Deterring the Undeterrable?

Proliferation Concerns in a World

of Rogue States and Non-state Actors

K r is K otar ski
(Univer sity of Calgar y)

Revolution or Evolution?
Emer ging Thr eats to Secur ity in the 21st Centur y
Fir st Annual Gr aduate Symposium
Dalhousie Univer sity, Halifax, N.S. Canada

Although nuclear weapons may no longer be at the forefront of great power

diplomacy with the familiar Cold War confrontation between the United States and the
Soviet Union fading into history, nuclear weapons remain an important consideration for
international policy makers. Even though Cold War-era deterrence strategies fall short
when faced with non-state nuclear threats because of the underlying state-centric
assumptions, the lack of rational motives exhibited by certain non-state groups and the
problems of retaliating against an actor with no territorial base, the theoretical framework
on which Cold War deterrence rests still offers much advice to policy makers today even
when considering threats from non-state actors. Also, although the symmetric nature of
the Cold War nuclear standoff may be a thing of the past, nuclear deterrence strategies
rooted in Cold War assumptions are still applicable to state actors including so called
rogue states which are susceptible to the same threats and same logic that arguably
prevented major theatre warfare during the Cold War.
This essay will first discuss the theory of deterrence and the application of the
theory to nuclear arms. Then, it will discuss whether these theories and strategies can be
applied in the post-Cold War security environment, arguing that deterrence strategies can
have some applications when faced with non-state actors and considerable applications
when faced with so called rogue states.
1.1 Deter r ence Theor y
Before any discussion of nuclear deterrence can begin, it is important to note that
there exists a difference between nuclear deterrence theory and nuclear deterrence
strategy. According to Patrick Morgan, deterrence strategy refers to the specific military
posture, threats, and ways of communicating them that a state adopts to deter, while the
theory concerns the underlying principles on which any strategy is to rest. 1

Morgan, Patrick M. Deterrence Now. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). pg. 1

While a convenient starting point for the discussion of deterrence theory is usually
a modern and sterile definition such as the one found in the U.S. Department of Defense
Dictionary, deterrence is by no means a modern concept. As Lawrence Freedman points
out, if the Bible is to be taken literally, then the first attempt at deterrence occurred
shortly after creation.
The first words used, spoken by God to man, contain a deterrent threat.
To his opening promise you may eat from any fruit in the garden was
added a critical exception. If you eat the fruit of the Tree of Conscience ,
God warned Adam, you will be doomed to die . 2
The 1994 version of the DoD dictionary offers that deterrence is ...the prevention
from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by
the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. 3
This definition is quite apt and serves the purpose of this paper quite well, yet it
must be stated that the concept of deterrence is not limited to modern human affairs.
Although God s threat differs from the mortal mutterings of Cold War policy makers in
both language and degree of clarity, the underlying concept remains the same. When God
threatened death onto Adam in order to prevent a specific act, he was following the same
principle as the Soviet Union s Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov who stated in July 1982
that:
With the present-day state of systems of detection, and the combat
readiness of the Soviet Union s strategic nuclear means, the USA will not
be able to deal a crippling blow to the socialist countries. The aggressor
will not be able to evade an all-crushing retaliatory strike. 4

Freedman, Lawrence. Deterrence. (Cambridge UK: Polity, 2004). pg. 7.

Morgan, pg. 8.
4
Catudal, Honor M. Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev. (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities
Press International, 1989). pg. 166.
3

Both threats were used as a means of preventing an undesired action by another

entity, in this case Adam and the United States. And although Freedman was quick to
note that the first deterrent threat was quickly followed by the first deterrence failure
when Adam and Eve tasted the forbidden fruit, the empirical record of Cold War nuclear
deterrence policy is considerably stronger.
While it is hard to state with certainty that nuclear weapons and nuclear
deterrence strategy were the sole reason for the lack of major theatre warfare between the
United States and Soviet Union between 1945 and 1991, most analysts agree that nuclear
deterrence played a significant role after it became the cornerstone of superpower
diplomacy early in the Cold War. As Morgan states, without nuclear weapons and the
Cold War, deterrence would have remained an occasional stratagem. After World War
II, for the first time, deterrence evolved into an elaborate strategy. 5 Due to necessity,
nuclear deterrence eventually became a distinctive way of pursuing national security and
the security of other states or peoples. 6
According to Robert Jarvis, nuclear deterrence theory came in three waves. The
first wave followed the first nuclear explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As early as
1946, military theorists began to recognize that nuclear weapons were exponentially
different from conventional arms. The father of nuclear deterrence theory, Bernard
Brodie, stated that thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to
win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other
useful purpose. 7
Brodie argued that because nuclear arms will be introduced only on a massive
scale due to the fact that no belligerent would be stupid enough, in opening itself to
reprisals in kind, to use only a few bombs, nuclear war would be too costly to wage, for
anyone.8 In such an atmosphere, the study of deterrence theory became paramount. In
5

Morgan, pg. 3.
Ibid., pg. 4.
7
Brodie, Bernard. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
1946). pg. 76.
8
Ibid., pg. 88.
6

response to Carl von Clausewitz s often-quoted assertion that war is a continuation of

policy by other means, Brodie and other nuclear deterrence theorists recognized that if
this statement was indeed true, then policymakers needed to be made aware of the costs
of war in the nuclear age.
The second wave came with the adoption of nuclear deterrence strategy by the
United States government and was geared to operating within a reasonably stable
bipolar relationship within which deterrence seemed to be a natural approach. 9 For
example, the second wave theorists rarely concerned themselves with the formation of
deterrence relationships taking them for granted. They focused instead on the
technicalities of deterrence strategy and, according to Jarvis, theorizing was taken to
high levels of abstraction, but no attempt was made to verify its central prepositions until
the third wave began in the 1970s. 10 During the third wave, critics began to question
the rational-actor assumptions of deterrence theory and the usefulness of deterrence
strategy in general. Freedman notes that as the Cold War concluded, scholars began to
realize that the United States overdosed on deterrence during the Cold War.11 In their
view, an over-reliance on deterrence strategy created an overly antagonistic atmosphere
not conducive to traditional diplomacy.
Each wave of deterrence theorists may have had something to offer to the greater
debate, however, the foundations of deterrence as articulated by the first-wave theorists
remain most important when discussing nuclear deterrence theory because they are taken
for granted by so many policy makers today. Although there has been a multitude of
differing strategies that emerged from nuclear deterrence theory both during the Cold
War and after, the main points of the theory are quite simple and remain rooted in firstwave thought.
To begin with, it is important to note the difference between deterrence, which is
concerned with maintaining the status quo through threat, and coercion (sometimes
9

Freedman, pg. 22.

Ibid., pg. 22.
11
Ibid., pg 23.
10

You are reading a preview. W o u l d y o u l i k e t o a cce ss t h e f u l l -t e x t ?

A c ce ss f u l l -t e x t

Bibliogr aphy
Allison, Graham, Nuclear Terrorism; The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. (New York, NY: Henry Holt
and Co., 2005).
Anonymous, Through Our Enemies Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America.
(Washington DC: Brassey Inc., 2002).

Art, Robert J. & Waltz, Kenneth A. eds., The use of force: military power and
international politics, (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).
Badey, Thomas J., Nuclear Terrorism: Actor Based Threat Assessment, in Intelligence
and National Security, Vol. 16, No. 2, (Summer 2001).
BBC News Online, America withdraws from ABM treaty December 13, 2001. Accessed at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1707812.stm November 10, 2005.
Bowen, Wyn Q., Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism in
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 25, No. 1, (April 2004).

Brodie, Bernard, Strategy in the Missile Age, (Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1959).
Brodie, Bernard, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946).
Campbell, Kurt M., The nuclear tipping point: why states reconsider their nuclear
choices, (Brookings Institution Press, 2004), accessed at
http://site.ebrary.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca:2048/lib/ucalgary/Doc?id=10077267
Castillo, Jasen J., Nuclear Terrorism: Why Deterrence Still Matters, in Current History,
no. 659, (December 2003).
Catudal, Honor Marc, Soviet nuclear strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev: a revolution in
Soviet military and political thinking, (Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, 1989).
Clarke, Richard, Against All Enemies: Inside America s War on Terror. (New York: Free Press, 2005).
Corr, Anders, Nuclear Terror and the Blind-Side Attack: Deterrence through Nuclear Tagging.
Unpublished, (March 2004). Accessed at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~corr/cv.htm November 20,
2005.

Daly, Sara; Parachini, John, & Rosenau, William, Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda, and the
Kinshasa reactor: implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism,
(Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2005).
Fakiolas, Efstathios T., Kennan's Long Telegram and NSC-68: A Comparative Analysis, in East
European Quarterly, Vol. 31, no. 4, (January 1998).
Gabel, Josiane, The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons after September 11 in The Washington Quarterly
Vol. 28 No. 1 (Winter 2004/05).

24

Gareau, Frederick H., The Balance of power and nuclear deterrence: a book of readings,
(Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).
Hagerty, Devin T., Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis
in International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3. (Winter, 1995-1996).
Heymann, Philip B., Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society.
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).

Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (New York NY: Columbia University Press, 1998).
Hutchison, Robert, The Struggle for Control of Radioactive Sources, in Jane s
Intelligence Review (March 2003).
International Atomic Energy Agency, Illicit Trafficking Database (July 1993 December 2004). Accessed
at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/Fact_Figures.html October 17, 2005.

Jasani, Bhupendra, Commercial satellite imagery: a tactic in nuclear weapon deterrence,

(Chichester UK: Praxis Publishing, 2002).
Katz,, Samuel M., The Hunt For The Engineer, (Guilford CT: The Lyons Press, 1999).
Khan, Kamran & Moore, Molly, 2 Nuclear Experts Briefed bin Laden, Pakistanis Say in Washington
Post, December 12, 2001.
Lawrence, Bruce editor. Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama bin Laden. (London UK: Verso,
2005).

Levine, Robert A., Uniform deterrence of nuclear first use, (Santa Monica CA: RAND
Corporation, 1993).
Manning, Robert A. The Nuclear Age: The Next Chapter in Foreign Policy, No. 109.
(Winter, 1997-1998).
Mark, Carson et al., Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons? Nuclear Control Institute,
Washington, D.C., accessed at http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm October 10, 2005.
Metraux, Daniel, Aum Shinrikyo and Japanese Youth. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999).
Mir, Hamid, Osama Claims He Has Nukes , Dawn (Internet edition), November 10, 2001. Accessed at:
http://www.blueprint-magazine.de/babylon/bnladen.htm October 28, 2005.
Morgan, Patrick M., Deterrence Now. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Naim, Moises, Missing Links: Collateral Damage in Foreign Policy, No. 127. (Nov.Dec., 2001).
Naim, Moises, and Kendall, Raymond, The FP Interview: Meet the World's Top Cop in
Foreign Policy, No. 122. (Jan. - Feb., 2001).
25

Nuckolls, John H., Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers: Proliferation and Terrorism in
Science, New Series, Vol. 267, No. 5201. (Feb. 24, 1995).
Pape, Robert A., Dying to Win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. (New York, NY: Random House,
2005).

Public Broadcasting Service, KGB Investigative Assets: Insights. Accessed at:

http://www.pbs.org/redfiles/kgb/inv/kgb_inv_ins.htm Nov. 10, 2005.
Rosenbaum, David M., Nuclear Terror in International Security, Vol. 1, No. 3.
(Winter, 1977).
Rynning, Sten, Potent or Paralyzing? Nuclear Weapons in Contemporary French Military Strategy in
Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 19, No. 1(Winter 2003).
Salama, Sammy. Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge
Components, Nuclear Threat Initiative, March 2005. Accessed at
http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_60b.html November 10, 2005.
Sanger, David E., The Khan Network. Presented at the Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future
June 4-5, 2004 at Stanford University.
Sanger, David E. & Broad, William J., Pakistani s Nuclear Earnings: $100 Million, New York Times,
March 16, 2004. Found in: Carnegie Endowment. A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology in Non Proliferation
Issue Brief Vol. VIII. No. 8, September 7, 2005.

Schelling, Thomas C., Who Will Have the Bomb? in International Security, Vol. 1,
No. 1. (Summer, 1976).
Schwartz, Daniel M., Environmental Terrorism: Analyzing the Concept in Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 4. (Jul., 1998).
Siracusa, Joseph M. & Coleman, David G., Scaling the Nuclear Ladder: Deterrence from Truman to
Clinton in Australian Journal of International Affairs,Vol.54 No.3, (Summer 2000).

Sprinzak, Ehud, The Great Superterrorism Scare in Foreign Policy, No. 112. (Autumn,
1998).
Steinberg, Gerald M. Rediscovering Deterrence After September 11, 2001 in Jerusalem
Letter/Viewpoints, No. 467 (December 2, 2001). Accessed at: http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp467.htm, October
16, 2005.

Steiner, Barry H., Bernard Brodie and the foundations of American nuclear strategy.
(Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991).
Tannenwald, Nina., The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use
in International Organization Vol. 53 No. 3, (Summer 1999).

26

The Simpsons, Much Apu About Nothing Season 7 Episode 23, (#3F20), first aired:
FOX, 5 May 1996. Transcript accessed at: http://www.snpp.com/episodes/3F20.html Dec. 3,
2005.
The United States Department of Defense, SecDef Histories Harold Brown. Accessed at:
http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/brown.htm Nov. 10, 2005.
The United States Department of Defense, SecDef Histories Robert McNamara. Accessed at:
http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/mcnamara.htm Nov. 10, 2005.
The United States White House. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December
2002.
The United States White House. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September
2002.

Yusufzai, Rahimullah Conversation with Terror , Time (Online Edition), January 11,
1999. Accessed at http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/interview/0,9754,174550,00.html October
28, 2005.
Zagare, Frank C, Perfect Deterrence. (Port Chester, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2000).

27