APOHA: A THEORY OF MEANING WITHOUT ONTIC COMMITMENT

Apoha (literally exclusion) is the Buddhist theory of meaning. According to this theory, the
meaning of a word is a conceptual image (vikalpa) which indicates an object not directly but
by way of excluding the other objects (anypoha): the word cow means exclusion of the
objects other than cow. Apoha is understood in a variety of ways. To some, it is a technique
to solve the problem of universalsthe problem of oneness in multiple individuals.
Universals (smnya) are recognized, particularly by the realist Nyya-Vaieika system, as
real entities inhering in particulars and functioning as the basis for bringing the particulars
into a class. The Buddhists believe in the actuality of particulars (svalakaa) only and regard
universals as merely mental constructs which do not form the fabric of the world, over and
above the particulars. In other sense, apoha is considered as an explanation of the idea of
meaning which is essentially based on the alleged causal relations between the particulars.
More importantly, the apoha theory seeks to explain our ability to use general terms without
committing to the existence of any eternal (nitya) or unchanging entities such as universals.
The reality, in Buddhism, is regarded as ever-changing. The present article is a modest
attempt to show that apoha as a theory of meaning is the logical necessity generated by the
Buddhist metaphysics of momentariness and the linguistic symbols (namely, words and
sentences) do enable us to pick out the intended object in the world though in a roundabout
way.
In Buddhism, what is ontically (?) given is only svalakaa (particularsdharma in early
Buddhism, svalakaa dhrad dharma). Universals are our mental constructsconcepts
and they are projected onto the particulars for practical purposes. Our knowledge regarding
everything is conventionally determined in that we think about the things in the way we are
taught to think. This also means that the way things are in-themselves (svalakaa) has only
little to do with our ideas about things. Our thought operates at the level of universals
(smnyalakaa), which arguably are not ontological realities in Buddhism. Particulars are
brought under a class or universal due to their functional similarity obtained in our
apprehension. But, as it is believed in Buddhism, the particulars (reality) and universals
(ideality) are things apart. Therefore it is desirable that our linguistic representation of
reality reflect this fact, observes A. K. Chatterjee (2007, p. 16). The apoha theory seeks to
serve this purpose.
In the Buddhist epistemology, what is cognized is a particular and it is this cognition which
is intended to be shared through linguistic medium. What is revealed in cognition is called
content (viaya). Since there are two kinds of contents believed in Buddhismthe ones
which are unique and free from conception (svalakaa) and the others which are common
and conceptually constructed (smnyalakaa), two distinct modes of cognition are accepted
(mnam dvividham meyadvaividhyt, Dharmakrti, Vol.1, p. 409). These are perception
(pratyaka) and inference (anumna). Dignga (c. 480 c. 540 AD Buddhist thinker) defines
perception as direct knowledge which is free from conceptual construction (kalpanpoham)
and Dharmakrti adds another feature, namely non-illusory (abhrntam), to this definition.
While commenting on the refined definition, Prajkaragupta (c. 8th century AD) in his

Vrtiklakrabhya (a commentary on Dharmakrtis Pramavrttika) says that the

apprehension of any object as qualified with certain properties etc. is a conceptual construct
(kalpan). Moreover, when the cognized properties are not practically discovered in the locus
they are apprehended, the apprehension turns out to be illusion (bhrnti). Perception, being
a veridical cognition (pram), is said to be free from both kalpan and bhrnti (Ibid., Vol.2, p.
593). Moreover, due to the concept-freeness (nirvikalpakatva) of the content of perceptual
cognition, it cannot be verbalized.
Unless an object (vastu) is cognized as predicated of certain qualities etc., cognition cannot be
verbalized. In the Nyya-Vaieika tradition, a qualified cognition is called determinate
perception (savikalpaka pratyaka, which is defined as vieaa-viiyavagh-jna).
Prajkaragupta calls such cognition kalpan (vieadisambandhavastu-pratibhs-pratti
kalpan, ibid.). While presenting the Nyya view, Stephen Phillips says that the mind does
not integrate flowerhood and the flowerhaving-as-object-an-entity-as-qualified is not a
combination (2004, p. 391). But, since flowerhood (jti) and flower (vyakti) are recognized as
different entities in the Nyya metaphysics, the apprehension of an object as qualified with
flowerhood is a combined knowledge and therefore conceptual construction for the
Buddhists (sayojya grahaam hi kalpan, Dharmakrti, Vol. 2, p. 614). An interesting debate
on indeterminate and determinate perception can be seen between Chakrabarti (2000),
Chadha (2001), Phillips and Siderits (2004). For the present purpose, it would suffice to say
that the determination of cognition in terms of conceptual construction is essential for the
verbalization of cognition. In the domain of inferential knowledge, the mind fully employs
its conceptual ability and the knowledge generated by language is classified as inferential
knowledge in Buddhism.
The immediate occupation is to discuss the Buddhist standpoint in relation to verbal
cognitioncognition which is verbalized in language. Once a cognitive agent acquires
cognition and after determination of its character, s/he intends to share it, s/he adopts a
common medium to communicate the acquired content to the fellow user(s) of the medium.
When the acquired cognitive content is communicated by way of connecting it with the
components of language and the same is received and understood by the hearer/reader, the
resultant state of mind in the hearer/reader is called verbal cognition (bdabodha); that is
why language is sometimes defined as verbalized cognition.
Words and sentences are the basic units of a language. The role of these units in the
production and acquisition of knowledge, in some of the Indian philosophical systems, is
discussed under the source of knowledge called testimony (abda). Among other things, the
discussion on testimony relates to the questions raised in the contemporary philosophy of
language such as what is language, what is the meaning of a word, what is it for a word to
have meaning, how the meaning of a word relates to the meaning of a sentence in which the
word occurs, whether the words have independent meaning or they are meaningful only in
the context of a sentence. It has also been a matter of great debate why testimony be
accepted as an independent source of knowledge. With the exception of perhaps Maitreya
and Asaga (the Buddhist thinkers prior to Dignga), Buddhism does not officially

subscribe to testimony as an independent source of knowledge and accommodates it under

inferential knowledge. Nevertheless, there have been elaborate logical discussions on the
role of language in human cognitive affairs and its relationship with the reality particularly
after the introduction of the theory of apoha by Dignga. Since then the theory of apoha
has been a matter of great significance not only within the Buddhist tradition but also as a
rival theory in the Nyya-Vaieika, the Mms and the Vaiykaraa traditions. Though
the apoha theory is largely discussed in the Yogcra Buddhist tradition, it may however be
called the Buddhist theory of meaning given its wider acceptance and coherence with the
basic metaphysics of Buddhism. Yet, the Buddhists in this article may be read as the
Yogcra Buddhists for all intents and purposes.
A proper appreciation and evaluation of the apoha theory requires some reflection on the
metaphysical and cognitive context in which the need of the theory is felt. The question
regarding the relationship between thoughts-words-sentences and reality has been a
perennial issue of debate. The fact that one may not require the knowledge of how words of a
language mean their objects in order to be a competent user of the language is suggestive of
something. The basic requirement for linguistic competence is a familiarity with the
linguistic conventions of a speech community, that is, how the people of that community
acquire the meaning of a word and use it to mean something in the reality; similarly, how
they combine various linguistic entities to mean the relationship between different facts of
the reality. Hence, a systematic understanding of the meaning of language necessitates the
knowledge of every concern shown by any speech community in the development and
acquisition of language. But, the Buddhist thinkers basically focus on the sequence of the
psychical facts occurring during the process of cognition in order to explicate their own
theory of language. Their theory of language seems to be a direct outcome of their
metaphysical belief in the theory of incessant change. What therefore follows is a discussion
on the concept of momentariness as a prelude to the issue at hand.
One of the basic tenets of Buddhism has been the denial of the existence of any unchanging
reality. The denial of unchanging reality owes to two convictions. First, since there is
nothing unchanging to be found in our experience and whatever is empirically discovered is
continuously changingoriginating and perishing, it is reasonable to believe that
everything that exists is impermanent. Second, since anything unchanging cannot be
causally efficacious, to assert that something exists but is causally inefficacious or
unchanging is to make a contradictory claim. Hence, the Buddhists propose the theory of
impermanence and, on the basis of it, a dynamic conception of reality. Life, for them, is a
series of becoming, instant manifestations of discrete conscious events that are causally
related to each other by the krmic impressions: the preceding conscious moment leaves its
traces on the succeeding conscious moment and so on. The preceding state transmits its
causal energy (paccayasatti) to its immediately succeeding state. Since the causal relation
holds between the two distinct and immediate conscious events in a sequence, there is no
question of the identity of a conscious self enduring in time. There cannot be a relation called
identity in a strict sense, because the talk of a relation would be meaningful only when there
are at least two things to relate. But, identity is a putative relation which an entity bears to

itself. Identity in the physical order of reality is likewise conceptualized on the basis of
similarity obtained in experiences of something external to the experiences. But, for the
Buddhists, everything is changing and due to its transient character, every act of reference or
the claim of correspondence is bound to fail howsoever pragmatically useful it is.
If everything is persistently changing and is inexorably bound to die out soon, there cannot
be an entity which remains identical across time and provides the basis for the referential
purpose of language. In conformity to this scheme, it is prudent to consider continuity in the
place of identity. The sensible identity seems to be imposed on the persistent continuity and
hence the existence of everything is seen in terms of duration: something may last for hours,
some may last for days and some may last for years. On this fact, Radhakrishnan
conjectures: [T]he idea might have arisen from reflection on consciousness and the apparent
transitoriness of all objects of nature (1989, p. 368).
The theory of impermanence, held by the Buddha, is said to be different from the theory of
momentariness. Though both the concepts are understood in relation to time, while the
former involves some duration, the latter does not have any scope for it. The origin of the
latter, however, is found in the former. The Buddha says that consciousness is momentary,
but not (physical) things. What perhaps he means by saying this is that consciousness
changes rather rapidly and incessantly, but in the case of material things the change is not
comparatively prompt. He says: It is evident that the body lasts one year...a hundred year
and even more. But that which is called mind, intellect, consciousness keeps up an incessant
round by day and night of perishing as one thing and springing up as another (Sayutta
Nikya, cf. Kashyapa, 1956, pp. 372-373). A suggestive figure is given in the Abhidhamma
that the change in consciousness is seventeen (or sixteen) times higher than the change in a
material configuration (Kashyapa, 1982, p. 125).
It is also conspicuous that the analogy of flame is used only in the case of consciousness and
not in the case of material things. It can arguably be said that the Buddha is not advocating
the theory of momentariness (kaikatva) in all cases; rather, he is emphasizing the feature of
impermanence or non-eternality (anityatva) of everything. It is again based on the
suggestions of empirical knowledge that we apprehend the changes occurring at certain
speed only, very swift and very slow changes are not apprehended by our senses. But the
later Buddhists extend the theory of momentariness to range over all existents. Arguably,
the theory of momentariness appears to be logical corollary of the theory of impermanence.
Unless things change every moment, their impermanence cannot be accounted for.
The Buddhists moreover believe that whatever exists does so in virtue of having capacity to
produce some effect. An unchanging entity cannot produce an effect; for, production of any
effect requires spatio-temporal change in the effect-producing entity. The Buddhists equate
existence with causal efficacy (arthakriykritva-sat-lakaam). With the emergence of the
Yogcra Idealism, which propounds the existence of consciousness-only, the development
of the theory of impermanence finds its ultimate end in the theory of momentariness, true to
the Buddha's contention of consciousnesss being momentary.

With the backdrop of the momentary existence of reality, the process of cognition in
Buddhism is explained in the following way. The cognitive process in our sensory
experience begins with the striking of a stimulus on a particular sense organ. Prior to the
strike, the flow of consciousness (citta-santati) is either completely undisturbed or is
occupied with some other stimulus and hence is undisturbed in regard to the new one. This
state of mind is technically called bhavaga in the Buddhist epistemology. With the first
stroke, the mind gets activated and seeks to find out the channel of sensation through which
the stimulus is coming such as eye, ear etc.; this state of feeble attention is called
pacadvravojjna. Thereafter, with the ascertainment of the particularity of sensation (that it
is coming from a particular sense organ), the sensation gets a name after the sensory
modality; for instance, if it is visual perception, the cognitive awareness is called cakkhuvina, similarly, auditory and olfactory experiences are called sota-vina and ghavina respectively, and so on. Having ascertained the nature of awareness the state of
mind becomes that of recipient consciousness (sapaticchana). Since the particular sensation
is coming from outside, there has not been any recourse to previous experience in respect to
the object being cognized. The state of sensory particularization leads to the next stage
where mind tries to determine the nature of the object by resorting to previous knowledge;
hence this state is called the investigating consciousness (santraa). The investigation leads
to determining the nature of object and as a result the determinate state of mind is called
vohpana. The mind equipped with a determinate form of cognition is ready to fix a future
course of action in accordance with the new information and this equipped and ready state
of mind is called javana or active consciousness.
The whole process of cognition is made clear with the help of a simile of a man who is
sleeping (bhavaga) under a fruited mango tree. When a fruit drops down, the dropping
breaks the slumber of the man (in the austere sense, perception ends with this). Then he
seeks to discover what has disturbed his sleeping (pacadvravojjna). Eventually he
perceives that it is a fruit (cakkhu-vina). After seeing it, he picks the fruit up
(sapaticchana) and investigates the condition of fruit (santraa). When he ascertains that the
fruit is quite ripe and consumable (vohpana), he eats it (javana). These are the seven stages
pertaining to the stimulus coming from outside of the body elucidated in the
Abhidhammakoabhya (cf. Kashyapa, 1982, pp. 1-3). However, if a cognitive awareness is not
due to an outside sensation, but is due to an ideational image arising from within, then the
process involves only the last two stages, namely, vohpana and javana.
From the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that before assuming a determinate form
(as the basis of individuation or outer expression), cognition undergoes subtle processes of
unconscious reasoning. Our interest in the mention of these processes is to understand how
concepts and thereby language creep in the cognitive process so as to enable us to verbalize
our cognition. What is verbalized is the content of our cognition. Dharmakrti, in dealing
with the realist traditions such as the Nyya and the Mms, says that the apprehension
of any object as qualified with specific objective properties involves the deployment of
certain concepts which are acquired through repetition and recognition in the past
experiences (saskrajanya). The sensory in-put so swiftly, and perhaps unconsciously,

triggers the suitable set of concepts from the bin of our mind that we tend to mistake these
mental contributions as external in-puts. Actually these are not present in the content
(svalakaa) of perception which is bereft of every vikalpa including the dichotomy of the
perceiver and the perceived. The concept-freeness (nirvikalpakatva or avikalpakatva) of
perceptual knowledge lies in the immediacy (aparokaviayatva) of its content (Dharmakrti,
Vol. 2, p. 612). The immediate availability of the content is due to its spatiotemporal
presentness.
As we have discussed earlier, what is real is momentary. The real is utterly unique (a-sada),
and being in present, it becomes the basis of perception. The reality in its unsullied form is
available only in perceptual knowledge. Everything other than this bare particular is due to
ideal or conceptual contribution of the mind. Given the momentary nature of reality, there is
no scope for any conceptual association with the perceived reality. All the vikalpas are
therefore superimpositions on the undifferentiated particulars like the superimposition of
water in a mirage. Conceptual construction is however necessary for any dealing with the
reality. Since conceptually constructed linguistic signs are utterly disassociated from
perceived reality, how can linguistic behavior lead us to successful practice? Obviously, our
ordinary notion of meaning as being the reference of a word to a real objective entity would
not be germane to this case. Dignga therefore proposes the theory of apoha which is
radically nominalistic in intention. For him, there cannot be drawn any real resemblance
between the contents of perception (given their momentary character). Nor there is any
experiential basis to accept any one entity, say potness (ghaatva), inhering in all instances of
pot by virtue of which they can be brought under single designation pot (ghaa). Dignga
says that what is common among the class of objects is only the word, the name. Now, if
there is nothing common in the class of, say, cows apart from the name cow, how is it
possible for any word to refer to something that too without landing in any kind of linguistic
anarchy?
In the Buddhist scheme, the world involves only particular things that too continuously
changing. Therefore, it would be misleading to say that the word cow refers to cowparticular. Nor is it acceptable to the Buddhists that it refers to ontologically essential cow
(cowness) which binds all incessant cow-particulars. Their response to this quandary is
rooted in the natural order of human apprehension: We come to cognize something as cow
when it is notionally excluded from all that is non-cow. One may however immediately
object to this response that it goes against the principle of semantics which assumes a
relation between language and reality. In the apohists proposal, one is now required to
identify non-cow in order to apply the word cow. Which means either one should
determine something which is common to everything belonging to non-cow and show that
it is absent in cow, or else be able to identify something common to all cows and show its
absence in non-cows. Thus one comes back squarely to the same point from where one
started. Dignga argues that the meaning of a linguistic entity must be a type of mental
content since two individuals, purportedly understanding the meaning of the sentence, may
have different response in relation to the same sentence. He says that the intuition (pratibh)
picks out a state of affairs in exclusion to the other states of affairs. Mark Siderits observes

that Dignga does not seem to have adequate response to the charge of circularity and it is
for his later commentators, ntarakita and Kamalala, to defend the apoha theory against
the charge (1985, p. 142). They argue by using the distinction between the nominally bound
negation (non-) and verbally bound negation (not). Whereas the negative particle of the
former kind is used before a noun term (e.g. a-gau) to form a term allegedly indicating the
complementary class to the class represented by the noun term (such as gau), the latter kind
of negation is taken to be sentential operator.
Let us consider the following sentences in comparison to an affirmative sentence X is Y in
order to have a better understanding of the point:
(a) X is not Y.
(b) X is non-Y.
(c) X is not non-Y.
The sentence (a) is understood as a statement (asserting a fact) which can be determined to
be true or false within the assumed framework of the Principle of Bivalence (that there are
only two values, namely, truth and falsity). So, the statement X is not Y is true just in case
the statement X is Y is false. The value of these statements can be fixed because of their
determinate structure and interrelationship established by the logical rule. But, on the other
hand, there is no logical rule which suggests any relation between (c) and X is Y. Suppose,
Y represents green color and Xs not being green, the statement X is Y is false and
therefore the statement (a) is true. But, can we say with the same amount of certainty that (c)
is also true? X may be colorless or non-existent. Because of such uncertainty, (c) is not
compatible with X is Y. Thus while X is not not Y reduces to X is Y (~~YY), X is not
non-Y does not (Hale, 2011, pp. 259-262). This shows that the theory of apoha is not a
theory of double negation. In fact, the criticisms considering it a theory of double negation
seem to be parasitic upon the understanding of negation in relation to some kind of positive
existence (bhva). The discussion on absence (abhva) in the Nyya-Vaieika system is the
classical point of reference.
The Nyya-Vaiiika philosophy considers the world of our empirical knowledge as real
and everything real is knowable (jeya) and nameable (abhidheya). Anything which cannot
participate in the experiential world cannot be known and therefore cannot be referred to.
For instance, sky-flower (ka-kusum) or son of a barren woman (bandhy-suta) is not known
since they lack the ability to participate in the world. Not only these things but also their
absence is not knowable. We certainly know ka and kusum, bandhy and suta, because they
are real entities. Whatever is known is also named, according to the Nyya-Vaieika
tradition. Since there is no entity which can be referred to by the words like aka-kusum or
bandhy-suta, such words do not generate any knowledge of reality. The world consists of
real entities and therefore its components are called padrtha (meaning or referent of a
linguistic term padasya artha). These components are either naturally given or humanly
created. In the Nyya-Vaieika scheme therefore, one can meaningfully talk of the absence
of anything only in relation to something actually existing. The fictitious entities (if at all
they can be called entities) are not said to be absent in the technical sense of absence. In the

Nyya-Vaieika terminology, the fictitious entities are called alka (non-existent) entities as
opposed to bhva (positive or present) and abhva (negative or absent) entities.
Given the Nyya-Vaieika understanding of negation, would it be appropriate to make
sense of the expressions such as non-cow, non-horse in the same way? A. D. Sharma warns
that the Buddhist conception of such negation is different from that of the Nyya-Vaieika
(1990, p. 275): whereas the former consider it as complete exclusion (pravyvartan), the
latter recognize it as mutual absence (anyonybhva). While presenting the Nyya-Vaieika
viewpoint, Mark Siderits also observes that this kind of negation (i.e. nominally bound
negation) seems to be the case of mutual absence (anyonybhva). Mutual absence, in the
Nyya-Vaieika tradition, is proposed to differentiate one thing from the other. The
difference of pot from cloth, for instance, is understood as the occurrence of the absence of
pot in the cloth and vice versa. In fact, the mutual absence of pot occurs in all and only in
non-pots. In this way, pot is different from anything which is other than pot or non-pot. This
absence is eternal. Therefore, the negation of the mutual absence of pot occurs only in pots
and all pots. But, as per the Nyya-Vaieika metaphysics, it is only potness (ghaatva) which
occurs in all pots and hence the verbally bound negation of a nominally bound negation of
an object finally refers to the universal inhering in the object (Mathurntha, cf. Siderits,
2011, p. 295).
Since the Buddhists are opposed to the existence of universals, the above understanding
rooted in the concept of mutual absence is not acceptable to them. For, such understanding
does not lead one to the particular object which is the object of cognition. To make our point,
let us consider the implications of the cognitive process discussed earlier. What is available
in sense perception is mere presence of something undifferentiated; the process of
conceptual construction begins with the signalizing of the presence of an object in the ken
(Stcherbatsky, Vol. 1, p. 149). Dharmakrti says that though pure sensation is not
experienced due to its point-instant character (i.e. devoid of duration), it is trans-empirical,
nevertheless it is not a construction of our mind; instead it imparts reality to everything
perceived, it is indispensible condition of all real and consistent knowledge (Ibid., p. 150).
Dignga is said to have traced his conception of pure sensation in the Abhidhamma
formulation of the reality (Ibid., p. 153). Since pure sensation is not a constructed reality, it is
inexpressible. Language cannot touch the reality which is particular. Whatever is expressible
in language is universal. The Naiyyikas say that words mean universal (jti), form (kti),
and particular (vyakti). But for the Buddhists, only universals can be expressed by language
since they are the produce of our creative imagination (Ibid., p. 184). The first moment of
pure sensation is followed by the construction of the mental image of the object and by an
act of identification of the image with the sensation. Such identification is then verbalized in
a judgment form, e.g. this is cow, where this refers to the incognizable sensational core
and cow refers to the constructed general conception. The dialectical nature of judgment
shows that what is received through sensation is different from thought-construction (Ibid.,
p. 212).

A word cannot signify a unique particular since the latter is a momentary reality. It implies
that the momentary reality cannot function as the basis of linguistic behavior. The
momentary reality is however stabilized in language in terms of thoughts and concepts and
thereby made available for practical purposes. According to Dignga, words and sentences
(abda) exist in a mutually supporting relation with the conceptual constructs (vikalpa). He
says, words and sentences are born out of the conceptual constructs and the conceptual
constructs are born out of the words and sentences (vikalpa-yonaya abd vikalpca
abdayonaya, cf. ibid., p. 215). Thus, every bit of judgment is contained in the domain of
mental construct and the particulars are left untouched in linguistic formulations.
The names, in the Buddhist scheme, are conventionally pragmatically assigned to an object
and their assignment is not based on universals or the intrinsic features (smnya or
svabhva) of the object, for there are no universals or intrinsic features recognized as such.
The process of reference is therefore an arbitrary one in that it does not indicate any
necessary relationship between a word and its meaning. The Mmsaka Kumrila
however says that if a necessary relation between word and its meaning is not accepted,
there would be an endlessness of the meanings (anantrthat) (Bhaa, 2009, p. 758). To
counter this objection, Paramrtha (a coeval with Dignga) retorts that if there were any
necessary relationship between name and its referent, the nature of referent would have
been revealed to us by the introduction of name, similarly the appearance of the referent
would have told its name. But our experience suggests neither of these (cf. Payne, 1987, p.
265). If that is the case, how do the linguistic signs guide us to the intended object?
According to Jinendrabuddhi (c. 8th century AD commentator on Dignga) the meaning of
a word contains a repudiation of the discrepant meaning (cf. Stcherbatsky, Vol. 1, p. 461).
Which means it seeks to determine the meaning by way of rejecting all the conflicting
opinions. We may make the point clear with the analogy of a search engine which is devised
on the principle of exclusion. When we type a letter, say Y, the search engine shows all the
words in its lexicon beginning with Y. And when we type O after Y, the words not involving
O after Y are excluded, putting U after Y and O, narrows down the choice further and with
the completion of sequence by typing N and G, the screen shows only one word YOUNG.
The intuition (praj) terminates its search here if the purpose is fulfilled; otherwise it
continues its search. What seems peculiar to this type of referent-hunt, is what Tom
Tillemans calls the theory of error: In order for us to apply language and concepts to things
in the world, we need to somehow ignore the differences that there are between all
particulars and think and talk in terms of common properties to whose reality we are
unreflectively and naively committed, even if in our more sophisticated theoretical
reflections we might be persuaded that they are merely our inventions (2011, p. 56). The
apoha theory may be taken in that sense to be a technique which reminds us of the
limitations associated with the linguistic expressions and also the discrepancies in the
opponents proposals that language establishes something affirmatively only. It would
however be worthwhile to explore how the theory reaffirms its intentions in its
developmental phases in the later thinkers.

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Author:
Anil Kumar Tewari, Assistant Professor, School of Philosophy & Culture, Shri Mata
Vaishno Devi University, Katra, Jammu & Kashmir 182320. Email: ak.tewari@smvdu.ac.in.

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