Chapter One

The Authority of Science: Method

We learn early about something called the scientific method. It is because science uses
a reliable method for arriving at the truth that we have such confidence in its outcomes.
The method, we learn, involves testing through experience and repeatability. Exactly
how the elements of the method are put together varies depending on which textbook or
source youre using. So what is the scientific method, and what would it have to be in
order for it to underpin the authority of science? Here, well look at two different broad
attitudes about scientific method. Observational evidence is the touchstone for each,
but observation comes in at a different point in each account.

Inductivism
Theres a long considered view about scientific method according to which all scientific
activity begins with careful observation. From a body of data carefully collected, general
principles are determined by induction and these principles are then used to make
further predictions that can be tested by experience.
The general schema
observation generalization prediction
lies behind the method that is known as inductivism.

Induction and deduction

The word induction comes to us from the study of logic. Logicians study the
relationship between the premises and conclusion of an argument.

If the premises are intended to guarantee or prove the conclusion, the

argument is a deduction.
If the premises are intended to show that the conclusion is probable, the
argument is an induction.

Observation of thousands of black ravens (and no ravens of any other color) makes it
highly probable that all ravens are black, but it doesnt guarantee or prove it, since the
next observed raven may be a counterexample. So the reasoning from the evidence to
the general conclusion in this case is inductive. The inductivist about scientific method
says that all science works in this way. Start from premises about evidence, and reason
to the probability of general claims about nature. As medieval logicians liked to say,
science proceeds by rising from the particular to the general. Read the note Logic in
notes on scientific reasoning for more information
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Aristotle
The greatest of ancient theorists about science (and arguably the greatest of ancient
scientists) was Aristotle (384-322 b.c.e.) Aristotle studied philosophy and mathematics
at Platos Academy, but later moved away from the strictly mathematical and deductive
conception of natural science he found there. He established a research program in
marine biology on the coast of the Aegean Sea, and later founded his own research
school in Athens the Lyceum.
Aristotle and inductivism
Aristotle was not a straightforward inductivist. His approach to science was conditioned
by his belief that all of our concepts come to us through sensory experience. We have
no innate ideas. However, he also believed very strongly that a scientific system
showed the causal and logical relationships among scientific generalizations. Thus, in
his most important treatise on scientific method the Posterior Analytics Aristotle
divides scientific knowledge into two parts: primary principles and derived knowledge.
To have genuine scientific knowledge of an item of the second kind, one must show that
it is a logical and causal consequence of primary principles about the nature of the
thing. Its not sufficient merely to have overwhelming evidence in favor of it.
For example, one might have plenty of empirical evidence that thunderstorms are
accompanied by a drop in barometric pressure. But the proposition all thunderstorms
are associated with a drop in barometric pressure does not count as scientific
knowledge unless we can demonstrate why this is the case. So there is an important
element of deduction in Aristotles account of the method by which we arrive at scientific
knowledge.
On the other hand, knowledge of primary principles cant be arrived at by deducing
them from more fundamental principles because there is nothing more fundamental. In
this case, Aristotle tells us in Book II part 19, it is by induction. Individual observations
of the same phenomenon build up to a universal generalization. We make thousands
of observations of black ravens and these add up to an experience of the universal a
judgment that all ravens are of this nature.
Knowledge of primary principles about the nature of something follows the inductivist
method, then. Start with careful observation, generalize through induction, predict
about future cases.

An important point about terminology: our translation of the Posterior Analytics

distinguishes between scientific knowledge and intuition, but it would be more in
keeping with our own understanding of the expression scientific knowledge to
distinguish between secondary knowledge and primary knowledge. We have
secondary scientific knowledge by demonstration from primary principles; we have
primary scientific knowledge by induction. Aristotle considers the way in which we know
the results of induction as a kind of intuition.
In fact, our evidence of Aristotles own scientific activity suggests that he employed this
method to arrive at most scientific generalities, not only primary principles. However, he
insisted that no genuine knowledge is to be had of non-primary propositions until they
are shown to fit into a causal-deductive system or theory.

Francis Bacon
Aristotles account of scientific method is sometimes called the method of induction and
deduction because of the separate roles of each form of reasoning in establishing
scientific knowledge. During the middle ages, his method was more influential in its
deductive part than its inductive part, and by the time of the scientific revolution,
Aristotles name had unfortunately become something of a byword for purely logical
manoeuvring without any reference to experience. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was one
of the most important theorists of scientific method during the scientific revolution. He
was nothing more than an amateur scientist himself, not in the league of Aristotle or of
his contemporaries Galileo, Kepler or Descartes as a producer of original scientific
ideas. But his writing on method had a transformative influence on the culture of
science, most notably since it was explicitly adopted by Isaac Newton.
Bacon criticized the scientific culture of his own time largely in terms of the confusion
and obscurity of its concepts. He identified four idols of scientific thinking:

Idols of the cave: concepts arrived at through peculiarities of upbringing.

We tend to conceptualize the world from the subjective point of view of our
own community;
Idols of the tribe: concepts peculiar to the human experience. An example
would be thinking that the way our sense organs perceive the world gives
us an objective view of how the world is: creatures with different eyes
would see it differently;
Idols of the marketplace: words that have no meaning associated with
them. Bacon is employing the image of currency as it is used as a
medium of exchange. We treat certain terms as though they have an
exchange value in science when in fact they are meaningless and hence
valueless.
Idols of the theater: Concepts whose significance arises purely out of their
significance in a system. We love systems like we love plays or movies.
And in the theater, we can enter into a play/movie as though its real; only
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when we step out do we remember its all an elaborate fiction. Bacon

thinks we get attached to systems because of their narrative unity and
logic, not because we have evidence for them.
Bacon believes science is replete with these phony and unjustified conceptions
treated as objective representations when they are in fact purely subjective. Whats
required is a return to a pure and straightforward method that guarantees objectivity in
science.

Bacon and inductivism

Bacon lays out his scientific method in a work called the New Organon (Novum
Organon in Latin). The name is a deliberate echo of a body of work of Aristotles called
the Organon (meaning instrument) of which the Posterior Analytics is a part. His
prescription is for science as a communal activity building towards a complete body of
public knowledge. The steps of the method are as follows:
1.

Observe. Accumulate observations without prejudice or bias, without specifically

looking for something, without consideration for possible narrow significance.
(paragraphs XCIX and C)

2.

Systematically record. Categorize the observations on the basis of objective

observable characteristics, group the related ones together, tabulate results in a
way that draws out similarities and differences. (paragraphs CI and CII)

3.

Generalize. From the observation results, make inductive generalizations that

will become the universal principles or laws of science. Bacon says that
Aristotles method of simple induction is childish and seeks more sophisticated
means of generating generalities from particular observations. (paragraphs CIIICV)

4.

Test. Make further unbiased observations to ensure that the generalizations are
correct and modify if necessary. (paragraph CVI)

Bacons method is best illustrated in a fictional work called The New Atlantis. In this
work, a European ship lost in the Pacific stumbles on the coast of a hitherto unknown
island. The navigators discover that this island is a scientific Utopia, a community in
which everyone participates in the goals of a completed science. There are those
whose work is to be observers, painstakingly collecting data; catalogers; logicians;
testers.

Problems with inductivism

Taken as a prescription for the individual scientist, this method can best be thought of
as backyard science. Imagine a four-year old stumping around the backyard looking at
things worms, bugs, rocks, dirt - and making random observations. She starts to
notice similarities among things. The bugs all have six legs, the worms all survive when
you pull them apart. She adopts some of these generalities as her worldview, and
subjects others to further test.
Despite the fact that this view has legions of critics and that we ultimately reject it as the
scientific method, there is much to recommend it. First of all, encapsulated here is the
idea that scientific practice should be unbiased. One should not come to scientific
activity with personal, social or cultural perspectives about what its results should be.
The observer who is looking for a specific result is one whose observations should be
treated with mistrust. Scientific generalizations should be drawn from systematic results
of observation.
So why wont this do? First of all, the method suggests that the starting point is
observation. Well, that seems right doesnt it? But what wholly unguided, unprejudiced
observations can anyone make? Even our four year old is coming to her observations
with certain categories in mind this is a worm, this is a bug; this is one creature and
not two. If one really wanted to make unprejudiced observations, one would have to do
it in terms of colors, shapes, smells, sounds. And then there is nothing that would
govern ones selection of what to observe. Look at a tree. There are limitless
observations one can make. Where to begin? Bacons observers on the New Atlantis
bring concepts and projects to their observations.
Even if one could make these limitless observations, how should one go about drawing
category lines? There are no pre-ordained distinctions among categories. It is itself a
scientific move to distinguish one species from another in the way we do. We might
draw these distinctions quite differently. This is not the point that one way may not be
better than another. Its a serious idea in biology that there are genuine species
distinctions that we are trying to discover. But these distinctions are not so obvious in
observation that we can make them the basis of categorization before we have any
general scientific principles in place.
Probably the main objection to Baconian inductivism is that it is a prescription for
building a completed science from scratch. As such, it gives little guidance to the
working scientist in the middle of a research project. It fails to recognize that scientific
activity involves being confronted with and trying to find ways to solve specific problems.
A better account of scientific method would show how science work as a problemsolving activity and how scientific method is something any working scientist can clearly
apply to the solution of a problem.

The hypothetical method

Theres something right about inductivism. Observation is paramount in the
establishing of scientific principles and we very often do proceed from observation to
general hypothesis. However, for the reasons weve explained, we cant think of
observation as being the starting point of the method. Inductivisms main mistake is
failure to see what scientific activity really is. Not just any accumulation of facts is
science and discovery is only a part of the activity. Science is a series of activities. Its
not an institution (or a group of institutions) or a body of doctrine. Rather, it might be
best to say that science is an extended family of activities, loosely related. Particular
branches of the family closely related activities constitute the sciences. Some very
general characteristics relate the whole family and distinguish it from other activities.
Scientists see their activity as problem solving. Every scientific activity is motivated by
the desire to solve a particular problem of understanding. This idea of starting with a
particular problem is what inductivism misses. Lets consider three examples from the
history of science:
(1)

The discovery of Uranus: a certain astronomical body is observed with increasing

frequency over the years 1680-1780. At first it is thought to be a star because it
does not appear to move relative to the fixed stars; after some years it is
observed to move, though not at all like any known comet or planet.
PROBLEM: what kind of body produces these unusual phenomena?
SOLUTION: a planet (Sir William Herschel.)

(2)

A single water pump can only pump water from a mine or well to a maximum of
about 34 feet near sea level.
PROBLEM: what limits the capacity of water pumps?
SOLUTION: water in the pump is supported by the weight of air, which perfectly
counterbalances the weight of the water at 34 feet (Evangelista Torricelli)

(3)

Speed of light: the Michelson-Morley experiment shows that light travels at the
same speed regardless of reference frame.
PROBLEM: how can observers travelling at speed relative to one another always
experience light as travelling at the same speed?
SOLUTION: passage of time is relative to reference frame (Albert Einstein.)

Kinds of solution
Problem (1) is solved against the background of a fixed astronomical theory based on
Newtonian mechanics. This is an accepted body of doctrine (in the 18th and 19th
centuries) laying down the framework of laws according to which phenomena are to be
explained. The conjecture that the body in question is a very distant and slow moving

planet is shown to be consistent with this established theory. The conjecture in no way
challenges established theory.
Problem (2) is solved against an uncertain and undeveloped theoretical background.
Hydrodynamics is not well understood and little by way of a useful framework of laws or
principles is available for investigation or explanation. The solution is guided by some
very general principles (e.g. that fluids of differing densities have weights that are
inversely proportional to their densities) It also helps to establish a more entrenched
physical theory.
Problem (3) is only solvable by a radical change in theory. The classical marriage of
Newtonian mechanics and optics is inadequate to account for the phenomena in
question. A new theoretical framework, the special theory of relativity, is proposed in its
place.

Hypotheses
Consider the first problem. The first observation of this new astronomical object was
made in 1680. At that time it was nothing special to make such a discovery. The
telescope was developed as a navigational instrument by Dutch navigators in the late
sixteenth century. It was improved as a scientific instrument in the early sixteen
hundreds by Galileo. He discovered the moons of Jupiter in 1609. Thereafter,
throughout the century, significant advances were made in the production of lenses, and
more and more previously unknown stars were identified. At first, the relative motion of
Uranus was not noticed. It was immediately conjectured that it was a star. Later, when
its motion had been recorded, it was hypothesized that this was a comet. However, the
motion was unlike any known comet. Finally, Herschel developed the hypothesis of a
planet. This involved calculating the size and distance such a planet would have to be
in order to move in accordance with the recorded observations.
So we can see three proposed solutions to the problem: the phenomenon is a star, a
comet, or a planet. Each of these is a distinct hypothesis.
A hypothesis =def (roughly) a proposed solution to a problem.
A scientific hypothesis must be a solution with certain credentials. Because only certain
problems admit of solutions with the right kind of credentials, only certain problems are
genuinely scientific problems. We can identify two requirements for an scientific
hypothesis:
FIRST REQUIREMENT:

It must be a genuine solution.

SECOND REQUIREMENT:

It must be testable.

Hypothesis and theory

A hypothesis is not a theory (though we say my hypothesis, my theory
interchangeably in ordinary talk.) As were going to use the terms, and in keeping with
scientific practice, well define a theory like this:
A theory =def (roughly) a body of laws and principles used as a framework for
investigation and explanation.
Herschels hypothesis had no impact on theory. It accorded with accepted theory and
left it unchanged. On the other hand, Semmelweiss hypothesis was proposed without
an established background of theory. Although his hypothesis was not a theory, it
helped to establish pathological theory. Einsteins hypothesis entailed a radical change
in theory. In his case, the hypothesis was a new theory. Well discuss this
terminological issue again later when we treat the nature of scientific theories.

How do we come by hypotheses?

Sometimes we are able to draw inductions from past observations. The method of
inductivism suggests that we can always do that, but that is now seen to be impossible.
Just as often its ingenuity or imagination a big part of the history of science. An ability
to see the big picture, a new picture; not to be in the grip of established points of view.
One well known story is that of the chemist Friedrich Kekule dozing by the fire. His
problem is to come up with the structure of the benzene molecule, and he has been
struggling over it without success. While he dozes, the fire seems to take on the form of
snakes that form themselves into a hexagon. With no rational basis, Kekule decides to
try the hypothesis that this is benzenes structure. Its very important to note that in
proposing a hypothesis, the scientist is not claiming that this is the true solution. Rather
he or she is putting an idea into play.
Some other perhaps more famous examples: Newton, hit on the head by an apple,
discovers the law of gravity; Archimedes playing in his bath comes up with the principle
behind the displacement of water. In both cases, actual scientific establishment took
more than just a bump on the head or a wet bathroom floor. Once the hypotheses were
proposed, they had to be tested and confirmed.

So what is the hypothetical method?

The physicist Richard Feynman tells us that the sequence of scientific activity goes like
this:
GUESS COMPUTE CONSEQUENCES COMPARE EXPERIENCE

His guess is our hypothesis. As weve said, a hypothesis doesnt have to be a guess:
we could have very good evidence for our hypothesis before proposing it, but it can be a
guess certainly an educated one. In speaking of computing the consequences,
Feynman says that the guess or hypothesis has implications. The implications are for
what we may observe. We deduce or compute or calculate these logically or
mathematically. If the implications dont match our experience, then the hypothesis is
wrong.
The important thing is to see that science is a problem solving activity. It starts with the
identification of a problem. A solution is proposed to the problem. This can arise in any
of a number of ways. There is no logic of the invention of hypotheses. Next,
observable consequences of the hypothesis are determined. What would be observed
to be the case if the hypothesis were true? Then observation and experiment are
employed to determine whether these implications hold. If they do, the hypothesis is
said to be confirmed; if not, then it is falsified.
PROBLEM HYPOTHESIS IMPLICATIONS OBSERVATION
In each case there is an observable implication of the hypothesis. If the hypothesis
(call it H) is true, then the implication (call it O) can be observed. That is a conditional
claim (an if, then). Well call it the conditional of testing, and well abbreviate it
like this:
If H, then O
In each of the three cases, the implication was observed. Careful plotting of the motion
of the astronomical body was in very close agreement with the projected orbit; an
experimental apparatus with the much denser fluid mercury gave the result of a
proportionately shorter column; observations of the progress of accurate clocks on
airplanes and the space shuttle showed them to move very marginally slower than
those on earth.

The Hypothetico-deductive (HD) Method

The relationship between a hypothesis and its observable implications is logical. The
hypothesis logically implies the observations. Its common for this relationship to be
explicated as a deductive one (see the note on Logic): the observable implications are
deduced or mathematically calculated from the hypothesis, as Feynan suggests. For
this reason, the hypothetical method is often introduced as the hypothetico-deductive
method HD for short. There are certain advantages to insisting the HD method. If
the observable implication of a hypothesis is required by the hypothesis, then in the
absence of that observation it seems we may be sure the hypothesis is false (although
well raise doubts about that in chapter 2). Nevertheless, on the face of it, theres
nothing wrong with the relationship between hypothesis and implications being an
inductive one:

If the hypothesis H is true, then observation O is likely to be observed

In the absence of O, H is likely to be false (though not certain); while in the event of
observing O, H is more likely.

Study questions
What are some of the main reasons Francis Bacon's inductivism could not be a
complete account of scientific method? (Primary source: Francis Bacon)
What are the distinct roles of deduction and induction in Aristotles account of method?
(Primary source: Aristotle)
How does the role of observation differ between the inductive method and the method
of hypothesis? What examples illustrate this? (Primary sources: Francis Bacon,
Richard Feynman (video), Letter from Torricelli to Ricci)

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