Iran Sanctions Disad Link

Increased Production Disad Link

Miller et al 12Rich Miller, Asjylyn Loder and Jim Polson, Americans Gaining Energy Independence With U.S.
As Top Producer, Bloomberg, 2-6, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-07/americans-gaining-energyindependence-with-u-s-as-top-producer.html
Higher U.S. output lessens the ability of countries like Iran and Russia to use energy diplomacy as a means of
strengthening their influence, Amy Myers Jaffe, director of the Baker Institute Energy Forum at Rice University, and her colleagues wrote
in a report last year.
While the U.S. will still have to pay attention to issues such as Israels security and Islamic fundamentalism in the Mideast, which could affect
oil prices, it wont have to be as worried about its supplies.

Positive Shock
Carlos Pascual, special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs at the State Department, suggested at a Council on Foreign
Relations conference in December that the

increased production in the U.S. and elsewhere gives Washington more

maneuverability in using sanctions to deal with Iran and its nuclear aspirations.
The increased U.S. production of oil and natural gas is a positive supply shock for the economy and for national
security, said Philip Verleger, a former director of the office of energy policy at the Treasury Department and founder of PKVerleger LLC, a
consulting firm in Aspen, Colorado.

Iran Sanctions Bad

Increased sanctions will increase Iranian aggression
International Crisis Group 2-25-13
Middle East Report N138 25 February 2013
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Iran/138-spider-webthe-making-and-unmaking-of-iran-sanctions.pdf
An assessment of the pattern of mutual escalation during the past several years shows that, although they might not have prompted it to
accelerate, sanctions have not deterred Tehrans nuclear advances. Nearly a month after the U.S. imposed unilateral
sanctions on individuals and entities involved in the nuclear program on 28 June 2005, Iran notified the IAEA that it would
resume its suspended uranium conversion activities. Then, almost two weeks after the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1747 in March 2007, Iran announced it was installing 3,000 centrifuges in its nuclear facility in Natanz,
reaching industrial-scale enrichment capacity. Shortly after the U.S. imposed sanctions on the central bank and the EU barred Iranian
oil imports in early 2012, Tehran began enriching uranium at its underground Fordow facility. Most recently, Iran boasted that it had completed
its centrifuge installation at Fordow following a new round of sanctions by Washington and Brussels in October 2012. At times, Iran has

threatened to respond to punitive measures with more escalatory measures (such as enrichment to above 20 per
cent or withdrawal from the NPT) but so far has shied away from doing so . Some analysts view the recent cyberattack against Saudi Arabias most important oil company as a possible warning shot from Tehran an indication
it could resort to different tactics should the economic warfare against it intensify . Crisis Group telephone
interview, oil executive, Dubai, December 2012; Nicole Perlroth, In cyberattack on Saudi firm, U.S. sees Iran firing back, The New York
Times, 23 October 2012.

More sanctions cause Iran not to cooperate and risks war

LA Times 13 (White House-Congress divide on Iran nuclear sanctions widens., LA Times, July 27, 13,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/middleeast/la-fg-us-iran-20130727,0,2104065.story)
U.S. officials and private analysts believe Iran wants to return to the bargaining table. But even if it is ready to
cooperate which remains unclear it could balk if Congress approves new sanctions. "You could have a train wreck
if a draconian new bill is passed during negotiations," said Cliff Kupchan, an Iran specialist at the Eurasia Group consulting
firm and a former State Department official. Though most of Congress has taken a hard line on Iran, a sizable minority worried
about the possibility of war has also been speaking up. This month, a bipartisan group of 131 lawmakers wrote to President
Obama calling Rouhani's election a "potential major opportunity" and urging him to give diplomacy a chance.

Increased sanctions increase nuclearization

International Crisis Group 2-25-13
Middle East Report N138 25 February 2013
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Iran/138-spider-webthe-making-and-unmaking-of-iran-sanctions.pdf
Many broad lessons can be learned from the international communitys long experience with sanctioning Iran. First, and
critically, are questions about the effectiveness of economic pressure as a tool of coercive diplomacy, ie, as a means of inducing specific policy
changes. Although one cannot say with any certainty whether Iran would have gone farther in the absence of such pressure, one can confidently
assert that the sanctions went hand in hand with advances in the nuclear program. Indeed, if the measure of that programs
progress is the concern it inspires among outsiders, then clearly the sanctions have fallen far short of their purported objective. Secondly, the
case of Iran illustrates the risk that, precisely due to their inability to secure their primary goal, sanctions may turn into an end in and of
themselves or, stated differently, the measure of their success grows to be how many sanctions have been imposed and how much pain they
inflict. That such pain does not translate into the desired policy change becomes, in this context, almost an afterthought. The
pursuit of ever-escalating sanctions in Iran, in Syria or elsewhere often reflects competing pressures: the political imperative to do
something; the understandable desire to avoid more perilous courses of action (notably, armed intervention); and the allure of an instrument
yielding results that are easily measurable in terms of economic hardship. It is in some ways a path of least resistance, appealing both to
hardliners who wish to exact a punishing price and to more moderate political actors who wish to avoid military action. There are potential
perverse incentives on both sides: on the part of the sanctioning party to intensify sanctions for the sake of intensifying them, but also on the
part of the sanctioned party to bolster its own leverage in anticipation of future negotiations. In the Iranian case, this has meant an escalatory
dynamic: more progress in Tehrans nuclear program mirroring more sanctions. Another, larger point is this: that, as the reach and scope

of sanctions expand, they not only miss their targets but play into the hands they intend to weaken. That those in power
are better equipped to navigate the economic obstacle is nothing new, a fact of life witnessed in Iraq under Saddam as well as in Gaza under
Hamas,257 among many others. The economic distortions to which sanctions give rise can be manipulated so that

rarefied goods are allocated to preferred constituencies, while those most prone to question their rulers are starved
of resources. Again, this lesson can be witnessed today in Syria, with the advent of a war economy from which regime cronies (but also some
rebel groups) can profit.258

Increased sanctions will cause Iranian prolif

International Crisis Group 2-25-13
Middle East Report N138 25 February 2013
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Iran/138-spider-webthe-making-and-unmaking-of-iran-sanctions.pdf
Vali Nasr, a former adviser to the U.S. State Department, argues that U.S. acts of sabotage and economic pressure [make] attaining
nuclear weapons of critical importance to the clerics. Without such weapons, Iran could face the Libya scenario: economic pressure
causing political unrest that invites intervention by foreign powers that feel safe enough to interfere in the affairs of a nonnuclear- armed state.

The more sanctions threaten Irans internal stability, the more likely the ruling regime will be to pursue nuclear
deterrence and to confront the West to win the time Iran needs to reach that goal. Hard-line US Policy tips Iran toward belligerence,
Bloomberg, 5 January 2012.

Iran sanctions spur its nuclear program

Jonathan Tirone - Feb 21, 2013 Irans Nuclear Gains Suggest Sanctions May Backfire
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-15/iran-s-nuclear-technology-gains-suggest-sanctions-arebackfiring.html
(Corrects 8th paragraph of story published Feb. 15 to say Iran has the capacity to manufacture a Fomblin-like oil
product rather than that is is manufacturing Fomblin oil.) International sanctions designed to punish Iran for its
nuclear program may be counter-productive, said scientists and security analysts tracking the decade-long dispute
over the Persian Gulf nations atomic work. While trade and financial sanctions have choked off Irans access to
materials such as aluminum and maraging steel used to make its first generation of nuclear equipment, they have
spurred the Islamic Republic to find its own solutions for subsequent technological innovations. Now, Iran is
positioned to both build better nuclear devices and export them. The serious consequence of all of these sanctions
are that you drive the indigenous production of these parts, Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, a physicist at the Monterrey,
California- based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, wrote in response to questions. This means the
proliferator learns more about the technology and so now they dont only know how to produce the parts, but they
could also sell them to other states. As embargoes strangle Irans ability to import high-quality metals and fibers
needed to build nuclear components, the countrys own resources, including oil, sand and zinc, mean it can
overcome technical hurdles. Last month, Iran notified United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency
inspectors it would begin installing 3,000 domestically built centrifuges that can produce more enriched uranium in
less time. Raw Materials Most technologies in use are decades-old, well-proven, well-published concepts, said
Andreas Persbo, executive director of the London-based Verification Research, Training and Information Center, a
non-governmental observer to the IAEA. The key thing is to get access to the raw material. If you have the raw
material, and a talent base to process them, you can construct whatever you need. Iran, with the worlds fourthbiggest proven oil reserves, began in 2011 to make its own carbon fiber, the strong, light material used in wind
turbines, airplanes and centrifuges. Like the uranium-enrichment market, which is led by a handful of companies
such as Urenco Ltd., Areva SA (AREVA) and Rosatom Corp., carbon-fiber production is driven by a few
multinational businesses including Hexcel Corp. (HXL), BAE Systems Plc (BA/) and Toray Industries Inc. (3402)
While the sanctions regime certainly slowed down Irans technological progress initially, it has also made Iran selfsufficient in a number of key areas, said Yousaf Butt, a physicist and nuclear non-proliferation analyst who advised
the U.S. National Academy of Sciences on Irans nuclear work. Iran is likely the most technologically advanced
nation in the Middle East, aside from Israel. Self-Sufficient The Islamic Republics research into polymers and
nanotechnology has given it self-sufficiency in other vital technology areas touched by sanctions. For example, the
country has the capacity to make a product like Fomblin oil, a lubricant used inside centrifuges, according to Persbo.
At a September IAEA meeting in Vienna, Iran displayed a copy of a domestically made nuclear-fuel panel destined
for a research reactor in Tehran. If in the past the country needed finished products and technologies for its program
which squarely fell under sanctions, now the required level of imported inputs is continuously going down to more
simple and basic items which Iran still needs but can upgrade on its own, according to Igor Khripunov, the Soviet

Unions former arms-control envoy to the U.S. who is now at the Athens, Georgia-based Center for International
Trade and Security. Kazakhstan Meeting Iran, which maintains its atomic program is peaceful, has ruled out
suspending its activities as the UN Security Council demands. Its willing to discuss its nuclear work when it meets
world powers in Kazakhstan next week, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said Feb. 4. Talks between Iran and
IAEA officials that concluded Feb. 13 in Tehran failed to clinch a deal that would give investigators wider access to
alleged nuclear sites. While Iran allowed wider access to sites, including centrifuge-manufacturing workshops, until
2005, it reversed course after accusations about its nuclear work escalated. The first UN sanctions were imposed in
2006. The country hasnt restricted IAEA access to sites its legally bound to let inspectors visit. Diplomats should
focus on returning to greater transparency of Irans nuclear facilities rather than trying to enforce a ban on
enrichment, said Paul Ingram, executive director of the London-based British American Security Information
Council, a policy-advisory group. Iran has a sophisticated economy relative to most states outside of North
America, Europe and the Far East, so it should be no surprise that they can develop the technologies to substitute for
sanctioned materials, Ingram wrote in reply to questions. The experience of sanctions proves this time and time
again.

Its uniqueThey are not aggressing and not proliferating now

Edwards 2/27/13
Alex Edwards is Contributing Editor at The Majalla. He gained a master's degree in International Relations and the
Middle East from Durham University before training as a journalist. He is currently a PhD candidate at the London
School of Economics, An Enduring Stalemate There is no end in sight in the dispute over Iran's nuclear program
http://www.majalla.com/eng/2013/02/article55238711
One of the senators on the panel declared that Iran poses an existential threat to the US, while another suggested that a nuclear Iran could not
contained or deterred because its leaders are not sane. Whatever the failings or crimes of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
neither of these claims can be taken seriously. Compared to the United States, Iran is a military pygmy. It poses no

conventional military threat at all. It is also worth remembering that the US intelligence services have concluded that
Iran stopped research into producing a functioning nuclear weapon a decade ago. In other words, they do not believe
that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. In regards to the mental state of its leaders, whatever dubious statements some Iranian
politicians (including the outgoing president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) have made about subjects like the Holocaust, Irans foreign policy
has been pragmatic for the most part, and geared towards securing Iranian interests.
Iran not pursuing nuclear weapons
Fox News 13 (Rowhani 'halted nuclear weapon programme': ex-ambassador, Fox News, July 27, 2013,
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/27/rowhani-halted-nuclear-weapon-programme-ex-ambassador/)
Iranian President-elect Hassan Rowhani personally stopped the development of a clandestine nuclear weapon in 2003, a
former ambassador to the country said Saturday. Writing in the International Herald Tribune newspaper, Francois Nicoullaud, France's
ambassador to Iran from 2001 to 2005, said he believed Rowhani was the "main actor" in persuading the country's Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei to halt the secret programme. Rowhani, who led the nuclear negotiating team under reformist former
president Mohammad Khatami from 2003-2005, will take power on August 3 after his election on June 15. "Based on conversations that I
had at the time, as French ambassador to Tehran, with high Iranian officials close to the matter, I firmly believe that Rowhani was the main actor
in the process," Nicoullaud wrote. "Of course, Iranians could not admit to a foreigner that such a program ever existed, and I cannot name the
officials I spoke to." Nicoullaud went on to describe a meeting with a "high-ranking official" after Iran had agreed with Western powers to
suspend enrichment in October 2003. After this agreement, the official "confided to me that ... Rowhani issued a general circular asking

all Iranian departments and agencies, civilian and military, to report in detail about their past and ongoing nuclear
activities. "The official explained to me that the main difficulty Rowhani and his team were encountering was learning exactly what was
happening in a system as secretive as Iran's. "A few weeks after, I heard from another official, a close friend of Rowhani: 'The Rowhani team is
having a hard time ... People resist their instructions ... But they will prevail'." After Nicoullaud advised the official to give researchers more time
to archive their work, his source later replied: "I conveyed your message ... It worked!" The retired diplomat confirmed to AFP Saturday he now
believes that the project Rowhani's team was working on was the Revolutionary Guard programme. " Uranium enrichment was the

visible part of it but there was a hidden section, the manufacture of a nuclear device -- once they had produced
enriched uranium, how to put it on the head of a missile and how to deliver it to 'friends' in the region -- that's the
programme Rowhani stopped," the former ambassador said. "I had known for a long time but now that Rowhani is becoming president I
had enough consistent information to prove that he was the principal figure, who made his decision known to the Supreme Leader," Nicoullaud
said. "Above all it was put into action, forcing the Revolutionary Guards to halt the programme that they held so very dearly," added the former
diplomat.

Increased sanctions cause war

Toosi 3-19-13
Sina Toossi Reporter for National Iranian American Council
http://www.niacinsight.com/
Two recent measures introduced in Congress received some pretty harsh criticism from the New York Times this past weekend. The first
resolution, introduced in the Senate by Democratic Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Robert Menendez and Republican
Senator Lindsey Graham, would essentially open a backdoor to war with Iran by pushing Israel to start it. The other bill will
sharply ratchet up already tough sanctions imposed on Iran. In a significant move, the New York Times ran an editorial article slamming the
bills as harmful to ongoing negotiations and as making war more likely. Last week, just as Iran and the major powers made some small progress
in talks and agreed to meet again, two measures were introduced in Congress that could harm negotiations, said the New York
Times. It could also hamper negotiations by playing into Iranian fears that Americas true intention is to promote regime change. It remains
to be seen if this unique criticism from the New York Times will have any effect on Congress. Especially since, as the editorial notes, these
bills are being promoted by AIPAC. Regardless, by taking on Congress latest Iran hijinks, the NYT is saying to Congress what NIAC
has been saying for years: that ratcheting up sanctions and upping the war rhetoric, our elected officials in Washington are closing off
political space for the Obama Administration to conduct serious diplomacy, and thereby making war more likely. The
NYT piece ended with a stark message, The best way to avert military conflict is by negotiating a credible, verifiable agreement. It is a very long
shot. But Congress needs to give the talks time to play out and not make diplomatic efforts even harder.

UniquenessSanctions not being increased now

Obama is winning battle for Congressional constraint on Iran now
Newton-Small 3/12/13
Jay Newton-Small is the congressional correspondent for TIME.
Congress Guns for Iran, While the Administration Focuses on Engagement
Read more: http://swampland.time.com/author/jnewtonsmall/#ixzz2O2wOIXTY
In early March, bipartisan legislation for a fourth round of sanctions against Iran was introduced in the House. But this
time around, Kirk has been searching thus far in vain for a Democratic partner for his new bill. Menendez, now the
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, seems less keen to stir up trouble for the Administration . After
all, the sanctions Congress has already imposed on Iran are exceptional and foreign policy is the purview of the White House, not Congress. To
hear Congress tell it, they have always been at least six months ahead of the Obama Administration when it comes to sanctions. To hear the
Administration tell it, they have always supported a dual-track strategy of negotiations and sanctions and have carefully balanced both. Iran has
repeatedly and increasingly complained about the sanctions. You are holding a gun against Iran saying, Talks or youll fire. The Iranian nation
will not be frightened by such threats, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Feb. 7. The concern among some diplomats is a stick
works only so long before Iran might want to fight back. And in this case, the negotiations on the table are over a nuclear weapon the biggest
of all sticks. Though engagement has not worked in the past four years, Obama has repeatedly warned the window for negotiations
is closing and Irans economic situation is increasingly dire. Despite the latest bills in Congress, the focus this year will be on a
diplomatic push.

Obama focused on diplomatic solution now

Newton-Small 3/12/13
Jay Newton-Small is the congressional correspondent for TIME.
Congress Guns for Iran, While the Administration Focuses on Engagement
Read more: http://swampland.time.com/author/jnewtonsmall/#ixzz2O2wOIXTY
In a Washington these days characterized by hyper partisanship, the last four years of near unanimous votes on sanctioning Iran has been striking.
They have also been a thorn in the Administrations side. As State Department diplomats try yet again for a breakthrough at talks in Istanbul at the
end of the month, two more bills further tightening the restrictions against Iran are in the works on the Hill . At best,
Congress plays bad cop to the Administrations good cop. Negotiators can say their hands are tied, that unless Iran changes its tune
theres little President Obama can to do to stop Congress. At worst, the bills complicate delicate negotiations and goad an already angry regime.
While sanctions legislation has been a successful stick, pushing Irans economy to the brink, the Administration has reached a point

where its focus is on reaching a diplomatic solution

and avoiding a war.

Stopping increased sanctions is the key to successful diplomacy

Afrasiabi 2-27-13
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy
Iran nuclear talks reach a turning point http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MID-01-010313.html
So here's the bottom line: The US and its allies have an excellent chance of putting an end to the Iran nuclear
standoff by remaining consistent and showing the necessary prerequisite of good-faith negotiation, instead of halfhearted or contradictory positions and initiatives that in the past have proved poisonous. While there should be a
moratorium on any new sanctions legislation in congress in light of the progress made in Almaty, a rule of reason is
unlikely to usurp the stereotypical Iranophobia in Washington's halls of power.
Increased sanctions will trigger conflict with China
Leverett & Leverette 2-25-13
Hillary Mann Leverett is co-author of the book Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with
the Islamic Republic of Iran and teaches international relations at American University
Flynt Leverett is co-author of the book Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the
Islamic Republic of Iran and teaches international relations at Penn State University.

The coming collapse of Iran sanctions

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201322584515426148.html
Western policymakers and commentators wrongly assume that sanctions will force Iranian concessions in nuclear talks
that resume this week in Kazakhstan - or perhaps even undermine the Islamic Republic's basic stability in advance of the next Iranian presidential
election in June. Besides exaggerating sanctions' impact on Iranian attitudes and decision-making, this argument ignores potentially fatal flaws
in the US-led sanctions regime itself - flaws highlighted by ongoing developments in Europe and Asia, and that are likely to
prompt the erosion, if not outright collapse of America's sanctions policy. Virtually since the 1979 Iranian revolution, US
administrations have imposed unilateral sanctions against the Islamic Republic. These measures, though, have not significantly
damaged Iran's economy and have certainly not changed Iranian policies Washington doesn't like. Between 2006 and
2010, America got the UN Security Council to adopt six resolutions authorising multilateral sanctions against Iran - also with limited impact,
because China and Russia refused to allow any resolution to pass that would have harmed their interests in Iran. Beyond unilateral and
multilateral measures against Iran's economy, the US has, since 1996, threatened to impose "secondary" sanctions against thirdcountry entities doing business with the Islamic Republic. In recent years, Congress has dramatically expanded the range of activities subject to
such sanctions, going beyond investments in Iranian oil and gas production to include simple purchases of Iranian crude and almost all financial
transactions. This year, Congress blacklisted transfers of precious metals to Iran, to make it harder for Tehran to repatriate export earnings or
pay for imports in gold. Congress has also increased the sanctions that can be imposed on offending entities, including their cut-off from the US
financial system. Secondary sanctions Secondary sanctions are a legal and political house of cards. They almost
certainly violate American commitments under the World Trade Organisation, which allows members to cut trade with states
they deem national security threats but not to sanction other members over lawful business conducted in third countries. If challenged on the
issue in the WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism, Washington would surely lose. Consequently, US administrations have
been reluctant to impose secondary sanctions on non-US entities transacting with Iran. In 1998, the Clinton administration waived sanctions
against a consortium of European, Russian and Asian companies developing an Iranian gas field; over the next decade, Washington declined to
make determinations whether other non-US companies' Iranian activities were sanctionable. The Obama administration now issues blanket
waivers for countries continuing to buy Iranian oil, even when it is questionable they are really reducing their purchases. Still, legal and
reputational risks posed by the threat of US secondary sanctions have reduced the willingness of companies and banks in many countries to
transact with Iran, with negative consequences for its oil export volumes, the value of its currency and other dimensions of its economic life.
Last year, the European Union - which for years had condemned America's prospective "extraterritorial" application of national trade law and
warned it would go to the WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism if Washington ever sanctioned European firms over Iran-related business finally subordinated its Iran policy to American preferences, banning Iranian oil and imposing close to a comprehensive economic embargo
against the Islamic Republic. In recent weeks, however, Europe's General Court overturned European sanctions against
two of Iran's biggest banks, ruling that the EU never substantiated its claims that the banks provided "financial services for entities
procuring on behalf of Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes". The European Council has two months to respond - but removing
sanctions against the banks would severely weaken Europe's sanctions regime . Other major players in Iran's economy,
including the Central Bank of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company, are now challenging their own sanctioned status. On the other side
of the world, America is on a collision course with China over sanctions. In recent years, Beijing has tried to accommodate US concerns about
Iran. It has not developed trade and investment positions there as rapidly as it might have, and has shifted some Iran-related transactional flows
into renminbito to help the Obama administration avoid sanctioning Chinese banks (similarly, India now pays for some Iranian oil imports in
rupees). Whether Beijing has really lowered its aggregate imports of Iranian oil is unclear - but it clearly reduces them when the administration
is deciding about six-month sanctions waivers for countries buying Iranian crude. The administration is taking its own steps to
forestall a Sino-American conflict over sanctions. Besides issuing waivers for oil imports, the one Chinese bank Washington has
barred from the US financial system for Iran-related transactions is a subsidiary of a Chinese energy company - a subsidiary with no business in
the US. However, as Congress enacts additional layers of secondary sanctions, President Obama's room to manoeuver
is being progressively reduced. Therein lies the looming policy train wreck. Middle East strategy If, at congressional

insistence, the administration later this year demands that China sharply cut Iranian oil imports and that Chinese
banks stop virtually any Iran-related transactions, Beijing will say no. If Washington retreats, the deterrent effect of secondary
sanctions will erode rapidly. Iran's oil exports are rising again, largely from Chinese demand. "If Washington sanctions major Chinese
banks and energy companies, Beijing will respond... by retaliating against US companies in China ." Once it becomes
evident Washington won't seriously impose secondary sanctions, growth in Iranian oil shipments to China and other non-Western economies (for
example, India and South Korea) will accelerate. Likewise, non-Western powers are central to Iran's quest for alternatives to US-dominated
mechanisms for conducting and settling international transactions - a project that will also gain momentum after Washington's bluff is called.
Conversely, if Washington sanctions major Chinese banks and energy companies, Beijing will respond - at least by taking
America to the WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism (where China will win), perhaps by retaliating against US companies in China.

Chinese policymakers are increasingly concerned Washington is reneging on its part of the core bargain that
grounded Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s - to accept China's relative economic and political rise and not try to secure a

hegemonic position in Asia. Beijing is already less willing to work in the Security Council on a new (even watered-down) sanctions resolution
and more willing to resist US initiatives that, in its view, challenge Chinese interests (witness China's vetoes of three US-backed resolutions on
Syria). In this context, Chinese leaders will not accept American high-handedness on Iran sanctions. At this point, Beijing
has more ways to impose costs on America for violations of international economic law that impinge on Chinese interests than Washington has
levers to coerce China's compliance. As America's sanctions policy unravels, President Obama will have to decide whether to stay on a path of
open-ended hostility toward Iran that ultimately leads to another US-initiated war in the Middle East, or develop a very different vision for
America's Middle East strategy - a vision emphasising genuine diplomacy with Tehran, rooted in American acceptance of the Islamic Republic as
a legitimate political order representing legitimate national interests and aimed at fundamentally realigning US-Iranian relations.

No Iranian nuclear program now

JAMES RISEN and MARK MAZZETTI February 24, 2012 U.S. Agencies See No Move by Iran to Build a
Bomb http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/world/middleeast/us-agencies-see-no-move-by-iran-to-build-abomb.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print
WASHINGTON Even as the United Nations nuclear watchdog said in a new report Friday that Iran had
accelerated its uranium enrichment program, American intelligence analysts continue to believe that there is no hard
evidence that Iran has decided to build a nuclear bomb. Recent assessments by American spy agencies are broadly
consistent with a 2007 intelligence finding that concluded that Iran had abandoned its nuclear weapons program
years earlier, according to current and former American officials. The officials said that assessment was largely
reaffirmed in a 2010 National Intelligence Estimate, and that it remains the consensus view of Americas 16
intelligence agencies. At the center of the debate is the murky question of the ultimate ambitions of the leaders in
Tehran. There is no dispute among American, Israeli and European intelligence officials that Iran has been enriching
nuclear fuel and developing some necessary infrastructure to become a nuclear power. But the Central Intelligence
Agency and other intelligence agencies believe that Iran has yet to decide whether to resume a parallel program to
design a nuclear warhead a program they believe was essentially halted in 2003 and which would be necessary
for Iran to build a nuclear bomb. Iranian officials maintain that their nuclear program is for civilian purposes. In
Senate testimony on Jan. 31, James R. Clapper Jr., the director of national intelligence, stated explicitly that
American officials believe that Iran is preserving its options for a nuclear weapon, but said there was no evidence
that it had made a decision on making a concerted push to build a weapon. David H. Petraeus, the C.I.A. director,
concurred with that view at the same hearing. Other senior United States officials, including Defense Secretary Leon
E. Panetta and Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have made similar statements in
recent television appearances. They are certainly moving on that path, but we dont believe they have actually
made the decision to go ahead with a nuclear weapon, Mr. Clapper told the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence. Critics of the American assessment in Jerusalem and some European capitals point out that Iran has
made great strides in the most difficult step toward building a nuclear weapon, enriching uranium. That has also
been the conclusion of a series of reports by the International Atomic Energy Agencys inspectors, who on Friday
presented new evidence that the Iranians have begun enriching uranium in an underground facility. Once Iran takes
further steps to actually enrich weapons grade fuel a feat that the United States does not believe Iran has yet
accomplished the critics believe that it would be relatively easy for Iran to engineer a warhead and then have a
bomb in short order. They also criticize the C.I.A. for being overly cautious in its assessments of Iran, suggesting
that it is perhaps overcompensating for its faulty intelligence assessments in 2002 about Iraqs purported weapons
programs, which turned out not to exist. In addition, Israeli officials have challenged the very premise of the 2007
intelligence assessment, saying they do not believe that Iran ever fully halted its work on a weapons program. Yet
some intelligence officials and outside analysts believe there is another possible explanation for Irans enrichment
activity, besides a headlong race to build a bomb as quickly as possible. They say that Iran could be seeking to
enhance its influence in the region by creating what some analysts call strategic ambiguity. Rather than building a
bomb now, Iran may want to increase its power by sowing doubt among other nations about its nuclear ambitions.
Some point to the examples of Pakistan and India, both of which had clandestine nuclear weapons programs for
decades before they actually decided to build bombs and test their weapons in 1998. I think the Iranians want the
capability, but not a stockpile, said Kenneth C. Brill, a former United States ambassador to the International Atomic
Energy Agency who also served as director of the intelligence communitys National Counterproliferation Center
from 2005 until 2009. Added a former intelligence official: The Indians were a screwdriver turn away from having
a bomb for many years. The Iranians are not that close. To be sure, American analysts acknowledge that
understanding the intentions of Irans leadership is extremely difficult, and that their assessments are based on
limited information. David A. Kay, who was head of the C.I.A.s team that searched for Iraqs weapons programs
after the United States invasion, was cautious about the quality of the intelligence underlying the current American
assessment. They dont have evidence that Iran has made a decision to build a bomb, and that reflects a real gap in
the intelligence, Mr. Kay said. Its true the evidence hasnt changed very much since 2007, he added. But that
reflects a lack of access and a lack of intelligence as much as anything. Divining the intentions of closed societies is
one of the most difficult tasks for American intelligence analysts, and the C.I.A. for decades has had little success
penetrating regimes like Iran and North Korea to learn how their leaders make decisions. Amid the ugly aftermath of
the botched Iraq intelligence assessments, American spy agencies in 2006 put new analytical procedures in place to
avoid repeating the failures. Analysts now have access to raw information about the sources behind intelligence
reports, to help better determine the credibility of the sources and prevent another episode like the one in which the

C.I.A. based much of its conclusions about Iraqs purported biological weapons on an Iraqi exile who turned out to
be lying. Analysts are also required to include in their reports more information about the chain of logic that has led
them to their conclusions, and differing judgments are featured prominently in classified reports, rather than buried
in footnotes. When an unclassified summary of the 2007 intelligence estimate on Irans nuclear program was made
public, stating that it had abandoned work on a bomb, it stunned the Bush administration and the world. It
represented a sharp reversal from the intelligence communitys 2005 estimate, and drew criticism of the C.I.A. from
European and Israeli officials, as well as conservative pundits. They argued that it was part of a larger effort by the
C.I.A. to prevent American military action against Iran. The report was so controversial that many outside analysts
expected that the intelligence community would be forced to revise and repudiate the estimate after new evidence
emerged about Irans program, notably from the United Nations inspectors. Yet analysts now say that while there
has been mounting evidence of Iranian work on enrichment facilities, there has been far less clear evidence of a
weapons program. Still, Irans enrichment activities have raised suspicions, even among skeptics. What has been
driving the discussion has been the enrichment activity, said one former intelligence official. Thats made
everybody nervous. So the Iranians continue to contribute to the suspicions about what they are trying to do. Irans
efforts to hide its nuclear facilities and to deceive the West about its activities have also intensified doubts. But some
American analysts warn that such behavior is not necessarily proof of a weapons program. They say that one
mistake the C.I.A. made before the war in Iraq was to assume that because Saddam Hussein resisted weapons
inspections acting as if he were hiding something it meant that he had a weapons program. As Mr. Kay
explained, The amount of evidence that you were willing to go with in 2002 is not the same evidence you are
willing to accept today.

Sanctions fail extensions

Sanctions are counterproductive
International Crisis Group 2-25-13
Middle East Report N138 25 February 2013
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Iran/138-spider-webthe-making-and-unmaking-of-iran-sanctions.pdf
A key problem is that the West and Iran view the sanctions through highly dissimilar prisms. European and U.S. officials bank on a
cost-benefit analysis pursuant to which the Islamic Republic, at some point, will conclude that persevering on the nuclear track will prompt
economic hardships sufficiently great to trigger more extensive popular unrest, ultimately threatening regime survival itself. But the world looks
very different from Tehran. There, the one thing considered more perilous than suffering from sanctions is surrendering to
them; persuaded the West is intent on toppling the regime, the leadership views economic steps as just one in a panoply of measures designed
to destabilise it. Its strategy, rooted in the experience of diplomatic isolation and the war with Iraq, can be summed up in two words: resist and
survive, the former being the prerequisite to the latter. So there are good reasons for thinking that, rather than adjusting its nuclear policy to
remove the sanctions, the regime will continue to adjust its economic policy in order to adapt to them. Likewise, whatever lobbying has occurred
from key domestic constituencies principally has been aimed at convincing the regime to amend its economic as opposed to its nuclear
approach. Tellingly, and while important regime constituencies have been harmed by international penalties, not all of them have been harmed
equally and not all of them have been harmed at all. Governmental and quasi-governmental institutions still dominate the economy, and evidence
suggests that groups with superior contacts with the state have been in a position to weather the storm, circumvent sanctions, exploit new
opportunities and thus minimise any damage to their interests. The net effect is to mould the nations political economy in ways
that run directly counter to the sanctioning nations stated intent . There are other unintended implications. The more
comprehensive the sanctions, the likelier they will harm average citizens. For all the Wests efforts to exempt humanitarian goods, reports of
widespread shortages, notably of specialised medicine, abound. This can be attributed partly to regime inefficiency, but only partly. For
sanctions, notably as comprehensive and far-reaching as those presently in effect, inevitably have both a snowballing and chilling effect. Iranians
lack foreign currency. Foreign businesses, fearing they might unknowingly cross an impermissible line, prefer to shy away even from
authorised deals. Transaction costs have escalated. In turn, this means that the target of public wrath is now more evenly divided between a
regime viewed as incompetent and an outside world seen as uncaring.

Sanctions fail
International Crisis Group 2-25-13
Middle East Report N138 25 February 2013
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Iran/138-spider-webthe-making-and-unmaking-of-iran-sanctions.pdf
How effective sanctions can be in affecting fundamental Iranian policy choices is one important area of inquiry. At one level, its leaders appear
confident they can ride the storm, having endured far more devastating conditions in the past, notably during the eight-year war with Iraq.7
Beyond that, sanctions could be strangulating Irans economy, and Tehrans leaders might be willing to pay a tactical price for their removal
without this necessarily establishing that Irans basic goals will have changed. Irans economy without question is under tremendous strain,
having suffered a dramatic drop in oil exports and a no less significant collapse in the value of its currency. But evidence of a concomitant
impact on Tehrans policy choices is far less easy to detect. To this, there are several possible, non-mutually exclusive explanations. First, the

Iranian system might be relatively impervious to political manifestations (in terms of popular discontent or anger of
the business community) of even sharp economic distress.8 Secondly, the regime harbours the strong conviction that any policy
change would signal weakness and thus, rather than lessen pressure would be likely to augment it;9 hence its leaderships determination to prove
that, although sanctions might affect Iran, they never will yield the desired result.10 As a European official put it, Irans strategy
now boils down to resistance till victory, which stands in sharp contrast to t he Wests sanctions till victory.11 Even assuming their
efficiency as a political instrument, the second question concerns the practicality of their use: imposing sanctions in order to modify behaviour
is only useful if they can be removed in response to altered practice in a calibrated, flexible way. Without such nimbleness, the West will be
unable to offer Iran necessary incentives. The real measure of efficacy is not sanctions imposition. It is sanctions relief.

Sanctions cannot work on Iran

International Crisis Group 2-25-13
Middle East Report N138 25 February 2013
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Iran/138-spider-webthe-making-and-unmaking-of-iran-sanctions.pdf

By the same token, the belief in Washington and Brussels that Tehran might surrender to pressure stands in sharp contrast to Irans selfperception. Western officials who believe crippling sanctions might force the Islamic Republic to rethink its calculations routinely invoke wellknown historical precedents in 1988, despite his war, war, till victory slogan, Ayatollah Khomeini drank the poisoned chalice and
accepted to end the essentially stalemated eight-year war with Iraq; then, in 2003, in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Tehran agreed to
suspend uranium enrichment and purportedly offered a grand bargain to Washington. The conclusion drawn from these rare policy reversals
tends to be clear: faced with an existential threat to the regime, Iran will budge.228 Yet, there are good reasons to believe that 2013
is akin neither to 1988 nor to 2003. The decision to end the war in 1988 certainly was a painful one, but from the Supreme Leaders
vantage point, it was a step that would ensure the Islamic Republics survival. By contrast, a compromise on the nuclear file delivered under
pressure to an entity (the U.S.) whose goal is believed to be regime change might do nothing of the sort. Compliance with Western demands, in
Ayatollah Khameneis mind, likely will not result in alleviation of pressure.229 Todays calculus, in other words, is not so clear-cut: a

concession risks projecting weakness both domestically and internationally and thus damage prospects of regime
survival rather than enhance it. Under this view, the deal, not its absence, could be the poison that brings down the Islamic Republic.230
Finally, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the 2003 offer was an invitation to the U.S. for discussing major issues of contention and not an
Iranian commitment to unilaterally and unconditionally reverse course.231 Moreover, and importantly, for many in the Iranian leadership
current hardships have an air of dj vu indeed, an air of something not nearly as bad as what previously has been seen. The country has
experienced two oil embargos in its modern history: the British-led boycott of Iranian oil between 1951 and 1953 (after
Iran nationalised its oil industry) proved highly effective, yet Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh did not budge;232 later, the U.S.
embargo on Iranian oil imposed in the wake of the 1979 hostage crisis likewise failed to meet its objective, as American diplomats
remained in captivity for 444 days.233 Iran also has dealt with two foreign currency crises in the recent past. Oil revenues dropped from $21
billion in 1983 to $6 billion in 1987, at a time when the country was engaged in a full-fledged war with Iraq. A decade later, amid the Asian
financial crisis, oil income fell once more, from $19 billion in 1996 to $10 billion in 1998.234 The situation today despite shrinking resources
and rising prices is nowhere near the deprivation experienced during the 1980s, when the drain of war had caused widespread shortages and
frequent blackouts. Ayatollah Khamenei, who presided over these previous crises, first as president and then as Supreme Leader, said: [The]
challenges the Islamic Republic is currently faced with are not new. And this is not an analysis, it is a fact. There was a day when our ships
and oil tankers were targeted in the Persian Gulf. There was a day when [Iraq] bombed our main oil terminal in Kharg Island. There were days
when the enemy used to drop bombs on all our industrial centres. These are the things that we have witnessed with our own eyes. We have
experienced these things before: they are not new to us.235 In response, U.S. and EU officials occasionally argue that the more recent round of
sanctions is unprecedented in scope and thus should be given enough time to sink in.236 They see the accumulated impact of punitive
measures, not the effect of their periodic intensification, as the force that eventually might compel the regime to alter its stance in fundamental
ways. A senior U.S. official said, when we think about the impact of sanctions on Irans oil and gas sector, we think long-term. Imagine what
will happen five to ten years from now, when Iranians cannot even keep up oil production for their domestic consumption.237 Yet, the Iranian
leadership offers a mirror image, persuaded that time is on its side. An official argued: The West will realise in due course that strongarming Iran is an exercise in futility. But even if it doesnt, fatigue will eventually set in, and the sanctions regime will start
haemorrhaging.238 To this end, Iran is preparing itself for a potentially prolonged confrontation. At the core of its strategy is its so-called
economy of resistance,239 which equates survival with victory.240 From this perspective, dissuading its foreign foes from toppling it and
establishing the fact of regime endurance is well worth suffering such costs.241

The only way to solve nuclear threats is a strong US arsenal

Genevieve Syverson Research Assistant at The Heritage Foundation July 2, 2013 Iran, North Korea Pose Greater
Nuclear Threat Than Russiahttp://blog.heritage.org/2013/07/02/iran-north-korea-pose-greater-nuclear-threat-thanrussia/
Irans nuclear energy chief, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, declared Friday that the country will continue uranium
enrichment for energy, though most outsiders suspect it will be used for nuclear weapons. Even more troubling, this
news comes directly after President Obamas declaration in Germany that he wants further reductions in the U.S.
nuclear weapons arsenal. He hopes that he is setting an example others will follow. To re-embark on the road to
zero, President Obama wants another nuclear reduction treaty with Russiaon the heels of the New START treaty
from his first term in office. But as Heritage Distinguished Fellow Kim Holmes explains in a recent op-ed, Russian
President Vladimir Putin doesnt believe in the road to zero. He finds it a fantasy that would undermine Russias
strategic power. Obamas attempts to reach the road to zero are misguided. For one thing, Congress remembers
the short end of the deal they got in New START and likely will not want a repeat. For another, Russia is not
interested in any deal that reduces its nuclear capability at all. Finally, Russias arsenal is not the primary nuclear
threat the U.S. should be worried about. Since the reductions to the U.S. nuclear arsenal from New START were
announced in 2010, North Korea has repeatedly threatened to fire missiles at South Korea and the U.S. and has
conducted nuclear tests that prove it has the capability to deliver on that threat. In Iran, though new President Hassan
Rowhani expressed interest in direct talks with the U.S. over its nuclear program, Iran is in fact close to critical
capability, according to The Economist. This is the point at which it could make a dash to produce enough
weapons-grade uranium for one or more bombs beforeWestern intelligence agencies would even know it had done
so. Clearly, none of President Obamas previous cuts to the nuclear arsenal has convinced those who wish the U.S.
harm to do the same. More nuclear weapons reductions on Americas part will not suddenly change the aspirations
of Americas enemies for nuclear weapons. As Ronald Reagan advised, Experience has taught us that preparedness

deters aggression and that weakness invites it. The only game changer in a proliferating world is, and will continue
to be, a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent.

Iran will have nuclear capabilities by 2015

Daniel Greenfield July 14, 2013 Pentagon Report: Iran May Be Able to Hit US with Nuke by 2015
http://frontpagemag.com/2013/dgreenfield/pentagon-report-iran-may-be-able-to-hit-us-with-nuke-by-2015/
Nothing to worry about Im sure. Obama has said that he will prevent Iran from getting a nuke by imposing
sanctions on Iran and then easing sanctions on Iran and then asking Iran to Pretty please, not make a nuke. So
problem solved. The Department of Defense report, the findings of which were first published by the Washington
Times, confirms the assessment of US intelligence agencies that Iran is set to test an intercontinental ballistic missile
as early as 2015. Iran has ambitious ballistic missile and space launch development programs and continues to
attempt to increase the range, lethality, and accuracy of its ballistic missile force, states the assessment produced by
the Department of Defenses National Air and Space Intelligence Center. The 2013 Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat Assessment, produced by the Department of Defenses National Air and and Space Intelligence Center, adds
that the number of Chinese land-based nuclear missiles able to hit the U.S. could expand to well over 100 within
the next 15 years. The report also confirms the revelation, first reported by The Washington Times, that rogue state
North Korea has already deployed its new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, known as the
Hwasong-13. In theory, military analysts predict that the Hwasong-13 is capable of flying 3,500 miles. The report
repeats the assessment by U.S. intelligence agencies that Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching
the United States as early as 2015. Iran has ambitious ballistic missile and space launch development programs and
continues to attempt to increase the range, lethality, and accuracy of its ballistic missile force, the assessment states.
But dont worry. This is what Obama said in 2009. Let me be clear: Irans nuclear and ballistic missile activity
poses a real threat, not just to the United States, but to Irans neighbors and our allies. Err okay. And this year,
Biden said that Obama is totally not bluffing about being clear. Let me make clear what that commitment is: It is to
prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon, period. End of discussion. Not contain. Prevent. So uh were clear on
that. Finally Obama visited Israel and clarified clearly his clear position. Right now, we think it would take over a
year or so for Iran to actually develop a nuclear weapon, but obviously we dont want to cut it too close, Obama
told Israeli Channel 2. They are not yet at the point I think where theyve made a fundamental decision to get right
with the international community but I do think that theyre recognizing that theres a severe cost for them to
continue on the path that theyre on and that theres another door open. So let me be clear. Iran nearly has the
bomb, but Obama is counting on stopping them with a sudden change of heart right before they have a nuke.
(This may be contradictory to the fact that they arent proliferating and aggressing right now)

AT: Russia Advantage

No Link if war with Russia is inevitable then they will launch long range nuclear missiles. There is no
reason that Cuba is key.
Cuba not key Russia successfully tested new long range ICBM capable of bypassing US defense systems, but
deployment is highly unlikely.
Gertz 6/7 Bill, Senior Editor of The Washington Free Beacon and National Security Columnist for The Washington Times, June
7 2013, Russia Conducts Test of New ICBM Designed to Defeat U.S. Defenses, The Washington Free Beacon,
http://freebeacon.com/russia-conducts-test-of-new-icbm-designed-to-defeat-u-s-defenses/

Russia conducted the first flight test of a new inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) that Russian officials say is designed to
defeat U.S. missile defenses. The prototype ICBM was launched yesterday from Moscows Kapustin Yar missile range, a spokesman for
Russian Defense Ministry told state media. U.S. and Russian officials describe the new missile as a road-mobile missile known as Yars-M
that is slated for deployment later this year . On Friday, Russian Deputy Premier Dmitri Rogozin said the new missile was designed
specifically to defeat U.S. missile defensesa key Russian priority for its strategic nuclear arms buildup. We closely watched last
nights events. They were successful. We tested an intercontinental ballistic missile which I call a missile defense killer, Rogozin was
quoted by Interfax as saying. Neither modern nor future American missile defense means will be able to stop this missile
from hitting its target directly. No details on the characteristics of the new missile were made public. However, U.S. officials said the
new ICBM is believed to use a high-technology fuel that allows higher speeds needed to outfly high-speed U.S. missile defense interceptors.

The new ICBM will have a range of up to 6,835 miles and 10 multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles. The new
ICBM is a setback for President Barack Obamas efforts to engage the Russians in a new round of strategic arms reduction talks. The president
sent a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin several weeks ago that a Russian official said addresses problems of military policy, including
the missile defense and nuclear arsenals issues. The new missile appears to be one of Moscows responses to plans by the United States and
NATO to deploy missile defenses in Europe against Iranian missiles. Russia is opposing the missile defenses, claiming they will be used to
defeat Russian strategic offensive forces. The Obama administration has denied the defenses can or will be used to defeat the Russian strategic
missile arsenal. The Obama administration twice has made concessions to Russia on the defenses. First, it canceled a plan to place long-range
missile defense interceptors in Poland in 2009. Then in March the Pentagon canceled a plan to deploy a ground-based version of the Navys SM-3
interceptor missile that is being designed to counter Iranian long-range missiles. Rogozin said in a speech to Moscows Civil University that the
military will continue building up a force that will allow us to ensure our absolute freedom of action, should our country encounter any
aggression. The Russian Federations state weapons procurement program will set such parameters of weapons and military hardware that will
only be linked with responding to the threat of sixth-generation wars, he said. The strategic missile test comes as Russia has been conducting
several Cold War-style strategic bomber incursions into U.S. air defense zones. Russia also announced recently that Moscow will
resume ballistic missile submarine patrols. The new ICBM is part of a major strategic nuclear buildup by Russia. In
addition to the new road-mobile missile, Moscow is developing a rail-mobile ICBM, similar to the dismantled Soviet-era rail-mobile SS-24.
Russia also is building a new ballistic missile submarine that will carry new submarine-launched Bulava missiles, and a new strategic bomber to
be deployed by 2020. Another new strategic weapon is Russias new Kh-102 air-launched cruise missile and a new Kaliber submarine launched
cruise missile under development. Asked about the Russian ICBM test, Rick Lehner, spokesman for the Pentagons Missile Defense Agency
said: Our missile defense technology doesnt threaten the Russian strategic deterrent force in any way. Igor Yegorov, a ministry spokesman for
strategic missile troops, said the test was carried out at 9:45 p.m. Moscow time on Thursday (1:45 p.m. in Washington) from a mobile launch
system. The missile facility at Kapustin Yar is located near the southern Russian city of Volgograd. The launch has been recognized as
successful; the combat payload arrived at Balkhash range at the scheduled time, Yegorov said. Balkash is an impact zone in Kazakhstan. The
tasks of the launch were to receive confirmation that the characteristics of the missile system and of all its elements correspond to those described
in the tactical and technical specifications, to ascertain the flight-technical characteristics of the missile and those of the units of the missile
system in general, to experimentally ascertain the reliability of the operation of the missile system, said Yegorov. It was reportedly the fourth
test of the new missile. The ICBM test comes as President Obama is set to approve a new plan for cutting U.S. strategic nuclear warheads called
the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation study. The new plan will call for seeking a new round of strategic arms cuts with Russia aimed at
cutting deployed strategic warheads to 1,000. Under the 2010 New START arms treaty, the United States and Russia agreed to cut their deployed
strategic warhead arsenals to 1,550 warheads. After the treaty was made public, it was disclosed that Russia had already reached that level and
thus the treaty unilaterally cuts U.S. strategic forces. A U.S. official familiar with strategic nuclear issues said the Obama administration is
seeking to conclude a missile defense deal with Russia this month. The objective of that agreement is to pave the
way for a future agreement between Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin to announce a new round of strategic arms
cuts, possibly to begin in September or October. Jack Caravelli, a former CIA specialist on Russia, said the new Russian ICBM may use a
depressed trajectory flight to avoid or defeat missile defenses. Russian claims of having developed a new missile capable of penetrating
current or future US missile defense may or may not be true, said Caravelli, now with the private intelligence firm Lignet. Russia fears the
United States may deploy large numbers of missile defense interceptors in the future with the theoretical capability to degrade a large-scale
Russian missile attack on the United States, he said.

The Russians know such future deployments are unlikely but are

probably hyping the new ICBM capability to demonstrate the futility of any such large scale missile defense

plan , Caravelli said. Congressional Republicans are concerned that the administration will make its next arms pact an executive agreement to
avoid another difficult treaty ratification fight, as occurred in 2010 with the New START treaty. Secretary of State John Kerry, during his Senate
confirmation hearing, did not rule out the use of an executive agreement for a new arms treaty. One sign of impending strategy force cuts was the
recent directive to the Air Force from the office of the secretary of defense to conduct an impact statement of dismantling an entire wing of U.S.
land-based ICBMs. The current START treaty calls for no similar reduction in land-based missile forces.
Russia wont build permanent military operations in Cuba
Meyer 8 Bill, reporter at Cleveland.com, Vladimir Putin says Russia has no need for permanent military bases in Cuba or
Venezuela, December 4 2008, Cleveland.com,
http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2008/12/vladimir_putin_says_russia_has.html
MOSCOW -- Russia

does not need to build permanent naval bases in Cuba or Venezuela, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said
on Thursday, speaking amid a Kremlin push to increase Moscow's influence in Latin America. In an annual televised
question-and-answer session with Russians, Putin said Russia has "very warm traditional ties" with Cuba and Venezuela. They were prominent
stops on a Latin America tour that his protege, President Dmitry Medvedev, ended late last month by meeting with Soviet-era ally Fidel Castro.
"Today there is no need to build permanent bases" in Cuba and Venezuela, Putin said in response to a question. He said Russia has an
agreement allowing its warships to use Venezuelan ports for refueling and resupply, "and I think the Cuban leadership
would not refuse this." The Russian nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great and destroyer Admiral Chabanenko conducted joint
exercises with Venezuelan forces in the Caribbean Sea on Monday, an activity unprecedented since the Cold War. The warships sailed across the
Atlantic at the invitation of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who campaigns against U.S. influence in the hemisphere, adding to his growing
military ties with the Kremlin. On Friday, one of the vessels is to be the first Russian warship since World War II to sail
through the Panama Canal -- long a symbol of U.S. regional clout. As the Kremlin signals hope for improved U.S. ties under the
administration of President-elect Barack Obama, the remarks may have been aimed at assuring Washington that Russia's recent flurry of
activity in Latin America is not part of a Cold War-style power struggle with the United States. At the same time, Putin
suggested Russia's military and political ties are growing, regionally and globally. "We have quite a lot of opportunities, and not only with the
countries that you mentioned, but also at the ports of other states," he said. "I want to tell you a 'terrible military secret,'" Putin said. "When we
announced that our military ships would go to Venezuela for joint exercises, we received very many inquiries -- frankly speaking, I didn't expect
this -- from many countries with requests that our ships visit their ports."

New cold war not coming war would be Russian economic suicide
Wagstyl 8 Stefan, Current Bureau Chief of Berlins Financial Times and has been covering emerging eastern markets for 20
years, March 1 2008, Return of the Cold Warriors, FT.com, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/fd9d7e48-e372-11dc-87990000779fd2ac.html#axzz2adCtei90
Lucas admits there

is little chance of another armed confrontation with the west. The US alone runs a defense budget
25 times bigger than Russias. While Russia possesses some smart new high-tech weapons, its factories can no longer
produce them on any scale. But Lucas says this isnt important when the west is so eager for Russian oil and gas, and Russian money.
During the Cold War, western politicians and officials who took money from the Kremlin risked professional disgrace and even prosecution.
Now business is business. The long-run consequences of this are problematic, he says: If you believe that capitalism is a system in which
money matters more than freedom you are doomed when people who dont believe in freedom attack using money. Lucas does well to make
clear the Kremlins dark and dangerous side. But in his rush to recruit soldiers for the new cold war, he overstates his case. For example, it
doesnt seem realistic to say: If the Kremlin cracks Estonia the chances for the rest of eastern Europe look bleak. What about Poland, with a
population 20 times larger than Estonias and a long history of resisting its powerful neighbors? If there is a new cold war, it is by no
means clear that the west is losing. Even since Putin took power in 2000, the west has, in geopolitical terms, made great
gains in the former Soviet empire through the eastward enlargement of Nato and the EU. Ukraine and Georgias democratic
revolts have yet to run their course, but both have resulted in defeats for the Kremlin. Both states have this year applied for Nato membership
action plans. The Kremlins gains over these years are significant they include provoking political tensions in the Baltic states, securing
Germanys backing for a gas pipeline under the Baltic and winning support in the Balkans for a southern gas route. But the Kremlins victories
pale in comparison with those of the west. Also, as the Kremlin is fighting largely on the economic battlefield, there will be
economic limits to its advances. If Gazprom, for example, tries to exploit its dominance by raising prices too much, consumers will
go elsewhere. Meanwhile, even the Kremlins hawks have links with Russian companies that profit from co-operation

with the west. They wont want to impoverish the west to the point that itll become uncomfortable for the business
oligarchs to spend time in London or the south of France. Finally, there is little discussion of Russias inherent economic
weakness. While Lucas acknowledges that Putins regime is based on high energy prices, he barely considers how vulnerable Russia is
to future price swings. If boom becomes a bust, the cash could run out for financing the Kremlins ambitious policies.
Russia, in other words, is weaker than it appears. These arguments are well made by Yegor Gaidar, the architect of Russias economic
reforms in the early 1990s under the late president Boris Yeltsin. Collapse of an Empire is a warning to todays Russian leaders to
avoid the disastrous mistakes of their Soviet predecessors. Gaidar, who had a ringside seat at the Soviet Unions collapse, argues
that the root cause of its end was the Soviet economys failure to feed its people. Under Stalin, the peasants were forced at
gunpoint to deliver food to the growing industrial cities. After his death, the Kremlin struggled to satisfy the urban populations growing needs
and imported ever more foodstuffs. By the 1980s, a country which had before the first world war supplied 45 per cent of the worlds grain

exports, had become the globes biggest importer. Gaidar vividly describes how Mikhail Gorbachev grappled with a crisis that eventually
overwhelmed him, trying to buy time by obtaining western loans in return for allowing Soviet satellite states to go free. But it was not enough.
With foreign debt exceeding $120bn, Gorbachev was reduced to sending begging letters, including one to John Major, British prime minister and
then co-ordinator of the Group of Seven rich countries. It read: Dear John! Help! Gaidar dismisses the arguments that either the oil price
collapse of the late 1980s or Ronald Reagans decision to accelerate the arms race brought down the Soviet Union. Pope John Paul II, who many
observers credit with stirring up Polish resistance to communism, is not mentioned. Instead, in Gaidars view, it was Stalins errors that destroyed
the Soviet Union the empire-builder himself was responsible.

US-Russia relations good - Putin empirically favors US cooperation

Mankoff 11 Jeffrey, specialist in Eurasian/Russian affairs and is Associate Director of International Security Studies at Yale
University and adjunct fellow for Russia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, October 16 2011, Russian foreign policy:
The return of Great Power Politics, pg. 87

Relations with the United States will, as always, also remain a prime subject for debate. For all his talk of Russia
becoming a Great Power and looking out for its own interests internationally, Putin on the whole pursued
cooperation with the U.S. to a significant degree. Whether offering a strategic partnership and the right to base
troops in the CIS following September 11 or calmly swallowing American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the
Putin administration was about as pro-American as a Russian government could have afforded to be, given the
political configuration then prevailing in Moscow. When Moscow started to believe that the U.S. was taking
advantage of this accommodating attitude to strengthen its own position relative to Russia, it began pushing back,
culminating in it invasion of U.S. ally Georgia in August 2008. As U.S. Russian relations improved in the context
of the Obama-Medvedev reset, which provided Russia the recognition and seat at the table for which it had long
clamored, cooperation between the two countries rapidly expanded into new areas, including sensitive ones such as
missile defense and security assistance in Central Asia.
No US-Russian war:
Perry, et al 2009 (William J. (former United States Secretary of Defense, Americas Strategic Posture The Final Report of the Congressional
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, http://media.usip.org/reports/strat_posture_report.pdf)
It is important, moreover, to bear in mind that despite our many disappointments, Russia has not

returned to the role of

the Soviet Union as a global challenger to the United States. It is not amassing military forces along its borders in
readiness for an invasion of Europe. Although Russia is strengthening its nuclear forces, it does not appear to be
seeking overall nuclear supremacy. Indeed, its focus is largely on its domestic economic transformation and its nearabroad, where there are many challenges but also some opportunities for cooperation with the West. The risk of direct military
confrontation between the United States and Russia is much lower than during the Cold War.