Piper Impartiality Compassion

Impartiality, Compassion, and Modal Imagination
Author(s): Adrian M. S. Piper

Source: Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Jul., 1991), pp. 726-757
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Impartiality,Compassion, and Modal

Imagination*
AdrianM. S. Piper
I. IMPARTIALITY
By using the term "modal imagination,"I want to call attentionto a
specificfeatureof imaginationas we ordinarilyconceive it. This is that
we can imaginenot onlywhatactuallyexists,such as thecomputerscreen
now in frontof me, but also what mighthave existed in the presentor
past, or might someday exist in the future,such as a vintage restored
is intended
The termmodalimagination
1950 RemingtonRand typewriter.
to
in
addition
possible
is
to remind us of our capacityto envision what
what is actual.
We need modal imaginationin order to extend our conception of
reality-and, in particular,of human beings-beyond our immediate
experience in the indexical present; and we need to do this in order to
preserve the significanceof human interaction.To make this leap of
is to achievenot onlyinsightbut also an impartial
imaginationsuccessfully
perspectiveon our own and others' inner states. This perspectiveis a
necessarycondition of experiencingcompassion for others. This is the
primarythesis I will tryto defend in this discussion.
My strategyfor defending this thesiswill be to offera conceptual
analysisof compassion. Therefore,although compassion is itselfa substantivemoralconcept,nothingI say here carriesany particularnormative
centralor peripheralrole I thinkcompassion
commitmentto the relatively
in
should play a substantivemoral theory.So, forexample, the analysis
that followsis consistentwitha substantivemoral theorythat advocates
the motivationalpriorityof moral duty (or, for that matter,personal
loyalty)overcompassionwhen the twoconflict.I tryto develop metaethical
* Work on this article was supported by a Woodrow Wilson InternationalScholars'
Fellowship,1988-89. It is excerptedfromchap. 15 of a manuscriptin progress,"Rationality
and the Structureof the Self."Earlierversionswere deliveredto the philosophydepartments
IllinoisStateUniversity,
WellesleyCollege,Purdue University,
ofWesternMichiganUniversity,
and the Universityof Connecticut at Storrs,and at the Impartialityand Ethical Theory
Conference at Hollins College. I am gratefulfor commentsreceived on those occasions
and also to Owen Flanagan, Charles Griswold,Ruth Anna Putnam, and the editors of
Ethicsfor criticismsof earlier drafts.
Ethics101 (July 1991): 726-757
( 1991 by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved.0014-1704/91/0104-1039$01.00
726

Piper
Impartiality,
Compassion,
and Imagination
727
criteriathatconstrainthe choice of an adequate substantivemoral theory

elsewhere.1
On the followinganalysis,compassion involvesmodal imagination,
empathy,sympathy,a disposition to render aid or mercy,and what I
willdescribe as strictimpartiality,
forwhich a conceptual analysisalso will
be furnished.Strictimpartiality
willbe shown to differfromimpartiality
in the ordinarysense, by adhering more closelythan impartialityin the
ordinarysense to the spiritas well as to the letterof what impartiality
in the ordinarysense explicitlyrequires. This is the secondarythesis I
want to defend.
However,strictimpartiality
willbe shownto be similarto impartiality
in the ordinarysense, in thatboth are metaethicalrequirementson substantivemoralprinciplesofjudgmentand conduct,ratherthansubstantive
moral principlesthemselves.In the ordinarysense,a substantiveprinciple
is inherently
impartialif it contains no proper names or rigged definite
descriptions.But an inherentlyimpartialprinciplemay be appliedprejudicially if it is applied only in some relevant circumstancesand not
others,or applied to suitthe interestsof some individualsand not others,
or applied on the basis of attributesirrelevantto those explicitlypicked
out by the principle.So, forexample,I violatethe metaethicalrequirement
of impartialityif I apply the principle of hiring the most competent
candidate for the job only to the pool of candidates selected from a
particularclub or class or race. This applicativenotion of impartiality
is
also part of the ordinaryusage of the concept. I will be concerned with
impartialityin this sense, in which it is the application ratherthan the
formulationof the principlethat is at issue.
In the applicativesense, to be impartialin one'sjudgmentis to ascribe
an evaluativepredicateto a subjecton thebasisof theattribute
or attributes
the predicate denotes ratherthan on the basis of some other,irrelevant
attributewhichone happens to value or disvalue. Withoutknowingwhat
the substantivejudgment is and on what attributesit is based, there is
no way of determiningwhetheror not one has judged impartially.For
example, myjudgment thatyou would make a particularlyentertaining
dinner guest is impartialif it is based on the high qualityof your conversationand social skills,and biased if it is based on your impressive
professionalconnections.Withoutknowingwhat it is I am judging and
on whatattributivebasis,whetheror not myjudgmentis impartialcannot
be determined.
Note that the impartialityof myjudgment has nothingto do with
whetheror not I bear some personal relation to you, that is, with how
impersonal I am in making the judgment. Thus, basing myjudgment
of your suitabilityas a dinner guest on your professionalconnections
does not require thatI be in the process of consideringwhetherto invite
1. Adrian M. S. Piper, "Seeing Things," Southern
JournalofPhilosophy
supply.
, "Moral
Epistemology")29 (1991): 29-60.

728
Ethics
July1991
you to dinner,or ifI am, thatI desireaccessto yourimpressiveprofessional

connections.There is nothingabout failingto stand in personal relation
ofjudgment,and nothingabout standing
to you thatinsuresimpartiality
in such relationthat precludes it.2
Similarly,to treatothers impartiallyis to be guided consistentlyin
principle
impartial,substantive
one's behaviortowardthembyan inherently
accordance
in
and
of conduct,such thatone actsas the principleprescribes
withthe attributesitsevaluativepredicatesdenote and not in accordance
withother,irrelevantattributesone happens to value or disvalue. Again,
withoutknowing what the substantiveprinciple of conduct is, and on
what attributivebasis I am applying it, there is no way of determining
whetheror not my treatmentof the other is impartial.So, forexample,
you cannot know whetherI have treated you impartiallyin hiringyou
forthejob unless you know,first,thatmychoice is guided bytheprinciple
of hiringthe most competentcandidate for thejob, and second, that I
have hired you because of your competence and not because of your
club, class, or race. I will be concerned with impartialityin this latter
sense, in which it is the application of inherentlyimpartialprinciplesof
conduct(ratherthan principlesofjudgment)thatis at issue. My argument
willbe thatcompassion is a substantivemoral emotionthatdisposes one
to apply the substantiveprincipleof renderingaid to the needy and sat(as I willdefineit).
isfiesthe metaethicalrequirementof strictimpartiality
mine withrespect
from
differs
impartiality
of
Lawrence Blum's view
moraltheories
Kantian
Blum
criticizes
First,
to at least twoof theseclaims.
theythereby
to
role
a
impartiality,
major
in
on the groundsthat assigning
in morality
concern
and
compassion,
to
sympathy,
"denya substantialrole
he means
what
define
not
does
Blum
Although
and moral motivation."3
"not
involves
it
that
about
impartiality
say
does
he
by "compassion,"
they
because
simply
interests
and
preferences
own
one's
givingweightto
are one's own, but rathergivingequal weightto the interestsof all, ...
favoringnone simplybecause of personalpreference"(p. 44). Impartiality,
on Blum's conception,is not an appropriaterequirementwherefriendship
is concerned (pp. 46-66). My argumentwillimplythat,like compassion,
genuine friendship-as opposed to excessivedependency or insensitivity-would be impossiblewithoutit.
as "givingequal weight
of impartiality
Second, Blum's characterization
because of personal
none
simply
favoring
...
of
all,
interests
to the
2. Of course, thisis not to deny thatstandingin a certainkindof personal relationship
to you may tempt me to bias the application of my substantiveprinciple in your favor,
e.g., ifI wantto curryyourfavoror avoid incurringyourwrath.But thisisjust to acknowledge
facilitate
whichis a psychologicalstate,may,under certaincircumstances,
thatimpersonality,
whichis a cognitivenorm. It is not to conflatethe two,and there
adherence to impartiality,
is no psychologicalreason to suppose that they must always go hand in hand. I discuss
ofPhilosophy
at greaterlengthin "MoralTheoryand Moral Alienation,"Journal
thisdistinction
84 (1987): 102-18.
and Morality(Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
Altruism
3. Lawrence Blum, Friendship,
1980), p. 3. Henceforth,all page referencesto thisworkwillbe parenthesizedin the text.

Piper
Impartiality,
Compassion,
and Imagination
729
preference"does not clearlyidentifyimpartiality

as a metaethicalrather
than a substantivemoral principle. It thus leaves open the conceptual
possibilityof substantivepseudoimpartialist
principles which might,for
example,requireone to treateveryonewitha similardegreeofdetachment,
or to distributeresources in exactlyequal amounts to everyone,or to
ascribe to everyone,including oneself, exactlythe same predicates,all
regardlessof attributivebasis. These principleswould prescribea policy
not of impartiality
but of indiscriminacy.
As substantivemoral principles
theywould be verypeculiar, and I know of no philosopher who holds
any one of them. They would also violate the metaethicalprinciplesof
impartialityin judgment and treatmentearlier described, since the inof theirapplicationwould be inherently
discriminacy
biased againstcertain
cases identifiablydemanding of special considerationby virtue of circumstance.
Blum himselfdoes not explicitlydescribe the targetof his criticism
in substantivepseudoimpartialistterms. But he does contrastwhat he
thinksimpartiality
requireswithwhathe thinkscompassionrequireswith
respect to substantivemoral conduct. Since compassion is a substantive
moral concept, thiscontrastsuggeststhathe viewsimpartiality
as a substantivemoral concept as well. I findthisinterpretationimplausiblefor
the reasonsjust mentioned.So I willassume in what followsthatwe both
mean to address the concept of impartialityas a metaethicalcriterion
for the correctapplication of substantivemoral principles.
II. MODAL IMAGINATION
Begin by consideringwhat our conception of human beings would be
likewithoutthe modal aspectof imagination.We would be able to recollect
experiences and emotions we had had, as well as mentallyto envisage
objects, events, and states of affairswe were presentlyexperiencing.
Images of familiarhuman bodies, stationaryand in motion, silentand
audible, as well as some of our intellectual,psychological,and sensory
reactionsto them,and our presentreactionsto those, would be among
the items accessible to memory and visualization. Our conception of
human beings would consist,roughly,in our sensoryexperience of ourselves and otherhuman bodies, plus our complex reactionsto them.We
might experience cravings,needs, desires, and intentionsin ourselves.
But we could envisage neither absent objects of desire nor ourselves
thosedesires,since thiswould requireus to imaginea possibility
satisfying
of action thatwe had not yetexperienced (of course, thisis not to deny
thatwe mightin factsatisfythemnevertheless).A nonmodal conception
of human beings, then, would be one in which our intentionalstates
were experienced as events withoutforeseeable consequences.
Nor could we envisage otherpeople satisfying
theircravings,needs,
desires,or intentions,forthe same reason. In fact,we could not imagine
other people having these or any of the other inner experiences that
constituteour interiority.
Thoughts, emotions,desires, and sensoryre-

730
Ethics
July1991
sponses would constitutepart of our conception of ourselves, but not

part of our conception of others. Since each of us can experience only
our own responses and not someone else's, and since we could imagine
onlywhatwe had experienced,others'experiencewould notbe accessible
to our imaginationat all.
Withoutthe capacityto envisageeventsor statesof affairsotherthan
those we ourselves were experiencingor had experienced,we would be
unable to identifyour experiences in terms of universallyapplicable
concepts,concepts that apply equally well to classes of events that may
occur in the futureor mighthave occurred in the past, in addition to
those that are occurringin the present or did occur in the past. This
means that,in particular,the concepts in termsof whichwe understood
even our own inner stateswould be extremelylimited.For example, no
quantityof recurrences of certain kinds of emotional state would be
sufficientto lead us to formulatethe concept of love, or fear,or anger,
orjoy as we actuallyunderstandthose concepts,because the application
of each extends past the experiences we have actuallyhad forwardinto
a possible futureand backwardinto a counterfactually
possible past. So
not only would others' inner states be imaginativelyinaccessible to us
but our insightinto our own would be almost nonexistent,or at least
extremelyprimitive.We would experienceour innerstatesas we do subtle
changes in the weather for which we have no words.
Withoutthe concepts thatdenote at least our own inner states,our
capacityto reason about them or others-to draw analogies, inferences,
and conclusions, or to make inductiveempirical generalizationsabout
them-would be correspondinglycrippled. For example, we mightbe
able to juxtapose two or more experiences we had had, and perhaps
even note the differencesand similaritiesamong them. But we could
supply no term to any analogy that required us to posit an experience
thatwas in some respectunlike any we had had. So, in particular,I could
not draw any analogy between any experience I had had and one you
mighthave. Because yourhavingan experienceis notitselfan experience
I would have had, I would have no basison whichto conceivethepossibility
of your having an experience at all. Thus I mightexperience the piano
landingon mytoe, resultantshootingpains in mytoe,and myselfjumping
up and down holding myfoot,the surroundingvisual horizonrisingand
fallingaccordingly.But from my observationof the piano landing on
yourtoe and yourjumping up and down holding your foot,I would fail
to supply the correspondingsensationsof the piano's landing on your
toe, the resultantshootingpains, or yourjumpingup and down. Because
I experiencedmyown behaviorentirelyfirst-personally
and yoursentirely
third-personally,I would be unable to detect the relevant similarities
between my behavior and yours. I would lack the imaginativebasis on
which to make even the simplestinferencefromthe one to the other.
and narrowlyconcrete
The resultwould be a primitively
self-centered
conception of human beings, in which the most vivid and memorable

Piper
Impartiality,
Compassion,
and Imagination
731
eventswere intrinsically
tiedto our sensoryexperienceofothersas mobile
physicalbeings, and our intellectualand emotional responses to it and
them.This conceptionwould be primitively
in thatthecriterion
self-centered
of significancein evaluating and judging our own and others'behavior
would be some functionof our own visceralresponse to them: the psychologicalqualityof our reaction,forexample; or itsdegreeof pleasantness
or vividness; or the abilityof that behavior to arrest our attention.A
primitively
self-centeredconception of othersis not necessarilya selfish
conception of them, since it does not necessarilyevaluate and judge
others'behavior withrespect to the satisfactionof one's own needs and
A primitively
interests.
self-centered
conceptionis,rather,one thatevaluates
and judges another'sbehavior in accordance withthe centralityof one's
own experience: other people are more or less importantor valuable,
and theirbehavior more or less interestingor worthyof note, insofaras
theyviscerallymove one-in whateverdirection-to a greateror lesser
degree. A primitivelyself-centeredconception of others reverses the
psychologicallyand morallyintuitiveorder of eventsin moral appraisal:
ordinarilyit is supposed thatwe are moved by an eventor action or state
of affairsbecause it is significant.An agent who holds a primitively
selfcenteredconceptionof othersregardsan eventor actionor stateof affairs
as significantbecause she is moved by it.
The conception of human beings that resulted from a nonmodal
in thatour view of ourselves
imaginationwould also be narrowly
concrete
and otherswould be neitherinformednor inflamedby implicit,tentative
suppositions regarding our or their internalmotivations,thoughts,or
emotional states; by hopes or expectations about our or their future
behavior; or by speculations on possible courses of action revealed by
our or theirpresentbehavior. We can assume forthe sake of argument
that our own motives,thoughts,and emotional stateswould be experientiallyaccessible to us in some conceptuallylimited way, perhaps as
schematic conjunctions of images.4 But we would lack the capacity to
speculate on the conceptual identityof those statesin ourselves,just as
we would lack the capacityto conceive them as being of any sort at all
in others. Nor could we plan for the future,aspire to achieve goals, or
consider alternativecourses of action we mighttake. Our mental lives
would be restrictedto experiencingour presentinnerstatesand rememberingpast ones, and observingothers'behaviorand reactingto itsimpact
on us.
Our socialrelationswould be correspondingly
bereft.Communications
about plans, hopes, dreams, or desires would be nonexistent,as would
4. I make thisconcessionto non-Kantiansonlybecause considerationsof space preclude
more extended argument to the effectthat without modal imagination and bona fide
concept formationwe would have no first-personalaccess to our motives,thoughts,or
emotional statesat all. Nothingof consequence formyargumentturnson thisconcession.
I take up thisissue in greaterdetail in "Xenophobia and Kantian Rationalism,"Philosophical
Forum(in press).

732
Ethics
July1991
the correspondingdimensions of personal character these intentional

statesexpress. The veryideas of sharingone's thoughts,reachingagreement,or achievingunderstandingwithanother would be unintelligible.
Such relationsmightbe somewhat more vivid to sensation withoutthe
interventionof suppositionsand expectationsabout the other. But they
would also be harsher,bleaker, and inchoate. They would lack the significanceand depth conferredby our implicitpresumptionof potential.
They would lack the richness of mutual insightconferredby shared
emotionsand thoughts.And therewould be no place in such relationships
borne of a commonworldview
and familiarity
forthe mutualcontentment
or value commitment,or for the cooperativebehavior that makes them
possible.
Many of us have occasionallyexperienced primitivelyself-centered
and narrowlyconcrete relationships,whether as object or as subject.
Ordinarilywe thinkof them as unsatisfactoryand withoutfuture,and
we tryto improve or move past them. In the scenario I have been envisioning,in which modal imaginationof alternativepossibilitiesis foreclosed, even the conceptual possibilityof moving past such dead-end
relationshipswould be foreclosedas well. Virtuallyour entireabilityto
thinkabout and understand our experience, both of ourselves and of
others, as well as our abilityto coordinate our behavior with others
presuppose the functioningof modal imagination. Those inclined to
Cartesian skepticismabout the existence of other minds need to be reminded of the centralityof modal imagination to the functioningof
fears need to be
human social and mental life. And theirverificationist
met witha reminderof what that lifewould be like withoutit.
III. SELF-ABSORPTION
AND VICARIOUS POSSESSION
Next consider two extremes of imaginativeobject. At one end of the

calls to mind with no cue
spectrum,there is the kind one effortlessly
beyondthatof a momentaryassociationor verbaldescription.For example,
I now ask you to imagine yourselfrisingfromyour seat, flappingyour
armsvigorously,and sailingaloft.It probablydoes notrequireverymuch
mentalconcentrationforyou to activatethe required visual imageryand
subliminalsensations;the mere verbaldescriptionmaysuffice.However,
easy come, easy go. Virtuallyany actual internal or external cue will
sufficeto banish thatfantasy:the ringingof the telephone,your shifting
in yourchair,or somethingyou read here thatmomentarilycatchesyour
attention.Call this a surfaceobjectof imagination.At the other end of
the spectrum,depthobjectsof imaginationcall fortha deeper psychological
investmentof energyand attention.They occupy a largerproportionof
one's waking consciousness,and may either replace or vividlyenhance
account
realityas one experiences it. For example, I read a first-person
as my
as
well
emotions
and
my
by a battered wife of her experiences,
as
afterward
but
I
am
as
reading
thoughtsare fullyengaged, not only

Piper
Impartiality,Compassion,and Imagination
733
well. My imaginativereconstructionreplaces realityas I am absorbing

her storyand alters my view of the world afterward.Most imaginative
objects lie somewherebetween these two.
Clearlythistaxonomyof imaginativeobjects is farfromexhaustive.
Nor does it sortimaginativeobjects into those we visualize and those we
conceive in some more abstractor schematic sense: I may be deeply
involved in imagining the outlines of my cosmological theoryof the
universe,or onlymomentarily
distractedbythevisualimageofthegroceries
I mustpurchase on the way home. Whereas nonmodal imaginationprecludes imaginativeconceptualization,modal imagination,as alreadysuggested, supplementsrationalityto produce it.
Nor does the distinctionbetweendepth and surfaceobjectsof imagination classifysuch objects by content: Penrod Scofield was so fully
engaged by the first-described
fantasythateven Miss Spence's repeated
shoutingscarcelysufficedto returnhim to the realityof the classroom.
Rather,I mean to distinguishamong such objectsof imaginationaccording
to the degree of one's momentaryexperiential involvementin them.
Some such objectshold us in theirgrip,whileothersslide overthe surface
ofour awarenesswhilebarelydisruptingour emotionaland psychological
state at all.
Sometimes we treat as objects of surface imaginationthose we are
called upon to treat in depth. For example, charitableconcerns often
bulk mail lettersto potentialcontributorsthatdescribein vividdetail the
plightof those for whom theywish to garner support. Upon receiving
these mailings,one skimsthe letter,barelyregisteringthe importof the
words,before tossingit in the trash.Conversely,we may treatin depth
imaginativeobjects that are more deserving of surface treatment.For
example, one maydie a thousand deaths imaginingin excruciatingdetail
the possibilitythat one may flub a line the next time one presents a
paper. The vividness of this scenario may overwhelm one with such
serious anxietyor depression thatit interfereswithone's sleep patterns.
In both of these cases, somethinghas gone awry.In the first,one's level
of imaginativeinvolvementis, at least on the face of it, insufficiently
responsiveto another person's real crisis-a predicamentthatdemands
a considered and fullyattentiveresponse. In the second case, one's level
of imaginativeinvolvementis excessivelyresponsiveto an inconsequential
possibilitythat can be prevented easily (e.g., by rehearsinga few times
beforehand one's deliveryof the paper).
Naturally,each of these inappropriateimaginativeresponses could
be directedtowardthe otherimaginativeobject. It may be, forexample,
that one is so engaged in dyinga thousand deaths while reading about
the plight of the disadvantaged that one can scarcely collect oneself
to take out one's checkbook. Alternately,one may treat so
sufficiently
offhandedlythe possibilityof flubbinga line in one's paper that one
neglectseven to reviewthe argumentstherein,much less rehearse one's

734
Ethics
July1991
deliveryof them. In each of these cases, one's level of involvementwith

the imaginativeobject is either too deep or too superficialrelative to
other,more pressing,considerations.
What considerations?The firstexample, in whichone failsto register
the importof another person's serious crisis,suggeststhe violationof a
moral norm of conduct, that one should be responsiveratherthan insensitiveto another'ssuffering.
But in thesecondthroughfourthexamples,
some differentrequirementof proportionseems to have been violated.
For instance, responsivenessto another's sufferingthat is so excessive
thatit incapacitatesone fromactingdoes not seem to exhibitany of the
familiarmoraldefectsof character.We pitya person who has a nervous
breakdown in response to the political tortureof her countrymen;we
do not condemn her. What all of these examples have in common is
instead the violationof certainpsychological
norms. In each of them,the
balance between preservingthe unityand rational integrityof the self
against external violation, on the one hand, and maintaininga selfenhancing connection and receptivityto external input, on the other,
has been destroyed.5In each, theinvolvementoftheselfin itsimaginative
object is inappropriatebecause it fails to recognize and respect the ontologicalboundaries eitherof the selfor of the imaginativeobject. As a
rough firstapproximationof necessary(though possiblynot sufficient)
criteriaof appropriate involvement,I propose the following:
An appropriate level of involvementin an imaginativeobject recognizes and respectsboth
A. thepsychologicalboundariesof one's selfas an actingsubject
and
B. the psychologicalboundaries of the other'sselfas an acting
subject.
A and B apply to cases in which one's imaginativeobject is another
subject. They also apply to cases in which it is not, on the assumption
that one's level of involvementin the object itselfhas consequences for
other subjects. The application of these criteriacan be illustratedby
reconsideringthe preceding examples in its light.
The firstcase described above, in which a writtendescriptionof
others' misfortunesscarcelyregistersin one's consciousness,much less
movesone to action,violatesB, forin itone failsto recognizetheexistence
of the other'ssubjectivity
comes
altogether.This brand of self-absorption
closest to the primitivelyself-centeredand narrowlyconcrete view of
others described in Section II. In this case, however,the mental representationsof others'inner statesexistat least as surfaceobjectsof imagination,while one's own are depth objects. One regardsother people as
5. I discuss thisissue at greaterlengthin "Two Conceptions of the Self,"Philosophical
Studies48 (1985): 173-97, reprintedin Philosopher's
Annual 8 (1985): 222-46, and in my
"Pseudorationality,"in Perspectives
on Self-Deception,
ed. Brian McLaughlin and Amelie 0.
Rorty(Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1988), pp. 297-323.

Piper
735
mere furniturein the external environmentand is withouta visceral

comprehensionof theirinternalconscious states.When we lack a visceral
comprehensionof what we read, the textin question is a conjunctionof
emptywords withoutpersonal meaning to us. Our intellectualgrasp of
the materialis impeded bya failureof themodal imaginationthosewords
are intended to spark.
By contrast,the second case described above, in which one cannot
sleep foranxietyat the possibilityof flubbinga line in one's paper, violates
A. Here the mere possibilityof an event that is temporallyexternal to
the selfin its presentstate invades thatselfto the point of disruptingits
internalequilibrium.That internalequilibriumitselfis treatedas a surface
objectof imagination,whereastheenvisionedpossibilityis a depth object.
In such cases, one's preoccupation with external events or anticipated
externalevents is so all-encompassingthatone failsto notice one's own
internaldiscomfortat all. This is an abdication of the presentselfto an
anticipatedfuturescenario.
The thirdcase, in whichone experiencestheagonyof theunfortunate
one is reading about to such an extentthatone is rendered incapable of
action, also violates A, for here, a spatiotemporallyexternal event is
allowed to invade the self in its present state to the point of disrupting
itsinternalequilibrium.In thiscase, one appropriatesothers'experience
of suffering
intothe selfand replacesone's own responseswithit.Whereas
a visceralcomprehension of others' sufferingmay motivateone to act,
the appropriation of their experience as a replacement for one's own
renders ameliorativeaction impossible. Couples who have experienced
the contagious effectsof one partner'sbad mood may recognize this
phenomenon. Taking action to help a suffererrequires one to make a
sharp distinctionbetween one's own inner stateand the sufferer's.Otherwiseone abdicates one's actual selfto the imagined selfof the sufferer.
Finally,the fourthcase, in whichone is obliviousto the consequences
for others of one's neglect to prepare for a futurecontingencyof one's
own behavior,violatesB, forin itone failsto respectthe validityof other
people's normal expectations. This case treats one's audience's inner
states-their justifiedexpectationsof a certainstandardof performance,
theirassumptionsand hopes of intellectualdialogue or edification-as
surface objects of imagination,whereas one's own inner state-of confusion,oblivion,complacency,presumption,sloth,or self-indulgenceis a depth object. In this sortof case one failsto imagine withsufficient
vividnessthedifference
betweenothers'innerstatesand one's own. Indeed,
one identifiesothers'inner stateswithone's own. Like the first,thiscase
illustratesa species of self-absorptionthat approaches the primitively
self-centeredand narrowlyconcrete view described earlier as resulting
froma lack or failureof modal imagination.
In general, then,an inappropriatelevel of imaginativeinvolvement
thatviolatesA tends to abdicate the actual, presentselfto the imagined
object. Call this a state of vicariouspossession.One can be vicariously

736
Ethics
July1991
possessed by the thoughtof an actual or possible externalevent as well

as by that of another person's inner states. (The possession is vicarious
ratherthan actual because abdication of the self is in part voluntarily
effected.)By contrast,an inappropriatelevel of imaginativeinvolvement
that violates B tends to express a failureto imagine modally the object
as separatefromthe selfaltogether.This drawsone closerto theprimitively
self-centeredand narrowlyconcrete perspectiveearlier described. Call
this a state of self-absorption.
Vicarious possessionand self-absorptionare botha matterof degree,
and each can take a varietyof imaginativeobjects. I may be so selfabsorbed in my experience of your discomfortas I conceive it that I am
completelyinsensitiveto your discomfortas you experience it in fact:
obsessed withreassuringyou thatyour recentauto accidentis not likely
to reoccur, I fail to notice that my repeatedly broaching and dilating
upon the topic only increases your anxiety.Conversely,I may be so
vicariouslypossessed by your conception of me as I envisionit thatI am
completelyinsensitiveto the discomfortit actuallycauses me to conform
to it: inspired to featsof strengthby the conception of me as physically
powerfulI imagine you to have, I pull unnoticedand uncounted muscles
liftingthe heavy objects of which,so I imagine, you thinkme capable.
In all such cases, one is self-absorbedby one's own inner stateif others'
have littleimpacton it,and vicariouslypossessed by another'sinnerstate
if one's own has littleimpact on it. Someone who is self-absorbedhas
too littleimaginationregardingexternals,whereasone who is vicariously
possessed has too much.
are also relativeto the actual
Vicariouspossessionand self-absorption
psychologicalboundaries of the particularself in question. The self is
always constitutedby (among other things) the particular social and
cultural norms instilledin the process of socializationas well as by the
values, goals, and practicesthat distinguishit both as an individual self
and as a member of a specific social community.6So what counts as
vicarious possession or self-absorptionfor one self mightbe a healthy
For example,
expressionof anotherself'scentralinterestsor commitments.
a selfunconditionallydevoted to the problem of feedingthe starvingin
India would satisfythe above criteriaifitwere MotherTeresa's butwould
violate A if it were Faye Wattleton's;a selfpreoccupied by memoriesof
its own past experiences might satisfythese criteriaif it were James
Baldwin'sbut would violateB ifitwere RichardNixon's. The boundaries
of some selves circumscribeprimarilyother-directedor self-sacrificial
ideals, whereas those of otherscircumscribeprimarilyself-directedones.
Perhaps the more numerousand familiarselves-those thatcementmost
human communities-contain both, in proportionsvaryingwith their
roles and positionsin the communityas well as theirpersonal aptitudes
and inclinations.We must firstknow these factsabout their individual
6. I say more about this in "Two Conceptions of the Self."

Piper
737
commitmentsand relationsto the surroundingcommunityin order to

ascertain whether any particular self is vicariouslypossessed, or selfabsorbed, or both.7
objectis another'ssuffering,
NextI willargue thatwhentheimaginative
a compassionate response is the mean between these two extremes.
IV. COMPASSION
An involvementwith another person's inner states as an imaginative
objectrequiresmore than thatone verballyascribecertaindrives,feelings,
and thoughtsin order to explain her behavior. To do only this much
would be to treat those states as a surface object and so violate B. In
experiencethosedrives,feelings,
addition,itrequiresthatone empathically
withanother is
and thoughtsas one observesher behavior. To empathize
other'sovert
the
motivates
to comprehend viscerallythe inner statethat
a
correspondingly
behavior
withthat
behaviorbyexperiencingconcurrently
similar inner state oneself, as a direct and immediate quality of one's
own condition. Empathy,in turn,requires an imaginativeinvolvement
withthe other'sinnerstatebecause we mustmodallyimagineto ourselves
what that state must be as we observe her overt behavior, in order to
experience it in ourselves.
These innerstatesare not to be identifiedwiththoseone experiences
in reaction to her behavior-for instance,as I experience gratitudein
reactionto my interpretationof your action as beneficent.Instead, they
are the inner states that constituteone's interpretationof her behavior-for instance,as I empathicallyexperience subliminalsensationsof
pain in interpretingyour wincing,grimacing,and puttingyour hand to
7. Cases in which valuable contributionsto the world are offsetby neglect of loved
ones at home furnishnumerous illustrationsof selves unbalanced by self-absorptionin
some areas and vicarious possession in others. Take Paul Gauguin, who abandoned his
familyto go offto the South Seas to paint. His psychologicalprofilegives clear evidence
of self-absorption,both in his neglect of his familyand in the patent racism and sexism
of his attitudestoward the subjects of his painting.On the other hand, his obsession with
the island cultureof Tahiti and of his own role in itmightbe viewedas evidenceof vicarious
possession, in his abdication to it of the self formedby his prior,longstandingsocial and
familial commitments.Merely his central and overridingcommitmentto his art by itself-independently of the psychologicaland social attractionsof his adopted as compared
to his original environment-cannot, I think,be cited as evidence of one or the other,
since such a commitmentmighthave existed independentlyof or concurrentlywithboth.
There are other such cases, such as Dickens's Mrs. Jellybyin Bleak House: "'Mrs. Jellyby
... devotes herselfentirelyto the public. She has devoted herselfto an extensivevariety
of public subjects at various times and is at present (until somethingelse attractsher)
devoted to the subject of Africa.'. .. 'Mr. Jellyby. . . is . . . merged-in the more shining
qualities of his wife.'[Her eyes] had a curious habit of seeming to look a long way off.As
if ... they could see nothing nearer than Africa!" (chap. 4). It appears that Mrs. Jellyby
is self-absorbed,in that she is unable to imagine proximate others (children,husband,
friends)as selves separate from herself;and vicariouslypossessed by the numerous and
transientcauses to whichshe devotes all her energies. I am gratefulto Ruth Anna Putnam
for raisingthese cases for discussion.

738
Ethics
July1991
your forehead. The claim is that an involvementwithanother person's

innerstateas an imaginativeobject is mutuallyinterconnectedwithone's
abilityto experience empathicallyan inner state similarto that which
one ascribes to the other as an interpretationof her behavior.8
How similarone's own state or condition must be to the other's in
orderto count as a case of empathydepends on the proportionalrelations
betweenthe intensityand qualityof (i) the other'sselfand her condition,
and (ii) one's own self-conceptionand one's own condition.9If you are
being disemboweled by a charging bull and I experience in response
only the mildesttwingein my gut, I probablyam not empathizingwith
yourcondition.Similarlyifyou are mildlyapprehensiveabout your first
drivinglesson whereas I am beside myselfwithpanic. These responses
of mine fail to count as empathic because they are too differentfrom
your actual inner state to enable me validlyto attributethem to you.
The more radicallyI get it wrongwhen imaginingthe analogue of your
inner statein myself,the less I succeed in understandingyours.The less
I succeed in understanding yours, the more the coordination of our
actionsmustdepend on conventionor forceor detailedverbalagreement.
And the more we mustdepend on these factorsto coordinateour actions,
the more closelywe willapproximatea dead-end relationshipof the kind
earlier described. Empathy requires not only a rich modal imagination
but an approximatelyaccurate one as well.
How does one achieve empathywithouthaving had first-personal
directexperience of thatstateone attemptsto approximateimaginatively
oneself? We can onlyspeculate on the extentto whichsome such external
perceptual cues, such as the sightof another person laughing withjoy
or grimacingin pain, or the sound of a baby crying,mightfunctionas
biologicallyingrained stimulito which we are biologicallydisposed to
8. That understandinganotherperson'sinnerstaterequiresone's empathicexperience
of it may seem to be a verystrongepistemicclaim. It implies that understandinganother
person'sinnerstate-as opposed to merelyexplainingit- is dependenton a feltpsychological
connectionwiththe otherin a way thatunderstandinga nonpsychologicalcourse of events
or state of affairsis not. This claim is not as radical as it may seem at first.In Sec. II I
argued thatmodal imaginationof another person's innerstatesas a way of understanding
the other person is the norm in most human interactions,withoutwhich theyall would
have a verydifferentcast. In thissectionit transpiresthatmodal imaginationrequires not
merelythatwe envisiontheother'sinnerstatein order to understanditbut thatwe viscerally
comprehend what we envision as well. This is no cause for alarm. The implicationsthat
therethenmustbe much about otherpeople thattranscendsour relativelyparochialpowers
of understanding;thatwe thenmustworkquite hard in orderto achievethatunderstanding,
of anyone;and thatmanyhuman interactions
are corruptedbya failureof thatunderstanding
should not be surprisingand should not be news. I discuss the consequences of moral
corruptionand thefailureofmotivationalunderstandingat greaterlengthin "The Meaning
of 'Ought' and the Loss of Innocence" (invitedpaper on ethicsdeliveredto the American
PhilosophicalAssociationEastern DivisionConvention,Atlanta,December 1989), abstracted
in Proceedings
oftheAmericanPhilosophical
Association
63 (1989): 53-54.
9. I discuss the notion of a self-conception,and distinguishit froma conception of
the self,in "Two Conceptions of the Self" and in "Pseudorationality."

Piper
739
respond empathically.Or we may see another behave in a certainway

wide varietyof circumstances,that
often enough, and in a sufficiently
we develop an empathic appreciationof her motivesthroughinference,
analogy, or induction. Sociopaths are characterizedby, among other
things,the inabilityto respond in these ways; and we do not yet know
whethertheirdisabilityis primarilysocial or biological in origin.
However, it is at least clear that formsof creativeexpression such
as music, painting, poetry,fiction,and first-personnarrativeaccounts
enhance our abilityto imagine modallyanother'sinner states,even ifwe
experienceourselves.Freshcombinations
have had no such first-personal
of images,words,metaphors,and tonalprogressionsenable us to construct
an imaginativevisionthatmay in turncausallytransformor enlarge our
range of emotional responses. Claims that one cannot understand,for
example, what it is like fora woman to be raped ifone is a man, or what
it is like for a black person to be the object of racial harassmentif one
is white, have the virtue of refusingto appropriate the singularityof
another'sexperience into one's necessarilylimitedconception of it. But
theyare too oftenbased on a simple lack of interestin findingout what
it is likethroughexploringthe wide varietyof literaryand artisticproducts
designed preciselyto instructus about these things.'0It is not surprising
to finda failureof modal imaginationof another'sinnerstatespreceded
and narrowly
bya failureof curiosityabout themor to finda self-centered
concreteview of others accompanied by a lack of interestin the arts.'1
How can we know how accurate our empathic responses are? We
our own firstcannot,sincewe have no wayof comparinginterpersonally
experiences of another's
personal experiences-even our first-personal
inner state as we modally imagine it-with the other'sinner stateitself.
A fortiori,we have no way of comparinginterpersonallytwo such firstpersonal stateswithrespectto qualityor quantity.Nevertheless,we may
estimatesof the accuracyof our empathicresponse
make rough-and-ready
by gauging the other's reaction to those of our own actions motivated
by it. We may be motivatedto respond verballyor behaviorallyin such
a way that the other'sresponse to our words or actions tellsus whether
or not theyexpressed genuine insightinto the other'sinner state as we
empathicallyimagined it. Or we may simplyask whetherthe conjunction
10. These creativeproductsmayinstructone about another'sinnerstatesbydepicting
what it would be like for oneself to have those statesor, alternately,what it would be like
if one were the other and had them. But theyaid in the cultivationof one's capacityfor
empathy to the extent that they ultimatelyenable one to understandviscerallywhat it is
like for the other to have them. That is, theysatisfyboth A and B above.
11. Obviously,we can confirm(to varyingdegrees) whetheror not a person genuinely
empathizes with another only by looking at the behavior that inner state is presumed to
requirement
neithera necessarynora sufficient
motivate.But wordsand deeds alone constitute
of empathyitself,since theymightmask the cleverdissembler,manipulator,or sociopath.
There is no necessarylink between the behavior taken as evidence of empathyand the
inner state that is empathy.

740
Ethics
July1991
of words,phrases,similes,metaphors,and colloquial expressionswe used

in order to describe it is, in fact,accurate, and correctour description
and so our understandingaccording to the other'sresponse. The deep
philosophical problems of privatelanguage, other minds,and solipsism
do not necessarilyengender correspondinglydeep practical problems
when the effortto understand another is committed,persistent,and
sincere.
And, of course, that we cannot know with certaintyhow accurate
our empathic responses are does not implythat there is no fact of the
matterabout this,or, therefore,that we cannot approximate empathic
accuracyto varyingdegrees whetherwe knowwithcertaintythatwe are
doing so or not. In what follows I will often speak of an (accurate)
empathicunderstandingof or insightinto another'sinnerstate,as though
such a thingis possible. This reflectsmybeliefthatitis,even ifwe cannot
know withcertaintythat it is, or how it is.
withanotheris to be affected
By contrastwithempathy,to sympathize
by one's visceralcomprehensionof the other'sinner statewitha similar
or correspondingstate of one's own, and to take a pro attitudetoward
both ifthe stateis positiveand a con attitudetowardthemifitis negative.
In orderto feelsympathyforanother'scondition,one mustfirstviscerally
comprehend what that condition is. Therefore, sympathypresupposes
at least a partial capacity for empathy. But once one has achieved an
empathic interpretationof the other'sbehavior,sympathyis, of course,
yourbehavioras murderous
not the onlypossibleresponse.I mayinterpret
rage withthe help of my empathic experience of it,and react witheven
greaterrevulsion against it for that reason. Whereas sympathyimplies
one's emotionalaccord withthe other'sinnerstate,empathyimpliesonly
one's visceral comprehension of it. That an interpretationof another's
inner state requires an empathic imaginativeinvolvementwith it does
not mean it requires one's concordantreaction to it as well.
An empathic imaginativeinvolvementwith another's inner states
treatsthose states as depth rather than surface objects of imagination.
It is an applicationof modal imaginationto a particularkindof imaginative
object, namely,a human subject,and to a particularqualityof thatkind
of object, namely,her inner states.To entertainanother'sinner stateas
a surfaceobject of imaginationis also an exerciseof modal imagination,
and thereforemightsufficefor mere verbal ascriptionof inner statesto
forempathicunderstanding
explainanother'sbehavior.But itis insufficient
of that behavior. An involvementwith another's inner states as an imaginative object requires that one empathicallyexperience those states
as well.
An inappropriateinvolvementthatviolatesA, thatis, vicariouspossession, has this featureto an excessive degree. In the case of vicarious
possession by another person's inner states,one treatsone's own inner
states as surface objects and the other's inner states as depth objects.
Here is whatitmeans to appropriatetheother'sexperienceas one imagines
it into one's self and replace one's own withit:

Piper
Impartiality,
Compassion,
and Imagination
741
1. one empathicallyexperiences the other's feelings as one

imaginesthemto the exclusionof one's own reactionsto them (i.e.,
a case of being "out of touch withone's feelings");
2. one is so preoccupiedwithimaginingwhattheotheris thinking
that one's own thoughtsare temporarilysuppressed; and
3. one's actions reflectone's conception of the other's wishes
or desires as to how one should act or what should be done.
In general, to be vicariouslypossessed by another person's inner states
means that one's own sentience,rationality,and agency are suppressed
in favor of the other's as one empathicallyimagines her to be. This
constitutesan abdication of one's self to another as one imagines her.
By contrast,an inappropriate involvementthat violates B, that is,
self-absorption,lacks this feature entirely.When another's inner states
are treatedas surfaceobjects in deferenceto one's own as depth objects
of imagination,the constituentsof one's interpretationof her behavior
are emptywords at best (assumingone bothersto interprether behavior
at all). Terms such as "headache," "grief,"or "starvation"fail to elicitin
one any correspondingempathic response altogether.This is one state
of mind that makes it easy to toss the letterfromthe charitableconcern
into the trash.The moral termfor thisconditionis "callousness,"and it
constitutesa sacrificeof another's inner statesas one conceives them to
one's absorption in one's own.
The contrastbetween both of these brands of inappropriateimaginativeinvolvementand an appropriateone is thatin the lattercase, one
manages to retainthe empathicexperience of the other'sinnerstateand
the reactions that constituteone's own simultaneouslyand with equal
vividness,in such a way that neitherA nor B is violated. One holds two
equally vividand sharplydistinctexperiences-one's own response and
the other'sas one empathicallyimaginesit-in mind simultaneously.An
appropriateimaginativeinvolvementin another'sinnerstateis symmetrical
withrespect to the relationbetween that state and one's own.
Now it mightseem thatinsofaras thisis possible,it would engender
agent paralysis. It might seem that to imagine empathicallyto oneself
another'sinner statewitha vividnessequal to one's directexperience of
one's own would be to be torn between being motivatedto act by the
other's inner state as one empathicallyimagines it and being motivated
by one's own inner state as one directlyexperiences it. If I empathically
imagine you to experience embarrassmentat the same timeand withthe
same vividnessas I directlyexperience schadenfreudein response, then
it appears that neithermotivationalstateoverridesthe other in myconsciousness. Then what spurs me to act at all?
is more imagined than real. First,these two
However, thisdifficulty
statesmay be equally vivid withoutbeing equally intense.The vividness
of an object or state depends on its perceptual (not necessarilyvisual)
of a state
clarityand on the sharpness of its sensorydetail. The intensity
depends ratheron the strengthof itscausal impacton one. For instance,
your heady pride of achievementmay meet withonly faintenthusiasm

742
Ethics
July1991
in me. Yet I may empathicallyimagine your heady pride of achievement

no less vividlythan I directlyexperience my own faintenthusiasmfor
it. Second, thatI experience simultaneouslyand withequal vividnesstwo
differentmotivationalstates does not imply any furthersimilarityof
structurebetween them. A structuralfeature that my own inner state
has and thatmyempathicimaginationofyourslacksis a directconnection
to myown capacityforagency.Whereas I can empathicallyimagineyour
inner state, I cannot spur you to action on the basis of my imaginative
involvementwithit. By contrast,my directexperience of my own inner
state in response can spur me to action on the basis of my imaginative
involvementwith it. Essential to the boundaries that enable me to distinguishmy selffromyours,hence to satisfyA and B, is the naturallink
between my selfand myaction thatis missingbetweenyour selfand my
action or between my self and your action.
It is only when thisnatural link is weakened thatviolationsof A or
B occur. For example, when a child is repeatedlytold thatshe feelswhat
her caretakersthinkshe should feel instead of what she does feel, she
may learn to suppress awareness of her own responsesand replace them
in imaginationwithothersthatare prescribedto her.This habitof thought
encouragesvicariouspossession.Alternately,
when othersregularlyassume
responsibilityfora child's actions and shield her fromtheirhuman consequences, she may fail fullyto develop the capacityto imagine modally
others' responses to them as independent of her own wishfulthinking
about them. This habit of thoughtencourages self-absorption.Both of
these cases involve a conflationof one's own inner stateswiththose of
others,and so a severanceof the naturallinkbetweenone's own thought
and one's actions. In the firstcase, of vicarious possession, one's own
action is guided by another's conception,as one empathicallyimagines
it,of one's own inner state. Such a case can lead to agent paralysiswhen
I empathicallyimagine your conception of my inner state to be at least
as motivationally
compellingas mydirectexperienceof myown response
in fuelingmy action. In the second case, of self-absorption,
one's action
is guided by one's own conception of another's inner state as one selfcenteredlyimagines it. Such a case can lead to agent paralysiswhen I
imagine myconceptionof yourinnerstateto be at least as motivationally
compellingas yourdirectexperience of yourown in fuelingyouraction.
In neithercase, however,do I succeed in directlyexperiencingmy own
inner state as fuelingmy action withthe same vividnessand intensityas
I empathicallyimagine your inner state as fueling yours. Only in this
last case is neitherA nor B violated.
Of course,myempathicimaginationof yourinnerstateas comprising
a desire that I act in a certainway can spur me to action, but only if I
already directlydesire to act as you desire me to act. Or my empathic
imaginationof your inner stateas comprisinga desire to act in a certain
waycan spur me to action,but onlyifI mistakenlyimagine,empathically,
thatI am you. But both of these possibilitiesviolateA. The firstabdicates

Piper
Impartiality,
Compassion,
and Imagination
743
my self to the desire, which I empathicallyimagine you to have, that I

act; my original desire to act as you desire me to act is ignored. The
second abdicates my self to the self I empathicallyimagine you to have.
Both possibilitiesrequire a severance of the directconnectionbetween
my capacityfor agency and my own inner motivationalstate. Both possibilitiesrequireestablishinga connectionbetweenmycapacityforagency
and the motivationalstate I empathicallyimagine you to have. Thus,
bothrequire myvicariouspossessionbyyourinnerstateas I empathically
imagine it. This just is to appropriate your responses into my self and
replace it withthem. It is to treatmy own inner stateas a surfaceobject
of imagination,and your inner state as a depth object. It is not to treat
both as occurringsimultaneouslyand withequal vividnessafterall.
Alternately,my primitivelyself-centeredconception of your inner
state as comprisinga desire that you act in a certainway can spur you
to action,but only if you already desire to act as I imagine you desire to
act. Or my primitivelyself-centeredconception of your inner state as
comprisinga desire to act in a certainway can spur you to action, but
only if you mistakenlyimagine,empathically,thatyou are me. But both
of these possibilitiespresuppose a brand of self-absorptionon my part
which violates B. The firstsacrificesyour self to the desire to act which
I self-centeredly
conceive you to have. The second sacrificesyour selfto
the self you empathicallyimagine that I conceive you to have. Both
possibilitiesrequire a severance of the directconnectionbetween your
capacityfor agency and your own inner states.Both possibilitiesrequire
establishinga connectionbetweenyourcapacityforagencyand the inner
states you empathicallyimagine me self-centeredly
to conceive you as
having.Thus, bothrequireyourvoluntarysubmergencein myimaginative
but primitivelyself-centeredreconstructionof your inner state. This
imaginativereconstructiontreatsmy own inner states-including those
I self-centeredly
conceive you to have-as depth objects,and youractual
innerstatesas surfaceobjectsof imagination.Again,thesymmetry
required
of an appropriate imaginativeinvolvementis lost.
When the other's experience is one of suffering,the appropriate
imaginativeinvolvementthatsatisfiesboth A and B is one of compassion.
Compassion comprises at least three distinguishableresponses. First,it
includes empathic understanding of the other's condition. Second, it
includes sympathetic"fellowfeeling"in reaction.And, third,it includes
a consequent dispositionto render aid or show mercyto the other. So
compassion includes cognitive,affective,and conative components,respectively.
To render aid, mercy,or restitutionto another is not the same as
on a momentaryfeelingof concern. It is ratherto
acting unreflectively
act consistentlyand reliablyin such a waycalculated to relievethe other's
distress.That is, it is to act in accordance witha substantiveprincipleof
moral conduct that itselfhas application to a varietyof situations.By
contrastwith occasional stirringsof sympathywhich may or may not

744
Ethics
July1991
sparkfleetingimpulsesto help, compassion is a principledmoralemotion

that moves one to a course of action in accordance with a substantive
requirementof renderingaid. As is the case with all substantivemoral
principles of conduct, the requirementto render aid is a requirement
that one strikea balanced accommodation between the condition and
demands of the self and the condition-and demands of another.
Strikinga balanced accommodationbetweenthese twodifferentsets
of interestsand demands requires that the self be vicariouslypossessed
by neither,but that it have a deep imaginativeinvolvement-one that
is antitheticalto self-absorption-withboth. Vicarious possession by the
other'sinner statewould constitutea sacrificeof the integrityof the self
to the inner deprivationor sufferingof the other. It would be to take
on the other'ssufferingas an internalconditionof one's own. This would
mean paralyzingor incapacitatingoneself,in the waysearlier described,
from consistentand principled agency in the service of relievingthat
suffering.When altruisticallyinclined agents worrythat an active,participatorycommitmentto solving an intractablesocial problem (such as
inner-citypoverty)will "suck them dry,"or "suck them in forever,"it is
the fear of this very real kind of incapacitatingself-sacrifice
that they
express. But incapacitatingself-sacrifice,
and the sacrificeof one's own
needs and intereststhat accompany it, is a consequence of vicarious
possession by the other'ssuffering.It is not a consequence of compassion
properlyunderstood.
As definedin thisdiscussion,compassion precludes such abnegation
of the self and its interestsbecause compassion disposes one to act in
accordancewiththemoralprincipleofrenderingaid to theneedy.Applying
this principle requires one to conceive of oneself either as a potential
provideror as a potentialrecipientof aid, and calls upon the formerto
put their resources in the service of the latter.But incapacitatingselfsacrificeis clearlya condition of need that itselfdemands amelioration.
Hence, consistentapplication of the principle of renderingaid to the
needy prohibitsdepleting or sacrificingone's resources so thoroughly
that one ends up joining the ranks of the needy oneself. Rather, the
terms of this principle implicitlyrequire protectingthe psychological
integrityof the self that is disposed to act on it, at the same time that it
requires extending the self in the serviceof the other. So the principle
of renderingaid to the needy imposes a double requirementof balance
on the affectiveand conative dispositionsit regulates.
Compassion satisfiesthe double requirementof balance bysatisfying
the symmetryrequirement already discussed. Indeed, this double requirementjustis a specialcase ofthesymmetry
requirement.In compassion,
the interestsand demands of the self are balanced in relation to those
of the other because the self as a unifiedwhole is balanced in relation
to the other. The self is situated between self-absorptionand vicarious
possessionwithrespectto another'sinnerstateof suffering.
It is a condition
both of inviolate inner integrityand of experiencing the other's felt

Piper
Impartiality,
Compassion,
and Imagination
745
distress,in whichthe demand forreliefof thatdistressis metby principled

action to restorethe other to a conditionof similarlyinviolateintegrity.
Mean-spiritedness,
by contrast,markspovertyof the spirit.It is a condition
of emotionaldeprivationin whichinnerintegrity
is violatedbythe other's
feltdistress-that is,in whichone is vicariouslypossessed bythatdistress,
and in whichthe demand forreliefof thatdistressis metbydesensitizing
the self against it-that is, in which one is self-absorbed
and fortifying
by one's own. Thus, the spirituallyundernourishedor mean-spiritedself
swingsbetween vicarious possession and self-absorptionrelativeto the
other's distress.It is bereftof the inner resources both for preserving
the integrityof the selfagainst incursionby the otherand forextending
those resources beyond the self to the other. Whereas compassion preand emotionalabundance necessaryto fuelactions
supposes the integrity
on behalfof anotheras wellas thoseon behalfof oneself,mean-spiritedness
involvesa feltviolation,an emotional deficitin which action on behalf
of the other is experienced as an extortion,as usurping those on behalf
of oneself. Compassion thus prepares the self for a balanced accommodationwiththe otherbecause it requiresone neitherto sacrificeone's
own well-beingon the other'sbehalf nor the other'swell-beingon one's
own. Instead it involvesrespectforthe psychologicalboundaries of both,
and a dispositionto restoretheinnerintegrity
of theotherthatis altruistic
withoutbeing-literally-self-sacrificial.
This is whycompassionrequiresa symmetric
imaginativeinvolvement
withtheother'sinnerstates.Unlikebothvicariouspossessionbyanother's
suffering,which violates A, and self-absorption,which violates B, compassion preservesthe symmetry,
required of an appropriateimaginative
involvementwithanother's inner state,between one's empathic understandingof thatstateand one's own directreactionto it. In compassion,
I sympatheticallyfeel the same inner state I empathicallyimagine you
to feel,namely,suffering,and withthe same vividnessI imagine you to
feel it. However, my sympatheticexperience of your sufferingas I empathicallyimagine it is connected to my agency in a way in which your
directexperience of your sufferingas I empathicallyimagine it is not.
That my sympatheticexperience is of your sufferingas I empathically
imagine it, and not of my own, is what inclines me to ameliorate your
sufferingratherthan my own. That my sympatheticexperience of your
sufferingas I empathicallyimagine it is sympatheticis what inclinesme
to ameliorate your sufferingrather than (or in addition to) you. And
thatmysympatheticexperience is of your suffering,
ratherthan of your
is what inclinesme to ameliorateit ratherthan promoteit.
gratification,
But if my sympatheticexperience is overwhelmedby the vividness
and depth of your sufferingas I empathicallyimagine it,then I abdicate
my sense of self and agency to the self I empathicallyimagine you to
have; I am vicariouslypossessed by your suffering.And ifyoursuffering
as I empathicallyimagine it is overwhelmedby the vividnessand depth
of my sympatheticexperience of it, then I sacrificeyour sufferingas I

746
Ethics
July1991
empathicallyimagineitto mysympatheticexperienceof it; I am absorbed

in that sympatheticinner state of my self I empathicallyimagine to be
in one's own sympathy
yours.Like dead-end relationships,
self-absorption
for others is hardly an unfamiliarphenomenon; but it is itselfmore
worthyof pitythan sympathy.That is why an imaginativeinvolvement
withanother'ssufferingcounts as compassion onlyifitis symmetric
with
respectto the relationbetween the other'sempathicallyimagined inner
state and one's own sympatheticone.'2
V. STRICT IMPARTIALITY
Now to take up in greaterdetail Blum's characterizationof impartiality
as being unbiased by one's personal preferencesor interestsin one's
treatmentof others. Blum adds that it involves"givingequal weightto
the interestsof all" (p. 44). Presumablyhe means "equal weight other
thingsequal," since, as we saw in Section I, it would be a sign of bias, not
impartiality,
to give equal weightto the interestsof the homeless and to
those of billionairereal estate developers in distributingHUD funding,
when the interestsof the homeless weigh so much more heavily.We can
say,then,to begin, thatto be impartialis to treatcompetingpreferences
and interestson theirown meritsand withoutbeing biased by one's own.
Even withthisadjustment,impartiality
remainsa metaethicalrequirement
ratherthan a substantivemoral principle,since we mustfirstknowwhat
theseinterests
are and forwhattheyare competing-informationprovided
in the substantiveprincipleto be applied-in order to identifythe nonarbitraryattributesrelative to which the principle can be impartially
applied. In all such cases the requirementof impartialitydirectsus to
apply a substantiveprinciple of conduct evenhandedly.It does not tell
us whichsubstantiveprincipleto apply. In thisconcludingsectionI want
to show that compassion requires not only a symmetricimaginativeinvolvementwithanother person's inner statesbut thereforea disposition
to impartialityof treatmentas well.
12. How should we analyze our feelingstowardthe masochist?This depends on the
correctdescriptionof masochism. If masochism involves feeling pleasure in response to
an experience that would cause us pain, then it may be difficultto empathize with the
masochist's inner state, since difficultto understand it viscerally;more difficultstill to
sympathizewith his inner state,since difficultforus to feel concordantly;and impossible
to feelingany immediateinclinationto render aid, since, accordingto thisdescription,he
does not suffer.So whateverwe may feel about thisbrand of masochist,it will not be, on
this account, compassion. Of course, we may feel distressed or shocked that he takes
pleasure in what causes us pain and feel inclined to tryto reformhim. But thiswould be
paternalismat best, meddling at worst.Suppose, however,thatthe correctdescriptionof
the masochistis thathe takespleasure in his own pain; i.e., thathe experiencestwoopposing
states,consecutivelyor simultaneously,where we would feel onlyone, namely,pain. Then
we might both empathize and sympathizewith his pain, and also feel an inclinationto
renderaid- an inclinationthatis, however,dampened byour recognitionthat,astonishingly,
he would prefernone. In this case I thinkwe should simplysay that we feel compassion
revulsion,and so forth.
compounded by incomprehension,frustration,

Piper
Impartiality,
Compassion,
and Imagination
747
Clearly,impartialityas just characterizedpresupposes modal imagination.It requiresone to imagineas depthobjectsinterests

and preferences
that one may not have and may never have had. This requires of one
an imaginativeinvolvementwiththe innerstatesof thosewho have them.
As we have seen, such an involvementis a necessarycondition of the
abilityto formuniversalconceptsof innerstatessuch as love, fear,desire,
or joy-concepts that extend backward into a counterfactuallypossible
past and forwardintoa possiblefuture.Modal imaginationis whatenables
one to apply these concepts to instancesof possible in addition to actual
experience,and so to apply them to the imagined inner statesof others
of which one has no actual experience at all.
Withoutan empathicimaginativeinvolvement,one's understanding
of the interestsand preferencesof others would remain purely verbal;
they would be surface objects of imagination.This is not to maintain
that theywould be entirelylacking in significance.But one would lack
forindividuals
insightintowhatwas at stakepsychologically
and emotionally
who have those preferencesand interests.By contrast,to the extentthat
one had first-personal
insightinto what was at stake psychologicallyand
emotionallyin havingone's own preferencesand interests,thoseinterests
would be depth objects of imagination.In thusviolatingsymmetry,
one's
capacityforimpartiality
would be correspondinglydefective.One's judgmentwould be distortedby the psychologically
and emotionallycompelling
representationof one's own interestsand preferences,relativeto which
others'would appear bydefinitionless compelling.'3The same argument
applies when we mustjudge impartiallynot between our own interests
and another's but between two third-personalsets of interests,in only
one of which we have an imaginativeinvolvement.'4
13. Could one be impartialin one'sjudgment ifbothone's own and theother'sinterests

were equally surface, rather than depth objects of imagination?Since symmetrywould
remain inviolate,why not? Since, in this case, one's capacity to understand any of the
interestsin question would be vitiated,a fortiorione's capacityto judge them impartially
would be as well.
14. For example,considerthe Californiaassociationof African-American
socialworkers
that has successfullylobbied forlegislationprohibitingthe adoption of African-American
children by Euroethnic families,even when those familieshave served the child in the
extended period of time that strongemotional
capacityof fosterparent for a sufficiently
and psychologicalbonds have formedbetween fosterparentsand child. The association's
reasoning is thatAfrican-Americansin general are best served by being raised in cohesive
African-American
families-a concernwithwhichall adult African-Americans
can identify.
What the association seems to lack is the empathic understandingof what it means to a
child to have psychologicalbonds of trustand affectionwithan adult caretakerdestroyed,
and destroyedrepeatedlyas the child is moved fromone fosterhome to another,and what
toll thiswill take on the child's capacityto formbonds of trustand affectionwithanyone
as an adult. It would seem that the association's failureof imaginativeinvolvementwith
the child'sinnerstatesas depth objects,and correspondinglydeep imaginativeinvolvement
as a group,incapacitatesitsmembers
withthe long-terminterestsof adult African-Americans
fromimpartially
carryingout theirmandateto protectand promotethe child'sbestinterests.

748
Ethics
July1991
We may begin, then,by thinkingof impartiality

in thejudgment of
preferencesand interestsas the resultof applyinga universaland general
substantivemoral conceptor principleto thoserelevantlysituatedagents'
inner states selected by the termsof that principle,such that the inner
states of the person applying the principle do not lead her to tailor its
application to her own situationor add special weightto her personal
interestsor allegiances in determiningitsapplication.'5 So, forexample,
an impartialapplicationof the principleof directlyapportioningquantity
of resources to need in the distributionof HUD funds would not give
any special weightto the need of the distributorto cement her political
alliances. Nor would it tailor the application of this principle to her
personal or social connections to billionairereal estate developers. An
impartialapplicationof thisprinciplewould compare therespectiveinner
states of need of all designated parties relativeto one another, on the
basis of a symmetric,empathic imaginativeinvolvementwith those of
each, and distributethe funds accordingly.
Such a distributionpresumes no solution to the problem of interpersonal comparisons,since a symmetricempathicunderstandingof another'sinnerstatesdoes not aspire to the objectivequantifiability
of those
states.16Indeed, the irreduciblyqualitative varietyamong such states
furtherin "Moral Theoryand Moral Alienation."
15. I discussthisnotionof impartiality
16. First it should be noted that the attemptto make interpersonalcomparisons of
utilityin welfareeconomics is engendered by a differentset of issues. Its goal is to end up
witha cardinal utilityscale thatobjectivelycalibratesthe satisfactionlevel of each intended
beneficiaryof a utilitydistribution,so thattotalor average utilitycan be maximizedoverall.
Thus it is generated not by the metaethicalrequirementof adequacy thatany substantive
moral principle be impartiallyapplied, regardlessof contentbut, rather,by the demand
to demonstratein practice the application of one particularsubstantivemoral principle,
namely, the principle of utility.But no such calibrationcould be objective in the sense
had some fixedreferenceto a qualitatively
welfareeconomicsrequires,even iftheterm"utility"
identifiableinner state,and even if thatstatewere detectableand individuallyquantifiable
by means of some overtbehavioralmanifestation.Suppose therewere some sortof natural
physiologicalbarometerthat all human subjects had, such as a pale pink "utilitymole" in
the middle of theirforeheadsthatturnedbluer as one feltmoreoverallsatisfaction.Suppose
furtherthatmyutilitymole turnedbrightcobalt blue when I receivedfivehundred dollars
in HUD funding,whereas yours would attain that hue only upon receivingfivehundred
thousand dollars. What would that demonstrate?Surely not that I were objectivelymore
satisfiedoverallwithmyfivehundred dollars thanyou were withyourfivehundred dollars.
grantmightstillbe less objectivesatisfaction
My satisfactionwithmy five-hundred-dollar
withyours,even though myutilitymole were bluer.
quantitativelythan yourdissatisfaction
And surelynot that I werejust as objectivelysatisfiedoverall withmyfivehundred dollars
as you would be withyour fivehundred thousand: my satisfactionwithmy fivehundred
dollars mightstillbe far less objective satisfactionquantitativelythan yourswithyour five
hundred thousand dollars, even though our utilitymoles were the same shade of blue.
The difficulty
about makinginterpersonalcomparisonsof objectiveutilitydoes not disappear
is caused by the
by stipulatinga solution to the problem of other minds. The difficulty
unavoidable existenceof differentsubjects. It is not the inaccessabilityof a subject's inner
itselfthatpresentsthe obstacleto interpersonal
comparisons
statesbut,rather,her subjectivity
of utility.(Thus, I disagree with Allan Gibbard, who conceives the problem of making

Piper
and Imagination
Compassion,
Impartiality,
749
precludes this.As suggestedin Section IV, it assumes,withoutbeing able

to show or prove, the capacityof one's modal imaginationto represent
subjectivelyas depth objects the quality and intensityof others' inner
stateswith some degree of de facto accuracy.This capacityis based on
an empathiccomprehensionof the behaviorthatordinarilyaccompanies
them and on rough-and-readybehavioral interactionsthat then enable
one to fine-tuneone's empathic insights.It also assumes one's capacity
to preservethe distinctivequalityand intensityof each such imaginative
object withequal vividness,simultaneouslyin one's consciousness.17 And
it assumes one's abilityto compare such vividlyimagined objects with
respect to one's subjectiverepresentationof theirqualityand intensity.
In a symmetricempathic understandingof another's inner states,the
scale of quantitativecalibrationamong these statesas imaginativeobjects
is a functionof their relative effecton the subject. It is ultimatelythe
quality and relative intensityof one's own experiences that are being
compared.
Some philosophershave offeredproceduralaccountsof impartiality.
It has been claimed, for example, that impartialityofjudgment is what
resultsfromputtingoneselfin theplace of theindividualwhosepreferences
are beingjudged,'8 or thatit resultsfromdiscountingone's own interests
and desires when makingthejudgment,'9 or both. The close conceptual
and the foregoing
connectionbetweenall of theseaccountsof impartiality
and compassion
analysisof compassiondeserveemphasis.Both impartiality
requirean empathicimaginativeinvolvementwiththeother'sinnerstate,
and both require a reduction of the preeminence in consciousness of
one's own inner state,in order to arriveat ajudgment thatappropriately
balancestheinterestsof the selfand thoseof theother.So bothimpartiality
and compassion require an imaginativeextension of the self into the
domain of the other and a correspondingimaginativeaccommodation
interpersonalcomparisons as a special case of the problem of knowingother minds. See
his "Interpersonal Comparisons: Preference,Good, and the IntrinsicReward of a Life,"
in Foundationsof Social Choice Theory,ed. Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland [New York:
Cambridge UniversityPress, 1989], pp. 165-93.) But here again, thatinterpersonalcomparisonsare in theoryimpossibleto make does not implythatthereis no factof the matter
about whethertwo individualsare equally satisfiedor not.
17. It assumes, thatis, our abilityto experience walkingand chewinggum at the same
time, even when it is oneself who is doing the walking and another who is chewing the
gum. Obviously, this assumption becomes less legitimateas the number of empathees
increases.Possiblysome adaptation of the methodof pairwisecomparisonsmightbe useful
here.
18. Rawls reconstructsthisview fromHume and attributesit to classicalutilitarianism
in A TheoryofJustice(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1971), pp. 33, 184-87,
and 27-28. Also see Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Claim to Adequacy of a Highest Stage of
70 (1973): 630-46.
Moral Judgment,"JournalofPhilosophy
19. Thus Rawls's own view is that impartialjudgments are those that result from
observingthe conditionscharacterizingthe originalposition,especiallytheveilofignorance
(of one's own interestsand position in society).

750
Ethics
July1991
to see impartiality
of the otherwithinthe domain of the self.It is difficult
and compassion as being as mutuallyexclusiveas Blum seems to think.20
are faultyin presupposing
However,all oftheseaccountsofimpartiality
the natural preeminencein consciousnessof one's own inner statesover
another's as one empathicallyimagines them. Each assumes, without
explicitlystatingthis,that impartialityconsistsin applying a corrective
to a naturaltendencyto self-absorptionalone-as though vicariouspossessionwere not as much of a vice,and as prevalenta vice,at the opposite
extreme.Consequently,taken at face value, these two procedures,alone
or in conjunction,exhibitbias towardthe other.Both advocate the suppression of the self in the service of vicarious possession by the other.
could not result
But the symmetry
requirementimplies thatimpartiality
fromeitherof these proceduresconsideredindependently,or fromboth
of them conjoined, forthisveryreason. If impartiality
requiresunbiased
then
the
in
must
be
biased
neithertoward
judgment,
judgment question
An adequate
oneself nor toward the other. Call this strictimpartiality.
proceduralaccount of strictimpartiality-whichI do not pretendto offer
here-must explicitlysteer the self clear both of vicarious possession
and of self-absorption.
to feelings
Blum's rejectionof impartiality
as appropriateand intrinsic
of compassion seems to stem fromthe view thatimpartialityis merelya
tendencyto make personally
correctiveto a predominantlyself-interested
biasedjudgmentsabout the properweightto be accorded other'sinterests
in the pursuitof one's own. If thisis all impartialityis, then of course it
will follow,as Blum seems to infer,that a compassionate person whose
concern has no
judgments are not biased by an excess of self-interested
need of impartiality'scorrectiveinfluence.But this presupposes a conception of the self-what I elsewhere call the Humean conception of
the self2 -as motivatedby essentiallyself-interested
concerns,to which
is the correctiveand compassion the exception.That is, comimpartiality
passion (as well as friendshipand altruism)in Blum's account functions
as though it were a counterexample to a generallyvalid empiricalgeneralization about the de facto prevalence of self-interestedmotivation
and judgment biased accordingly.
But suppose the Humean conception of the self is wrong as a descriptivemodel of human motivation,and other-directedmotivessuch
as sympathyand altruism play a more central role overall. Does this
mean that we may dispense with strictimpartialityas a virtueas well?
Clearly not. An altruisticperson may give unjustifiablyshort shriftto
her own interestsin devoting her energies to others. Or a sympathetic
person may be uncertain to whom, among the many claimantson her
20. The connection between impartialityand compassion is particularlyevident in
Hume's TreatiseofHuman Nature,ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974). See
the firstparts of bk. 2, pt. 1, sec. 11, and bk. 3, pt. 1, secs. 1 and 6.
21. See n. 5 above.

Piper
and Imagination
Compassion,
Impartiality,
751
sympathy,she should directher sympatheticresponse. Strictimpartiality

has a centralrole in the analysisof compassion,because so manyclaims
on our sympathyregularly confrontus, including those of our own
interestsand preferences,that we are compelled to adjudicate among
them. As we have seen in Sections III and IV, a healthycompassionate
response to othersdemands thatwe navigatebetween the Scylla of selfabsorption and the Charybdisof vicarious possession. It demands that
we find a principle for distinguishingbetween unhealthyfortifications
of theboundariesof theselfand healthysocialexpressions
or transgressions
of it. A principleof strictimpartialitymeets this demand.
The symmetryrequirementon compassion as an appropriate imaginativeinvolvementwith another's sufferingimplies that compassion
presupposes strictimpartialityof modal imagination.We have already
seen in Section IV that unlike occasional and unpredictablestirringsof
concern, or impulsive attempts to be helpful, compassion involves a
dispositionto respond to the sufferingof another in a consistentand
discriminatemanner, that is, in accordance with universal and general
substantiveprinciplesof aid, mercy,or restitutionthat,likeall substantive
moralprinciples,
require a balanced accommodationof the demands and
Compassion
interestsof the self with those of the other symmetrically.
achieves such an accommodation by avoiding both vicarious possession
byone's own,and so bydisposing
bytheother'sdistressand self-absorption
the self to action that sacrificesthe inner integrityof neither self nor
other.
Moreover, satisfactionof the symmetryrequirement implies that
withpersonaldislikeor revulsion
compassionas a moralmotiveis consistent
toward the object of one's compassion, because the empathic comprehension of the other's suffering,the sympatheticreactionto it, and the
respectin whichcompassion disposes one to extendoneselfon theother's
behalf in order to ameliorate it, is independent of attributesirrelevant
to those picked out by the principleof renderingaid to the needy.Where
a personal dislike of the suffererprecludes sympathywithher distress,
symmetryis violated, skewingthe self toward self-absorption;and bias
therebyprecludes compassion from taking hold. Impatience with the
other's personal vanityor disgust at her malodorous garb may coexist
withthe feelingof compassion because the object of that feelingis her
sufferingand her need, not her self-estimationor her sartorialhabits;
and because theresultingdispositionto actionis directedto theamelioration
of her sufferingand her need, not to the improvementof her personality
to an inherentlyimpartial,
or sense of style.Strictlyimpartialconformity
substantiveprescriptiveprincipleof compassion rules out as attributively
irrelevantboth sacrificeof selfor otherin the ameliorationof suffering,
and also bias toward popular or charmingsufferersover unpleasant or
sociallyrepulsive ones.
The strictly
impartialapplicationof such principlesthus requiresan
absence of personal bias, both towardthe other'sinner stateand toward

752
Ethics
July1991
one's own. One exhibitspersonal bias towardanother'sinnerstateto the

extent that one's imaginative involvementwith it is weighted toward
vicariouspossession: one appropriates the other's sufferingas one empathicallyimagines it into one's self and replaces one's own with it, as
described in 1-3. By contrast,one exhibitspersonal bias toward one's
own inner state to the extent that one's imaginativeinvolvementwith
the other'srecedes towardself-absorption,
withprimitiveself-centeredness
and narrowconcretenessconstitutingthe extreme.
But whydescribethese as cases of personal bias ratherthan of mere
imaginativeexcess and failure,respectively?A bias, unlike a merelyunbalanced imagination,presupposes a value judgment, that is, that the
objectof bias is more worthyof favoror considerationthanthe alternative.
The basis for thisjudgment is the possession by the object of bias of
some specificbut irrelevantattributewhich the alternativeis perceived
to lack.In thecase of an imaginativeinvolvement
withone's own experience
or that of another, personal bias occurs when one evaluates either as
more worthyof favoror considerationthan the other on the basis of a
specificbut irrelevantattributethattheone has and theotheris perceived
to lack. For example, one may regard another'spain as one empathically
imaginesitas more worthyofconsiderationthanone's own as one directly
experiences it,because one regardsother people in general as more importantor worthythan oneself; or because one regards other people's
inner states as intrinsicallymore interestingor worthyof investigation
than one's own. In either of these cases, the irrelevantattributethat
directsone's personal bias to the other is the attributeof being other
than oneself.
Conversely,one may regard one's own pain as more worthyof considerationsimplybecause it is one's own, or because one regardsoneself
as in general more importantor interestingthan others.Unlike cases in
which one regards one's own or another'spain as more worthyof favor
or considerationbecause the pain in question is more intense,these cases
exhibitpersonal bias because the attributivebasis forascribingsuperior
value to the one or the other is arbitraryand irrelevant.The mere fact
thatmyheadache is minedoes notentitleitto precedencein myimagination
over your imminentdemise frommalnutrition.Nor does the mere fact
that your sufferingis yours entitleit to precedence in my imagination
over my sympatheticresponse to it. Indeed, if my sympatheticresponse
to your sufferingis to motivatemy ameliorativeaction on your behalf,
your sufferingas I empathicallyimagine it had better not overwhelm
my sympatheticresponse to it.
Of course, itmighthappen thatthe pain of mysympatheticresponse
as I empathically
to yoursuffering
is greaterthanthepain of yoursuffering
imagine it. Conceiving of myselfas infinitelymore sensitivethan thou,
I might sufferfor you in a way that I empathicallyimagine you to be
incapable of sufferingyourself.Hence, this is a case not of vicarious
possession but rather of surrogatemartyrdom.
(Surrogate martyrdomis

Piper
and Imagination
Compassion,
Impartiality,
753
distinctfrom genuine martyrdombecause a genuine martyrshoulders

the actual sufferingof others,not the sufferingshe imaginestheywould
feel were they as sensitiveas she.) Since greater pain justifies greater
consideration,accordingto the foregoingaccount,surrogatemartyrdom
would seem to warrantmore attentionto my sympatheticresponse than
withoutimplyingpersonalbias. However,in conceiving
to yoursuffering,
of myselfas being more sensitiveto sufferingthan thou, I violate B, for
I imagine your inner stateof sufferingas though itwere a surfaceobject
of imaginationin comparison to my own inner, sympatheticstate as a
depth object. Hence, even surrogatemartyrdomimplies personal bias.
The bias consists in arbitrarilyascribing superior sensitivityto myself
and weightingmy imaginativeinvolvementaccordingly.Surrogatemartyrdomis thereforedistinctfromgenuine compassion.
What about the standardcase, in whichthe magnitudeof your pain
as I empathicallyimagine it exceeds the magnitude of my sympathetic
response to it? Since neither A nor B is violated, surely symmetryis
violated by our unequal experiences of pain, withoutimplyingpersonal
bias in thiscase? Not so. This standardcase is analogous to thatdiscussed
in Section IV, in which your heady pride of achievementoutstripsmy
faintlyenthusiasticresponse to it,and the answeris the same. I may hold
in mind with equal vividnessboth your greater pain as I empathically
imagine it and my lesser sympatheticpain response to it. Symmetry
does as well.Compassion
remainsinviolate,and thereforestrictimpartiality
has the psychologicalfeature that neither the other's sufferingas one
empathicallyimagines it nor one's own sympatheticresponse to it is
submerged by the other,regardlessof the magnitude of either.
This analysisextends to third-personcases. Consider, for example,
the friendshipcase Blum raises fordiscussion.Blum thinksit is obvious
thatwhen choosing between helping a friendand helping a stranger,(1)
one is morallypermittedto choose to help the friendsimplybecause she
is one's friend.However,thisviewhas biteonlyifthe strangeris stipulated
tobe in greaterneed ofhelp. In thatcase,as itturnsout,Blum acknowledges
the possibilitythat (2) if the strangeris in greaterneed of help, she may
have a superior claim on one's compassion (p. 49).
In these passages, Blum's discussiontreatsthe psychologicalfactof
compassion as generatingsubstantivemoral principles,among themthat
the object of this emotion should be the recipientof one's ameliorative
principledepends on rejecting
of thissubstantive
action.But the plausibility
and compassion for which I
strict
impartiality
the connectionsbetween
notion
of compassion is consistent
Blum's
have argued here. Specifically,
describedin Section 11,
of
others
view
withthe primitivelyself-centered
by how fully
is
determined
of
others
treatment
according to which one's
one's
feelings.
theyhappen to engage
By contrast,myconceptual analysisof compassion,as includingsatcarriesno
isfactionof the metaethicalrequirementof strictimpartiality,
whether
the
leaves
questions
open
analysis
My
such substantiveimplication.

754
Ethics
July1991
centralin a substantivemoraltheory;
compassionshould be motivationally
whetheror not one should act on those principlesof aid in a particular
case; if so, whetherone is most appropriatelymotivatedby feelingsof
compassion, ties of personal loyalty,or the voice of conscience; and to
whom,among the deservingcandidates,one should directone's ameliorativeefforts.
Nevertheless,the foregoinganalysis can accommodate both 1 and
2. Friendship,too, is governedby substantivemoralprinciplesof conduct
and emotion.As in the case of compassion,adherence to these principles
requires an empathic imaginative involvementwith the other's inner
states that violates neither A nor B. Without satisfactionof these two
conditions,one's relation to the other is poisoned either by vicarious
possession or by self-absorption.Vicarious possessionby another'sinner
statesbespeaks a level of psychologicaldependency on the other that is
patentlyinimical to genuine friendship.Self-absorptionin one's own
conceptionsof the otherbespeakan insensitivity
innerstatesor self-serving
to and disrespect for the other that is equally antitheticalto genuine
impartialsatisfaction
friendship.So genuinefriendshippresupposesstrictly
respect,
impartial,substantiveprinciplesof mutualsensitivity,
of inherently
and psychologicalindependence, and therefore,satisfactionof the symmetryrequirement.Thereforefriendshippresupposes strictimpartiality.
is expressedin compassion
thisstrictimpartiality
And whena friendsuffers,
for her condition.
When a friendand a strangersufferwith equal intensityand one
empathicallyimagines the inner states of both with equal vividness,a
compassionate person will feel equal sympathyfor both, and equally
moved to ameliorate the sufferingof both. Because the inner state of
each bears the same relation to one's own, namely, satisfactionof the
symmetryrequirement,compassion evinces a strictlyimpartialconcern
for the stranger'sas well as the friend'scondition. What finallydetermines one to render aid to one's friendinstead of the strangeris not
one's heightened compassion for the friend.What moves one to help
the friend are the bonds of mutual trust,loyalty,shared history,responsibility,and respect thatuniquely definethe relationof friendship.
This conclusion departs from Blum's in two respects. First,Blum
seems to thinkthat there is a psychologicalconnection between liking
someone more, or having a more intimaterelationshipwith her, and
feelinggreatercompassionforher. In SectionIV I rejectedthisconnection
impartialwithrespectto irrelevant
on thegroundsthatcompassionis strictly
attributesthat mightbias one eithertowardor against the sufferer.But
moreover,the psychologicalconnectionmay work in the opposite way:
it may happen that the more intimatelyone knows a person, the more
one becomes accustomed to her suffering,and the more emotionally
inured one becomes to it. Hence, friendshipmayunderminecompassion
ratherthan promote it.
Second, Blum believesthereis a normativeconnectionbetweenhaving
a more committedor intimaterelationshipwith someone and feeling

Piper
Impartiality,
Compassion,
and Imagination
755
greater compassion for her suffering.I reject this connection on the

grounds that it prescribesstrongerfeelingsof empathyand sympathy,
and a more motivationallyeffectivedispositionto renderaid on grounds
irrelevantto the magnitudeof the pain feltbythe sufferer,
and irrelevant
to the magnitudeof her need foraid. That is, it prescribesfeelingmore
compassion forpeople we knowthan forpeople who are in greaterpain.
I find this prescriptionunacceptable, but not only because it expresses
basisthatis irrelevant
to feelingcompassion.
clearbias towardan attributive
It is also unacceptablyexclusionaryin the presence of those for whom
the conditionsof survivalmake stable friendshipan unattainableluxury
and whose magnitude of sufferingclearlysurpasses that which anyone
we knowis likelyto experiencefirsthand.
Compassiondemandsa generosity
of spiritwhich is incompatiblewithnarrowand arbitraryrestrictionsof
ofthesymmetry
scope. So I insiston satisfaction
requirementin compassion
for normativeas well as psychologicaland conceptual reasons.
Compassionate action toward one other requires only the special
link between my self and my action when the symmetryobserved is
between my own and the other's inner state as I empathicallyimagine
it.By contrast,compassionateactionwhen symmetry
is observedbetween
my own and many others' inner states also requires, when all suffer
equally, some furthermotivatingattributeof the particularother on
whose behalf I compassionatelyact. Since one's own strictimpartiality
among equally sufferingothers expresses an inherentlyceterisparibus
relationamong agents,one's compassionateactionon behalfofanyrequires
some sortof motivationaltiebreakeramong them. Otherwise,agent paralysisreallydoes set in.
In the case in which the strangerpatentlysuffersmore intensely,
the dictate of compassion is equally clear: my empathic imaginativeinvolvementwiththe plightof brutalizedblack South Africanswill move
me to contributefundsto Transafricaratherthan to myfriend'spurchase
of a new coat, when these two options conflict,because I perceive the
greaterintensityof sufferingin the former.But the responses to each
of these cases are applicationsof the strictimpartiality
requirement,not
precludedby it.In the firstcase, strictimpartiality
determinestheempathic
recognitionof equal sufferingon the part of both friendand stranger,
and of the bonds and obligationsof friendshipas a tiebreaker.In the
second case, strictimpartialitydeterminesthe empathic recognitionof
greater sufferingon the part of the strangerdespite those bonds and
obligationsthat mightotherwisehave biased one toward the friend.In
fixesone's compassionate
both cases, the requirementof strictimpartiality
response to the situationin such a way as to give one's own interestsand
attachmentsno more and no less than theirdue.22
is a metaethicalrequirementof adequacy on theapplication
22. That strictimpartiality
of any substantivemoral principleand not itselfsuch a principleimpliesthatthe factthat
one's experience of identifiablecompassion for one or many suffererswill move one to
ameliorate their sufferingdoes not by itselfcommit one to ameliorativeaction on their

756
Ethics
July1991
The unbiased application of distributiveprinciples,the emotion of

compassion,and the relationof friendshipare not the onlymoral virtues
betweenselfand other.Honesty,trust,
thatpresuppose strictimpartiality
love, and responsibility-indeed, any virtue susceptible to analysis in
termsof substantiveprinciplesof behavior-could be treatedsimilarly,
although I will not attemptthis here. The general point is that strict
impartialityrequires the abilityto balance the demands and interestsof
the self with those of others in accordance witha substantiveprinciple
biased towardneither.Indeed, the set of moral principlesthatconstitute
impartialsolutionto the problemscreated
a moral theoryjust is a strictly
by the competingdemands and interestsof differentselves.23So it is not
surprisingthat Kantians insistthat this abilityis definitiveof the moral
pointof viewand thatitentersintotheconceptionand practicalapplication
personal interactions
of everymoral virtue.Withoutstrictimpartiality,
or dependentvicarious
would consistsolelyin manipulativeself-absorption
possession. Feelings of injustice,violation,neglect,or betrayalare moral
reactionsthatrightlyalertus to the operation of these vices in our social
relationships.
of moralvirtuessuchas compassionor friendship
That thefunctioning
presuppose empathic modal imaginationof another'ssufferingwhich is
strictlyimpartialwith respect to the relation between one's own inner
stateand others'explains whycommitmentto an impartialmoral theory
engenders ratherthan precludes such virtues.I have argued elsewhere
thata moral theoryis an ideal descriptivetheorythatenables us to make
sense of our moral experience: to identifyanother'sconditionas one of
suffering,for example, or our own behavior as that of renderingaid. I
have also argued that if it is a genuine theory,a moral theory is by
definitionimpartial,since it contains neither definitedescriptionsnor
arbitrarybias.24 In this discussion we can see how a strictlyimpartial
and to regulateour empathic
moraltheorymightfunctionbothto constitute
in a morallyappropriate
condition
another's
imaginativeresponses to
our
by providingus
responses
imaginative
way. Moral theoryconstitutes
impartial-character.
virtuous-that
strictly
is,
withconcepts of morally
understand,and evaluateour experiences
We use theseconceptsto identify,
of our own inner statesas well as those of others'as we modallyimagine
them.
Moral theoryalso regulatesour imaginativeresponsesbecause these
strictlyimpartialconcepts of virtuouscharacterserve to guide theirculbehalf: feelingsof compassion mayneed to be balanced againstconsiderationsof efficiency,
rational prudence, or other moral obligations-such as those to friendsor family-and
may not always override them.
23. That is, it solves a Prisoner'sDilemma-type situation,although to point thisout
is not necessarilyto justifythe theoryor to account for its origins.
24. Piper, "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation,"and "The Meaning of 'Ought' and
the Loss of Innocence."

Piper
and Imagination
Compassion,
Impartiality,
757
tivation.By describingideals of characterand action against which we

compare our own, the strictlyimpartialconcepts of substantivemoral
theoryprovide criteriaof self-evaluationthe application of which itself
contributesto our moral growth.In applying these criteriawe come to
understand the differencebetween, for example, a balanced, sensitive
response to another's sufferingversus one thatuses another's suffering
to meet various unmet psychologicalneeds of one's own. We thereby
come to see thatwhatdistinguishescompassionfromvicariouspossession
and self-absorptionis not the agent's good will toward the suffereror
her desire to minimizeunhappiness as completelyas possible. A person
whose responses to another'ssufferingfailto satisfythe strictimpartiality
requirementof compassion is not necessarilyan immoral person. But
we rightlysay of such a person that she is infantile,self-indulgent,or
lacks vision or, alternately,that she is too invasive,self-abnegating,or
meddlesome to behave reliably as a moral agent. What distinguishes
compassion from vicarious possession and self-absorptionis the more
general requirementof a strictlyimpartialmoral theory,that we treat
another's moral personhood with no more or less than the care and
respect we accord our own-that is, with the care and respect due a
moral person impartiallyconsidered.


Piper Impartiality Compassion

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Piper Impartiality Compassion

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Impartiality, Compassion, and Modal Imagination

Author(s): Adrian M. S. Piper

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 19 Feb 2014 18:45:51 PM

Impartiality,Compassion, and Modal

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criteriathatconstrainthe choice of an adequate substantivemoral theory

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you to dinner,or ifI am, thatI desireaccessto yourimpressiveprofessional

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preference"does not clearlyidentifyimpartiality

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sponses would constitutepart of our conception of ourselves, but not

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the correspondingdimensions of personal character these intentional

AND VICARIOUS POSSESSION

Next consider two extremes of imaginativeobject. At one end of the

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well. My imaginativereconstructionreplaces realityas I am absorbing

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deliveryof them. In each of these cases, one's level of involvementwith

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mere furniturein the external environmentand is withouta visceral

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possessed by the thoughtof an actual or possible externalevent as well

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commitmentsand relationsto the surroundingcommunityin order to

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your forehead. The claim is that an involvementwithanother person's

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respond empathically.Or we may see another behave in a certainway

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of words,phrases,similes,metaphors,and colloquial expressionswe used

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1. one empathicallyexperiences the other's feelings as one

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in me. Yet I may empathicallyimagine your heady pride of achievement

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my self to the desire, which I empathicallyimagine you to have, that I

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sparkfleetingimpulsesto help, compassion is a principledmoralemotion

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distress,in whichthe demand forreliefof thatdistressis metby principled

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empathicallyimagineitto mysympatheticexperienceof it; I am absorbed

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Clearly,impartialityas just characterizedpresupposes modal imagination.It requiresone to imagineas depthobjectsinterests

13. Could one be impartialin one'sjudgment ifbothone's own and theother'sinterests

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We may begin, then,by thinkingof impartiality

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precludes this.As suggestedin Section IV, it assumes,withoutbeing able

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sympathy,she should directher sympatheticresponse. Strictimpartiality

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one's own. One exhibitspersonal bias towardanother'sinnerstateto the

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distinctfrom genuine martyrdombecause a genuine martyrshoulders

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greater compassion for her suffering.I reject this connection on the

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The unbiased application of distributiveprinciples,the emotion of