECS administrative hierarchy subject to the
following guidelines:

1.1 The positions of Education and District Supervisors are hereby

restored to their original status as a supervisory level in the
DECS administrative hierarchy, subject to the following
guidelines:
1.1.1

The functions of a district supervisor as an

instructional leader and resource person for
teachers should be emphasized.

In the event of restoration and appointment of public schools district

supervisor, the designation of the coordinating principal shall be withdrawn.
Appointment of district supervisors shall be issued by regional directors
only upon verification from the Department of Budget and Management that the
positions still exist since a number of vacated district supervisor positions in some
divisions may have been converted to other positions and/or otherwise phased out
since 1991.38[38]

However, as already stated, the Senate resolved to maintain the positions of district
supervisors but limited their responsibilities only to those enumerated in Section
7(D) of R.A. No. 9155 to conform to the basic thrust and objectives of the law. Far
from strengthening the office of the district supervisors as a mid-head field office
of the DepEd, the law limited the authority and responsibility attached to such
position.

38[38] Id. at 98.

While it is true that the district supervisor is given a support staff for
program promotion, it cannot thereby be implied that he/she likewise has
administrative supervision over ESPs and SSPs. Such a construction has no basis
in law and in fact. Indeed, such a construction of the statute defeats the very
purpose of the law.

It is a basic precept that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor
in the interpretation of the statute. The particular words, clauses, and phrases
should not be studied as detached and isolated expression, but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and
in order to produce a harmonious whole.39[39]

Besides, Congress enumerated the duties and responsibilities of a district

supervisor. Congress would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it
had the intention not to restrict or limit its meaning and confine its terms only to
those expressly enumerated. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge
the scope of a statute and include situations not provided nor intended by
Congress.40[40]

39[39] National Tobacco Administration v. Commission on Audit, supra note 24, at

808 (1999).
40[40] Canet v. Decena, G.R. No. 155344, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 388, 394.

The submission of the OSG, that the schools district supervisors have the
administrative supervision over school heads, is more in accord with the law, to
wit:

Section 7 of RA 9155, on School District Level, pertinently provides that

a school district shall have a school district supervisor and an office staff for
program promotion, and that the schools district supervisor shall be responsible
for: (1) (p)roviding professional and instructional advice and support to the
school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the
district [or] cluster thereof; (2) (c)urricula supervision; and, (3) (p)erforming
such other functions as may be assigned by the proper authorities.
A perusal of Section 7 shows that the District Supervisor has limited
responsibilities, and that the power to exercise administrative supervision over the
ESPs is not covered by responsibility nos. 1 and 2. Neither is that power covered
by the directive that the District Supervisor shall have an office staff for program
promotion. The only logical conclusion, therefore, that can be derived from the
aforesaid enumeration of responsibilities is that the District Supervisor may only
exercise administrative supervision over ESPs when such function is assigned by
proper authorities. And, since the DepEd Secretary specifically declared through
the IRR of RA 9155, that the District Supervisor shall not exercise administrative
supervision over the ESPs, unless otherwise authorized, petitioners cannot
complain against the said declaration. On this score, it is settled that the intent of
the statute is the law (Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President, 252
SCRA 5 [1996]). In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage
meaning (Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430 [1996]).
Needless to say, Section 7, on Division Level, further provides that the
School Division Superintendent shall have authority, accountability and
responsibility for, among others, (s)upervising the operation of all public and
private elementary, secondary and integrated schools, and learning centers. To
claim, therefore, that the District Supervisor has administrative supervision over
the ESPs would also violate the above-quoted provision.41[41]

41[41] Rollo, pp. 136-138.

The Court likewise declares that the last paragraph of Section 4.3 of the IRR,
stating that the regional director shall continue exercising disciplinary authority
over the teaching personnel insofar as the latter are covered by specific and
exclusive disciplinary provisions under R.A. No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers) does not contravene R.A. No. 9155. Indeed, the IRR merely
reiterates the DECS Rules of Procedure, DECS Order No. 33, issued on March 30,
1999 by the DepEd Secretary, and R.A. No. 4670 which was approved on June 18,
1966, and pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code, which provides that the DepEd Secretary is empowered to

a.

Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department

objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs, and projects; and

b.

Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient

administration of the offices under the Secretary and for execution of the laws
relative thereto.

Additionally, the IRR was issued by the DepEd Secretary pursuant to

Section 7(A)(1) of R.A. No. 9155, which mandates that the Secretary formulate
national educational policies and enhance the employment status, professional
competence, welfare, and working conditions of all the DepEd personnel.42[42]

We agree that R.A. No. 9155 does not provide who has disciplinary authority over
the teaching personnel of the DepEd. However, under Section 3, Chapter III of
DECS Order No. 33, Series of 1999, otherwise known as the 1999 DECS Rules of
42[42] Section 7(A)(7), R.A. No. 9155.

Procedure, the disciplining authority in the DECS is the DepEd Secretary, with the
regional directors acting as such in their respective regions except those appointed
by the President.43[43]

The officers and employees referred to in the Rules of Procedure include teachers
who, under R.A. No. 4670, shall mean:

x x x all persons engaged in classroom teaching, in any level of

instruction, on full-time basis, including guidance counselors, school librarians,
industrial arts, or vocational instructors, and all other persons performing
supervisory and/or administrative functions in all schools, colleges and
universities operated by the Government or its political subdivisions; but shall not
include school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other school
employees.

A division superintendent of schools is not a disciplining authority over

teachers, whether under R.A. No. 4670 or under the DECS Rules of Procedure. In
fact, under Section 2, Chapter VII of such Rules of Procedure, a division
superintendent is a chairperson of the investigating committee over formal
complaints filed against such teachers:
43[43] Section 3. Disciplining Authority. The Disciplining Authority in the DECS shall be
the Secretary. Regional Directors shall also act as the Disciplining Authority in their
respective regions.The President is the disciplining authority for presidential appointees. The
Secretary is duly authorized to discipline Presidential appointees subject to the Presidents
confirmation.

a)

When the respondent is an elementary or secondary school teacher, head

teacher, principal, district supervisor/chair/coordinator or Education
Supervisor I
(1) The schools division superintendent or his or her duly authorized
representative, as chairperson;
(2) The duly authorized representative of the school, district, or division
teachers organization, as member; and
(3) The division supervisor for elementary or secondary education
where the respondent belongs, as member.

The foregoing rule is based on Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 which reads:

Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher

shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School
Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should, at
least, have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teachers organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its
findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty
days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the
school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of
the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

Anent the issue on reporting of acceptance of donations, Section 7(E)(11) of

R.A. No. 9155 provides:

(11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants for the purpose of
upgrading teachers/learning facilitators competencies, improving and expanding

school facilities, and providing instructional materials and equipment. Such

donations or grants must be reported to the appropriate district supervisors
and division superintendents. (emphasis supplied)

However, Section 6.2(11), Rule VI of the IRR provides that:

(11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants in accordance with

existing laws and policy of the Department for the purpose of upgrading
teachers/learning facilitators competencies, improving and expanding school
facilities, and providing instructional materials and equipment. Such donations
or grants must be reported to the division superintendents. (emphasis
supplied)

We agree with petitioners contention that, under the law, donations and
grants must be reported to the appropriate district supervisors and not only to the
division superintendents. The use in the law of the word must is an expression of
the mandatory nature of the reporting of donations and grants to district
supervisors. The reason for the provision is that such grants and donations which
are intended to upgrade teachings/learning facilitators competencies, improve and
expand school facilities, and provide instructional materials and equipment will
assist the school district supervisors in the performance of their duties and
responsibilities under Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, and submit appropriate
recommendations to the proper administrative officers.

On petitioners plaint of the failure of respondents to upgrade their salary

grade level to at most SG 21, and for the issuance of the writ of mandamus
mandating respondents to increase their salary grade from SG 19 to 24, the same is
premature.

There is no showing in the petition that, before filing their petition,

petitioners sought an adjustment of level of their salary grade from SG 19 to SG 21
before respondents or the Civil Service Commission. Section 17 of Presidential
Decree No. 985, as amended by Section 14 of R.A. No. 6758, otherwise known as
the Salary Standardization Law, provides:

Sec. 17. Powers and Functions. The Budget Commission (now

Department of Budget and Management), principally through the OCPC (now
CPCB, Compensation and Position Classification Board) shall, in addition to
those provided under other Sections of this Decree, have the following powers
and functions:
a.
Administer the compensation and position classification system
established herein and revise it as necessary;
xxxx
f.
Certify classification actions and changes in class or grade of
positions whenever the facts warrant, such certification to be binding on
administrative, certifying, payroll, disbursing, accounting and auditing officers of
the national government and government-owned or controlled corporations and
financial institutions.

Sections 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9155 provide:

SEC. 10. The Secretary of Education and the Secretary of Budget and
Management shall, within ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act, jointly
promulgate the guidelines on the allocation, distribution, and utilization of
resources provided by the national government for the field offices, taking into
consideration the uniqueness of the working conditions of the teaching service.
The Secretary of the Department of Education shall ensure that resources
appropriated for the field offices are adequate and that resources for school
personnel, school desks, and textbooks and other instructional materials intended
are allocated directly and released immediately by the Department of Budget and
Management to said offices.
SEC. 11. The Secretary of the Department of Education, subject to civil
service laws and regulations, shall issue appropriate personnel policy rules and
regulations that will best meet the requirements of the teaching profession
taking into consideration the uniqueness of the working conditions of the
teaching service.

And insofar as the salary system for teaching positions is concerned, Section
14 provides:

SEC. 14. The Salary System for Teaching Position. The salary grade of a
teacher shall be determined in accordance with the following:

a. The Teachers Preparation Pay Schedule shall be prepared by the

Commission in consultation with the Department of Education and Culture.
Under this system, the teacher's academic or educational preparation, teaching
experience in both private and public schools, and extra-curricular activities for
professional growth, shall be considered in pursuance of the principle of 'equal
pay for equal training and experience.'

xxxx
d. The Budget Commission, in coordination and consultation with the
Department of Education and Culture and the Civil Service Commission may,
when future needs require, modify, change or otherwise improve on the salary
system herein established for the teaching and closely related occupations, any
change that may be made as provided herein shall become part of the
implementing rules of this Decree to be issued by the Budget Commission upon
prior approval by the President.

Moreover, the issue of whether or not respondents should be compelled to

adjust upwards the salary grade of petitioners to SG 21 has become moot and
academic, because, on November 3, 2003, the DepEd and the DBM issued Joint
Circular No. 1, Series of 2003 containing the guidelines in the implementation of
the Salary Upgrading for District and Education Supervisors, to wit:

4.0 GUIDELINES
4.1 To maintain the previous salary grade relationships under RA No.
6758 among the PSDS and ES I, on the one hand, and Elementary
School Principal (ESP) IV and Secondary School Principal (SSP) II,
on the other hand, and to preserve the consistency in the salary grade
relationships of said positions, the following are hereby authorized:
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4

Upgrading of the PSDS and ES I positions from SG-19 to

SG-20 in July 2003 and to SG-21 in July 2004;
Upgrading of the ES II positions by two (2) salary grades
from SG-20 to SG-21 in July 2003 and to SG-22 in July
2004;
A one-step salary adjustment to incumbents of ES III
positions starting July 2003 and another one-step salary
adjustment starting July 2004;
A one-step salary adjustment to incumbents of CES positions
starting July 2003 and another one-step salary adjustment
starting July 2004.

4.2 Attached herewith is Annex A containing the summary of the

guidelines for the salary upgrading of positions authorized herein.
5.0 SALARY RULES
5.1 For purposes of the salary upgrading herein authorized, the basic
salary of the employee concerned shall be adjusted as follows:
5.1.1

5.1.2

Effective July 1, 2003 at the same salary step of his assigned

salary grade as of June 30, 2003 (Illustrative Example A)
adopting the Salary Schedule prescribed under National
Budget Circular (NBC) No. 474 (Annex B);
Effective July 1, 2004 at the same salary step of his assigned
salary grade as of June 30, 2004 (Illustrative Example A)
adopting the Salary Schedule prescribed under National
Budget Circular (NBC) No. 474 (Annex B).

5.2 The transition allowance as defined in 3.2 being received by the

PSDS and ES, if any, shall be considered as advance entitlement of
the salary increase herein authorized. (Illustrative Examples B and
C)
5.3 No step adjustment shall be granted to incumbents of positions
whose salary already falls at or exceeds the maximum step (eighth
step) of the salary grade allocation of their positions. (Illustrative
Example D)
5.4 The herein salary increases shall be effected through the issuance of
a Notice of Salary Adjustment (NOSA) by the duly authorized
official. (Annex C)
6.0 FUNDING SOURCE
The amounts necessary to implement the salary adjustments authorized
herein shall be charged against the Nationwide lump sum appropriation
for the purpose amounting to fifty million pesos (P50,000,000) in the
DepEds budget in RA 9206, the CY 2003 General Appropriations Act.
For CY 2004, the same shall be charged against the lump sum
appropriation for the purpose that may be included in the 2004 budget.
7.0 POST-AUDIT
Any salary adjustment paid under this Circular shall be subject to postaudit by the DBM ROs concerned. Any payments thereof which are not
in accordance herewith shall be adjusted accordingly.

8.0 CONTRIBUTIONS
The salary adjustments authorized herein are subject to the mandatory
requirements for life and retirement premiums, and health insurance
premiums.
9.0 SAVING CLAUSE
Conflicts arising from the implementation of the provisions of this
Circular shall be resolved by the Department of Education, upon prior
consultation with the Department of Budget and Management.
10.0 EFFECTIVITY
This Circular Letter shall take effect on July 1, 2003.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition for prohibition is

PARTIALLY GRANTED. Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2003 is declared valid,
except Section 6.2(11), Rule VI thereof which provides that donations or grants
shall be reported only to the division superintendents. Such donations or grants
must also be reported to the appropriate school district supervisors, as mandated by
Republic Act No. 9155. Petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice

On leave

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

Today is Wednesday, March 02, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176162

October 9, 2012

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 178845
ATTY. HONESTO L. CUEVA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the December
29, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 95293, entitled "Dr. Dante G. Guevarra and Atty.
Augustus Cezar v. Civil Service Commission and Atty. Honesto L. Cueva."

The Facts
Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar) were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the
Vice President for Administration, respectively, of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP)2 in 2005.
On September 27, 2005, petitioner Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case
against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, being notoriously undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713.3 Cueva charged Guevarra with falsification of a public document, specifically the Application for Bond of
Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter denied the existence of his
pending criminal and administrative cases. As the head of the school, Guevarra was required to be bonded in order to be able
to engage in financial transactions on behalf of PUP.4 In his Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees
of the Republic of the Philippines (General Form No. 58-A), he answered Question No. 11 in this wise:
11. Do you have any criminal or administrative records? NO. If so, state briefly the nature thereof NO.5
This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had 17 pending cases for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan.6 Cezar, knowing fully well that both he and Guevarra
had existing cases before the Sandiganbayan, endorsed and recommended the approval of the application.7
The respondents explained that they believed "criminal or administrative records" to mean final conviction in a criminal or
administrative case.8 Thus, because their cases had not yet been decided by the Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra
responded to Question No. 11 in General Form No. 58-A correctly and in good faith.9
On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued Resolution No. 06052110 formally charging Guevarra with
Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service after a prima facie finding that they had
committed acts punishable under the Civil Service Law and Rules.
Subsequently, the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case11
praying that the case be suspended immediately and that the CSC declare a complete absence of a prima facie case against
them. Cueva, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Preventive Suspension12 and an
Omnibus Motion13 seeking the issuance of an order of preventive suspension against Guevarra and Cezar and the inclusion
of the following offenses in the formal charge against them: Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Official Document, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Being Notoriously Undesirable, and Violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713.
In Resolution No. 061141, dated June 30, 2006,14 the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents for
being a non-responsive pleading, akin to a motion to dismiss, which was a prohibited pleading under Section 16 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Commission.15 It also denied Cuevas motion to include
additional charges against the respondents. The CSC, however, placed Guevarra under preventive suspension for ninety (90)
days, believing it to be necessary because, as the officer-in-charge of PUP, he was in a position to unduly influence possible
witnesses against him.
Aggrieved, Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA essentially questioning the
jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative complaint filed against them by Cueva. On December 29, 2006, the CA
rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullifying and setting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having

been rendered without jurisdiction. According to the CA, Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), the second paragraph of which states that heads of agencies and
instrumentalities "shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction," bestows upon the Board of Regents the jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against respondents Guevarra and Cezar. In addition, the CA noted that the CSC erred in
recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out that the latter should have exhausted all administrative remedies by
first bringing his grievances to the attention of the PUP Board of Regents.
Hence, these petitions.
THE ISSUE
In G.R. No. 176162, petitioner CSC raises the sole issue of:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases falling
under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies.
The same issue is among those raised by petitioner Cueva in G.R. No. 178845.
The Court agrees that the only question which must be addressed in this case is whether the CSC has jurisdiction over
administrative cases filed directly with it against officials of a chartered state university.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
Both CSC and Cueva contend that because the CSC is the central personnel agency of the government, it has been expressly
granted by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 the authority to assume original jurisdiction over complaints directly filed with
it. The CSC explains that under the said law, it has appellate jurisdiction over all administrative disciplinary proceedings and
original jurisdiction over complaints against government officials and employees filed before it by private citizens.16
Accordingly, the CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction, together with the PUP Board of Regents, over the administrative
case against Guevarra and Cezar and it can take cognizance of a case filed directly with it, despite the fact that the Board of
Regents is the disciplining authority of university employees.
Respondents Guevarra and Cezar, on the other hand, fully adopted the position of the CA in its questioned decision and
propounded the additional argument that the passage of R.A. No. 8292 has effectively removed from the CSC the authority
to hear and decide on cases filed directly with it.
CSC has jurisdiction over cases
filed directly with it, regardless of
who initiated the complaint
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and
employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal.17 Section 2(1),

Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution defines the scope of the civil service:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341,18 PUP became a chartered state university, thereby making it a
government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are
subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292.19
The parties in these cases do not deny that Guevarra and Cezar are government employees and part of the Civil Service. The
controversy, however, stems from the interpretation of the disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC as specified in Section 47,
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292:
SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with
the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case
or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the
investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to
be taken.
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the
same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
Secretary concerned. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
While in its assailed decision, the CA conceded that paragraph one of the same provision abovequoted allows the filing of a
complaint directly with the CSC, it makes a distinction between a complaint filed by a private citizen and that of an
employee under the jurisdiction of the disciplining authority involved. The CA resolved that because Cueva was then the
Dean of the College of Law and the Chief Legal Counsel of PUP when he filed the complaint with the CSC, he was under
the authority of the PUP Board of Regents. Thus, it is the Board of Regents which had exclusive jurisdiction over the
administrative case he initiated against Guevarra and Cezar.
The Court finds itself unable to sustain the reading of the CA.
The issue is not novel.
The understanding by the CA of Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 which states that "a
complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee" is that
the CSC can only take cognizance of a case filed directly before it if the complaint was made by a private citizen.
The Court is not unaware of the use of the words "private citizen" in the subject provision and the plain meaning rule of

statutory construction which requires that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it
says. The Court, however, finds that a simplistic interpretation is not in keeping with the intention of the statute and
prevailing jurisprudence. It is a well-established rule that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation so as not to defeat
the very purpose for which they were passed. As such, "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd results."20 In Secretary of Justice v. Koruga,21 the Court emphasized this principle and cautioned us on the
overzealous application of the plain meaning rule:
The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary,
they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. However, a literal interpretation of a statute is to be
rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole.
After all, statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to absurd or
unreasonable consequences.22
A literal interpretation of E.O. 292 would mean that only private citizens can file a complaint directly with the CSC. For
administrative cases instituted by government employees against their fellow public servants, the CSC would only have
appellate jurisdiction over those. Such a plain reading of the subject provision of E.O. 202 would effectively divest CSC of
its original jurisdiction, albeit shared, provided by law. Moreover, it is clearly unreasonable as it would be tantamount to
disenfranchising government employees by removing from them an alternative course of action against erring public
officials.
There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by a private citizen and one filed by a member of the
civil service, especially in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the same E.O. No. 292 which
confers upon the CSC the power to "hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal" without any qualification.
In the case of Camacho v. Gloria,23 the Court stated that "under E.O. No. 292, a complaint against a state university official
may be filed with either the universitys Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission."24 It is important
to note that the Court did not interpret the Administrative Code as limiting such authority to exclude complaints filed
directly with it by a member of the civil service.
Moreover, as early as in the case of Hilario v. Civil Service Commission,25 the Court interpreted Section 47, Chapter 7,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 as allowing the direct filing with the CSC by a public official of a complaint
against a fellow government employee. In the said case, Quezon City Vice-Mayor Charito Planas directly filed with the CSC
a complaint for usurpation, grave misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, gross insubordination, and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service against the City Legal Officer of Quezon City. The CSC issued a resolution ruling that the
respondent official should not be allowed to continue holding the position of legal officer. In a petition to the Supreme
Court, the official in question asserted that the City Mayor was the only one who could remove him from office directly and
not the CSC. The Court upheld the decision of the CSC, citing the same provision of the Administrative Code:
Although respondent Planas is a public official, there is nothing under the law to prevent her from filing a complaint directly
with the CSC against petitioner. Thus, when the CSC determined that petitioner was no longer entitled to hold the position
of City Legal Officer, it was acting within its authority under the Administrative Code to hear and decide complaints filed
before it.26 [Underscoring supplied]

It has been argued that Hilario is not squarely in point.27 While it is true that the circumstances present in the two cases are
not identical, a careful reading of Hilario reveals that petitioner therein questioned the authority of the CSC to hear the
disciplinary case filed against him, alleging that the CSCs jurisdiction was only appellate in nature. Hence, the reference to
the abovequoted passage in Hilario is very appropriate in this case as respondents herein pose a similar query before us.
It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the complainant is immaterial to the acquisition of jurisdiction over an
administrative case by the CSC. The law is quite clear that the CSC may hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases
brought directly before it or it may deputize any department or agency to conduct an investigation.
CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction
with the Board of Regents over
administrative cases
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service28 (the Uniform Rules) explicitly allows the CSC to hear and
decide administrative cases directly brought before it:
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and shall
review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to
pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters
relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
The CA construed the phrase "the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal,
separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service" to mean that the CSC could only step in after
the relevant disciplinary authority, in this case the Board of Regents of PUP, had investigated and decided on the charges
against the respondents. Regrettably, the CA failed to take into consideration the succeeding section of the same rules which
undeniably granted original concurrent jurisdiction to the CSC and belied its suggestion that the CSC could only take
cognizance of cases on appeal:
Section 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, over their respective officers and
employees.29 [Emphasis supplied]
It was also argued that although Section 4 of the Uniform Rules is silent as to who can file a complaint directly with the
CSC, it cannot be construed to authorize one who is not a private citizen to file a complaint directly with the CSC. This is
because a rule issued by a government agency pursuant to its law-making power cannot modify, reduce or enlarge the scope
of the law which it seeks to implement.30
Following the earlier disquisition, it can be said that the Uniform Rules does not contradict the Administrative Code. Rather,
the former simply provides a reasonable interpretation of the latter. Such action is perfectly within the authority of the CSC,
pursuant to Section 12(2), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292, which gives it the power to "prescribe,
amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent
laws."

Another view has been propounded that the original jurisdiction of the CSC has been further limited by Section 5 of the
Uniform Rules, such that the CSC can only take cognizance of complaints filed directly with it which: (1) are brought
against personnel of the CSC central office, (2) are against third level officials who are not presidential appointees, (3) are
against officials and employees, but are not acted upon by the agencies themselves, or (4) otherwise require direct or
immediate action in the interest of justice:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. The Civil Service Commission Proper shall have
jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of the Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review;
2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities, imposing penalties exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days salary brought before it on appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission Proper personnel;
4. Complaints against third level officials who are not presidential appointees;
5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees which are not acted upon by the agencies
and such other complaints requiring direct or immediate action, in the interest of justice;
6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by Civil Service Regional Offices;
7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and
8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in connection with the foregoing
enumerations.
It is the Courts position that the Uniform Rules did not supplant the law which provided the CSC with original jurisdiction.
While the Uniform Rules may have so provided, the Court invites attention to the cases of Civil Service Commission v.
Alfonso31 and Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,32 to be further discussed in the course of this decision, both of which
buttressed the pronouncement that the Board of Regents shares its authority to discipline erring school officials and
employees with the CSC. It can be presumed that, at the time of their promulgation, the members of this Court, in Alfonso
and Sojor, were fully aware of all the existing laws and applicable rules and regulations pertaining to the jurisdiction of the
CSC, including the Uniform Rules. In fact, Sojor specifically cited the Uniform Rules in support of its ruling allowing the
CSC to take cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against the president of a state university. As the
Court, in the two cases, did not consider Section 5 of the Uniform Rules as a limitation to the original concurrent jurisdiction
of the CSC, it can be stated that Section 5 is merely implementary. It is merely directory and not restrictive of the CSCs
powers. The CSC itself is of this view as it has vigorously asserted its jurisdiction over this case through this petition.
The case of Alfonso33 is on all fours with the case at bench. The case involved a complaint filed before the CSC against a
PUP employee by two employees of the same university. The CA was then faced with the identical issue of whether it was

the CSC or the PUP Board of Regents which had jurisdiction over the administrative case filed against the said PUP
employee. The CA similarly ruled that the CSC could take cognizance of an administrative case if the decisions of
secretaries or heads of agencies, instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities were appealed to it or if a private
citizen directly filed with the CSC a complaint against a government official or employee. Because the complainants in the
said case were PUP employees and not private citizens, the CA held that the CSC had no jurisdiction to hear the
administrative case. It further posited that even assuming the CSC had the authority to do so, immediate resort to the CSC
violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the complaint should have been first lodged with the PUP
Board of Regents to allow them the opportunity to decide on the matter. This Court, however, reversed the said decision and
declared the following:
xxx. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies
and instrumentalities. However, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to
hear and decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a department or an
agency to conduct the investigation. x x x
xxx

xxx

xxx

We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinary committees and governing bodies in
different branches, subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the government to hear and decide administrative
complaints against their respective officers and employees. Be that as it may, we cannot interpret the creation of such bodies
nor the passage of laws such as R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing for the creation of such disciplinary bodies as having
divested the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline government employees, including those in the academe.
To hold otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established, i.e. to instill professionalism,
integrity, and accountability in our civil service, but would also impliedly amend the Constitution itself.
xxx

xxx

xxx

But it is not only for this reason that Alfonsos argument must fail. Equally significant is the fact that he had already
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit and his motion for reconsideration and
requested for a change of venue, not from the CSC to the BOR of PUP, but from the CSC-Central Office to the CSC-NCR. It
was only when his motion was denied that he suddenly had a change of heart and raised the question of proper jurisdiction.
This cannot be allowed because it would violate the doctrine of res judicata, a legal principle that is applicable to
administrative cases as well. At the very least, respondents active participation in the proceedings by seeking affirmative
relief before the CSC already bars him from impugning the Commissions authority under the principle of estoppel by
laches.
In this case, the complaint-affidavits were filed by two PUP employees. These complaints were not lodged before the
disciplinary tribunal of PUP, but were instead filed before the CSC, with averments detailing respondents alleged violation
of civil service laws, rules and regulations. After a fact-finding investigation, the Commission found that a prima facie case
existed against Alfonso, prompting the Commission to file a formal charge against the latter. Verily, since the complaints
were filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSCs exercise of
jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. To repeat, it may, however, choose
to deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials such as the BOR of PUP to conduct the investigation,
or to delegate the investigation to the proper regional office. But the same is merely permissive and not mandatory upon the

Commission.34 [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

It has been opined that Alfonso does not apply to the case at bar because respondent therein submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit before it, thereby preventing him from later questioning the
jurisdiction of the CSC. Such circumstance is said to be totally absent in this case.35
The records speak otherwise. As in Alfonso, respondents herein submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the CSC when
they filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit.36 It was only when their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence
of Prima Facie Case37 was denied by the CSC that they thought to put in issue the jurisdiction of the CSC before the CA,
clearly a desperate attempt to evade prosecution by the CSC. As in Alfonso, respondents are also estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the CSC.
Based on all of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the CSC may take cognizance of an administrative case
filed directly with it against an official or employee of a chartered state college or university. This is regardless of whether
the complainant is a private citizen or a member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction is shared with the Board of
Regents of the school.
Gaoiran not applicable
In its decision, the CA relied heavily on Gaoiran v. Alcala38 to support its judgment that it is the Board of Regents, and not
the CSC, which has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint filed against the respondents.
A thorough study of the said case, however, reveals that it is irrelevant to the issues discussed in the case at bench. Gaoiran
speaks of a complaint filed against a high school teacher of a state-supervised school by another employee of the same
school. The complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the Commission on Higher Education (LAS-CHED).
After a fact-finding investigation established the existence of a prima facie case against the teacher, the Officer-in-Charge of
the Office of the Director of LAS-CHED issued a formal charge for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, together with the Order of Preventive Suspension. The newly-appointed Director of LAS-CHED,
however, dismissed the administrative complaint on the ground that the letter-complaint was not made under oath. Unaware
of this previous resolution, the Chairman of the CHED issued another resolution finding petitioner therein guilty of the
charges against him and dismissing him from the service. The trial court upheld the resolution of the director of LAS-CHED
but on appeal, this was reversed by the CA, affirming the decision of the CHED chairman removing petitioner from service.
One of the issues raised therein before this Court was whether the CA erred in disregarding the fact that the complaint was
not made under oath as required by the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292.
In the said case, the Court concurred with the findings of the CA that it was the formal charge issued by the LAS-CHED
which constituted the complaint, and because the same was initiated by the appropriate disciplining authority, it need not be
subscribed and sworn to and CHED acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Court further affirmed the authority of the heads
of agencies to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against their officers and employees. It bears
stressing, at this point, that there is nothing in the case that remotely implies that this Court meant to place upon the Board of
Regent exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases filed against their employees.
In fact, following the ruling in Gaoiran, it can be argued that it was CSC Resolution No. 060521 which formally charged
respondents that constituted the complaint, and since the complaint was initiated by the CSC itself as the disciplining
authority, the CSC properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

R.A. No. 8292 is not in conflict

with E.O. No. 292.
In addition, the respondents argue that R.A. No. 8292, which granted to the board of regents or board of trustees disciplinary
authority over school employees and officials of chartered state colleges and universities, should prevail over the provisions
of E.O. No. 292.39 They anchor their assertion that the Board of Regents has exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases
on Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292,40 to wit:
Section 4. Powers and duties of Governing Boards. The governing board shall have the following specific powers and
duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors
of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines;
xxxx
(h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees subject to the provisions of the
revised compensation and classification system and other pertinent budget and compensation laws governing hours of
service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its discretion, leaves of absence under
such regulations as it may promulgate, any provisions of existing law to the contrary not with standing; and to remove them
for cause in accordance with the requirements of due process of law. [Emphasis supplied]
The respondents are mistaken.
Basic is the principle in statutory construction that interpreting and harmonizing laws is the best method of interpretation in
order to form a uniform, complete, coherent, and intelligible system of jurisprudence, in accordance with the legal maxim
interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus.41 Simply because a later statute relates to a similar
subject matter as that of an earlier statute does not result in an implied repeal of the latter.42
A perusal of the abovequoted provision clearly reveals that the same does not indicate any intention to remove employees
and officials of state universities and colleges from the ambit of the CSC. What it merely states is that the governing board
of a school has the authority to discipline and remove faculty members and administrative officials and employees for cause.
It neither supersedes nor conflicts with E.O. No. 292 which allows the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases filed
directly with it or on appeal.
In addition to the previously cited case of Alfonso, the case of The Civil Service Commission v. Sojor43 is likewise
instructive. In the said case, this Court ruled that the CSC validly took cognizance of the administrative complaints directly
filed with it concerning violations of civil service rules committed by a university president. This Court acknowledged that
the board of regents of a state university has the sole power of administration over a university, in accordance with its
charter and R.A. No. 8292. With regard to the disciplining and removal of its employees and officials, however, such
authority is not exclusive to it because all members of the civil service fall under the jurisdiction of the CSC:
Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this power is not exclusive in the
matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials. Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power
under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the
law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be
presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same

jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career
civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC.
Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.44 [Emphases and underscoring
supplied]
It has been pointed out that the case of Sojor is not applicable to the case at bar because the distinction between a complaint
filed by a private citizen and one filed by a government employee was not taken into consideration in the said case.45 The
dissent fails to consider that Sojor is cited in the ponencia to support the ruling that R.A. No. 8292 is not in conflict with
E.O. No. 292 and to counter respondents flawed argument that the passage of R.A. No. 8292 granted the Board of Regents
exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases against school employees and officials of chartered state colleges and
universities. Also noteworthy is the fact that the complainants before the CSC in Sojor were faculty members of a state
university and were, thus, government employees. Nevertheless, despite this, the Court allowed the CSC to assert
jurisdiction over the administrative case, proclaiming that the power of the Board of Regents to discipline its officials and
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with the CSC.46
The case of University of the Philippines v. Regino47 was also cited to bolster the claim that original jurisdiction over
disciplinary cases against government officials is vested upon the department secretaries and heads of agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities, whereas the CSC only enjoys appellate jurisdiction over such cases.48
The interpretation therein of the Administrative Code supposedly renders effectual the provisions of R.A. No. 8292 and does
not "deprive the governing body of the power to discipline its own officials and employees and render inutile the legal
provisions on disciplinary measures which may be taken by it."49
The Court respectfully disagrees. Regino is obviously inapplicable to this case because there, the school employee had
already been found guilty and dismissed by the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines. Therefore, the issue
put forth before this Court was whether the CSC had appellate jurisdiction over cases against university employees,
considering the university charter which gives it academic freedom allegedly encompassing institutional autonomy. In
contrast, no administrative case was filed before the Board of Regents of PUP because the case was filed directly with the
CSC and so, the question here is whether the CSC has original concurrent jurisdiction over disciplinary cases. Rationally,
the quoted portions in Regino find no application to the case at bench because those statements were made to uphold the
CSCs appellate jurisdiction which was being contested by petitioner therein. At the risk of being repetitive, it is hereby
stressed that the authority of the CSC to hear cases on appeal has already been established in this case. What is in question
here is its original jurisdiction over administrative cases.
A different interpretation of the Administrative Code was suggested in order to harmonize the provisions of R.A. No. 8292
and E.O. 292. By allowing only a private citizen to file a complaint directly with the CSC, the CSC maintains its power to
review on appeal decisions of the Board of Regents while at the same time the governing board is not deprived of its power
to discipline its officials and employees.50
To begin with, there is no incongruity between R.A. No. 8292 and E.O. No. 292, as previously explained in Sojor. Moreover,
the Court fails to see how a complaint filed by a private citizen is any different from one filed by a government employee. If
the grant to the CSC of concurrent original jurisdiction over administrative cases filed by private citizens against public
officials would not deprive the governing bodies of the power to discipline their own officials and employees and would not

be violative of R.A. No. 8292, it is inconceivable that a similar case filed by a government employee would do so. Such a
distinction between cases filed by private citizens and those by civil servants is simply illogical and unreasonable. To accede
to such a mistaken interpretation of the Administrative Code would be a great disservice to our developing
jurisprudence.1wphi1
It is therefore apparent that despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8292 giving the board of regents or board of trustees of a state
school the authority to discipline its employees, the CSC still retains jurisdiction over the school and its employees and has
concurrent original jurisdiction, together with the board of regents of a state university, over administrative cases against
state university officials and employees.
Finally, with regard to the concern that the CSC may be overwhelmed by the increase in number of cases filed before it
which would result from our ruling,51 it behooves us to allay such worries by highlighting two important facts. Firstly, it
should be emphasized that the CSC has original concurrent jurisdiction shared with the governing body in question, in this
case, the Board of Regents of PUP. This means that if the Board of Regents first takes cognizance of the complaint, then it
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC.52 Thus, not all administrative cases will fall directly under the CSC.
Secondly, Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code affords the CSC the option of
whether to decide the case or to deputize some other department, agency or official to conduct an investigation into the
matter, thereby considerably easing the burden placed upon the CSC.
Having thus concluded, the Court sees no need to discuss the other issues raised in the petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Resolution Nos. 060521 and 061141 dated March 24, 2006 and June 30, 2006, respectively,
of the Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

(No part)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

(No part)
BIENVENIDO L. REYES*
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

No part.

Rollo (G.R. No. 176162), pp. 57-72.

Id. at 57.

Id. at 97.

Id. at 196-197.

Id. at 196.

Id. at 98, 197.

Id. at 197.

Id. at 107.

Id. at 110.

10

Id. at 196-199.

11

Id. at 106-120.

12

Id. at 146-148.

13

Id. at 155-162.

14

Id. at 200-212.

15

Section 16. Formal Charge. After a finding of a prima facie case, the disciplining authority shall formally
charge the person complained of. x x x
If the respondent has submitted his comment and counter-affidavits during the preliminary
investigation, he shall be given the opportunity to submit additional evidence.
The disciplining authority shall not entertain requests for clarification, bills of particulars or motions
to dismiss which are obviously designed to delay the administrative proceedings. If any of these
pleadings are interposed by the respondent, the same shall be considered as an answer and shall be
evaluated as such. [Underscoring supplied]
16

Rollo (G.R. No. 176162), pp. 730-731.

17

Constitution (1987), Article IX (B), Section 2; Executive Order No. 292 (1987), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A,
Chapter 3, Section 12(6) and (11).
18

(1978).

19

Executive Order No. 292 (1987), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 6:
SECTION 6. Scope of the Civil Service.(1) The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.

20

Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte v. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte, G.R. No. 169435,
February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 71, 96.
21

G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 513.

22

Id. at 523-524.

23

456 Phil. 399 (2003).

24

Id. at 411.

25

312 Phil. 1157 (1995).

26

Id. at 1165.

27

Dissenting Opinion (J. Velasco), pp. 10-11.

28

Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 99-1936 (1999) in Memorandum Circular No. 19 (1999).

29

Id.

30

Dissenting Opinion (J. Velasco), pp. 6-7.

31

G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009, 589 SCRA 88.

32

G.R. No. 168766, May 22, 2008, 554 SCRA 160.

33

Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, supra note 31.

34

Id. at 96-100.

35

Dissenting Opinion (J. Velasco), p. 10.

36

Rollo (G.R. No. 176162), pp. 232-235.

37

Id. at 106-132.

38

486 Phil. 657 (2004).

39

Rollo (G.R. No. 176162), pp. 603-604.

40

(1997).

41

Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 449 Phil. 711, 726 (2003) and Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, G.R.
184861, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 466, 474.
42

Valera v. Tuason, Jr., 80 Phil. 823, 827 (1948).

43

Supra note 32.

44

Id. at 176.

45

Dissenting Opinion (J. Velasco), p. 10.

46

Civil Service Commission v. Sojor, supra note 32, at 174.

47

G.R. No. 88167, May 3, 1993, 221 SCRA 598.

48

Dissenting Opinion (J. Velasco), p. 8.

49

Id at 9.

50

Id. at 11.

51

Id. at 9.

52

Puse v. Delos Santos-Puse, G.R. No. 183678, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 500.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the Court has no choice but to
see to it that its mandate is obeyed.1
The Case
For consideration before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assailing the December 29, 2006
Decision2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No 95293, nullifying and setting aside the resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) on jurisdictional ground.
The Facts
On September 27, 2005, petitioner Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then Chief Legal Counsel of the Polytechnic University of
the Philippines (PUP), filed an administrative complaint with the CSC against respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra)
and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar), who were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice-President for Administration,
respectively, of the PUP. The charge was for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, notorious undesirability and violation of Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713.3 According to Cueva, Guevarra falsified General Form No. 58-A (Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and
Employees of the Republic of the Philippines), a public document, which he was required to accomplish as the head of PUP
in order to be bonded and consequently engage in financial transactions on said institutions behalf.4 Guevarra allegedly
committed falsification when he wrote on the application that he has no pending criminal and administrative cases when
both respondents at that time have seventeen (17) pending cases for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the
Sandiganbayan.5 Guevarra also claimed that Cezar, notwithstanding his knowledge of these existing cases against them, still

endorsed and recommended for approval said application.6 On their part, respondents clarified that it was their
understanding that the phrase "criminal or administrative records" pertain to final conviction in a criminal administrative
case. They add that, inasmuch as the adverted seventeen (17) cases had not yet been decided by the Sandiganbayan,
Guevarras negative answer to Question No. 11 in General Form No. 58-A which states, "Do you have any criminal or
administrative records?" was correct.7 After a prima facie finding that respondents committed acts punishable under the Civil
Service Law and Rules, the CSC, on March 24, 2006, issued Resolution No. 0605218 formally charging Guevarra with
Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Thereafter, respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case,9 therein
praying, among other things, that the case be immediately suspended. Cueva, on the other hand, interposed an Urgent ExParte Motion for the Issuance of Preventive Suspension,10 as well as an Omnibus Motion,11 praying that an order of
preventive suspension against respondents issue and the inclusion of the certain offenses in the formal charge against the
two, particularly: grave misconduct, falsification of official document, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
being notoriously undesirable, and violation of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6713.
By Resolution No. 061141 dated June 30, 2006, the CSC denied both respondents motion for reconsideration and Cuevas
motion to include additional charges against respondents.12 Nonetheless, the CSC placed Guevarra under preventive
suspension for ninety (90) days.
Therefrom, respondents went to the CA on a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC
over the administrative complaint filed against them. On December 29, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision granting the
petition and nullifying the resolution issued by the CSC for lack of jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, petitioners have filed the instant separate petitions.
Issue
WHETHER THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS ORIGINAL CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OVER
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES FALLING UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF HEADS OF AGENCIES.
Discussion
The petitions are bereft of merit.
Jurisdiction as conferred by law
It is a basic legal precept that "jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law."13 In the instant case, the
pertinent legal provision is Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known
as the "Administrative Code"), which reads:
Sec. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days
salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the
Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or
it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the

investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to
be taken.
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days, salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the
same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
Secretary concerned. (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on the first paragraph of the above-quoted provision of the Administrative Code, it is clear that, as a general rule, the
CSC shall have appellate jurisdiction over "all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office." This jurisdictional grant complements the second paragraph of the same
provision which vests upon the department secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities the original jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Concomitantly, the law even accords finality to their decisions "in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary."
By way of exception, the same provision allows a complaint to be "filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen
against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department
or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation." Evidently, the law sanctions the direct filing of a
complaint with the CSC, but only if a private citizen is the complainant. Thus, the CSC has concurrent jurisdiction with the
department secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities when the complaint
is filed by a private citizen.
In this case, Cueva, then Chief Legal Counsel of the PUP, filed the administrative complaint directly with the CSC against
respondents. Applying the abovementioned provision of the Administrative Code, since a public employee and not a private
citizen filed the complaint, the case falls under the original jurisdiction of the disciplining authority involved, which is the
Board of Regents (BOR) of the PUP.14 The CSC merely has appellate jurisdiction. As stated under Section 4(h) of R.A. No.
8292, otherwise known as the "Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997":
Section 4. Powers and duties of Governing Boards. The governing board15 shall have the following specific powers and
duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors
of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines:
xxxx
(h) x x x and to remove [faculty members and administrative officials and employees] for cause in accordance with the
requirements of due process of law. (Emphasis supplied.)
Admittedly, the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service16 (Civil Service Rules) is silent as to
who can file a complaint directly with the CSC. The pertinent provision of the Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. - The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative
cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review decisions
and actions of its offices and of agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to
pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters
relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is basic that a rule issued by a government agency pursuant to its quasi-legislative power cannot modify, reduce or enlarge
the scope of the law which it seeks to implement. The discourse made by the Court in Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections
is instructive:
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement
of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations
adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs
may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative
agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation
cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment.
It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for
its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.17 (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, in Padunan v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,18 this Court held:
It must be stated at the outset that it is the law that confers jurisdiction and not the rules. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is
conferred by the Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must
exist as a matter of law. (Emphasis supplied.)
Taking the foregoing into consideration, Sec. 4 of the Civil Service Rules cannot be construed as authorizing one other than
a private citizen to file a complaint directly with the CSC, contrary to the ruling in the ponencia. Pertinently, even Sec. 7 of
the Civil Service Rules cannot run counter to the clear provision of the Administrative Code. Sec. 7 of the Civil Service
Rules reads:
Section. 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, over their respective officers and
employees. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this regard, "original concurrent jurisdiction" means that the CSC and the BOR have original concurrent jurisdiction over
complaints filed by a private citizen against a member of the civil service, but the BOR has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over complaints filed by a member of the civil service against an officer or employee of the university. A
contrary interpretation violates the explicit provision of the Administrative Code, as this is clearly covered by Sec. 47 of the
said Code.
Be that as it may, and considering that the Civil Service Rules does not explicitly mention who can file a complaint directly

with the CSC, then the clear import of Sec. 47 of the Administrative Code19 should be controlling, that is, only private
citizens can file administrative complaints directly with the CSC.
Power to discipline administrative officials and employees
Indeed, government employees, in general, being members of the civil service, are under the jurisdiction of the CSC. Thus,
CSCs power to discipline erring government employees cannot be doubted. As this Court held in Garcia v. Molina:
The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS, or those created by special law. As such, the employees are part
of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the CSC on
discipline, attendance and general terms and conditions of employment. The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide
disciplinary cases against erring employees.20 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
Nonetheless, CSCs jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases against erring government officials is not without
limitation. As discussed above, the Administrative Code vests the CSC appellate jurisdiction over "all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office." Original jurisdiction
is vested upon the department secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. In
University of the Philippines v. Regino,21 this Court held:
The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary
cases involving members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the Commission shall have the power to "hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal."
And Section 37(a), provides that, "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving
the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office."
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the manner of their creation,
were considered part of the Civil Service. Under the 1987 Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), which states:
The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under the 1973
Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and has an original charter. As a component
of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 807 and administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees
come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. (Emphasis supplied.)
Even if Regino involves the application of Presidential Decree No. 80722 (PD 807), still, the doctrine enunciated therein is
still applicable as the provision on the disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC under PD 807 is retained almost verbatim in the
Administrative Code.
Such interpretation renders effectual the provisions of R.A. No. 8292, which vests the governing boards of the universities

Today is Wednesday, March 02, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 106296 July 5, 1996

ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is partially granted. The questioned Orders and writs directing (1) "reinstatement" of respondent Isabelo T.
Crisostomo to the position of "President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines", and (2) payment of "salaries and benefits" which said
respondent failed to receive during his suspension insofar as such payment includes those accruing after the abolition of the PCC and its transfer to
the PUP, are hereby set aside. Accordingly, further proceedings consistent with this decision may be taken by the court a quo to determine the
correct amounts due and payable to said respondent by the said university.
The background of this case is as follows:
Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that position by the President of the Philippines on July 17,
1974.
During his incumbency as president of the PCC, two administrative cases were filed against petitioner for illegal use of government vehicles, misappropriation of construction
materials belonging to the college, oppression and harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The administrative cases, which were filed with the Office of the
President, were subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation.
Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, 3(e) and R.A. No. 992, 20-21 and R.A. No. 733, 14 were likewise filed against him with the Office of Tanodbayan.
On June 14, 1976, three (3) informations for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as amended) were filed against him. The informations
alleged that he appropriated for himself a bahay kubo, which was intended for the College, and construction materials worth P250,000.00, more or less. Petitioner was also accused
1
of using a driver of the College as his personal and family driver.

On October 22, 1976, petitioner was preventively suspended from office pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, 13, as amended. In his place Dr.
Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge on November 10, 1976, and then as Acting President on May 13, 1977.
On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF
COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND

FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS.

Mateo continued as the head of the new University. On April 3, 1979, he was appointed Acting President and on March 28, 1980, as
President for a term of six (6) years.
On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment acquitting petitioner of the charges against him. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Isabelo T. Crisostomo, not guilty of the violations charged in all
these three cases and hereby acquits him therefrom, with costs de officio. The bail bonds filed by said accused
for his provisional liberty are hereby cancelled and released.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and under which the accused has been suspended by this Court in an Order dated
October 22, 1976, said accused is hereby ordered reinstated to the position of President of the Philippine
College of Commerce, now known as the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, from which he has been
suspended. By virtue of said reinstatement, he is entitled to receive the salaries and other benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
him.
The bail bonds filed by the accused for his provisional liberty in these cases are hereby cancelled and
released.
SO ORDERED.
The cases filed before the Tanodbayan (now the Ombudsman) were likewise dismissed on August 8, 1991 on the ground that they had
become moot and academic. On the other hand, the administrative cases were dismissed for failure of the complainants to prosecute
them.
On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for execution of the judgment, particularly the part ordering
his reinstatement to the position of president of the PUP and the payment of his salaries and other benefits during the period of
suspension.
The motion was granted and a partial writ of execution was issued by the trial court on March 6, 1992. On March 26, 1992, however,
President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting president of the PUP, following the expiration of the term of office of
Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner was one of the five nominees considered by the President of the
Philippines for the position.
On April 24, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, through respondent Judge Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, issued another order, reiterating her
earlier order for the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of PUP president. A writ of execution, ordering the sheriff to implement the
order of reinstatement, was issued.
In his return dated April 28, 1992, the sheriff stated that he had executed the writ by installing petitioner as President of the PUP,
although Dr. Gellor did not vacate the office as he wanted to consult with the President of the Philippines first. This led to a contempt
citation against Dr. Gellor. A hearing was set on May 7, 1992. On May 5, 1992, petitioner also moved to cite Department of Education,
Culture and Sports Secretary Isidro Cario in contempt of court. Petitioner assumed the office of president of the PUP.
On May 18, 1992, therefore, the People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA G.R. No. 27931), assailing the
two orders and the writs of execution issued by the trial court. It also asked for a temporary restraining order.
On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from acting as
president of the PUP pursuant to the reinstatement orders of the trial court, and enjoining further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos.

VI-2329-2331.
On July 15, 1992, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, 2 the dispositive portion of which is set forth at the
beginning of this opinion. Said decision set aside the orders and writ of reinstatement issued by the trial court. The payment of salaries
and benefits to petitioner accruing after the conversion of the PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery of salaries and benefits was
limited to those accruing from the time of petitioner's suspension until the conversion of the PCC to the PUP. The case was remanded
to the trial court for a determination of the amounts due and payable to petitioner.
Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which converted the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He contends
that if the law had intended the PCC to lose its existence, it would have specified that the PCC was being "abolished" rather than
"converted" and that if the PUP was intended to be a new institution, the law would have said it was being "created." Petitioner claims
that the PUP is merely a continuation of the existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could be reinstated to his former position as
president.
In part the contention is well taken, but, as will presently be explained, reinstatement is no longer possible because of the promulgation
of P.D. No. 1437 by the President of the Philippines on June 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic University
of the Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the Philippine School of Commerce
into the Philippine College of Commerce. What took place was a change in academic status of the educational institution, not in its
corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to replace it with
another one, the lawmaking authority says so. He cites the following examples:
E.O. No. 709:
1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Trade and Industry, hereinafter referred to as the Ministry. The
existing Ministry of Trade established pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 721 as amended, and the existing
Ministry established pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 488 as amended, are abolished together with their
services, bureaus and similar agencies, regional offices, and all other entities under their supervision and
control.
E.O. No. 710:
1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Public Works and Highways, hereinafter referred to as the Ministry.
The existing Ministry of Public Works established pursuant to Executive Order No. 546 as amended, and the
existing Ministry of Public Highways established pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 458 as amended, are
abolished together with their services, bureaus and similar agencies, regional offices, and all other entities
within their supervision and control. . . .
R.A. No. 6975:
13. Creation and Composition. -- A National Police Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, is
hereby created for the purpose of effectively discharging the functions prescribed in the Constitution and
provided in this Act. The Commission shall be a collegial body within the Department. It shall be composed of a
Chairman and four (4) regular commissioners, one (1) of whom shall be designated as Vice-Chairman by the
President. The Secretary of the Department shall be the ex-officio Chairman of the Commission, while the ViceChairman shall act as the executive officer of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx

90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. - Upon the effectivity of this Act, the present National Police
Commission, and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease to exist. The Philippine
Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the integrated Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall
cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National Police, which is the
civilian component of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall cease to be the national
police force and in lieu thereof, a new police force shall be established and constituted pursuant to this Act.
In contrast, P.D. No. 1341, provides:
1. The present Philippine College of Commerce is hereby converted into a university to be known as the
"Polytechnic University of the Philippines," hereinafter referred to in this Decree as the University.
As already noted, R.A. No. 778 earlier provided:
1. The present Philippine School of Commerce, located in the City of Manila, Philippines, is hereby granted
full college status and converted into the Philippine College of Commerce, which will offer not only its present
one-year and two-year vocational commercial curricula, the latter leading to the titles of Associate in Business
Education and/or Associate in Commerce, but also four-year courses leading to the degrees of Bachelor of
Science in Business in Education and Bachelor of Science in Commerce, and five-year courses leading to the
degrees of Master of Arts in Business Education and Master of Arts in Commerce, respectively.
The appellate court ruled, however, that the PUP and the PCC are not "one and the same institution" but "two different entities" and that
since petitioner Crisostomo's term was coterminous with the legal existence of the PCC, petitioner's term expired upon the abolition of
the PCC. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals took into account the following:
a) After respondent Crisostomo's suspension, P.D. No. 1341 (entitled "CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE
COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES,
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS")
was issued on April 1, 1978. This decree explicitly provides that PUP's objectives and purposes cover not only
PCC's offering of programs "in the field of commerce and business administration" but also "programs in other
polytechnic areas" and "in other fields such as agriculture, arts and trades and fisheries . . ." (section 2). Being
a university, PUP was conceived as a bigger institution absorbing, merging and integrating the entire PCC and
other "national schools" as may be "transferred" to this new state university.
b) The manner of selection and appointment of the university head is substantially different from that provided
by the PCC Charter. The PUP President "shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Education and Culture after consultation with the University Board of
Regents" (section 4, P.D. 1341). The President of PCC, on the other hand, was appointed "by the President of
the Philippines upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees" (Section 4, R.A. 778).
c) The composition of the new university's Board of Regents in likewise different from that of the PCC Board of
Trustees (which included the chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and the chairman of the House
Committee on Education, the President of the PCC Alumni Association as well as the President of the Chamber
of Commerce of the Philippines). Whereas, among others, the NEDA Director-General, the Secretary of
Industry and the Secretary of Labor are members of the PUP Board of Regents. (section 6, P.D. 1341)
d) The decree moreover transferred to the new university all the properties including "equipment and facilities:"
". . . owned by the Philippine College of Commerce and such other National Schools as may
be integrated . . . including their obligations and appropriations . . ." (sec. 12; emphasis
supplied) 3
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and to create a new one. New course offerings can be added to

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Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines

National Government Portal Edited at the Office of the
President of the Philippines Under Commonwealth Act No. 638

Decision of the Office of the President on the

administrative case against Deputy Ombudsman Emilio
Gonzalez, March 31, 2011
March 31, 2011
Tags: Benigno S. Aquino III
Office of the President
of the Philippines

Malacaang
IN RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
AGAINST EMILIO A. GONZALEZ III,
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

OP Case No. 10-J-460

DECISION
The constitution mandates that public office is a public trust. Public officers are enjoined to
be at all times accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, and act with patriotism and justice. (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution as
quoted in several cases such as Civil Service Commission vs. Cortez, G.R. No. 155732, June 3,
2004 and Villar vs. Angeles, AM. No. P-062276, February 5, 2006)
Antecedents Facts and Statement of the Case
On 23 August 2010, a dismissed police officer, former Manila Police District Police Senior
Inspector (Captain) Rolando Del Rosario Mendoza, hijacked a tourist bus, and held hostage a
group of twenty-one foreign tourists and four Filipino tour assistants.
Mendoza was a bemedaled police official who served the Philippine National Police (PNP) for
thirty years prior to his termination ordered by the Office of the Ombudsman. For the liberty of
his hostages, Mendozas lone demand was his reinstatement in service.

Regrettably, the long-drawn drama ended with, the murder of eight, the injury of seven and the
demise of Mendoza, a surly scorn for the institutions of a representative government.
This Office, perforce, mandated Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila De Lima and
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Jesse Robredo to conduct a
thorough investigation of the incident, and recommend, among others, the appropriate
administrative and criminal charges against culpable individuals, public officers or otherwise.
Pursuant to his mandate, Joint Department Order NO. 01-2010 was subsequently issued, creating
the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC), which was chaired by Secretary De
Lima and vice-chaired by Secretary Robredo. The IIRC conducted a series of public hearings
and executive sessions, and invited several resource persons for the purpose (Investigation and
Review Committee, First Report, 16 September 2010, pp. 6-7).
Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez and respondent Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and
Other Law Enforcement Agencies Emilio Gonzalez III were duly sent invitations to take part in
the proceedings (Id., page 7). Both declined, however, interposing that the Office of the
Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body. (Id.).
In its First Report dated 16 September 2010, nonetheless, the IIRC made determinations based
on pertinent testimonial and documentary evidence with respect to the accountability of
respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez, which can be summarized as follows:
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross
violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendozas motion for reconsideration to
languish for nine (9) long months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman
prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within
five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering that there was no opposition
thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.
Moreso, Mendozas demand for immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration is not
without legal and compelling basis considering the following:
a) PSI Mendoza and four policemen were investigated by the Ombudsman involving a case for
alleged robbery (extortion), grave threats and physical injuries amounting to grave misconduct
allegedly committed against a certain Christian Kalaw. The same case, however, was previously
dismissed by the Manila city Prosecutors Office for lack of probable cause and by the PNP-NCR
Internal Affairs Service for failure of the complainant (Christian Kalaw) to submit evidence and
prosecute the case On the other hand, the case which was filed much ahead by Mendoza et al.
against Christian Kalaw involving the same incident, was given due course by the City
Prosecutors Office.

b) The Ombudsman exercised jurisdiction over the case based on a letter issued motu proprio by
Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzalez III, directing the PNP-NCR without citing any reason
to endorse the case against Mendoza and the arresting policemen to his office for
administrative adjudication. He also caused the docketing of the case and named Atty. Clarence
V. Guinto of the PNP-CIDG-NCR, who indorsed the case records, as the nominal complainant,
in lieu of Christian Kalaw who did not even affirm his complaint-affidavit b the before the
Ombudsman or submit any position paper as required.
c) Mendoza, after serving preventive suspen-sion, was adjudged liable for grave mis-conduct
based on the sole and uncor-roborated complaint-affidavit of Christian Kalaw.
d) Despite the pending and unresolved motion for reconsideration, the judgment of dismiss-sal
was enforced, thereby abruptly ending Mendozas 30 years of service in the PNP with forfeiture
of all his benefits.
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez likewise committed serious disregard of due process, manifest
injustice and oppression in failing to provisionally suspend the further implementation of the
judgment of dismissal against Mendoza pending disposition of his unresolved motion for
reconsideration.
For as long as his motion for reconsideration remained pending and unresolved, Mendoza was
also effectively deprived of the right to avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to
challenge the judgment of dismissal before the higher courts and seek a temporary restraining
order to prevent the further execution thereof.
When they received Mendozas demand for the release of the final order resolving his motion for
reconsideration, they should have performed their duty by resolving the reconsideration that
same day since it was already pending for nine months and the prescribed period for its
resolution is only five days. Or they should have acted decisively by issuing an order
provisionally suspending the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal subject to
revocation once the reconsideration is denied and without prejudice to the arrest and prosecution
of Mendoza for the hostage-taking.
But instead of acting decisively, they merely offered to review a pending motion for review of
the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the situation. As expected, Mendoza
who previously berated Deputy Gonzalez for allegedly demanding Php 150, 000 in exchange
for favorably resolving the motion for reconsideration rejected and branded as trash (basura)
the Ombudsman letter promising review, triggering the collapse of the negotiation. (Id., pp. 7577).

Based on the foregoing, the IIRC recommended with respect to Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez,
that its findings be referred to this Office for further determination of possible administrative
offenses, and for the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings (Id., page 81).
Upon a review of the findings and recommendation of the IIRC, an administrative charge was
formally instituted against Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez.
The charge states, thus:
FORMAL CHARGE
Finding a prima face case as contained in the Incident Investigation and Review Committee
Report (IIRC) dated 17 September 2010, particularly pages 73-75 thereof, this Office hereby
formally charge Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzalez III, Office of the Ombudsman, a
presidential appointee, for Gross Neglect of Duty and /or Inefficiency in the Performance of
Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O.
292 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, rules and regulation and for Misconduct in Office
under Section o3 of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In view thereof, respondent is herby directed to submit within seventy-two (72) hours from
receipt hereof, his answer under oath to the above-charges, as narrated in said IIRS Report copy
which is hereto attached, together with his documentary evidence, if any. Respondent should
state therein whether he elects to have a formal investigation or waives the same. Respondent is
also advised of his right to counsel.
Any Motion to Dismiss, Request for Clarification or Bill of Particulars shall not be entertained
by this Office. Any of these pleadings interposed by the respondent shall be considered as an
Answer and shall be evaluated as such. Failure of respondent to submit his answer within the
herein required period shall be considered as a waiver thereof.
SO ORDERED.
In his Answer dated 4 November 2010, Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez elected a formal
investigation, without waiving his right to question the validity and propriety of the
administrative proceedings.
This Office then called a Clarificatory Conference on 8 February 2011. Despite due notice,
however, respondent Deputy Ombudsman failed to appear.
Earlier, respondent submitted an Objection to proceedings accusing this office of having made
a prejudgment of his case even before a formal investigation has been conducted. Respondent

based his objection on news items that figured in two local tabloids, Abante and Bulgar, on 4
February 2011 that he was already meted out the penalty of one (1) year suspension.
While there was absolutely no truth to the news items in question, and despite a subsequent
express retraction by Mr. Raymond Burgos of Abante, in whose column said news items came
out, and the Deputy Ombudsmans own denial published in the same column, the latter chose to
snub the clarificatory conference and made no amends therefor.
Respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez having been given an opportunity to be heard, the
case was subsequently submitted for resolution.
The Issues
In his Answer, respondent Deputy Ombudsman contended in his defense that:
(1) This Office does not have the authority nor the jurisdiction to try the instant case, which is
cognizable by the Office of the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan;
(2) There was never gross neglect of duty/inefficiency in the performance of official duties on his
part prior to, during and after the hostage-taking incident; and
(3) There was no misconduct in office committed by him as he never demanded a bribe from
Mendoza.
The Ruling
A. On the Disciplining Authority of the Office of the President over the Deputy
Ombudsman
In his Answer, Respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez assails the jurisdiction or authority of
this Office to exercise disciplinary power over him, asserting that the Office of the President is
not a judicial or quasi-judicial body with authority or jurisdiction to charge or try him
administratively.
Respondent Deputy Ombudsman contends that it is the Office of the Ombudsman that has the
disciplinary authority over him, citing Section 21 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which states:
Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporation and their subsidiaries,

except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress,
and the Judiciary.
Respondent argues that he is not exempt from the disciplinary authority of the Office of the
Ombudsman since he is not a member of Congress nor is he removable by impeachment under
Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution.
Respondent adds that under Section 15(1) of the Ombudsman Act, it is the Office of the
Ombudsman that has the authority to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public
officer or employee.
Section 15(1) of the Ombudsman Act provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
form any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases;
xxx

xxx

xxx

Respondents contentions are without merit.

While it may be correct to state that the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over respondent
Deputy Ombudsman pursuant to Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act, it is not correct to say that
the President is without any disciplinary power over him.
It is worthy to note that the Ombudsmans disciplinary power over public officers is not
exclusive in nature. It has been recognized as concurrent with the power vested by law in
similarly authorized heads of offices or departments (Vide: Office of the Ombudsman v.
Delijero, G.R. 172635, 20 October 2010; Flores v. Montemayor, G.R. no. 170146, 25 August
2010; Office of the Ombudsman v. Beltran, G.R. 168039, 5 June 2009).
Verily, Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act itself expressly vests the President with the power to
remove a deputy of the Ombudsman, thus:
Sec. 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(2) A Deputy, or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for
any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
[Emphasis supplied]
Since the law expressly authorizes the President to remove a deputy of the Ombudsman for any
of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, subject to the requirement of due
process, it is within the authority and jurisdiction of this Office to have conducted administrative
proceedings against respondent Deputy Ombudsman, to determine cause for his administrative
culpability, and to impose the penalty of dismissal if the determination warrants the same.
It bears noting that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez was given two separate
opportunities to explain his side and answer the Formal Charge against him.
In the first instance, respondent was given the opportunity to submit his answer together with his
documentary evidence, which opportunity respondent actually availed of. In the second
instance, this Office called a Clarificatory Conference on 8 February 2011 pursuant to
respondents express election of a formal investigation. Despite due notice, however, respondent
Deputy Ombudsman refused to appear for said conference, interposing an objection based on the
unfounded notion that this Office has prejudged the instant case. Respondent having been given
actual and reasonable opportunity to explain or defend himself in due course, the requirement of
due process has been satisfied.
In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is simply the opportunity to explain ones side (Catbagan v. Judge
Barte, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452, 6 April 2005; Vide: Office of the Ombudsman vs. Galicia, G.R.
No. 167711, 10 October 2008; Civil Service Commission v. CA, G.R. No. 161086, 24 November
2006; Cayago v. Lina, G.R. No. 149539, 19 January 2005; Montemayor v. Bundalian, et al.,
G.R. No. 149335, 1 July 2003; Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 114683, 18
January 2000; Audion v. NLRC, G.R. No. 106648, 17 June 1999; Umali v. Guingona, Jr.,
G.R. No. 131124, 29 March 1999).
Held the Supreme Court, thus:
xxx The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain
ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties
are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process
are sufficiently met. (Montemayor v. Bundalian, supra).
Withal, where not expressly provided for by law, the power to remove or discipline may be
derived under the doctrine of necessary implication from the power to appoint (C. Cruz, The
Law of Public Officers, 2003 Ed., Central Book Supply, Inc., page 223). Otherwise put, the

power to appoint carries with it the implied power to remove or to discipline (Aguirre v. De
Castro, G.R. No. 127631, 17 December 1999; Vide: DOH v. Camposano, et al., G.R. No.,
157684, 27 April 2005; Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, 16 October 1997;
Bagatsing v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-34952, 25 July 1975).
In the words of the Supreme Court:
Absent any contrary statutory provision, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove or to discipline. Since respondent was appointed by the regional director of DECS, she
may be disciplined or removed by the latter pursuant to law (Aguirre, supra). [Emphasis
supplied]
Under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act, the power to appoint the deputies of the
Ombudsman is expressly vested in the President.
Section 9, Article XI of the constitution provides thus:
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of
at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees
for each vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies
shall be filled within three months after they occur.
Similarly, Section 4 of the Ombudsman Act states:
Sec. 4. Appointment. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor,
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least twenty one (21) nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three (3) nominees for each vacancy thereafter,
which shall be filled within three (3) months after is occurs, each of which list shall be published
in a newspaper of general circulation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Notably, no provision in the Constitution or the Ombudsman Act effectively enjoins the
President from exercising the power to remove or discipline a deputy of the Ombudsman as the
latters appointing authority.
This implied power of the President may be starkly contrasted with his lack of the same power
with respect to the Ombudsman, or the members of the Supreme Court, or the judges of inferior
courts, whom the President is vested the express authority to appoint. With respect to the
Ombudsman and the members of the Supreme Court, Section 2, article XI of the Constitution
expressly provides that said public officers may be removed only through impeachment. With

respect to judges of inferior courts Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly provides
that the Supreme Court shall have the power to remove and discipline them.
B. On the Charge of Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of
Official Duties
Upon a consideration of the First Report, the evidence and allegations of respondent Deputy
Ombudsman himself, and other documentary evidence gathered, this Office finds that the
inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of Captain Mendozas Motion for
Reconsideration timely filed on 5 November 2009, or within five (5) days from Mendozas
receipt of a copy of respondents Decision on 30 October 2009, amounted to gross neglect of
duty and/or inefficiency in the performance of official duty.
As correctly observed by the IIRC, the delay in the resolution of Mendozas Motion for
Reconsideration that spanned nine (9) long months constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office
of the Ombudsmans own Rules of Procedure. The Rules require that the resolution of a motion
for reconsideration be made within a period of only five (5) days from the submission thereof
(Section 8, Article III, Office of the Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 17, series of 2003).
As further correctly observed by the IIRC, the delay in the resolution of Mendozas motion was
all the more unjustified since no opposition to Mendozas motion for reconsideration was filed
whatsoever.
In more than a single occasion, the Supreme Court has considered inferior court judges failure to
resolve motions or pending incidents within the reglementary period prescribed by law as gross
inefficiency (Vide: Perez v. Concepcion, 378 Phil. 918; Dela Cruz, et.al v. Vallarta, A.M. No.
MTJ-04-1531, 6 March 2007; Arcenas v. Avelino, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1642, 15 June 2007). By
analogy, this Office considers the inordinate delay of nine (9) months as constituting gross
inefficiency in the performance of official duty. After all, the protection of the parties right to a
speedy disposition of cases is a common consideration (Re: Cases Submitted for Decision
Before Hon. Meliton G. Emuslan, Former Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan, Resolution A.M. No. RTJ-10-2226, March 22, 2010).
In his Answer, respondent Deputy Ombudsman alleged that the resolution of Mendozas Motion
was assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) Dennis L. Garcia on 14
December 2009. After almost four (4) months or on 5 April 2010, GIPO Garcia released the
draft Order resolving the Motion. Respondent alleged that his office received the draft of the
resolution on 27 April 2010, and that on 7 May 2010 he completed his review of the draft,
approved the same, and transmitted to the Ombudsman for final approval.

Attached to respondents Answer were copies of the receiving books evidencing receipt of
Mendozas Motion by the Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Adjudication
Bureau (CIPAAB) of the Ombudsman (Annex E), GIPO Garcias receipt thereof on 14
December 2009 (Annex F), receipt of the draft Order resolving the Motion by respondent on
27 April 2010 (Annex H), receipt of the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices
(MOLEO) Records Section on 7 May 2010 after respondent allegedly acted on the resolution
(Annex I), and the alleged receipt of the said Order by the Central Records Division of the
Office of the Ombudsman on 19 May 2010 or 12 days later (Annex J).
Respondent contended that considering the number of approvals that the resolution on
Mendozas Motion had to undergo, the period that elapsed could not be considered vexatious,
capricious, or oppressive. Respondent maintained that there was no prolonged inaction on his
part since he acted on the draft Order within nine (9) calendars days from his receipt thereof.
What respondent Deputy Ombudsman conveniently failed to acknowledge is the fact that when
he acted on the draft resolution of Mendozas motion, said motion had already languished for a
period of almost five (5) months in his subordinates hands. He should have acted with more
dispatch, therefore, in resolving the Motion.
Moreover, in view of the fact that respondent Deputy Ombudsman has caused the enforcement of
Mendozas dismissal pending resolution of the latters Motion, utmost responsibility and
fundamental considerations of justice should have impelled respondent to diligently supervise his
subordinate and apprise the Ombudsman of the necessity to expedite their respective official
actions to avoid undue prejudice on Mendoza, an erstwhile decorated police officer who served
the PNP for thirty (30) years.
As correctly pointed out by the IIRC, this Office notes that as long as his Motion for
Reconsideration remained pending and unresolved, Mendoza was also effectively deprived of the
right to avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to challenge the judgment of dismissal
before the higher courts and seek a temporary restraining order to prevent the further execution
thereof.
Gross neglect of duty refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences, insofar as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to
give to their own property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a
breach of duty is flagrant and palpable (Golangco v. Fung, G.R. no. 147640, 16 October 2006).
Under the peculiar circumstances involving the disciplinary case of Mendoza, especially
including the fact that the penalty of dismissal was enforced even before Mendoza could receive

a copy of the February 16, 2009 Decision, respondent Deputy Ombudsmans palpable lack of
care to supervise his subordinate to act with more dispatch in his review of the resolution of
Mendozas Motion for Reconsideration, and to apprise the Ombudsman of the delay which said
resolution had already suffered amount to a conscious indifference to the consequences of the
delay to the person (s) affected thereby.
This conscious indifference was highlighted when Mendoza demanded for a resolution of his
case during the fateful high-jacking incident. The following points raised by the IIRC are
apropos:
When the two Ombudsman officials [Gutierrez and Gonzalez] received Mendozas demand for
the release of the final order resolving his motion for reconsideration, they should have
performed their duty by resolving the reconsideration that same day since it was already pending
for nine months and the prescribed period for its resolution is only five days. Or if they cannot
resolve it that same day, then they should have acted decisively issuing an order provisionally
suspending the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal subject to revocation once the
reconsideration [sic] is denied and without prejudice to the arrest and prosecution of Mendoza
for the hostage-taking. Had they done so, the crisis may have ended peacefully, without
necessarily compromising the integrity of the institution. After all, as relayed to the negotiators,
Mendoza did express willingness to take full responsibility for the hostage-taking if his demand
for release of the final decision or reinstatement was met.
But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to review a
pending motion for review of the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the
situation. xxx xxx xxx
For the reasons stated above, this Office finds respondent Deputy Ombudsman guilty of gross
neglect of duty.
C. On the Charge of Gross Misconduct
With respect to the charge and findings of the IIRC that respondent may be further held liable for
gross misconduct for allegedly demanding from Mendoza the amount of one hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P150,000.00), there is substantial evidence to support the same in the light of the
circumstances surrounding the incident. As the Supreme Court has taught us, only substantial
evidence, that is, that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion is necessary in administrative cases (Vide: Adap v. Comelec,
516 SCRA 309).

As admitted by respondent himself in paragraphs 23 and 24 of his Answer, he accommodated the

request of Bob Kalaw to transfer the case Mendoza which was then pending with the Philippine
National Police-Internal Affairs Service, to the Office of the Ombudsman, explaining this wise:
24. On 25 June 2008, the father of the complainant, Bob Kalaw, together with Dindo Lucindo, a
family friend of the former, came to my office to request that the Office of the Ombudsman take
over the case of Christian Kalaw. They expressed their concern not just about the outcome of
Christian Kalaws case, but the safety of the latter, considering it wad the wife of then respondent
Mendoza who was serving the subpoena from the IAS.
Apparently, on the strength of his visitors bare allegation, respondent, without verifying the
same, encroached on the PNP-IAS exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the case. And when
the complaint endorsed by the PNP-IAS to the Office of the Ombudsman in July 2008 was
resolved in less than seven (7) months based on the sole and uncorroborated complaint-affidavit
of the alleged victim who did not even affirm the same, there is reason to believe that respondent
Deputy Ombudsman had shown undue interest on the case. Added to this is the lack of motive
on the part of Mendoza to implicate him, and in statements given spontaneously.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer, and the misconduct is grave if it
violates any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules (Santos v. Rasalan, 515 SCRA 97; Rodriguez v. Eugenio, 512 SCRA
489).
D. Arbitrary and Tyrannical Exercise of Authority; Betrayal of Public Trust
As hereinabove discussed, the Ombudsman Act expressly empowers the President to remove a
deputy of the Ombudsman for any of the grounds for the removal of the Ombudsman.
Section 2, Article XI of the constitution expressly provides for these grounds, to wit:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members
of the constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Betrayal of public trust is a new ground added by the Constitutional Commission as a catch-all
ground to cover all manner of offenses unbecoming a public functionary but not punishable by
the criminal statutes, like inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of authority, breach

of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, and obstruction of justice

(Records of the Constitution Commission, Vol. 2, page 22).
Clearly, the gross neglect of duty, gross inefficiency and misconduct committed by respondent
Deputy Ombudsman is constitutive of or amounts to a betrayal of the public trust. Put
differently, had respondent Deputy Ombudsman not betrayed the trust of Capt. Mendoza, the
latter would not have been compelled to resort to hostage-taking to advance his cause. This fact
cannot be denied as clearly expressed in the handwritten demand posted on the bus Release
final decision OMB-P-A-090570-A.
The urgency of resolving the motion on the part of Mendoza is understandable. To reiterate, the
decision dismissing him from the service was implemented even before he could receive a copy
of the Decision. At this point , a great injustice has already been committed as prior thereto,
Mendoza could not file a Motion for Reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman nor an
appeal before the Court of Appeals, and in the pendency thereof seek a temporary restraining
order against the implementation of the Decision. Consequently, when he got to file his Motion
for Reconsideration, the urgency of the matter heightened, as he had long suffered from the
effects of the Decision. These considerations cannot have escaped the respondent Deputy
Ombudsman had he been circumspect in the performance of his duties.
Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution sanction, thus:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
The provision sums up the high sense of idealism that is expected of every officer of the
government (J. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A
Commentary, 2003 ed., Rex Bookstore, Inc., page 1108). As Justice Malcolm expressed in
Cornejo v. Gabriel, G.R. No. L-16887, 17 November 1920, The basic idea of government in the
Philippines as in the United States is that of a popular representative government, the officers
being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a
proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the
provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people whom he represents.
Based on facts substantially established, and measured against the fundamental mandate of his
public office to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and
to act with justice, this Office finds that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalezs gross
neglect of duty, gross inefficiency and misconduct in office amounted to a betrayal of the public
trust reposed in him.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A.
Gonzalez III guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of
public trust, and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176162

October 9, 2012

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR,
Respondents.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 178845
ATTY. HONESTO L. CUEVA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR,
Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing the December 29, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 95293, entitled "Dr. Dante G. Guevarra and Atty. Augustus Cezar v. Civil Service
Commission and Atty. Honesto L. Cueva."
The Facts
Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar) were the Officer-inCharge/President and the Vice President for Administration, respectively, of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines (PUP)2 in 2005.
On September 27, 2005, petitioner Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel,
filed an administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct,
falsification of official documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being
notoriously undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713.3 Cueva
charged Guevarra with falsification of a public document, specifically the Application for Bond
of Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter
denied the existence of his pending criminal and administrative cases. As the head of the school,
Guevarra was required to be bonded in order to be able to engage in financial transactions on
behalf of PUP.4 In his Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of the
Republic of the Philippines (General Form No. 58-A), he answered Question No. 11 in this wise:
11. Do you have any criminal or administrative records? NO. If so, state briefly the nature
thereof NO.5
This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had
17 pending cases for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan.6
Cezar, knowing fully well that both he and Guevarra had existing cases before the
Sandiganbayan, endorsed and recommended the approval of the application.7

The respondents explained that they believed "criminal or administrative records" to mean final
conviction in a criminal or administrative case.8 Thus, because their cases had not yet been
decided by the Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded to Question No. 11 in
General Form No. 58-A correctly and in good faith.9
On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued Resolution No. 06052110
formally charging Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service after a prima facie finding that they had committed acts punishable under
the Civil Service Law and Rules.
Subsequently, the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare
Absence of Prima Facie Case11 praying that the case be suspended immediately and that the CSC
declare a complete absence of a prima facie case against them. Cueva, on the other hand, filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Preventive Suspension12 and an Omnibus Motion13
seeking the issuance of an order of preventive suspension against Guevarra and Cezar and the
inclusion of the following offenses in the formal charge against them: Grave Misconduct,
Falsification of Official Document, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Being
Notoriously Undesirable, and Violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713.
In Resolution No. 061141, dated June 30, 2006,14 the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by the respondents for being a non-responsive pleading, akin to a motion to dismiss, which
was a prohibited pleading under Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service Commission.15 It also denied Cuevas motion to include additional charges against
the respondents. The CSC, however, placed Guevarra under preventive suspension for ninety
(90) days, believing it to be necessary because, as the officer-in-charge of PUP, he was in a
position to unduly influence possible witnesses against him.
Aggrieved, Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA
essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative complaint filed against
them by Cueva. On December 29, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and
nullifying and setting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having been rendered
without jurisdiction. According to the CA, Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), the second paragraph of which
states that heads of agencies and instrumentalities "shall have jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction," bestows upon the Board of Regents the jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against respondents Guevarra and Cezar. In addition, the
CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out that the
latter should have exhausted all administrative remedies by first bringing his grievances to the
attention of the PUP Board of Regents.

Hence, these petitions.

THE ISSUE
In G.R. No. 176162, petitioner CSC raises the sole issue of:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases falling under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies.
The same issue is among those raised by petitioner Cueva in G.R. No. 178845.
The Court agrees that the only question which must be addressed in this case is whether the CSC
has jurisdiction over administrative cases filed directly with it against officials of a chartered
state university.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
Both CSC and Cueva contend that because the CSC is the central personnel agency of the
government, it has been expressly granted by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 the authority to
assume original jurisdiction over complaints directly filed with it. The CSC explains that under
the said law, it has appellate jurisdiction over all administrative disciplinary proceedings and
original jurisdiction over complaints against government officials and employees filed before it
by private citizens.16 Accordingly, the CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction, together with the
PUP Board of Regents, over the administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar and it can take
cognizance of a case filed directly with it, despite the fact that the Board of Regents is the
disciplining authority of university employees.
Respondents Guevarra and Cezar, on the other hand, fully adopted the position of the CA in its
questioned decision and propounded the additional argument that the passage of R.A. No. 8292
has effectively removed from the CSC the authority to hear and decide on cases filed directly
with it.
CSC has jurisdiction over cases
filed directly with it, regardless of
who initiated the complaint
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and
discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or
brought before it directly or on appeal.17 Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution
defines the scope of the civil service:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341,18 PUP became a chartered state university,
thereby making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose
employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292.19
The parties in these cases do not deny that Guevarra and Cezar are government employees and
part of the Civil Service. The controversy, however, stems from the interpretation of the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC as specified in Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of E.O. No. 292:
SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the
Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may
hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of
officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in
case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally
to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is
removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary
concerned. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
While in its assailed decision, the CA conceded that paragraph one of the same provision
abovequoted allows the filing of a complaint directly with the CSC, it makes a distinction
between a complaint filed by a private citizen and that of an employee under the jurisdiction of
the disciplining authority involved. The CA resolved that because Cueva was then the Dean of
the College of Law and the Chief Legal Counsel of PUP when he filed the complaint with the
CSC, he was under the authority of the PUP Board of Regents. Thus, it is the Board of Regents
which had exclusive jurisdiction over the administrative case he initiated against Guevarra and
Cezar.
The Court finds itself unable to sustain the reading of the CA.

The issue is not novel.

The understanding by the CA of Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No.
292 which states that "a complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private
citizen against a government official or employee" is that the CSC can only take cognizance of a
case filed directly before it if the complaint was made by a private citizen.
The Court is not unaware of the use of the words "private citizen" in the subject provision and
the plain meaning rule of statutory construction which requires that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The Court, however, finds that a
simplistic interpretation is not in keeping with the intention of the statute and prevailing
jurisprudence. It is a well-established rule that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation
so as not to defeat the very purpose for which they were passed. As such, "a literal interpretation
is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results."20 In Secretary of Justice v.
Koruga,21 the Court emphasized this principle and cautioned us on the overzealous application of
the plain meaning rule:
The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning. However, a literal interpretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly,
lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole. After all,
statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention
and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to give words
meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.22
A literal interpretation of E.O. 292 would mean that only private citizens can file a complaint
directly with the CSC. For administrative cases instituted by government employees against their
fellow public servants, the CSC would only have appellate jurisdiction over those. Such a plain
reading of the subject provision of E.O. 202 would effectively divest CSC of its original
jurisdiction, albeit shared, provided by law. Moreover, it is clearly unreasonable as it would be
tantamount to disenfranchising government employees by removing from them an alternative
course of action against erring public officials.
There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by a private citizen and one
filed by a member of the civil service, especially in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A,
Title I, Book V of the same E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to "hear and
decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal" without any
qualification.
In the case of Camacho v. Gloria,23 the Court stated that "under E.O. No. 292, a complaint
against a state university official may be filed with either the universitys Board of Regents or

directly with the Civil Service Commission."24 It is important to note that the Court did not
interpret the Administrative Code as limiting such authority to exclude complaints filed directly
with it by a member of the civil service.
Moreover, as early as in the case of Hilario v. Civil Service Commission,25 the Court interpreted
Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 as allowing the direct filing
with the CSC by a public official of a complaint against a fellow government employee. In the
said case, Quezon City Vice-Mayor Charito Planas directly filed with the CSC a complaint for
usurpation, grave misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, gross insubordination, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service against the City Legal Officer of Quezon City. The
CSC issued a resolution ruling that the respondent official should not be allowed to continue
holding the position of legal officer. In a petition to the Supreme Court, the official in question
asserted that the City Mayor was the only one who could remove him from office directly and
not the CSC. The Court upheld the decision of the CSC, citing the same provision of the
Administrative Code:
Although respondent Planas is a public official, there is nothing under the law to prevent her
from filing a complaint directly with the CSC against petitioner. Thus, when the CSC determined
that petitioner was no longer entitled to hold the position of City Legal Officer, it was acting
within its authority under the Administrative Code to hear and decide complaints filed before it.26
[Underscoring supplied]
It has been argued that Hilario is not squarely in point.27 While it is true that the circumstances
present in the two cases are not identical, a careful reading of Hilario reveals that petitioner
therein questioned the authority of the CSC to hear the disciplinary case filed against him,
alleging that the CSCs jurisdiction was only appellate in nature. Hence, the reference to the
abovequoted passage in Hilario is very appropriate in this case as respondents herein pose a
similar query before us.
It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the complainant is immaterial to the acquisition
of jurisdiction over an administrative case by the CSC. The law is quite clear that the CSC may
hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases brought directly before it or it may deputize
any department or agency to conduct an investigation.
CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction
with the Board of Regents over
administrative cases
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service28 (the Uniform Rules) explicitly
allows the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases directly brought before it:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission shall
hear and decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the
agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall
have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and
employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and
efficiency of such officers and employees. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
The CA construed the phrase "the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass
upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service" to
mean that the CSC could only step in after the relevant disciplinary authority, in this case the
Board of Regents of PUP, had investigated and decided on the charges against the respondents.
Regrettably, the CA failed to take into consideration the succeeding section of the same rules
which undeniably granted original concurrent jurisdiction to the CSC and belied its suggestion
that the CSC could only take cognizance of cases on appeal:
Section 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces,
cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with
the Commission, over their respective officers and employees.29 [Emphasis supplied]
It was also argued that although Section 4 of the Uniform Rules is silent as to who can file a
complaint directly with the CSC, it cannot be construed to authorize one who is not a private
citizen to file a complaint directly with the CSC. This is because a rule issued by a government
agency pursuant to its law-making power cannot modify, reduce or enlarge the scope of the law
which it seeks to implement.30
Following the earlier disquisition, it can be said that the Uniform Rules does not contradict the
Administrative Code. Rather, the former simply provides a reasonable interpretation of the latter.
Such action is perfectly within the authority of the CSC, pursuant to Section 12(2), Chapter 3,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292, which gives it the power to "prescribe, amend and
enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and
other pertinent laws."
Another view has been propounded that the original jurisdiction of the CSC has been further
limited by Section 5 of the Uniform Rules, such that the CSC can only take cognizance of
complaints filed directly with it which: (1) are brought against personnel of the CSC central
office, (2) are against third level officials who are not presidential appointees, (3) are against
officials and employees, but are not acted upon by the agencies themselves, or (4) otherwise
require direct or immediate action in the interest of justice:

Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. The Civil Service Commission
Proper shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of the Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for
review;
2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities, imposing penalties exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days salary brought before it on appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission Proper personnel;
4. Complaints against third level officials who are not presidential appointees;
5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees which are not acted upon by
the agencies and such other complaints requiring direct or immediate action, in the
interest of justice;
6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by Civil Service
Regional Offices;
7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and
8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in connection with the
foregoing enumerations.
It is the Courts position that the Uniform Rules did not supplant the law which provided the
CSC with original jurisdiction. While the Uniform Rules may have so provided, the Court invites
attention to the cases of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso31 and Civil Service Commission v.
Sojor,32 to be further discussed in the course of this decision, both of which buttressed the
pronouncement that the Board of Regents shares its authority to discipline erring school officials
and employees with the CSC. It can be presumed that, at the time of their promulgation, the
members of this Court, in Alfonso and Sojor, were fully aware of all the existing laws and
applicable rules and regulations pertaining to the jurisdiction of the CSC, including the Uniform
Rules. In fact, Sojor specifically cited the Uniform Rules in support of its ruling allowing the
CSC to take cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against the president of a
state university. As the Court, in the two cases, did not consider Section 5 of the Uniform Rules
as a limitation to the original concurrent jurisdiction of the CSC, it can be stated that Section 5 is
merely implementary. It is merely directory and not restrictive of the CSCs powers. The CSC

itself is of this view as it has vigorously asserted its jurisdiction over this case through this
petition.
The case of Alfonso33 is on all fours with the case at bench. The case involved a complaint filed
before the CSC against a PUP employee by two employees of the same university. The CA was
then faced with the identical issue of whether it was the CSC or the PUP Board of Regents which
had jurisdiction over the administrative case filed against the said PUP employee. The CA
similarly ruled that the CSC could take cognizance of an administrative case if the decisions of
secretaries or heads of agencies, instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities were
appealed to it or if a private citizen directly filed with the CSC a complaint against a government
official or employee. Because the complainants in the said case were PUP employees and not
private citizens, the CA held that the CSC had no jurisdiction to hear the administrative case. It
further posited that even assuming the CSC had the authority to do so, immediate resort to the
CSC violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the complaint should have
been first lodged with the PUP Board of Regents to allow them the opportunity to decide on the
matter. This Court, however, reversed the said decision and declared the following:
xxx. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by
government departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a complaint may be filed
directly with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide the case,
although it may opt to deputize a department or an
agency to conduct the investigation. x x x
xxx

xxx

xxx

We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinary committees
and governing bodies in different branches, subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the
government to hear and decide administrative complaints against their respective officers and
employees. Be that as it may, we cannot interpret the creation of such bodies nor the passage of
laws such as R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing for the creation of such disciplinary bodies
as having divested the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline government
employees, including those in the academe. To hold otherwise would not only negate the very
purpose for which the CSC was established, i.e. to instill professionalism, integrity, and
accountability in our civil service, but would also impliedly amend the Constitution itself.
xxx

xxx

xxx

But it is not only for this reason that Alfonsos argument must fail. Equally significant is the fact
that he had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his counteraffidavit and his motion for reconsideration and requested for a change of venue, not from the

CSC to the BOR of PUP, but from the CSC-Central Office to the CSC-NCR. It was only when
his motion was denied that he suddenly had a change of heart and raised the question of proper
jurisdiction. This cannot be allowed because it would violate the doctrine of res judicata, a legal
principle that is applicable to administrative cases as well. At the very least, respondents active
participation in the proceedings by seeking affirmative relief before the CSC already bars him
from impugning the Commissions authority under the principle of estoppel by laches.
In this case, the complaint-affidavits were filed by two PUP employees. These complaints were
not lodged before the disciplinary tribunal of PUP, but were instead filed before the CSC, with
averments detailing respondents alleged violation of civil service laws, rules and regulations.
After a fact-finding investigation, the Commission found that a prima facie case existed against
Alfonso, prompting the Commission to file a formal charge against the latter. Verily, since the
complaints were filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has opted to assume jurisdiction over
the complaint, the CSCs exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction. To repeat, it may, however, choose to deputize any department
or agency or official or group of officials such as the BOR of PUP to conduct the investigation,
or to delegate the investigation to the proper regional office. But the same is merely permissive
and not mandatory upon the Commission.34 [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
It has been opined that Alfonso does not apply to the case at bar because respondent therein
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit before it,
thereby preventing him from later questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC. Such circumstance is
said to be totally absent in this case.35
The records speak otherwise. As in Alfonso, respondents herein submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the CSC when they filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit.36 It was only when their
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case37 was denied by
the CSC that they thought to put in issue the jurisdiction of the CSC before the CA, clearly a
desperate attempt to evade prosecution by the CSC. As in Alfonso, respondents are also estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC.
Based on all of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the CSC may take cognizance of
an administrative case filed directly with it against an official or employee of a chartered state
college or university. This is regardless of whether the complainant is a private citizen or a
member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction is shared with the Board of Regents of
the school.
Gaoiran not applicable

In its decision, the CA relied heavily on Gaoiran v. Alcala38 to support its judgment that it is the
Board of Regents, and not the CSC, which has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint
filed against the respondents.
A thorough study of the said case, however, reveals that it is irrelevant to the issues discussed in
the case at bench. Gaoiran speaks of a complaint filed against a high school teacher of a statesupervised school by another employee of the same school. The complaint was referred to the
Legal Affairs Service of the Commission on Higher Education (LAS-CHED). After a factfinding investigation established the existence of a prima facie case against the teacher, the
Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Director of LAS-CHED issued a formal charge for Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, together with the Order
of Preventive Suspension. The newly-appointed Director of LAS-CHED, however, dismissed the
administrative complaint on the ground that the letter-complaint was not made under oath.
Unaware of this previous resolution, the Chairman of the CHED issued another resolution
finding petitioner therein guilty of the charges against him and dismissing him from the service.
The trial court upheld the resolution of the director of LAS-CHED but on appeal, this was
reversed by the CA, affirming the decision of the CHED chairman removing petitioner from
service. One of the issues raised therein before this Court was whether the CA erred in
disregarding the fact that the complaint was not made under oath as required by the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292.
In the said case, the Court concurred with the findings of the CA that it was the formal charge
issued by the LAS-CHED which constituted the complaint, and because the same was initiated
by the appropriate disciplining authority, it need not be subscribed and sworn to and CHED
acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Court further affirmed the authority of the heads of
agencies to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against their officers and
employees. It bears stressing, at this point, that there is nothing in the case that remotely implies
that this Court meant to place upon the Board of Regent exclusive jurisdiction over
administrative cases filed against their employees.
In fact, following the ruling in Gaoiran, it can be argued that it was CSC Resolution No. 060521
which formally charged respondents that constituted the complaint, and since the complaint was
initiated by the CSC itself as the disciplining authority, the CSC properly acquired jurisdiction
over the case.
R.A. No. 8292 is not in conflict
with E.O. No. 292.
In addition, the respondents argue that R.A. No. 8292, which granted to the board of regents or
board of trustees disciplinary authority over school employees and officials of chartered state
colleges and universities, should prevail over the provisions of E.O. No. 292.39 They anchor their

assertion that the Board of Regents has exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases on
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292,40 to wit:
Section 4. Powers and duties of Governing Boards. The governing board shall have the
following specific powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the
exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines;
xxxx
(h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees
subject to the provisions of the revised compensation and classification system and other
pertinent budget and compensation laws governing hours of service, and such other duties and
conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its discretion, leaves of absence under such
regulations as it may promulgate, any provisions of existing law to the contrary not with
standing; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the requirements of due process of
law. [Emphasis supplied]
The respondents are mistaken.
Basic is the principle in statutory construction that interpreting and harmonizing laws is the best
method of interpretation in order to form a uniform, complete, coherent, and intelligible system
of jurisprudence, in accordance with the legal maxim interpretare et concordare leges legibus est
optimus interpretandi modus.41 Simply because a later statute relates to a similar subject matter
as that of an earlier statute does not result in an implied repeal of the latter.42
A perusal of the abovequoted provision clearly reveals that the same does not indicate any
intention to remove employees and officials of state universities and colleges from the ambit of
the CSC. What it merely states is that the governing board of a school has the authority to
discipline and remove faculty members and administrative officials and employees for cause. It
neither supersedes nor conflicts with E.O. No. 292 which allows the CSC to hear and decide
administrative cases filed directly with it or on appeal.
In addition to the previously cited case of Alfonso, the case of The Civil Service Commission v.
Sojor43 is likewise instructive. In the said case, this Court ruled that the CSC validly took
cognizance of the administrative complaints directly filed with it concerning violations of civil
service rules committed by a university president. This Court acknowledged that the board of
regents of a state university has the sole power of administration over a university, in accordance
with its charter and R.A. No. 8292. With regard to the disciplining and removal of its employees
and officials, however, such authority is not exclusive to it because all members of the civil
service fall under the jurisdiction of the CSC:

Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this
power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials.
Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its
employees and officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the law bestows
upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is
to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is
likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter.
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided
by law. Being a non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC.
Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.44
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
It has been pointed out that the case of Sojor is not applicable to the case at bar because the
distinction between a complaint filed by a private citizen and one filed by a government
employee was not taken into consideration in the said case.45 The dissent fails to consider that
Sojor is cited in the ponencia to support the ruling that R.A. No. 8292 is not in conflict with E.O.
No. 292 and to counter respondents flawed argument that the passage of R.A. No. 8292 granted
the Board of Regents exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases against school employees
and officials of chartered state colleges and universities. Also noteworthy is the fact that the
complainants before the CSC in Sojor were faculty members of a state university and were, thus,
government employees. Nevertheless, despite this, the Court allowed the CSC to assert
jurisdiction over the administrative case, proclaiming that the power of the Board of Regents to
discipline its officials and employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with the CSC.46
The case of University of the Philippines v. Regino47 was also cited to bolster the claim that
original jurisdiction over disciplinary cases against government officials is vested upon the
department secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities, whereas the CSC only enjoys appellate jurisdiction over such cases.48 The
interpretation therein of the Administrative Code supposedly renders effectual the provisions of
R.A. No. 8292 and does not "deprive the governing body of the power to discipline its own
officials and employees and render inutile the legal provisions on disciplinary measures which
may be taken by it."49
The Court respectfully disagrees. Regino is obviously inapplicable to this case because there, the
school employee had already been found guilty and dismissed by the Board of Regents of the
University of the Philippines. Therefore, the issue put forth before this Court was whether the
CSC had appellate jurisdiction over cases against university employees, considering the
university charter which gives it academic freedom allegedly encompassing institutional

autonomy. In contrast, no administrative case was filed before the Board of Regents of PUP
because the case was filed directly with the CSC and so, the question here is whether the CSC
has original concurrent jurisdiction over disciplinary cases. Rationally, the quoted portions in
Regino find no application to the case at bench because those statements were made to uphold
the CSCs appellate jurisdiction which was being contested by petitioner therein. At the risk of
being repetitive, it is hereby stressed that the authority of the CSC to hear cases on appeal has
already been established in this case. What is in question here is its original jurisdiction over
administrative cases.
A different interpretation of the Administrative Code was suggested in order to harmonize the
provisions of R.A. No. 8292 and E.O. 292. By allowing only a private citizen to file a complaint
directly with the CSC, the CSC maintains its power to review on appeal decisions of the Board
of Regents while at the same time the governing board is not deprived of its power to discipline
its officials and employees.50
To begin with, there is no incongruity between R.A. No. 8292 and E.O. No. 292, as previously
explained in Sojor. Moreover, the Court fails to see how a complaint filed by a private citizen is
any different from one filed by a government employee. If the grant to the CSC of concurrent
original jurisdiction over administrative cases filed by private citizens against public officials
would not deprive the governing bodies of the power to discipline their own officials and
employees and would not be violative of R.A. No. 8292, it is inconceivable that a similar case
filed by a government employee would do so. Such a distinction between cases filed by private
citizens and those by civil servants is simply illogical and unreasonable. To accede to such a
mistaken interpretation of the Administrative Code would be a great disservice to our developing
jurisprudence.1wphi1
It is therefore apparent that despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8292 giving the board of regents
or board of trustees of a state school the authority to discipline its employees, the CSC still
retains jurisdiction over the school and its employees and has concurrent original jurisdiction,
together with the board of regents of a state university, over administrative cases against state
university officials and employees.
Finally, with regard to the concern that the CSC may be overwhelmed by the increase in number
of cases filed before it which would result from our ruling,51 it behooves us to allay such worries
by highlighting two important facts. Firstly, it should be emphasized that the CSC has original
concurrent jurisdiction shared with the governing body in question, in this case, the Board of
Regents of PUP. This means that if the Board of Regents first takes cognizance of the complaint,
then it shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC.52 Thus, not all administrative cases
will fall directly under the CSC. Secondly, Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code affords the CSC the option of whether to decide the case or to deputize

some other department, agency or official to conduct an investigation into the matter, thereby
considerably easing the burden placed upon the CSC.
Having thus concluded, the Court sees no need to discuss the other issues raised in the petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Resolution Nos. 060521 and 061141 dated
March 24, 2006 and June 30, 2006, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission are
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

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Sunday, April 02, 2006

Rules of procedure in administrative cases against teachers

Newspaper and television news reports in recent weeks have bannered stories of abuse
allegedly committed by teachers against helpless schoolchildren. We have, for example, that
egregious case of a teacher punishing a Grade 2 student by asking her to swallow pencil
shavings.
The Family Code, in several articles, provides for the scope and limitations of teachers
special parental authority over their students:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article
shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions
of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons
exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not
apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the
particular circumstances.
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the
respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right
precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their
means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company,
and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and

morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and
guardians.
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly
liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same
authority over the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in
child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment
upon the child. (emphasis by boldfacing supplied)
Please take note especially of Article 233 which absolutely prohibits
teachers from inflicting physical punishment on their students.
While there are true stories of abuse committed by teachers against their
students, still, the Constitutional presumption of innocence applies. As
former Senator Rene Saguisag (my fellow alumnus from Rizal High School in Pasig)
once said, It is only by guaranteeing the rights of the most guilty that we
can guarantee the rights of the most innocent.
Thus, charges against a teacher must go through a process where he or
she is given the chance to be heard and present exculpatory evidence. In
administrative cases against teachers, the Department of Education
follows The DECS Rules of Procedure under DECS Order N0. 33, s. 1999.
Disappointingly, as of this writing, the DepEd does not have a copy of this
Order in its website. (But the said rules, with some differences, basically follow
the rules of procedure laid down by the Civil Service Commission. You can read
these rules in the CSC website http://www.csc.gov.ph/.)
Basically, however, the DECS Rules observe the following requirements
and procedures:

1. A complaint in writing and under oath is filed against a teacher. Anonymous

complaints, under certain conditions, may be allowed. For example, the complaint is
supported by documentary evidences upon which the truth can be ascertained,
even without the presence of a complainant. If the complaint is filed with the DepEd
Central Office or with its Regional Offices, the complaint is indorsed to the
respective Division Office under which the teacher serves.
2. The complaint must contain a certification against non-forum shopping.
3. A fact-finding or preliminary investigation is conducted to determine whether the
complaint is meritorious or not. The investigating officer or committee of the
Division submits its Investigation Report to the Regional Office. The report may
either recommend the filing of a formal charge against the teacher by the
disciplining authority, OR the dismissal of the complaint.
If the complaint is dismissed, the complainant can file a Petition for
Review with the Secretary of the DepEd.
4. The formal charge will require the respondent-teacher to submit within a
maximum of five days from receipt of the charge to file his answer. In the answer,
the teacher must state whether he chooses to exercise his right to a formal
investigation.
5. The Division Office concerned creates its investigation committee. The
composition of the committee can be challenged under the DECS Rules (or under
the Magna Carta for Teachers).
The respondent may be placed under preventive suspension for a maximum of
ninety days.
The formal investigation is conducted just like a courtroom trial, and both
complainant and respondent are entitled to the services of lawyers. Testimonies of
witnesses are under oath, and subject to cross-examination. Documentary
evidences are marked and later on formally offered.
After the proceedings, the committee submits to the Regional Office its Formal
Investigation Report with its recommendations for either a finding of guilt or
innocence. The Regional Office will then hand down its decision on the case. (Please
take note that the Supreme Court has ruled that the Formal Investigation Report is
an internal document of the DepEd, and there is no denial of due process if the
complainant or respondents is not provided with a copy of the said report.)
6. If the teacher-respondent is found guilty, his successive modes of appeal are as
follows: (a) motion for reconsideration filed with the Regional Office; (2) appeal to

the Secretary of DepEd; and (3) petition for judicial review with the Court of
Appeals.
If the teacher-respondent is acquitted, however, the complainant must file
a Petition for Review with the Civil Service Commission.
Posted by Atty. Gerry T. Galacio at Sunday, April 02, 2006

Today is Wednesday, March 02, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 81032 March 22, 1990

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE and SPORTS, represented by EDNA V. AZURIN, ANASTACIO
RAMENTO and HON. ONOFRE D. CORPUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA V. NAVARRO, respondents.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
The question presented in this petition is whether or not the reassignment of Gloria Navarro as principal from Carlos Albert High School to Manuel Roxas High School, both in
Quezon City, is valid.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On January 1, 1981, respondent Gloria V. Navarro was appointed Secondary School Principal II. Her appointment was without reference to any particular school, and merely states

You are hereby appointed Secondary School Principal II in the Division of City Schools, District II, Quezon City, Ministry of Education petition and
Culture, National Capital Region, with compensation at the rate of Eighteen Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Six Pesos (P18,636.00) per annum,
effective January 1, 1981. . . .
For some years, however, her station as high school principal had been at Carlos Albert High School.
Sometime in 1982, petitioner Edna B. Azurin in her capacity as Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City, effected a reshuffling of all high school principals in Quezon City in
the exigencies of the service, as all of the principals had been overstaying in one station for more than five (5) years. As a result of said reshuffling, respondent Navarro was
reassigned from Carlos Albert High School to the Manuel Roxas High School without demotion in rank nor diminution in salary.
On August 25, 1982, however, respondent Navarro wrote a letter to petitioner herein Edna B. Azurin, requesting for a reconsideration of her transfer or re-assignment and citing her
achievements as an administrator of Carlos Albert High School as her reason therefor.
Petitioner Azurin denied the said request explaining that respondent Navarro's new assignment was made in the exigencies of the service and precisely in recognition of her
capabilities as school administrator, and that since respondent Navarro had already spent ten (10) years as principal in Carlos Albert High School, she was accordingly advised to
consider her new assignment as a challenge to accomplish new and bigger projects for Manuel Roxas High School.
Despite the denial of her request for reconsideration, respondent Navarro gave notice to petitioner Azurin that she would not comply with her new assignment allegedly because the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers states that no principal/teacher could be transferred without her consent and that the reasons for her transfer are not plausible.
Thereupon, respondent Navarro appealed to Regional Director Anastacio C. Ramento who rendered a Decision on October 6, 1982, holding that aforesaid transfer is proper and in
accord with law as it was done in the exigencies of the service.
Still dissatisfied with the said Decision, respondent Navarro appealed to Minister Onofre D. Corpuz, in a letter dated October 15, 1982.
In a Resolution dated November 11, 1982, Minister Corpuz denied the said appeal, holding that the transfer of respondent Navarro is proper and lawful since it is the prerogative of
the superintendent to reassign personnel in his division in the exigencies of the service, and considering that the appointment of respondent Navarro does not state any specific
school, her transfer could be effected without violating the law and rule on transfer.
Inspite of said resolution, respondent Navarro refused to comply with the lawful directive of her superior. And, without elevating the matter to the Civil Service Commission for
exhaustion of administrative remedies, said respondent immediately filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against Edna Azurin, Anastacio
Ramonte and Honorable Onofre D. Corpuz before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. Q-37025 and assigned to Judge
Ricardo Tensuan.

On February 25, 1983, Judge Tensuan issued an Order granting the petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
On March 9, 1983, petitioner filed its Answer stating that Navarro is not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction and her action deserved outright dismissal since she failed to
exhaust administrative remedies; that her re-assignment was being made in the exigencies of the service and does not constitute demotion in rank and salary, hence, not in violation
of R.A. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers; that her reassignment was in accordance with MEC Circular No. 28, series of 1962, directing transfer
or reassignment after service of more than five (5) years in one station to avoid the teacher's becoming stale or unchallenged and to avoid over-fraternization with associates which
could be detrimental to the service.
On March 17, 1983, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration in respect of the Order dated February 25, 1983, which motion was denied in an Order dated May 3, 1983.
Accordingly, on July 25, 1983, petitioner filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for certiorari. This case was docketed as AC G.R. No. 01266.
After hearing and oral argument, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a Decision on November 25, 1983 setting aside the Orders dated February 25, 1983 and May 3, 1983.
After resumption of the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-37025 before the Regional Court, petitioner thru counsel moved for the dismissal of the complaint therein on the ground that
Navarro's petition before the Regional Trial Court had been rendered moot and academic by the Decision in AC-G.R. No. 01266, wherein it was stated that her reassignment is valid
since she had not been appointed to a specific station and that Navarro's petition states no cause of action as she failed to appeal her reassignment to the Civil Service
Commission.
After successive hearings and the filing by Navarro of an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and a reply by petitioner, an Order dated August 27, 1986 was issued dismissing Civil
Case No. Q-37025. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by Navarro was denied in an Order dated October 17, 1986.
On appeal by Navarro (CA-G.R. SP No. 11305) the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision (penned by Justice Venancio D. Aldecoa and concurred in by Justices Jorge Coquia and
Josue Bellosillo) declaring null and void the Orders dated August 27, 1986 which dismissed Civil Case No. Q-37025 and October 17, 1986 which had denied Navarro's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, the present recourse.
In deciding for Navarro, the Court of Appeals applied Republic Act No. 4670 known as the Magna Carta of Public School Teachers. The provisions of the law which are relevant to
this case are the following:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to promote and improve the social and economic status of public
school teachers, their living and working conditions, their terms of employment and career prospects in order that they may compare favorably with
existing opportunities in other walks of life, attract and retain in the teaching profession more people with the proper qualification, it being recognized
that advance in education depends on the qualifications and ability of the teaching staff and that education is an essential factor in the economic
growth of the nation as a productive investment of vital importance.
Sec. 2. Title-Definition. This Act shall be known as the "Magna Carta for Public School Teachers" and shall apply to all public school teachers
except those in the professional staff of state colleges and universities.
As used in this Act, the term "teacher" shall mean all persons engaged in classroom teaching, in any level of instruction, on full-time basis, including
guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial arts or vocational instructors, and all other persons performing supervisory and/or administrative
functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the Government or its political subdivision; but shall not include school nurses, school
physicians, school dentists, and other school employees.
Sec. 6. Consent for Transfer Transportation Expences. Except for cause and as herein otherwise provided, no teacher shall be transferred
without his consent from one station to another.
Were the exigencies of the service require the transfer of a teacher from one station to another, such transfer may be effected by the school
superintendent who shall previously notify the teacher concerned of the transfer and the reason or reasons therefor. If the teacher believes there is
no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the Director of Public Schools, or the Director of Vocational Education, as the case may
be. Pending his appeal and the decision thereon; his transfer shall be held in abeyance: Provided, however, That no transfers whatever shall be
made three months before any local or national election.
Necessary transfer expenses of the teacher and his family shall be paid for by the Government if his transfer is finally approved. (pp. 439-440, 128
SCRA)
Citing the case of Maderazo Jr. vs. Baylon, 128 SCRA 440, the Court of Appeals ruled that the reassignment of Navarro is contrary to law because it is without her consent and over
her opposition and that the reason for the reassignment was not plausible.
The aforequoted provision of Republic Act No. 4670 particularly Section 6 thereof which provides that except for cause and in the exigencies of the service no teacher shall be
transferred without his consent from one station to another, finds no application in the case at bar as this is predicated upon the theory that the teacher concerned is appointed

not merely assigned to a particular station. Thus:

The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as the appointment indicates a specification. Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained security of tenure
cannot shield her. In appointments of this nature, this Court has consistently rejected the officer's demand to remain even as public service
dictates that a transfer be made in a particular station. Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature is expressed in the following statement in
Ibanez vs. Commission on Elections (1967 Phil. 257, 264, L-26558, April 27, 1967):
That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our Civil Service System, is not open to
debate. The mantle of its protection extends not only against removals without cause but also against unconsented transfer
which, as repeatedly enunciated, are tantamount to removals which are within the ambit of the fundamental guarantee.
However, the availability of that security of tenure necessarily depends, in the first instance, upon the nature of the
appointment (Hojilla vs. Marino, et al., G.R. No. L-20574, February 26, 1965.) Such that the rule which proscribes transfers
without consent as anathema to the security of tenure is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed
not merely assigned to a particular station (Miclat V. Ganaden, et al., G.R. No. L-14459, May 30, 1960; Jaro v. Valencia, et
al., G.R. No. L-18352, August 30, 1963). [Brillantes v. Guevarra, supra] (pp. 123-124, Rollo)
The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any particular station or school. As such, she could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently
at any specific school. (Bongbong vs. Parado, 57 SCRA 623) When she was assigned to the Carlos Albert High School, it could not have been with the intention to let her stay in
said school permanently. Otherwise, her appointment would have so stated. Consequently, she may be assigned to any station or school in Quezon City as the exigencies of public
service require even without her consent. As this Court ruled in Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138, 143
Plaintiff's confident stride falters. She took too loose a view of the applicable jurisprudence. Her refuge behind the mantle of security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution is not impenetrable. She proceeds upon the assumption that she occupies her station in Sinalang Elementary School
by appointment. But her first appointment as Principal merely reads thus: "You are hereby appointed a Principal (Elementary School) in the Bureau
of Public Schools, Department of Education", without mentioning her station. She cannot therefore claim security of tenure as Principal of Sinalang
Elementary School or any particular station. She may be assigned to any station as exigencies of public service requires, has no right of choice. (p.
123, Rollo)
It should be here emphasized that Azurin's letter of August 12, 1982, clearly stated that Navarro's reassignment is in the exigencies of the service. It was explicitly mentioned that her
re-assignment is a recognition of her capabilities as administrator in improving the Carlos Albert High School and that she should look at her new assignment as a challenge to
accomplish new and bigger projects for Manuel Roxas High School. Moreover, her reassignment was the result of a recognition/reshuffling of all principals in the Quezon City public
high schools in the exigencies of the service pursuant to MEC Circular No. 26, Series of 1972. This circular refers to the policy of the Ministry of Education that principals, district
supervisors, academic supervisors, general education supervisors, school administrative officers and superintendents are to be transferred upon completion of five (5) years of
service in one station. Such policy was based on the experience that when school officials have stayed long enough in one station, there is a tendency for them to become stale and
unchallenged by new situations and conditions, and that some administrative problems accumulate for a good number of years.
In the case at bar, the reasons given by Azurin in recommending Navarro's reassignment were far from whimsical, capricious or arbitrary. Navarro had been assigned as principal of
Carlos Albert High School for more than ten (10) years. She was ripe for reassignment. That she was a model principal was precisely one of the reasons for recommending her for
reassignment so that her management and expertise could be availed of in her new assignment. Apart from the presumption of good faith that Azurin enjoys, We believe that her
recommendation for Navarro's reassignment for the latter to share the benefits of her expertise in her new assignment plus the recognizable fact that a relatively long stay in
one's station tends towards over-fraternization with associates which could be injurious to the service has a substantial factual basis that meets the requirements of the
exigencies of the service.
The Maderazo ruling cited by the Court of Appeals in its Decision is not applicable in the instant case. The case involved a district supervisor who was being transferred without the
reason for such transfer being stated. At the time of his transfer he was already 61 years old and due to retire. These circumstances are not present in the case at bar because the
reason for Navarro's reassignment was stated and made known to her.
With the foregoing, the conclusion is thus inescapable that there can be no violation of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers in this case.
Finally, respondent Navarro has not exhausted administrative remedies as she did not elevate the matter of her transfer to the Civil Service Commission in accordance with Section
24 (c) PD No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree which provides:
(C) Transfer. A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is equivalent in rank, level, or salary without break in service involving
the issuance of an appointment.
It shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which case, the employees concerned shall be informed of the
reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer he may appeal his case to the (Civil Service) Commission.
(Emphasis supplied) (pp. 125-126, Rollo)
By not appealing her case to the Civil Service Commission before filing Special Civil Action No. Q-37025, respondent Navarro is indubitably without cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 1987 is hereby SET ASIDE and another one rendered DISMISSING Special Civil Action No. Q-37025 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Wednesday, March 02, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11600

June 27, 1958

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
IIGO PABLICO CORPIN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellant.
Estanislao L. Granados and Primitivo Penaranda for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines is appealing the order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, in Special Proceedings No.
294, of September 17, 1956, denying permission to commence the present action of quo warranto on the following grounds.

We quote the last paragraph of said order:

Considering that the present petition for leave to admit the complaint was filed long after the lapse of the
period of one week after the proclamation of the defendant as mayor elect of Biliran, Leyte as required by
Section 173 of the Election Code; and considering further that there is pending resolution by the Court of
Appeals Case No. 264, CA-G. R. 16375, another quo warranto case filed by Jose Napalit against the same
defendant, and at whose instance and relation the present case is being filed, and that the decision in said quo
warranto case is decisive on issues herein involved, the Court hereby DENIES permission to commence the
present action, with costs against the indemnity filed by the relator.
The appellee is Iigo Pablico Corpin, the Solicitor General in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, appellant,
makes a succinct and correct statement of the facts invoked, and inasmuch as the appellee accepts the correctness of said
statement of the case and of the facts, we reproduce the same below and make it our own:
On June 20, 1956, the Provincial Fiscal of Tacloban, Leyte, in representation of the Republic of the
Philippines, and upon relation of Jose Napalit, filed a complaint for quo warranto. The action seeks to
exclude from the Office of the Municipal Mayor, of the municipality of Biliran, Leyte, the herein defendant,
Iigo Pablico Corpin, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and is therefore, unlawfully holding the
position (pp. 2-3 rec.). A motion to dismiss the complaint was filed by the defendant, alleging that the relator
in this case Jose Napalit, a defeated candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Biliran, Leyte, had
previously filed a similar petition for quo warranto against him to impugn is election on the ground of
ineligibility, and that said case has been decided by the Court of First Instance in favor of the defendant and is
now on appeal before the Court of Appeals (pp. 10-12, rec.). The Provincial Fiscal filed an opposition to the
motion to dismiss, alleging that the first case cannot be pleaded to bar the filing of the present proceedings at
the instance of the Republic of the Philippines, because the latter was not a party in the first quo warranto
case which was brought directly by Jose Napalit, without the intervention of the provincial fiscal or any
official in representation of the Republic of the Philippines. (pp. 13-15, rec.).
On August 4, 1956, the Court on motion of the defendant, issued an order authorizing him to withdraw his
motion to dismiss, considering that the complaint had up to then not yet been ordered docketed by the court,
but reserving for the defendant the right to file an opposition against the admission of said complaint (pp. 1718, rec.). Pursuant to the order just mentioned, the defendant filed an opposition to the complaint therein
embodying the same argument which he had adduced in his motion to dismiss. (pp. 21-24, rec.).
On September 17, 1956, the court issued an order denying, for the reasons therein stated, permission to
commence the present action, with costs against the indemnity bond filed by the relator (pp. 25-31, rec.). A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the provincial fiscal which was opposed by the defendant; and acting
on said motion for reconsideration, the court denied the same (p. 41, rec.). From the order of the court dated
September 17, 1956 and its order dated November 3, 1956, the provincial fiscal interposed the present appeal.
The Solicitor General makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the present petition for quo warranto requires permission of the court
before same could be filed therein.

II. The lower court erred in holding that the quo warranto case against the same defendant herein entitled
"Jose Napalit vs. Iigo Pablico Corpin," Case No. 264, may be pleaded in abatement of the petition for quo
warranto under the principle of res judicata.
III. The lower court erred in not giving due course to the present action for quo warranto.
Under the first assignment of error, the Government contends that it was not necessary to secure the permission of the trial
court before filing the action, for the reason that the Provincial Fiscal who filed the complaint, alleged in his petition "that he
has good reasons to believe that there is proper action for quo warranto against the herein defendant Iigo Pablico Corpin."
Consequently, it is argued, the petition falls under the provisions of Section 3, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, which reads as
follows:
SEC. 3. When Solicitor General or fiscal must commence action. The Solicitor General or a fiscal when
directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to
believe that any case specified in the last two preceding sections can be established by proof, must commence
such action.,
whereas, the trial court allegedly through error, applied Section 4 of the same rule, which reads as follows:
SEC. 4. When Solicitor General or fiscal may commence action with permission of court. The Solicitor
General or fiscal may, with the permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an
action at the request and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first
require an indemnity for expenses and costs of the action to be given to him by the person at whose request
and upon whose relation the same is brought.
The trouble with this argument of the Government and the position taken by it is that its very petition or complaint before
the trial court invoked Section 4 of Rule 68. Not only this, but it asked for leave of court to file said petition or complaint. In
other words, it made it known to the lower court that the law applicable was Section 4 of Rule 68 and that the permission of
said court was necessary before the action could be filed. Now before this Tribunal, the same Government, through the
Solicitor General, tells us exactly the opposite, namely, that it is Section 3 (not Section 4) of Rule 68, and that the permission
of the lower court is absolutely unnecessary. The least that could be said is that appellant Republic of the Philippines is not
now in a position, and may not charge the trial court with the supposedly erroneous action, if error it be, that it itself induced
and persuaded said trial court to take. But regardless of this inconsistent and equivocal position of appellant, we are inclined
to agree with the trial court and the appellee that the pendency of another case of quo warranto on the same subject matter
which was previously decided by the same trial court, and now pending in the Court of Appeals, can be pleaded in
abatement of the present action on the ground that a final decision on the said appeal, either by the Court of Appeals or, if
taken to us on review, by this Tribunal, would definitely and finally resolve and settle the issue or issues involved in the
present case, and thus serve as res adjudicata.
The issue in both cases is whether or not defendant-appellee is or is not a Filipino citizen now and at the time he was
declared mayor-elect of the municipality of Biliran, Leyte, and whether or not he is at present illegally occupying said post.
When that issue is finally determined, it matters little and becomes of no importance whether the action against defendantappellee was brought under Section 3 or under Section 4 of Rule 68, whether brought by a private party or by the
Government itself. When the objective and goal is the same or identical, the procedure and the way followed to reach and
achieve the end is of little or no import. True, in the first case now pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, the Government

was not a party and was not given its day in court, but it should not be forgotten that the action therein was brought by a
private individual in accordance with the provisions of a law which the Government itself, through its legislative
department, had provided to test the right of a person to occupy a public and elective position. It is equally true that the
Government is interested in such a question or issue, because it does not want to see and allow an intruder or impostor to
occupy a public position. But when the law itself, Section 4 of Rule 68, allows a private party, alone and without the
intervention of the Government and before a competent court, to test the right of a person to occupy a public position, it is
apparent that the procedure so provided by law is deemed adequate, safe, and sufficient, without the intervention of the
Government itself.
It is also true that the Government is also given by the law an opportunity to question in court the right of a person or
corporation to occupy a public position or exercise public functions, but when as in the present case, said Government
allowed a private individual to file the same action for the same purpose, without even any attempt on its part to intervene in
the action, and then allowed several months to elapse before it finally wakened to bring its own action for the same purpose
and objective, we fail to see any reason for said rather belated second action, because the first petition or suit by the
individual would adequately and sufficiently decide the same issue and either affirm the position of the defendant if found
legally occupying a public position, or oust him from the same if found not qualified and without any prerogative or
authority. Besides, the Government could have asked for permission to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae in the first
case instituted by now relator Jose Napalit.
Moreover, the trial court should be accorded discretion to grant or withhold permission to file the action contemplated in
Section 4 of Rule 68, specially when as in the present case, the suit sought to be filed by the Government was upon relation
of relator Jose Napalit.
[SEC. 27] (b) Discretion of Court. Granting or refusing leave to institute a quo warranto proceeding by
filing an information or otherwise rests largely in the discretion of the court to which the application is
made. . . . In exercising its discretion, the court may and should consider all the circumstances of the case, the
motives of the relator in having the proceeding instituted, the time which has elapsed since the cause of
complaint occurred, and whether the public interest will be served by allowing the information to be filed;
and it may leave or decline to entertain the proceeding upon considerations of public policy, interest, or
convenience, or because of such conduct on the part of applicants as precludes them from making the inquiry,
circumstances tending to throw suspicion on the motives of the relator, long, unexcused, and prejudicial delay
or acquiesence on the part of the persons complaining or the public generally, or the prior institution of
actions, proceedings, or contests involving the same questions, . . . . In a proceeding brought for the benefit of
the relator primarily, the court's discretion is much greater than where purely public interests are involved.
(51 C. J. 328-29).
In conclusion, we hold that where under the Revised Election Code, a defeated candidate for the office of mayor has filed
quo warranto proceedings against the opposing candidate who had been declared elected and has assumed office, for the
purpose of having him ousted from the said office on the ground that he was not eligible or qualified because he was not a
Filipino citizen, and said quo warranto case has been finally decided by the Court of First Instance, and was pending appeal
in the Court of Appeals, it is usually not necessary for the Government, through the Solicitor General, and at the request or
instance of the same party who instituted the quo warranto proceedings, to bring another action of quo warranto to test the
right of the same party respondent in the first quo warranto case to occupy the office. The reason is that a final decision in
the first case either by the Court of Appeals where it was pending appeal, or by the Supreme Court, should said case ever
reach it, would definitely and finally determine the same issue involved in the second case, and constitute res adjudicata.

The granting or denial of permission to file said second suit by the Government under Rule 68, Section 4, of the Rules of
Court, rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, specially when said suit by the Government is being instituted upon
the relation and at the instance of the same party relator who filed the first quo warranto proceedings.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur..
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

FERDINAND S.
TOPACIO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 179895

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,
- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN
GREGORY
SANTOS
ONG and THE OFFICE
OF
THE
SOLICITOR
GENERAL,
Respondents.

NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE
and

CASTRO,

BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:

December 18, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition for

certiorari and prohibition seeks, in the main, to prevent Justice
Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers, duties and
responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

It will be recalled that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,44

[1] the Court, by Decision of July 3, 2007, enjoined Ong from
accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the
functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed
all

necessary

steps,

through

the

appropriate

adversarial

proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino

citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship. 45[2]

On July 9, 2007, Ong immediately filed with the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Petition for the amendment/ correction/
supplementation or annotation of an entry in [his] Certificate of

44[1] G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 353.

45[2] Id. at 367.

Birth, docketed as S.P. Proc No. 11767-SJ, Gregory Santos Ong v.

The Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, et al. 46[3]

46[3] Vide rollo, pp. 25-46.

Meanwhile,

petitioner,

Request/Complaint47[4]

of

by

September

verified
5,

2007,

Letterimplored

respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate posthaste a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the latters
capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
Invoking

paragraph

1,

Section

7,

Article

VIII

of

the

Constitution48[5] in conjunction with the Courts Decision in

Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,49[6] petitioner points out that
natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as
member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet
the citizenship requirement from the time of his appointment as
such in October 1998.

The OSG, by letter of September 25, 2007, informed

petitioner that it cannot favorably act on [his] request for the
filing of a quo warranto petition until the [RTC] case shall have
been terminated with finality.50[7] Petitioner assails this position of
47[4] Id. at 19-22.
48[5] No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of
the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for
fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)
49[6] Supra note 1.
50[7] Rollo, p. 24.

the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside

from Ongs continuous discharge of judicial functions.

Hence, this petition, positing that:

IN OCTOBER OF 1998, RESPONDENT WAS NOT DULY-QUALIFIED UNDER

THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1, SECTION 7, OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, TO BE APPOINTED AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, MERELY ON THE STRENGTH OF AN IDENTIFICATION
CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND A 1ST
INDORSEMENT DATED 22 MAY 1997 ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998, RESPONDETS BIRTH
CERTIFICATE INDICATED THAT RESPONDENT IS A CHINESE CITIZEN AND
BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998, THE RECORDS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT DECLARED THAT RESPONDENT IS A NATURALIZED FILIPINO
CITIZEN.51[8] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner thus contends that Ong should immediately desist

from

holding

the

position

of

Associate

Justice

of

the

Sandiganbayan since he is disqualified on the basis of citizenship,

whether gauged from his birth certificate which indicates him to
be a Chinese citizen or against his bar records bearing out his
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen, as declared in Kilosbayan
Foundation v. Ermita.

51[8] Id. at 7-8.

Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan Foundation v.

Ermita did not annul or declare null his appointment as Justice of
the Supreme Court, but merely enjoined him from accepting his
appointment, and that there is no definitive pronouncement
therein that he is not a natural-born Filipino. He informs that he,
nonetheless, voluntarily relinquished the appointment to the
Supreme Court out of judicial statesmanship. 52[9]

By Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss of January 3, 2008,

Ong informs that the RTC, by Decision of October 24, 2007,
already granted his petition and recognized him as a natural-born
citizen. The Decision having, to him, become final, 53[10]he caused
the corresponding annotation thereof on his Certificate of Birth. 54
[11]

Invoking the curative provisions of the 1987 Constitution,

Ong explains that his status as a natural-born citizen inheres from
birth and the legal effect of such recognition retroacts to the time
of his birth.
52[9] Vide footnote 16 of Comment, id. at 89.
53[10] Vide Entry of Judgment/Certificate of Finality of December 27, 2007, id. at
123.
54[11] Id. at 124, 127.

Ong thus concludes that in view of the RTC decision, there is

no more legal or factual basis for the present petition, or at the
very least this petition must await the final disposition of the RTC
case which to him involves a prejudicial issue.

The

parties

to

the

present

petition

have

exchanged

pleadings55[12] that mirror the issues in the pending petitions for

certiorari in G.R. No. 180543, Kilosbayan Foundation, et al. v.
Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr., et al, filed with this Court and in CA-G.R. SP
No. 102318, Ferdinand S. Topacio v. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr., et al.,56
[13] filed with the appellate court, both of which assail, inter alia,
the RTC October 24, 2007 Decision.

First, on the objection concerning the verification of the

petition.

55[12] Petitioner filed a Counter Manifestation with Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss, to which Ong filed a Reply. After petitioner filed a Rejoinder, Ong filed a
Comment ad cautelam, to which petitioner submitted a Reply.
56[13] Petitioner filed on February 13, 2008 a Petition for Certiorari with Ad
Cautelam Motion to Certify to the Supreme Court which also assails the RTC Orders
of October 30, 2007, November 7, 2007 and December 26, 2007 and calls for the
reopening of the RTC proceedings.

The OSG alleges that the petition is defectively verified,

being based on petitioners personal knowledge and belief and/or
authentic records, and having been acknowledged before a notary
public who happens to be petitioners father, contrary to the Rules
of Court57[14] and the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, 58[15]
respectively.

This technicality deserves scant consideration where the

question at issue, as in this case, is one purely of law and there is
57[14] RULES OF COURT, Rule 7, Sec. 4, as amended, reads: Except when
otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified
or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that
the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
information and belief, or upon knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (Underscoring supplied)

58[15] Resolution of July 6, 2004 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule IV, Sec. 3 of which reads: A
notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
(a) is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized;
(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right, title,
interest, cash, property, or other consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by law; or
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of
the principal within the fourth civil degree. (Underscoring supplied)

no need of delving into the veracity of the allegations in the

petition, which are not disputed at all by respondents. 59[16]

One factual allegation extant from the petition is the

exchange of written communications between petitioner and the
OSG, the truthfulness of which the latter does not challenge.
Moreover, petitioner also verifies such correspondence on the
basis of the thereto attached letters, the authenticity of which he
warranted in the same verification-affidavit. Other allegations in
the petition are verifiable in a similar fashion, while the rest are
posed as citations of law.

The purpose of verification is simply to secure an assurance

that the allegations of the petition or complaint have been made
in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings,
and non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render it
fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a
jurisdictional requirement.60[17]
59[16] Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and Development, Inc.
(ACORD) v. Zamora, G.R. No. 144256, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 578, 590 citing
Decano v. Edu, 99 SCRA 410, 420 (1980).
60[17] Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada, G.R. 168943, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 828,
840-841.

In the same vein, the Court brushes aside the defect, insofar
as the petition is concerned, of a notarial act performed by one
who is disqualified by reason of consanguinity, without prejudice
to any administrative complaint that may be filed against the
notary public.

Certiorari with respect to the OSG

On the issue of whether the OSG committed grave abuse of

discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for quo warranto, the
Court rules in the negative.

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 61[18]

61[18] Feliciano v. Villasin, G.R. No. 174929, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 348, 363-364.

The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a

grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the filing
of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been
terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with
grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party
disagrees with it.62[19]

The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government, its

agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. In the
discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the
best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by
law.63[20]

The pertinent rules of Rule 66 on quo warranto provide:

SECTION 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for

the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a
verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office, position or franchise;

62[19] Marohomsalic v. Cole, G.R. No. 169918, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 98.
63[20] Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, 189 SCRA
459.

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of
law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines
without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.
SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence
action. The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the
President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good
reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be
established by proof, must commence such action.
SEC. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence
action with permission of court. The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor
may, with the permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced,
bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of another person; but in
such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses
and costs of the action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court
by the person at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought.
(Italics and emphasis in the original)

In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may

suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto
where there are just and valid reasons. 64[21] Thus, in Gonzales v.
Chavez,65[22] the Court ruled:

64[21] Amante v. Hilado, 67 Phil. 338 (1939); cf Gumaru v. Quirino State College, G.R.
No.164196, June 22, 2007, 525 SCRA 412, 423 holding that the Solicitor General cannot
refuse to represent the government without a just and valid reason; cf. Commission on
Elections v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108120, January 26, 1994, 229 SCRA 501 even insofar
as control over criminal cases before appellate courts is concerned.

65[22] G.R. No. 97351, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 816.

Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has

absolute discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not to
prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started, our own
Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or
compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other
party. Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that the
Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid
reasons, for the discretion given him is not unlimited. Its exercise
must be, not only within the parameters get by law but with the best
interest of the State as the ultimate goal.66[23]

Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General

exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may
start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in
court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do
everything within his legal authority but always conformably with
the national interest and the policy of the government on the
matter at hand.67[24]
It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor General
saw the folly of re-litigating the same issue of Ongs citizenship in
the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, not to
mention the consequent risk of forum-shopping. In any event, the
OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it merely advised
petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.

66[23] Id. at 838-839.

67[24] Calderon v. Solicitor General, G.R. Nos. 103752-53, November 25, 1992, 215
SCRA 876, 882.

Certiorari and Prohibition with respect to Ong

By petitioners admission, what is at issue is Ongs title to the

office of Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan. 68[25] He claims to
have been constrained to file the present petition after the OSG
refused to heed his request to institute a suit for quo warranto.
Averring that Ong is disqualified to be a member of any lower
collegiate

court,

petitioner

specifically

prays

that,

after

appropriate proceedings, the Court

. . . issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition against Respondent Ong,

ordering Respondent Ong to cease and desist from further exercising
the powers, duties, and responsibilities of a Justice of the
Sandiganbayan due to violation of the first sentence of paragraph 1,
Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution; . . . issue the writs of certiorari and
prohibition against Respondent Ong and declare that he was
disqualified from being appointed to the post of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan in October of 1998, considering that, as of October of
1998, the birth certificate of Respondent Ong declared that he is a
Chinese citizen, while even the records of this Honorable Court, as of
October of 1998, declared that Respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino;
x x x69[26]

68[25] Rollo, p. 257 as petitioner justifies his failure to implead the nominating and
appointing authority as indispensable parties whose official actions are allegedly the
very acts assailed.
69[26] Id. at 14-15.

While

denominated

as

petition

for

certiorari

and

prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a quo warranto

proceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare
null and void his appointment as an Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. While the petition
professes to be one for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner even
adverts to a quo warranto aspect of the petition.70[27]

Being a collateral attack on a public officers title, the present

petition for certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed.

The title to a public office may not be contested except

directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed
collaterally,71[28] even through mandamus72[29] or a motion to
annul or set aside order.73[30] In Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,74

70[27] Vide id. at 254-255, 257 where petitioner admits that the action consists of
both a quo warranto case and a certiorari case.
71[28] Gonzales v. COMELEC, et al., 129 Phil 7, 29 (1967).
72[29] Pilar v. Sec. of the DPWTC, et al., 125 Phil. 766 (1967).
73[30] Gamboa, et al. v. CA, et al., 194 Phil. 624 (1981).

[31] the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into
the validity of the appointment of a public officer.

x x x [T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons

acting as judges or other judicial officers, cannot be treated as a
substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any
of the functions of the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto,
the title to the office and the right to act cannot be questioned by
prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of a judicial office, the
person dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of prohibition
commanding the alleged intruder to cease from performing judicial
acts, since in its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by
which to determine the title to an office.75[32]

Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo warranto,
the petition is, just the same, dismissible.

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to

determine the right or title to the contested public office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment. 76[33] It is brought against the
person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or
unlawfully held or exercised the public office, 77[34] and may be
74[31] 85 Phil. 126 (1949).
75[32] Id. at 133.
76[33] Sec. Defensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276, 302 (1998).
77[34] RULES OF COURT, Rule 66, Sec. 1.

commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the

case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another.78[35]

Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back

to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor,79[36] reiterated in the recent
2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin,80[37] that for a quo warranto
petition to be successful, the private person suing must
show a clear right to the contested office. In fact, not even a
mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a
modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action. 81[38]

In the present case, petitioner presented no sufficient proof

of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of an Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan. He in fact concedes that he was
never entitled to assume the office of an Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan.82[39]
78[35] RULES OF COURT Rule 66, Sec. 5.
79[36] 5 Phil. 18 (1905).
80[37] G.R. No. 174929, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 348.
81[38] Vide Garcia v. Perez, 188 Phil. 43, 47 (1980).
82[39] Rollo, p. 9.

In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto is filed by

an individual in his own name, he must be able to prove that he is
entitled to the controverted public office, position, or franchise;
otherwise, the holder of the same has a right to the undisturbed
possession thereof. In actions for Quo Warranto to determine title to a
public office, the complaint, to be sufficient in form, must show that the
plaintiff is entitled to the office. In Garcia v. Perez, this Court ruled that
the person instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf,
under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to
show that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Without such averment
or evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed at any
stage.83[40] (Emphasis in the original)

The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his

public judicial functions, cannot be questioned by any merely
private suitor, or by any other, except in the form especially
provided by law.84[41] To uphold such action would encourage
every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing
incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of
the governmental machine.85[42]

Clearly then, it becomes entirely unwarranted at this time to

pass upon the citizenship of Ong. The Court cannot, upon the
83[40] Feliciano v. Villasin, G.R. No. 174929, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 348, 366.
84[41] Tayko v. Capistrano, 53 Phil. 866, 872 (1928).
85[42] Tarrosa v. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, May 25, 1994, 232 SCRA 553.

authority of the present petition, determine said question without

encroaching on and preempting the proceedings emanating from
the RTC case. Even petitioner clarifies that he is not presently
seeking

resolution

on

Ongs

citizenship,

even

while

he

acknowledges the uncertainty of Ongs natural-born citizenship. 86

[43]

The present case is different from Kilosbayan Foundation v.

Ermita, given Ongs actual physical possession and exercise of the
functions

of

the

office

of

an

Associate

Justice

of

the

Sandiganbayan, which is a factor that sets into motion the de

facto doctrine.

Suffice it to mention that a de facto officer is one who is in

possession of the office and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from an
election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the
incumbent is not a mere volunteer.87[44] If a person appointed to
an

office

is

subsequently

declared

ineligible

therefor,

86[43] Rollo, pp. 233-234.

87[44] Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., G.R. No. 154674, May 27, 2004, 429
SCRA 773, 786.

his

presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that will
confer on him the status of a de facto officer.88[45]

x x x A judge de facto assumes the exercise of a part of the prerogative

of sovereignty, and the legality of that assumption is open to the attack
of the sovereign power alone. Accordingly, it is a well-established
principle, dating back from the earliest period and repeatedly confirmed
by an unbroken current of decisions, that the official acts of a de facto
judge are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure judge, so far
as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.89[46]

If only to protect the sanctity of dealings by the public with

persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State, and
without ruling on the conditions for the interplay of the de facto
doctrine, the Court declares that Ong may turn out to be either a
de jure officer who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed
and qualified and whose term of office has not expired, or a de
facto officer who enjoys certain rights, among which is that his
title to said office may not be contested except directly by writ of
quo warranto,90[47] which contingencies all depend on the final
outcome of the RTC case.
88[45] Carlo Cruz, THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS (1999) 37 citing Regala v. Court of
First Instance of Bataan, 77 Phil. 684 (1946).
89[46] Tayco v. Capistrano, supra at 872-873.
90[47] Ibid.

With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to

dwell on the ancillary issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

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Form No. 1--Contract of Lease Simple Form

Category: Philippines Legal Form

Hits: 49267

(Contract of Lease Simple Form)

CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Contract of Lease made and entered into by and between:
_____________, of legal age, Filipino, (single / married / widow), and a resident of
_____________, Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as the "LESSOR");

- and _____________, of legal age, Filipino, (single / married / widow), and a resident of
_____________, Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as the "LESSEE");

WITNESSETH That:
WHEREAS, the LESSOR is the owner of a certain parcel of land situated at _____________,
Philippines, more particularly described as follows:
(Technical Description of Property)
WHEREAS, the Lessor desires to lease the afore-described property in favor of the LESSEE and
the LESSEE accepts the lease subject to the terms and conditions herein set forth.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the terms and conditions mutually agreed upon
by the parties, the LESSOR hereby lease unto the LESSEE, his heirs, successors and assigns, the
above-described parcel of land subject to the following terms and conditions, to wit:
1. That the term of this lease shall be for a period of _____________ (_____) (years/months) to
commence upon the signing of this Contract and shall be renewable for another _____________
(_____) (years/months) at the option of the LESSEE, and thereafter renewable upon mutual
agreement of the parties;
2. That the monthly rentals on the leased premises above-mentioned shall be
__________________________ (P___________), Philippine Currency for the first
_____________ (_____) (years/months) of this agreement, which shall be increased by
__________________________ (P___________) every _____________ (_____) (years/months)
thereafter. The rentals shall be paid by the LESSEE to the LESSOR on a monthly basis payable
on or before the _______th day of the every month;
3. That upon the signing of this Contract, the LESSEE agrees to pay advanced rentals for
_____________ (_______) months;
4. That the LESSOR shall pay the real property taxes levied of the leased premises
corresponding to the aforementioned parcel of land while the LESSEE shall pay the real property
taxes levied on the building and other improvements that shall be introduced by the latter;

5. It is expressly agreed by the parties herein that any fixed improvements or renovations that
will be introduced in the subject stall shall become the property of the LESSOR after the
expiration of the term of this Contract.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their signatures this
_____________ at _____________, Philippines.
LESSOR LESSEE
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
__________________ __________________
(ACKNOWLEDGMENT)