• Phillipine War

• Benevolent Assimilation, Military government

• Emilio Aguinaldo and Philippine Republic
• Conventional War, February-December 1899
◦ Battle of Manila, February
◦ Operations in Central Luzon
• Guerrilla War, January 1900-July 1902
◦ Regional guerrilla war
◦ US counterinsurgency
▪ Military government, repression, Filipino allies, civil government
Iraq parallels
• secondary theaters to larger global war
• seen as low cost mil ventures to achieve great geopolitical goals (pacific, remaking mid east)
• enemy armies rapidly defeated
• guerrilla resistance takes longer to suppress, more casualties, higher cost
• resistance decentralized, varies from area to area:L tribes, religious sects, ex-army, bandits
• what applies here might not apply to 40 blocks away
• US mil adapts w/ decentralized COIN policies
• use of indigenous troops, collaborators
• combinding repression and reform
• senior leadership slower to adapt to insurgency
• accusation of US atrocities, torture, executions

situation, december 1898

• US Army VII corps occupies Manila
• 17K soldiers in US force
• most of troops are citizen-soldier vols who had enlisted to fight the spanish in cuba...not to fight in
philippines
• great concern about troops' health, morals
• army of republic of philippines est 40K … entrenched around manila
• some vets of spanish forces, wall armed
• trying to increase political stability
• most of troops are levies, draftees
• philippine rebels atempting to hold constitutional convention that will select a national government, but
little participation outside the Central Luzon

WM McKinley and Benevolent Assimilation policy 21 dec 1898

• US Mil commander MUST
• restore government, trade, transportation, etc
• proclaim US good intentions “we come not as invaders...but as friends”
• protect those filipinos who cooperate
• army's primary mission is to win confidence respect and affection of the inhabitants
• as opposed to invade and occupy
• thats a mission statement right there folks

Elwell S. Otis: the Soldier-governor

• Civil and military functions integrated throughout army
• clean up manila as showcase of US rule
• sanitation, schools, trade
• integrates every part of the military
• establish responsible government to provide order
• otis writes civil law code
• harvard trained lawyer, expert on administration
• had political skills

Emilio Aguinaldo and Philippine Republic

• Aguinaldo is coalition leader with power base in South Luzon. Supporters are local elites, warlords,
tagalong inhabitants near manila
• kind of a “power broker” so to speak
• Limited ability to exert any influence outside of Central-South Luzon, largely ignored on other islands
• Aguinaldo is poor general and divisive political leader, unable to control factions or personal rivalries

Battle of Manila, 4-23 Feb 1899

• Skirmish between patrols sparks battle
• US offensives quickly secure manila and surrounding area, serves as main base for US for rest of war
• divides Aguinaldo's army
• manila insurrection suppressed, city remains quiet for rest of war
• Aguinaldo's forces lose heavily in troops, weapons

US strat in 1899
• benevolent assimilation: defuse filipino hostility to US occupation
• Naval blockade: isolate insurgents from foreign help, preven them from moving troops , money both
between islands and along coast
• conventional ops: smash aguinaldo's army in central Luzon
• try to prevent the rest of the islands from combining

Situation in Jan 1900

• No nationalist armies
• small dets of local guerrillas
• aguinaldo in hiding
• perception in manila and washington that war is over
• army mission to prepare for hand off to civilian colonial government

regional guerrilla warfare

• decentralized: “political-mil jefe” and local forces operating in “home” area
• speak language, family connections, know terrain
• tactics – ambush, attack weakness, harass troops, avoid battle
• usu either sniping or H2H combat
• local infrastructures or “shadow governments”
• fighting essentially for local support
• americans might see this as treason but locals as getting by
• seek to influence US public – 1900 elections
• convince the Amer public that the war is unwinnable
• prevent collaboration – terrorism, patriotism

guerilla weaknesses
• dependent on local connections
• you would know who's not supposed to be there...the insurgents are you neighbors
• rarely cooperate with other guerrilla bands, often rivalry between leaders
• poor weapons, untrained troops
• no sanctuaries or secure areas
• no capacity for large-scale ops
• one informant can compromise entire organization
• taxation, recruitment, violence alienate the pop and local elites

counterinsurgency: civil-mil
• schools, roads, econ reforms, medical funded by US\
• schools kind of a form of social control
• civil government, police provide stability
• protection against bandits
Counterinsurgency: repression
• punitive raids> burning crops and houses, imprisonment
• enforced local cooperation – requiring police and political leadership
• encouraging inter-tribal and inter-toewn rivalry
• harder policy – december 1900 directed against filipinos who aided cuerrillas

indigenous il forces* macabebe scouts

• macabebe scount
• 1K of filipinos served as scouts, aux, militia, self defense forces and other prelim forces.

US counterinsurgency: the navy

• blockade with gunboats
• stop weps, supplies, and troops rom outside PI between islands and along coatst
• prevent all costal trade excetpt from cities under US control
• stop piracct and raids

counterinsurgency: PI government and Civil government

• commission takes over from mil government july 1901
• fed party
• provincial and town electrions – in some areas former insurgents elected
• PI constabulaty assume law enforcement
• dems benefits of peace at same time escalation of repression by Army shows cost of continued
resistance

summary:
• most suffessufnl US counterinsurgency campaing
• anti-imperialsit mvy portrayed as brutal war of conquest this is the US history “txtbook” version
• US army paid no attention to lessons of PI was until 03, when it found itself once again an occupying mil
force trying