Concom - For Merge

CONSTIARTICLE IX [CONCOM]: DIGESTS/FULLTEXTS
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Aruelo v. CA [G.R. No. 107852 October 20, 1993]

SYLLABUS:
1.ELECTION LAW; ELECTION PROTEST; PROCEEDINGS THEREIN, GOVERNED BY THE RULES OF
COURT. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No. 343-M-92) with the Regional Trial
Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As
expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of
motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the
COMELEC. It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it
provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo
warranto cases pending before the regular courts.
2.ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY. The instant case is
different from a pre-proclamation controversy which the law expressly mandates to be resolved
in a summary proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX, Sec. 2; Dipatuan v. Commission on Elections,
185 SCRA 86 [1990]). Pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent
with the legislators' desire that the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidate be done with dispatch and without unnecessary delay. Questions as those involving
the appreciation of the votes and the conduct of the balloting, which require more deliberate and
necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in the corresponding election protest
(Abella v. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 [1989]; Alonto v. Commission on Elections, 22 SCRA 878
[1968]). An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates
for an office. Over and above the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to
determine the true choice of the people. For this reason, it is a well-established principle that
laws governing election protests must be liberally construed to the end that the popular will,
expressed in the election of public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated
(Unda v. Commission on Elections, 190 SCRA 827 [1990]; De Leon v. Guadiz, Jr., 104 SCRA 591
[1981]; Macasundig v. Macalanga, 13 SCRA 577 [1965]; Corocoro v. Bascara, 9 SCRA 519
[1963]).
3.ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTION; NO POWER TO PROHIBIT THE FILING OF CERTAIN PLEADINGS
IN THE REGULAR COURTS. Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule
prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules
concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court
(Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
4.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; BILL OF PARTICULARS; ANSWER IN CASE OF DENIAL
THEREOF; WHEN TO FILE; RULE. Private respondent received a copy of the order of the
Regional Trial Court denying his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section
1 (b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after
receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had
until August 11, 1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and
Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed timely.
Facts: Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the
respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the
petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed
his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is
prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of
said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new fiveday period to file his answer.
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Issue: whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day
period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Held: No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings
are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings
before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to
proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings
brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases
cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that
motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests orquo
warranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain
pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice
and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
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ROMEO M. ESTRELLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [429 SCRA 789 (2004)]

Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation.
FACTS: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001 elections. His opponent,
Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election protest which consequently annulled Salvadors
proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While
Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second
Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was
issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another Commissioner to
substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC decision and declared
Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order
issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division
deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division deliberations may participate in its En
Banc deliberation
HELD: The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En Banc is nullified.
Commissioner Lantions voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules
does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc
proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only
judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving
three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the
COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision or order.
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SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 113219, August 14, 1995
ANICETO G. MATEO, MAXIMO SAN DIEGO, QUIRINO MATEO, DANIEL
FRANCISCO, AND LEONILA KUIZON, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, AND EDGAR STA.
MARIA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees,
petitioners, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an
investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General
Manager.[1] On December 13, 1992, private respondent was placed
under preventive suspension and Maximo San Diego was designated
in his place as Acting General Manager. He was later dismissed on
January 7, 1993.
On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed a Special Civil Action
for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction[2] before
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 78, challenging his dismissal
by petitioners. The petition embodied three (3) causes of action. It
reads:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx
xxx
xxx
II-2 Petitioner is the General Manager of the MOWAD since August

1984 with concomitant security of tenure in office and could not be
removed either temporarily or permanently, except for cause and only
after compliance with the elementary rules of due process;
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II-3 However, on December 14, 1992, contrary to the tenets of justice

and fairness, as well as for want of procedural due process, the
respondents (petitioners) and members of the Board of Directors of
the MOWAD have arbitrarily, whimsically, and unilaterally stopped
and prohibited the petitioner from exercising his rights and
performing his duties as General Manager of the MOWAD and, in his
place, have designated the respondent (petitioner) Maximo San Diego
as Acting General manager x x x.
II-4 On December 15, 1992, while petitioner was out of office on
official travel, x x x thru stealth and strategy, the respondents have
conspired and helped one another in removing the petitioner from the
Office of the General Manager of the MOWAD by forcibly destroying
its door and locked it with a replaced door-knob and all attempts on
his part to gain access and entry proved futile; x x x
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
xxx
xxx
xxx
III-2 On January 7, 1993, x x x in confabulation with his corespondents and members of the Board of Directors of the MOWAD,
the respondent Aniceto G. Mateo slapped the petitioner with an Order
terminating his services as General Manger x x x;
III-5 Petitioner has a clear right to the Office of General Manager of
the MOWAD which is being usurped or unlawfully held by respondent
Maximo San Diego in conspiracy with his co-respondents; x x x
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
xxx
xxx
xxx
IV-1-a Petitioner is entitled to the relief mandated, and the whole or

part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of more particularly the
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continuous acts of respondents in stopping and prohibiting him from

exercising his rights and performing his duties as General Manager of
the MOWAD and from stopping and prohibiting him to gain access
and entry to office."[3]
Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on two (2) grounds: (1)
the court had no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government
employees which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service
Commission; and (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy.[4]
Respondent Judge Arturo Marave denied the Motion to Dismiss on
April 26, 1993, and the Motion for Reconsideration on June 9, 1993. [5]
Petitioners then elevated the matter to this Court through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 which was referred to respondent Court
of Appeals for adjudication. In its Decision, dated November 24,
1993, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
merit, and in its Resolution, dated January 11, 1994, denied the
Motion for Reconsideration.[6]
The main issue in this petition for review is whether or not the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over Sp. Civil Case No.
014-M involving dismissal of an employee of a quasi-public
corporation.
We hold that it has no jurisdiction.
There is no question that MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation
created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the
Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended.[7] In Davao City
Water District v. Civil Service Commission,[8] the Court en banc ruled
that employees of government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission, viz:
xxx
xxx
xxx
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"As early as Baguio Water District v. Trajano et, al., We already ruled
that a water district is a corporation created pursuant to a special law
- P.D. No. 198, as amended, and as such its officers and employees are
covered by the Civil Service Law.
In another case (Hagonoy Water District v. NLRC), We ruled once
again that local water districts are quasi-public corporations whose
employees belong to the Civil Service." (citations omitted)
Indeed, the established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees
of government-owned and controlled corporations are governed by
the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. [9]
Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, [10] and Rule II,
section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil
Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent
against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party
aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the
government involving termination of services may appeal to the
Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent
could go on certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service
Commission. So we held in Mancita v. Barcinas,[11] viz:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"[N]o appeal lies from the decision of the Civil Service Commission,*
and that parties aggrieved thereby may proceed to this Court alone on
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, within thirty (30) days
from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to section 7, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution. We quote:
'SEC. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.'
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The Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the single

arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service and as such, its
judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's certiorari
judgment."
Mancita, however, no longer governs for under the present rule,
Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions
of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the Court of
Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule or the present rule,
Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving
dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated November 24, 1993 and its
Resolution dated January 1, 1994 in CA G.R. SP No. 31530 are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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VITAL GOZON VS. CA [G.R. No. 129132, August 14, 1992]

FACTS: Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 ordered the reorganization
of the various offices of the Ministry of Health where Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was
demoted to Medical Specialist II from being the Chief of the Clinics of the National
Children's Hospital. De la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board but
was ignored and she brought this to Civil Service Commission. While the case was
pending, the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be
exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla. Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided and declared that
the demotion/transfer of appellant de la Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical
Specialists II as null and void, the resolution became final. De la Fuente there upon sent
two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of National Children's
Hospital, demanding the implementation of the Commission's decision but she did not
answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise
compliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. She
instituted in the Court of Appeals an action of " mandamus and damages with
preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget
Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution but
Vital-Gozon did not respond to the order of the court. Thus CA declared, that the said
resolution declared dela Fuente as the lawful and de jure Chief of Respondents,
particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no discretion or choice on the matter; the
resolution had to be complied with. A writ of execution was issued thereafter. On her
motion for reconsideration, Vital-Gozon argued that the Appellate Court had no
jurisdiction over the question of damages in a mandamus action and referred this to the
Office of Solicitor General. Court of Appeals denied the motion and ruled that the
Solicitor General has no authority to appear as counsel for respondent Gozon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of
mandamus against a public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages sought
to be recovered from the defendant officer
HELD: The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an explicit
and specific statement regarding " actions for moral and exemplary damages, " and
finding none, concluded that the Court of Appeals had not been granted competence to
assume cognizance of claims for such damages. The conclusion is incorrect. Section 19,
governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases,
contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral and exemplary damages," and
indeed does not use the word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that said courts
have power to try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of damages
accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases falling within their specified jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural one allowing
the joining of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it
implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject

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of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages
not being inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly not
the case. It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here charged with a crime, or
civilly prosecuted for damages arising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to her
being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. The petition was DENIED and
the resolution was affirmed.

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EN BANC
G.R. No. 90780, February 06, 1991
RAYMUNDO ACENA, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
AND JOSEFINA ESTOLAS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul resolution No. 89-748 [*] dated
October 9, 1989 of the Civil Service Commission which set aside the
order[**] dated March 23, 1988 of the Merit Systems Protection Board
declaring the herein petitioner as the legitimate Administrative
Officer of Rizal Technological Colleges.
It appears on record that petitioner Raymundo T. Acena was
appointed on October 18, 1982 as an Administrative Officer of Rizal
Technological Colleges (RTC). He was appointed to the said position
by Dr. Lydia Profeta, then the President of Rizal Technological
Colleges, a State College located at Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila. His appointment as Administrative Officer of Rizal
Technological Colleges was approved as permanent by the Civil
Service Commission (Annex "B"; Rollo, p. 34). Later on December 9,
1985, Dr. Lydia Profeta extended to petitioner Acena a promotional
appointment as Associate Professor of Rizal Technological Colleges
effective November 1, 1985. Despite his appointment as Associate
Professor he was also designated as Acting Administrative Officer in a
memorandum dated October 30, 1985, issued by Dr. Lydia Profeta.
On March 21, 1986, then Secretary of Education Lourdes Quisumbing,
designated Dr. Josefina V. Estolas as RTC Officer-in-Charge in lieu of
Dr. Lydia Profeta.
On April 4, 1986, the RTC Board of Trustees approved the designation

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of twenty two (22) employees of the College to various positions

including the designation of Ricardo Salvador as Acting
Administrative Officer vice petitioner Acena (Rollo, p. 42).
Subsequently, on May 23, 1986, the RTC Board of Trustees confirmed
said designation in its regular meeting subject to the submission of
supporting documents and/or the certification of the selection and
promotion board (Rollo, p. 116).
In a memorandum No. 30, series of 1986, Dr. Estolas revoked effective
April 8, 1986, the designation of petitioner Acena as Acting
Administrative Officer. She also requested the latter to effect a
smooth turn-over of the said office to Ricardo Salvador.
On April 8, 1986, the Civil Service Commission - National Capital
Region, received two letters dated January 9, 1986 and January 13,
1986. In the letter dated January 9, 1986 addressed to Dr. Profeta,
petitioner Acena manifested to the latter his desire to remain as
Administrative Officer as his appointment as Associate Professor
could be approved only as temporary until such time that he could
prepare a thesis and obtain a masters degree. In her reply letter
dated January 13, 1986, Dr. Profeta withdrew the appointment of
petitioner Acena.
Also on April 8, 1986, petitioner Acena filed a complaint for injunction
with damages against Dr. Estolas and Ricardo Salvador. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 53327, assigned to Branch CLXVII,
Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila. In his complaint he
assailed the validity of Memorandum No. 30 as violative of his
security of tenure.
On May 9, 1986, petitioner Acena filed a letter complaint dated April
17, 1986 with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) against Dr.
Estolas for illegal termination (Rollo, p. 28).
On May 20, 1986, Adelina B. Sarmiento, Assistant Regional Director,
CSC-NCR, approved as temporary the appointment of petitioner

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Acena as Associate Professor because he lacks the master's degree

required for the position pursuant to CSC MC No. 4, series of 1985.
Despite the filing of the injunction case and the pendency of the case
before the MSPB, petitioner Acena sought on July 7, 1986, the opinion
of the CSC Chairman Celerina G. Gotladera who opined in her letter
dated March 23, 1987, addressed to the RTC Officer-in-Charge (Dr.
Estolas) that petitioner Acena is still the Administrative Officer of RTC
because his appointment as Associate Professor had been withdrawn.
Dr. Estolas filed on May 18, 1987 a motion for reconsideration, but
then CSC Chairman Gotladera denied it in her letter dated July 8,
1987.
On May 15, 1987, the Pasig Court granted petitioner Acena's
application for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Dr. Estolas
from enforcing Memorandum No. 30. The Court of Appeals likewise
sustained the issuance of injunction when it dismissed on September
4, 1987 the petition for certiorari filed by Dr. Estolas and Ricardo
Salvador.
On February 3, 1988, the MSPB issued an order dismissing petitioner
Acena's complaint for illegal termination. The dismissal was anchored
on the findings that petitioner Acena was validly appointed to the
position of Associate Professor and he was merely designated as
Administrative Officer which designation could be revoked anytime by
the appointing authority. However, on March 23, 1988, acting on
petitioner Acena's letter dated February 12, 1988 informing the MSPB
of the opinion of CSC Chairman Gotladera, the MSPB reversed itself
and set aside its order dated February 3, 1988.
On July 16, 1988, Dr. Estolas and Ricardo Salvador filed a petition for
review with the Office of the President. The case was entitled "Dr.
Josefina Estolas and Ricardo Salvador (Rizal Technological Colleges),
petitioners v. the Honorable Civil Service Commission, the Honorable
Merit Systems and Protection Board and Raymundo T. Acena,
respondents." In his 1st Indorsement dated July 20, 1988, Vicente

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Galang, Presidential Staff Director, Office of the President referred

the said petition to the Civil Service Commission (Rollo, p. 159).
On October 9, 1989, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 89-748, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the commission
resolved to rule, as it hereby rules that the action taken by the then
Officer-in?Charge (now President) of the Rizal Technological Colleges
(RTC) Dr. Josefina V. Estolas, in revoking the designation of Raymundo
T. Acena as Acting Administrative Officer, is in order. Accordingly, the
Order dated March 23, 1988 of the Merit Systems Protection Board
and the letter-opinions of the Commission dated March 23, 1987 and
July 8, 1987, are set aside."
Petitioner Acena received a copy of the above resolution on October
24, 1989. He filed a petition for review on certiorari on November 15,
1989.
The proper remedy which petitioner should have taken from the
resolution of public respondent Civil Service Commission is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of said rules. Although Rule 65
does not provide for a period, the petition for certiorari assailing the
resolution of the Civil Service Commission should be filed within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the resolution as provided under Section 7,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution (Pacis v. Secretary of Science and
Technology, G.R. No. 89165, August 10, 1989). Error in the title of the
petition is a defect in form that may be disregarded as it does not
affect the merits of the case. Considering the jurisdictional issue
raised in this petition, we consider the same as a special civil action
under Rule 65.
The jurisdictional issue for resolution is whether or not the public
respondent Civil Service Commission acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it set aside the
order dated March 23, 1988 of the MSPB.

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It is a settled rule, that a respondent tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if he does not
have the authority conferred by law to hear and decide the case
(Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 [1918]). There is
excess of jurisdiction where the respondent has the legal power to
decide the case but oversteps his authority (Rocha & Co. v. Crossfield,
6 Phil. 355 [1906]; Blanco v. Ambler, 3 Phil. 358 [1904]). And there is
grave abuse of discretion where the respondent acts in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction (Alafriz v. Noble, 72 Phil.
728 [1941]; People v. Vallarta, 77 SCRA 476; F.S. Divinagracia Agno
Commercial, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 180; Young v. Sulit,
162 SCRA 639; Filinvest Credit Corporation v. IAC, 166 SCRA 155;
Carson et al. v. Judge Pantanosa, Jr., G.R. No. 75934, December 15,
1989).
In the case at bar, it is an admitted fact by no less than the public
respondent Civil Service Commission that private respondent Estolas
petition for review filed on June 16, 1988, with the Office of the
President was filed out of time and with the wrong forum (pp. 7-11,
Comment, dated February 20, 1990, Civil Service Commission).
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1409 dated June 8, 1978,
provides that:
"SEC. 8. Relationship with the Civil Service Commission. - Decision
of the Board involving the removal of officers and employees from the
service shall be subject to automatic review by the Commission. The
Commission shall likewise hear and decide appeals from other
decisions of the Board, provided that the decisions of the Commission
shall be subject to review only by the Courts."
Implementing the above provisions, Section 7 of CSC Resolution No.
81-1329 dated November 23, 1981 likewise provides that:
"SEC. 7. Cases appealable to the Commission. Decision of the Merit
Systems Board on contested appointments and other non-disciplinary
cases are appealable to the Commission by the party adversely

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affected within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof."

(Underscoring supplied).
Based on the above provisions of law, the decision of the MSPB is
appealable to the Civil Service Commission within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the copy thereof. Perfection of the appeal within the
prescribed period is jurisdictional so that the failure to perfect an
appeal within the reglementary period has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory (De Los Santos v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83927,
June 28, 1989; Andaya et al. v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 73726-28, August 2,
1990). Moreover, the right to appeal is a statutory right and the party
who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the
requirements of the law. Failure to do so, the right to appeal is lost
(Ozaeta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83281, December 4, 1989).
Ostensibly, public respondent Civil Service Commission has the
jurisdiction to review the decision of the MSPB. However, said
authority to review can only be exercised if the party adversely
affected by the decision of the MSPB has filed an appeal with the
Commission within the reglementary period.
Here, it is admitted by public respondent Commission and not
disputed by private respondent Estolas that the petition for review
which can be considered as an appeal from the decision of the MSPB
dated March 23, 1988 was filed outside the reglementary period. This
being so, the public respondent exceeded its jurisdiction when it
entertained the petition that was erroneously filed with the Office of
the President. Having exceeded its jurisdiction public respondent
committed a reversible error when it set aside the order dated March
23, 1988 of the MSPB which had long become final and executory.
Final decision or orders of the MSPB is an adjudication on the merits
conclusive on the parties, hence, it can no longer be subject to review
(San Luis, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 80160, June 26,
1989).
While it is true that under exceptional circumstances, delay in the
filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice

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and equity, the delay must, however, be excusable and the appeal
must be impressed with merit (Legasto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
76834-60, April 25, 1989).
In the instant case, private respondent Estolas has not even bothered
to offer an explanation why she incurred delay and why she filed a
petition for review with the Office of the President. Such being the
case, the public respondent Civil Service Commission cannot legally
invoke and justify the assumption of jurisdiction on grounds of equity
and substantial justice.
The issue of jurisdiction having been resolved, it appears unnecessary
to discuss the other issues raised in the petition.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED and
resolution No. 89-0748 dated October 9, 1987 of the Civil Service
Commission is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

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EN BANC
G.R. No. 80519-21 December 17,1987
JUNIE EVANGELISTA CUA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RICHARD S. PUZON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In SPC No. 87-454 and SPC No. 87-467, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered a 2-1 decision on August 10,
1987, favoring the herein petitioner Cua but nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone
congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in
COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 dated May 2, 1984. Pursuant to said rules, private respondent Puzon filed on
August 14, 1987 a "motion for reconsideration/appeal" of the said decision with the COMELEC en banc, where on
October 28, 1987, three members voted to sustain the First Division, with two dissenting and one abstaining (one
member having died earlier). On the strength of this 3-2 vote, Cua moved for his proclamation by the board of
canvassers, which reconvened on November 9, 1987, and granted his motion. Cua took his oath the same day, but
the next day Puzon filed with the COMELEC an urgent motion to suspend Cua's proclamation or to annul or
suspend its effect if already made. On November 11, 1987, the COMELEC set the motion for hearing and three
days later it issued a restraining telegram enjoining Cua from assuming the office of member of the House of
Representatives. The petitioner then came to this Court to enjoin the COMELEC from acting on the said motion and
enforcing its restraining order.
Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 reads as follows:
SEC. 5. Quorum: votes required; substitution. Two members shall constitute a quorum for the
transaction of the official business of the Division.
A case being heard by it shall be decided with the unanimous concurrence of all three
Commissioners and its decision shall be considered a decision of the Commission. If this required
number is not obtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion, the case may be appealed to the
Commission en banc, in which case the vote of the majority thereof shall be the decision of the
Commission. ...
The position of the petitioner is that the 2-1 decision of the First Division was a valid decision of the COMELEC itself
despite the above rule because of Article IX-A. Section 7 of the new Constitution, providing that "each Commission
shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it." He argues that this applies
to the votings of the COMELEC both in division and en banc and that the private respondent himself recognized this
when he filed the motion for reconsideration/appeal with the COMELEC en banc.
Cua also contends that Puzon's move, treated as a motion for reconsideration, is deemed denied for lack of the
necessary majority to overturn the challenged decision. As an appeal, it should be considered dismissed, also for
the same reason, resulting in the decision being regarded as affirmed in accordance with Rule 56, Section 11 of the
Rules of Court applied suppletorily, reading as follows:

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SEC. 11. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in
opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on re-hearing no
decision is reached, the action shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the court; in appealed
cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the
petition or motion shall be denied.
For their part, the respondents insist that no decision was reached by the First Division on August 10, 1987,
because the required unanimous vote was not obtained and there was therefore nothing to be affirmed on appeal by
the COMELEC en banc and nothing to reconsider either. Additionally, they argue that in any case no valid decision
was reached by the COMELEC en banc because only three votes were cast in favor of the petitioner and these did
not constitute a majority of the body.
After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties, the Court holds that the 2-1 decision rendered
by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three
members who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated and voted
thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the
proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his
seat in the House of Representatives.
It is expected that the above categorical rulings will put an end to the seemingly interminable debates on this matter
that have been festering for quite some time now not only in this case but also in other cases still pending in the
COMELEC. The indecisiveness of the public respondent in the appreciation and application of its own rules has
seriously prejudiced a considerable number of our people who remain unrepresented to date in the House of
Representatives despite the fact that the congressional elections were held more than seven months ago.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the public respondent is enjoined from further proceeding with the
private respondent's motion dated November 10, 1987. The restraining order issued by the COMELEC on
November 14, 1987, enjoining petitioner from assuming office as member of the House of Representatives for the
lone congressional district of Quirino is LIFTED. This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

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FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP vs. HON. JAIME N. FERRER [G.R. No. L-31455
February 28, 1985]
Facts: In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then respondent commissioners of the
commission on elections issued an invitation to bid call no. 127 on September 16, 1969 calling for the
submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 1 1,000 units of voting booths with some
specifications and descriptions. Among the seventeen bidders who submitted proposals in response to the said
invitation were the herein petitioner, Filipinos Engineering and machine shop, (Filipinas for short) and the
private respondent, Acme Steel Manufacturing company, (Acme for short). However, the respondent Comelec
bidding committee chairman and members submitted their memorandum on the proceedings taken pursuant to
the said invitation to bid which stated that acme's bid had to be rejected because the sample it submitted was
"made of black iron sheets, painted, and therefore not rust proof or rust resistant," and that, "it is also heavy. The
committee instead recommended that Filipinas be awarded the contract to manufacture and supply the voting
booths, but that an "ocular inspection be made by all members of the commission of all the samples before the
final award be made." 5after an ocular inspection of all the samples submitted was conducted by the Comelec
commissioners, and after the commissioners noted that acme submitted the lowest bid, the Comelec issued a
resolution awarding the contract (for voting booths) to acme, subject to the condition, among others, that
"(acme) improves the sample submitted in such manner as it would be rust proof or rust resistant. Two days
after, the Comelec issued purchase order no. 682 for the manufacture and supply of the 11,000 units of voting
booths in favor of acme. Acme accepted the terms of the purchase. Filipinas then filed an injunction suit with
the then court of first instance of manila, docketed as civil case no. 77972, against herein public respondents
Comelec commissioners, chairman and members of the Comelec bidding committee, and private respondent
acme. Filipinas also applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. After hearing petitioner's said application, the
respondent judge in an order, denied the writ prayed for. 7 thereafter, the public respondents filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of suit, and that the complaint
states no cause of action which the respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing civil case no.
77972. Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the Comelec
dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid; and
2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the Comelec and
acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them from complying with their contract.
Held: The court resolve the first issue in the affirmative pondering on to section 2, article x, 1935 Philippine
constitution, section 5 of the revised election code and section 17(5) of the judiciary act of 1948 (republic act
no. 296). Nevertheless, it has been consistently held 9 that it is the Supreme Court, not the court of first
instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders or rulings of the
Comelec relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws. The Comelec resolution
awarding the contract in favor of acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an
incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution
may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the supreme court. Being non-judicial in
character, no contempt may be imposed by the Comelec from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by
certiorari to this tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an
ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

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With regards to the second issue, Filipinas, the losing bidder, has no cause of action under the premises to
enjoin the Comelec from pursuing its contract with acme, the winning bidder. While it may be true that the
lower court has the jurisdiction over controversies dealing with the Comelec's award of contracts, the same
being purely administrative and civil in nature, nevertheless, herein petitioner has no cause of action on the
basis of the allegations of its complaint.
Indeed, while the law requires the exercise of sound discretion on the part of procurement authorities, 10 and
that the reservation to reject any or all bids may not be used as a shield to a fraudulent award, 11 petitioner has
miserably failed to prove or substantiate the existence of malice or fraud on the part of the public respondents in
the challenged award. In issuing the resolution awarding the contract for voting booths in acme's favor, the
commissioners of the Comelec had taken into account that acme's bid was the lowest; that acme was a
responsible manufacturer; and that upon an ocular inspection of the samples submitted by the bidders, acme's
sample was favorable chosen subject to certain conditions cited in the resolution. In fine, the public respondents
properly exercised its sound discretion in making the award.
Finding the instant petition to be without merit aside from being moot and academic, the same is hereby
dismissed.

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Province of Camarines Sur vs CA [G. R. No. 104639, July 14, 1995]

FACTS:In January 1, 1960 - private respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then Gov. of
Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza.
October 12, 1972 - Dato was promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by then Gov. Felix Alfelor,
Sr.
Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, thus, he could not be legally extended
a permanent appointment. He was extended a temporary appointment, which was renewed annually.
January 1, 1974 Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to permanent
upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards. Said
change of status however, was not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that
Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His appointment
remained temporary and no other appointment was extended to him.
March 16, 1976 Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him
and a prison guard for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners
who escaped from confinement.
Two years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the Camarines Sur Unit
of the Civil Service Commission, wrote the Gov. a letter informing him that the status of private respondent
Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the examination for Supervising
Security Guard. The change of status was to be made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said
examination.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and
deleted private respondent's name from the petitioner's plantilla.
Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the Gov. for
reinstatement and backwages.
His request was not heeded. Dato filed an action before the RTC.
RTC Decision: Ordered the payment of backwages of Dato equivalent to five years. Province of Camarines Sur
appealed the decision to the CA.
CA: Affirmed RTCs decision. Hence the present petition.
ISSUE: W/N Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was
suspended on March 16, 1976.
Petitioners contention: When Gov. Alfelor recommended to CSC the change in the employment status of
private respondent from temporary to permanent, which the CSC approved as only temporary pending
validation of the results of private respondent's examination for supervising security guard, private respondent's
appointment in effect remained temporary. Hence, his subsequent qualification for civil service eligibility did
not ipso facto convert his temporary status to that of permanent.
SC Held: Agrees with Petitioners contentions. Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not entitled to his
claim for backwages for the entire period of his suspension.
Ratio: At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified
in an appropriate examination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his
appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the
appointing power.

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The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed
the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a
permanent one. What is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of
the temporary appointment these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority
The letter communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear arrogation of power
properly belonging to the appointing authority. CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set
before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to
change the employment status of an employee. CSC should have ended its participation in the appointment of
private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the
proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on
the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter.

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EN BANC
G.R. No. L-49677 May 4, 1989
TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION and ATTY. VIRGILIO SY, as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, respondents.
Bonifacio V. Tupaz for petitioner.
The Government Corporate Counsel for respondent NHC.
Raul E. Espinosa for intervenor PACIWU.
REGALADO, J.:
The employees of the public sector comprise the largest bloc of workers in our national work force. Governmental
bureaucracy is continually being reorganized to cope with the growing complexity of the problems and needs of
political and administrative governance. As the increase in the number of government employees grows space, the
need to enhance their welfare correspondingly becomes more imperative. While it may be assumed that the
Government is exerting efforts to advance the interests of its employees, it is quite understandable that the
employees themselves should actively seek arrangements where by they can participate more meaningfully in
management and employment relationships. There is, thus, a proliferation of unions or employees' organizations,
each seeking concomitant representational recognition.
The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this special civil action for certiorari are clear and undisputed. The
juridical status and relevant circumstances of respondent corporation have been established in a case of illegal
dismissal filed against it, as previously decided by the Court and hereinafter discussed. However, submitted this
time for Our resolution is a controversy on the propriety of and requirements for certification elections in
government-owned or controlled corporations like the respondent.
Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is a corporation organized in 1959 in
accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations,
dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the
Government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its
shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank
of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation. 1 Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS, for brevity) is a legitimate labor
organization with a chapter in NHC.
On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the
Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was
claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. 2 The petition was dismissed by
med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a government-owned
and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for
purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code." 3

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From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations 4 where, acting thereon in BLR Case
No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-1090-77), Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the holding of
a certification election. 5 This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of
November 21, 1978 6 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.
In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the reversal of the said resolution and prays that a certification
election be held among the rank and file employees of NHC.
In retrospect, it will be recalled that in a former case of illegal dismissal involving the same respondent
corporation, 7 We had ruled that the employees of NHC and of other government owned or controlled corporations were
governed by civil service laws, rules and regulations pursuant to the 1973 Constitution which provided that "the civil
service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations." 8
It was therein stressed that to allow subsidiary corporations to be excluded from the civil service laws would be to
permit the circumvention or emasculation of the above-quoted constitutional provision. As perceptively analyzed
therein, "(i)t would be possible for a regular ministry of government to create a host of subsidiary corporations under
the Corporation Code funded by a willing legislature. A government-owned corporation could create several
subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporation rations would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and
employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree
and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraints of
the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment."
The rule, however, was modified in the 1987 Constitution, the corresponding provision whereof declares that "(t)he
civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." 9
Consequently, the civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or
legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under
and pursuant to a general legislation. As We recently held
..., the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed by this Court in
theNational Housing Corporation case ... appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987
Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government-owned controlled
corporationswith original charters and therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not
include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of
government-owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation law. 10
While the aforecited cases sought different reliefs, that is, reinstatement consequent to illegal dismissal, the samelis
mota determinative of the present special civil action was involved therein.
The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees' organizations. The right
to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental
and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that "(t)he right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged" 11
This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human Rights,
which mandates that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law ...."

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Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2,
Article IX B 12 which provides that "(t)he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees." The
rationale of and justification for this innovation which found expression in the aforesaid provision was explained by its
proponents as follows:
... The government is in a sense the repository of the national sovereignty and, in that respect, it
must be held in reverence if not in awe. It symbolizes the unity of the nation, but it does perform a
mundane task as well. It is an employer in every sense of the word except that terms and conditions
of work are set forth through a Civil Service Commission. The government is the biggest employer in
the Philippines. There is an employer-employee relationship and we all know that the accumulated
grievances of several decades are now beginning to explode in our faces among government
workers who feel that the rights afforded by the Labor Code, for example, to workers in the private
sector have been effectively denied to workers in government in what looks like a grotesque, (sic) a
caricature of the equal protection of the laws. For example, ... there were many occasions under the
old government when wages and cost of living allowances were granted to workers in the private
sector but denied to workers in the government for some reason or another, and the government did
not even state the reasons why. The government employees were being discriminated against. As a
general rule, the majority of the world's countries now entertain public service unions. What they
really add up to is that the employees of the government form their own association. Generally, they
do not bargain for wages because these are fixed in the budget but they do acquire a forum where,
among other things, professional and self-development is (sic) promoted and encouraged. They also
act as watchdogs of their own bosses so that when graft and corruption is committed, generally, it is
the unions who are no longer afraid by virtue of the armor of self-organization that become the
public's own allies for detecting graft and corruption and for exposing it.... 13
There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear
that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without
an original charter. Statutory implementation of the last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:
... Right of employees in the public service Employees of the government corporations
established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively
with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to form
associations for purposes not contrary to law.
The records do not show that supervening factual events have mooted the present action. It is meet, however, to
also call attention to the fact that, insofar as certification elections are concerned, subsequent statutory
developments have rendered academic even the distinction between the two types of government-owned or
controlled corporations and the laws governing employment relations therein, as hereinbefore discussed. For,
whether the employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the civil service laws, a certification election
may be conducted.
For employees in corporations and entities covered by the Labor Code, the determination of the exclusive
bargaining representative is particularly governed by Articles 255 to 259 of said Code. Article 256 provides for the
procedure when there is a representation issue in organized establishments, while Article 257 covers unorganized
establishments. These Labor Code provisions are fleshed out by Rules V to VII, Book V of the Omnibus
Implementing Rules.
With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies
of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and who are,
therefore, covered by the civil service laws, the guidelines for the exercise of their right to organize is provided for
under Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of

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the "sole and exclusive employees representative"; Under Section 12, "where there are two or more duly registered
employees' organizations in the appropriate organization unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition
order the conduct of certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rankand-file employees in said organizational unit."
Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific qualification in the Constitution that the State "shall guarantee
the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law" and that they shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." 14 (Emphasis supplied.)
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations, dated
November 21, 1978, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the conduct of a certification election among the affected
employees of respondent National Housing Corporation in accordance with the rules therefor is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

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Luego vs CSC [143 SCRA 327]

(Public Officer, Appointments, CSC)
Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The
appointment was described as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary, subject to the final action
taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested
position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose
appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the
new mayor.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the
respondents appointment.
Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is
better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.
Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by
Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was
not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power
to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service .and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing
officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of
the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission
has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.
CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified,
which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

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SSS Employee Asso. v CA [175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)]

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order
pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made
reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the
National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand
that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They
are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among
workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand,
Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and
strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987
of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government
officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass
action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the absence of any
legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as government
employees and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having
been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes
within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to
enjoin the strike is appropriate

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Salazar vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976

The Civil Service Commission: Appointments
Facts: On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General
confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March 28, 1962 and on February 12,
1965 she was extended another appointment by way of promotion, as confidential agent in the same
office.
On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as confidential
agent have been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On March 31, 1966, the
Auditor General upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an
appointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by the Commission of Civil
Service. On the same day, petitioner assumed the position.
On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be
reinstated to her former position as confidential agent. However, no action was taken on said
letter. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to
reinstate her to her former position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to her
filing the proper action to the Court of First Instance.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.
(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as confidential agent was validly terminated on the
alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to said
position after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.
Held:
(1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two instances when a position
may be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the President upon recommendation of the
Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to be
primarily confidential; or (2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions
of the office, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state. In the case before us, the provision of Executive
Order No. 265, declaring ...confidential agents in the several department and offices of the
Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily confidential brings within
the fold of the aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the
Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential.
(2) Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her
services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential
positions are excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees
therein is allowed by the Constitution. This should not be misunderstood as denying that the
incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing
power. It should be noted, however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent
is not removed or dismissed from office his term merely expires, in much the the same way
as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been
appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed removed or dismissed therefrom, upon the
expiration of said term. The main difference between the former the primarily confidential officer
and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-

31
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fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined
when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent.
When this even takes place, the latter is not removed or dismissed from office his term has
merely expired.
But even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not primarily confidential
and that therefore her removal from said position for loss of confidence was in violation of her
security of tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the position of Junior
Examiner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandoned
former position of confidential agent in the same office.

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G. R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965

R. MARINO CORPUS, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. MIGUEL
CUADERNO, SIT., ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
in its Civil Case No. 41226, both the above-named petitioner and
respondents interposed their respective appeals to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, certified the said appeals to
this Court to avoid splitting them, it appearing that, while the Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction over the respondents' appeal, the amount in
controversy in the petitioner's appeal (P574.000.00 in damages and
attorneys' fees) is beyond the jurisdiction of the said appelate court.
The essential facts are as follows: On 7 March 1958, petitionerappellant, R. Marino Corpus, then holding position of "Special
Assistant to the Governor, In-rge of the Export Department" of the
Central Bank, Position declared by the President of the Philippines 24
January 1957 as highly technical in nature, and d as such by both the
present litigants, was adminiistratively charged by several coemployees in the export department with dishonesty, incompetence,
neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct
unbecoming a public official, and of violation of the internal
regulations of the Central Bank.
On 18 March 1958, the Monetary Board suspended the petitioner
from office effective on said date and created a three-man
investigating committee composed of Atty. Guillermo de Jesus,
chairman, and Atty. Apolinar Tolentino, Assistant Fiscal of the City of
Manila, and Professor Gerardo Florendo, senior attorney of the
Central Bank, members. In its final report dated 5 May 1959, the
investigating committee, "after most extensive hearings on which both
complainants and respondents were afforded all opportunity to submit

33
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their evidence, and after a most exhaustive and conscientious study of

the records and evidence submitted in the case", made the following
conclusion and recommendation:
"(I) In view of the foregoing, the Committee finds that there is no
basis upon which to recommend disciplinary action against
respondent, and therefore respectfully recommends that he be
immediately reinstated."
Nevertheless, on 20 July 1959, the Monetary Board approved the
following resolution:
"After an exhaustive and mature deliberation on the report of the
aforesaid fact-finding committee in conjunction with the entire
records of the case and representations of both complainants and
respondent, through their respective counsel; and further, after a
thorough review of the service record of the respondent, particularly
the various cases presented against him, object of Monetary Board
lies. No. 1527 dated August 30, 1955, which all involve fitness,
discipline, etc. of respondent; and moreover, upon formal statement of
the Governor that he has lost confidence in the respondent as Special
Assistant to the Governor and In-Charge of the Export; Department
(such position being primarily confidential and highly technical in
nature), the Monetary Board finds that the continuance of the
respondent in the service of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to
the best interests of the Central Bank and, therefore, in accordance
with the provisions of Section 14 of the Bank Charter. considers (lie
respondent R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his
suspension."
Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the
Hoard denied it, after which he filed an action for certiorari,
mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with preliminary injunction,
with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The said court, after trial,
rendered judgment declaring the Board resolution null and void, and
ordering, among others, the reinstatement of the herein petitioner

34
Page |
and awarding him P5,000,00 as attorney's fees. As aforesaid, both the

petitioner and the respondents appealed the judgment.
Per its resolution, the premises of the board in dismissing the
petitioner are: (1) its deliberation of the report of the committee, the
records of tiie case and the representations of the parties; (2) the
service record of the petitioner, particularly the various cases against
him in 1955; and (3) loss of confidence by the Governor, with the
implied concurrence of the Monetary Board. No specific findings were
made; it is, therefore, evident that the petitioner was removed on the
third ground, since he was neither removed for guilt of the charges
against him in the administrative complaint nor on account of his
previous cases in 1055 because he had suffered the correspondent
penalty imposed upon him on the counts for which he was then found
guilty, and because he was thereafter promoted in salary and to the
position in question by the Monetary Board on recommendation of the
Governor.
The appeal of the Central Bank and its Monetary Board is planted on
the proposition that officers holding highly technical positions may be
removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power,
and that such1 power of removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII or the
Constitution:
"Section 1. A Civil Service embracing all branches and such visions: of
the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil
Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only
according to merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable
by competitive examination."
It is argued that for the three classes of positions referred to in the
constitutional disposition (policy-determining, primarily confidential
and highly technical), lack of confidence of the one making the
appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal.

35
Page |
We find the appeal of the Central Bank authorities to be clearly

untenable.
In the first place, the loss of confidence ground, on which the
dismissal is sought to be predicated, is a clear and evident
afterthought resorted to when the charges, subject-matter of the
investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board
nowhere stated anything in the record which the committee failed to
consider in recommending exoneration from the charges; it nowhere
pointed to any substantiation of the charges; it, therefore, relied only
on the statement of the loss of confidence made by Governor
Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of facts herein that the alleged
loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of
substantiating the charges upon which the investigation had
proceeded.
The court, therefore, can not rely on the so-called "loss of confidence"
as a reason for dismissal. And inasmuch as the charges against
petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but
to follow the mandate that
"No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Sec. 4, Art. XII,
Constitution of the Phil.)
Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be
afforded civil servants in positions that are by their nature important,
such as those that are "highly technical", the Constitutional safeguard
requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law"
atleast demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence", if
at all allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate
to show that said ground exists.
In the second place, the argument for the Monetary Board ignores the
self-evident fact that the constitutional provisions merely constitute
the policy determining, primarily confidential, and highly technical
positions as exceptions to the rule requiring appointments in the Civil

36
Page |
Service to be made on the basis of merit and fitness as determined

from competitive examinations (sec. 1, supra) (Jover vs. Borra, 93
Phil., 506; 49 Off. Gaz., (No. 7) 2755), but that the Constitution does
not exempt such positions from the operation of the principle
emphatically and categorically enunciated in section 4 of Article XII,
that
"No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law."
and which recognizes no exception. The absolute rule thus
propounded is repeated almost verbatim in Section 132 of the Central
Bank Charter (Rep. Act 265) that provides in equally absolute terms
that
"No officer or employee of the Central Bank subject to the Civil
Service law or regulations shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law."
It is well to recall here that the Civil Service Law in force (Rep. Act
No. 2260) divides positions into three categories: competitive or
classified; non-competitive or unclassified service; and exempt
service, the last being expressly excluded from the scope of the Civil
Service Act (sec. 3, R. A. 2260,). In view of section 3 and 5 of the same
law, providing that
"SEC. 3. Positions Embraced in the Civil Service.The Philippine Civil
Service shall embrace all branches, .subdivisions and
instrumentalities of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, * * *"
SEC. 5. The non-rnmpetitive service.The non-competitive or
Unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared
by law to be in the non-competitivo or unclassified servioo or those
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical in nature." (R.A. 2260)

37
Page |
it is indisputable that the plaintiff Corpus is protected by the Civil

Service law and regulations as a member of the non-competitive or
unclassified service, and that his removal or suspension must be for
cause recognized by law (Unabia vs. Mayor, 99 Phil., 253; 53 OfF.
Gaz., 132; Arcel vs. Osmena, 111 Phil., 171; Garcia vs. Executive
Secretary, L-19748, Sept. 13, 1962).
The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as
private secretaries of public functionaries) ends upon loss of
confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as
confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no
removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly
technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The
Constitution clearly distinguishes the primarily confidential from the
highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter
incumbents is to ignore and ei'ase the differential ion expressly made
by our fundamental charter. Moreover, il is illogical that while an
ordinary technician, say a clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or engineer,
enjoys security of tenure and may not be removed at pleasure, a
highly technical officer, such as an economist or a scientist of avowed
attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be
removable at any time, without right to a hearing or chance to defend
himself. No technical man worthy of the name would be willing to
accept work under such conditions. Ultimately, the rule advocated by
the Bank would demand that highly technical positions be filled by
persons who must labor always with an eye cocked at the humor of
their superiors. It would signify that the so-called highly technical
positions will have to be filled by incompetents and yes-men, who
must rely not on their own qualifications and skill but on their ability
to carry favor with the powerful. The entire objective of the
Constitution in establishing and dignifying the Civil Service on the
basis of merit, would be thus negated.
Of course a position may be declared both highly technical and
confidential, as tho supreme interests of the state may require. But
the position of plaintiff-appellant Corpus is not of this category.

38
Page |
The decision in De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289, relied upon by
the appellant Bank, is not applicable, since said case involved the
office of city engineer, that the court expressly found to be "neither
primarily confidential, policy determining nor highly technical" (at p.
297, in fine).
Turning now to the appeal of plaintiff Marino R. Corpus. The latter
complains first against the allowance of only P5,000.00 attorneys' fees
by the court below, stressing that the stipulation of facts between the
parties clearly recites that Corpus had agreed to pay his attorney
P20,000.00 as fees. It is to be noted, however, that the agreement
between client and lawyer can not bind the other party who was a
stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil Code allows a party to
recover reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must
lie primarily in the discretion of the trial court, and no abuse of that
discretion is here shown. The same thing can be said as to plaintiff's
recovery of moral damages: the trial court was evidently not satisfied
with that such damages were adequately proved, and on the record,
we do not believe We would be warranted in interfering with its
judgment.
The claim for exemplary damages must presuppose the existence of
the circumstances enumerated in Articles 22.'51 and 2232 of the Civil
Code. That is essentially a question of fact that lies within province of
the court a quo, and we do not believe that in opining that the position
of Corpus was one dependent on confidence, the defendant Monetary
Board necessarily acted with vindictiveness or Wantonness, and not in
the exercise of honest judgment.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without
special pronouncement as to costs.

39
Page |
Delos Santos v. Mallare [G.R. No. L-3881 August 31, 1950]

Facts: Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the
President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of
that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R.
Mallare was extended an ad interimappointment by the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the
Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of
Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other
officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position,
he commenced these proceedings.
Issue: whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his present position for assignment to another position
violates Section 4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."
Held: Yes. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions
of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as those which are policydetermining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to
be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination." Section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code
provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil service pertain either to the classified service," and went on to say that
"The classified service embraces all not expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then section 671
described persons in the unclassified service as "officers, other than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors
of bureaus or offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government whose appointments are by law
vested in the President of the Philippines alone."
Three specified classes of positions policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical are
excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by
the Constitution. None of these exceptions obtain in the present case.
The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical. A confidential
position denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer
does not formulate a method of action for the government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not
to make it. With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for
him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the
position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess
a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is
employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose technical
competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently
administrative in character and could very well be discharged by non-technical men possessing executive ability.

40
Page |
Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991]
Facts: The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by then President Corazon Aquino is being
challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than
those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. The Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by
its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.
Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional
Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or
employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Evidently, from this move as
well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the
Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other
offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on
a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

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