G.R. No.

202242 July 17, 2012

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme
Court Chief Justice following Renato Coronas departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate,
competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that (1) A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. In compliance therewith, Congress, from
the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the
JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven
(7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC
as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a
unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating a representative of the National Assembly to the
JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if
the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead
of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of
Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive
the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be
members of the JBC does not render JBCs purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the
presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six
(6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have thecc right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions
of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, a representative of Congress, the use of the
singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in
mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers
could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.
Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body
of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle
to this case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there
is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless,
even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional
Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a
single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among
any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress
and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional
Commission, held that Congress, in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as
one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that an interplay between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to
them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required
between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial
officers. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the
Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by
having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would
negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of
it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with
an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is
explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to
which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land,
must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time.
It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself
to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition
is immediately executory

G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013 JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 199082
July 23, 2013
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; et al, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
NATURE:

These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in G.R.
No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look
at our September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against
respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator
Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee
(Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.
FACTS:

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Teppppa m on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud
and manipulation cases
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May
14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was
indeed perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage and manipulating the election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1. Fact- Finding Teams Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules
of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004
and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the
preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the
Comelec.
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the
Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction
HELD:
1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in
the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for
election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of

Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that we the the court cannot consider the creation of the
Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelecs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction"
authorized by the amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to
deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no
prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is
the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the
Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the refiling of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent
assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a
settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.